PERSONALISM

AND THE

PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

AN APPRECIATION OF THE WORK OF

BORDEN PARKER BOWNE

BY

RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER
BY RUDOLF EUCKEN



THE METHODIST BOOK CONCERN
NEW YORK CINCINNATI

B945
.B74F6

Copyright, 1915, by
RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING

$1.00

©CLA411482

SEP 14 1915

No 1

TO B. P. B.

WHOSE WORDS OF TRUTH WERE
A BEACON LIGHT TO MANY SOULS,

AND

TO HIS PUPILS

WHOSE LOVE ABIDES THROUGH
TIME AND CHANGE

CONTENTS

PAGE

FOREWORD 11

INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER I

THE WORK OF BORDEN PARKER BOWNE. BY RUDOLF EUCKEN 17

CHAPTER II

THE CHANGING MOOD OF THE AGE 32

Dominance of the practical in modern life—The struggle for unity—The present crisis—The new task of philosophy.

SECTION I

NATURALISM

CHAPTER III

THE MODERN SPELL OF A GREEK PHANTOM ... 49

The ancient dream of material unity—The phantom of form and space—Perpetuation of the doctrine through Epicurean and Stoic—Revival and development of the doctrine in modern science—The difficulty of naturalistic explanation.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER IV

PAGE

THE EVADED PROBLEMS OF SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY 59

The much-known Unknowable—The little-known reality—The theory of evolution—The definition of life and mind.

CHAPTER V

BOWNE AS AN ANTAGONIST OF NATURALISM 73

All philosophical values hinge on the definition of reality—Is God immanent Mover or prime Mover?—The personality of the World-Ground—Is Freedom possible in the natural world?

SECTION II

IDEALISM

CHAPTER VI

THE KANTIAN STARTING-POINT 87

Has the mind a task in experience?—Where can we find a permanent world?—What lies behind the appearance of things?—Can we "prove" the world of spirit?

CHAPTER VII

THE ABSOLUTE PHILOSOPHY, LOTZE AND BOWNE 98

Is the world more than knowledge?—Of what does reality consist?—Bowne's debt to Lotze—Bowne's advance on Lotze's system.

CONTENTS

SECTION III
PRAGMATISM

Chapter VIII

PAGE

The Unmetaphysical Pragmatism of William James 113

The pragmatic element in the history of philosophy—Can the pragmatic test of truth be maintained?—Are space and time the abiding realities?—Pluralism a confession of failure to unite subject and object—Can pragmatic pluralism reach freedom or solve the problem of evil?

Chapter IX

Bowne's Pragmatism, "A Step in the Development of Philosophy" 130

A pragmatic definition of Being—The escape from pluralism and absolutism to world-unity—The ideal nature of time and space—The pragmatic test for religious values.

SECTION IV
BOWNE AND SOME PRESENT-DAY THINKERS

Chapter X

Bergson, The Abstractions of an Impersonal Philosophy 145

Can knowledge and life be brought together on the empirical basis?—Time as duration

PAGE

—The "vital impulse" assumed for the sake of freedom—A harmony due to identity of impulsion—His doctrine of knowledge.

CHAPTER XI

EUCKEN—THE RETURN TO SPIRITUAL VERITY.. 169

Reality must include more than things, and more than ideas—Truth must have a common validity—Eucken's personal idealism, the realization of the life of the spirit—The absence of the Christological interest.

CHAPTER XII

BOWNE'S PERSONALISM AND THE PROBLEMS OF LIFE..... 183

Unity possible only through personalism—Personalism and freedom—Personalism and the problem of evil.

BIBLIOGRAPHY..... 197

INDEX..... 201

FOREWORD

The essential problems of philosophy are few. Out of three or four fundamental presuppositions flow whole systems of thought. Unless the fountain itself is clear the outflowing streams cannot be kept so. The nature of reality, or being, is the fundamental principle by which all systems are to be judged. Given the basic attitude toward this problem, it is easy to see what the logical goal will be. Next to the question of reality are those of space and time, and the relation of life to knowledge. These are the main questions about which all others hinge. For this reason these terms will appear frequently in the following pages, as we attempt to trace the leading philosophical ideas down to modern times, and to discover their relation to the thought of Bowne.

He would have been the last to claim

finality for his system. He assumed only to clear away a foundation for accurate thinking, to expose the common sophistries of thought, and to give a basis on which to build. In these positions he felt fundamentally secure, being not satisfied to speak "after the manner of the scribes." We believe the future will amply justify his confidence.

This work was undertaken reluctantly in the sense that the writer knew there were many others who might have performed the task more worthily; with alacrity, in the consciousness that there was need to point out the place which Bowne's system occupies in the history of philosophy, and that more than five years have passed without this being done. This feeling was intensified by the expressed desire of Professor Eucken that such a work be undertaken.

The author does not aim at an exhaustive discussion, but, rather, at a brief and suggestive treatment that shall define for the popular mind the relation of Bowne's thought to other philosophical endeavors. To forestall disappointment it should be

said there is need for a more detailed and technical work than is possible within the limits of so small a volume. To make a book that shall be brief and yet clear to the nonprofessional mind, that shall drop technical terms whenever possible and yet satisfy the exacting student, is exceedingly difficult. The writer makes no pretense of being sufficient for so great a task. If, however, this effort shall succeed in expressing the deep love and respect felt by one whose intellectual horizons were enlarged by the touch of a master in the realm of thought, and shall lead to a renewed study of that master's work, its purpose will have been achieved.

Acknowledgments are due to Zion's Herald for the use of materials first printed therein; to Dr. Marshall Livingstone Perrin, who transcribed and translated Professor Eucken's chapter, which was one of the American addresses; to Dr. Albert C. Knudson for valuable criticism; and to Professor Eucken himself, for his generous interest and encouragement.

INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER I

THE WORK OF BORDEN PARKER BOWNE

BY RUDOLF EUCKEN

I NEVER had the pleasure of a personal acquaintance with Dr. Bowne, and felt the touch of his personality only through our correspondence, which was, indeed, most hearty and intimate. I felt that our relation to each other was close and most friendly. He intended to visit Jena on his way to Constantinople, whither he expected to take a trip in a few months; but within a week after receiving the letter containing the news of his promised visit I received the announcement of his untimely death. It is a sad pleasure to me, and yet a satisfaction, to be able to give this evidence of my personal admiration for Dr. Bowne, and for his personality as shown in his writings.

The first general impression which one receives in taking up his books is a favorable

one, on account of the concise and definite form in which they are written, so clear in concept and straightforward in expression, not at all confused or indistinct. They are pervaded by an energy and manliness which show no fear, either of criticism on the part of the half-enlightened, or of the dictum of those assuming to be in authority. On the contrary, his words are sympathetic and almost tender in his desire to recognize what is good in the writings of others, with an unsparing denial of what he considers might do harm. His works show a personal warmth which gives the reader almost the impression of "confessions" on the part of a living and strong personality. This feature is especially to be valued, inasmuch as he himself placed a very high estimate upon personality. He says to the reader, "Above all things be personal in the expression of truth as you see it."

Secondly, we find in his writings his own inmost convictions expressed clearly, and the openness of his "confessions" is a marked and fascinating element in them. In reading some philosophers we feel in

them what I might call personal untruth, as in Schopenhauer, who preaches a Hindu's self-abnegation and indifference, while we find him personally the genuine epicure. The question arises at once, What have his great ideas made out of a man, if in his own life we find him to be small? On the other hand, I find in Spinoza the expression of his own inner convictions, and I must have respect for him even though I do not agree with his conclusions. In reading Bowne one respects and agrees, for there is no word uttered behind which one does not feel the man.

Let us turn now to the content of his works, the central thought. Bowne has often been placed by the side of Lotze, the famous Göttingen professor with whom he studied. There are many points of similarity as well as many differences.

First, Lotze was a logician, a dialectician; he struggled to overcome the material or else to reconcile it. Lotze's religion we feel rather to be on the fringe of life, and it is a question whether it ever affects the central thought. For this reason it does not exert

any strong influence upon his philosophy. Bowne, on the contrary, puts religion at the very center, and regards it as the crown of being, maintaining that metaphysics and logic are enlightened by the fundamental question of religion, and are to be understood only in connection with it. While Bowne makes a definite distinction between religion and ethics, he makes it clear that they are inseparable, and that the one gains worth in the light of the other. The relation between them is that of the deep and underlying to its manifestation. The two should not be studied apart. And, moreover, the keynote of both lies in personality, which gives value to religion as well as to ethics. Studying them further, he maintains that religion includes ethics. This view he bases upon the close connection of religion with every kind of moral progress and advancement.

Religion cannot be proved or explained in ordinary words; neither can anything that lies deep in our nature. Aristotle asserts that the knowledge of anything must be derived from something higher than it-

self. Religion, therefore, would have to be proved through something of a still higher nature, and as we have access to nothing higher, it must remain unproved. Consequently, we must not try to prove it but to illustrate it; and this we may do by showing that every phenomenon depends closely upon it, and also, that an intelligent being is the established basis of every reality. Hence religion lies at the basis of our life if it is real; and if this be denied, there is nothing to fall back upon. Bowne maintains that any other attempt to explain life is due to bad thinking. The practical application of any tenet is so important in Bowne's philosophy that he takes this truth almost for granted, for by it our very life becomes exalted and valuable. The proof of religion, then, so far as it can be proved, is the creation of a new life and a new world in a man.

Secondly, the content of the world points to a unity in the universe. We must learn to see more unity in the world's phenomena, or, rather, behind them. The reign of law in all existence shows that

there is interaction among all the elements of nature. What would happen if the world were made up of separate, independent particles? There would be no mutual interaction. As it is, we know that what happens in A produces a result in B, so that every phenomenon depends strictly upon a cause, and proceeds from something else. If all things were independent of one another, nothing could result. Again, this unity must rest in mind or spirit, for it is not to be found in the visible; it is to be sought in the invisible. And, once again, no spiritual mind can exist without personality, for otherwise it would be shadowy and vague and have no independent existence of its own. Such a mind must be an active, self-existent principle, and such a principle must exist; so far Lotze and Bowne advance together. Bowne further adds that this activity in nature must proceed from a God, who shall be considered the active, underlying principle. As Goethe says in Faust, "Nature is the garment of God."

There are two ways of viewing phe-

nomena: first, as mere appearance; and, secondly, with some Being behind them as a personal Mind. Now every language has expressions for the visible, but only metaphors for the spiritual and invisible. Love is inexpressible, and cannot be defined; no more can personality. The manifestation can be described, but this has nothing to depend upon without a deeper basis for its very existence. Bowne maintained, in the face of fierce criticism, that we must be able to force our way to the certainty of some such basis. It is wrong, as well as foolish, to say that we must be content with the visible and be satisfied with leaving the invisible as something incomprehensible; and it is erroneous to say that we can appreciate only the visible. If we study the life of Luther, shall we regard him merely as a phenomenon, and say he had no real existence? No, indeed. Luther was the true man behind it all, and his acts were the expression of this hidden existence. We must believe in a creative power behind all phenomena or we are not true even to our own subjective lives.

I should like to recommend to your younger men a good subject for a dissertation, and it would be, "Bowne's Philosophy in Relation to that of Kant," together with the objections which Bowne would raise against the latter. Hegel, too, makes a great deal of "thought processes." To all this Bowne replies: "All right, if a personal existence is recognized as a basis for them; otherwise, there is no reality to these processes." Bowne is a sharp critic, not unkind, not fault-finding, but severely punishing those writers who assume to be contented with the natural, the visible, or with the impersonal spirit. He demands personal spiritual life, and consequently a living personal God, out of whom proceeds all power, and who is the active principle from whom all phenomena set forth. Another thesis that I would suggest to young men is, "Bowne as an Opponent of the Materialists," for, indeed, he was the chief opponent of naturalism. Naturalists deny the metaphysical and take the visible as the basis of their so-called metaphysics. This is illogical, as it turns effect into cause. So

Bowne criticizes evolutionists for commonly confusing the ideas of cause and effect. The visible, which is, after all, only the effect, is assumed to proceed and develop of itself. Bowne goes farther. He not only makes these truths which he asserts the basis of all real theism; he has developed a metaphysics of theism. He does not simply posit certain truths of theism, but treats all these from a metaphysical standpoint, and this is of great value to-day in the field of philosophy.

If we consider the content of religion according to Bowne and his development of it, we find three leading points which mark the chief directions of his thought: First, religion consists in life, and not in teaching or doctrine; second, the kernel of religion is ethical, and religion is the lodestar of ethics, with which it is inseparably connected; third, religion is common to all humanity. I might add as a possible definition of Bowne's standpoint that religion is the spiritual experience of humanity and is manifested in the individual.

Concerning the first point, he maintains

that religion means life, and relates to life as a whole, as well as to the whole life. In Germany certain phases of this thought have been emphasized separately, but never grasped comprehensively. With Kant religion is a moral matter, and manifested in the individual as will. For Schleiermacher it was a matter of feeling, and showed itself in the emotions; while Hegel maintained that it was a form of intelligence. These elements, which have been separated in Germany, are for Bowne only different features of one thought. He would have religion embrace all forms of life together, and he maintains that it should influence and ennoble every act and thought. Hence it is impossible to base religion on any fixed doctrine. The fundamental beliefs underlying religion from the start should be maintained, but we must allow the development from time to time of new theologies. While fundamental truths are eternal, man is still developing, and consequently these eternal truths must be manifested in the different stages of man's development in different ways.

These truths do not become new, but are newly presented. So we find in the education of children that the same truths appear to them in different lights as they grow up. True religion will change its theology, while the underlying ideas are not changeable. There has been too much abstract speculation apart from the concrete experiences of life, too much holding to abstract conceptions. Experience is the true teacher, and through her teaching we can grasp new thoughts and new views without endangering the eternal truths by abstract speculation. The old philosophy was established upon the universe as we understand it, and upon this doctrine was built up, and then life was explained according to that theory; whereas Bowne starts with life, out of which grows the world of experience, and upon this rests the doctrine, which must change as experience changes. Another good thesis would be "Bowne's Definition of Life."

James leads us back to the practical. So does Bowne, but with a different meaning, for with him, behind the practical stands

the metaphysical. This is a new step in the development of philosophy. This "practical" is not that which means useful, nor that which rests upon utilitarian grounds. Still another subject for a thesis would be "The Definition of the Practical as used by Aristotle and Later Philosophers, up to Bowne." This would help to define his position. I would particularly urge the study of Bowne's philosophy, as there is always danger lest tradition, which crystallizes soon after a man's death, may put his works in a wrong light.

Bowne's contention is that the spiritual basis of life is not new, but it becomes new in its forms of development. God does not develop, but it is man that changes and develops. This is shown characteristically in the development of religious ideas; for instance, since mediæval times, when the dogmas of Catholicism were universally accepted. The study of theological development as a manifestation of religion in the varied experiences of humanity cannot but bring all views and doctrines into a clear and healthy relation to one another.

Our second point refers to the relation of ethics to religion, upon which we have already touched. Bowne, differing from the men of the Illumination period, as well as from Kant, declares that religion is distinctly ethical, that ethics is the mere form of religion. Without the latter, ethics would have no life, content, or character, so that ethics depends wholly upon religion. We must not lose our bearings by a consideration of the ethical as such, but regard it as the medium through which religion shines and produces new life, and that the two exert a mutual influence. So Bowne would have us hold no harsh or crude ideas of God's relation to the world. Theologies of the past held that God created the world for his own glory. This was the severe and strict doctrine of the Jesuits, as well as of the Calvinists. Over against this Bowne would have us believe, with modern Christians, that he created the world out of the fulness of his love. All religion and worship would be a form of love, and would mean the worship of a loving Being, not of a tyrant. The Christian should be cheerful

and joyous because his religion should make him so. We should be glad that God created the world and us, and that he will save us.

The third point is one that needs emphasizing, particularly among Protestants, who are apt to view religion too subjectively. Bowne urges that there are many ways of arriving at religion. There are some that have the experience of perceiving God's love all at once, whereupon a sudden change comes over the man's whole nature. Such persons are those whose temperament is susceptible to contrasts; but this is only one form of the manifestation of God, and quite dependent upon the individual. There are, on the other hand, many in whom this change takes place more quietly. We must only be sure of a complete turning about, and not judge of the manner, but of the results. Religion leads to lives, not to theologies, for it is based upon the fundamental principles of life, and not upon temperament or environment. In these ideas of Bowne we find a reconciliation of opposing views, of earnest seriousness and

happy enjoyment, of problems and conflicts, combined with hope and joyous courage. We must sympathize with the many forms of life and experience, with the serious and the merry; and our children should learn that they may combine the liberty of freedom and the soberness of earnest effort, both in their mental and in their spiritual development.

Dr. Bowne was a philosopher of America, and as such all America may be proud of him and of his memory. His strong personality showed itself in such vigorous effort; his humor was so happy and flashed forth so frequently in the midst of the most serious work, that moroseness and melancholy were impossible to him. He remained fresh and youthful in spirit to the end. Even in his last letter to me he seemed to be more than ever pervaded with a spirit of youth and joyous living. It is given us to say, as did Goethe of his friend Schiller, "He belonged to us."

CHAPTER II

THE CHANGING MOOD OF THE AGE

Dominance of the Practical in Modern Life

In a passage of the "Stones of Venice" Ruskin speaks of the high architectural beauty of the cathedral of Torcello, built by the Venetians as they took refuge from their pursuers, on the half submerged sand dunes of the Adriatic. He says, "The actual condition of the exiles who built the cathedral of Torcello is exactly typical of the spiritual condition which every Christian ought to recognize in himself, a state of homelessness on earth, except so far as he can make the Most High his habitation."[1]

A more recent writer, speaking of the present age, has said: "When man was doubtful if he would see to-morrow's sun-

[1] Stones of Venice, vol. ii. p. 13.

rise, he built as if not dreaming of a perishable home. To-day, when he cannot believe that death will touch him, and his orderly life stretches forward as an endless end of the world, he will leave for the amazement of future ages the Crystal Palace and the City Temple and the Peabody Building."[2]

These descriptions present by vivid contrast the material basis of the changing mood of the age. Whatever men build, whether it be of brick and stone, institutions of government and civilization, or systems of thought and education, the sense of dependence upon the Eternal, the attitude toward the things not seen, will inevitably write itself into all their work.

The outward and material circumstances of man's position on the earth will reflect themselves in his philosophy and dictate the mood of his thought. The age of grinding poverty, of elemental struggle toward freedom and knowledge, is always an age of faith and optimism. The age of material fullness, when man seems to have almost within his grasp the secrets of the universe,

[2] Masterman, In Peril of Change, p. 170.

the ultimate triumph over poverty, ignorance, and the brute forces of nature, is the age when pessimism and despair range deepest. The human spirit is so constituted that when man must take up an heroic struggle, in which life and the most precious interests are daily put in jeopardy, his dreams and faiths exalt him to the skies. When these material things and the external forms for which he fought seem forever assured, he is plunged into doubt and morbid self-examination by his unsatisfied soul.

To understand the philosophical mood of our own age it is necessary to keep in mind the dominating elements in our material progress. The prevalence of scientific investigation and the growth of the scientific spirit have given us a hitherto unknown environment for our thought. With the mastery of physical forces the old horror of nature has passed. With it has gone a great deal that was merely tradition, prejudice, and superstition. Beyond the borders of childhood we live in no magic world. Laws of nature are to us as an open book

and in many minds the only book possessing any authority. Even the common man feels that he has deciphered, or will have deciphered for him in the near future, the last of nature's secrets. There is to be nothing left at which to wonder. We are amazed no longer at the vastness of the universe, at its marvelously interlocking processes, or at its hints of Final Purpose; but, rather, at ourselves that we know so much. In the spirit of Goldsmith's lines, we can say of man that

> Still the wonder grows
> That one small head can carry all he knows.

The most startling discoveries in nature provoke but a momentary enthusiasm. We are masters of nature.

With the passing of the old feeling toward nature has come a new acquaintance among the peoples of the earth. Nothing is perhaps more startling than the adoption by pagan and strange bloods of modern inventions, the latest philosophies and schemes of education. That which has been the product of generations of struggle is sud-

denly appropriated by men of other races and civilizations. We are chagrined at the ease and adaptability at our own game of genius and invention of these strange and long-despised peoples. Whether we wish it or not, they represent mighty forces to be reckoned with. The overcoming of space and time sets them in our own dooryard. Tokyo, Peking, and Calcutta are nearer than London, Paris, and New York were yesterday. We are reminded of their thought in every review, of their deeds in the morning paper, and we eat of their products at every breakfast table. A new world of human relationships has dawned upon us, in which we are burdened with a responsibility which we cannot escape.

The resources of science have been put at the service of the industrial world. The discoveries of the past generation have revolutionized the world of commerce and labor. The comforts and luxuries of life have vastly increased. Great fortunes have resulted, and with them an overwhelming eagerness to discover the sesame of wealth. The contribution of science to this new

world of material things has elevated scientific dogma into unquestioned power. The gravest criticism and deepest slur, that according to the average man can be cast, is the criticism and the slur of being unscientific. Little room is left for the æsthetic, the idealistic, or the spiritual. To such an age it has seemed, speaking in the words of Noyes's "Resurrection," that

> Love was too small, too human to be found
> In that transcendent source whence love was born;
> We talked of "forces": heaven was crowned
> With philosophic thorn.

The demands made upon all departments of life have thus become intensely practical and utilitarian. What does it accomplish? How great are the returns? These are the questions that are constantly asked, not only in the world of economics, but also in the worlds of philosophy and religion. The demand of pragmatism is the demand of the modern spirit elevated into a test for truth. And this demand is not without its basis of sanity and justice. Men are

wearied of theories and systems which appear divorced from every practical interest. But too often the pragmatic question is made so individualistic and so fragmentary that truth becomes a mere utility for the moment and occasion only.

To all of this is added the feeling that in our fullness and material prosperity we have no need to be comforted either by philosophy or religion. The former contents itself too largely with the explanation of the material, and the latter approaches an unredeemed world with a timidity that leaves no place for authoritative appeal. The indecision and blindness of a great multitude is voiced in Swinburne's "Watch in the Night":

> I halt and hearken behind
> If haply the hours will go back
> And return to the dear dead light,
> To the watch fires and stars that of old
> Shone where the sky now is black.

The Struggle for Unity

The main streams of philosophic thought, materialism, and idealism have run their

course, and neither has been able to bring philosophic peace, except in the minds of their most extreme partisans. To the former has been given the popular role by reason of her close allegiance with practical science, and the inability of the average man to sense the problems that hedge her way. To common sense, all the ways of materialism are pleasantness, and all her paths are peace. The world is just what it appears to be. Material atoms are conjured up to impinge upon nerves; and mind, thought, and purpose are the easy result of mechanical forces. Memory follows the grooves plowed in the brain by yesterday's experience, while other memories await the expectant call, filed carefully away, according to the best modern business methods, in their appropriate pigeonholes. When all is so easily imagined, he would seem to be only a fool who would question. In this system nothing is denied the imagination and only the facts are wanting. On such a theory everything becomes as sun-clear, from the first accidental jiggling of atoms to the philosopher at the other end

of the line, as the continuous juvenile tragedy of The House that Jack Built. Unfortunately for the comfort of materialism, the barrenness of the supposed solution is coming to the attention of her own disciples, and we have the old garment patched with the new cloth of pragmatism and Creative Evolutions. These reach the solemn decision that "universe" is a term of delusion and must yield to pluralism or at least to dualism.

Nor has professional idealism been more fortunate in the endeavor to unite the sundered sides of consciousness. The world of materialism has been one in which matter was all and spirit nothing, but the world of idealism has been one in which the reality of matter has been altogether denied. She has been no more able to command men with authority than has her opponent. The material world bulks so large in the common experience that it is ever difficult to convince men that

> The solid earth, the round sun,
> And all the visible world of sight and sound,
> Are but the phantasmagoria of a dream.

Thus the ancient battle between materialism and idealism has raged since the days of the Greek philosophers, and not until our own generation have the conflicting arguments been sufficiently sifted and analyzed to show that neither bald materialism nor absolute idealism can present a possible solution to the enigma of the universe.

The Present Crisis

We have to-day the natural successors of idealism, who cling to the thought of unity, thrust out by time and criticism from the ancient peace of an absolutism whose only ultimate reality is the divine Spirit, hard pressed to answer the problem of evil. If all we see is the manifestation of the Divine, whence comes evil in the world? This is the insistent question cast at the spokesmen of idealism. Thinking men are impatient of any denial of the reality of pain, evil, or sorrow, in an effort to save the character of God. The sense of suffering and injustice is more acute than ever in the history of the world. A God that will

cause suffering, pain, and evil they will repudiate. Even that human being seems a monster who will not do his best to alleviate misery of every sort. How much more will they despise a Supreme Being so obtuse to moral responsibility as to create men for pain! The supreme question of the age for idealism as well as for Theism is how to maintain a Moral Causal Intelligence in the face of existent evil and suffering.

It might be thought that, in view of these conditions, the way of the materialists would be easy. A cursory examination will show, however, that it is no longer possible for materialism to imagine that she speaks in terms of universe. Even the most obtuse materialist is to-day forced to admit a power and a reality, which, whether he knows or not, is not provided for in his system. He has before him the expedient of a dualism somewhat after the fashion of Mr. Bergson's, or he may resort with Mr. James to a pluralistic world. But such a universe falls more and more, the farther we search, into a disjointed and ever-dissolving

individualism in which all realities disappear at the touch like Apples of Sodom. The lack of order and purpose is mistaken for freedom, and much dilated upon. The tumbrils daily cart the Theists to the slaughter in the interests of the new-found emancipation, and there is not missing the grim joy of the populace at the effectiveness of the guillotine of freedom. Still there is ever present at the feast of joy a lurking Banquo's ghost of Purposive Intelligence that refuses to keep decently buried; the Great Perhaps, for which the heart of man cries out like a lonely child in the night.

> Just when we're safest there's a sunset touch,
> A fancy from a flower-bell, some one's death,
> A chorus-ending from Euripides—
> And that's enough for fifty hopes and fears
> As old and new at once as nature's self
> To rap and knock and enter in our soul.

The New Task of Philosophy

The new task of philosophy is the reconciliation of these contrasting views. Much critical work has already been done which makes repetition unnecessary. There is a

generally clear recognition of the real issues at stake. The individual mood toward one or the other side will greatly influence the result in any particular case, but yet there is reason to hope that we can come to an understanding of the issues involved, if we cannot unite in a common explanation. It is true that the old, old questions of the nature of reality, of Creative Purpose and evil, of unity or diversity, of freedom or necessity, will remain; but in the coming age we shall approach them from a new angle and see them in a new light. While we cannot expect to settle them, we may hope to work toward a solution. We may find a standpoint from which life may go on without despair or the eclipse of faith in the things of the spirit.

In the realization of this new task of philosophy we believe that the future will have to reckon with the work of one of our foremost philosophers whom Rudolf Eucken is pleased to call a "world philosopher." His purpose was to show how the contrasting and apparently irreconcilable questions might find solution and common ground in

the recognition of personality. Eucken declares that "we need something eternal to bind the different ages together, but this eternal has grown dim amid our doubts and struggles."[3] This is true for history and for individual thought as well. This need Bowne would meet with his doctrine of personalism. To show the implications of this theory with relation to the different phases of thought is the purpose of this volume.

Because we believe that the case for faith has not been closed, nor its last word spoken, we come to the task in the mood of Swinburne's lines:

> The tides and the hours run out,
> And the seasons of death and of doubt,
> The night watches bitter and sore.

Even the clamors and confusions of warring peoples will confirm the prophecy of our Lord, and be but the birth-pangs of a better world. The night ebbs away and across the hills lies the dawn.

[3] Christianity and the New Idealism, p. 38.

SECTION I
NATURALISM

CHAPTER III

THE MODERN SPELL OF A GREEK PHANTOM

The Ancient Dream of Material Unity

Whatever it may imply, the human mind has ever shown a remarkable thirst to achieve unity. The apparent relationships in a world of great diversity make possible the belief that all things proceed from the same source. The world of things is assumed to be a universe and the mind of man has never been able permanently to rest in any other assumption. Unity is sought, whether in a material protoplasm from which all things have developed, or in a final ground of divine Thought or Purpose. Between the two ideas the philosophical world has been divided from early times into the opposing camps of material-

ism and idealism. The search of the early Greek school was for this primal essence of things. Certain conclusions then reached have exerted an overwhelming influence in the scientific thought of our own age. It is interesting to glance at the movement in its beginnings. The great contribution of Greek philosophy to modern science was the theory that the material world is made up of atoms. With Leucippus, the founder of the theory, the atoms were countless, infinite in variety, imperceptibly small, having only the quality of filling space. They were in motion from eternity, and so held within them all the possibilities of producing the visible world. The importance of this theory for science lay in the fact that all qualitative differences could be accounted for by varying the quantities and combination of atoms.

To the thoughtful it is at once apparent that with the materialist the atom is endowed with that magic and with those undiscoverable powers which the idealist ascribes to a World-Soul, or Divine Intelligence. In the case of the materialist the

unaccountable powers of the fabled atom are overlooked in the beginning because they seem insignificant, yet when some real explanation is needed they are marshaled in such masses as to become suddenly visible, and sufficient to account for any result. Of course what has actually taken place is a flight of the imagination. Whether it has represented truly the order of nature we are left in confused doubt if we be unimaginative souls.

Protagoras added to the atomism of Leucippus the further doctrine that perception itself rests upon the motion of atoms, and that perceiving and thinking are psychologically identical. All perceptions that come to us are true for us, just as they appear. Hence the famous maxim loved by the modern Humanist, "Man is the measure of all." Perceptions, under this scheme, are only relatively true. There can be no universal standard of truth. However, it must be noted that in this system perception is something other than the perceiving subject, and is likewise something apart from the object perceived. This

discrepancy, though apparent, remains unanswered. So soon in our search for materialistic unity have we happened on a divided world.

The Phantom of Form and Space

With Democritus, the system of materialism is at last in full flower. Observing the relativity of Protagoras' scheme of perception, Democritus transcends it to assert the possibility of knowledge of the real through thought. Both Democritus and Plato were in this sense rationalistic, but Plato's rationalism took an ethical turn. He sought the knowledge of the true Being as a means to virtue. His philosophy grew out of ethical need. With Plato perception applies only to the corporeal world and can give opinions only. Thought, on the other hand, leads us to a higher and ultimate truth and knowledge of the True Being.

Democritus kept to the way of materialism. "Pure Form," with Plato, had been a general term corresponding to logical species, but Democritus meant by this term

atom forms. To the motion of atoms he refers perception and all mental activities whatsoever. The mind, or soul, or whatever may be named as the perceiving subject, consists of atoms which differ from other atoms only in fineness, as the atoms of fire were said to be finer than those of other substances. In a perceiving being the fire atoms were assumed to exist in about the proportion of one in three. By this simple and easy speculation was laid the basis of later materialism with its knowing and purposive monads, corpuscular attractions and repulsions, atomic loves and hates, vital sparks and *elans vitaux*, which at least to the advocates of the system are sufficient to account for the world and all that dwell therein. "Thus the prejudice in favor of what may be perceived or imaged (*anschaulich*), as if spatial form and motion were something simpler, more comprehensible in themselves, and less of a problem than qualitative character and alteration, is made the principle for the theoretical explanation of the world."[1]

[1] Windelband, History of Philosophy, p. 111.

Perpetuation of the Doctrine Through Epicurean and Stoic

The theories of Democritus passed on through the Epicureans in so far as they involved atomism and mechanism. But Epicurus was weak in his conception of the necessary causation of mechanical forces. He differed from Democritus in denying altogether the existence of purpose in matter. He held that the causeless deviation of atoms was sufficient to explain the worlds. Such a statement of the doctrine would have been of little use to the scientific age that was coming, but fortunately the Stoics preserved that which the Epicureans lacked of Democritus' doctrine. Through their pantheistic conception of the Deity as the "vital principle" they arrived at belief in an absolute causal necessity. Thus they continued that which the Epicureans had lost in the shuffle—the idea of a universal reign of law.[2]

When at last the long reign of Neoplatonism and scholasticism was ended by the shock of discovery and renaissance, it was

[2] Sc. Windelband, History of Philosophy, p. 183.

the complementary ideas of mechanical causation and reign of law that proved so potent to the new generation of scientific investigators.

Revival and Development of the Doctrine in Modern Science

The tool had been preserved, and was ready when the syllogistic form of reasoning introduced by Aristotle had spent its force and had shown its inadequacy to deal singlehanded with practical problems. The world had grown tired of the weary round of dialectic. The reaction was for that reason all the more intense. But the tool was yet to be perfected.

Bruno led the way by his conception of the monad, which in truly Hylozoistic fashion he endowed with potentiality. He affirmed the homogeneity of the universe, and declared that all qualitative determinations must be traced to quantitative changes.

Bacon, casting off the rigors of scholastic method, declared that induction from particular experiences is the only true method of science.

Galileo contributed an insistence upon the application of the mathematical principle to scientific investigation, with this difference: instead of applying it to Being he applied it to Becoming, or change. Thus with his brilliant contemporaries he laid the foundations for modern astronomy.

Descartes made a contribution of greatest importance in that while he insisted on the certainty afforded by induction, he also demanded that the principle thus attained should by the method of composition afford explanation to the whole round of experience.

The Difficulty of Naturalistic Explanation

Why, then, should we remain unsatisfied with a principle which in the material world has so proved its practical worth? Why should Greek atomism, lying at the basis of the modern discovery of nature, receive the unworthy title of "phantom"? For this reason: while it has furnished an invaluable method of procedure in investigation, its leading postulates are yet unproved. Many

of them remain as much in the realm of the imagination as they did in the crude theories of the sixth century before Christ. The weakness of the supporters of naturalism has in the main been their inability to recognize the possible truth and value of the theory for physics, without reviving the ghost of ancient speculation and insisting that it has equal force for metaphysics.

Whatever the attempt of materialism to explain life and mind, whether through the Hylozoistic endowment of atoms with sense or the hiding of the fact of self-directing personality under the verbiage of "states of consciousness," it can do no more than explain half the world. For the thinking mind, burdened with the explanation of its own consciousness and volition, seeking to know its rightful place in the universe and to understand itself, the half world explained by naturalism is the half that is least important. It needs ever to be kept in mind that knowledge of the laws of change, of precedence and sequence, while giving us sure ground on which to build our human expectations, tells us nothing of the

essence of that which acts. As a method of science atomism is to be judged solely by its value as a guide upon the road, not to metaphysical explanation, but to the human mastery of physical forces. It is good so long as it proves valuable, and only to that extent.

Perhaps the most humorous thing in the history of philosophy—if humor can ever be said to invade so dreary a realm—is the attempt of naturalism to account for thought and will, decrying the vagueness and abstraction of the idealist, and at the same moment introducing into its conception of the atom the illusory, magical, and abstract powers which it condemns in the God of its opponents. One inevitably reverts to the picture of Faust traveling the Pharsalian fields in the Walpurgis Night, with Homonculus speaking to him out of a bottle. The materialist may prefer a God whose magic powers can all be confined in a test tube, but there will always remain some who cannot discover folly in believing in a God both immanent and transcendent, after the manner of Sidney Lanier, "My God is great, my God is strong."

CHAPTER IV

THE EVADED PROBLEMS OF SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY

It would seem unnecessary to take much space for examination of the now generally discredited system of Herbert Spencer. Because he was the spokesman for the naturalistic school; because he long held sway over the popular mind as the representative of scientific thinking; and because it was Bowne who early called attention to the metaphysical inconsistencies of his position, we enter here upon a brief discussion of his work.

The naturalistic school itself now sees the untenability of Spencer's favorite positions. By no one of any school has he been more sharply arraigned than by Mr. Bergson. But this arraignment comes forty years after the clean-cut criticisms of the young Bowne. Bowne's criticisms were offered at

a time when the empirical philosophy was both in physics and metaphysics in the ascendant. It was then an unpopular thing to venture criticism. Forgiveness was never accorded him in the minds of some for his sacrilegious daring in the presence of this idol of their thought. To take an attitude of criticism seemed at the time opposed to all that judgment and right sense science and reality dictated. The possession of clearer ideas by the philosophical world to-day upon the proper limits of scientific investigation is doubtless in some measure due to the pitiless criticism and constructive thought of Bowne.

The Much-Known Unknowable

One secret of Spencer's popularity lay in his apparent reconciliation of science and religion in a time of intense bitterness. He was essentially monistic, and yet, while yielding the claims of empirical science, seemed to leave place for a Divine Creative Power. It is true that he left to the religious a poor sort of God, but at the moment they were glad to be left anything.

Spencer repudiated with warmth the charge of being a materialist and strove to keep his thought free from it. Nevertheless, the logic of his doctrine of mind inevitably landed him there, though unwilling and protesting.

The loophole by which he hoped to admit the Divine Being, and so save the cause of religion, is the very one through which the Purposive Intelligence is compelled to make his escape from the system. To admit God at all was to make him so vaguely indefinite as not to be able to interfere with the natural world. Relieved of this responsibility, there was nothing left that was of any consequence to our thought of the Divine.

Spencer declared for the phenomena of experience as the only source of knowledge. When we go back of these we hit at once upon the absolute, are lost in an infinite regress, and are told that the absolute can never be a cause. Concerning this absolute we can make no affirmation, and, therefore, he applies to it the term "Unknowable." Thus he seems at first to be determined to

confine himself to the actions and interactions of the phenomenal world, and science and religion seem placed on an equal footing regarding the Unknowable. As soon, however, as religion has been consigned to the region of pure mystery we discover a strange and unaccountable activity in the Unknowable. We were told to reject religious assumptions regarding the Unknowable because they involved an infinitude of time, which was unthinkable. Once we are well freed from the religious realm, however, we are no longer to be constrained by such considerations. We begin to be able to affirm many things of the Unknowable. In the words of John Stuart Mill, which Bowne was fond of quoting, we begin to possess "a prodigious amount of knowledge concerning the Unknowable." We find that it is omnipresent in time and space; that it is related to the system of experience; "Coexistences and sequences in experience point to coexistences and sequences in the fundamental reality." We learn that the Unknowable is subject to time and change; that it is one, eternal, power, reality, the

cause of phenomena, persistent, and indestructible, "The infinite and eternal energy on which all things depend and from which all things forever proceed." Though we have not been allowed to affirm anything of the Unknowable for religious faith, yet such affirmation becomes the mainstay of the system of physics. In the religious realm we were ordered to reject all conclusions requiring an infinitude of time, but in the physical realm we are commanded to invoke such an infinitude in order to account for the system. We are to pass to this by affirming an indestructibility of matter, and an ever-persistent force, which, indeed, phenomena will not enable us to prove, but which we must imagine.

It is true that Spencer tries to save the absolute, after having banished it from his kingdom, by saying that we have an indefinite consciousness of it. Examination shows that an indefinite consciousness is worth nothing for any practical purpose, is nothing more than a form of words. We feel again as Wordsworth expressed himself:

I'd rather be
A pagan suckled in a creed outworn;
So might I, standing on this pleasant lee,
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn.

The Little-Known Reality

A similar negativing indefiniteness attends Spencer's account of reality. We have seen how unsafe and improper he considers it to affirm anything like personality or purpose of the Unknowable. Inasmuch as the fundamental reality bulks back on the Unknowable, we can affirm nothing except certain coexistences and sequences which are witnessed in phenomena. All knowledge is thus made relative to the individual who perceives in any given case. There is, indeed, no power assigned by which the individual can recognize similarity in phenomena, or reason from individual experiences to general laws. Memory is unaccounted for because no personality is provided to relate "faint states of consciousness." Dependent, as we are, upon an Unknowable of which we can affirm nothing, it is difficult to see how we can be

certain at all that there is a world of things corresponding to our perceptions.

At this point he meets, according to Bowne, with a double problem. He is forced to rescue science from the skeptical conclusions of his know-nothing argument. At the same time he is compelled to state a doctrine of phenomena and of knowledge which will provide a foundation for science and save his system from materialism and atheism. To escape agnosticism he calls back the cashiered and discredited notions of matter, force, motion, time, and space, treating them as if there had never been any doubt of their standing and making them the foundation on which to build.

The other half of the problem he meets by asserting the relative nature of reality, defining it as "persistence in consciousness." Reality is, then, the effect produced in us by the fundamental reality, or the Unknowable. In this case Bowne raises a question. Would the Unknowable be able to do anything in our absence? If so, then these relative realities are something more than effects in us, and the definition is

inadequate. If the relative realities do not exist in our absence, then reality is a mere subjectivity, as illusive as a dream.

Spencer makes his final appeal to the claims of the persistence of force and the indestructibility of matter. By persistence of force he declares himself to mean "the persistence of some cause that transcends our knowledge and conception." Thus we are brought back as a last resort to the much-known Unknowable about which we can affirm nothing. The assumed law of the indestructibility of matter would seem likewise insufficient as a basis for a doctrine of phenomena. It may be sufficiently accurate as a working basis in the physical realm, but it cannot be accurately demonstrated even there. In the case of the wedge or the lever we determine the exact amount of power, resistance, friction, and heat, and on paper write an equation which is sufficiently correct for practical purposes. But, speaking with the exactitude required by a law of indestructibility, there are losses in the process that we cannot compute nor include. Our equation is an approximation

of the fact. We speak of the transmutation of friction, weight of falling water, or energy of steam into electrical power, light, or heat, and can come sufficiently near for practical purposes, but along the way much has to go unaccounted for. We cannot turn the processes backward and get the first terms of our equation. In other words, science can secure a practical working basis after the law of indestructibility. It cannot do more.

In the end we find that Spencer cannot meet his problem without assuming for his persistence of force and indestructibility of matter that very infinitude of time against which he has warned us in the religious realm. He cannot prove these laws in any given case, but he can imagine that they might be true if they were given an infinite time in which to work.

The Theory of Evolution

Spencer's theory of evolution, though not originating with him, and advanced first in the early Greek philosophy, was the part of his system which gave him the widest

reading and popularity. In his statement of the theory we find much philosophical unsoundness.

The main support of his definition of evolution lies in his dependence upon the fallacy of the universal. This is the fallacy which vitiates general statements and makes for half-truths. It is a part of the busybody's statement, "Every one is saying," when the exact truth is that the busybody is saying. If we can multiply atoms sufficiently to make impossible the tracing of any individual atom, and can multiply to an indefinite length the time in which they have to work, we can observe without wonder any imagined result. The point at issue is further lost in the words with which Spencer covers up the gap from the inorganic to the organic, from organic to sentient, from sentient to reasoning being. This is done by employing a word in slightly different senses, and so the gulf is bridged, linguistically speaking. But never yet hath eye seen nor ear heard how or when one single atom was led across the gulf to become a living soul.

Moreover, if we are compelled to assume with Spencer the logical equivalence of cause and effect, the definition has no meaning. If I must say of any effect that all of its elements were already contained in its cause, the passing from one to the other is no progress. It cannot explain the elements of novelty which enter in. It would certainly be inadequate to explain the emergence of the present world from the original dance of atoms. Mr. Bergson has directed his sharpest shafts at this conception of evolution. He compares it to putting together a puzzle picture, all the parts of which have been previously fitted and prepared, and then with childish imagination assuming that a creative progress has been made.

The Definition of Life and Mind

It is Spencer's doctrine of mind that exposes the materialistic trend of his philosophy. Judged from his doctrine of matter, Spencer rightly claimed not to be a materialist. Judged from his doctrine of mind, materialism was his inevitable goal.

According to the statement of the evolution formula, life is to be defined in terms of matter and motion. These in turn are but the symbols of the Unknowable. Here Bowne calls attention to the fact that the atoms may be chemically regrouped, and can also be summoned forth in sufficient numbers to cause considerable masses. Bowne asks, however, what chemical distribution can be made which will be more than a distribution or combination of chemicals. So long as it is a chemical combination it can be resolved into its constituent elements. Borrowing a word from the biological realm to cover the discrepancy between chemical atom and living protoplasm is not an actual but a verbal process. We are not told how matter or motion becomes something essentially different—that is, a living organism.

In like manner, in his theory of mind Spencer is satisfied with bridging verbally the gap between an affection of the nerves and a consciousness of the external world. He does this by asserting a double face to all nervous action. But it is useless to talk

of a double-faced character for nervous action. We would still be bound to explain how an affection of the auditory nerve can be more than pleasurable or painful, soft or harsh, faint or vivid. Whence comes the mental content? There must be something more than the affection of a nerve, or I should not recognize the voice I hear as my mother's, to say nothing of the attendant thought and memory which stir into consciousness all the springs of loyalty and affection. How shall I judge whether a sharp affection of my nerves is the "Soldier's Chorus" or a toothache? The "face" of nervous action by which I come to knowledge tells me nothing about the other "face" at all, but speaks directly of that outside world which impinges upon consciousness. If I say the effects produced in me are only the attendants upon certain nervous affections, I have yet to show how I can consider my consciousness a true picture of what I seem to see. I must further explain how in this system of fleeting experiences, the factors of experience are by good fortune related each

to each, or how the memory of yesterday can persist with any real meaning for to-day.

We are shut up to a world of nervous action. The structure that we build thereon is without common validity or verification. With or against our wills, if we cling to Spencer's system, we come to haven in a universe purely materialistic, from which even the Unknowable is powerless to save us.

CHAPTER V

BOWNE AS AN ANTAGONIST OF NATURALISM

All Philosophical Values Hinge on the Definition of Reality

The real import of any system of thought eventually rests with its doctrine of reality. In regard to the nature of reality we have noted the two great antagonistic streams of thought. Under the first category are included those thinkers who assume matter as the basal reality. It makes little difference whether they proceed upon the theory of magical and metaphysical atoms endowed with energy, motion, and force, or whether they conceal the metaphysical drift of their arguments by the assumption of vital impulses, reactions, affinities, selection, or what not. In the end the sufficiency of all such theories will be found to lie in the ignoring of a part of the problem. Disaster is avoided only by refusal to carry the

problem to its logical conclusion. Such is the end of all materialism.

Plato attempted to meet the tide of materialistic thought by raising the barrier of ideal knowledge. To him the universal was the true reality. The universally true was forever beyond the cavil or denial of individuals. He thus erected in thought an idealism that through Neoplatonism profoundly influenced Christian theology for centuries.

Aristotle, his pupil, noted the impassable gulf in Plato's world between the ideal and the actual and attempted to bridge it. He declared that reality could not exist as a general term, but must be found in concrete and particular instances. As Aristotle labored to bring together the universal and the particular, and to let the Platonic idealism down to earth, so Bowne aimed to join the sundered sides of philosophic thought. Knowing the importance of the doctrine of reality to the future implications of his system, he stated his definition with unusual care. Reality with Bowne was active and causal, that which can act or be

acted upon. He thus made possible the assumption of the reality of thought without falling prey to the phenomenalism of the absolute idealist.

The naturalist, by assuming an atomic causation for all mental perception, invests each idea, right or wrong, with fundamental validity. He leaves no room, either, for the substantiation of mental possessions that come by the way of reflection. He is not only faced by the problem of error; he is at loss to account for all reflective knowledge.

From the opposite direction, the absolute idealist encounters difficulty with the problem of evil. If thought in man is simply a reflection of God's thought, the burden of all evil and malicious thinking, error, superstition, and baseless fears is laid upon the Infinite Mind.

Now if, as with Bowne, the essence of reality is simply causal activity, no such difficulties arise. The world of things depends upon the causal activity of a Divine Personality. The mutual relations and interactions of the world spring from the unity of the Supreme Will. The mind of

man grasps a true world because both thinker and thing are included in the one creative harmony. We have an inkling of how this may be in the causal efficiency of the human personality, which is able to penetrate matter and to make matter conform to it. This may, indeed, be a great mystery to the materialist, but it is a truth which no man can doubt without the overthrow of confidence in the reality of his own experience.

It might seem that while Bowne has by this process escaped the problem of error, he has not been so fortunate with the problem of evil. And yet the problem of evil, that crux of theism, as the problem of error is the nightmare of materialism, ceases to maintain so great a tyranny. Dr. Bowne would have been far from claiming for his system the solution of the problem. But under the order of Personalism evil is no longer the necessary expression of the fundamental reality, nor is it loaded upon the Divine Will. It is, rather, an attendant upon the granting of freedom to responsible human personalities, it being more dear to

the Divine to secure moral character than to create an otherwise perfect but morally irresponsible world. It is at least thinkable that to a God of moral capacity an unmoral world would be imperfect. If at the end of long disciplines he can bring mankind up to a moral perfection that is true because voluntary, might that not be the perfect world that should satisfy the divine thought? This mingling of human and divine personality and purpose has been thus beautifully expressed by Alfred Noyes in his poem "Creation":

When he is older he shall be
My friend and walk here at My side
Or—when he wills—grow young with Me,
And, to that happy world where once We died,
Descending through the calm, blue weather,
Buy life once more with our immortal breath,
And wander through the little fields together,
And taste of Love and Death.

Is God Immanent Mover or Prime Mover?

Naturalism can secure nothing more than a phenomenal world. If the stirring of atoms gives us perception, and chemical or

molecular change in the cells of the brain is alone responsible for ideas, we are still at loss to explain how molecular changes can give us thought and a knowledge of the world of relations. What we really have is an affection of the nerves. When we attempt to reason from these nervous affections to a world of relations we have no reason to assume that we have more than phenomena. We have no means of proving our world to be a real one. The reason is that moving from the materialistic standpoint we have not assumed a ground sufficiently inclusive to take in the thinker and the thing.

We are at an equal loss on the naturalistic plane to trace effects to a first cause. We cannot follow the series far until we discover that we are involved in an infinite regress. Each effect demands a preceding cause. The earliest cause becomes more troublesome for explanation than the latest. In despair we may be led to affirm with Spencer that the first cause is the Unknowable. Then we are compelled to face the question of how the knowable can spring from the unknowable. Aristotle attempted

to solve this deadlock by positing a Divine Will as the Prime Mover.[1] Such a world would find its unity in a primal impulse, but would fall victim to a doctrine of necessity only less rigid than that of naturalism. Bowne meets this problem by assuming that the fundamental causal activity is not a Prime Mover, but an Immanent Mover continually manifesting himself in the on-going of the world. Such a conception does not conflict with the laws of natural science, for Bowne draws a careful distinction between phenomenal and efficient causality. Natural science is built upon the laws of sequence in phenomena. We can affirm the order in which events will occur without making any metaphysical assumptions at all. The efficient cause of the action and interaction of the natural order is the Divine Personality establishing his own laws of procedure.

The Personality of the World-Ground

At this point we find Bowne going beyond the thought of Aristotle to affirm personal-

[1] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book xi, chap. vii.

ity in the Divine Being. This thought would have been repugnant to Aristotle, but his failure to affirm it made impossible the maintenance of a moral order and of personal immortality. This fact is most clearly brought out by Eucken. He says: "Aristotle affirms the existence of a transcendent Deity as the source of reason, and as the origin of motion, which from eternity to eternity pervades the universe. But he denies to this Deity any activity within the world; concern with external things, not to say petty human affairs, would destroy the completeness of the Deity's life. So God, or pure intelligence, himself unmoved, moves the world by his mere being; any further development of things arises from their own nature. Here, accordingly, there is no moral order of the world, and no Providence. Likewise there can be no hope of a personal immortality.'

In contrast with Aristotle, Bowne declares that "Causal explanation must be in terms of personality or it must vanish altogether." This view is strictly in accord

[2] The Problem of Human Life, p. 47.

with all that we know of causation. Precedences and sequences in phenomena could give to individual atoms no knowledge of the meaning of the processes of which they are a part. Phenomenal causes would be confined to the effects which they themselves produced, and in any case we would be forced to an infinite regress. In human personality alone we have introduced into experience of causation that which is an uncaused cause of phenomena. The human personality, being able to relate a succession of causes and effects to itself, and standing outside the mechanical circle, becomes measurably an efficient cause. But the human personality in order to preserve the integrity of its own thought bulks back on an eternal thinking Personality through which it finds its synthesis with the world of things and persons. Thus the human personality, introducing an unaccounted factor into the realm of nature, gives a hint of the place of the Divine Personality in this order. If this uncaused and purposive personal element be left out, we can have no efficient causation and no real progress. On

the impersonal plane the effect must be already contained in the cause, and there can be no progress. To say that the effect is only potentially contained in the cause is to introduce the new factor surreptitiously under the cover of a word. Any World-Ground capable of real causation, not itself involved in the atomic flux, must be personal as well as intelligent.

Is Freedom Possible in the Natural World?

As has already been pointed out, any system of mechanical explanation falls inevitably into difficulty with the problem of evil, as well as with the problem of error. If all thinking and action is caused by atomic motion, then we are bound to a system of necessity, and moral action becomes impossible. The criminal in his crime is then simply fulfilling the necessary result of affections of his nerves. He is much to be pitied, but not at all to be blamed. Every sort of error and extravagance is given an equal footing with truth and sanity. Only a little reflection

serves to show how deeply this theory would cut into every demand of the moral order.

By positing all causal efficiency as arising from personality, place is left for the existence of error and evil without offending the human sense of moral obligation or erecting error into the plane of truth, or of burdening the Deity with responsibility for evil. It is impossible to explain the problem of evil in any general way that will give satisfaction, because man is a moral being and so constituted that the existence of evil is forever an offense; and because, further, the problem can be met only on the arena of action and solved only in the individual life. It is possible to hold such a view as not to offend the most treasured instincts of the heart. This Bowne has done by reason of his definition of reality and by the assumption of personality in the World-Ground.

SECTION II
IDEALISM

CHAPTER VI

THE KANTIAN STARTING-POINT

Has the Mind a Task in Experience?

Kant's great contribution to the world of thought was his discovery that the mind has a task in experience. He affirmed truly when he declared that his work would make as great a change in the outlook of philosophy as had the discoveries of Copernicus in the field of astronomy.

Hitherto the mind had been regarded as the passive recipient of impressions, a tablet on which the world of external things could write itself. Kant showed that every experience was due to the constitutive activity of the mind itself, as well as to the impressions of the outside world. Time and space had been conceived as fundamental realities which could exist apart from all intelligence. He aimed to show how they were but the forms under which the thinking mind relates the world of things and events to itself and to each other. This

power of the mind to bring a real contribution of its own to experience will be apparent if we consider how the world of nature yields a decidedly richer content to the biologist than to the man ignorant of her processes. She speaks to the trained mind a thousand things unnoticed by the untrained, and every addition to the mental capital increases the synthesizing power of the beholder.

That space is a necessary form of thinking, an intuition rather than an acquirement of experience, is to be illustrated in many ways. In dreams, though there is no actual space, the mind works under the space form. In traveling distances during the unconsciousness of sleep, and even for places never seen, the mind proceeds to construct ideas of them under the form of space.

Time is likewise a law of intelligence rather than an entity in itself. As space is the form under which we relate a world of diversity to ourselves and each other, so time is the form under which we relate the world of experiences to the abiding self. Without this contribution of the self which

survives the changes there could be no sense of time. In other words, it is because there is an element of timelessness in the thinker that he gets the idea of the passage of time. Time being the form under which intelligence acts, the mind by its own constitutive activity is able to grasp and assign a meaning to historic periods of which experience could tell it nothing.

The weakness in Kant's position lay in the fact that he took account only of the subjective side of this activity of the mind. It is well enough for me to say that time and space are only the forms under which I think, but are they peculiar to me? Do they not exist apart from my thinking? How may I be sure that the time and space which I think will correspond to that which others think? Kant's failure to answer these questions vitiated his system. It becomes at once apparent that both time and space must possess some objective validity to free them from the disjunctive caprice of the individual and make possible a world united in space and time relations. This Kant did not give us.

"We cannot impose mental forms upon the world of experience unless that world itself be adapted to those forms."[1]

It is interesting to note how Bowne, affirming the ideal nature of space and time, yet avoided the logical impasse to which Kant was brought. Bowne was too close to the practical in his thinking not to see that the forms of time and space must be true for the object of thought as well as for the thinker. To him space and time gain a validity which makes them universal for all intelligent beings through a Supreme Personal Intelligence who creates and upholds all. The world of things and of intelligences correspond each to each because all are comprehended in a Supreme Intelligence from which they acquire their meaning and reality.

Where Can We Find a Permanent World?

Of course Kant was not blind to the necessity of asserting somewhere an objective validity. He clearly saw that a purely subjective world would be one in which

[1] Bowne, Kant and Spencer, p. 150.

every man would make his own world and no two worlds would correspond. It was necessary to point out some principle that would possess permanence and give unity. This permanent principle he attempted to introduce under what he called the analogies of experience.[2] In this portion of the Critique Kant becomes perilously involved in his search for the permanent in phenomena. To find this principle of permanence he all but affirms an independent and back-lying existence for things in themselves. To the mind of Bowne the problem of permanence could never be solved in this crude fashion. "On the impersonal plane there is no possibility of combining permanence with change, least of all by a mere analysis of the notion of change. On that plane we cannot reserve anything in the world of change as an abiding element, for as soon as it becomes changeless it no longer explains change, and when it explains change it passes into the changing, and changes through and through. The problem here can be solved only as we

[2] Kant, Critique, tr. by Müller, p. 144.

carry it up to the plane of personality, and find the permanence of experience in the world of meaning and in the self-conscious intelligence which founds and administers the world of meanings under the forms of change."[3]

What Lies Behind the Appearance of Things?

The same subjectivity that oppressed Kant in the consideration of time and space troubled him likewise in his attempt to find the abiding real. This difficulty was in part due to his failure to discriminate between two possible definitions of the term "subjective." We may mean by the term that which is peculiar to the individual alone, or we may mean that which is true for intelligence anywhere and has no existence apart from it. If Kant had kept this truth in mind when affirming the subjectivity or phenomenal nature of reality, all might have been well. But failing to draw the distinction, he made the system of experience the fiction of the individual. Kant's

[3] Bowne, Kant and Spencer, pp. 99, 100.

only escape would have been to affirm a back-lying and independent Cause. It was only thus he could have saved his system from solipsism. Phenomena are not masks or appearances of any kind, existing only for the individual. They are the things that exist for human intelligences everywhere and derive their common meaning through a supreme intelligence by which they exist. We apprehend them through our own intelligence, but they do not depend upon our intelligence for their existence; and since they must depend upon intelligence for existence, it only remains that we affirm a back-lying intelligence as their cause and presupposition.[4]

But Kant does not discover the high road out of his subjectivism. For him things in succession imply causal relations, and as the causal relations in things must be something independent of the mind of the onlooker, there must be in phenomena a residuant reality beyond that which the mind is able to perceive. Thus he has resort to a doctrine of noumena. The end of this way is

[4] Bowne, Kant and Spencer, p. 124.

an impossible dualism, for it erects a reality which is not only independent of individual intelligence, but which is beyond all intelligence, being of a different and unknowable nature. This dualism into which Kant unwittingly falls is to be avoided by distinguishing between causal and phenomenal reality. Phenomenal reality is the noted succession of appearances, common to all. We can mark the preexistences and successions which universally hold in the world of experience, and we can formulate the law of their procedure without granting them a causal efficiency or saying anything about their metaphysical ground. Causal reality, in contrast, deals not with the order of succession, but with the ground of being itself.

Can We "Prove" the World of Spirit?

Kant's purpose was to prove that it is impossible from the common data of experience to arrive at affirmations respecting God and immortality. He did this, not from hostility, but from friendliness to faith.

Naturalism had shown the inadequacy of

the so-called "proofs" of the Divine existence. It went farther, for, assuming its ability to account for everything in heaven and in earth, it also asserted the non-existence of everything not dreamt of in its philosophy. What Kant did was to make room for faith by showing that religious convictions lie outside the province of the naturalistic speculation. It could neither be proved nor disproved on the basis of naturalism. Kant thus claims the honor of overthrowing all materialistic and atheistic teaching by showing its attempt at religious explanation to be outside its possible field. The religious world of to-day has come to realize that there can be no "proofs" for God and immortality, in the sense that was so much sought after in Kant's day. We realize now that the great argument for God is the practical interest. We affirm the existence of God because he is a necessity for all sane thinking and his existence is demanded by the moral and religious interests of life. This practical argument possesses much more force for the present day than the old "proofs." What is said

for the doctrine of God can likewise be said for immortality and all the fundamental religious truths. They stand forever because they are written into the very nature of the human spirit.

In his contention Kant was true to the facts. The apprehension of God is an act of faith. Spiritual truths are gained in the exercise of faith and the spiritual powers. Bowne, in a lecture commenting on Kant's showing of the impossibility of an intellectual demonstration of the existence of God, declared that the apprehension of God could be reached only by faith, and then added this significant word: "By way of mere speculation we cannot attain to demonstration in any field. There is no way of stopping where Kant stops."

The outcome of Kant's "antinomies of thought" after verbose and tedious discussion is closely allied to this pragmatic judgment upon the deeper religious values.

Bowne thus sums up his argument: "Conviction must be reached in life itself, and this has always, with scantiest exception, led the race to theistic faith, not, indeed, as

something that can be speculatively demonstrated or against which any cavil or objection is impossible, but something which represents the line of least resistance for human thought. The intelligent world points to an intelligent author, the moral world to a moral author, the rational world to a rational author. This is the conclusion which the race has drawn and the conclusion in which it increasingly rests, the conclusion which it holds with more and more confidence as the ground of all its hope and the security of its efforts, whether in the field of science and cognition or of morality and religion. . . . Assuming the legitimacy of life and of our human instincts, we may ask ourselves what life implies; and Kant says it implies God, freedom, and immortality, as postulates without which the mind would fall into discord with itself and life would lose itself in inner contradiction. We may then hold these postulates, not as something given by the speculative reason, but as something rooted in life."[5]

[5] Bowne, Kant and Spencer, pp. 212, 213.

CHAPTER VII

THE ABSOLUTE PHILOSOPHY, LOTZE AND BOWNE

Is the World More than Knowledge?

Lotze was the first to successfully refute the absolute idealism of Hegel. Nevertheless, he was himself to be counted among the idealists. He hoped to harmonize the differences between modern scientific thought and that romantic idealism which had so largely characterized the metaphysics of the preceding generation. The interaction of things in an intelligible universe was to him the best evidence of essential unity between mind and matter. He believed that Hegel had indicated a great goal. He did not believe with Hegel that all truth can be deduced from reflection. It was Lotze's aim to grant perception, or empirical knowledge of nature, its place in thought.

"His philosophy is a persistent defense of perception against reflection, of the concrete particular against pale and vacant general ideas; it is a powerful protest against injustice to the individuality and uniqueness which he found at the core of every fact. Thought with its abstract conceptions and unsubstantial universals seemed to him poor and thin as compared with the facts and events of the real world; every general law seemed to him to fall short of reaching the core and essence of anything actual."[1]

In particular was Lotze opposed to the closed system of idealism where everything was so ordered in the eternal thought that there could by no possibility enter in any factors which had not already been determined before the world was, and which relegated freedom to the realm of shadow and make-believe. He believed that history was something more "than a translation in time of the eternally complete content of an ordered world." He concluded, then, that the world is something more than an eternal thought; that it contains a ca-

[1] Jones, Philosophy of Lotze, p. 9.

pacity for freedom and a possibility for the introduction of the unique, which is an irresistible demand of the human spirit. By his incisive criticisms he laid bare the deceptive generalities of the extreme Hegelian position and made necessary a drastic modification of its thought.

Of What Does Reality Consist?

Hegelianism thought to reach reality by reflection and without the aid of experience. Lotze, on the other hand, held steadfastly to the importance of experience and maintained that we can understand it only as we grasp its inner continuity. He raised the question of the ultimate nature of reality by asserting that in a united universe of relations and correspondences capable of being apprehended it must be either material or spiritual. If we are to allow the reality of anything outside matter, the conclusion is foregone—the ultimate nature of being is spiritual. But if we are to understand reality, we need to know more than the elements into which it is divisible, more than the laws under which it acts; we

must know also its destination. Laws in themselves are nothing more than the formulated sequence of events, the tabulated data of experience. They can give us little concerning the ground of their activity. We must go back of the law to the apparent aim of the uniformity and therein catch a glimpse of the controlling purpose. Thus he introduces into his system the idea of value. He now proceeds to describe reality as the realized law of procedure. It is that in which the Infinite Purpose is realizing itself.

So far Lotze has scarcely escaped the absolute idealism which he aimed to supersede. His world of reality remains phenomenal in spite of his protestations. This phenomenalism he endeavored to avoid by looking toward the Good as the supreme end. "The objectivity of knowledge consists in this, that it is not a meaningless play of illusion, but that it presents to us a world whose several parts are linked and ordered according to the prescription of that which is alone real in the world, namely, the good."[2]

[2] Quoted by Stählin, Kant, Lotze and Ritschl, p. 141.

Thus with Lotze the Supreme Good is the ultimate Reality in whose existence all other realities find their ground.

Bowne's Debt to Lotze

There are many well-defined correspondences between the systems of Lotze and Bowne. There are many points at which Bowne would gladly have owned his obligation to his teacher. An examination of these correspondences will be of moment to those who are interested in Bowne's philosophy.

They were at one in the insistence upon the difference between the practical field of science and the speculative field of metaphysics, in which both hark back to Kant. They held that science is properly limited to the order of coexistence and sequence in phenomena with reference to the practical issues. To metaphysics alone is assigned the realm of efficient causality. The scientist may learn from experience with phenomena the laws of their action and interaction, but when he goes back of phenomena to discuss the nature of reality

or being, he has left the realm of science for that of philosophy.

Both discerned the folly of an attempt to understand nature simply by a method of classification. They called attention to the emptiness of such endeavors so far as the problem of reality is concerned. Classification is a method of intelligence the better to handle its materials. Classification in no wise changes the things classified or reveals their back-lying reality.

Both philosophers pointed out the astounding claims of atomism to an efficiency which in the end would endow each separate atom with a purpose, wisdom, and knowledge of other atoms far superior to human intelligence, and with a proclivity for peace remarkable in this, that in a divided world of innumerable atoms there should be any working in relations at all. Instead of naturalism being free from the dark realm of magic and unaccountable powers, she is rather the high priestess of superstition with her powerful demiurges of atoms.

They saw the impossibility of assuming the absentee God of absolute idealism.

Such a God would find himself, at the best, working at cross purposes in a disjointed world, and gradually realizing his thought through the slow-struggling intelligence of man and accomplishing his own moral character in the slower moving ebb and flow of the tides of human action.

They saw that neither pluralism which springs from atomism nor the pantheism which springs from Absolutism was sufficient to explain the world and leave place on the one hand for individuality and on the other for freedom.

They were alike in recognizing the absurdities which left Absolutism in the clouds. Lotze felt himself to be sufficiently definite when he referred everything to the Supreme Good. Bowne went on to declare that the world of experience can be maintained as real only as it is grounded in a Supreme Personality from whom all things forever proceed.

Bowne possessed Lotze's view concerning the barren round of mechanical causation assumed by materialism, in which there can be no possibility of progress, no chance for

the introduction of unique factors of advance. They were one likewise in recognition of the corresponding weakness of an Absolute who contained all in himself, and in whom was buried also all possibility of human freedom, that novelty that forever spells progress in the history of the individual and the race.

Bowne's Advance on Lotze's System

It is only fair to say that Bowne received many of the features of his system from Lotze. In the clearness of his critical faculties he was remarkably like Lotze. It is also fair to say that Bowne overcame the weaknesses inherent in Lotze's system and carried it out to a more logical conclusion.

In his definition of reality, Lotze is needlessly vague. His shortest and most direct definition of reality is that it is the realized law of procedure. This definition points toward activism, but it is not thoroughgoing enough. Its reality is still phenomenal, existing only in the absolute purpose. What he was aiming for was a reality whose real-

ness lay in the very act of a Divine Purpose realizing itself.

Bowne's definition of reality was not only more clear and simple, but also more profound. With him reality is that which can act or be acted upon. Thus he makes way for matter and mind and God.

Lotze pointed out the fact that we must discover some continuity behind the ebb and flow of matter and even of human experience if we are to find out the meaning of the world. Bowne carried the thought up to secure footing and made the relation of thought and thing clear. He affirmed that the desired continuity can be found alone in personality. Personality is the only power of which we are conscious that can join the sundered experiences of time and space into a unity and look upon all from the standpoint of the one. Thus alone, he argues, is unity possible in the world. The universe finds its unity in the thought of a Supreme Personality, himself the unchanging cause of change.

Thus Lotze's vague Purpose of the Supreme Good, which he considers the funda-

mental reality, gives way to a Person who is also the World-Ground. Both the material universe and the individual mind fall into step because both proceed from the same source. Our intelligences were made for the true understanding of the world. What the general mind reports is true because the world was made for our intelligence. In this way the idea with which Lotze began was given a new and richer and more powerful content.

If Lotze had thus completed his system, he would have been free from the criticism of one of the most skillful and friendly critics, who declared that his cardinal defect lay at this point. This writer says: "He may, like the ordinary consciousness, maintain the necessity of nature, and the freedom of men, and the omnipresence of God; he may give man all his own way, which is essential to morality, and God all His own way, which is essential to religion, and thus permit both these forces which mold the higher destinies of mankind to exist together. But he must also strive to reconcile them. Truth for him must not be

a thing of aspects and phases merely; he must not agree with the common consciousness in its fragmentariness."[3]

Herein is the chief point of difference between Lotze and Bowne. Lotze stops short of asserting personality of the World-Ground and leaves the fundamental reality only less vague than Hegel's absolute. Bowne presses on to the assertion of personality in the World-Ground with all that such an assertion implies. He thus carries the metaphysical problem up into religion and is able thereby to bring about that very reconciliation between science and religion which was Lotze's own aim.

Bowne's position is well disclosed in a passage in his last work touching the idealist position, in which he says: "Being in this world is nothing more than having a certain form and type of experience with certain familiar conditions. Passing out of this world into another would mean simply not a transition through space, but passing into a new form and type of experience differently constituted from the present. And

[3] Jones, Philosophy of Lotze, p. 13.

how many of these systems are possible or to what extent this change might go is altogether beyond us. Of course these many systems would all be objectively founded; that is, they would be rooted in the will and purpose of the Creator, and they would also be one in the sense that the creative purpose would comprise them all in one plan; but they would not be one in the sense of being phases or aspects of one absolute reality. They would be stages in God's unfolding plan, but not aspects of the static universe. This static universe is a phantom of abstract thought. The only reality is God and his progressively unfolding plan and purpose and work, and the world of finite spirits. In this case also we should have a relativity but not an illusion, a validity of knowledge within the sphere which finds its ground and warrant in the plan and purpose of the Creator."[4]

[4] Bowne, Kant and Spencer, pp. 145, 146.

SECTION III
PRAGMATISM

CHAPTER VIII

THE UNMETAPHYSICAL PRAGMATISM OF WILLIAM JAMES

The Pragmatic Element in the History of Philosophy

Protagoras is said to have been the originator of the watchword of pragmatism —"Man is the measure of all things." The phrase and the doctrine have unpleasant connections, however, for Protagoras and the Sophists to whose school he belonged meant thereby all that the word "sophism" has come to imply in modern life. In the words of Eucken, "Man the measure of all things," meant for them "A renunciation of all universally valid standards, a surrender of truth to man's momentary caprice and fluctuating inclinations. In other words, it implied that everything may be turned this way or that and differently judged, according to the point of view; that what appears

as the right may be represented as the wrong, and conversely; and that any cause may be championed according to the necessities of the case or to one's whim. In this manner life is gradually degraded into a means of the profit, the self-indulgence, even the sport of the single individual, who acknowledges no restraints, feels no respect; . . . thus the good yields to the profitable; all valuations become relative. . . . Such a doctrine of relativity . . . raised to a sovereign position, . . . becomes the deadly enemy of everything great and true."[1]

The pragmatic movement came in Greece after the climax of her brilliant age had passed. The touch of disorganization and decay had struck into her civilization. Old faiths and old institutions were breaking before an incoming tide of individualism.

That system which had such questionable origin with the Sophists became with the Stoics a judgment by moral values, and here perhaps reached its highest and noblest influence. It appears in the sensualistic

[1] Eucken, The Problem of Human Life, p. 14.

system of Epicurus, to whom the criterion of truth becomes the sensation of pleasure as contrasted with pain.[2]

We again see the pragmatic postulate in the teachings of Pyrrho and the new academy. They hold it as the foundation of knowledge. Arcesilaus named probabilism as the only rule of practical life. Carneades introduced the idea of degrees of probability. To the eclectics, that was truth which appeared to be true. In the end, when both scientific and deductive truth have been rid of all reality, we reach the reaction of neo-platonism with its affirmation of truth by revelation alone.

Modern pragmatism applies the thought of value, not primarily to the moral and æsthetic, as did the Stoics, but to reality itself. Davidson has called attention to the fact that the new element in modern pragmatism is to bring knowledge as well as æsthetics and ethics to the test of practical value.[3] The modern pragmatists do not by

[2] Compare Janet and Seailles, History of the Problems of Philosophy, p. 103.

[3] The Stoic Creed, p. 256.

any means agree in the phase of the system which is most important. Mr. Pierce revived the name for modern philosophy. F. C. S. Schiller is interested in giving the movement a particularly subjectivistic turn. James has pursued the line of Realism. Because of the extended influence of the latter, and the commonness with which his name is associated with the term "pragmatism," we shall confine ourselves to the discussion of his particular system.

Can the Pragmatic Test of Truth Be Maintained?

In the chapter on "The Notion of Truth," in his volume on pragmatism, James justly balks at the vague abstractions of the definition of truth given by the rationalists. He quotes Taylor's definition, "Truth is the system of propositions which have an unconditional claim to be recognized as valid," and also Rickert's statement that "Truth is a name for all those judgments which we find ourselves under obligations to make by a kind of imperative duty." These definitions of truth James declares "unutterable

triviality." While we sympathize with him in his revolt from any attempt at making truth a mere abstraction, we cannot be blind to the commission of the same error of abstraction by James himself when he substitutes "verify-able" for "verify-cation" under exigency. What both James and his rationalist opponents are aiming for is an independent norm of truth. This fact James desired to conceal while the rationalists openly admitted it. By "verify-able" James means that there is a common-to-all which makes it possible for the individual to compare his judgment with the common judgment of others. Thus only can he push the borders of knowledge past his individual experiences to truths imparted by others and which he might verify if circumstances permitted. He could better have shown the error of the rationalist definition of truth by calling attention to its fallacy of the abstract. He would also have secured the desired concreteness by open acknowledgment of a common-to-all in human experience by which the individual can verify his own conclusions respecting phenomena.

But Mr. James tells us that there is no such thing as truth independent, and by this, if he is consistent, he means truth independent of concrete individual experience. He declares, "The pragmatist clings to facts and concreteness, observes truth at its work in particular cases, and generalizes." He does not, however, show us the "value" of this generalization in a world in which truth is to be found only in concrete individual cases. How is the pragmatist to possess any certainty that his intellectual effort of synthesis represents any corresponding reality? Indeed, it could not apart from a higher and uniting intelligence.

Again he says, "True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those we cannot." Here, moving on the individualistic plane, are certain difficulties that give no promise of solution. The jungle-dweller who is told for the first time that the earth is round might be utterly unable either to assimilate, validate, corroborate, or verify the statement. Would his inability in this respect justify him in putting the conception of

rotundity in the region of false ideas? Would the truth thereby be imperiled? Still there are some who profess to believe that the roundness of the earth would remain presumably beyond question. It would seem to come perilously close to being a truth independent of this man's concrete individual experience. It might conceivably be beyond the concrete individual experience of any dweller upon the earth, as in the days before the rotundity of the earth was discovered. Was or was it not true? Would the earth continue round in the absence of human life and intelligence?

Evidently, the chief pragmatist himself was troubled with evil dreams, for a few pages later he declares that "verify-ability" will do as well as "verify-cation" anyway. Here he jumps again from the particular to the general without sensing it. If he would rescue truth from the uncertainties of individual experiences, he could do so by positing a Personality as the World-Ground. He could thus have saved his pragmatism and have maintained his ground against rationalism.

Respecting his definition of truth as that which serves an end or a purpose, Davidson[4] very justly calls attention to the fact that purpose or end implies an intellectual element at utter variance with the pragmatic claim that it is not man's intellect or reason which determines reality and truth, but his will and his feelings.

So the pragmatic definition of truth, while attempting to avoid the abstractions of absolute idealism, becomes the prey of a solipsistic individualism, because, spurning the assistance of metaphysics, it has no intelligent ground. At any rate, the serious-minded cannot be satisfied with a test of value for truth which shall be merely human and relative. "We have outgrown the standard of a welfare merely human, and all the values of such a welfare cannot blind us to their narrowness and emptiness."[5]

Are Space and Time the Abiding Realities?

Unwilling to affirm any continuity which falls outside the realm of concrete indi-

[4] The Stoic Creed, p. 263.

[5] Eucken, Knowledge and Life, p. 83.

vidual experience, because that would be untrue to pragmatism, James is forced to seek some continuity which will hold his disunited and pluralistic world together long enough to consider the situation. This continuity he gains in a thoroughly naturalistic way by assuming time and space as the abiding realities. "Space and time are thus vehicles of continuity by which the world's parts hang together."[6] One must think of space and time both as objectively real. Of them he says: "Just as atoms, not half or quarter atoms, are the minimum of matter that can be, and every finite amount of matter contains a finite number of atoms, so any amounts of time, space, change, etc., which we might assume would be composed of a finite number of minimal amounts of time, space, and change."[7]

One scarcely knows whether to be more surprised at the naïve boldness in presenting such crudities or the uncritical state of the mind that could formulate them. In the first place, the unseeable and imaginary

[6] James, Pragmatism, p. 134.

[7] Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 154.

atom is reduced in words to finite and ponderable reality. Then such subjective ideas as space and time are spoken of as if they could be reckoned in the same way. If there is any meaning, it would seem as if one might trade a chunk of his space for another's time, and so prolong life by reducing the dimensions of his "verify-able" world.

The resulting mystification regarding the nature of time is shown in his view of the verification of history by the individual. He says: "The stream of time can be remounted only verbally, or verified indirectly by the present prolongations or effects of what the past harbored. Yet if they agree with these verbalities and effects, we can know that our ideas of the past are true. *As true as past time itself was*, so true was Julius Cæsar, so true were antediluvian monsters, all in their proper dates and settings."[8]

Truth being confined to concrete individual experience by Mr. James's fundamental postulate, it would seem easier to

[8] Pragmatism, pp. 214, 215.

take his say-so for the foregoing than to attempt to reach any consistent ground for such a view of time.

The fact is that time is nothing apart from an abiding personality to relate its flowing events each to each and all to some unmoving center. But once this is granted, the disunited world in time and space falls into wondrous unity which would be quite upsetting to the pluralistic mind, which the pluralistic mind will not acknowledge but without which it cannot think. He should have become aware that the "connecting medium" was no less than personality when he talks about the relationships of life breaking up into little worlds, or a multitude of small systems.

Pluralism a Confession of Failure to Unite Subject and Object

Being unable from the empirical standpoint to found any real unity, James turns to pluralism as a means of escape from the insistent problems arising out of the contrast between mind and matter, subject and object. The mere thought of any essential

unity seems repugnant. He says, "If our intellect had been as much interested in disjunctive as it is in conjunctive relations, philosophy would have equally successfully celebrated the world's disunion."[9] "Ay, there's the rub . . . what dreams!" Why is the intellect not equally interested in establishing a disjunctive world? The reason is a very good one. It is because it is as mentally impossible to seriously think a disjunctive world as to think a topsy-turvy world. If we can find no higher unity, it will inevitably be this, that there is a world of various relations all of which are grasped by our intelligence and are thought of as "our" world. Even pragmatists are driven to this common expedient before they can tell us what pragmatism and pluralism are. The fact that the world can be understood by us is a principle of unity in itself, which must be removed before pluralism can be admitted. Unity does not depend, as the pragmatists seem to think, upon chemical spatial and social interaction between given individuals. The apple does not quarrel

[9] Pragmatism, p. 137.

with the banana because both cannot grow on the same tree nor in the same climate. They are not for that reason parts of other and disunited worlds. They both find a unity in the comprehension of very ordinary mortals as being in the same world and in spite of diversity yielding obedience to the same laws.

Can Pragmatic Pluralism Reach Freedom or Solve the Problem of Evil?

One reason that Mr. James assigned for denying a unitary world was to save some place in it for novelty and innovation.[10] The effort to escape the meshes of absolutism on the one hand, and to avoid the necessities of empiricism on the other, so as to gain a place in the world for freedom, is a laudable one. But here pluralism offers only a false hope. The common example of absolute innovation in our world is that which is introduced by the free human spirit. The moment a free intelligence is posited as the world ground we have our freedom and not in any otherwise.

[10] Some Problems in Philosophy, p. 132.

In similar manner pluralism congratulates itself on having escaped the problem of evil. It escapes it in the sense that having neither God nor absolute the presence of the problem need not be accounted for as a moral obligation. But in the very same terms whereby it escapes the problem it also makes void all moral responsibility in the individual. If that is truth which the individual sees at the moment—and we must hold pluralistic pragmatism to its principles here—then any independent norm of right moral action is as ridiculous as the abstractions of idealism. The maintenance of laws and the punishment of offenders against such ideal right is involved in the same category. What the individual sees for the moment is the true and the good. The individual cannot be blamed for not seeing other than as it presents itself to him. Along with the heralded escape from the problem of evil has come likewise the escape from moral responsibility. One is reminded of what Professor Eucken says of the moral degradation which followed in the wake of the sophistic pragmatism and

which was quoted in the early part of this chapter. Of course Mr. James did not intend this result, for in another place he criticizes materialism because it rules out the moral order of the world.[11]

Yet with all his love for a disunited world, Mr. James seems to tell us of a certain sort of unity, a unity of nature that is coming to pass gradually in proportion as we verify our ideas. It would be difficult to explain such a unity except as a subjective and intellectual one, as the mind reaches conclusions, classifies and generalizes its knowledge. But we have already been warned to abhor all intellectualism, so that even this poor attempt at unity would seem to be denied to a consistent pragmatist.

The whole subject of pluralism has thus been summed up by a recent writer, who says: "As regards pragmatism, it does not furnish us with a pluralistic universe, but

[11] Pragmatism, pp. 105–107. For a discussion of the relation of the Scholastic Free Thinkers to Pragmatism in judging religion by its utility, politically, morally, and socially, and the affirmation that this is the necessary outcome of any pragmatism not theistically grounded, see Lange, History of Materialism, vol. i, pp. 222ff.

with a thinker who interrupts his thinking, an experimenter who breaks off his experiment, whenever it suits his feelings. Pragmatistic thought resembles the artist's thought, in so far as both not only build for the Heart's Desire, but also (as Omar Khayyám forgot to mention) break off and sweep away its own construction whenever the logical necessities, that is, the *peculiarities independent of his wishes*, begin to bore or annoy it. The pluralistic pragmatist takes advantage of the fact (for even he must build with facts!) that we need not always *think on and on*, that there are other subjects and other points of view; in short, that although the independent universe rolls on in its established manner, with or without the music of the spheres and the hymn of Goethe's archangels, human attention can turn upon its ear and for a while dream of its own juicy cabbages or intoxicating effulgent roses."[12]

In commenting on Plato's search for the absolute, Eucken has given in clear statement the argument against all such prag-

[12] Vernon Lee, Vital Lies, vol. ii, pp. 171, 172.

matic schemes of life. "Every human undertaking which seeks to be self-sufficient, and to avoid all responsibility to superior authority, he looks upon as petty and necessarily inadequate. Dominated by a hollow show of independence, such efforts can never produce more than the appearance of virtue and happiness, which is rendered repulsive by its self-complacency. . . . However much that is problematic may remain in Plato's Doctrine of Ideas, the latter discloses a great truth which we cannot relinquish. And that is the recognition of the fact that there is *a realm of truth beyond the likes and dislikes of men;* that truths are valid, not because of our consent, but independently of it, and in a sphere raised above all human opinion and power. Such a conviction is the foundation of the independence of science, and of the secure upbuilding of civilization; only a self-dependent truth can provide laws and norms which elevate human existence because they unite it."[13]

[13] Eucken, Problem of Human Life, pp. 18–21.

CHAPTER IX

BOWNE'S PRAGMATISM, "A STEP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHY"

A Pragmatic Definition of Being

F. C. S. Schiller, in attacking the absolutist idea of God from the pragmatic standpoint, declares that the pragmatic dependence of meaning on purpose "negatives the notion that truth can depend on how things would appear to an all-embracing, or 'absolute' mind. For such a mind could have no purpose. It could not, that is, select part of its content as an object of special interest to be operated upon or aimed at. In human minds, on the other hand, meaning is always selective and purposive."[1]

Bowne is equally antagonistic to the closed system of the absolutist. He too re-

[1] Schiller, Humanism, p. 10.

fused to accept a pantheistic God appearing in all his creations and depending upon them for his own being, hence thinking evil with their evil thoughts and bound to a hideous and unethical world which really is himself. But we must take note of what Schiller's interpretation does to the system. With him truth becomes thoroughly individualistic. One man's "truth" is on as secure a footing as another's. One man's illusions, he being the judge of his truth, are as valid as the most plausible conclusions of another. Schiller seems to feel that there cannot be an independent norm of truth, apart from Absolutism. In the endeavor to get away from all ideas of truth as an abstraction he makes void the value of concrete and particular truth.

Bowne retains his pragmatism, and shows the emptiness of the absolute position without surrendering truth that shall be valid for all. He does this through his definition of being. We have already noted his definition of the real as that which can act or be acted upon. The definition of being naturally follows. It is neither an Abstract

Supreme Idea, nor an Unknowable substance as the base of phenomena. Being is implied in the capacity for intelligent causal action, or the capacity of being intelligently acted upon. He would join with the pragmatists in saying that there is no being apart from purpose, meaning, by that, intelligent purpose. All that exists, then, is the result or manifestation of a supreme active or purposive intelligence and includes the world of lesser intelligences. It has no meaning apart from this intelligence, which is its ground. Mind can understand the movement of matter because both proceed from the same ground. The mind grasps the meaning of the world because it owns a kinship with the intelligence that creates the world. It is itself purposive and self-directing within the world-order. This definition of being escapes the pantheistic conclusion of absolutism and also avoids the mechanical determinism of empiricism.

All being is, then, according to Bowne, essentially causal and active.[2] In reaching this conclusion he guards his position by a

[2] For discussion see Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 17.

very important discrimination between phenomenal or inductive as contrasted with metaphysical efficiency, which is the immanent causality of a Fundamental Unitary Being. Phenomenal causality refers to the laws of change in phenomena which give us the anticipated order of events of science. These may be studied, classified, and verified without reference to their metaphysical ground. Metaphysical efficiency has reference to that Supreme Intelligent Purpose by which all things subsist, and which must be affirmed if there is to be any true knowledge or if the sundered sides of consciousness are to be united.[3]

The Escape from Pluralism and Absolutism to World-Unity

Convinced that there can be no unity without a closed system, with no real freedom and no novelty, the pluralists have rushed to the maintenance of a disjunctive universe. But a disjunctive universe is as much of an impossibility to thought in a sane and intelligible world as a universe

[3] Ibid., pp. 83–90.

absolutely predetermined by a Supreme Idea or by the mechanical necessities of materialism. The refuge taken in a pluralistic universe is simply the attempt to flee from one irrationality to a greater. We find pluralism unable to reconcile change and identity on its impersonal plane. The demon of determinism may be momentarily exorcised, but with the resulting return of seven other demons worse than itself. In maintaining a pluralistic universe the pluralist does not make it disjunctive enough to be consistent. Unless he preserves a certain amount of unity, the unity of a mind able to grasp the fleeting events of time and the baffling appearances of change, all knowledge would be meaningless. Even pluralism would become a jargon of words. The baseless fears of pluralism spring from a failure adequately to define the meaning of unity. Bowne[4] points out the fact that the only real unity of which we are directly aware is the unity of the free and conscious self. The self survives the passing events of experience, relates them to itself under

[4] Metaphysics, p. 91.

the forms of time and space, and makes itself the center of a multitudinous and rapidly changing world. That there is any higher unity than this synthesis of the world by the individual is due to the fact that one is not alone in the universe of intelligence, but is surrounded by a world of self-conscious intelligences which are themselves comprehended in synthesis by a Supreme Personal Intelligence. Through self-conscious and self-acting personality alone can the world be brought into substantial unity. The experiences of the individual, then, become something more than peculiar to himself and valid for more than himself. Living in a world of intelligences, which is maintained by intelligence, his idea of truth must conform, not only to the common-to-all, but, higher than this, to the order of an intelligible world. Thus at a single stroke are we rid of the conflict between mind and matter, noumena and phenomena, and the disjointed and illogical world of pluralism. This is done also without resort to an idealism which, though grand in its conception, is death to the

maintenance of freedom and individuality. How strongly Bowne felt toward the outcome of such a system may be judged by his own words:

"When we consider life at all reflectively, we come upon two facts. First, we have thoughts and feelings and volitions; and these are our own. We also have a measure of self-control, or the power of self-direction. Here, then, in experience we find a certain selfhood and a relative independence. This fact constitutes us real persons, or, rather, it is the meaning of our personality. The second fact is that we cannot regard this life as self-sufficient and independent. How the life is possible we do not know; we only know that it is. How the two facts are put together is altogether beyond us. We only know that we cannot interpret life without admitting both, and that to deny either lands us in contradiction and nonsense. It is no doubt fine, and in some sense it is correct, to say that God is in all things; but when it comes to saying that God is all things, and that all forms of thought and feeling and conduct are his, then reason

simply commits suicide. God thinks and feels in what we call our thinking and feeling; and hence he blunders in our blundering and is stupid in our stupidity. He contradicts himself also with the utmost freedom; for a deal of his thinking does not hang together from one person to another, or from one day to another in the same person. Error, folly, and sin are all made divine; and reason and conscience as having authority vanish. The only thing that is not divine in this scheme is God; and he vanishes into a congeries of contradictions and basenesses."[5]

The Ideal Nature of Time and Space

Next to his doctrine of a Supreme Intelligence as the World-Ground, Bowne is most likely to be denied standing as a Pragmatist because of his position regarding the ideal nature of time and space. Pragmatism of the James type is very prone to fly at anything which bears the suggestion of idealism. Such pragmatism approaches the problems from a realistic if not from a

[5] Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 102.

materialistic standpoint. Nevertheless, the question of the nature of time and space is a momentous one for the cause of pluralistic pragmatism. We have already seen, with Mr. James, how purely objective is their explanation. Space is a sort of entity existing for itself, and time is of similar nature, to be spoken of as if it possessed extension. Mr. James seems to indicate that we are sure of the events of history because time as an enduring entity pokes itself somewhat like a pole into the present. Seeing one end, the present, we can be sure there is another end, though out of sight. It is not surprising that the pragmatists are unwilling to surrender space and time to idealism, for on these two hang all the unity that is left them, and by their own confession some unity is necessary even to a pluralistic universe.

But to consider the question of history, what is there in my present that reminds me of the historic character, Julius Cæsar, or compels me to believe that any such person ever lived? What realistic way is there of being sure that he existed in his

time as I in mine? To arrive at such a conclusion I must rationalize and relate, and this is strictly forbidden by the pragmatic doctrine. Indeed, I can have no idea of the time that has elapsed since Cæsar's day, being myself confined to my threescore years and ten. But I relate events to my own personality in time, and by imagination I relate other events and other days of which I am told, in some sort of consistent order to that time into which my own life falls. By the same token I am able to relate my present time to a fancied order yet to come, and obtain a belief in it only second to that which obtains concerning that which is told me as history.

Without a unitary personality the fleeting facts and changes of our human life could not be related. To-day would have no intelligible relation to yesterday, only that an abiding personality superior to the events, possessing a certain timelessness, relates them to itself. Likewise can we think of the events of history only as they might be the related experiences of a unitary being itself above their flux and change.

The Pragmatic Test for Religious Values

James, speaking of the pragmatic test as applied to religion, says: "If theological ideas prove to have a concrete value for life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much. For how much more they are true will depend entirely on their relations to the other truths that also have to be acknowledged. . . . The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good too for definite assignable reasons."[6] Permission to exist in the pragmatic scheme is of little value to religion, however, in a many sundered world. Without a fundamental intelligence, capable also of moral qualities, with a care for moral law binding on all moral creatures, one's theological beliefs—indeed, one's ideal of the good—becomes momentary and individual. The belief which is found to be true for one man will be found equally false for another. There could be under such a system no common moral imperative to receive the

[6] Pragmatism, pp. 73, 76.

sanction of all moral beings. Yet this is one of the common experiences in life.

Bowne applied the pragmatic test to religion, but from a very different standpoint. Affirming a moral governor of the world, he yet held that the test of theological opinion, of so-called religious experience, must ever lie in actual life. "How does it work in life?" was a question proper to any religious belief whatever. By the practical answer must the theory stand or fall.

On the other hand, those beliefs that have been found contributing toward a higher civilization, a nobler moral order, a clearer conception of duty and the greatest good to the race, carry with them their own credentials, which cannot be speculatively overthrown.

SECTION IV
BOWNE AND SOME PRESENT-DAY THINKERS

CHAPTER X

BERGSON, THE ABSTRACTIONS OF AN IMPERSONAL PHILOSOPHY

Can Knowledge and Life Be Brought Together on the Empirical Basis?

Bergson approaches the problems of philosophy from the standpoint of empiricism. He denies the conclusions of idealism and at the same time opposes the claims of materialism. He says: "We maintain as against materialism, that perception overflows infinitely the cerebral state; but we have endeavored to establish as against idealism, that matter goes in every direction beyond our representation of it, a representation which the mind has gathered out of it, so to speak, by an intelligent choice. Of these two opposite doctrines, the one attributes to the body and the other to the intellect a true power of creation, the first insisting that our brain begets represen-

tation and the second that our understanding designs the plan of nature. And against these two doctrines we invoke the same testimony, that of consciousness, which shows us our body as one image among others and our understanding as a certain faculty of dissociating, of distinguishing, of opposing logically, but not of creating or of constructing."[1]

He states the problem of philosophy to be the bringing together of the sundered sides of consciousness, matter and mind, life and knowledge, and discloses the fatal flaw in the Spencerian system: "It is necessary that these two inquiries, theory of knowledge and theory of life, should join each other. . . . Together they may solve by a method more sure, brought nearer to experience, the great problems that philosophy poses. For if they should succeed in their common enterprise, they would show us the formation of the intellect, and thereby the genesis of that matter of which our intellect traces the general configuration. They would dig to the very

[1] Matter and Memory, p. 236.

root of nature and of mind. They would substitute for the false evolutionism of Spencer—which consists of cutting up present reality already evolved, into little bits no less evolved, and then recomposing it with these fragments, thus positing in advance everything that is to be explained—a true evolutionism, in which reality would be followed in its generation and its growth."[2]

Of being, Bergson says, "Being, in ourselves, is becoming, progress and growth."[3] Being is, then, a part of the act of consciousness, matter and mind conjoined in perception. The consciousness, freighted with all its past, comes to the act of perception in the present. This activity, the consonance of being and knowing, is the very essence of reality.

What Bergson is seeking after is something more than mechanical causation that would make thought the mere product of material forces, while, on the other hand, he seeks to establish a world which shall

[2] Creative Evolution, p. xiii, f.

[3] Sc. Le Roy, Philosophy of Bergson, p. 38.

not be dependent on the individual judgment. A world of mechanical causation is a closed system and negates the reality of knowledge. A world which must search for its reality in a Divine Idea alone takes away all possibility of novelty or uniqueness. Bergson sees that there is a factor of which neither side has taken account, the factor of novelty, without which there can be no progress or evolution. This factor he introduces under the name of "vital impulse," which he makes the seat of reality.

Does he, then, reach the goal for which he has striven—the unity of mind and matter, of knowledge and life? He has if we are to accept his word as the final authority in the matter. But his position contains certain important implications that vitiate the system.

Time as Duration

To escape the Spencerian snare of mechanical explanation, Bergson gives to the idea of time as duration the leading role in his philosophy. Instead of time being, on the one hand, an external reality upon

which are strung successive experiences, or, on the other, a relating of experiences by an abiding personality as with Bowne, Bergson takes a position less clear, that the individual contains within himself the past at any moment. Duration is not a mere succession of appearances, but himself, his individuality. His stock illustration of this is the rolling snowball: "My mental state," he says, "as it advances on the road of time, is continually swelling with the duration which it accumulates; it goes on increasing—rolling upon itself, as a snowball on the snow."[4] "The past follows us at every instant; all that we have thought, felt, and willed from our earliest infancy is there, leaning over the present which is about to join it, pressing against the portals of consciousness that would fain leave it outside. . . . What are we, in fact, what is our character, if not the condensation of the history we have lived from our birth—nay, even before our birth, since we bring with us prenatal dispositions."[5]

[4] Creative Evolution, p. 2.

[5] Creative Evolution, pp. 4, 5.

To understand the implication of this doctrine it is necessary to pause and ask ourselves a few pertinent questions. Granted that time is but a bastard space, and is nothing apart from experience. Is it not something apart from my individual experience? Granted that I derive my sense of duration from my own past states. What gives me power to go beyond my individual experience? If time is nothing apart from individual experiences, how can any two of us come by the same calendar? Why does my time coincide with yours? Why is my sense of time greater, the fewer the experiences that fill my day, and shorter, the more multiplied these experiences? If this duration is myself and at the same time a consciousness, why is it that all memories are not with me at the same moment, and all are not equally at my command? How does attention come in to fix some events indelibly in my mind while I may deliberately choose to reject others? Is not this power of choice, this principle of freedom, something apart from the mere consciousness, possessing in itself the power

of direction? How, having never experienced it in consciousness, can I exercise the historical sense?

To avoid the deadlock raised by such questions as these, we are told of racial memories passed along from generation to generation. Much language is used to describe an imaginary stream or current of life. We have been warned to beware of abstraction in speaking of life, but now it seems expedient to say: "At a certain moment, at certain points in space, a visible current has taken rise; this current of life, traversing the bodies it has organized one after another, passing from generation to generation, has become divided amongst species and distributed amongst individuals without losing anything of its force."[6] Thus have we fallen into that very fallacy of abstraction against which Bergson had warned us.

If there is a racial memory which flows along with and is a part of this current of life, just what is it, speaking concretely? It remains to be proved that we can inherit

[6] Creative Evolution, p. 26.

the intellectual ideas of our ancestors. More's the pity for many of us. But it seems reasonable to say that there can be no experience apart from an experiencing intelligence. How, then, can the experiences of my own immediate ancestors, not to mention those of my cousins and my aunts, become the property of my consciousness until they are grasped through an effort of my intelligence? Here it is evident our progress was only verbal.

Further: if time is duration, we must ask, "For whom?" Events can be gathered up and related only by a consciousness which not only endures, but is also a self-relating personality. This personality can relate itself to events outside of its experience only as they and it find relation through a higher, self-relating Personality, which is not fragmentary, but which knows all.

The "Vital Impulse" Assumed for the Sake of Freedom

To free the individual from becoming a mere mechanism whose present is the pro-

duct of past states, and to give place to initiative, Bergson introduces the factor which he calls the "vital impulse." He says: "The role of life is to insert some indetermination into matter. Indeterminate, i. e., unforeseeable, are the forms it creates in the course of its evolution."[7] It is the "vital impulse" which gives rise to new possibilities. It is the source and explanation of evolution. Instead of a closed mechanical universe, we have one in which any miracle may occur. While avoiding a universe of mechanism on the one hand, and a fore-ordered world on the other, he seems to choose a world in which God himself cannot know what is going to happen.

It is difficult to see how in such a scheme it is possible to preserve any order of nature whatever. All purpose, order, or predictableness is especially horrifying as implying a closed system and an absence of freedom. The "vital impulse" raised to the power of a self-directive intelligent personality would give ground, not only for freedom, but also for the usual order of

[7] Creative Evolution, p. 126.

phenomena. The very order of occurrence would be based upon such a Supreme Will. By gaining freedom without such a Personality Bergson undoes the possibility of a unitary world of relations. This conclusion has been very well brought out by the criticism of a well-known writer: "If for the magic power of types invoked by Aristotle we substituted, with M. Bergson, the magic power of the '*elan vital*,' that is, of evolution in general, we should be referring events not to finer, more familiar, more pervasive processes, but to one all-embracing process, unique and always incomplete. Our understanding would end in something far vaguer and looser than what our observation began with. Aristotle at least could refer particulars to their specific types, as medicine and social science are still glad enough to do, to help them in guessing and in making a learned show before the public. But if divination and eloquence—for science is out of the question—were to invoke nothing but a fluid tendency to grow, we should be left with a flat history of phenomena and no means of

prediction or even classification. All knowledge would be reduced to gossip, infinitely diffuse, perhaps enlisting our dramatic feelings, but yielding no intellectual mastery of experience, no practical competence, and no moral lesson. The world would be a serial novel, to be continued forever, and all men mere novel readers."[8]

A Harmony Due to Identity of Impulsion

Having rejected both radical mechanism and radical finalism, Bergson attributes those harmonies in nature that have furnished materials for the teleological argument of theology to an identity of impulsion rather than to an aspiration after any future goal existent in the mind of a Creator. He says: "If the evolution of life is something other than a series of adaptations to accidental circumstances, so also it is not the realization of a plan. A plan is given in advance. It is represented, or at least representable, before its realization."[9]

[8] Santayana, Winds of Doctrine, p. 68.

[9] Creative Evolution, p. 52.

Such harmony, he concludes, would be won only at the expense of freedom. "If, on the contrary, the unity of life is to be found solely in the impetus that pushes it along the road of time, the harmony is not in front, but behind."[10]

At this point we ought to stop and take inventory of our ideas to be saved from being swept along on the wave of undefined terms. What do we mean by unity of life? Is the "impetus" something that survives the passage of time and events. If there is to be a continuity in an impetus, something must keep its identity. Just what would the identity of a changing impetus be? We cannot have identity without something to be identical. To have consciousness of change there must be an abiding element that survives change. Personality is the only reality in life which we can actually posit as causing or experiencing change and yet itself maintaining its identity. Is the "vital impulse," then, an unchanging personality? If it is not (and we are given no such clue to its nature), then all must have

[10] Creative Evolution, p. 103.

been set going in some past time. In that case we have not escaped from the closed system Bergson seeks to avoid, but have, rather, fallen back into the pit. If it is not a personality, and yet acts in the present in lives so diverse as Mr. Bergson's and mine, of what does the unity consist?

Out of this positing of the "vital impetus" grows Bergson's definition of God: "God has nothing of the already made; he is unceasing life, action, freedom. Creation, so conceived, is not a mystery; we experience it ourselves when we act freely."[11]

By this definition he hopes to escape the dilemma just mentioned. This is because he senses the fact that his problem cannot be met on the impersonal plane. It remains to inquire if the God of his definition is sufficient for the need. To provide the necessary impetus we have a growing, changing, becoming God. The question at once arises as to how a becoming God, who is himself a part of the general movement, could, with a constantly changing mind, outlook, and purpose, furnish an identity of impulsion.

[11] Creative Evolution, pp. 104, 105.

Where are we to find the looked-for harmony? Will the harmony be for this day, this hour, or this minute? It includes all? Then we cannot avoid pantheism, and every kind of impulse, criminal and saintly, the strange gamut of human heroism and beastliness, are a part of God and issue from the "vital impetus." We have crawled in by the cellar window to find ourselves once more in the pent-up quarters of Absolutism, out of the front door of which we recently marched with drums beating and banners flaunting. What Eucken says of the spiritual life is here equally applicable to the thought of a becoming God: "Spiritual life must never be understood as an entire Becoming—as a mere Process—for, if this were the case, Truth would become the mere slave of its age; and such a state of things would mean an inner destruction of Truth."[12] In the same way a becoming God falls prey to his own creation, is no God.

But Bergson's object in positing a God is to provide a ground of duration which shall

[12] Eucken, Knowledge and Life, p. 228.

include all human experiences of duration. We have already noted the timeless element necessary to all consciousness of change. If we are to have a God who will be a real Ground, he must himself be more than a creation of time, else there is nothing in the thought of duration as Bergson employs the term. But we cannot admit the assumption of a God not a creation of time without being led far afield from Bergson's standpoint. Bowne has well expressed the relation of the Supreme Being to time in his discussion of the Kantian philosophy:

"The bringing of the present with the resultant time judgment into relation to activity greatly modifies the subject. We call those things present which we possess in the certain immediacy of consciousness, and if we possessed all our experiences in a similar immediacy, the whole experience would be present in the same sense. There would still be a certain order of arrangement among the factors of experience which could not arbitrarily be modified, but all the members of the series would be equally present to the consciousness. If, now, there were a

being who could retain all the facts of his experience in the same immediacy, he would have no past. And, further, if such a being were in full possession of himself, so as to be under no law of development and possessing no unrealized potentialities, he would also have no future, at least so far as his own existence might be concerned. His present world would be all-embracing, and his now would be eternal. These considerations modify our judgment of the subjectivity of time very profoundly. Taking up once more the question, Are we in time? we see that it has several meanings and the answers must vary to correspond. If it means, Are things and events in a real time which flows on independently of them? the answer must be, No. If it means, Does our experience have the temporal form? the answer must be, Yes. If we further inquire about the possibility of transcending temporal limitations, it is clear that this can be affirmed only of the Absolute Being, for only in him do we find that complete self-possession which the transcendence of time would mean. Nontemporality, then, in the

concrete sense cannot be reached by passing behind the world of phenomena into the world of noumena, but, rather, and only by rising above the sphere of the finite into the absolute self-possession of the infinite."[13]

Bergson lacks what Bowne had so clearly, a Personal World-Ground, himself the unchanging Cause of change. Bergson leaves out of reckoning that purpose which makes humanity great. For man is indeed great in the universe and the lord of all only as behind his little and short-sighted purpose lies a deeper Purpose which is also a Person.

In this connection my attention has been called to a letter written by Mr. Bergson to Father Joseph de Tonquedec, S. J., and quoted in a recent review of Bergson's philosophy:[14]

"I speak of God (pp. 268–272 of L'Evolution Creatrice) as of the *source* whence issue successively, by an effect of his freedom, the 'currents' or 'impulses' each of which will make a world; he therefore, re-

[13] Bowne, Kant and Spencer, pp. 158, 159.

[14] Ruhe and Paul, Henri Bergson, an Account of his Life and Philosophy, p. 42.

mains distinct from them, and it is not of him that we can say that 'most often it turns aside' or it is 'at the mercy of the materiality that it has been bound to adopt.'". . . Again he is quoted as saying: "From all this emerges clearly the idea of a God, Creator and free, the generator of both matter and life, whose work of creation is continued on the side of life by the evolution of species and the building up of human personalities. From all this emerges, consequently, a refutation of monism and of pantheism in general."[15]

The reply to this is that if Mr. Bergson wishes to hold to this conception of God, he must modify his system. He here assumes that God is made free by fiat. This statement does not remove the yoke of necessity which must ever hang about the neck of a Being whose mind, thought, and moral character are in process of becoming—that is, who is himself a creature of time. It is not enough to affirm that God always existed. We must go still further and ask what he was at first. In the case of a be-

[15] Ibid., p. 44.

coming God he may not have been God in the beginning. He may have grown to that estate. Mental and moral perfection and timelessness, in other words, are necessary to our thought of God. A lesser Being may be a blind demiurge, but possessing no personality, becomes inevitably the victim of his own world. If Mr. Bergson wishes to avoid a pantheistic God, it devolves upon him to modify his philosophy, and to so clear his definitions that a pantheistic God will not be implied.

His Doctrine of Knowledge

We must not leave this brief review of Bergson's system without looking at his doctrine of intelligence and intuition as contrasting forms of knowledge. He suggests that intuition really gets nearer to life, while intellect is, by the nature of the mind, bound to the rigors of geometrical explanation. The knowledge gained by intuition is, however, intensive, and applicable only in a realm of limited life. But intelligence is able to transcend itself: "There are things that intelligence alone is able to

seek, but which, by itself, it will never find. These things instinct alone could find; but it will never seek them."[16]

Intuition leads us to the very inwardness of life. Intelligence, however, had the ability to turn inward on itself and to "awaken the potentialities of intuition which slumber within it."[17] Intuition "is a lamp almost extinguished, which only glimmers now and then, for a few moments at most. But it glimmers wherever a vital interest is at stake. On our personality, on our liberty, on the place we occupy in the whole of nature, on our origin, and perhaps also on our destiny, it throws a light feeble and vacillating, but none the less pierces the darkness of the night in which the intellect leaves us. . . . Philosophy introduces us thus into the spiritual life. And it shows us at the same time the relation of the life of the spirit to that of the body. . . . A philosophy of intuition will be a negation of science, will be sooner or later swept away by science, if it does not resolve to see the

[16] Creative Evolution, p. 151.
[17] Ibid., p. 182.

life of the body just where it really is, on the road that leads to the life of the spirit. But it will then no longer have to do with definite living beings. Life as a whole from the initial impulsion that thrust it into the world will appear as a wave which rises, and which is opposed by the descending movement of matter. On the greater part of its surface, at different heights, the current is converted by matter into a vortex. At one point alone it passes freely, dragging with it the obstacle which will weigh on its progress, but will not stop it. At this point is humanity; it is our privileged situation. On the other hand, this rising wave is consciousness, and, like all consciousness, it includes potentialities without number which interpenetrate and to which consequently neither the category of unity nor that of multiplicity is appropriate, made as they both are for inert matter. The matter that it bears along with it and in the interstices of which it inserts itself, alone can divide it into distinct individualities. On flows the current, running through human generations, subdividing itself into

individuals. This subdivision was vaguely indicated in it, but could not have been made clear without matter. Thus souls are continually being created, which nevertheless, in a certain sense, preexisted. . . . All the living hold together, and all yield to the same tremendous push. The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, and the whole of humanity, in space and in time, is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death."[18]

It seems a pity to disturb the grandeur of words that for abstraction would do credit to the absolute philosophy itself. Out of the mazes two pertinent questions arise. The first has respect to the intuitive nature of religion and its contrast with anything intellectual. If intuitive knowledge is closer to life, and religion is grasped by intuition alone, why does not the savage possess the highest form of religion? To ask this question is to perceive its answer. To follow

[18] Creative Evolution, pp. 269–271.

reason in religion instead of blind impulse is to be moral and to attain the highest reaches of character. Religion without the intellectual content has ever proved unworthy and inadequate. Furthermore, if we are to posit any reality in "the life of the spirit," we must provide some ground for it in the "vital impulse" with its essence of Becoming. If we do this, we shall have a God who is only growing from wickedness to righteousness, and we obtain a reversal of moral standards and responsibilities.

The second question arises out of the statement that the life of the spirit will "no longer have to do with definite living being." We at once ask what such a life of the spirit would mean, and what it would amount to if it meant anything. By the definition it could mean nothing for human beings; and if it meant anything to God or to the "vital impulse," we would have no means of ascertaining. All of which goes to show that we have been regaled with a form of words and a sound of wisdom.

That Bergson has done a real service to philosophy by calling attention to intelli-

gence and intuition as contrasting forms of knowledge cannot be gainsaid. The idea is vast in its possibility of explaining the abnormalities of genius, the uniqueness of Jesus, the authority of divine revelation, and the possibility of revelation to those who, untrained in the schools, are yet open to the deepest voices of our being. Bergson's proclamation of the value of the common intuitions, the possibility of the possession of the deepest insights by the unlettered, is one of the things that have drawn to him great popular attention. But that his ideas lack the metaphysical grounding that would make them most effective must be admitted. The truth of this statement will never be more evident than upon comparison of the abstractions of Bergson's impersonalism with the directness of Bowne's personalism.

CHAPTER XI

EUCKEN—THE RETURN TO SPIRITUAL VERITY

So many excellent expositions and reviews of the important work of this leading thinker of the present time have already appeared that it is here unnecessary to do more than touch upon the few leading features of his system in order to gather the affinity and relationship of his thought with that of Bowne.

The two thinkers possess essential features in common. There was between them the warmest personal regard and mutual appreciation. Their harmony was arrived at quite independently, though both had been pupils of Lotze. We are told that the young Eucken was not favorably impressed with Lotze, and after a short time at Göttingen passed on to another university. On the other hand, Bowne is most often known for his likeness to his former teacher. The similarities between Bowne and Eucken, however, lie, rather, along the line of the

positions to which Bowne advanced independently of Lotze. The strength of the latter lay, rather, in his dialectic and in his power of clear criticism than in constructiveness and advance.

Reality Must Include More Than Things, and More Than Ideas

Eucken opposes the pretensions of the naturalistic school to include the whole world in the experience of phenomena, which leads direct to skepticism and the denial of knowledge. He also takes issue with the Absolute Philosophy, which would confine all truth to vague and shadowy ideas. He will not deny reality to the objective world, nor will he allow that the world of thought is of itself complete. He points, rather, to the value of the ideal as something toward which man may bend his energies in achievement. It is possible for intellect to arrive at great and inspiring ideals, but these find content and value only as they are achieved. He points out the impossibility of moral victory and of progress in history and civilization, if man

is to be left at the dead level of a phenomenal and disunited world. It is the power of intellectual synthesis which enables man to apprehend truth and then by actual struggle to make the truth his own in character. In this "activism" Eucken would unite the subjective and objective worlds, the clue to whose relationship he finds in the life of the spirit. The spiritual in man is thus seen as something not so indefinite as to be a mere bringer of individual peace and comfort, as has often been the case with the followers of absolutism. Nothing is really had apart from struggle and the realization of the ideal in life. Spiritual truth, from being a wandering child of intellect or emotion, becomes a fundamental fact, the fundamental reality, for in its outworking it is the highest expression of man's very being.

Truth Must Have a Common Validity

Though insisting that ideal truth must find its value and verification in actual living, Eucken would resent being classed as a pragmatist according to the type of William James. He saves his pragmatic test of the

reality of the ideal from falling into the pluralistic confusion of the latter by asserting the universal validity of truth. Truth has an authoritative validity far above the power of individual thought or caprice. James' repugnance to all general ideas and to all absolute standards led him to a view of truth which made it the victim of the individual notion, the individual himself being the sole judge of what is useful, good, and, therefore, true. No one has shown more clearly than Eucken the absurdity and worthlessness of a truth whose only norm is its utility for the individual on a given occasion. To make the truth thus the prey of individual choices, of individual standards of judgment and states of civilization, is to destroy its own inner character. So while bringing all ideals to the pragmatic test of action, he would claim for them a validity outlasting the moment of realization by a single individual. The great norms of truth lift themselves up like mountains in the moral consciousness of men as something worthy to be achieved, and will ever so lift themselves, independent of the moral

failure to achieve, either on the part of any one man, or of any class of men, or of an epoch or an age. Thus Eucken assumes theism as the very ground of truth.

"We look at nature very differently from our forefathers. It no longer seems to us a realm of soulful harmony and blessed peace, but, rather, a complex riddle, the arena on which a perpetual struggle for existence is being enacted. Men too, in the wild vortex of political and social struggles, lose the romantic glory of former days; and even the exaltation of personality so usual to-day, of its grandeur, dignity, and so on—unless grounded on something greater and deeper —becomes merely a hollow and irrelevant phrase, especially in an age which so forces upon our notice the smallness and self-seeking of man. As things stand the only choice is between theism and atheism."[1]

Eucken's Personal Idealism, the Realization of the Life of the Spirit

It will be readily seen that Eucken's interests lie naturally with idealism in that he

[1] Eucken, Can We Still Be Christians? p. 144.

defends and maintains the necessity of the ideal to all true progress. He does not thereby, however, commit himself to that system of necessity in which intellectualism finds itself. Reality lies, not in the Divine as a passive thing, but, rather, in its realization, in its springing into action in the concrete. At the same time that he thus makes place for freedom and initiative he escapes that pantheism into which absolute idealism inevitably falls. The only difference here between Eucken and Bowne is one of emphasis rather then essence.

Bowne brings his thought to great clearness and definiteness by gathering it up into his definition of personality. The difference is not constitutional. It has been Bowne's distinctive task to develop the idea of personality. Eucken's peculiar work has been to emphasize the place and reality of the life of the spirit.

The Absence of the Christological Interest

There is at one point an essential difference between Bowne and Eucken. This is

at the point which affects the Christological interest, which is a very important part of Bowne's system. With Eucken, the appearance of the Deity in a historic point of time, speaking likewise an eternal message, is unthinkable. The realization of the moral idea agrees inevitably with a slow advance toward such an ideal. The ideal itself is affected by its realization. Any revelation of a perfect ideal in a historic personality seems to him to put a stop to struggle and progress. To him such revelation is incongruous with imperfect human comprehension and achievement. Eucken himself tells us of the impossibility of the atheistic standpoint and assumes theism as the necessary moral grounding of the ideal which lifts it above the individual judgments and caprices of men to universal validity. To Bowne this very view would demand the incarnation for its completion. Eucken has spoken of love as a manifestation of this universally valid moral ideal. Yet it would be impossible in a world of pain and error, of human vanity and failure, of ruthless and crushing brute force, to conceive of love as

the possession of the Supreme Moral Being unless we had been directed to it through the life of Jesus himself. The incarnation becomes in the experience of man the most effective spur to the realization of that ideal. The deity of Jesus hinges upon this moral necessity. We have again and again in human history the example of men in a supreme self-renunciation giving their lives for the realization of the higher moral aims and happiness of their fellow men. What shall we conclude concerning a magnified personality, the abode of absolute ideals, who can do no more than give advice by which to offset the disheartening evils and the crushing sorrows of the world? Without an incarnation man would himself be capable of a moral grandeur and outlook of which God would give no evidence. The incarnation is necessary to save the thought of moral perfection in God. An incarnation past or an incarnation to come would seem to Bowne to be implied by the demands of thought.

"If God had filled space and time with inanimate worlds, that would have revealed

only power and skill. If he had filled the world with pleasure-giving contrivances, that would have revealed benevolence. If he had sent us prophets and teachers at no real cost to himself, that too would be something; but it would not greatly stir our hearts toward God. Our love would go out to the prophets and teachers themselves, for the toil and pain would fall on them. In all beneficence of this sort God would appear simply as a rich man who out of his abundance scatters bounty to the needy, but at no cost to himself. A certain gratitude would indeed be possible, but along this line God would forever remain morally below the moral heroes of our race. Their gifts cost. They put themselves and their hearts into their work. They attain to the morality of self-sacrifice, and this is infinitely beyond the morality of any giving that does not cost. And there must ever be a higher moral possibility until we reach the revelation of God in self-sacrifice, until God becomes the chief of burden-bearers and the leader of all in self-abnegation. . . . Thus the power of God's revelation has

its chief source in the incarnation. And we may be perfectly sure that no lower conception of God will permanently command the minds and hearts of men. We should not have reached the conception ourselves, but now that it has been revealed to us, we see that something of the kind is a moral necessity if we are to think the highest thought of God. And there is a peculiar dialectic in human thought whereby we are compelled to think of God as perfect or not at all. An imperfect God is none. As soon as a higher conception emerges we must adopt it into our thought of God or see our faith in him fade out until it vanishes altogether. A fairly good God we cannot abide. We can be satisfied with nothing less than the supreme and the perfect. Hence it is that the Christian thought of God wins its way. It is the only one worthy of God or man."[2]

How God could empty himself to become a partaker in human toils and sorrows will remain, of course, inexplicable. It will also remain beyond our comprehension how a

[2] Bowne, Studies in Christianity, pp. 96, 104.

timeless personality could reveal himself to any part of his world in any degree, or, in revealing the moral ideal to man, consent to work under the limitations of time. The particular ground of this difficulty is in the confusing of the power world with the space and time world.

If, however, the debate should rage about the thought of the possession by the historic Jesus in the flesh of all the divine powers and attributes in order to establish his Deity, we have recourse to the theory of the Kenosis. We believe his deity is sufficiently verified by the revelation of perfect moral character which formed the supreme object of his revelation. The deity of Jesus is proved neither by genealogy nor miracle in themselves.

The character and personality of Jesus is the world's great miracle. The most convincing test for the present age is to be found in the essentially universal mastership of the character of Jesus, and his ability to satisfy the moral and spiritual demands of all classes and conditions of men. No other man, prophet or hero, ever lived that could

for any length of time, for all races of man, fulfill in his own character their highest ideal of the character of God. Eucken speaks of him as classified with other great geniuses. Viewed from the single standpoint of his teaching of moral truth, this might be. One might come with transcendent spiritual insight to do for the realm of religion what Shakespeare and Mozart have done in the realm of literature and music. But great genius has too often been commonplace in morals and in ideals. There is no certainty that a future age may not produce a greater master than either. The love and the passion of Jesus, his revelation of the moral character of God, can never be transcended so long as humanity shall retain its essential nature. But Jesus is much more than the teacher of a truth which has not been transcended. In the case of spiritual revelation, the personality of the teacher is quite as important as his message. Not only are his truths compelling for all classes of men, his personality has never been transcended as the supreme goal of man's achievement. He thus remains undimmed

above the march of ages, and every moral advance of the race but serves to increase the appreciation in which he is held. The actual test between Jesus and other geniuses is to be found in his character, in himself. His deity is to be read in the universal compulsion and validity of his order of life. Incarnation is the easiest and most satisfying explanation of the character of Jesus. All others break down.

Disagreement with his Christological views is likely to blind the eyes of many of the most conscientious to the greatness and the importance to religion of the work of Rudolf Eucken. He easily represents the supreme philosophical message of our day, and his constructive work and leadership promises to wield a profound influence in the cause of faith. His voice comes to his time like that of one of the Hebrew prophets, when the age engrossed in the pursuit of material things was forgetting that it had a soul at all. He speaks to an age that in its scientific thinking has steadily barred out the spiritual as an illusion and a dream. He speaks to a world of philosophy which

to a large degree has lost its way in the meshes of skepticism and materialism. And his word is ever for the reality of the higher things of the spirit, in behalf of the necessity for the moral regeneration of man, and the life that is lived in conscious harmony with God. He shows in phrases of beauty and convincing power that though a man possess the whole world, if he loses his own soul he has utterly failed. For back of all our getting and enjoying the fundamental truth of life is the spiritual. Adapting an old, old thought, the chief end of man is the realization of God.

CHAPTER XII

BOWNE'S PERSONALISM AND THE PROBLEMS OF LIFE

At the risk of repetition, it may be well to touch upon the relation of Personalism to some of the problems of life. Bowne saw, as few others, how impossible it is to account for an intelligible and orderly world, for knowledge and for spiritual reality, on the plane of the impersonal. This was his distinctive contribution to philosophy. So clear was his criticism along this line that all metaphysical thinking will be forced to take account of it.

Unity Possible Only Through Personalism

Personalism is the most reasonable solution of the problem of unity. A unity obtained by assuming a unitary substance must inevitably negate the reality of knowledge, mind, and spirit. A unity which is won by lifting time and space into realities

independent of all intelligence, involves confusion no less than that of materialism. Time as duration cannot be thought without a clearly defined personality which is more than consciousness, more than memory, self-directing and free. Change and identity are irreconcilable except through an abiding Personality surviving above their fluctuations. A unity obtained by assuming an Absolute of whose thought the world is but the outworking, ends in a pantheism fatal to all freedom or individuality. If instead of naming a vague Absolute as the ground of all things, we assume a free Personality upholding the world of things, and the world of spirits endowed by him with a freedom akin to his own, then all is well. There exists, then, no insoluble problem of how the mind can grasp matter or of how its knowledge can represent reality. It is no longer necessary to attempt the tracing of matter and motion and molecular change into the brain cells to account for an idea of beauty or an aspiration of the soul after God. We note for scientific or pathological purposes the physical changes and the psy-

chological results, but we no longer dream that we have grasped all the factors in the process, nor do we relegate to the realm of unreality all that our investigation fails to explain. We think truly of the world of matter because the world of matter is founded in an Intelligence related to our own. The mind and the world are by their very nature prepared to correspond and co-operate, and both find synthesis and agreement in that intelligent Personality which is able to grasp all and to act in all.

There is no longer a conflict between science and religion, because the laws of nature are seen as the self-imposed ways of the Divine in bringing forth the order of change. Natural laws are not erected into an independent system in which God is a slave, for they are but the uniformities of his activity. The deductions which we draw from the order of sequence are not to be given a causal efficiency.

Personalism and Freedom

We thus come to the problem of freedom and necessity. Freedom is not provided for

in any naturalistic scheme whatever. This is not alone because of innate or *a priori* ideas which cannot be traced to experience. It is not merely inability to trace the products of reflection to appropriate nervous excitations. The power of self-directing personality to introduce its own will as a new factor into the order of nature is too evident in common experience to be overlooked. This introduction of purpose to modify the natural processes is something of which nature herself is evidently incapable. The mechanical system of causation would not only deprive man of individuality, but would preclude the possibility of moral action.

The outcome of absolutism of the extreme type is very close to that of materialism despite their wide difference of spirit and of aim. Absolutism, seeing in all a manifestation of the Divine Idea, cannot escape making God a moral monster, responsible for the weaknesses, errors, and sins of men. By the same token man would be no longer morally responsible, because he would not be free. He would be but the unresisting tool

through which the Divine works sometimes good and sometimes ill.

On the personal plane we can affirm a good and perfect God who has given to man a personality measurably like his own, free to act in accordance with or against the Divine will. Moral action is of like nature in God and man, being voluntarily chosen in distinction from wrong. Man becomes thus morally responsible, and his freedom to make a confusion of God's world is a gift to which he is to be held strictly to account. He is no longer to be considered as giving forth the thoughts and activities to which he is compelled by physical environment, nor is he an automaton, finding all his thoughts of holiness or wickedness inspired by the Eternal, the manifestations of whose thought under the absolutist scheme, they would be.

Personalism and the Problem of Evil

The schools of idealism and of materialism find equal difficulty when they face the problem of evil. If one were compelled to choose between the two, the dilemma which

they present is this: either a God who is as responsible for evil as he is for good, or a world that is essentially unmoral. In either case it would be impossible to hold to individual moral responsibility. No doubt if all the wrong that springs from immoral thinking and acting were eliminated, the great mass of evil that depresses man and creates his problem would be done away. Still there would remain the mysteries of pain and death, and for these it would at first seem almost impossible to clear the Infinite Personality. This point is the rock on which theism is supposed to wreck itself.

One thing is certain: there can be no satisfactory solution for human spirits along the line of blind, purposeless, impersonal causation. If our sorrows, griefs, and ills are not for discipline after some manner, we have simply to cry into the dark. We may not be able to satisfy our minds, but we certainly cannot satisfy our souls except through assuming a divine purpose which works good in our behalf through pain. When to the demand of our spirits we add the consciousness of our limitations in

knowledge and our lack of understanding of disciplines which have afterward proved the most substantial blessings, we can see how an Intelligence not bound to the temporal form of experience, seeing the end from the beginning, in view of the moral discipline attained, might account the whole course as very good. Why discipline should be necessary is a question bound up with that of the attainment of character. That it is necessary is a commonplace of experience.

If the further question of the suffering of the innocent for the guilty is invoked, we can only say that, in such a case, suffering is a contribution to the moral progress of the world. Voluntarily accepted, it becomes to the sufferer, by that strange mystery of personality, the deepest and most satisfying joy that life can give. If to this thought should be added the thought of the Creator of all entering with moral fullness into human life and giving himself for the moral welfare of his creatures, we should at once make possible the maintenance of theism in the face of the problem of evil. This assumption would also be in strict keeping

with the deepest facts of religion and of life. In the world around us we begin to see

> On every side
> Great hints of Him go by—
> Souls that are hourly crucified
> On some new Calvary!
>
> . . . . . .
>
> In flower and dust, in chaff and grain,
> He binds Himself and dies!
> We live by His eternal pain,
> His hourly sacrifice.[3]

What of death, that last but not most inexplicable of mysteries? No man who has had wide experience of life is unaware that in a world of physical and moral infirmity there frequently arise situations to which death itself is a welcome relief. Here, as before, there is no explanation on the impersonal plane. The world has too often witnessed the cynicism and moral flabbiness of those who assume that there is no survival of death. That assumption has long been proved as not the road that leads to high moral achievement and the enrichment of life with things most precious. So

[3] Noyes, "Vicisti Galileæ," Collected Poems, vol. i, p. 244.

much there is for the practical side of the argument.

On the theoretical side is still another consideration. In our knowledge we are shut up to the present order of existence. We cannot look at life from the standpoint of any other order. It might be that to see it from another order would transmute death into blessed good fortune, the thing most to be desired. It might indeed be found that

> "Death is but a change of key,
> In life the golden melody."

On the personal plane, then, if we can trust the wisdom of the Supreme Personal Intelligence, even the last of the dark problems, if not finding abstract solution, may yet find one sufficient for the individual need. Even Henley, with his sense of pessimism, could come to look on death with complacency as the benediction of a departing day, thrilled with the sense of the triumphing night,

> Night with her train of stars
> And her great gift of sleep.

In this mood he could pray with a steady courage,

"So be my passing!
My task accomplished and the long day done,
My wages taken, and in my heart
Some late lark singing."

Here too he came to look for the solution of earthly misunderstanding and irreconcilable ills as voiced in lines said to have been addressed to Robert Louis Stevenson:

O Death and Time they chime and chime
Like bells at sunset falling!
They end the song, they right the wrong,
They set the old echoes calling:
For Death and Time bring on the prime
Of God's own chosen weather,
And we lie in the peace of the Great Release
As once in the grass together.

It is not only impossible to face the problem of evil with any satisfaction apart from the personalistic view. The problem can never be solved in the abstract. It must be solved in each particular case as it arises. In some cases this seems quite impossible, but in most death comes as a benevolence to the individual, second only to birth itself. For, after all, the value of

a life is not determined by its length, but by its realization of the highest things.

Let the great winds their worst and wildest blow,
Or the gold weather mellow round us slow:
We have fulfilled ourselves, and we can dare
And we can conquer.

Personality is surely the richest gift of man, and who can deny that it is likewise the supreme possession of God?

Mr. James has said in his Pluralistic Universe: "A man's vision is the great fact about him. A philosophy is the expression of a man's intimate character, and all the definitions of the universe are but the deliberately adopted reactions of human characters upon it." This was particularly true of Bowne. It, as much as his philosophy, was the source of his deep and widening influence. Men gathered from east and west to hear his teaching with varying preparation and adaptability for philosophical endeavor. The intellectual rewards which they carried away were as varied as the men who came, but all had this in common: each was certain that he had felt

the touch of a master spirit. They were one in a feeling of exaltation and inspiration. Wherever they have gone to the various tasks of business or professional life, or social ministry, they have gone even to the ends of the earth in a new, high sense of the greatness and meaning of life and with a loyalty that time cannot dim. If two such meet in the antipodes, the common meeting ground is "Did you take Bowne's work?" The underlying significance of all this is the inspiration of an unusual personality, a mind that rang so true that it satisfied the most questioning youth, a vision and an insight which lifted the student into the heights and enabled him to grasp the relations of life to the world, to man, and to God. Accused by the shallow-minded of heresy, the strong religious tone of all Bowne's teaching was its predominant characteristic. This was the very point most criticized by his philosophical contemporaries, to whom the recognition of religious verity was a sign of philosophical weakness. The religious note was never wanting as he unfolded to his

eager students the thought of the great minds of the centuries. Never did he fail to draw them in perspective to the thought of One who was his Master. We

"Watched the great hills, like clouds arise and set;
And one named Olivet"

was never missing from the horizon.

For this reason he was at the close of life fitted as perhaps no other man of his time for great constructive religious and intellectual leadership. He was already beginning to influence profoundly the thought of the Orient as he had already influenced many in the West. It was his distinction to be almost better known in Germany than at home. His loyalty to an institution kept him from entering into that large measure of recognition that might have come to him earlier. So far as human judgment can discern, he is gone too soon. But his work will live. It was done so truly, so conscientiously, so greatly, that its influence is certain to deepen with the passing years. This will prove true in that age which we feel is just at hand, when men will more

generally recognize the inadequacy of great thinking which is lacking in reverence and respect for the profounder realities and problems of our mortal life. There is that in the work of Bowne that answers to the deepest spiritual questionings, and in death as in life he can await the judgment of the years unhumiliated and unafraid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Included in this list are the titles which have been found most helpful in the particular field covered. It does not aim to be exhaustive.

General

Adamson, Development of Modern Philosophy.
Bowne, Metaphysics.
Bowne, Personalism.
Bowne, Philosophy of Theism.
Bowne, Studies in Christianity.
Bowne, The Essence of Religion.
Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge.
Caird, Problems of Philosophy at the Present Time.
Dewing, Introduction to the History of Modern Philosophy.
Eucken, The Problem of Human Life.
Höffding, History of Modern Philosophy.
Janet and Sailles, History of the Problems of Philosophy.
Külpe, Philosophy of the Present in Germany.
Pfleiderer, Philosophy and Development of Religion.
Windelband, History of Philosophy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ancient Philosophy

Adamson, Development of Greek Philosophy.
Aristotle, Logic.
Aristotle, Metaphysics.
Eucken, Fundamental Concepts of Modern Thought.
Eucken, Life's Basis and Life's Ideal.
Gompers, Greek Thinkers.

Materialism

Bowne, Kant and Spencer.
Eucken, The Truth of Religion.
Höffding, Influence of the Conception of Evolution.
Lange, History of Materialism.

Kant

Bowne, Kant and Spencer.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason.
Stahlin, Kant, Lotze, and Ritschl (Reply to Lange, Materialism).

Lotze

Caspari, Hermann Lotze, etc., pp. 4 and 53.
Falckenberg, Hermann Lotze.
Jones, Critical Account of the Philosophy of Lotze.
Külpe, Philosophy of the Present in Germany (Lotze chapter).
Lotze, Metaphysics.
Lotze, Microcosmus.
Pfleiderer, Lotze's philosophische Weltanschauung nach ihren Grundzugen. (Sympathetic treatment.)

Schiller, Humanism (Reference to Lotze).
Seth, Development from Kant to Hegel.

Pragmatism

Bawden, Principles of Pragmatism.
Berthelot, Un Romantisme utilitaire (Volume II contains exhaustive treatment of Bergson's Pragmatism).
Davidson, The Stoic Creed.
De Laguna, Dogmatism and Evolution.
Haldane, Pathway to Reality.
James, Essays in Radical Empiricism.
James, Pluralistic Universe.
James, Pragmatism.
James, Problems of Philosophy.
James, Will to Believe.
Jourdain, Theory of the Infinite in Modern Thought.
Lyman, Influence of Pragmatism on Theology.
Parker, Plato and Pragmatism (short essay, but very good).
Schiller, Humanism.
Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx (3rd edition).
Schinz, Anti-pragmatism.
Vernon Lee, Vital Lies.

Bergson

Bergson, Creative Evolution.
Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics (Article, Metaphysical and Moral Revelation, January, '03).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bergson, Matter and Memory.
Bergson, The Immediate Data of Consciousness.
Bergson, Time and Free Will.
Hermann, Eucken and Bergson.
James, Pluralistic Universe, Chapter VI.
Le Roy, New Philosophy of Bergson.
Ruhe and Paul, Henri Bergson, An Account of His Life and Personality.
Solomon, Bergson.

Eucken

Eucken, Life's Basis and Life's Ideal.
Eucken, Main Currents of Modern Thought.
Eucken, Problem of Human Life.
Eucken, The Life of the Spirit.
Eucken, The Truth of Religion.
Gibson, Eucken's Philosophy of Life.
Hermann, Eucken and Bergson.

INDEX

Arcesilaus, pragmatist, 115

Aristotle's attempt to reconcile universal and particular, 74; relation to Plato, 74; hostile to doctrine of Divine Personality, 79f.; Divine Will as Prime Mover, 78f.; view of knowledge, 20f.

Atomism, as basis of perception, 51ff., 77f., 184f., Bacon's contribution to, 55; begins with Leucippus, 50; as a method of science, 58, 184f.; a phantom of thought, 52f., 56, 73; of Epicurus, 54; of Stoics, 54f; restricted value, 57

Bergson, his abstractness, 151, 167; a becoming God impossible, 157f., 160–162; criticism of Spencer, 59, 69, 146f.; definition of Being, 147f.; reality, as "vital impulse," 147f.; statement of problem of philosophy, 145f.; time as duration, 148ff., 158f.

Bowne, advance on Aristotle's World-Ground, 79; advance from Lotze's position, 105ff.; in definition of reality, 105; affirming Personality fundamental, 106–108; avoids determinism of empiricism, 132f.; his central thought, 19, 183f.; compared with Lotze, 19, 22; limits realm of physics, 103; denies explanation by classification, 103; refuses astounding claims of atomism, 103; denies absentee God, 103f.; points emptiness of mechanical causation, 104

Bowne's criticism of Spencer, 59, 60; debt to Lotze, 102; definition of Being, 131f.; definition of reality, 74f., 83, 106, 108f.; definition of religion, 25, 29, 141; personality, 193–196; Eucken's estimate of, 18ff., 24, 30; philosophical aim, 11; idea of ethics, 20, 141; metaphysical theism, 25; opposition to absolutism, 130f.; opposition to naturalism, 24; pragmatism, 130–141; religious interest, 20; sincerity, 19f.; starting point, life, 25–27; theism, 25; view of the incarnation, 176ff.; view of the practical, 27f.; view of time and space, 137ff., 159ff.

Bruno, conception of monads, 55

INDEX

Carneades's pragmatism, 115
Causation, efficient and phenomenal, 57, 79, 81, 94, 133; explained in terms of personality, 80f., 133
Cause and effect, 78, 133
Change and personality, 91, 134, 139, 155f., 184
Common-sense view of the world, 39
Creative evolution, 40, 105–167

Deity of Jesus, moral necessity, 176–181, 189f.
Democritus, relation to materialism, 52
Descartes, theory of induction, 56
Doubt and prosperity, 38
Dualism of Kant, 94

Epicurus' atomism, 54
Error, the problem of naturalism, 75, 82
Error, problem of, met by personalism, 75, 83.
Eucken quoted, 11, 80, on pragmatism, 113, 128f.
Eucken and Bowne, pupils of Lotze, 169
Eucken, relation to Bowne, 15, 169f., 174f.
Eucken's "activism" to solve philosophical antithesis, 171; difficulty with the idea of incarnation, 175f.; particular contribution, 174, 180f.; supreme message, 181f.; view of truth, 170f.
Evil, problem of idealism, 75
Evil, problem of, not avoided by pluralism, 125f.; met by personalism, 76, 83, 187–193
Evolutionist confusion of cause and effect, 25

Fallacy of the universal, 68; main support of Spencer, 68; in Bergson, 151
Faust, Walpurgis Night, 58
First Cause not reached by naturalism, 78
Freedom, attended by error and evil, 76; dependent on personality, 82f., 125, 152f., 185ff.; not reached by pluralism, 125; through activism, in Eucken, 174

INDEX

Galileo's application of mathematical principle, 56
God, as Immanent Mover, Bowne's view, 79, 159ff., 184f.; as Prime Mover, Aristotle's view, 78f.; Bergson's view, 161f.; becoming God of Bergson, not tenable, 157ff., 162; behind phenomena, 23, 161, 184f.; chief argument for, the practical interest, 95f.; underlying principle of the world, 22, 29, 161
Greek philosophy, contribution to science, 50

Hegel's absolute idealism, 98, 100; doctrine of thought processes, 24; view of religion, 26
Henley quoted, 190, 191, 192
Hylozoism, 55, 57

Idealism, inadequate for explanation, 39, 40; must answer problem of evil, 41
Immanence, Divine, 79
Incarnation, Bowne's view, 176ff.; Eucken's exception to, 174f.; necessary to thought, 175f., 189
Indestructibility of matter a working postulate, 66
Intuition, value to religion, 166–168
Intuitional and reflective knowledge, 164–167

James, William, pragmatism, 116–129; guilty of abstractness, 117

Kant's contribution, constitutive activity of mind, 87; dualism, 94; effort for objective validity fails, 90f.; subjectivism, 92f.; view of reality, 93; view of time and space, 87; saw only subjective side, 89

Lee, Vernon, quoted, 127f.
Leucippus, founder of atomism, 50
Lotze compared with Bowne, 19, 22, 105ff.; opposed to absolutism, 99f.
Lotze's aim, 19, 98f.; definition of reality, 101; idealism, 98, 101; relation to Hegel, 98, 100; religion, 19

INDEX

"Man the measure of all," 51, 113
Masterman, quoted, 31
Material basis of modern philosophy, 33
Materialism, its abstraction completed in Democritus, 52; its doctrine of reality, 73; ignores metaphysical factors, 73; inadequate for explanation, 38ff., 56f., 77f.; its moral insufficiency, 82; of Spencer indicated in his doctrine of mind, 69; use of atomic theory, 50, 73, 75, 77f.
Matter, indestructibility of, working postulate, 66
Mechanical view of thought process, 39, 82
Memory, racial, emptiness of theory, 150f.; unaccounted for by Spencer, 64, 71f.
Mill, John Stuart, quoted, 62
Mind, constitutive activity, Kant's discovery, 87f.

Naturalism, cannot provide for freedom, 185ff.; its abstractness, 58; based on visible, 24; inadequate for explanation, 38–40, 56f., 185ff.; possesses only phenomenal world, 77f.; present attitude toward Spencer, 59
Nature, new feeling toward, 35
Neoplatonism, influence of, 74
Nervous action, as "double-faced," 70
Novelty as a factor in evolution, 69; attempted in Bergson's "elan vital," 147f., 155ff.
Noyes, Alfred, quoted, "Resurrection," 37; "Creation," 77; "Vicisti Galileae," 190

Optimism, attendant on struggle, 33

Pain, modern attitude toward, 41f.
Pantheism of Stoics, 54; untenable, 136f.
Perception, more than nervous affection, 78, 184; Bergson's view of, 145
Permanence, problem of, 91f.
Personalism and freedom, 185ff.; related to problems of life, 183–196; solution of philosophical antithesis, 44f., 134f., 183f.; and problems of error and evil, 83; and problems of space and time, 90, 106, 137ff., 184

INDEX

Personality, and change, 91, 134, 139, 155f., 184; divine, as efficient cause, 79, 81, 133, 135; keynote to religion and ethics, 20; novel factor in causation, 80f.
Pessimism, fruit of material fullness, 33
Phenomena, demand intelligent Cause, 93
Phenomena, two contrasting views, 23
Phenomenal and efficient causation, 57
Phenomenalism of Lotze, 101
Philosophy, influenced by circumstances, 33; its new task, 43ff.
Plato, ethical nature of his rationalism, 52; his doctrine of Ideas, 129; relation to Aristotle, 74; resistance of materialism, 74; "true being," 52
Pluralism, failure to unite subject and object, 123ff., 133f.; insufficiency, 42f., 133f.; outcome of materialism, 40, 42; unable to meet problem of evil, 126
Pragmatic attempt at unity through space and time, 121, 133f., 137ff.; doctrine of unity, 127, 133; judgment of religious values, 96, 140ff.; pluralism and freedom, 125, 133f.; test of truth, 116f., 118f., 120, 129, 130f., 140ff.
Pragmatism, misuse of, 38; moral influence of, 113f., 126, 140f.; in modern life, 37f., 40; of Bowne, 130–141; of Pyrrho and the new academy, 115; of the Sophists, 113
Pragmatists, ancient, 114f.; modern, 115f.
Problems, essential to philosophy, 10; Bergson's statement of them, 145f.
Protagoras, a pragmatist, 113; perception due to atomic action, 51
"Pure Form" in Democritus; system, 52; in Plato's thought, 52
Purposive intelligence, the bugbear of pluralism, 43
Pyrrho, a pragmatist, 115

Rationalistic definitions of truth, 116f.
Reality, Bergson's definition, 74f.; Bowne's definition, 101; Eucken's definition, 174f.; Kant's view of, 93; Lotze's definition, 101; Spencer's account of, 64f.; fundamental definition of philosophy, 10, 73
Reality of pain and evil, 41

INDEX

Religion and ethics, their relation, 20, 25, 29
Religion, the basis of life, 21; in relation to theology, 27, 29; Kant's view of, 26, 29, 94f.; not subject to ordinary proof, 20f., 94f., 97; not wholly subjective, 30; the spiritual experience of humanity, 25
Ruskin quoted, 32

Schiller, F. C. S., on the Absolute, view of truth, 130
Schopenhauer, personal untruth, 19
Schleiermacher's view of religion, 26
Science, relation to modern life, 35; relation to modern philosophy, 34f.
Space and time made the fundamental realities in pragmatism, 121, 137ff.; as forms of thought, 87f.; must possess objective validity, 89f.
Spencer and modern naturalism, 59
Spencer's appeal to "persistence of force," 66; definition of life, 69; denial of materialism, 61; doctrine of mind, 69f.; doctrine of reality, 64f.; doctrine of the Unknowable, 61f., 78; empiricism, 61; materialism indicated by doctrine of mind, 69; relativity, 65; relation to theism and religion, 60; theory of evolution, 67; supported by fallacy of universal, 68
Spinoza, personal sincerity, 19
Spiritual basis of life, 28
Spiritual, incapable of expression in language, 23
Spirituality, impossible apart from personality, 22
Stoics, preservation of atomism, 54
Swinburne, quoted, "watch in the night," 38, 45

Time as "bastard space," 150f.; as "duration," 148–152; with God as ground of its "duration," 158ff.; impossible except to abiding intelligence, 88, 122, 138f.; 152, 159f.
Time and space as forms of thought, 87f.; ideal yet objectively valid, 137ff., 150f.; as viewed by Bowne, 137f.
Truth, universal validity of, in Eucken's view, 170f.

INDEX

Unity, by "activism," Eucken's solution, 170f.; found only in mind and spirit, 22; necessary even to pluralism, 124, 134; possible through personality, 134f., 153f., 156f., 183f.; by primal impulse; Aristotle's view, 78f.; Bergson's view, 147f, 154ff.; problem of, 21, 49f., 133f., 147f., 156f., 170f., 183f.; struggle for, 38, 49; in Greek thought, 50
Utilitarianism, demanded in life, 37

"Vital impulse," Bergson's necessary factor of evolution, 152ff.; Bergson's ground of being, 147f.

World-Ground must be personal, 81f.

RD-16

Deacidified using the Bookkeeper pro
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide
Treatment Date: August 2004

PreservationTechnolog
A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVA
111 Thomson Park Drive
Cranberry Township, PA 16066
(724) 779-2111

DOBBS BROS.
LIBRARY BINDING
DEC 81
ST. AUGUSTINE
FLA.
32084

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
0 012 826 219 2

Cornell University Library

BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME
FROM THE
SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND
THE GIFT OF
Henry W. Sage
1891

A.91965 9/4/96

The date shows when this volume was taken.
To renew this book copy the call No and give to the librarian.

24 D '08
FEB 11 19..

29 FEB 1925

MAY 5

Ap 23 '32

HOME USE RULES.

All Books subject to Recall.

Books not used for instruction or research are returnable within 4 weeks.

Volumes of periodicals and of pamphlets are held in the library as much as possible. For special purposes they are given out for a limited time.

Borrowers should not use their library privileges for the benefit of other persons.

Books not needed during recess periods should be returned to the library, or arrangements made for their return during borrower's absence, if wanted.

Books needed by more than one person are held on the reserve list.

Books of special value and gift books, when the giver wishes it, are not allowed to circulate.

Readers are asked to report all cases of books marked or mutilated.

Do not deface books by marks and writing.

Cornell University Library
B803 .E86 1880
Fundamental concepts of modern philosoph

3 1924 028 980 477

olln

803
F86
1880

The original of this book is in
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.

http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924028980477

THE

FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS

OF

MODERN PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT,

CRITICALLY AND HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED.

BY

RUDOLPH EUCKEN, PH. D.,

PROFESSOR IN JENA.

TRANSLATED BY M. STUART PHELPS, PH. D.,

PROFESSOR IN SMITH COLLEGE,

WITH ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS BY THE AUTHOR,

AND AN

INTRODUCTION BY NOAH PORTER,

PRESIDENT OF YALE COLLEGE.

NEW YORK:

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY,

1, 3, AND 5 BOND STREET.

1880.

A.91965

COPYRIGHT BY
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY.
1880.

INTRODUCTORY ESSAY.

THE author of this volume has undertaken the very important service of writing a critical history of the terms and conceptions which are of special interest at the present time in literary and philosophical circles. The table of contents shows on what principle they have been selected. The list is very far from including all the technical terms of either science or philosophy. It contains few which are strictly scholastic or technical. The few which originated in the schools of modern speculation and criticism have come forth from the schools and taken a strong hold of thoughtful and cultivated men who are neither philosophers nor scientists by profession. Most of these—like *Subjective* and *Objective*, *Monism* and *Dualism*, *Development* and *Evolution*, *Realism* and *Idealism*, *Optimism* and *Pessimism*, *Culture* and *Humanity*—have come into current use within the past few years, and represent some new principle or distinction in philosophy, some important theory or discovery in science, or some novel doctrine or conceit in ethics, art, or criticism. Scarcely one, however, is a product of the present century, like those multi-

tudinous technical terms of chemistry or natural history which originally designated conceptions as novel as their names. Most of the terms treated in this volume have been in use for many generations, though only a small number may have been long employed in the special significations which they have finally assumed, and which give them their present interest and importance. It is obvious that the gradual emergence of such terms from occasional and uncertain use into permanent recognition with sharp and definite meanings must necessarily indicate a positive movement of human thinking for better or for worse. Not infrequently such a movement is equivalent to a revolution in literary opinion or scientific theory.

In every instance the question is always curious and often instructive, What was the popular and general meaning of the term before it crystallized into its special and fixed meaning? Or, if it were originally a term of the schools, by what steps of transition did it proceed from one meaning to another, till finally it took on a signification which was the opposite of that which it originally bore, or till two correlated terms completely interchanged their significations? The remark of Coleridge is often repeated, that "there are cases in which more knowledge of more value may be conveyed by the history of a word than by the history of a campaign." This is emphatically true, and more; for, in cases not a few, the history of a word is the history of an actual campaign of patient research or active controversy.

We may not forget, however, that the history of words does not always record the progress of exact thinking or verified truth. The shifting and subtle changes of meaning in words may as effectually obscure and mislead the thinking of an age or a school as make it clear and solid. Especially is this true of terms of science or of philosophy. Words of very high generalization may, by reason of their abstract character, be more easily used by the philosophical magician, first to bewilder himself, and then to mislead his fellow men. The history of speculation in every age enforces the truth that, the more abstract an important term becomes, it may be the more readily personified into a living force or law by the vivid imagination or the confident reiteration of a brilliant theorist. The farther a word is removed from common use, the more easily may it be worshiped as a bedizened fetish by the devotees of a philosophic leader, or hooted at as a scarecrow by his antagonists. The more remote any subject matter is from any possible verification by experiments or the realities of every-day life, the more brilliant and delusive may be the attractions of plausible hypotheses, if these are only set off by the jugglery of philosophic word-play. For these reasons it becomes especially important, in an age of intense scientific activity and philosophical enthusiasm, that every earnest seeker after truth should scrutinize with the utmost care the terms that are occupying the attention of the public, if he desires to master the conceptions for which they stand.

There is no method by which he can do this so effectually, and I may add so pleasantly, as by the study of their history. In this way, and in this way only, will he be able intelligently to accept and successfully to defend what is true in the new thinking which is sure to arouse every generation, and at the same time to reject what is false with an enlightened and liberal spirit.

The author of this volume has very wisely limited himself to a few topics, which he has as wisely selected because of their comprehensive interest and importance. The conceptions of which he gives the history, and which he subjects to acute criticism, are all of present and exciting interest. Many of them have a practical as well as a speculative importance. Some of them concern the grave and interesting problems of Duty and Faith and Immortality. To the history and criticism of these conceptions, and their terminology, Professor Eucken has brought thorough and careful reading, acute and candid criticism, and a clear and solid style. While he is at home among the systems of the past, he seems equally familiar with the controversies of the present. Above all, he has studied brevity, and has mastered the art of expressing in few words the results of patient research and critical discrimination.

The writer of this notice was constrained to recommend the work for translation to his friend and former pupil by his estimate of the intrinsic value of the treatise, and the desire that it might be brought within the reach of English readers, as eminently suited to the

times. He can say with an assured confidence that there are few books within his knowledge which are better fitted to aid the student who wishes to aequaint himself with the course of modern speculative and scientific thinking, and to form an intelligent estimate of most of the current theories. He trusts also that Professor Phelps has succeeded in the somewhat difficult task of rendering such essays as these into neat and readable English, and that his labor may be rewarded by the consciousness that he has contributed somewhat to the progress of solid and scientific thinking at a time when such thinking is greatly needed and always respected, even though it may not always be loudly cried in the market-place.

NOAH PORTER.

YALE COLLEGE, *January*, 1880.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

THE concepts which enter into our thoughts and actions are the outgrowth of a definite relation which we hold to the interests and problems of our time. They show with what problems we are occupied, and how we treat these problems. A consideration of the concepts of an individual, a school, or a time, must then give us an explanation of what is striven after, and what is accomplished. A criticism of concepts must become a criticism of the entire contents of the conscious intellectual life of the man, or the school, or the period.

This task, however, can not well be undertaken without attempting also to understand these concepts in their historical formation and their historical association; since only in that way is it possible to carry back to its sources and fundamental principles that which is given us in its present developed form. And, indeed, the concatenation of things carries us a step farther, so that we must pay a certain amount of attention also to the clothing of the concept, that is, to its verbal ex-

pression, since we can hope to obtain a just estimate of a concept only when we understand clearly the relation between its signification and its present form of phraseology.

In attempting to establish such a consideration of the questions of our day, we should expect to meet with difficulties in the method of execution, rather than with scruples as to the undertaking itself.

First of all, we limit the problem in a way which is perfectly practicable. We do not propose to discuss the concepts which now are most prominent in what is specifically philosophical, or technically scientific; but those, rather, which, proceeding from philosophy and the general scientific development, have become a power in life as a whole. The subject of our investigation will be, not the concepts of the philosophy of to-day, but the philosophical concepts of to-day. By to-day, however, we understand the last decade, as it is limited by the reaction against the Constructive and generally systematic philosophy, and, further, by the preponderating influence of the natural sciences. In so doing, we have specially in view the development in the German thought-world; but believe that we can from that obtain also a judgment which shall extend far outside, since the specific tendencies of modern science are nowhere so distinctly manifested as they are among the Germans.

But how many considerations and questions arise, if the method of our investigation is to be still further

justified! What are the measuring tendencies of our day, and within what limits do individual forces unite, in the highest degree, in a joint action that is historical? Which concepts are to be considered as therein the leading ones? How extensive, or how limited, should be our consideration of them? In short, so many questions arise, that, to answer them in any measure, we should have to discuss at the outset our method of discussion. Instead of this, we much prefer to plunge at once into our subject, and run the risk that some topic may be thought missing here, or superfluous there, and that, everywhere, we may be accused of a certain arbitrariness in our choice and treatment of material.

Only, we ought to be allowed to vindicate ourselves in this respect: if isolated sections seem to stand in unconnected sequence, we do not thereby renounce all claim to a logical progress in the discussion. There need be no lack of unity in the whole, because one proceeds from many isolated points. But we would further beg to be allowed to make no claims for the following discussions which they are not intended to satisfy. Choosing, as they do, for their object a province which lies between science and common life, they must necessarily maintain a certain middle ground in their form; what is specifically technical must be kept, as far as possible, in the background.

It is then involved in the whole nature of the task, that the philosophical investigation which is here undertaken can, emphatically, lead only to negative results.

The principle is essentially involved in the investigation itself, that a positive treatment of concepts can be usefully given only in connection with a systematic philosophy; and, for that reason, we have abstained from even occasionally entering upon such discussion, although greatly tempted to do so. We may be blamed for our limitation of the discussion; but we make no pretensions of passing into what is excluded by that limitation. We will not shun the positive side of the work; but, for the present discussion, we beg the favor of the Platonic expression: *πάντα ταῦτα προοιμιά ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου ὅν δεῖ μαθεῖν.*

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
Subjective—Objective	1
Experience	34
A Priori—Innate	81
Immanent (Cosmic)	92
Monism—Dualism	113
Law	135
Development	155
Primary Concepts of Causation	181
Mechanic—Organic	182
Teleology	196
Culture	215
Individuality	231
Humanity	249
Realism—Idealism	258
Optimism—Pessimism	271
Conclusion	294

THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS.

SUBJECTIVE—OBJECTIVE.

Συντέτακται ὅτι μὴ ἐπεισόδιον τὸ σὸν τῷ παντί.—PLOTINUS.

THE history of the expressions shows the development which the concepts "subjective" and "objective" have undergone in modern philosophy. In the course of the centuries, they have simply interchanged meanings. In Duns Scotus, who was the first to use them in their present antithesis,* *subjectivum* signifies that which refers to the subject of the judgments, and so to the concrete objects of thought; *objectivum*, on the contrary, signifies that which lies in the pure *objicere*, that is, in the act of making ideal, and so is assigned to the perceiving mind. (See Prantl, "History of Logic in the West," iii. 208.)

In this sense, the expressions remained unchanged until the commencement of modern philosophy. In the controversy between Descartes and Gassendi, subjective is used synonymously with *formaliter in se ipsis*, and objective with *idealiter in intellectu*. More commonly, to be sure, the antithesis was between objective and *formaliter*, which was still undisputed in the first half of the eighteenth century. Toward the end of

* According to Prantl ("History of Logic," i. 581), *subjectivus* in a purely logical signification occurs in the works of Appuleius.

Scholasticism a certain vacillation appeared in isolated instances, and this increased in proportion to the entrance of modern thought. In that which was called objective, things cut themselves loose from thought and gained an independent existence. By subject, however, the thinking mind began to be understood, instead of the logical concept. (See, for example, Leibnitz, Erdmann's ed., 645 b, "*Subjectum* ou l'âme même.")

The change of meaning, however, toward which this tended, was not completed until the expressions passed over into the German language. I find the first examples of the new meaning in 1730. For example: in the "Introduction to Philosophical Science," by A. F. Müller (1733), ii. 63, *objectivum* is explained as "in itself and outside of the understanding"; *formale*, as "in the understanding." With A. Baumgarten the new usage seems already to predominate; while Crusius, Lambert, and Tetens employ the terms just as we do.* But the way in which they were employed in the controversy between Lessing and Götze† shows plainly that they were still used as thoroughly scholastic terms; so that we can say that they first entered upon their common use with Kant.

The new signification spread especially to France, and then to England. In the latter country, although the application of many terms customary in the middle ages had penetrated into the living language,‡ this new

* But Crusius and Tetens usually said *subjectivisch* and *objectivisch*.

† The distinction which Götze made between the subjective and objective consideration of Faith can be traced back to Baumgarten, "German Metaphysics," § 738.

‡ See, for example, Berkeley (Frazer's ed., ii. 477): "Natural phenomena are only natural appearances. They are, therefore, such as we see and perceive them. Their real and objective natures are therefore the same."

usage was for a long time felt to be strange and scholastic.

The concepts are, of course, older than the expressions. But, if we follow their history backward, from the culmination of the middle ages, we must search for a long time before we find them distinctly formulated. In the first half of the middle ages, as among the earlier Romans, we find only circumlocutions;* but no determinate significations, until we reach the later Greek antiquity. When the Stoics and others place in contrast ἐπινοεῖσθαι and ὑπάρχειν, κατ' ἐπίνοιαν and καθ' ὑπόστασιν (ὕπαρξιν), they express the same antithesis that is contained in our subjective and objective; and the disputes which arose over the concepts signified by the terms are very similar to those of later times.

But the concepts themselves extend beyond these expressions; they are numbered among those which, although in different degrees of clearness, must be present in every philosophical system. As the object of our thought is to obtain a knowledge of nature in determinate content, and this content can be obtained only by labor and struggle, we must make obvious everywhere, where we suppose an act of knowledge, the distinction between that knowledge which is, at least for us, absolutely valid and that which is only empirical to the individual. But, as a matter of fact, the comprehension of this distinction will ever vary, according to one's theories of knowledge. The Skeptic, for example, can not avoid distinguishing in phenomena that which is

* So, to adduce only one illustration, Scotus Erigena gives as the antithesis, "De Divisione Naturæ," 528 a: *in nostra contemplatione —in ipsa rerum natura;* 492 d: *dum in se ipsis naturaliter perspiciuntur—in ipso solo rationis contuitu;* 493 d: *in rebus naturalibus—sola ratione.*

common from that which is purely individual;* and the constructive philosopher, who would constitute the whole world out of thought, will be discreet enough not to confuse the necessary processes and results of thought with the impressions or fancies that vary with the experience of the individual.

But, to the common sense of men, the question involved in this problem is that of the relation of thought to a world which is independent of it; and, inasmuch as this view is uniformly the ruling one with the masses of mankind, we can assume that the concepts subjective and objective have no significant meaning to the common consciousness, until a chasm is opened between the thought-world and the real world. This again depends, in the great life of the whole, on the general view taken of the position of mankind in the world. The more closely a man believes himself to be bound up in the life of the whole, the more he regards himself as its culmination, so much the more will he be convinced that, in the act of knowledge, he seizes the essence of things; and, conversely, every doubt in respect to the former belief will be accompanied by a vacillation in the latter. In this way, the contest over objectivity and subjectivity not only reflects the shifting relation of thought and being, but also expresses the entire estimate made of the meaning of the life of man.

Thus the Stoical distinction between the objective and the subjective in knowledge is only the consequence of a change in the view of man's position in

* Sextus Empiricus, *πρὸς λογ*, ii. 8: *οἱ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησίδημον λέγουσί τινα τῶν φαινομένων διαφοράν, καὶ φασὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν κοινῶς πᾶσι φαίνεσθαι τὰ δὲ ἰδίως τινί, ὧν ἀληθῆ μὲν εἶναι τὰ κοινῶς πᾶσι φαινόμενα, ψευδῆ δὲ τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα.*

relation to the world; which change came in with the most flourishing period of ancient thought; and from that time, in the development of history, the conflict became more and more violent, and the sense of it had ever greater power over the consciousness of man, until at last all pleasure in life and in action was destroyed.

Then we find Plotinus making the bold attempt to restore the connection between the world and the mind, by making Being the product of creative thought. But the world at which he arrived by that means was not, even to himself, that which is present to the senses, but something supra-mundane; and, if his doctrine amounts ultimately simply to this, that all our knowledge arrives only at a likeness (an *οἷον*) of truth, it must be admitted that the chasm which seemed to be overcome will open again in some other place.

Not till we reach Christianity, where life receives anew a concrete meaning through its ethical-religious definition, does mind, in its connection with the whole, obtain again a firm confidence in itself and its responsibilities.

But now other dangers at once stepped in. The conviction that man's ethical life is essentially the object of all that happens in the world, and controls the destinies of the universe, led to the reference of everything directly to that life, and to the interpretation of the whole plan of the world, with reference to the considerations and postulates involved in the practical life of man.

The serious consequences of such an endeavor appear already in the system of Augustine. Revealing as it does an astonishing knowledge of human nature, everything in it is so shaped as to bring out the greatest possible exertion of forces for ethical-religious—

often, in fact, only for churchly—aims; and, in so doing, the human is unreservedly found in the universal; purely psychical occurrences are projected outside of the mind; wishes change into facts, presentiments into certainties.

The later thinkers, lacking Augustine's theoretical interest and speculative power, went carelessly to a greater extreme in this dangerous direction; and to it there was no effective counterweight in the Aristotelian philosophy, which was finally adopted, to supplement this cosmology. For there has never been a great thinker who was so absolutely convinced as was Aristotle of the connection of the human life with the events of the world, and thus of the objectivity of our knowledge. No one, therefore, had less hesitation in carrying over into the physical universe without ceremony the peculiarities of psychical beings. A soul was implanted in all things: every event was explained as resulting from an endeavor: qualitative distinctions and oppositions took possession of all nature: a good and an evil, a normal and an anomalous, a natural and a violent appeared everywhere distinguished, and in hostility rent asunder every natural bond. In this way, every variety of being became a mere copy of human life. Wherever man looked, he found himself; and, accordingly, however far the investigation might extend, he remained everywhere shut up in a closed circle, and hemmed in by a limitation which must have appeared far more oppressive than the narrow bounds of the world's physical horizon, which seem to us to be peculiarly characteristic of those times.

The modern interpretation of the universe was directly opposed to this. Knowledge and action contained a fuller meaning; and mankind, tearing off the

limitations of the past, sought to extend its own life into the infinite. That which was specifically human appeared to be everywhere too small. It was the custom rather to seek the explanation of man in the world, than to seek the explanation of the world in man. In order to obtain an "interpretation" of nature, in place of an "anticipation," all concepts must be transformed. Everything was hereafter to be measured by the known universe, and the meaning of human existence was to be recognized only in so far as it gave expression to the general order.*

If, however, the universe is to make itself known to the mind, and is to disclose the soul of nature, that must leave behind it all that is arbitrary and fantastic, and submit itself to the great laws of the whole; but this is to be done only that, through knowledge, elevation above the universe and supreme control over it may be reached. What was lost to the mind from its presumed possessions seemed evanescent in comparison with that which was to be won; to realize an end so high, it became worth while for man to exert his strength to the utmost. When this happened to succeed, modern science built itself up, the powers of man were broadened, and life itself was transformed.

To oppose such a tendency, after the position of man in relation to the world had been radically changed,

* Bacon, "Parasceve ad Historiam Naturalem," aphor. iv.: "In historia quam requirimus et animo destinamus, ante omnia videndum est, ut late pateat et facta sit ad mensuram universi. Neque enim arctandus est mundus ad angustias intellectus (quod adhuc factum est) sed expandendus intellectus et laxandus ad mundi imaginem recipiendam, qualis invenitur." Spinoza, "Tract. theol. pol.," chap. xvi. 10: "Natura non legibus humanæ rationis, quæ non nisi hominum verum utile et conservationem intendunt, intercluditur, sed infinitis aliis, quæ totius naturæ, cujus homo particula est, æternum ordinem respiciunt."

was to attack modern science, and the culture which resulted from it. But we need not do this, in order to recognize the fact that this revolution produced a commotion, which necessarily introduced at the outset perplexity and discord into the entire apprehension of the problem.

First of all, the mechanical natural philosophy established with perfect clearness the distinction between the qualities which phenomena offer to scientific thought, and those which they offer to common-sense perception. What Democritus had already substantially affirmed now found exact confirmation in Descartes. Even before the investigation of nature had achieved important results, the interpretation of the specific qualities of things was limited to their effects upon the sentient soul, and ultimately only masses and movements remained.*

When in this way it was found that we to a great extent create the very world itself, which seems to be opposed to us as something objective, not only was our faith shaken in the truth of all that is in general present to consciousness, but even the substance of the mental life seemed to be cut off from the world.

Moreover, the mental life itself was made the subject of criticism. Here, too, it was customary to discriminate between facts and interpretations, between real and imaginary powers, in order thus to advance to pervading laws, which might render possible a control over the motive power of the soul through the knowledge of its hidden springs.

But, though the most prominent thinkers attacked in their theories only what was superficial, in order to

* Boyle and not Locke was the first to apply the scholastic phrase "primary and secondary qualities" to the new distinction.

make room for the free action of that which they thought was essential, in the common life the doubt, once excited, went beyond this. Pragmatic psychologists showed how much the picture which a man draws of himself differs from what he really is. A man like Pierre Bayle endeavored to show how essentially unimportant those attempts are which we like to consider as the most important; how little expression of actual conviction there is, even in those propositions which are defended in good faith. He was the first to make use of the phrase, which since then has been repeated to satiety, that "men only believe that they believe.* Similar endeavors were made by other men, especially in France, who were in like manner repelled from a comprehensive knowledge of the whole by their keen analysis of the individual. The chasm between the immediate percept and that which was supposed to be really existent became continually greater. The purely natural instincts appeared to become more and more established, as all there was to real existence; and these were little fitted to entitle the mind to any kind of a prominent position in the universe. Even the opponents of such a tendency seemed to be seized with doubt, and were therefore poorly qualified to offer successful opposition.†

To investigate anew the position of mind in the universe was unquestionably the problem of philosophy;

* See the article "Socinius," which, in the discussion of the present question, is emphatically worthy of consideration. In the eighteenth century Lichtenberg, apparently independently of Bayle, defended the same sentiment. See "Miscellaneous Writings," i. 158.

† Pascal, "Pensées," art. xxv., 46: "L'un dit que mon sentiment est fantaisie; l'autre que sa fantaisie est sentiment. Il faudrait avoir une règle. La raison s'offre; mais elle est pliable à tous sens, et ainsi il n'y en a point."

but here we see the systems differ from the outset, and diverge even to antagonism. Bacon, throughout whose system nature determines the formation of the universe, shows an inclination to consider what is specifically mental as something which lies outside of material events. In some degree related to this, we see later English thinkers studious to treat the province of the mind as self-contained, and relatively independent of the material world. One renounces here the connection with the whole, so as not to endanger what is specifically mental in its own sphere.

The speculative thinkers on the Continent went beyond such a limitation. Spinoza and Leibnitz, above all, believed that they had no right to renounce a close union between the mind and the material world. But with Spinoza there is a vast difference between intention and execution. From the beginning he wishes surely to guarantee to the mind, as an attribute of the infinite substance, both significance and permanence; but when, in the actual development of his system, he derives all its meaning from that which is outside of it, and ascribes reality to its life only in so far as it reflects the external, he is compelled to oppose as phantoms all forms of life peculiar to it, such as estimates of value, designs, etc., and to degrade it finally to a pure form. Spinoza's mental world is nothing more than that part of the material universe which is brought into consciousness; the soul is matter regarded as an idea; and thus, in this pretended reconciliation, the one is sacrificed to the other.

Leibnitz saw this clearly, and tried to evade the difficulty in another way. He found his solution in the principle that all heterogeneity in the world is ultimately resolved, in different grades, into one and the

same power, and hence from each unit we can form a concept of the whole. If, then, the mind occupies such a position in the gradation of existence, we can understand all other existence from it, provided we investigate its essence; and, at the same time, it can itself be justified as a specific existence. It finds itself again everywhere in the world, and can in thought reëstablish the closest connection between itself and the universe. But, to accomplish this, in fact, we must strip off everything that is specific, and so we lose in content what we gain in extent. Leibnitz's essential force, the idea, is in truth no longer a psychological concept; it has become ontological (union of plurality in unity); and so here, too, what is specifically mental is ultimately sacrificed to the whole.

When we see the most prominent thinkers placed in a dilemma where they must either isolate mind or else abandon its peculiar properties, we are not surprised to find that the chasm was only widened by the attempt to bridge it over, and that the problem became more complicated, until, in the hands of Kant, the discussion took a new turn. He brought out more clearly than any one else had done the antithesis between subjective and objective. He established everywhere fixed criteria by which to distinguish the two; and he made it seem so evident that this distinction was the leading problem of philosophy, that the whole discussion, which up to that time had been preponderatingly either metaphysical or psychological, was now very properly directed toward the doctrine of knowledge. Not improperly did Lichtenberg suppose that to determine the relations between the Subjective and the Objective was to think in the Kantian spirit.*

* See "Miscellaneous Writings," i. 101.

But it is well known how little this peculiarly positive attempt at solution accomplished. Even in the decisive questions a divergence of opinion arose, which could not be repressed. If mind was once completely shut off from the world, with no means of pressing out into it beyond its own narrow circle, then, on the other hand, it came to the world with its own limitations, and produced out of itself a peculiar kingdom. What was taken away by one hand was given back by the other; and so, according as one started from the Theoretical or from the Practical Reason, he found himself led to wholly opposite estimates of the material universe. The endeavor to overcome this antithesis was the motive of further discussion. The Constructive thinkers wished to adjudicate to the reason in general the rights before held by the practical reason, and thus to allow all being to spring from it. But in that case the reason must naturally be conceived not as empirical and individual (subjective), but as absolute and universal (objective);* and this view is in fact often rendered prominent by them. But they passed very lightly over the question as to how we can arrive at such a concept, and secure it against disturbance and assault. In place of the thoughtful analysis of the earlier writers, we find here bold leaps, a "free flight" of thought, which might produce ingenious performances here and there, but which could not prevent what is contingently empirical from mixing itself in with the pure forms of thought, and could not restrain the introduction into the concept of the material world of what is specifically human.

It was an inevitable result that such an attempt to

* Jacobi used the expression "objective reason." See "David Hume," p. 194.

solve the great problem should be followed by a sudden revulsion; and with that we come to the present day, the situation of which is easily understood from this historical development. We see a problem very important in its bearing upon the entire thought-life of our day—in fact, a decisive problem—reduced to its simplest terms, and thus intensified almost beyond endurance. A comprehensive solution is courageously undertaken; and it endeavors to gain an influence in all departments of thought. But the catastrophe enters suddenly. That the endeavor is one-sided, unsatisfactory, and defective, is rather felt in its consequences than shown in its principles. But the counter-movement is sanctioned by the whole work done in the exact sciences; it seems to find a philosophical basis in the criticism of the pure Reason; and—what is more significant than all—it is supported by that practical common sense, to which the chasm between mind and the material world, in spite of all the labor of philosophers and others to the contrary, has always increased in width.

There are thus many causes, permanent and temporary, which favor that tendency of thought which would cut man's knowledge and life loose from the material universe, and which regards it, therefore, as one of the prime objects of scientific investigation to make conspicuous, everywhere, the antithesis between subjective and objective. Our modern use of terms shows what heterogeneous elements are brought together in this tendency. At the outset, subjective and objective express plainly enough a relation between the act of perception and the object perceived. But soon some one understands by it the position of the single individual in relation to the entire mass of persons judging;

and then the relation of the specifically human view of the world to the real nature of things; and, finally, the relation of thought to being in general.

Then, however—and this is peculiarly characteristic—the use of the terms is so extended that all that is in general assumed in a spiritual being is set down as subjective: and then one is everywhere inclined without further ceremony to substitute the subjective for the imaginary, and the objective for the real.

The different significations thus play into one another in many ways; so that, even in the following discussion, it will be occasionally necessary to bear in mind the narrower signification of the terms. This discussion, however, will not investigate in any way, from the positive side, the question as presented; since such a discussion can be undertaken only in connection with a systematically philosophical investigation. It aims only to glance critically at the views of the subject which predominate to-day; and especially to raise the question whether that which is set down sometimes as self-evident, sometimes as being the valuable result of modern investigation, is not often, after all, only an inference from very doubtful and dogmatic suppositions.

First of all, subjectivism attacks the possibility of any kind of certain and adequate knowledge. Since, as it claims, we remain always and for ever, no matter what we may undertake, shut up in the narrow circle of our own ideas, and we can not possibly put ourselves into a position where we can compare the subject and the object, it follows that we are once for all shut off from any knowledge of real things, whether they lie outside of us or within us. Even the shades of Kant are conjured up to defend this proposition, as if we could not derive such an opinion from the

early Sophists,* or find it shrewdly and effectively defended by Sextus, the Empiricist. Not that Kant asserted the proposition; but its significance is found in the way in which he laid the foundation for it, and carried it through, and supplemented it, as involved in the development of his system. But what was for him only an element in the whole, and by no means the point at which he finally stopped, is now esteemed the final result of philosophy and the sum of all wisdom. And yet this whole doctrine rests simply upon an interpretation of the conception of truth which is dogmatic, and, for modern philosophy, emphatically unscientific. It supposes truth to be the harmony of the thought concerned in the act of knowledge with objects which can be present independently of that thought. Knowledge is supposed to come by the reflection of what lies outside of the mind, which furnishes no means of determining how far the mirrored picture is an accurate one.

Here the question at once arises, by what means thought in general arrives at the supposition of an existence independent of it. Surely, if we do not wish to appeal simply to the material world, as given in the percept of common sense, the supposition must arise from elements found in thought itself and its activity; and, if we adopt this position, the definition of truth as just explained is rendered worthless.

The study of the history of the definition shows, too, that it belongs to that period in which thought had not worked its way to an independence of the ideas of the world as given by the psychical mechanism. It underlies the entire system of Aristotle; and at any time

* Gorgias (see Mullach, Frg. 16): *τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἀφανές, μὴ τυχὸν τοῦ δοκεῖν· τὸ δὲ δοκεῖν ἀσθενές, μὴ τυχὸν τοῦ εἶναι.*

it may, by the decline of thought, steal back again into scientific discussion. Yet, even with the Neo-Platonists, still more with the more distinguished thinkers of the middle ages, and specially with all the prominent systematic philosophers of modern times, it is considered a settled doctrine that knowledge is to be regarded, not as a pure reception and reflection, but as an inner activity.* There may be divergent opinions on this point. Some may consider the material universe as coöperating with this activity, and furnishing elements of its own, as a suggestive force; others, on the contrary, may treat the material world simply as a production of thought. But it is a common principle of all those who maintain the idea of an independent task for philosophy, that in the discussion of knowledge the question deals with that which is internal, and that, for this reason, the criteria of knowledge are to be found in thought itself.

German Idealism, culminating in Hegel, has carried out to its full development the principle that the entire antithesis of subject and object arises originally in the thinking activity, and that we are compelled to postulate a world in antithesis to the thinking subject, not by any power perceived by the senses, and forcing itself in from the outside, nor by any necessity set over against thought, but simply by the nature of thought itself.

Skepticism, which is opposed to this, finds itself in an untenable position, midway between the material world of common sense and the world of a systematic, scientific philosophy. Common sense furnishes it the principle that the knowing mind cognizes an existence independent of itself, which is not subject to its control; but the development of science has brought out

* Duns Scotus, the most distinguished thinker of the middle ages, called knowledge an "actus immanens."

clearly the antithesis of subject and object; and so the problem of the objectivity of knowledge, which had been previously investigated as one of the questions involved in the nature of the thinking activity, is now taken up and discussed by itself, as a supplementary question. We are not surprised that the answer of skepticism is all that can be given, if knowledge is made entirely dependent upon that which is external. In that case we see only what we have read into external objects.

This confusion of theories of the world, as viewed from these two different standpoints, has penetrated, as well, into the individual concepts, and has introduced perplexity even where, as a matter of principle, skepticism would be rejected. The concept of the phenomenon is taken to express simply the objects of thought without any estimate of their metaphysical worth; but it is used also to denote the ideas which are produced in us by things lying outside of us, and so becomes the instrument of a specific and thoroughly dogmatic theory of the relation of the mind to the material world. If even men like Kant and Herbart have allowed themselves to be led into fallacies by this ambiguity, we can not be surprised at the various errors of the present day. Many an investigator transforms the world given through the senses into an ideal one. But he forgets that the original apprehension is destroyed, just in proportion to the progress of this transformation. The world given by the senses remains as actually existent, by the side of the one furnished by scientific philosophy; and so we have two worlds, when in fact we are discussing only two different ways, or perhaps grades, of apprehending one and the same world. But, for the doubt which will nowhere place any confidence in the activity of

thought, we must blame the work of science itself, which alone can relieve this doubt. In any case, we should not allow ourselves to be brought, through dogmatic suppositions and confused concepts, to those vague doubts which no arguments can overcome—for the very good reason that they are founded upon no arguments.

But here arises, ultimately, the theoretical doubt involving the uncertainty of man's position in relation to the universe in general; and we are thus compelled to examine a little more closely the particular points which come under consideration.

First of all, our idea of the specific nature of the external world as subjective is valid, in the sense that it possesses no reality beyond the inner life of man. When the scientist, as we saw, draws a sharp distinction between that appearance which is the result of our specific organization and that which offers itself to scientific investigation as the last point reached in the analysis, the result is that only masses and movements constitute the objective world, while everything else belongs to the sphere of the subject. The philosopher, to be consistent, is compelled to remember that what the scientist thus regards as an objective world comes as well as the rest under the common conditions of the mind's comprehension, and hence, for philosophy, needs a new examination.

Matter and motion, as well as secondary qualities, presuppose thought-activity, and can not therefore be set over against the mind as the final essence of things. The objective world of the scientist is, accordingly, to the philosopher only a determinate system of phenomena which are distinguished by the quality of persistence, but which are always dependent upon the mind, and therefore, like everything else, relative to it. The dif-

ference between such phenomena as these and the secondary qualities is, to be sure, a great one. Moreover, we must not forget that even our very capacity for sensation is itself a part of the world, and stands in causal connection with the whole, and that for this reason there is something in it which, as a legitimate occurrence, should not be set aside as imaginary. Yet, aside from this, as one man may reason from this difference between the phenomena of matter and motion and those of the secondary qualities to the conclusion that consciousness is shut off from the material world, another can conclude that, in ultimate analysis, the essence of things must be determined to be something different from its presentation in moved masses; and so we arrive at wholly different results, according to the connection into which the data are brought.

This doubt penetrates still more deeply into our theory of the processes which are specifically spiritual. Here the concealed phenomena find no external support; a strictly scientific analysis of them seems to be excluded by their anomalous heterogeneity, which gives what appears to be a simple series of disconnected productions; and so the whole thought-realm is explained as subjective, in the sense that in it there can be only individual opinions, and not acts of knowledge of universal validity. There is certainly an obvious distinction between these phenomena and those of the external world. Yet the question arises, whether such a negative judgment of them does not really have its foundation in the fact that, in spite of what is involved in the judgment, purely psychical phenomena are estimated by a standard which has been verified only in its application to physical phenomena. Particular phenomena are often taken up just as they originally pre-

sent themselves, and are thrown together in a heap; and then men expect that a law will spontaneously spring forth, and the scattered parts will suddenly combine into a whole. But, as a matter of fact, the distinctions remain, and develop into contradictions. We find divergent tendencies. Theories formed at different times lack connection; and, on the supposition that, in view of all this, no general fundamental principles can be discovered, judgment is passed upon the whole just as it is presented. But it is not valid reasoning to reject a thing because we can not receive it in the precise form in which it is originally presented. If, in the province of natural science, phenomena must be transformed before they are in proper condition for scientific investigation, it is even more true of the mind that its phenomena, as originally given, are often only a remote and transformed consequence of the reality behind.

There are, to be sure, differences between these two kinds of phenomena. In mental phenomena the relation of the individual to the whole is different from what it is in physical phenomena. The individual has a far greater independence, and so can not be conceived simply as an expression of the whole, and with proportionate ease be formulated under a comprehensive law: no more, however, can the individual be treated in itself alone, since it is always found in combinations, and is suggestive of a connection with the whole.

From such a condition of things problems arise which seem almost to demand an artistic as well as a scientific efficiency of treatment. It results from this that in thought-action we have, not a system of uniformly persistent forces, but a becoming, and a self-formation in the act of becoming. If single phenomena

can not be adjusted to one another, a chaos is inevitable; but, as soon as the investigation is directed toward the impelling forces and their inner connections, harmonious boundaries and comprehensive essential forms can easily be established above all differences; progressive formations can be recognized in apparently lawless events; the divergent tendencies are seen to approach in their development, and even that which is apparently antagonistic will not resist the process of reduction to its proper place in the general system.

If, for example, in the province of ethics, phenomena torn off in isolation are brought together, it is easy to establish contradictions, and so to prove the contingency of moral endeavors, judgments, and sensations in general. Yet it is surely an established fact that, in general, such activities actually exist; and, before we discuss the "what," we must recognize the "that." But, then, the meaning of peculiar cases will cease to be unintelligible, so far as the individual is made a part of the whole, and the temporary form finds its justification in the entire historical development. The difficulty of the problem may in this way allow more room for the play of arbitrariness in the solution of it by the individual, but such an uncertainty is not caused primarily by the thing itself, but by our relation to it, and should not be allowed to prejudice our estimate of it.* But if we should question the possibility of an objective scientific knowledge in all cases where there can be a difference of opinions, and resign the field to a subjective arbitrariness wherever no law is revealed at the first glance, in that case we prejudge most em-

* See Leibnitz, 314 a: "Notre incertitude ne fait rien à la nature des choses."

phatically every scientific problem.* It would be a natural result that whole realms of great importance would be withdrawn from the sphere of scientific knowledge—a result which would be as convenient for the individuals as it is dangerous for the matter involved. To reject nothing should be the first principle of all investigation.

It is still more preposterous to introduce into science itself, as permanent limitations, the contradictions incident to our treatment of it; and also to slight whole sciences as "subjective," because at the outset opinions and theories diverge on account of the difficulty of the problem, and the dependence of our judgment of the individual case upon the investigation of the whole. It is certainly very advantageous to be able to treat certain provinces of science without taking into consideration the ultimate questions involved; yet it is advantageous only in so far as such sciences are taken in detail, and considered out of relation to the knowledge of the whole. But, as soon as we go beyond this, that which is peculiar in each becomes involved in the fate of the whole; and especially if philosophy, as the science which lies beneath all others, is endangered, it must react on the value of the results of every special science. To extol the trustworthiness of single sciences, as opposed to philosophy, is thus seen to be essentially a renunciation of the prerogative of knowledge as involved in science itself; and the delight in such an objectivity proceeds from a conception of it

* See Kepler, "Opera," i. 243: "Si absurdum et falsum id censeri debet, quod uni alicui hominum coctui tale videtur, nihil erit in tota physiologia, quod non pro crassissimo absurdo haberi debet. Variæ sunt hominum sententiæ, varii captus ingeniorum. Quid autem ex his verum sit, quid falsum, penes vere philosophum est decernere."

which may perhaps be suited to a day-laborer, but certainly not to an architect. In brief, we must reject the distinction between objective and subjective sciences. There are, to be sure, different methods and different grades of certainty in knowledge; we can set each individual science off for consideration by itself; but ultimately the contest over truth is a general one, and so the danger involved in this contest becomes general also.

The decisive problem, however, the one which essentially includes the preceding ones, is that of the reality and the significance of spiritual processes in general. The doubt which finds its expression in the other problems has its origin in this. Now, if we set aside the utterly crude materialism as a doctrine lying altogether beyond and outside of all philosophical investigation, we find that the independent existence of mind is called in question, in modern times, specially by two schools of thought. The one of these is based upon the natural sciences, and starts with Bacon; while the other is philosophical, and appeals to Spinoza for support. The partisans of the former take up their standpoint in nature, the investigation of which occupies all their attention. They judge mind to be something which lies outside of the realm of science, and should therefore be let alone; and then, before long, they judge it to be unsubstantial and of no account. The whole specific meaning of the thought-process is degraded to a species of illusion. It often seems as if we were to believe that ingenious law-givers, and theorists inclined to spiritualistic interpretations, had invented the whole province of apparently independent thought-activity, and had succeeded in convincing others of the reality of their invention.

But such opinions can be held only where the nature of the world and the philosophy of natural science are

regarded as simply synonymous. Whenever a more extended view is taken of the realm of science, that which is specifically mental must be recognized as something which belongs to the world. For if a phenomenon occurs in the mind, it also occurs in the universe, and by that fact is protected against a simply dogmatic rejection. No matter what conception one forms of the world, as soon as he earnestly considers the thought of a comprehensive causal connection, mind must form a part in the structure of the whole, and, as interpreted, must be included in its working. Even if it were to be regarded only as a production of physical forces, it can not stand out, as such, suddenly and immediately, like a *deus ex machina;* but the elementary forces must be so conceived, according to their general nature, that this ultimate result is seen to be eventually possible. It is, strictly, a mistake in methodology to form the ideas of the world, first of all, out of the non-mental, and then, by way of addition, to interpolate mind as an unrelated fragment. For, as Aristotle rightly remarked, the universe is not divided into episodes, like a poor tragedy; and the responsibility for the denial of the reality of the thought-process, the motive of which is explained in this way, rests entirely upon the observer, who forms concepts too narrow to embrace the whole, and who has not the faculty of holding firmly, in an investigation, to the idea of a comprehensive causal connection.

The philosophical tendency, however, which leads to the questioning of the independence of what is specifically mental, attained its culmination in Spinoza. We have already seen how far removed from him such a tendency was at the outset; but his speculative thought was not powerful enough to achieve its own design; and the action of the materialistic propositions which are

ultimately decisive is all the greater, as one believes that, in accordance with his suppositions, the philosophical problem is solved.

As soon as a point is reached where the mind is nothing else than the consciousness of an existence lying outside of it, and independent of it, it is divested of all substantial meaning. If, indeed, all of its processes contain reality and value only through their relation to what is external, everything that forms its independent existence is condemned as illusion. To ascribe anything to spiritual essence signifies the declaring it to be a phantom; and in like manner, in rigid consistency, all specific forms of thought-action, estimates of value, designs, etc., are banished from the actual world as delusions.*

This doctrine, which at first was vehemently rejected,† but afterward commended in its idealizing interpretation, has now become the conviction of a large number of men—though without the limitations which it always received from Spinoza, and without the speculative reason on which he based it. Not a few scientists consider that this is the only possible way of recognizing mind, without endangering an exact and causal comprehension of the material world. But there is at the basis of this whole doctrine a πρῶτον ψεῦδος, viz., the interpretation of the meaning of the mind itself, that is, the interpretation which makes mind and consciousness identical. Whether the relation of consciousness to external

* Spinoza's error, regarded as a pure concept, and viewed in its connection with his system, lay in the fact that he referred mind, as consciousness, not to the absolute substance, as was demanded by his first principles, but to the material world, and so substituted this for the infinite existence.

† And this, not only by zealous theologians, but also by such men as Leibnitz and Bayle.

objects, as assumed by Spinoza, may not conceal inner contradictions, is not a question we need discuss here. The fact is enough for us, that the powers of mind are not exhausted in a mere consciousness of external things, but that it creates an inner world, an independent existence (*Fürsichsein*) for itself, in which consciousness first makes its appearance and obtains significance. Those forms of thought-activity which Spinoza opposed do not belong merely to consciousness, and still less to mere reflection; but they penetrate the entire being, and are, in this essential form, thoroughly independent of any strife of opinions. It was not a reflecting brain which first invented estimates of value and designs; but, from the very beginning, these rule human life, and show that they exert a power far beyond mere reflection in all that pertains to the soul. Reflection and error are only the particular formations which these essential elements assume in the conscious life. Here the criticism of the philosopher can take possession, and find rich material to work upon. But the fact that fallacies, frauds, and encroachments are of frequent occurrence here does not in the least justify us in rejecting these essential elements themselves.

We must therefore make a more exact distinction than is usually made between consciousness and reflection. Reflection is that which has to deal, in a peculiar sense, with what is in many ways mediate and dependent, and so is continually involved in errors and exposed to doubts and assaults. The strife of parties reaches just as far as the reflecting judgment reaches; and here, where the question is one of opinions and interpretations, science must certainly explain as subjective imagery much of the reality of which the ordinary common sense of men is fully convinced. But such doubts

and contests affect only what is superficial: they do not reach the depths of the thought-process, and even that, which, in the form in which it presents itself to us, can not be retained, should not be thrown away simply as something subjective, but should much rather be traced back to its cause. We are not through with a thing as soon as it is explained as a delusion; for the delusion also demands explanation, and even error points, in ultimate analysis, to something true. Perhaps the ancient Paracelsus is here superior in profundity to many shrewd thinkers of the present day, when he says (Ed. of Huser, ii. 248), "There may also be no shadow, and, so far as there is none, thou hast nothing of the same sun that would then make shadows."

The independent existence of the mind does not need, as soon as recognized, a confirmation from outside that it may serve as real. Only when we make the attempt to unite mind and nature in a systematic cosmology do we take into consideration their reciprocal relation, and the significance of each to the whole.

Such a question, in fact, however little it may be confounded with the preceding one, will not allow itself to be placed in a subordinate position. Many persons have declared, "This is for us thoroughly transcendent, and it is a matter of practical indifference what value our life has to us, since we always remain in the same identical circle"; but, in spite of that, the most distinguished thinkers are plainly always turned, yes, driven back again to this problem by an inner necessity. Since the mind has the universe as the object of its activity, to renounce the explanation of its position in that universe signifies for it nothing else than to doubt the knowledge of itself and its own life; and, the less successful it is in this, the more certainly will

it ever turn back to the problem of the world, to add to its own self-knowledge whatever it may there obtain. In spite of all doubts, the question which Schelling (see "Works," vi. 75) makes prominent will always again arise: "Would the mind strive to fathom this relation (that of man to the universe)? I answer, if it would not, still it must. It always has striven after it; and, in the future, it always will strive after it."

It is therefore impossible to maintain the attempt at mediation which has recently been made, by letting the world of mind stand by the side of the world of nature, without specifying their mutual relations—that is, if this is to be considered a decisive cosmological theory. In this one world thought does not admit two kinds of reality: the one kind will always repress the other; and, since mind, in this case, much more readily suffers disadvantage, and is much more easily etherealized into a purely subjective world, it is the only element which is damaged by such uncertainty and indeterminateness. And even the uncertainty becomes insupportable when it reaches the point where conviction might otherwise awaken powers which are great and ordinarily difficult to excite. Even if we would seek rest in the faith that the world given in thought is a dream, the possibility of a doubt destroys our natural resignation to the illusion. The ideal world, which the phantasy paints as elysium, could comfort us only so long as it serves as a full and complete actuality: as a recognized delusion, it would be man's greatest torment—hence something to be unconditionally removed.

The problem thus allows itself neither to be pushed to one side nor to be evaded; and it is the task of philosophy always to turn back to it again. Our purpose, however, is limited to the attempt to show the prejudices

which stand at the present day in the way of an impartial treatment of the subject. From the first, thought-activity appears unimportant to many, simply because, when measured by its external extension, it seems to disappear when contrasted with the infinite universe. Kepler opposed such a notion, for the very reason that, in an immeasurably extended world, the significance of that which was small externally seemed to him to be especially worthy of admiration; and he held that we ought not to draw conclusions as to the value of anything simply from its bulk.* But, now, the glance into infinity seems to confuse many, and they are inclined to communicate the unavoidable defect of the percept to the things themselves. It is not true that all that is individual and internal is absolutely transitory and worthless, for the reason that, to our glance, the individual disappears before the Infinite, or that we can not measure the worth of the internal as we do the dimensions of time and space. It would be most decidedly a foolish undertaking to compare mind and nature with each other according to their external circumference. Setting aside the question how far we are justified in regarding as a reliable standard the contingent duration of the experience which offers itself to us, the man who, from internal evidence, thinks mind unique, would be only strengthened in this estimate by its rarity. But he who should bring it into a close causal relation with the rest of existence, and should maintain the similarity of nature in all the events in the world, could not refuse to

* Kepler, "Opera," i. 68: "At hercle recreat me nôn leviter dum perpendo, non tam debere nos mirari ingentem et infinitæ similem ultimi cœli amplitudinem, quam e contra nostrum homuncionum nostræque hujus exilissimæ glebulæ adeoque mobilium omnium exiguitatem. Nempe Deo mundus non est vastus, at nos mundo, me Christe, perquam exigui sumus. Neque ex mole judicium est de præstantia faciendum."

extend it beyond and beneath the superficial indications of experience. And, setting all that aside, what opinion should we form of a physicist who thought he could take the liberty of ignoring unquestionable phenomena, which happened to contradict his individual hypotheses, because these were of rare occurrence?

A further objection, that mind lacks independent reality, because it appears only in the development of universal history, after going through a process of formation, and vacillating in many ways, has already been met, in part, by the remarks made above concerning the cognizability of spiritual phenomena. It can be added, that it does not in the least follow from its gradual creation that anything is, in the universe, only an incidental result and a transitory phenomenon; because it is still an open question whether it arises in the process as a supplement, or was determined from the beginning, along with the process itself. If we were to predicate of all being, which receives its particular formation only in the progress of universal history, a less degree of reality than that which we give to the unchangeably persistent, we should destroy the whole significance of the world-process and of development; and it would not be the mind only which would be degraded to the position of a fleeting phenomenon.

He, who, in his conception of development, always maintains the characteristics of causality and legitimacy, will be much more inclined to deem that to be peculiarly worthy of consideration which is created later in its processes.

But, we hear it remarked, mind not only appears at a late date, and in a solitary position, in the world's history; it is also the result of very complicated conditions and of various combinations, and is therefore far

more dependent and changeable than the simple elements which lie at the basis of the compound; and, since it is a valid axiom in science to proceed from the simple to the complex in an explanation, we can in no case make the mind our starting-point in our conception of the world. Yet this whole demonstration rests on the dogmatic assumption that mental activity as it appears in the phenomenon reveals its own intrinsic essence. That activity of course supposes our organization, which must be regarded as very complicated and variably compounded; but we must not, for that reason, in philosophy esteem the mind itself as something composite—that is, the very being which, single and alone among the things accessible to us, possesses an internal unity, and must claim the highest degree of reality whenever it is viewed in the light of philosophy.

If, indeed, as now almost universally happens, the antithesis of lower and higher is to be made the equivalent of that between the simple and the complex, we must regard the higher as the dependent, and derive it from the lower. But even in that judgment there is already the concealed expression of a determinate theory, which, nevertheless, is not self-evident. Empedocles and Democritus may consent to it, but exactly the reverse is held by Platonism, in which the highest stage is formed by the simple, the plainly coined, while the lower seems to be something which is hemmed in, confused, little by little struggling out from pressure into freedom. Here, too, a gradual development can be fully vouchsafed; but in it our concept of the lower would be formed from that of the higher.*

* See, for example, Aristotle, 1252 b, 32: *ἡ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου*

Thus we see that the contempt for the existence and activity of thought rests everywhere on assumptions, which, within certain limits and referred to mere phenomena, may have their full justification, but which, so far as they enter with the claim of being decisive facts of philosophical knowledge, are to be rejected as dogmatic presuppositions. That such dogmatic presuppositions should have been able to obtain so great an influence in science is explained in greater part by the fact that, on the other hand, the chief endeavor of modern investigation to form an idea of mind as something cosmic, and of what is human as a part of the universe—that this endeavor, if not given up, still has not been prosecuted with sufficient energy. Even in the contests of science we continually see the idea of the world, which the mind forms in accordance with the tendencies and postulates arising immediately in consciousness, without hesitation presented as a conception of the objective world; while the fact is, that what is thus present in consciousness has usually come into the form in which it offers itself to us only through a varied accommodation and transformation, and therefore needs to be thoroughly worked over before it becomes generally applicable in science, and furnishes a building-stone for the whole.

And, then, the human does not give the measure for the universe. If, from the human as a point of vision, new views of the whole are opened, and a change is to that extent introduced into the entire conception of the universe, still even this supposes an elevation above what is exclusively specific, and so, in theory and in practice, a changed position in relation to the world, as was the case in the experience of the past. The appeal, too, to what are supposed to be practical interests, as opposed

to merely theoretical results, is here often only a device for putting aside unverified ideas as beyond the reach of science. The phenomena of active life must indeed find an explanation and a guarantee within the theory; but this must be done in connection with the whole, and under the common conditions of knowledge. Modern science is unfavorable to all special privileges. Whoever lays claim to anything of this sort, only betrays the weakness of his own position.

It is no part of our present undertaking to explain how much truth has been in the mean time worked out through and in the contest of erroneous theories. This much should be evident from the preceding considerations: that the scientific idea of consciousness stands, in a variety of ways, under the influence of a subjective skepticism. Perhaps this also is evident, that the reasons by which that idea is supported, considered in themselves, do not possess a high degree of essential force. But even this weakness in the reasons shows that we have to do here, not so much with a theory of science as with a great tendency in the universal history of all life. And for this reason success in the struggle after a truth raised above these divergences of opinion depends on conditions which no investigation of science can provide; it depends on the faith of the mind in itself—on the consciousness which it has of problems which are positive and important in their relation to the universe. Science is powerless as soon as doubt and negation rule in the place of this faith, because it falls itself, with its entire contents, within the province of that which the doubt destroys.

EXPERIENCE.

"Scienee is the mother of experience; and without science is there nothing in it."—PARACELSUS.

SINCE the famous utterance of Polus,* the import of experience has passed through a variety of changes. Plato and Aristotle understood by the *ἐμπειρία* of science very different things. The former combined *ἐμπειρία* and *τριβή*. Aristotle, who had studied the concept more searchingly, and who first coined the expressions *ἐμπειρικός* (*ἐμπειρικῶς*), understood by *ἐμπειρία* only the summing up of single acts of judgment, with no knowledge of the universal—in accordance with which meaning, it can, of course, form only a first step in science.†

The Stoics were the first to distinguish definitely the scientific (*ἐμπειρία μεθοδική*) from the common experience, and the same distinction was made by Polybius, who in principle and in phraseology was closely allied

* See Plato, "Gorgias," 448 C: *πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως εὑρημέναι. ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην.*

† See "Metaphysics," 981 a, 7: *τὸ μὲν ἔχειν ὑπόληψιν ὅτι* Καλλίᾳ *κάμνοντι τηνδὶ τὴν νόσον τοδὶ συνήνεγκε καὶ* Σωκράτει *καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον οὕτω πολλοῖς, ἐμπειρίας ἐστίν. τὸ δ' ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῖσδε κατ' εἶδος ἓν ἀφορισθεῖσι, κάμνουσι τηνδὶ τὴν νόσον, συνήνεγκεν οἷον τοῖς φλεγματώδεσιν ἢ χολώδεσιν ἢ πυρέττουσι καύσῳ, τέχνης.*

with the Stoics.* Yet this employment of the term does not seem to have come into general use. The Platonists, and especially the Peripatetics, adhered to the Aristotelian definition, and so it remained to the end a matter of dispute whether or not the *ἐμπειρία* were synonymous with the *τέχνη*.† In the contest between the medical schools, also, it was regarded as characteristic of the Empiricists that they renounced all investigation into causes. ‡

This signification, according to which empiricism was distinguished from science, is the one which passed over into the middle ages in the word *empiricus;* and it continues to exert an influence even in the present day. Bacon drew the line sharply between the standpoint of the Empirics and his own. Still more often, in the eighteenth century, we find the scientific experience separated from that which is empirical or common; and also in Kant we notice a distinction between empirical knowledge and experience in a strict sense. The name of the school, *Empiricism*, although first used in the eighteenth century, and frequently employed by Kant, was brought into a wider use especially by

* See i. 84, 6, where the *ἐμπειρία μεθοδικὴ καὶ στρατηγικὴ δύναμις* is opposed to the *ἀπειρία καὶ τριβὴ ἄλογος στρατιωτικὴ*. Further, ix. 14, 1: *τῶν δὲ προειρημένων τὰ μὲν ἐκ τριβῆς, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἱστορίας, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐμπειρίαν μεθοδικὴν θεωρεῖται.*

† See Sextus Emp. "adv. Math.," i. 60, where it is adduced as the opinion of the Peripatetic Ptolemæus: *ὅτι οὐκ ἐχρῆν ἐμπειρίαν εἰρηκέναι τὴν γραμματικὴν (αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἐμπειρία τριβή τίς ἐστι καὶ ἐργάτις ἄτεχνός τε καὶ ἄλογος, ἐν ψιλῇ παρατηρήσει καὶ συγγυμνασίᾳ κειμένη, ἡ δὲ γραμματικὴ τέχνη καθέστηκεν).* Olympiodorus opposes *ἐμπειρικός* to *λογικός* (see Creuzer's ed., 135): *οὐδὲ διαφέρει ὁ ὀρθοδοξαστικὸς τοῦ ἐπιστήμονος, εἰ μὴ τὸ εἰδέναι τὴν αἰτίαν ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὁ λογικὸς ἰατρὸς τοῦ ἐμπειρικοῦ διαφέρει· ἐν τῇ πράξει γὰρ τὰ αὐτά ποιοῦσιν.* (124.)

‡ See, on this point, Häser, "History of Medicine," 3d ed., i. 245 et seq.

Schelling, and generally gave the impression that the doctrine signified by it was an inferior one. *Ἐμπειρία* itself, however, was replaced by *experientia*, which was used (*experientz*) for a while by German writers; as, for example, by Paracelsus, Kepler, and others. In the middle ages the plural, *experientiæ*, experiences, was also formed; as, for example, by Roger Bacon. We find the term *scientia experimentalis* in Nicolaus Cusanus. Our German word *ervarn* (properly found originally in *varn*, to acquire, to search) dates very far back. In the oldest philosophical writer in the German language, Notker, we find *comprehendere* so translated. In the middle ages the expression is in general use. *Erfahrung* (*ervarunge*) occurs at that time, also prominently in Luther. Paracelsus was the first to employ the word *erfahrung* in a strictly scientific sense, as well as *erfahrnuss*, and the predominant *erfahrenheit*. *Erfahrenheit* signified with him the activity involved in the reception of the objects presented through the senses, as well as the totality of what was given.*

This expression, which was used as well by Kepler and others, assumed later a narrower signification;† and, as *erfahrniss* and *experientz* went out of use, *erfahrung* alone remained, and now unites in itself a variety of significations. It signifies on the one side, subjectively, the act of perception itself, the particular acts of knowledge involved in perception, and the sum total of such acts of knowledge; then, however, objec-

* See iii. 78, "Weg der *Erfahrenheit*"; ii. 380, "Erforschung der *Erfahrenheit*."

† Adelung makes the remark, after he has cited the signification which is at present predominant, that "In Upper Germany this word is used also for *Erfahrung*, as . . . . I have it from *Erfahrenheit*."

tively, it signifies the object of perception,* and the sum total of that which is accessible to perception—a variation in signification which continually occasions confusion in our definitions.

The concept became naturally a problem for philosophical investigation at every point where the question of the sources of knowledge was discussed; but this question did not become a center of philosophical activity until the modern era. An empirical and a speculative tendency then acted together to change the relations of the question. As opposed to the cosmological theories of the middle ages, there was brought to bear at this point the desire to comprehend whatever is founded on fact with less embarrassment, and with more precision; to distinguish this sharply from all addition on the part of the recipient subject, and to construct science anew on what was thus obtained, as on a sure foundation. If we remember that, simultaneously with the discussions of a Bacon, so distinguished a thinker as Suarez made searching investigations into the psychology of the angels, we shall understand the full extent of this change. The consideration of essential facts became an infinitely more difficult task than it had previously seemed to be, partly because the established cosmical theories were being slowly undermined, and partly because of the discovery of scientific instruments; and for this reason the exact nature of experience necessarily became much more important.

To Bacon belongs the merit of having brought out, with a stimulating vivacity, the problems which arise from such a condition of things, even though he failed to solve them. He drew the line most sharply between

* Especially at the time when the expression *Thatsache* was not yet in general use.

that which in ordinary life is called experience (the *experientia vaga*) and that which is alone valuable to science, and he deseribed the essential characteristics of the latter. He insisted upon a peculiarly scientific experience (an *experientia literata*), by which observations and results might be communicated among men, to the end that a continuous total of human experienee might be formed. He developed for the first time the fundamental principles and problems of the inductive method, and extended these to all provinces of investigation, so that he could rightly eall his philosophy inductive,* and claim to introduce a reform in all sciences.

But this inductive tendency is supplemented by one which is speculative, which would transform the whole relation of thought to the world, and essentially change the problems of science. The inquiry proceeds from the assumption that we know things, not according to their real existence, but only by means of their action in and upon us; hence we are not at liberty, in our explanation, to proceed to something lying beyond our activity, but are compelled to endeavor to reduce the various phenomena to these first principles, which are simple and actually capable of proof, and then, in turn, from these to derive all phenomena by a legitimate process. This tendency, which is already noticeable in the

* "Nov. Org.," i. 127: "Etiam dubitabit quispiam potius quam objiciet, utrum nos de naturali tantum philosophia, an etiam de scientiis reliquis, logicis, ethicis, politicis, secundum viam nostram perficiendis loquamur. At nos certe de universis hæc quæ dicta sunt intelligimus, atque quemadmodum vulgaris logica, quæ regit res per syllogismum, non tantum ad naturales, sed ad omnes scientias pertinet, ita et nostra, quæ procedit per inductionem, omnia complectitur." "Philosophia nostra inductiva" appears in the beginning of the *thema cœli*. Further, induction as a distinct method was first used by Socrates (see Arist. "Metaph.," 1078 b, 27). Aristotle gave it a name (ἐπαγωγή and ἐπακτικός), and also an exact investigation: the translation (*inductio*) was introduced by Cicero.

prominent thinkers of the transitional period (among the Germans, for example, in Nicolaus Cusanus, Nicolaus Taurellus, and Kepler), obtained in Descartes a classical expression. Here the ancient categories are replaced by new ones. According to Descartes, we know, essentially, only forces, but are compelled, where we find a single force, to add the substance, in thought, as a supplementary concept. The qualities which had dwelt in the substance as little souls, and which, as concealed properties (*qualitates occultæ*), had stood in the way of exact knowledge, gave way to modifications (*modi*, *modificationes*), which exist only as connected, and constitute a determinate form of the essential force.*

To be sure, as was usually the case in the writings of Descartes, these new doctrines appear in the forms of the ancient terminology. And yet, in spite of that, they show unmistakably that a reformation in principles has been effected, which would extend to all the sciences, and transform the whole method of scientific

* "Princ. Philos.," i. § 52: "Non potest substantia primum animadverti ex hoc solo, quod sit res existens, quia hoc solum per se nos non afficit; sed facile ipsam agnoscimus ex quolibet ejus attributo," etc. § 53: "Et quidem ex quolibet attributo substantia cognoscitur; sed una tamen est cujusque substantiæ præcipua proprietas, quæ ipsius naturam essentiamque constituit et ad quam aliæ omnes referuntur." Since the concept of substance thus reaches no farther than the activity, substance must be conceived as continually acting. See, for example, "Epist.," vol. ii. 4, 14: "Necessarium videtur ut mens semper actu cogitet; quia cogitatio constituit ejus essentiam, quemadmodum extensio constituit essentiam corporis." It is noted as one of the two leading principles of his physics ("Epist.," ii. 116): "Me nullas in natura qualitates reales supponere, quæ substantiæ tribuantur, tanquam animulæ quædam corporibus suis, et quæ possint ab illa per divinam potentiam separari; atque ita plus realitatis non tribuo motui aut aliis substantiæ mutationibus, quas qualitates vocant, quam vulgo philosophi tribuunt figuræ, quæ apud illos non est qualitas realis, sed tantum modus."

investigation. It was seen to be especially important that we discover the simple forces, reduce to them the heterogeneous elements in phenomena, and establish the conditions under which the special formations may admit of the coexistence of these simple forces. This entire doctrine is not superior to attacks; it rests upon a determinate theory of the world, and of the relation of the thinking subject to it: but it received a striking confirmation from the mechanical conception of nature; and, when it then sought to establish itself everywhere, it ruled completely the science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, until it was shaken by Kant within the province of philosophy.

In the entire realm of science, the inductive and the speculative tendencies now acted upon each other, and mutually made good progress. The one restricts the investigator to what is given, and insists upon an abundance of material; the other, on the contrary, gives the standard for the proper estimation of what is given, and for the working of it; and so each enhances the value of the other. It is just this close connection of the two which invests with such an intensity the struggle over truth at the present day, and stamps modern science with that peculiar character which distinguishes it from all earlier developments, and gives to all the different systems certain points of contact and resemblance. There is even in the contest concerning the sources of knowledge far more harmony than would appear at first sight. All agree that this is a process in the material world and in life: knowledge is not supposed to be received, as something inherited, or inborn, or in general ready-made, but much rather to be something immediately produced; and hence all agree in

desiring of it clearness, evidence, and constant capability of verification. Debate arises only over the question where the forces producing such results are to be sought; and, if here some decide in favor of the activity of the mind originating from within, and others in favor of the forces of the external world revealing themselves to it, the dispute must become the more fierce the less endurable is a mere juxtaposition of the two theories in the one closely coherent world which all parties assume. It is not possible to enter here upon the particular phases of this dispute, nor is it necessary, since, by the turn which Kant gave to the problem, the leading feature of the discussion has lost, for us, its immediate significance. Besides Kant's definition, only that of Leibnitz remains, as of independent value.

Leibnitz was far from despising experience; but he believed that it is impossible for us to stop with it, because our striving after knowledge is satisfied only by the discovery of causes throughout the whole world—a discovery which experience can not give. The facts of experience seem to him to be material which is to be transformed by the work of science into principles of the reason. Actual knowledge is ultimately possible only when the data are reduced to principles in which, as in equations, the agreement of subject and predicate is immediately evident, so that the task of philosophy is found to be an attempt to analyze what is confused into such simple propositions.*

This, however, can be fully attained only by ne-

* See "De Libertate" (Foucher, ii. 181): "Demonstrare nihil aliud est, quam resolvendo terminos propositionis et pro definito definitionem aut ejus partem substituendo, ostendere æquationem quandam seu coincidentiam prædicati cum subjecto in propositione reciproca; in aliis vero saltem inclusionem."

cessary truths (*vérités de raison*); while by contingent truths (*vérités de fait*) the finite mind is able to approach the solution only in a process incapable of completion. Although it is peculiarly the task of philosophy to transform knowledge through experience into rational knowledge, and a complete assurance and verification of judgments are possible only so far as we succeed in this,* still experience is necessary, not only as a point of departure and means of progress, but also as giving a residuum, the significance of which can never be fully explained.†

Kant agrees with Leibnitz in this, that philosophy has experience not as its principle, but as its problem; yet, in accordance with his own peculiarity of method, he considers the activity exerted by philosophic thought upon the phenomena as something which dissects and analyzes; and this activity is all the more searching the more it comprehends the nature of experience itself and tests the process over the results of which there has been so long a contest. But, because the fundamental distinction between the understanding and the sensitive faculty was in general of essential importance to the formation of his system, the two are separated in experience also; and experience thus appears as "the product of the understanding, from the materials furnished by the sensitive faculty." ‡ As this distinction between matter and form was made in the definition,

* See, for example, 344 b: "La liaison des phénomènes, qui garantit les vérités de fait à l'égard des choses sensibles hors de nous, se vérifie par le moyen des vérités de raison; comme les apparences de l'optique s'éclaircissent par la géométrie."

† Leibnitz thus comes near to the distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments; but he considers the whole distinction as relative, and as one which disappears in infinite development.

‡ See "Works," Hartenstein's ed., iv. 64.

the one being assigned to things, the other to the mind, it became everywhere a problem to analyze what is empirically given into these factors, in order to bring subsequently into one system that which had been thus separated. By his grand execution of this great endeavor, all that hitherto had been foremost in the certainty of philosophical knowledge was shaken, and, above all, the problem of experience itself was completely changed; but the change, in turn, brought with it so many new questions, as practically, for the first time, to inaugurate what is now the real contest.

First of all, the starting-point can itself be involved in doubt. Kant discussed the question as to how experience is possible; but it happened here, as in another decisive point in his system (that of his doctrine of freedom), that the question whether the object of the investigation was something real was everywhere kept in the background. This is the one place in which skepticism can always insinuate its attacks upon the Kantian doctrine.* The empirical school, however, can find fault with the fact that experience, with its factors, is presented too much as something completely given, and capable of being from its very beginning reviewed. We are compelled to remember here that much of that which is asserted to be necessary knowledge *a priori* has, as a matter of fact, worked itself out from what was really contingent, as the result of a long struggle, and by the aid of experience—for which reason we can by no means consider further changes to be absolutely excluded. In

* Herbart's objection (see "Works," vi. 286) to this is not without foundation: that there is a *petitio principii* involved in the statement that "experience possesses an objective validity, which contains in itself an absolute solidity, and is of a far higher rank than that of a universal, uniform habit of men."

ultimate analysis, the relation of the reason to experience, in the speculative philosophy, does not seem to be determined beyond all contradiction. Thought was considered superior to experience as its product, and the assumption that thought produces the material world out of itself seemed to be imminent; still the necessity of the *thing-in-itself* was maintained, and the reason was limited to this material world as given. This involved a contradiction, which was clearly expressed by Kant himself in the *Transcendental Dialectic*, and which he attempted to escape by the different definitions of the theoretical and the practical reason.

The Constructive philosophers carried out an extensive and one-sided development, in the doctrine of the practical reason. Since they desired to produce the whole world by the activity of thought, experience could no longer be to them the starting-point, but only the final goal. It was to be brought into the comparison which tests it only at the conclusion of the philosophical process, which process should follow only its own laws, without regard to what was presented to the senses. The difference between empiricism and science consisted in this, that the former showed as already produced that which the latter had formed by the activity of thought.* Moreover, this school took possession by degrees of the whole province of science. With Fichte, philosophy deals only with universal and necessary defi-

* Schelling calls (iv. 97) "experience not a principle, but a problem; not a *terminus a quo*, but a *terminus ad quem* of construction." He says (iii. 283): "The antithesis between empiricism and science rests on the fact that the former regards its object in Being as something ready-made and completed, while science regards its object in Becoming and as something to be first produced." In general, Schelling has paid more attention than any of the other German Idealists to the problem of the relation of philosophy to experience.

nitions,* while knowledge from experience gives the nature of particular things. He thus guards himself emphatically against a nature-philosophy, as against any historical philosophy which claims to be able to evolve the individual from the concept. Schelling goes a step farther in his nature-philosophy; and in his mental science we see him, in his first Period,† ever tending more and more toward philosophical construction, until at last this development culminates in Hegel, who leaves nowhere to experience an independent significance.

The thoughtful theory of Herbart, which recognized experience everywhere as the starting-point, but which, through the contradictions prominent in it, was led into philosophy and a consequent transformation of the data furnished by experience, ‡ succeeded in making no farther advances; and so the reaction from that sovereign position which thought had claimed for itself proceeded not so much from philosophy as from the special sciences and from common sense.

Common sense, which has a concealed hatred for every philosophy, as for all higher ambitions of the reason, and which concerns itself with the systems only to point out what is fallacious, absurd, and ridiculous, found in the doctrines of the Constructive philosophers a rich field for its attacks. So long as one did not deal

* But here, too, experience is a condition of the empirical consciousness. See vi. 313: "All laws of reason are grounded in the nature of our minds, but they come into empirical consciousness only through an experience to which they are applicable."

† The discussions of the second Period, belonging here, in spite of many strikingly appropriate remarks, are too far removed from modern investigation to be included in the vital questions of science.

‡ He fails to prove, in fact, the right of thought thus to test experience by its own laws, and also to prove the special criteria by which the process was to be conducted.

with the elements of the decisive problems of philosophy and the historical development of thought, that for which one fought necessarily appeared Quixotic; and we can not wonder that many a man fancied that he demonstrated his own mental superiority if he overwhelmed with ridicule doctrines the foundation and connection of which appeared to him simply enigmas. Inasmuch, however, as such anti-philosophical tendencies prefer the covering of a philosophical theory, Empiricism was assumed as a verbal symbol of the attack.

Those who defended the special sciences, particularly the Scientists, had better reasons for their position. For a long time their work was not affected nor ruled by the preponderating influence of the Constructive philosophy—by no means as much as is often to-day asserted; yet the essential significance of those sciences, with all their devoted and productive labor, was undoubtedly called in question by a system which supposed it possible to develop the whole content of experience out of pure thought. It thus became evident what errors the Constructive thinkers committed in illegitimately claiming this province for philosophy.

The rejection of this claim from the side of the exact sciences was thus thoroughly justified, and their change of attitude to the aggressive is easily explained. The only danger was that one might in that way judge the principles involved simply from their consequences, and often from consequences which were very remote, and so, on his side, pass beyond his proper province, and undertake the decision of problems the treatment of which really involved many other conditions. There were in fact some such men who, in addition to their regular work, attempted in a measure to solve in their leisure hours questions which had taxed the greatest skill

of a Leibnitz and a Kant. The utterances, however, which came from this side, virtually agreed in resolutely contesting the right of philosophy to extend itself to the results of these special sciences. This justifiable protest against the Constructive philosophers led, in this way, to a distaste for all systematic philosophy.

And then there arose at last, within philosophy itself, a development in favor of the Empiricism which had been undervalued in the discussions of the earlier writers. Those elements of science which favor Empiricism, which had often been passed over superficially, now asserted their claims to notice with renewed energy. With Empiricism, moreover, were associated many results of the special sciences, which, when carried over into philosophy, made necessary a transformation of the question concerning the origin of knowledge. At this point comes into consideration the principle of the positive characters of the forms of knowing and being which shows once for all the weakness of a philosophical construction of the contents of experience out of the most universal concepts. While Empiricism has Kant as its companion, in this respect, up to a certain point, yet it turns against him when it admits the gradual development of its rigidly valid forms—allying itself here with Herbart, but, above all, submitting the question to a special investigation.

The further prosecution and philosophical accomplishment of such fully justifiable tendencies must, however, lead to an essential change in philosophy, and in its relation to the special sciences; and we can therefore only thank Empiricism for insisting emphatically upon the validity of those points. It is to its advantage, in its influence over popular thought, that in its work it understands how most fully to appreciate and

to utilize in the greatest degree the investigations of the exact sciences, while the supporters of other schools, as it seems, either oppose them or are unable to make use of them.

But all these different tendencies act simultaneously in popular thought, and appear united in a complex whole, in which it is difficult to distinguish the single elements. The philosophical, the unphilosophical, and the anti-philosophical come together and interpenetrate. It is not easy to decide where the one begins and the other ceases. For this reason the criticism of modern Empiricism involves a peculiar difficulty. In this confusion we are in danger of making the one element responsible for another—in fact, of treating the friend as an enemy, and the enemy as a friend. But this very union of heterogeneous elements in a total effect is characteristic of the state of things in our day. Especially, the important fact for our consideration is not the philosophical Empiricism of particular scientists, but Empiricism as a complete phenomenon; and hence we must regard, as well as we can, the leading features of the entire development, at the risk of placing less value upon the critical discussions of particular scientists than upon the dogmatic assertions of the mass.

The question in dispute, as universally considered, is primarily this: How high a value are we to place upon the activity of thought in the conception of the material world? Is the mind essentially receptive, and active only as it forms in itself transcripts of things; or is it its right and its duty to subject what is presented to it to the test of its own laws, and according to these to form its results? In particular, is it the province of philosophy simply to receive and combine what is furnished to it by the special sciences; or has it, on the

contrary, with an independent method, an independent task? Many gradations are possible on both sides; but a specific antithesis remains in the fact that, in the systematic construction of philosophy (not in the psychological development), the process is, on the one side, from thought to objects—on the other side, from objects to thought. It may, however, be considered a special characteristic of the kind of Empiricism which is to-day commonly predominant, that the inductive method is esteemed as the peculiar means, not only of scientific investigation, but of philosophical knowledge as well. In this view the independent activity of the mind, as contrasted with its objects, is degraded to a most insignificant position; thought is compelled, essentially, to limit itself to the clear presentation to consciousness of that which things accomplish by themselves; the formation of the individual object of thought into definite shape seems to be determined by things from without; and science is built up by degrees into a whole in the manner of a pyramid.*

Of this strictly inductive method, we assert that it does not even rule in the province to which it lays especial claim, that of the natural sciences; that it falls still more into the background in the other realms of thought; and that it does not reach at all to the ultimate problems of philosophy.

The first statement becomes sufficiently evident, from a close examination of the processes and methods involved in the work of the natural sciences. If we analyze, so far as we can, such concepts as hypothesis, analysis, law, and others; if we consider the categories under which phenomena here, not arrange themselves,

* Bacon is the classical type of all this.

but are arranged by us; if we, finally, glance through the systematic articulation of these sciences, we shall find that, to all these, induction is an invariably necessary assistant, an indispensable condition, but that nowhere is it the sufficient or even the most important productive power. But perhaps it is simpler to glance at the historical development of these sciences, because it is here that the different forces are presented most conspicuously.

We believe that we can say here, that every one who is familiar in any measure with the vigorous thought-contests which accompanied the unusually difficult transition from the Aristotelian-Scholastic to the modern, from a naïve to a scientific explanation of nature—that any such person will drop as untenable the supposition that in these contests the inductive method of investigation turned the scale. Induction presupposes that the particular cases can be observed for themselves, and for themselves can furnish a definite result; that then the particular classifies, arranges itself, etc., until a whole is attained. But how now if the whole foundation is shaken; if questions are raised concerning the stability and ultimateness of the individuals; if everything existing is dissolved before the glance of the investigator, and the question is to discover the elements of a new world, and to distinguish the ultimate forms remaining in the confused mass? When the thing to be done is to construct anew something solid out of an immense chaotic mass, and we are called upon to formulate and to conceive the phenomenal under new relations and from a new point of view, induction then stands before problems which overpower it; for, while it can build up what is given it, it can not essentially and intrinsically transform a world.

Nor was the doctrine of categories, in which the modern explanation of nature is involved, discovered by Descartes by means of induction. Is it by induction that the investigation of nature is determined as involving the comprehension of the phenomenal as something thoroughly compound, and as involving, first, its reduction to simple primary forces, and, secondly, its derivation from these by the help of the idea of development? In harmony with such a theoretical determination of the task, not induction, but analysis was the peculiar instrument of progress in the actual work of scientists—of such men as Kepler and Galileo, Descartes and Newton. They saw that it was, above all, their task to analyze what was confused in a phenomenon, that they might arrive at simple forces, and from those again work back to what was originally given. They went out beyond this, only that they might return to it again; but it was only by this exercise of thought that it became possible to see in the given phenomena anything else than had been seen there before; only so could they hold and conceive, as itself a legitimate product, that which, received unchanged, was involved in complications and contradictions.

To this end, of course, a precise determination and a constant consideration of the phenomenal were unconditionally necessary; and, so far as this went, modern natural science had undeniably an inductive character. But for the really decisive work itself induction was thoroughly insufficient, since the object which it observed was itself already complicated; experience "became conscious at the same time of laws and exceptions" (see Goethe, "Ausg. letzter Hand," 50, 160); and hence the circumstances under which it could form a decision required a transformation of its material.

Facts of knowledge, as the so-called law of inertia, the law of the persistence of force, etc., have not been discovered, in gradual ascent, from single data—for these all contained at the outset more or less apparent contradiction—but they became possible only through the fact that scientists knew how to span the totality of things with comprehensive glance; that they grasped the heterogeneous, not as an aggregate, but as a system; that in thought they followed out series by themselves into the infinite; and that, by all this, they obtained a position from which they could form a new world, without a conflict with those apparent contradictions. In this way have been achieved all those great discoveries which excite our astonishment.

The mathematical character of modern natural science is also a witness for this interpretation of its method. If Kant's statement is correct, that natural science contains only so much science as it does mathematics, and hence the knowledge of laws and forms is to be regarded as of primary importance, then induction must be content with the second place. For the mathematical element, through its primary concept of pure quantity, turns out to be, in principle, superior to the inductive element. And, as a matter of fact, the first scientist who formulated mathematical laws in nature, John Kepler, did not proceed to these by direct highways from phenomena; but, after sufficient inquiries in the material world, he first calculated possibilities and hypothetically developed consequences, and not till then turned back to experience for comparison and decision. Only because the mind produces the mathematical forms in its constant, inner activity, did he consider it possible that it could find laws in nature: for which reason such a cognition is explicitly expressed as a recogni-

tion.* The other great scientists came much nearer to this method which Kepler employed than to that which was recommended by Bacon. A man like Newton might, in many statements, apparently profess to be a follower of the inductive tendency; but a scientist's opinion of his own method and that method itself are two different things. In his actual process Newton agrees with Kepler and Descartes much more than with Bacon and Locke. Surprise is sometimes expressed that a scientist, who recognized the methods of the natural sciences as accurately as Bacon did, should have advanced scientific knowledge so little by his own work. But there is no cause for surprise, since the assumption itself is inaccurate. Bacon, in some details, recognized correctly many processes and methods of natural science, and brought out the value of this knowledge with all the vivacity and perspicuity of his style. But his doctrine of method, considered as a whole, neither corresponds to the scientific process of our day,† nor could it be productive in the condition of science in his time.

In brief, we believe that the peculiarity of modern natural science is misunderstood, and that especially the important thought-labor involved in it is undervalued, if it is supposed to be chiefly the creation of induction. After the path is once broken, induction can accomplish the work of the day; and it is not at all strange that it is far more prominent to the reflective consciousness

* See "Opera," v. 216: "Idoneam invenire in sensibilibus proportionem est detegere et agnoscere et in lucem proferre similitudinem illius proportionis in sensibilibus cum certo aliquo verissimæ harmoniæ archetypo, qui intus est in animo." In general, Kepler's doctrine of knowledge, which is especially developed in the fourth book of the "Harmonice Mundi," should not be so wholly forgotten, in favor of the Baconian doctrine.

† This is evident from his undervaluation of mathematics.

than operations which are of superior power and importance; for that which is the most important, not being produced by reflection, escapes our notice while in operation, and even after it has been employed, and so the real process remains concealed beneath what is actually present in consciousness. Unless we are prepared to identify with what is the decisive power involved what is only its necessary condition, or to interpret the concept of inductive investigation as involving the assertion of something self-evident, we are compelled to coördinate induction with and subordinate it to other methods.

But, then, this same method is supposed to be transferable to the mind as well, because of the analogy between the experience of internal and that of external phenomena. We can not of course defend what the Mystics understood by inner experience.* There can, among scientific men, be no doubt that it leads to a contradiction to establish something which avoids the essential conditions and forms of knowledge (as such an inner experience does) as a source of an act of knowledge, and indeed of a knowledge which surpasses all other forms of judgment. If, then, we carefully distinguish between inner experience and the experience of internal phenomena, the demand that the latter shall share in the definite establishment of a cosmology is fully justified. But it becomes a very problematical assertion if the specific form, which the concept of experience has received in the investigation of the material world, is transferred to the thought-world without modification, and if an exclusive sway is demanded for meth-

* Weigel, especially, introduced the phrase into German ("innere Erfahrenheit" and "innere Erfahrung"). See "Christl. Gespräch vom wahren Christenthum," Cap. ii.

ods which, even there, are employed only in connection with and after other methods.

Before we take up the watchword of the *inductive psychology*, so attractive to the predominant tendency of our day, it is especially necessary to ask whether the conditions of applying the inductive method to this material are given, at least to the same extent as they are in the case of the investigation of nature, provided we hold that a method should be adapted to the nature of its material, rather than that the material should be constrained to forms not fitted to it, for the sake of a system. But, as a matter of fact, there is in this respect unmistakably a great difference between the internal and the external world. The phenomena of the former do not immediately arrange themselves in a world which is connected, permanent, and common to all observers; so that, though there may be a perception of the internal, there is no internal intuition, and that which we have experienced is exposed to constant change in the progressive development of the whole.* The particular phenomena are not in general given as relatively independent, and hence can not be held as solved by themselves, but they are always influenced by their connection and occurrence in combinations. And, moreover, the universal does not proceed simply from the particular, and absorb it in itself without residue; but in every combination the particular preserves a certain independence. But here we face problems for which the inductive method is by no means a match.

* Herbart says correctly (vi. 358): "Every fact which we assume as known in previous time, through consciousness, or in general as having already happened, and being present in plain sight, can be called in doubt —in fact, must be called in doubt—because of the vacillation in all internal perception, and because of the extreme ease with which some element can be insidiously interpolated in such a fact."

On this account, while there is, of course, no doubt that induction has an important significance in psychology,* still it can here, as in natural science, operate only on the border-land between nature and the soul. As soon as the problem becomes specifically psychological, induction is banished into narrower limits. We may, for example, ask how a system of ethics or religion can be inductively proved from psychical phenomena. Is it through combination of the similar, and ascent to universal propositions? But we must have formed a previous judgment, in order to decide what material belongs here; and we must have ascertained the boundaries, in order to discover what is similar, which, in this case, must possess intrinsic similarity. Or are we to obtain a law by striking an average?

From all this it can be inferred, with sufficient clearness, on how weak a foundation an inductive psychology would stand as a system, and how absurd it would be to construct the whole system of philosophy on such a basis. This would be true even if that which is immediately present to perception and observation were pure fact; while, in reality, it has passed through our own apprehension, and the combinations and for-

* We have no objections at all to make to an empirical psychology, so far as it claims to be only a preparation for philosophy. For our part, we desire it. But the descriptions, classifications, and analyses, which it is able to give, establish no science, and do not lead to an ultimate distinction between what is actually existent and what is added in thought. And then we can always be mindful, here, of Schelling's warning (iii. 282), "that only those warm admirers of Empiricism, who, faithful to the concept of Empiricism, extol it at the expense of science, have desired to sell to us as Empiricism, not their own judgments and what is inclosed in nature, but rather what has been forced upon objects; for, although many may believe that they can sagely discuss the subject, still there is much more involved than many imagine in seeing clearly the events of nature and in accurately translating what has happened."

mations in which it now meets us are the results of a process. It is not the metaphysician who first begins a transformation of the original facts. If it were, he could not be blamed too severely. But every man who thinks performs it from the very beginning, even though unconscious of it; and so we find that in what is presented there are already results, perhaps highly complicated results, the actual contents and simple elements of which can be discovered only by philosophical methods.

There is something tempting in the thought of proceeding from the soul, as what is nearest and most accessible to us, and of binding all further knowledge to what is obtained from it; and it is fully justified in this sense, that what Descartes called the Archimedean point for philosophy is to be sought in the thinking consciousness. But, if we take the specific contents of the human life as our starting-point, we are met by the fact that it is the very thing which lies nearest that offers the greatest difficulties to our knowledge. The whole development of the mind shows that the evolution does not proceed from a microcosm to a macrocosm, but from the latter to the former. The truths which the thinking mind comprehends it has always first referred to the whole world, and only subsequently sought to employ in the interpretation of itself. Only when truth is thus brought to its notice, as world-wide in its sway, has it obtained power enough to be applied to the interpretation of internal phenomena as well; and then, in fact, every important judgment concerning the whole has proved itself to be true and forcible, in that it enlightens us concerning ourselves.

For this reason it is true, whether we like it or not, that psychology is dependent upon the philosophy of

the universe—that is, upon metaphysics. If we examine more critically its history, the formation of its general principles, even the coinage of its terminology, we shall find it all dependent on the general development of the whole system. We shall see that, everywhere, even what was believed to be recognized as a fact was conditioned by the starting-point, and by the connections of the method of observation. For phenomena do not, from the outset, obtrude here upon consideration, but they wait for the observer, and do not come into the field of vision until the attention has been directed to that particular point. What is then discovered seems to be self-evident, although the real circumstances of the case prove the opposite, namely, that much which every one now believes he sees immediately and intuitively has come into consciousness only at a late stage of the progress of scientific thought, and later still has come to an explicit recognition. If we examine them closely, our ideas of the soul present themselves essentially as theories and hypotheses (as even the concept of the soul itself, empirically regarded, is an hypothesis), dependent, indeed, upon the general nature of our thought, but dependent, also, upon its historical formations. It is under the influence of such theories that our method in psychology now stands. It can not, then, be sufficient, in order to penetrate to the real facts, simply to lay aside the metaphysics of philosophy; for, in so doing, we should only place ourselves under the influence of an uncontrolled metaphysics.

And with this we have arrived at the decisive point of the whole discussion.

It is certain that thought has not the least right to extend itself beyond the starting-point of ordinary Empiricism, and, on its own responsibility, to undertake to

transform the phenomena which are given to it—provided the phenomena thus given are to be regarded simply as matters of phenomenal occurrence. It is, however, not only the right, but the duty of thought to do this, when we are compelled to recognize in the phenomena a previously determined cosmical theory, which has come into the condition in which we find it only as the result of a thought-process. In this case, thought does not create for itself, at pleasure, a world of phantasy by the side of the actual world; but, by its activity, corrects the original errors, and in a measure restores the integrity of that which comes under its consideration.

Whether we regard the nature of this activity, with Leibnitz, as the passage from a confused to a distinct knowledge; or, with Kant, as the solution of the complex into its factors, and as the systematic combination of ultimate elements; or, with the Idealists, as the transformation of the quiescent and dispersed in a unifying process involving the whole; or, with Herbart, as the removal of contradictions from the concepts of experience; or whether we adopt any other methods of procedure—still it is the common conviction that it is an error "to consider a concept valid because it is already given" (see Herbart, iii. 82); that, for imperative reasons, what is given can not be retained just as it is given; and that it is a fundamental mistake not to proceed to a metaphysical working-over of materials.*

While Empiricism ends simply with what is given it, it presumes to assert a thesis, which is none the less

* Herbart has asserted this most emphatically. He finds (vi. 314) the origin of a false metaphysics in the fact "that the first principles of experience are allowed to remain, and are assumed as valid, just as they are first brought to light by the psychological mechanism. Sins of omission are what prevent us from advancing to a true metaphysics."

positive because it takes a negative form when it forbids us to proceed beyond experience; and which has none the less a metaphysical character because it identifies ultimate being—or what is, so far as accessible to us, ultimate being—with the phenomenal.* The weight of this thesis lies in the fact that it seems to be immediately evident, and that the power of the impression thus made holds its ground against the attacks of thought. It is manifest that the mind is, at first, a *tabula rasa.* Only by degrees do acts of insight appear and individual objects arrange themselves into shape. The forms of knowledge, even, which in the Kantian philosophy were something firm, and given in combination, are separated into single elements, and developed in their order. But this development is seen everywhere to be suggested and determined from without; and whence but from without should its universal content come, unless we are to take refuge in the now exploded innate ideas? There is, then, only so much in the mind as it has earlier or later received from outside. Knowledge has truth only so far as it reflects the facts which lie without: it is verified only by reference to those facts. But, since we call this reception of the external experience, the conclusion follows, that all knowledge arises from experience, and it is as foolish as it is useless to wish to go beyond that by the aid of speculation.

This whole reasoning seems simple—if anything, rather too simple; for it might lead some one to raise the question, How, then, can it be explained that men, for example, like Leibnitz and Kant, made a mistake in what was so evidently the real condition of things? and, once started on such a line of questioning, he might

* We are reminded here of Plato's statement: τοσούτῳ μᾶλλόν εἰσιν, οἷοι οὐκ οἴονται, ὅτι οὐχὶ οἴονται. ("Theætetus," 176 D.)

then very easily feel prompted to ask further, whether the reason for this conflict of opinion, instead of lying in a mistaken judgment of tangible facts, were not to be found in a difference in the significance and value given to those very facts.

And this is the actual state of things. That objects present themselves externally, as Empiricism asserts, the other schools also grant, although with occasional protests. But, that this which seems to happen in the phenomenon is identical with what happens in very substance, does not appear to them absolutely certain. They do not deny that the mind originally, regarded from outside, seems like a *tabula rasa;** but they hesitate to suppose a being without any kind of activity, and assume that no action can come in from without, unless it is received by an action from within. It does not escape their notice that the mind, in its relation to things, appears to be only passively receptive. But, more closely examined, the concept of pure passivity seems to them untenable, in that it assumes action without counteraction; and so they are aroused, by deeper penetration into the matter and keener analysis of the processes involved, to prove also an activity of the mind in its connection with things.† They readily recognize the formation, from simple elements, of what is finally presented as a complex total; but they can

* It has often been noticed, on the side of the speculative philosophers, that this idea essentially regards the mind as something corporeal. For example, Nicolaus Taurellus. Leibnitz, too, in a further comprehension of the question, says (223 a): "L'âme a-t-elle des fenêtres, rassemble-t-elle à des tablettes? est-elle comme de la cire? Il est visible, que tous ceux qui pensent ainsi de l'âme la rendent corporelle dans le fond."

† The Empirics always say that things are given; but there must also be something to which they are given. Or do they mean that things are found so and so in the world? but, then, who and what is the finder?

not desist from the question whether this formation is absolutely conditioned from without, and whether every combination of the heterogeneous does not point also at inner laws. They are ready to value experience as highly as possible; but it is to them a problem to discover what is already presupposed by experience, and to ask whether this is not itself complex, and therefore needs to be analyzed into different factors.

The problem which arises from all this is wholly different from that from which Empiricism originally proceeded. The question is not how knowledge arises, from a psychological point of view, and whether it starts from experience and is held to experience, but what the origin is of that which is known through experience, and, accordingly, what opinion should be formed of ultimate facts. The contest, then, concerns not the determination of what phenomenally happens, but what ultimate judgments should be passed upon the events themselves, and what opinions should be formed, by reason of such a judgment, concerning ultimate action and existence. It is, then, thoroughly absurd for the Empiric to compel his opponents to discuss that which is primarily factitious, and to contest something which can be experimentally proved.*

Kant, too, stated the matter correctly (see viii. 536), when he carefully distinguished the question whether all knowledge arises from experience, as a *quæstio facti*, from the *quæstio juris* whether it can be derived from experience alone as the highest ground of knowledge. We prefer to-day, in dealing with this problem, not to tear apart roughly the questions of right and of fact;

* The difference between Locke and Leibnitz is not so irreconcilable as is generally supposed. The one may be right at the beginning, the other at the end.

but, then, it does not yet follow from this that they should be simply confounded. In every case, if we start the question of right, the investigation assumes another meaning and another character. We can then no longer form a decision immediately concerning individual cases; but their justification must be found in their connection, while the method and reason of this connection must themselves be systematically considered and explained.

From the first, the starting-point is changed from the psychological investigation, which is engaged with the empirical production of knowledge, to the transcendental investigation, which seeks to discover the origin of knowledge, and the metaphysical, which seeks to fathom its ultimate significance. In the former, the process in the empirical advance of knowledge is from the external to the internal, starting from the world as something objective. In the latter, where the question concerns the ultimate origin, the mind must, first of all, be considered. Again, in the former, one must simply describe from observation what goes on in the process, and be content with the facts presented. In the latter, where the object is to discriminate between the mind and the world, and to advance to the last facts attainable by us, the results of the former process can serve only as phenomenal, and to be understood must be tested and transformed. But such a definition of the problem, and the transformation involved in it which changes the investigation by descriptive aggregation into one which is analytically systematic, must essentially affect the nature of all single concepts.

The Empiric usually appeals to facts; that is, to "objects of concepts, of which the objective reality . . . . can be proved" (see Kant, v. 482). But what, then, in

general, is comprehended under this concept? Only the single event in the external world? Or are there also general facts—are there also subjective facts? And is Kant to be considered a fantastic visionary in thinking that he derived an idea from the reason, namely, the idea of freedom, which he regarded as a fact (see Kant, v. 483)? But, then—and this is the most important question here—are phenomena, as they are immediately present to consciousness, already pure facts? Every inquirer in his own sphere, according to his own method, will agree with the philosopher, in his ultimately comprehensive and decisive investigation, in asserting that the facts in the phenomena can be ascertained only by the work of thought;* that this problem can be treated only by the criticism of all the elements involved; and that the single data obtain a firm significance only through their connection† with one another in this whole.

Moreover, the concept of verification changes as the concept of a fact changes. Verification is usually thought to mean the comparison of the constituents of a percept with the external object; but this definition is not sufficient even for the special sciences. In mathematics, for example, we can confirm the truth or falsity of the process only by the consistency of the thought-process itself, which reduces what is problematical to

* Schelling says rightly (x. 228) that, in all possible investigations, the determination of the pure, the true facts, is the first and the most important thing to be done; but that it is, at the same time, the most difficult.

† The expression *Thatsache* (fact) is, aside from other reasons, an unfortunate one, in that it seems to represent something as firmly grounded and self-contained while it is still to be tested. The word occurs first in the last half of the eighteenth century (as, for example, in Lessing's controversial writings against Götze, in Herder, and others). But Adelung wanted to banish it as "unfit, and compounded contrary to analogy," and "liable to misinterpretation." Fichte insisted upon the concept of *Thathandlung*, as opposed to *Thatsache*.

immediate judgments.* But in philosophy, where not only the entirety of the external world, as such, but also knowledge in general, can be called in question, wholly new problems are opened, which can be taken up and discussed, as far as is in general possible for us, only by a systematic investigation. The idea of solving such questions of general principles by isolated data should be decidedly rejected.

And now, lastly, we consider the concept of experience itself, from which all knowledge is supposed to originate. If this means that we obtain all that we know from the thought-activity which appears and acts in relation to the world, no one will have any objections to make to it. If we are to understand by it that this activity is always restrained by the objects opposed to it, the assertion is more problematical, and a glance not only, for example, at ethics,† but also at pure mathematics, can excite doubts concerning it. But if it is asserted that in this co-existence the mind ultimately retains all that comes from outside, without any formative activity on its own part, we have no longer a presentation of empirical occurrences, but a specifically dogmatic thesis concerning their contents ‡—a thesis, the

* The first philosopher who seems to have thoroughly investigated the problem of verification in general science, Roger Bacon, presented mathematics as the means of verification for the rest of knowledge, and especially for natural science. (See "Specula Mathematica," dist. I.)

† See Kant, iii. 260: "In the consideration of nature, experience suggests to us the rule, and is the source of truth; but, as for ethical laws, experience is, alas! the mother of illusion; and it is highly objectionable to wish to derive from or to limit by that which is done the laws for that which I ought to do."

‡ Hence the erroneousness of the customary way, in language, of opposing experience and reason, and of regarding that which obtains significance for knowledge only by scientific activity, as something ready-made in distinction from that activity, and given as fixed. Boyle, "the

ordinary demonstration of which suffers from a constant *petitio principii;* for in it the external world is usually regarded as something given and presented to the mind ready-made: but this fact, which may seem self-evident to the unphilosophical consciousness, is just what is called in question; for the very point in dispute is whether we do not often, in such reception, only receive back something which we ourselves have attributed to the world, and whether the Empiric does not forget something which is a concomitant of experience—the observer himself.

There is thus an ambiguity if it is asserted that we should not go out beyond experience. If the idea is that phenomena are to be left unchanged, just as they are given to us, then not only philosophy, but every kind of science, is destroyed; for every act of knowing, if it seeks to discover laws and causal connections, and to solve the composite in phenomena, or to unite what is apparently independent, must go beyond the senses and transform what is immediately presented to them. The Constructive philosophers were entirely right when, supposing this to be the meaning of experience, they attacked the concept of an experiential science,* and saw a complete contradiction in the using as a principle —and, indeed, as the highest principle—in philosophy, experience itself, whose very essence consists in the fact that it never leads to a principle (see Schelling, vi. 78).

Christian virtuoso," toward the end says, with reason, in regard to this: "When we say experience corrects reason, 'tis an improper way of speaking; since 'tis reason itself that, upon the information of experience, corrects the judgment it had made before."

* Thus Schelling calls (iii. 282) the concept of an experiential science an "hermaphrodite concept, under which nothing connected, or rather nothing at all, can be thought. What is pure empiricism is not science; and, conversely, what is science is not empiricism."

The only mistake they made was in giving any scientific brain credit for such a concept of experience. Of course, it is the scientific experience which we should profess. But, then, the question arises whether, according to what has just been said, even this does not presuppose an independent thought-activity; and the champion of such an experience enters into a discussion which, when carried out consistently, must necessarily adjudicate to philosophy a problem of its own beyond experience. The Empiric falls into the dilemma either of seeing himself driven back upon the common experience by the consistent denial of thought-activity, or of denying in philosophy that which he defends in the special sciences; the consequence of which is a constant vacillation in the concept of experience itself. But, if one concedes the right of changing the form of what is given, he can not evade the question whether such a transformation (entirely without regard to the relativity of the concept's form and content) does not lead further in regard to its matter also; and whether thought-activity does not thus rise, by its very nature as truly as in fact, above the foundation furnished by the phenomena, and advance legitimately beyond it.

But the essential fact for us, here, always remains—that the problems and claims of philosophy constitute the highest development of the entire work of science, so that they can not be laid aside as something wholly adventitious. And this is particularly true of modern science, which assumes a far more free position in relation to what is given in sense-perception, and which by its analysis has recreated the whole naïve cosmic theory. Although the special sciences neither formulate the general question nor pursue it to its final answer, still philosophy undertakes to do this, and so takes up the

nature of knowledge as a necessary and comprehensive problem in order to justify the entire work of science.* Moreover, through this it first obtains for itself a clear and definite task, a systematic arrangement and method of its own. It is now, for the first time, that the questions, by their philosophical treatment, enter upon a practically new sphere. The general principles are transformed. The experiences of the external and of the internal, otherwise divergent, can now be united in a whole. Philosophy ceases to be an appendage to other sciences, a mere crowning of the structure, or a rendezvous for the fancies of the common understanding: it becomes rather the science of sciences, which forms properly the very soul of all knowing activity, and gives it its inner unity.

But, from the standpoint of Empiricism, such an independent task for philosophy, and hence philosophy itself as a unique science, can not be consistently maintained. For a part of the concept of a science is that of a systematic combination of acts of knowledge under general principles, and also that of a specific method. The Empiric, however, must either adjudicate to philosophy the mere grouping of the results of the other sciences, or else limit it to the observation of psychical occurrences as a specific province. In the first case, we should have no science at all; in the second, at least, no central science of principles. But modern Empiricism does not seem in a single instance to advance a claim to a peculiar method for philosophy, for it professes only those methods which we are accustomed to regard as belonging to the natural sciences. Yet the renunciation

* So the special manner in which this philosophical problem is treated in any period of time is closely connected with the distinctive peculiarity of the scientific work of that time.

of philosophy as an independent science can not well be expressed more frankly than in such a renunciation of its peculiar method.

Answering to this description, then, modern Empiricism, judged by what it has hitherto attained as positive * results, has made little advance beyond a new formulation and hypothetical extension of facts of knowledge in natural science. As soon as it deviates from the territory of the natural sciences, it finds itself referred to the common sense of men; and so we can well say, without being unfair, that, if Empiricism contains science as well as philosophy, the two can not harmonize. What is here science is not philosophy, and what is philosophy is not science.

Corresponding to this view, the influence of Empiricism on the thought-activity of the present day is due less to its specifically philosophical productions than to tendencies of a general character. The most prominent cause is a distaste for all speculative and systematic philosophy, which was first turned against Hegel and the Constructive thinkers, and then extended far beyond this exciting occasion. It is not so much a clear judgment as it is a confused feeling which lies at the bottom of such an agitation. It is the antipathy to an abstract and purely formal knowledge; to the forcible construction of a system out of concepts claiming to be pure, and in truth often devoid of meaning; to the whole estrangement of philosophy from the positivity of material phenomena. This reproach may be aimed especially at Hegel; it applies essentially to all modern systematic philosophy, with the exception of Kant.

* In general, a negation has far more weight, and the Empirics can not be thankful enough to the Constructive philosophers for their aberrations.

Pervasively, and to an increasing extent in modern philosophy, all existence was reduced to the operations of the understanding, and all positive content of the material world more and more dissolved. The opposing reaction has now entered; the thirst for a real and concrete cosmology has become powerful; and, since it finds no satisfaction in philosophy, it has turned against it, and favors every view which does homage to the immediate phenomenon.

The tendency which leads to this change we consider fully justified, and we rejoice in it most heartily. But, if it would obtain significance and permanence, it must win for itself a place inside of philosophy, and must not remain stationary within the prejudices of vulgar impressions. As matters are situated at present, all possible elements are mixed together; all that is in general opposed to idealistic tendencies is united to fight against, not this or that philosophy, but against all systematic philosophy. To defend philosophy from such attacks is to degrade it. The final question is not how the age judges philosophy, but how philosophy will judge the age.

Only in one point would we oppose a misunderstanding which has taken possession of scientific circles—the misunderstanding of the real province of metaphysics. The expression metaphysics has become one of those war-cries which do not allow the exercise of quiet reflection. All the odium that is attached to the abstruse, the arbitrary, and the empty, is heaped upon one such appellation, and the result is in this way rendered certain.

Now, the term metaphysics is certainly an unfortunate one, because it easily suggests the idea that it treats of a knowledge which is transcendental, and lies outside

of all experience. But a glance at history shows how little justification there is for making one single prominent thinker responsible for it—to say nothing of philosophy as a whole. Originated in a misunderstanding, then carried over from the Neo-Platonic to the Transcendental side,* the phrase, in the sense of Ontology, became a favorite with the Scholastics, and was also employed with favor in modern philosophy in the Wolffian school, where the Scholastic spirit was retained the longest. From this, and in fact without distorting it, Kant formed the concept of metaphysics, which he opposed. If, now, no thinker of any prominence has ever taken much pleasure in the use of the expression, we can easily see in that fact evidence that the deeper problem of philosophy is not affected by the attacks on "Metaphysics." That upon which all systematic think-

* As is well known, the expression was originally derived from the order of the writings of Aristotle. As Gassendi conjectured, Andronicus of Rhodes, who arranged the writings of Aristotle, is to be regarded as its originator. Then the word was quickly adopted as the symbol of the science (*τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, ἡ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πραγματεία*), which was finally understood by the Neo-Platonic Herennius as the science of that which is above nature (see Brandis, "Transactions of Berlin Academy," 1831, p. 80: *μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ λέγονται ἅπερ φύσεως ὑπερῆρται καὶ ὑπὲρ αἰτίαν καὶ λόγον εἰσίν*). The singular form, *metaphysica*, may have been derived from the translations of Arabian philosophers; it had already been adopted among the leaders of Christian Scholasticism. Moreover, in the middle ages, Metaphysics does not at all signify a science of the Transcendental; and, even for Wolff, Kant's opinion of Metaphysics is not correct (see Kant, viii. 576). "The ancient name of this science, *μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*, already indicates the species of knowledge at which it aimed. One wishes, by means of it, to go out beyond all objects of possible experience (*trans physicam*), in order, wherever possible, to recognize that which absolutely can not be an object of the same." The ancient metaphysics is rather, in connection with the Aristotelian metaphysics, the doctrine of the universal determinations of the existent; for which reason the name Ontosophy or Ontology was suggested for it by Clauberg (see "Prolegomena zur Metaphysica de Ente quæ rectius Ontosophia").

ers, and especially those who opposed the Scholastic concept of metaphysics, have laid stress, is an independent doctrine of the principles of philosophy. The most that can be inferred from the expression metaphysics is, that this necessary problem has been falsely presented to certain minds, but not that it has itself gone astray. We can just as well say that the systematic philosopher investigates what precedes the special act of knowledge, that is, the general conditions of knowledge, as to reproach him with wishing to transcend the material world; but it is more correct to lay aside here all accidental definitions, and to measure the problem by what is essentially involved in its import.

The systematic philosopher does not wish to undervalue experience in any way; only he can not identify the propositions, "nothing without experience," and "everything from experience alone." In its proper position, experience will be valuable to him to the same extent that it is to the Empiric; only he believes that he can not renounce a further question.

Moreover, it is by no means true that he wishes to dislodge what is given in experience by the propositions at which he arrives. That remains, rather, uncontested in its place; only it can not serve, for him, as the ultimate point at which thought can arrive. But here philosophy has to suffer from the evil custom by which the results of investigation, instead of being criticised in their connection with the whole, are referred directly to the single phenomena. The philosophical solution, then, seems to wish to displace that which is evidently present in the phenomenon and, because common sense naturally thinks that nothing is more real than what a man sees and touches, the philosopher seems to be a Utopian and a dreamer, and every penny-a-liner believes

that he can in his sport overthrow the greatest scientists of all times. From such a reference of the results of philosophical investigation to the immediate phenomenon, in the realm of theory as well as of practice, proceeds especially the boasting of common sense over philosophy, which has not rarely excited the ridicule of thoughtful men. "In all ages," says Schelling (see "Works," ii. 19), "the most commonplace men have overcome the greatest philosophers with things which are conceivable even to children and minors. One hears, reads, and is astonished that such common things were unknown to such great men, and that men acknowledged to be so insignificant still could master them. No man thinks that, perhaps, they also knew them all; but how, then, could they possibly swim against the stream of evidence? Many are convinced that Plato, if he could only have read Locke, would have gone out from his presence in shame. Many a man believes that even Leibnitz, were he to rise from the dead and go to school to learn of him for an hour, would be converted. And how many fledglings are there who have not sung songs of triumph over Spinoza's grave?"

All such encroachments of common sense affect the systems, so far as those systems postulate for philosophical investigation an independent problem. The nearer the systems remain to the ordinary idea of the world, the sooner can they count upon being pardoned by that practical common sense. This usually grants to Empiricism a certain favor, which in truth its scientific defenders have not reciprocated. For the philosophical treatment of the present questions, this whole partisanship of the masses has no value at all. The transcendental and metaphysical problem is one which is everywhere so difficult, and presupposes so much scientific

and philosophical labor, and lies, moreover, so far away from the naïve idea of the world, that popular opinions have here about as much significance to philosophers as the vulgar ideas of the heavenly bodies and their movements have to astronomers.

But the confusion has at the present day forced its way out from the circle of unreflecting minds into that of scientific investigators. That the philosophical problem in its distinctive nature is not understood, is evident from the arguments for Empiricism which are asserted even by men who occupy a prominent position in the special sciences. Thus, for example, an argument for philosophical Empiricism is fabricated from the fact that, in the psychologico-physiological problem of the formation of our idea of space, the scale seems to turn in favor of the empirical rather than the intuitional explanation. But the two questions are radically different. In the one case we discuss the psychical production and development in consciousness; in the other, the ultimate origin. We might answer the psychological problem entirely in the sense of Empiricism, without being in the transcendental sense a philosophical Empiric. The identification of the two questions shows a decided misunderstanding of the Kantian philosophy, against which Kant has often expressly guarded himself. The very man who has most highly valued the originality of the forms of knowledge has carefully distinguished the problem of originality from the question whether these forms are to be regarded as ready-made and innately given, or as first developing themselves in the experience of life, and has unambiguously expressed his sympathy for what has since been called the empirical explanation.*

* Definite quotations will be given in the discussion of the concepts *a priori* and innate.

Further, the recent investigations in regard to the principles of geometry, from which it is concluded that our idea of space is determined from among other possible ideas, are understood as if the Kantian doctrines were overthrown by the knowledge of this positive fact, and the question were decided in favor of Empiricism, because that newly discovered property of the idea of space is learned only by experience. But, for philosophers, the question is not at all by what process we bring the judgments into our consciousness, but it is from what source they originally arise; and it is a very different thing to construct something by a process of pure thought, from conceiving it as produced by mental activity after it is known. Therefore the schools which defend the originality of the forms of thought do not in the least need to derive these from pure concepts; but they can admit without hesitation a specific nature which we first know through experience. Yet I should correct that expression. There can be no talk about an "admission," for it is by the systematic school itself that this fact of experience is first asserted. For Leibnitz, it was a peculiarly attractive and in his system important principle, to apprehend what is actually existent in every case as one of different possibilities. But, in Kant, one of the leading elements of his transcendental Idealism was the conviction that the definitive property of the intuition of space—as under three dimensions—could not be inferred from the general concept of space.* He would then have greeted with

* See ii. 410: "Non dari in spatio plures, quam tres dimensiones, inter duo puncta non esse nisi rectam unicam; e dato in superficie plana puncto cum data recta circulum circumscribere etc., non ex universali aliqua spatii notione concludi, sed in ipso tantum, velut in concreto, cerni potest."

especial pleasure the very investigations by means of which many men now believe that they could overthrow him.* And, in general, is there not, in the fact that the mind knows the peculiar forms of the sense-intuition as something specific, an advancement beyond their limits? Is it not one of the greatest triumphs of thought to be able to construct a geometry which is independent of the specific conditions of this very intuition?

With the Empirics, the demonstration of this point is always involved in darkness, for they appeal simply to the phenomenon as empirically known. But to test and to estimate the value of this is just the problem, yet the result of this testing may very easily be a transformation of the original phenomenon. Perhaps with some reason Leibnitz says (page 591 b): "Il leur paraît d'abord, que tout ce que nous faisons n'est qu'impulsion d'autrui; et que tout ce que nous concevons vient de dehors par les sens, et se trace dans le vuide de notre esprit, *tanquam in tabula rasa.* Mais une méditation plus profonde nous apprend que tout (même les perceptions et les passions) nous vient de votre propre fonds, avec une pleine spontanéité." At all events, however, all that scientific labor can obtain by way of results—that is, all that it can prove in relation to the development and the positive character of our mental products—can be entirely recognized and fully esteemed by a systematic philosophy. According to our conviction, it

* Whatever position one may assume in other respects, in relation to this problem, the question of the origin of mathematical knowledge in general is not decided by it. We should be curious, for example, to see the concept of pure quantity derived from experience—if one does not stop short with empty words, as, for example, "abstraction from what is given." For how is such an "abstraction" possible?

can find the full realization of its principles only in such a philosophy.

There is already sufficient confusion of concepts; but even this is increased by the favorite way, in certain circles, of representing the opponents of Empiricism. It appears, according to the expressions of many, as if no supporter of a systematic philosophy could be anything else than the friend of a system which constructs it out of concepts in the style of Hegel: by which view, again, the picture of such a philosophy is wantonly distorted. But, however one may judge Hegel, by what right are others made responsible for his principles? Shall we have in philosophy, too, such a doctrine of imputation that all must atone for the sins committed by one? or are we, non-empirics, supposed to allow ourselves to be set back into the middle ages, and, by the command of the Empirics, to be robbed of the privilege of learning something from the mental progress of modern times? Further, without regard to any historical connection, care must be taken that every one who defends an independent significance of philosophy as systematic science is not put down by the great mass of men as confused, fantastic, and incomprehensible. Even Leibnitz was compelled to rebuke the rudeness, introduced by Locke, of designating anything removed from one's own thought-process as incomprehensible,* and so of pushing it aside. He characterizes this style of

* As opposed to this, the dilettant Empiricism gladly uses as a weapon the "self-evident"—an inadequate means in the contest for truth. For this which is self-evident either belongs to the sphere of the naïve intuition of the world, which itself in turn becomes the problem of science, or it is only that which is unconsciously received as the result of previous scientific processes. Most of the advances in the knowledge of the world, in respect to principles, have proceeded from the point where a man began to doubt something "self-evident."

reasoning appropriately, when he says (451 a): "Je remarque souvent que certaines gens tâchent déluder ce qu'on leur dit par cette affection d'ignorance comme s'ils n'y entendaient rien; ce qu'ils font non pas pour se blâmer eux mêmes, mais ou pour blâmer ceux qui parlent, comme si leur jargon était non intelligible, on pour s'élever au dessus de la chose et de celui qui la débite, comme si elle n'était point digne de leur attention."

It can be added to this, that he who fancies that he can treat the question so cavalierly gives up all community between different kinds of scientific labor.

If, after all this, one imagines the picture which many men make to-day of the "metaphysicians"—those men who rashly, without a compass, steer out beyond all the limits of experience, and who, disinclined to earnest effort, wish to seize by a bold flight of the imagination that which can be obtained only by earnest effort, and who in this way boast of their superiority to those who actually labor—if this picture is true, it seems as if we could feel only detestation of an outrage so gross, and could not guard ourselves too strongly against the men who share in it. But now, if one looks more closely at the company of these non-empirics and anti-empirics, he finds not only men like Plato and Plotinus, Spinoza and Hegel, but also Descartes and Leibnitz, Kant and Herbart—in short, nearly all the men who have had any significance in philosophy; and I fear there will always still be many who prefer, in the company of such men, to be condemned by the high priests of common sense, rather than to share with them the favor of philosophical dilettanteism, which they prize so highly.

But enough of joking: we should not anticipate the serenity which subsequent centuries will feel in the con-

sideration of this sprawling, prosily earnest dilettanteism, which plays the schoolmaster over great problems and great men indifferently. We would rather simply, from one point of view, protect our presentation of the subject from an undesirable misunderstanding. Among the men devoted to philosophical investigation are many usually counted as Empirics, who could with reason shield themselves from our representation of their school. We see these men busied with concrete and weighty problems, in thoughtful and critical labor—a labor which commands our highest respect, and which, in its results, brings nearer together those who at the outset are situated far apart. Perhaps such men will allow us to use here Fichte's expression: "He who finds what we say superfluous is not one of those for whom we have said it." What we really oppose is, that anti-philosophical tendency in popular thought which rejects the great problems of thought and endeavor because it does not understand them; which denies to the mind all independent and formative force in the world, and which, nevertheless, wishes to assume a philosophical garb, in order, with the appearance of right, to make a virtue of their deficiencies.

To oppose such tendencies in a directly scientific way is impossible. But all engaged in philosophical investigations, without distinction of party, should combine in defense of the independence and greatness of philosophical science, and of its significance in the system of knowledge at which mankind aims. This significance is not measured by the sum of single dogmas, which can be demonstrated to every one, nor by the wonderful discoveries at which the common understanding is astonished, but by the fullness of mental power which is developed by such discoveries, by the

tendency of this mental power to valuable ends, and by the general elevation of the level of mental and scientific labor which is thus accomplished. That such benefits may be preserved, it is necessary to hold fast to the complete greatness of the problem, even if we have to-day so little faith and so little power to advance in its solution. "For fire is not extinguished everywhere because it is extinguished with you";* and the ultimate aims of mankind can not in any way be made dependent upon the humors of the day.

But—and this is what especially concerns the act of knowledge—we assert that a systematic philosophy is justified by the fact that only by means of this is it possible to vouchsafe a free investigation of phenomena as they occur, to make experience itself a problem, and to avoid stamping what is from the outset contingent as something necessary. Hegel has repeatedly brought out conspicuously the fact that the knowledge of a limit points at an inner advancement beyond that limit; but the proposition also admits of the inversion, that we must be beyond a limit in order to be truly conscious and mindful of it. In order, then, to be thoughtful and circumspect in our investigations within experience, there is need of a philosophy which does not end with experience.

* Plotinus, 205: *ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἀποσβεννυμένου τοῦ ἐν σοὶ πυρὸς τὸ ὅλον πῦρ ἀπέσβη.*

A PRIORI—INNATE.

Ubique in natura aliquid agitur.—KEPLER.

THE problem of experience involves the concept of the *a priori*. In the modern use of this concept there is a great deal of obscurity, and it may require a somewhat exhaustive historical treatment to clear away that obscurity. The expressions *a priori* and *a posteriori* refer back, ultimately, to Aristotle's custom of calling the universal the earlier (as a concept), and the particular the later;* but this usage was not fully established until the last half of the middle ages.

In Albertus Magnus we find the antithesis between knowledge from causes and knowledge from effects expressed by the phrases *per priora* and *per posteriora*. *A priori* and *a posteriori* first occur, according to Prantl, in Albert of Saxony, a scholar of the fourteenth century.† These expressions continued to be used as understood in the middle ages, until, in the seventeenth century, Luther (see "Tischreden," Förstemann's ed.,

* See chap. ii. of Book △ of the "Metaphysics"; also Trendelenburg, "Elements of Aristotelian Logic," § 19.

† Prantl ("History of Logic," iv. 78) adduces the following passage where the expression does not indeed seem to enter exactly as a new one: "Demonstratio quædem est procedens ex causis ad effectum et vocatur demonstratio a priori et demonstratio propter quid et potissima; alia est demonstratio procedens ab effectibus ad causas, et talis vocatur demonstratio a posteriori et demonstratio quia et demonstratio non potissima." Hence knowledge by induction is more often opposed to knowledge *a priori*.

iv. 300) translated *a priori*, "from what precedes" (*von vornen her*),* *a posteriori*, "from that which follows after" (*von dem was hernach folget*). Men like Kepler, Hugo Grotius, Descartes, and Spinoza employed the terms as established scholasticisms, but the last evidently felt that they were obsolescent, and direct attacks upon them were not wanting.†

But a change in the use of the concepts began with Leibnitz, although, in fact, as was uniformly the case in his writings, the old usage almost concealed the new. He recognized *a priori* knowledge as knowledge from causes; but because, for him, ultimate causes lay in the reason itself, the expression began to denote such judgments as have their origin in the knowing activity of the mind, and thus involve a complete correspondence of the ground of the knowledge with the cause of the thing. *A posteriori*, as opposed to this, denoted the knowledge which comes from experience.‡

* Still this usage was a frequent one in the preceding century.

† Gassendi holds, for example, that the meaning of the words can be simply converted, since *a posteriori* knowledge is the earlier and more certain, and itself produces *a priori* knowledge. See "Exercitationes parad. adv. Aristoteleos," v.: "Quocirca non immerito quispiam existimaverit, cum omnis notitia (et proinde demonstratio) quæ dicitur a priori pendeat ac petatur ex ea, quæ haberi dicitur a posteriori, necessarium esse hanc semper haberi et evidentiorem et certiorem illa."

‡ *A priori* is found in Leibnitz, Erdmann's ed., 80 b, 99 a, 272 b, 393 a, 451 b, 465 a, 494 b, 515 b, 740 b, 778 b; Foucher, i. 38, ii. 184, 253, 357, 361. In 778 b, the "philosophie expérimentale qui procède *a posteriori*" is contrasted with the knowledge through "la pure raison, ou *a priori*." The peculiarity of the new signification appears most clearly in 393 a: "Particulièrement et par excellence on l'appelle raison, si c'est la cause non seulement de notre jugement, mais encore de la vérité même, ce qu'on appelle aussi raison *a priori*, et la cause dans les choses répond à la raison dans les vérités." (Yet this passage belongs to the "Nouveaux Essais," which, as is well known, was a later production.)

This new signification struggled at first with the old one; but the change corresponded so well with the general tendency of philosophy, that there was no doubt of its ultimate success. Accordingly, in Wolff and his school, *a priori* and *a posteriori* denoted the antithesis of rational and experiential knowledge; but the keen distinction of principles in this antithesis, which had been introduced by Leibnitz, was again lost. For, by this school, every judgment is called *a priori* which we obtain by pure inference from facts of knowledge already held in the mind, without passing judgment upon the ultimate origin of this knowledge.* Wolff thus falls back again in this respect into Scholasticism. In the earlier writings of Kant, in contrast to this, we find in different places a keener comprehension of the problem, which approximates to the position of Leibnitz rather than to that of Wolff;† but the concept of a knowledge free from all experience was first distinguished with complete clearness by Lambert.‡ A similar though less precise meaning is found in Hume;§ and in many ways a preparation was thus made for the

* See "Psychol. Empirica" (in which, more than in all the other productions of Wolff, these expressions are employed and explained), § 434: "Quod experiundo addiscimus, a posteriori cognoscere dicimur: quod vero ratiocinando nobis innotescit, a priori cognoscere dicimur." § 425: "Quicquid ex iis colligimus, quæ nobis jam innotuere, cum ante ignotum esset, id ratiocinando nobis innotescit, adeoque idem a priori cognoscimus." See also § 461.

† See, for example, ii. 134, 145, 136, 366, 386.

‡ "Neues Organon" (appeared in 1764), Dianoiol., § 639: "We wish, then, to assume that absolutely, and in the strictest understanding of the term, only that can be called *a priori* in which we owe absolutely nothing to experience."

§ See "Philosophical Essays," iv.: "If we reason *a priori*, and consider merely any object or cause as it appears to the mind, independent of all observation."

later Kantian interpretation, according to which the *a priori* denotes what belongs originally to the mind.*

But this Kantian principle served in turn as the starting-point of new developments of the concept. When the Constructive philosophers attempted to overcome the dualism of Kant's doctrine, and undertook to develop the whole world out of the activity of the mind, they referred the *a priori*, throughout, to this activity; and, according to the position which they everywhere assigned to mental activity, they could understand the antithesis of *a priori* and *a posteriori* as the consideration of things, not as arising from ultimately distinct sources of knowledge, but from different ways of viewing them. When things are considered as produced by the necessary activity of the mind, we have a general knowledge *a priori;* when they are considered as met with ready-made, and hence contingent, we have a special knowledge *a posteriori:* a definition which encounters all the doubts to which such a Constructive philosophy is exposed,† and which naturally calls out the rejoinder, as, for example, among the Positivists, that the *a priori* is supposed to express something arbitrarily set up without regard to what is actually true, and thus something only subjectively valid.‡ And

* Yet, in fact, he frequently uses *a priori* in a looser sense.

† See Fichte, ii. 355: "The scientific doctrine, without any regard to the perception, derives *a priori* that which by virtue of it appears even in the perception, and so *a posteriori*. Thus these expressions do not denote different objects, but only a different view of one and the same object; somewhat as the same watch is used *a priori* in the demonstration of it, *a posteriori* in the actual perception." On a closer examination, many differences between single thinkers appear here; and in this concept one could point out the finer distinctions between them, as well as the gradations of development in individuals.

‡ Bourdet, "Vocabulaire des principaux termes de la philosophie positive" (1875), p. 129: "Il y a plusieurs méthodes: 1, la méthode *a priori*,

then, finally, in most recent times, on the side of the Darwinian scientists, the *a priori* is identified with the innate, but in this sense is regarded as something inherited. The individual does not obtain everything from experience, but what he receives from his ancestors is, in ultimate analysis, formed by them from experience; so that all *a priori* knowledge is resolved, essentially, into that which is *a posteriori.**

The history of the concept thus reflects the history of the struggle over the doctrine of knowledge. All the different forms which the concept has assumed have left traces behind them; and on the modern usage the Scholastics and Leibnitz, Kant and Hegel exert an influence in confused combination. Kant's influence predominates only so far as the question of the origin of knowledge is joined to this concept, at least as used in science—the question which, in the problem whether knowledge is innate (*eingeboren*) † or obtained from without, extends through the whole of philosophy. Hence, all the difficulties and misunderstandings which are involved in that problem are centered to-day on the concept of the *a priori.*

At all times, the specific question was whether knowledge originated from within the mind ‡ or came

métaphysique ou subjective, dans laquelle les propositions qui servent de point de départ, au lieu d'être déduites de l'expérience, sont et restent purement rationelles."

* See Häckel, "Natural History of Creation," 4th ed., p. 636: "Knowledge *a priori* has arisen only by long-continued inheritance of acquired tendencies in the brain, from what was originally empirical '*a posteriori* knowledge'."

† *Angeboren* must, for this concept, be unconditionally rejected. It is not suitable to use here the *an*, which expresses what comes from without, and remains on the surface. (See Grimm's Dict.: "*an* denotes the surface.") Paracelsus used *eingeborn* in the sense desired here.

‡ The prominent thinkers even of the middle ages always used the

to it from without. As to the general principle, it was the conviction of most of the prominent thinkers that an essential and inner relation of the mind to the objects was presupposed in an adequate and legitimate * knowledge. But the specific application of this gave rise to an infinite number of disputes and errors. The subjective appeared as something received in a state of completeness, held by the memory and preceding all activity. In the very beginning of the discussion, Plato always failed to distinguish carefully enough between what is contributed by the form of an idea and what is furnished by the contents of a concept; and, as a result of this, criticism began with Aristotle, who recognized only a *δύναμις σύμφυτος κριτική* (see Anal. Post. 99 b, 35), and when discussing the mind purposely used, not the customary Platonic *ἔμφυτος*, but rather *σύμφυτος*.

But the philosophic contrast which these two men present extends through the whole of philosophy. They agree essentially in the belief that knowledge involves an independent activity of mind; † but the one limits this activity wholly and completely to the phenomena of life, while the other believes that all which happens here is conditioned and determined by wider connections and deeper relations. This Platonic doc-

expression "innate" (*innatus*) with great caution, and with care to avoid misunderstandings. See, for example, Roger Bacon, "Specula Mathematica," i. 3: "Mathematicarum rerum cognitio est quasi nobis innata.—Cum sit quasi innata et tanquam præcedens inventione et doctrina; seu saltem minus indigens eis, quam aliæ scientiæ."

* See Plotinus, 481: *Ἔρημον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων θεωρημάτων οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν. εἰ δὲ μή, ἔσται οὐκέτι τεχνικὸν οὐδὲ ἐπιστημονικόν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἂν καὶ εἰ παῖς λέγοι.*

† The Aristotelian idea of a *tabula rasa* (the Latin expression, according to Prantl, iii. 261, appears first in Ægidius Romanus) is often completely misunderstood.

trine was naturally far more exposed to misinterpretations and to the intrusion of pictures of the fancy. We always see the concept grow feeble whenever there is a diminution of philosophical force.

To unphilosophical thought, it is almost a matter of course to assume that everything within the mind comes from without, so that even schools which respect the independent activity of the spirit easily introduce the opposite theory in some other form. For is it anything more than another kind of Empiricism, if we regard as introduced in the beginning that which apparently is not explicable by experience, and continue to hold every state, as often as it is renewed, as something transferred from without?

But the concept of a perpetual activity is as perplexing as is that of an inner activity. Men are so accustomed to regard rest as the normal condition, and activity as a disturbance of the same, that, throughout, what happens uniformly is identified with rest; and, in place of a continual action of the mind, some kind of property or disposition, or something else that is "given," is assumed. Hence, as philosophy has always attempted to give verbal expressions to its concepts, common usage has constantly transferred these expressions into the sphere of popular thought. In *innatus* and *angeboren* no one thought at first of heredity.* The theologians considered the original sin (*peccatum originale*) an inherited sin (*Erbsünde*).† "Actual" and "actuality" served from the outset (as *actualis* and

* See, for example, Lucretius, who first introduced *innatus* into philosophy, ii. 286; Eckhart, 434, 26 (daz ist ime [dem steine] angeborn).

† Tertullian and Augustine use the phrase *peccatum originale*, and have in mind a tendency to evil, always produced anew by sexual propagation; but Ambrose has the concept of inheritance, which Kant rightly characterizes as, in this case, the most unsuitable of all expressions.

actualitas since Duns Scotus) as a substitute for the Aristotelian concept of *ἐνέργεια*,* until they were by degrees simply substituted for existence.

The succeeding philosophy, which limited all being by activity, and restricted this activity to the phenomenal world and to life, contested alike the Platonic theory of knowledge and the determination of knowledge by external things.† Every great section of its history is marked by the prominence of this characteristic. Nicolaus Cusanus thus not only rejected innate ideas, in the sense of the Platonics, because he was willing to admit only a *vis concreata* (see "Opera," i. 92 b) and a *judicium concreatum* (i. 83 b), but also opposed a doctrine of inheritance;‡ every mind is to him an independent living mirror of the universe.§ Descartes did not, indeed, disdain the unfortunate phrase "innate ideas"; but he has in many places brought out the fact distinctly that he does not understand by it anything ready-made in the mind;‖ and it seemed inconceivable to him that

* Thus "actuality" (*Wirklichkeit*) in Eckhart, who coined the word.

† When Proclus (Creuzer, i. 281) says: *οὔκ εἰσιν ἄγραφα γραμματεῖα δεχόμενα τοὺς τύπους ἔξωθεν, ἀλλὰ γέγραπται μὲν ἀεί, καὶ ὁ γράφων ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστι*, the later philosophy would substitute *γράφεται* for *γέγραπται*.

‡ II. 187 b: "Si anima esset a generante, omnia opera ejus essent naturalia et nullum morale opus posset habere" (where *morale*, according to the customary usage of the middle ages, means inner).

§ II. 103 b: "Nominamus intellectum virtutem illam quæ ex se ipsa generat et producit sicut principium motus." This is the most proper reference for the thought indicated, but is too extensive to be quoted here in full.

‖ Of the different passages which can be adduced in support of this, I present only the one which seems to me to be the most significant—"Ad Vœtium," viii.: "Notandum est eas omnes res, quarum cognitio dicitur nobis esse a natura indita, non ideo a nobis expresse cognosci; sed tantum tales esse, ut ipsas absque ullo sensuum experimento ex proprii ingenii viribus cognoscere possimus." The "Notæ ad Programma" are also especially important.

the mind, as a thinking being, should have arisen from without.* Kant, finally, in the famous dissertation, expressed himself against the innateness of the ideas of Time and Space. † The intuitive originality of knowledge was one of his leading principles; and, if he did not present clearly enough the definition of mind, as a pure and incessant activity, this concept is asserted all the more distinctly by the Constructive philosophers. In no case can we read into Kant the doctrine of judgments ready-made in the mind. ‡

But I see the question facing me, Why has so much historical material been heaped together here? My only object is to show that the tendency, not rarely seen at the present day, to identify the *a priori* with the "inborn" is not suited to the great problem of knowledge; and that it has not accepted (to say nothing of advancing) the results of the historical development of the concept.

If it is absurd to combine the idea of innateness

* See Ep., i. 119: "Nequeo animum inducere quod illi me fecerint quatenus ego me considero ut cogitans quid," *et seq.*

† II. 413. He says in relation to Time and Space: "Conceptus uterque procul dubio acquisitus est, non a sensu quidem objectorum (sensatio enim materium dat, non formam cognitionis humanæ) abstractus, sed ab ipsa mentis actione, secundum perpetuas leges sensa sua coordinante, quasi typus immutabilis ideoque intuitive cognoscendus. Sensationes enim excitant hunc mentis actum, non influunt intuitum, neque aliud hic connatum est, nisi lex animi, secundum quam certa rationis sensa sua e præsentia objecti conjungit." (P. 400.) If the law appears here as something established before the action, later on all is resolved into the activity itself.

‡ See vi. 37: "Criticism allows absolutely no imprinted or innate ideas. It assumes that they all, taken together, are received, whether they belong to the intuition (*Anschauung*) or to the concepts of the understanding. But there is also an original acquisition (as the teachers of natural rights expressed it): consequently, what before did not exist at all does not of course belong to anything before this action."

with the old doctrines of innate ideas, it is decidedly still more so to construct a defense against such identification. We speak of innateness in the transmission of specific properties, and we to-day ascribe much more than formerly to such a transfer. But we do not in this way reach that *a priori* which denotes the original and essential vital activity of the mind, and, more particularly, the activity of knowledge. Modern philosophy assumed such an activity as necessary, because it held it to be irrational to posit a substance without according to it some original activity. Moreover, as we have seen, modern science devises the concept of substance from the principle of activity, while the assumption of a substance which is empty and inactive carries us back to the worst periods of Scholasticism. In connection with this, we might ask, in the case before us, what then the thing is to which the inheritance was made, how it in general comes into activity, and how it declares itself to us. If we once admit that absolutely everything comes into the mind from outside, there is neither sense in nor authority for ascribing to the spirit a peculiar existence; it would be much more commendable in that case to admit, in consistent materialism, the production of the mind by external agencies, and to deny to it all independent existence. And, then, how should anything originally empty and inactive appropriate to itself whatever might come from without? These are all questions with which we shall deal later in the discussion of development. The only thing to be done here is to protect from misunderstanding the concept of the *a priori* taken in its philosophical sense.

In the contest over this concept, the question is not about something known previous to experience; for it deals with a relation, not of time, but of concepts, and

hence not with the historical commencement, but with the original causes of knowledge. Just as little do we dispute about a something ready-made in the mind, for we recognize here only a striving activity. Moreover, no assertion is made of a judgment obtained, without any experience, from the pure activity of thought, since the mind arrives even at its self-consciousness only by the aid of an empirical activity. But we discuss as the main question, not only of philosophy but of all science, and of psychology especially, the fact that in mental activity something essential, original, and legitimate is recognized. It shows that one is behind the times in his knowledge of modern philosophy, if he presents the dilemma whether knowledge is furnished ready-made in the mind or is created from without, for he thus leaves out of consideration the question to the development and defense of which the most prominent thinkers of the last century have devoted their strength.

IMMANENT (COSMIC).

O quam res est contempta homo, nisi supra humana surrexerit.—SENECA.

THE antithesis at present current between immanent and transcendent originates with Kant.* Until his time, *immanens* (*permanens*) and *transiens* were contrasted, the *actio immanens* being an activity which remains within the subject, and the *transiens* one which goes out beyond it.† A similar distinction was made also between a *causa immanens* and a *causa transiens;* and the only new thing in the famous remark of Spinoza, "Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens," is the negation, by which, in fact, the whole idea is essentially changed. This use of terms can be traced back to the thirteenth century, and has not to-day entirely disappeared from scholarly works. ‡

The expression transcendent was technically used in the last half of the middle ages for the most universal

* See iii. 245: "We will call immanent those first principles the exercise of which is restricted wholly within the limits of possible experience, but transcendent those which are supposed to fly beyond these limits."

† See Goclenius, "Lexicon Philosophicum," under "Actio": "Actio est immanens (seu ἐνέργησις) agentis intra se, transiens (ποίησις) agentis extra se." Eckhart says (101, 15): "Lîplichiu dinc diu sint ûzwürkende, geistlîchiu dinc sint înwürkende."

‡ See, for example, Volkmann, "Treatise on Psychology," 2d ed., ii. 450.

definitions, which, according to the Neo-Platonic doctrine, are superior to the categories, and are adapted to all kinds of being. The four concepts, *ens*, *unum*, *verum*, *bonum*, were at first accepted; later, *res* and *aliquid** were added; and in this form the theory was handed down. The word *transcendentalis* came from its use in the phrases *veritas*, *unitas*, etc., *transcendentalis*. But by the time of the transitional period the whole doctrine had been thoroughly weakened by the numerous attacks upon it, and the expressions were used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the most various ways, and with great arbitrariness, until at last they were firmly fixed by Kant.

So far as the concept is concerned, the tendency to an essentially immanent cosmology is common to all forms of modern philosophy and science; all are agreed in opposing the method of the middle ages, which reduced the events of the world to a supra-mundane and extra-mundane cause. This was not simply an inference from a theoretical principle; but everywhere man, estranged from the world by previous cosmologies, turned back to that world again, vigorously and joyfully, to act and to create in it. He had again obtained confidence in himself and in the world, and felt strong enough to get along without any apparently foreign assistance. As a matter of science, this immanent tendency attained its classical expression in Spinoza, who, above all others, possessed that intellectual strength of character which can present thoughts, of the truth of which one is convinced, according to their pure contents, without confusion, and without enervation, and so can reveal the secret meaning of them all. But the powerful influence of Spinoza's doctrines was due to

* See Prantl, iii. 245.

the fact that they seemed self-evident, and yet, from the historical standpoint, opened out decidedly new paths of speculation.

For how could man, by any exertion of thought, ultimately carry himself beyond the limits of the world (in its widest philosophical sense)? Although he creates the supra-mundane, still can he put into it anything except what comes from this world? Yet, self-evident as this seems, there is undoubtedly some danger involved in this process. When such a supra-mundane entity is once formed, it frees itself from its connections; it appears to be something set over against the world; and, as such, it is easily employed for the explanation of material events in general, or of any single occurrences which appear peculiarly enigmatical.

But since, on this theory, the intrinsic connection of phenomena under the causal relation is lost sight of, and we no longer resolve phenomena back to that something which is essentially contained in them (which resolution constitutes the definite problem of knowledge), it seems as if such a transcendent explanation not only here and there broke through the scientific conception of the world, and in general limited it, but also, as if, in principle, it destroyed such a scientific conception. Such an explanation is to be banished all the more decidedly, the more it gives the appearance of science by its reference to something supra-mundane, and by that appearance lulls to sleep the impulsive desire for actual knowledge.

Who would wish to mistake the truth contained in such propositions? The theory of our relation to the world which was predominant in the middle ages is made for ever impossible by modern science; and, if religion were bound to an external supra-mundane interpretation, there would arise, of course, between it

and science an irreconcilable antithesis. In any case, the immanent character of its explanation of nature is essential and necessary to the whole of modern science, so that every attack upon this claim is to be regarded as an attack upon science itself.

But now the question arises, What then, more exactly, is to be understood by an immanent explanation? That causes are to be presented as manifesting themselves in the world, and that every kind of individual is to be understood in connection with the whole, and according to universal laws—this can be first of all asserted; but we must insist upon it that, if statements of this kind are to have any sort of valuable meaning, it must be clear what the specific meaning of the word "world" is. But here we find ourselves before an immense problem. For, however simple this concept may appear to the common sense of men, a brief glance at its history shows that it is not so simple in the realm of science. Every great system has its own concept of the world, and the great epochs of history show throughout, in this respect, distinctive characteristics.

To the ancients, the concept of the world was, first of all, that concept which embraced everything; it included everything mental and material, ideal and sensitive, divine and human, actual and possible.* Only at a later date, and under the influence of Christianity, was the concept of the supra-mundane formed.† There was

* See, for example, Seneca, "Nat. Quæst.," ii.: "Omnia quæ in notitiam nostram cadunt aut cadere possunt, mundus complectitur."

† Ὑπερκόσμιος and the contrasted ἐγκόσμιος are used in Pseudo-Archytas (see Mullach, Frg. i. 574 b, 6). In Proclus the antithesis of ὑπερκόσμιος and ἐγκόσμιος appears, after (in Plotinus) the ancient concept of the world had been essentially changed. It is worthy of note, also, that the Neo-Platonics opposed the νοητά to the ἐγκόσμια, and so understood the Intelligible as something supra-mundane.

accordingly no antithesis between what is within and what is outside of the world, which could be used in the cosmology. In fact, nothing could come in from outside; yet, in such an extension of the concept of the world, the supra-mundane was excluded far less than is the case in modern times. But the interpretation held at the height of Grecian thought, which found its expression in the denotation *κόσμος*, is definitive of the meaning of the term world.* The world, thus considered, is a whole, compounded, shaped by art into a living form, a *σύστημα* in the nomenclature of the Stoics. The single parts do not simply stand near one another, bound together, perhaps, only by their participation in some law, but each one has a place and signification as a part of the whole, and receives by that participation a specific determination. This idea influenced the investigations of the leading thinkers, and especially of Aristotle, even in regard to single objects. For example, specific forms of action are supposed to differ according to their position in space, and in a measure even in time, so that the glance is always directed from the individual to the whole. But that what is human, as well as everything else which is particular, is dependent on the great order of the world, is from the outset taken for granted, and is perhaps more emphatically sanctioned by no one than it is by Plato,† who certainly was inclined to value as highly as possible the ideal meaning of the human life. Ultimately, then, the Gre-

* The philosophical use of the word is, as is known, traced back to the Pythagoreans; but this signification does not seem to have been in general use in the time of Xenophon (see "Memorabilia," i. 1, 11: *ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος*). Aristotle was the first to use *κοσμικός*. Pliny, "Nat. Hist.," ii.: "Quem *κόσμον* Græci nomine ornamenti appellarunt, eum nos a perfecta absolutaque elegantia mundum."

† See "Philebus," 29 B.

cian world separated into two parts, one purely mental and one endowed with sensibility, so that the cosmic theory was compelled to fall back upon something which, although not in itself externally transcendent, was still so as far as the concepts were concerned.

In Christianity, the world, as the sum total of all creation, naturally took the second place. In so far as whatever was created was considered as having fallen away from its destiny, the terms world and worldly could be used to signify that which was not taken possession of by and which offered resistance to the divine spirit.* But the phenomena of the world, as thus defined, received harmonious connection and significance only when they were referred to the ethico-religious problems of the human race, and its events consequently became of value only by reason of this reference; but in the realm of ethics there was a consciousness of an immense chasm between being and duty, and everywhere a clearly defined feeling of personal powerlessness in view of the inconsistency therein involved. All that the world in general offered could not be sufficient here: only from something supramundane could help be expected. It was involved in such a theory that God should be contrasted with the world as something outside of it, and that his action should be considered as something distinct from, and so exercising an influence upon the world. To the world, once created, was adjudicated a kind of internal conformity to law, and the divine influence was reserved for extraordinary cases. But, directly or indirectly, every occurrence was referred ultimately to a miracle: everywhere we stumble upon something not

* Augustine, "Opera," iii. B, 668 c: "Christus missus est ut mundus ex mundo liberaretur."

furnished by considerations of reason, concealed designs, confused relations, etc., so that world and nature still remain mysterious, however far we may carry our investigations. Science seemed almost to have as its chief task to bring into consciousness human impotence as contrasted with the divine omnipotence, from which it happened that inferior minds, in their irrational endeavors, the less they could demonstrate their own greatness, were the more inclined to show constantly the greatness of God (see Lichtenberg, i. 279).

Men of a speculative turn of mind, carrying out an independent line of theoretical speculation, went further still in their analysis. What to others seemed to lie by the side of and above the world, was to them the deeper cause, essence, and force of the world itself. The antithesis of natural and supernatural they adopted in very much the same sense as that in which we use it; but they held that man forms an integral part of a whole which is to himself unfathomable. Yet in Augustine, who was the greatest of the Christian philosophers,* such principles are inseparably combined with positively theological doctrines. The Mystics took a bold step in advance of this, and, apparently, came very near to the pantheistic systems of modern times. But there is a difference in their principles which is decisive of the whole method of investigation, for the Mystics derive the world from God, while our modern Pantheists, on the contrary, find God in the world. These earlier speculative principles were valuable, and exerted an important influence upon the historical development of thought, but they were not sufficiently independent to accomplish a scientific transformation of the ideal

* The expression *Christiana philosophia*, in a specific sense, was first used by Augustine (x. 408 c).

world as it appears to the naïve ethical consciousness, so that it was reserved for modern times to take up the struggle against it and produce the transformation.

The cosmic concept of the present day is, first of all, limited by the fact that, in general, only what is active is recognized as existent. By the supra-mundane which is excluded from the sphere of the Cosmos is especially to be understood whatever is not manifested in action; in this case, theology and metaphysics in the ancient sense alike disappear. But it is the task of positive science to reduce the heterogeneous elements in a phenomenon to continually demonstrable primary forces, and to derive their whole determination, under the principle of causality, from these simple elements. In such fundamental principles there is full harmony, whether the world is formed from the mind or from nature. In the former case, the progressive activity of thought is supposed to produce everything, and to support continually what is produced; in the latter, actively present forces, and not any feigned and unverifiable hypotheses, serve for the explanation. The former method can be traced back to Nicolaus Cusanus; in the latter, we find what Newton calls the *vera causa*, first formulated as a concept by Kepler, who sought to detect the secret of Nature herself, and to conceive of the cause as continuous force.* In Descartes both tendencies are combined, and they receive from him, under the modern doctrine of categories, a systematically philosophical foundation.

If, then, the world was to be recognized by the pri-

* See Apelt, "Epochs of the History of Man," i. 243. He was the first who discovered the art of asking Nature for her laws, while his predecessors only invented grounds of explanation, which they tried to fit to the processes of Nature.

mary forces acting in it, it was not, of course, immediately necessary to go beyond those primary forces in the investigation. And, if one still holds to the concept of God, the real meaning of the concept diverges so much from that of former times that only the retention of the old forms of expression conceals in some measure the actual change. That concept was formed for the purpose of giving to the world cause, unity, and connection, and this unification became the more necessary the more distinct single objects were made by the analysis of modern investigation. But these are all formal definitions—in a measure, subsidiary concepts, which thought creates to satisfy its own claims. This is seen especially in the fact that infinity is regarded as the most important characteristic of the concept of Deity. This infinity, as has been many times clearly shown, is not, of course, to be understood in a quantitative sense, but it expresses a concept of Being which is pure, limitless, superior to all determination and all limitation. But thus the concept of Deity has no other significance than to lend completeness and ultimate validity to the concept of the world.

We find, of course, much divergence in the views held concerning this general principle; yet even in Leibnitz, with whom there seems to be the greatest degree of connection with the earlier theories, on careful examination we find that the modern views are predominant. Though Leibnitz calls God a supra-mundane Intelligence,* he still understands by the world only particular phenomena, so far as they are associated without connection; and he presents, therefore, a dis-

* It is always worthy of notice that he prefers to say supra-mundane rather than extra-mundane. See 571 a: "Dieu selon nous Intelligentia extramundana, comme Mart. Capella l'appelle, ou plutôt supramundana."

tinction in concepts rather than a difference in essence. In its real meaning, Leibnitz's concept of God is far nearer to that of Spinoza than to that of Christianity.

But it can not be doubted that such a concept of God has no significance for the practical religious life, and it is, of course, equally worthless in any special science, because, in such scientific investigation, by common consent it can nowhere be used for the explanation of the particular event, and it appears as necessary only in the attempt to find a philosophical conception of the universe when regarded as a whole. Accordingly, such a concept puts an end to the theory of a transcendent religious derivation of phenomena.

This became evident even in the transitional period. Giordano Bruno found the difference between the devout theologian and the true philosopher in the fact that the one, in his explanations, ascended above Nature, the other confined himself within her limits.* Kepler shows the difference between his own conviction and that of his orthodox friend Fabricius, when he says (i. 332): "*Tibi Deus in naturam venit, mihi natura ad divinitatem aspirat*"; and when Spinoza identifies the concepts (*deus sive natura*) God and Nature (of course in the philosophical sense), and establishes only a single world, all that before this rational analysis had been justified as supra-natural must be removed as contra-natural.† The concepts of the cter-

* See "Della Causa, Principio et Uno," 4th Dialogue.

† See "Tract. Theol. Polit.," vi. 27: "Neque hic ullam agnosco differentiam inter opus contra naturam et opus supra naturam; hoc est, ut quidam aiunt, opus, quod quidem naturæ non repugnat, attamen ab ipsa non potest produci aut effici. Nam cum miraculum non extra naturam, sed in ipsa natura fiat, quamvis supra naturam statuatur, tamen necesse est, ut naturæ ordinem interrumpat, quem alias fixum atque immutabilem ex Dei decretis concipimus."

nity of being and of the legitimacy of all events displace such concepts as those of creation and miracle, and the immanent conception of the world receives here a typical form.*

But the world, which thus serves as that which is highest and unique, is then as a whole brought into contrast with the particular existence. The latter takes rank according to its worth in view of the world as a whole, and adapts itself to it in its forms of action. This makes it necessary that the whole method of consideration shall be different from the earlier methods. Nothing particular, even though, as in the case of man, it is the highest in what is empirically given, can refer all events to itself; for that was the very cause of the numerous mistakes of the past. Rather must every individual be judged by the whole. The speculative thinkers, who take this concept of the whole in its stricter sense, believe that everything individual can be, as a concept, discovered from the concept of the whole: all apparent contradictions disappear from the world, if the observer, to use Leibnitz's expression, fixes his eye upon the sun, and views things from this point. It is believed that the most difficult problems, even those of the thought-process, can be solved by such a change in the point of observation. But the whole, to which everything is subordinate, is not æsthetical, as in ancient times, nor ethical, as in Christianity; but it is

* So far as the expressions are concerned which serve to indicate the positions occupied by the different parties in religious philosophy, we find that they all belong to modern times. Naturalist and Deist extend back into the sixteenth century. In the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were various attempts to distinguish between Deist and Theist; but the distinction made by Kant has been generally though not universally adopted. Pantheist was used by Toland in 1705; Pantheism by his opponent Fay.

supposed to be metaphysical, yet is in fact mathematical, whether of a geometrical or an arithmetical nature (Spinoza or Leibnitz). The individual accordingly serves ultimately only as an integral part of a magnitude; and, if everything is understood as thus homogeneous, there can be no longer a claim to any specific significance of the individual.

But, independently of such speculative attempts, there was a general conviction of the similarity of nature in all events. Time and space do not effect the least change in them, and in every point something pervasive and eternal can be apprehended. Everything apparently specific must reduce to something simple, and thus admit of a place in homogeneous classifications.

The prosecution of such tendencies necessarily changed the whole method of constructing a cosmology. With every external extension of the horizon, things appeared to move in their nature still nearer to man, for in everything was operative the law which ruled his own life. All concepts seemed to extend further out over the narrow circle which had been broken; and, since it escaped attention at first that the content must diminish with the extension of the circumference, it seemed as if a decided advantage had been obtained. The abundance of the concrete life, which the historical developments contained in their comprehension, might now pour itself out in the entire universe, and animate it. Life thus appeared greater and freer. Who would complain of the time which brought such principles to their expression, if it gave itself up wholly to the new doctrines, and hoped for a complete change for the better as a result of this immanent interpretation of the world?

Only by degrees the limitations and difficulties of

this theory came into sight. Above all, is it certain that here, too, a duality in the world is established, and perhaps more firmly than ever before. For the world which scientific thought constructs is thoroughly distinct from that which is present to sense-perception, and the chasm becomes the greater the nearer thought approaches its boundaries. What is given is dissected and brought into new connections, but in that way its contents and the relations of single objects are completely changed from their original form, so that science gives back the world in an essentially different condition from that in which it received it. And the further we advance in the progress toward simple forces the further away do we get from what was originally given; and so, in a peculiar manner, does investigation seem to remove the world further from us, as fast as it teaches us a knowledge of it. At any rate, the world of exact science is at least as much estranged from the world of common sense as was formerly the world of artistic intuition from that of religious faith.

But, in regard to the simple phenomena as well, problems arose, the answers to which diverged even to contradiction. In the ordinary idea of the world, the mental and the material elements seem to stand side by side, but such juxtaposition can not be allowed here in ultimate analysis: an inner connection, or a reduction of the one to the other, must therefore be obtained. From one point of view, then, the content of the world is regarded as mental and specifically intellectual; for it is particularly characteristic of modern times to limit the mental by thought. The sum total of what is presented is accordingly supposed to be transformed into the forms of thought and of knowledge: the world presents a complete process evolved by the constant activity of the

mind, in which process everything particular is inserted as a single gradation. Herein is found the highest task of science: what is immediately presented, the crudely material, is taken up and transformed; what is apparently at rest is set in motion; in everything external something mental is recognized; but the limitation remains, that in such an interpretation we do not pass beyond purely formal determinations, and, as is well known in the case of the systems of the Constructive philosophers, we must renounce the apprehension of everything concrete.

On the other side, external nature, scientifically considered, serves as the true world. Here the specifically modern categories find their full realization: the heterogeneous is more and more conceived as the result of simple primary activities; laws are discovered, in accordance with which all events proceed; through the concept of progressive formation, the complex is, as a matter of fact, obtained from the simple. The immanent explanation thus receives a concrete meaning; it opens to scientific treatment an infinite abundance of material, an immense kingdom of forms. But we do not arrive here literally at a concept of the world. Individual objects are considered as acting in juxtaposition, with no conception of their coexistence; harmony is found in the forms of events, without an understanding and a justification of the inner nature of this harmony; so that, finally, the concept of law hovers in the air, new grooves are formed, and the whole advances, yet not according to a necessity of the whole, but from the accidental conjunction of single forces acting aimlessly for themselves. If law and form can not thus be truly understood in their own province, the thought-process involved presents an impassable limit: we have

no concept of that very thing which supports and conditions the whole science—that is, the observing and investigating mind itself. So, though the whole theory may attain, in its own sphere, what is astounding and indubitable, it is all valid only under so many conditions and limitations that it can never furnish an ultimate apprehension of the universe.

It is evident from all this that the two tendencies are reciprocally related, and we must have a broader concept of the world than that offered by either one-sided idea. This problem was so evident that none of the prominent speculative minds could overlook it, and a history of the concept of the world in modern philosophy would mirror its general development as well as the peculiarities of individual writers.

But Leibnitz unquestionably presents the best attempt at a solution of this problem. With him nature and the thought-world are united in the fact that they can be known as different degrees in our comprehension of one single world. After each for itself had been constructed completely and without interference, the two should be united in an ultimately comprehensive philosophical consideration, and this should be done after these elements had been adjusted to each other. But it was a necessary condition of this union of nature and mind that Leibnitz should extend his concept of the world, as regards its principles, so far as to include not only the forces evidently active in the phenomenon, but also the latent yet still active forces. What was presented to the senses appeared thus as the consequence of events extending further and deeper, and these concealed events must be added in thought to bring causal connection into individual phenomena; and the question then arose whether it was not possible, by such a

transformation of the concept of the world, to raise the concepts into a sphere where the antithesis between nature and mind could be overcome. Leibnitz exerted himself to the utmost to accomplish this; but we shall be compelled with Kant to deny that he has succeeded in the essential thing, in spite of all the brilliant discoveries and all the extensions of the realm of knowledge to which this endeavor led him. There was, in fact, a union, but in a kingdom of shadows, Ontology: the concrete determinations remained at the end still undecided. But, in the primary concept of possibility, the physical significance of tension and the logico-metaphysical significance of the (legitimately) thinkable always diverge, in spite of every attempt to unite them; and the endeavor to join together an intellectual and a sensuous world is thus wrecked.

The clear knowledge of the impossibility of solving the problem from the given premises was a determining factor in the formation of the Kantian philosophy. The antithesis is still maintained, but, together with all knowledge, is transferred to the province of the phenomenon. In this way the whole concept of the world is changed, and the modern doctrine of categories given up. Things in themselves (*Dinge an sich*) are separated from phenomena; the endeavor to reduce the heterogeneity of the forms of action to a primary force is relinquished; a multiplicity of powers is left in juxtaposition; the significance of the coexistence of things is decidedly undervalued; in short, an important revolution commences here, upon the closer study of which, however, we can refuse to enter in this connection, since the principles, and with them the problems, of the seventeenth century have, in spite of this system, remained predominant, in their importance and their

completeness, in actual scientific investigation. It may, then, be unhesitatingly asserted that at the present day, as well, we lack wholly a concrete philosophical concept of the world, to which the different realms and kinds of existence are subordinate. Not only mind and matter, but also content and form, are divergent concepts. One man thinks primarily of the one, another of the other; and only the word conceals in some measure the fact that we think something utterly different, provided that we in general think anything at all under the term.

With this problem of the determination of the content of the world, other problems are connected, and they likewise present difficulties to an immanent explanation. The single phenomenon is to be conceived entirely through that which is comprehensive, or, rather, what is valid, as derived, is to be conceived through what is simple; only the question arises whether every special formation can be so understood, and whether we are not compelled to recognize a certain individuality in specific groups and in single objects.

The Naturalistic school, especially, is in danger here of presenting to us as cosmic, without further question, that which is empirically the most distinct, and is from the outset given as purely phenomenal, or as unique, without regard to any combinations in which it may occur, and is thus in danger of considering every specific formation as a casual and independent result. Yet it may be that what thus appears only in unique formations is of great importance in its bearing upon our ultimate theory of the world. What is apparently specific may compel us to change our most general principles. Instead of insisting upon a comprehensive concept of the world as a substitute for a concept confined to strictly human limitations, men, in ordinary discussion, are

very easily led to accept simply the positive contrary of any proposition which they may oppose. Thus, when they deny that the human sphere gives us the truly cosmic, they assert at once that the inorganic sphere must serve as the cosmic. Modern investigation incurs great danger from its readiness to consider a thing as already proved simply because its positive contrary has been shown to be inadequate.

The concept of the world and the immanent explanation find no less difficulty in the relation of events in time to primary forces acting outside of time-relations. Understood as a process of development, events seem to be bound up in time. The later supposes and assumes the earlier, but in that way it becomes dependent; so that the problem arises, how determinate formations can be reconciled with the immediateness and freedom from time-relations of the primary forces. There is also a weakness in the explanation as given, in the fact that the present can be understood only by the past, and yet an immediate verification is insisted upon. This dilemma appears most evidently in the Hegelian system. As a matter of principle, development must be understood as something constantly turning back to itself, and so outside of time-relations; but, then, the different elements in the system are essentially distinct, and either time and all that happens in it must be considered a pure illusion (which view at once starts a number of new questions), or else the speculative primary principle must be modified, if not given up.

The Naturalistic school has to encounter the same difficulty. It must regard any special event as something partaking of the general nature of the whole, and above time-relations, and so must assume it to be something simply existent rather than a manifestation of

force, or else it must regard that which comes later in a series as something wholly new, and devoid of all sufficient causal connection. The dilemma thus continually faces us, either to limit ourselves to the elements which appear under time-relations, or to give up the doctrine of the pure immediateness of knowledge; and the old problem of the relation between history and eternity remains unsolved.

From all this we can easily see what judgment we are to pass upon the demand for an immanent explanation of the world, which is made to-day with increased emphasis. There is a truth in this explanation which, in its general application, we must admit as being above all contest and doubt. Only what manifests itself as acting can be recognized as existing; and it is the problem of an explanation to reduce to such actively manifested forces everything which is an object of experience. The general difference between our day and other periods, especially the middle ages, lies in the fact that we hold this truth firmly in consciousness, and therefore recognize nothing as existing which can not be obtained, in a strictly causal connection, from that starting-point. But the question immediately arises, how far thought is compelled to go out beyond what is immediately presented in order to apprehend what is ultimately and independently active, and so to arrive at an actual explanation, instead of a mere periphrasis; and, in view of this question, every answer is a wholly definite thesis, which must be carefully established, and can in no way be regarded as covered by that general truth from which it starts.

If the immanent explanation of the world asserts here as much as this, that we are to stop with what is immediately given in external nature, then, as we have

seen, the entire work of modern science, and, in general, law and form, and even all thought-activity, remain, in their own spheres, devoid of suitable concepts. And, even if the practical physicist easily corrects here in his concrete work the original mistake, on the other hand, the theorizer in physics is inclined to increase the error, and to call that an immanent explanation of the world which is the precise opposite of what the expression asserts. He speaks of immanence, where the question is one of purely external relations; of the world, where the idea of a universe is given up before the overwhelming power of isolated phenomena; of explanation, where only a juxtaposition of external events is given.

But, if the demand for an immanent explanation of the world expresses the principle that what is present in nature and in mind is to be taken as the measure of truth, immediately, as it presents itself, one leaves out of consideration the activity of the mind, and particularly the transformation of the idea of the world which in our day proceeds from it. If, finally, thought-activity is recognized, but is limited to a purely formal transformation of what is given to the senses, the question arises whether such a transformation does not necessarily lead still further, in regard to the material itself as well as its forms, and give to the world of thought a richer content than it does to the world of phenomena.

Such problems and difficulties, which grow upon us all the more as we advance, need not, as a matter of course, weaken the general postulate of an immanent explanation, but they do seem to justify the question whether the definite method and the whole style of treatment laid down by modern science accomplish their aim, whether, in order to advance perhaps a single step, broader starting-points must not be sought out,

whether other concrete definitions of that which acts must not be adopted, whether other methods corresponding to these must not be constructed. But we treat such questions unjustly, if we touch upon them only hurriedly.

MONISM—DUALISM.

"I assert that to present an actual antithesis in all its strictness is as advantageous to science as to present an identity."—SCHELLING.

ONE of the leading difficulties in the way of a universal conceept of the world, and an immanent explanation of it, consists in the distinction between material and mental being. Hence all attempts to diminish or to remove this distinction must be of serious consequence in their bearing upon the entire work of science, and for this reason the Monism of modern natural science can be sure of commanding universal attention.

So far as the expression goes, Dualism is older than Monism. It is first used by Thomas Hyde, in his work "De Religione Veterum Persarum," to denote a religious system, in which an evil principle is placed by the side of the good principle, and in this sense the word was accommodated to a wider application by Bayle (see the article "Zoroaster") and by Leibnitz (see "Théodicée," ii. 144, 199).* Wolff first forms the antithesis of Monism and Dualism, but applies it to metaphysics, and not to religious philosophy. He calls Monists those thinkers who assume only one principle, whether of a mental or material nature, so that "Idealists" as well

* See, for example, Brucker, 2d ed., i. 176: "Ex ratione systematis quod vocari ita solet dualistici."

as "Materialists" * are comprehended under the term; while Dualists are those who consider matter and mind as mutually independent substances. Among the latter Wolff wished to be reckoned himself. The word Dualist obtained a tolerably wide usage in this signification (see Kant, "Kritik d. r. Vernunft," 1st ed. [in Hartenstein's ed., iii. 599]; Fichte, ii. 88: for another meaning, see Kant, vi. 360). Monism, on the contrary, led a miserable existence † in philosophical dictionaries, until, as a denotation of the Hegelian philosophy, it obtained a very wide use (see Göschel's "Monism of Thought," 1832). It had again in some measure fallen out of use, when it was taken up by modern natural philosophy, and made the watchword of a doctrine which considers mind and matter neither as separated nor as derived from each other, but as standing in an essential and inseparable connection. Matter receives, as an original determination, a mental characteristic, which in the progress of formation develops into the activity of full consciousness. Mind thus becomes a part of the general world-process, and is controlled by its physico-mechanical laws. Accordingly, as the term Monism has thus passed over into what is nearly the contradictory of its original signification, our estimate of its value is also changed. While the followers of Wolff believed that they could not guard themselves with too great care against Monism, at the present day that doctrine of natural philosophy is almost never contested, except to substitute for it another form of Monism. Such a transformation can well be inter-

* Idealism will be treated later in detail. "Materialist" I find first used by Boyle (as in his work, which appeared in 1674, "The Excellence and Grounds of the Mechanical Philosophy").

† In Fichte (ii. 88) we find Unitism used as the correlate of Dualism.

preted as a sign that in the present problem different points of view are possible, and different elements intersect; and this, on closer examination, we find to be the fact.

On a superficial consideration, and still more after a scientific investigation, mind is found to be so closely connected with matter that every forcible separation of them appears violent; to this we add that metaphysics demands unity of the ultimate principle, and, at the end, the æsthetic intuition refuses to allow the separation of the sensuous and the mental.

On the other hand, there appears at the outset a reason of equal weight for the impossibility of success in this attempt, if the self-consciousness of the mind, the consciousness of a unique content of life, leads to the claim of a peculiar and a superior position in the world; such a demand is also, in fact, supported by the analysis of the specific contents of both spheres of existence, and this analysis presents such pervasive differences between the two spheres that a simple union or identification of them seems to be impossible. So each kind of existence stands opposed to the other—each strong enough to assert itself, yet too weak to carry through the overthrow of the other.

Among the Greeks the principles of Monism were predominant, but with them the doctrine assumed very different forms. At the outset, mind was associated with matter only as one of its characteristics, until Anaxagoras introduced that distinction which constituted the preliminary condition of the doctrine of the Socratic school. After Plato had endeavored to give to mind the leading place in the universe, a speculative Monism was constructed in the Aristotelian philosophy, which sought to embrace both elements, and which, in

spite of many vacillations in its execution, may be regarded as the culmination of Greek thought. The later schools, too, maintained a Monism, only there was an unmistakable falling off in the fact that the principle became more abstract with the Stoics, more crude with the Epicureans. The genuine tendency of thought was toward a Dualism, which, partly from its association with Plato, partly from its submission to Oriental influences, assimilated the antithesis of mind and matter with that of good and evil, while it expressed this antithesis most distinctly.*

Nevertheless, the development of Grecian thought rose yet again to a monistic conception of the world, and created in the doctrine of Plotinus a system in which matter was inserted in the spiritual-intellectual life simply as a phenomenal form and degree. But an age of decadence was not capable of vigorously carrying through this principle of a spiritualistic Monism: in the very attempt to overcome the antithesis of mind and matter, the world was divided into an ideal element, and one known phenomenally through the senses, and matter pressed in again as a positive force, the force of evil. Greek philosophy always arrived at a goal directly opposite to that from which it started. Mind, at first buried out of sight in the events of nature, worked its way by degrees to independence and freedom, and clearly maintained itself there; yet, in the struggle to defend this position, it was ever more and more compelled to degrade, and even to give up, the phenomenal world, until it at last transformed it into a simple similitude of true existence. As the Idealism of the Greek character showed itself, if anywhere, in the sacrifice of

* Plutarch, "Isis and Osiris," 45 (ed. of Parthey): *δεῖ γένεσιν ἰδίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν ὥσπερ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν.*

the phenomenal world rather than in that of the reality of the thought-process, so its speculative power was perhaps best manifested in the fact that, in spite of the immense pressure which at that time weighed heavily upon thought, it was unwilling to end with a disunited world, and sought in itself the ultimate unity.

We can attribute to Christianity an absolute Monism, so far as it makes the mind, as a free personality, the source of all existence. Still, here, as in many other places, the general theory is determined more by the phenomenon with which we come in immediate contact than by its ultimate cause. But in that phenomenon the distance between matter and mind appeared so great that man was usually designated as something compound (*συντεθέν, compositum*). The estimate of the ethico-religious content of the thought-life not only excluded its degradation into a simple event of nature, but also forbade a too close connection of mind and matter; and this gave rise to many schools. Hobbes could well appeal to the materialism of Tertullian, while, for Augustine * and the Mystics, mind alone formed the ultimate existence.

But the discussion of this problem reached its culmination in modern times. Powerful impulses to each tendency came in anew, and increased the vehemence as well as the fruitfulness of the contest. Monism had usually a little the start. On its side was especially active the endeavor to attain an immanent conception of the world, by which endeavor the demands for unity and connection in the universe were so increased that

* See Augustine, i. 254 D: "Intellectus in quo universa sunt vel ipse potius universa"; vi. 96 C: "Colligitur non esse causas efficientes omnium quæ fiunt, nisi voluntarias, illius naturæ scilicet quæ spiritus vitæ est."

two different primary forces were not allowed to remain in juxtaposition. Added to this were the tendencies to Monism arising from the increasing knowledge of the dependence of the thought-process on bodily functions; from the theory of the relationship of the human to the lower forms of life, which seem to be dependent upon matter; and from the principle of development, in view of which nothing can assert for itself an isolated existence.

From the first it was believed that the problem could be solved by a simple union of the two elements, and already in the sixteenth century a principle was advocated in scientific circles which shared in many of the features of the Monism of to-day. An inner life was attributed to everything corporeal, and in all occurrences in nature an analogy to the activity of the soul was assumed. Paracelsus, for example, found in all things a soul, or rather something "conformable to the soul"; * and the chief apostle of this new philosophy of nature, Giordano Bruno, announced with enthusiasm that even the smallest particle contained in itself the properties of a soul, and that matter and mind could be traced back to a common source.†

The maintenance of this position was, nevertheless, opposed by weighty scientific reasons, especially in physics, but also in philosophy. It was an indispensable presupposition of all exact cosmology, that matter should

* "Phil. ad. Ath.," ii. 6: "To better understand what an element is —an element is nothing else than a soul. Not so much that its essence is as a soul, but is conformable to a soul. For there is a difference between the soul of the element and the eternal soul. The soul of the element is the life of everything created."

† "Della Causa," ii.: "Spirto si trova in tutte le cose, e non è minimo corpusculo, che non contegna cotal porzione in sè, che non inanimi"; iii. toward the end: "In somma l'una e l'altra si riduca ad uno essere et una radice."

be freed from those inner characteristics which had been read into it by the Scholastic Aristotelianism. For the very reason that all action was reduced to inner forces, and the peculiarities of the thought-process were continually carried over into nature, there could be no scientific knowledge, in the modern sense of the term. The primary principles of this knowledge are valid only so far as everything subjective is given up, and nature is regarded as something soul-less. But much painful labor has been necessary to carry that principle through; men like Nicolaus Taurellus, Kepler, Galileo, and others, have been compelled to lay out their whole strength upon it, and have advanced to their goal only step by step. The human mind was compelled to separate nature from itself and to renounce all immediate union with it, a renunciation which demanded a degree of strength and a sacrifice which command our highest respect.

Moreover, just as the analytical process in physics had come to its first conclusion with Galileo, it passed over into philosophy through Descartes. With the latter, matter and mind were from the first distinguished in principle; the activity of consciousness and extension, although closely and legitimately united in action, could not be reduced to one essence; so that we can assert, not a oneness of nature (*unitas naturæ*), but only a oneness of composition (*unitas compositionis*). Descartes was compelled to judge thus if he wished to be consistent with the first principles of his philosophy; for, if a substance is inferred only from its action, or rather is added to that in thought, an existence with two entirely different forms of action can not be allowed.

Yet, in fact, on the other hand, in the progress toward a single immanent conception of the world, two forces essentially unconnected could not be left un-

molested, so that the two most powerful tendencies in modern philosophy became thus contradictory. In either case the naïve Monism of the sixteenth century was destroyed, and the problem became so extensive that an advance in its solution could be hoped for only by means of a speculative transformation of the phenomena.

Of the solutions offered, the most important for us are those of Spinoza and Leibnitz. The former, leaving the Cartesian concepts of matter and mind almost unchanged, attempted to remove the difficulties by the way in which he defined their relations to each other and to substance. His principle of essentially uniting matter and mind in the concept of the world is, in its general content, so necessary and so convincing, that his mistake in the development of it is often overlooked. It is enough for us to remember that his comprehension of the principle and his complete development do not agree. According to his principle, Spinoza would have been compelled to refer mind to the absolute substance as a conscious subject; in which case, of course, his philosophy would have become mysticism, and the relation of his concept of substance to that held in the middle ages would have been clearly evident. If, on the other hand, the material world, in its actual existence, underlies that absolute substance, a concrete content is thus, to be sure, obtained, and a position in the realm of modern science is assured to the mind; but mind, so far as its specific essence is concerned, is sacrificed,* and Spinoza's entire philoso-

* It is of especial significance to this that the law of inertia is presented as a primary law of all being, even of that which is mental. See "Tract. Theol. Pol.," xvi. 4: "Lex summa naturæ est, ut unaquæque res in suo statu, quantum in se est, conetur perseverare, idque nulla alterius, sed tantum sui habita ratione" ("Eth.," iii., Prop. 6).

phy becomes a naturalism, and even a materialism, on the basis of a mysticism. This apparent reconciliation of the incongruous practically contributed not a little to the extreme results at which he arrived.

The attempt of Leibnitz is superior to that of Spinoza, because with him the meaning of the concept was not simply taken from another philosopher, but was more exactly determined by means of an independent analysis. In matter the characteristic of force took precedence of that of extension, but the concept of mind was so enlarged that it embraced also unconscious activity. And then the attempt was made to understand matter as a legitimately precedent appearance of mental being, a *phænomenon bene fundatum*, and to conceive the whole external world as a mirage of the mental Cosmos presenting itself to the finite, and therefore confused, percipient mind. In this way all physical determinations were subordinated to the determinations of mind, and even the primary laws of motion were supposed to be derived from the idea of the most perfect world.* The impossibility of representing mind as the origin of sensuous phenomena (since it will never be possible to a theory to bring into a simple sequence what is given to knowledge under essentially different conditions †) testifies less against this gigantic attempt than does the fact that, in such an endeavor to establish mind as the unique world-

* He says (682 b): "Physicam necessitatem sic explicui, ut sit consequens moralis."

† Leibnitz himself has clearly shown the inconsistency of such a demand (358 b): "Vouloir que ces phantômes confus demeurent et que cependant on y démêle les ingrédiens par la phantaisie même, c'est se contredire, c'est vouloir avoir le plaisir d'être trompé par une agréable perspective et vouloir qu'en même tems l'œil voie la tromperie, ce qui serait la gâter."

power, all that is specific in the contents of mind is lost. The monads are ultimately, according to the philosopher's own expression, only "metaphysical points," and no longer spiritual substance; the idea, with its comprehension of plurality in unity, is no longer a psychological, but an ontological concept.* If, then, Spinoza subordinated to nature, and thus destroyed, the concrete content of mind, Leibnitz sacrificed mind and nature to ontologico-mathematical definitions; and, if Spinoza's concepts directly contradicted the facts of mind, those of Leibnitz were exact only for an abstract comprehension, the way back from which to concrete properties could not be found. The fact that Spinoza's doctrine, with all its one-sidedness, had a definitely expressed meaning, was in great part the reason of its accomplishing far more, and appearing to defend more vigorously the principles of Monism. For anything which can be expressed in a concrete form is often practically influential and successful, whatever may be its errors.

When the school of Leibnitz, presenting tamely the fluent and vivid principles of their master, made of his Monism a lifeless Dualism, it was a natural result that, as opposed to them, freer and more penetrative minds greeted Spinozism as a solution of the problem, and that Spinozism thus appeared as a new system, and attained an idealistic interpretation. Scientific and artistic elements combined to produce an instinctive opposition to "the infamous Two in the world" (see Lichtenberg, "Miscellaneous Writings," viii. 151).

* Kant's reproach (iii. 231), that Leibnitz intellectualized phenomena, rests on a very superficial understanding of the subject. It is rather the fact that he ultimately subjected both mind and nature to a third something.

But the synthesis which seemed so necessary was demanded rather than established, and the Systematic philosophy was especially influenced by the failure of the monistic attempts of Spinoza and Leibnitz. The prominence of the specific difference between matter and mind, between sensitivity and understanding, and the knowledge of the impossibility of reducing these to each other were what to a great extent determined the formation of the Kantian philosophy. If the world, as it is phenomenally given, is composed of two factors, as what is reached in ultimate analysis, then there is no finally valid decision concerning the real relation of those factors. Yet, since for us this question is a purely transcendent one, the difference between them remained, and the surprising power with which the distinction was developed in Kant's system necessitated the overthrow of all previous forms of both naïve and speculative Monism as a matter of science, and brought the question into a third stadium.

But it is a fundamental principle of our nature that analysis always calls out new attempts at synthesis; and the German philosophers now undertook most boldly a synthesis, in which they were agreed in deriving the material universe from a mental one, as from what is the ultimate existence and the source of the phenomenal world, while in other respects they were very diverse in their opinions, and allied themselves with various points in the historical discussion. Whatever judgments we may form of the results of these endeavors, as a matter of fact they have played their part in the crisis of philosophy, and have become paralyzed by the influence of common sense. Such a state of affairs was to the advantage of Materialism, which, powerless against every scientific philosophy, always

steps forward instantly in a time of speculative exhaustion, justifies itself by an abundance of phenomena, and so easily obtains an extensive influence.

The Monism of to-day may be considered as an advance upon what preceded it. Clearly recognizing the impossibility of producing what pertains to the soul by composition from matter, however abstractly considered, it prefers to recognize a mental characteristic as essential to all being, and explains this more fully by attributing to matter in general the capacity of sensation and consciousness, while yet in this extension of the concept it raises the laws of material being to the rank of universal principles. This modern Monism has not so much undertaken to subject matter and mind to a new analysis, after their leading historical connection and in a critically systematic method, or to explain the general conditions under which being is given to us as material or mental, and, as connected with these conditions, to make a comprehensive use of all the data now presented, as it has been inferred from groups and connections of phenomena which have not been philosophically treated, which for the most part have been previously recognized and used as individual data, and which have now been brought together and combined into a sort of Darwinian view of the world.

Prominent here is the knowledge of the dependence of psychical on physical events. The results of science have put an end to the convenient theory of former times, which considered matter only as the instrument of the mind, so that the latter unrestrainedly produces its activity purely from within.* Science has driven us more

* We can furthermore request those who gladly ascribe this idea to philosophy in general to name a single thinker of importance who has been contented with it.

and more to the principle that matter has an important influence upon the processes which common sense regards as absolutely mental, since it not only, in some cases, refuses its services to thought, but also positively limits that thought, and even compels the mind to follow definite paths (as is demonstrable in cases of insanity). And it is a fact of especial importance here, that we thus establish a general connection between mind and matter, and also that it is shown to be probable that there is a dependence of determinate mental productions upon material functions—a dependence which occurs frequently, although it has been as yet discovered only as manifest under certain specific relations. Accordingly, that which is apparently simple and independent is thus proved to be compound and variously conditioned; what seems to be unique and intrinsic is still further analyzed; and life is judged to be not a presentation of something which as presented is essentially complete, but simply a creative process toward a new formation.

In this way, a change was introduced into the estimate of the human mind, in its general relations and its special form. After its relation to lower gradations was recognized, and certain primary forms were shown to be common to all life, the lofty isolation of mind could be no longer maintained. The facts of heredity, as they were more closely observed, brought the individual into an extensive connection with other phenomena in the series, and in that way rendered it dependent,* so that the "development theory" was

* The presentation of the phenomena of heredity, in a materialistic-monistic theory, extends back to the Stoa. See Cleanthes (Zeller, iii. 1, 2d ed., p. 180): *οὐ μόνον ὅμοιοι τοῖς γονεῦσι γινόμεθα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, τοῖς πάθεσι, τοῖς ἤθεσι, ταῖς διαθέσεσιν· σώματος δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον, οὐχὶ δὲ ἀσωμάτου· σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή.*

inclined to transfer such analogies to the universe as well, and to conceive of everything of a higher degree, not only as produced in causal connection with the lower, but also as genetically originating from it.

All this conceals an infinite amount of the problematical. Hypotheses and observations are mixed up in an almost inseparable entanglement, and the wish not only hurries far ahead of the results, but also brings them from the first into very questionable connections. Yet, in spite of this, we can not fail to recognize in the principle of development as a whole a great and justifiable advance in scientific investigation.

To the confusion of concepts, by no means the least contribution has been made by those Idealists who, uniting essential and eternal truths with narrow and contingent principles formed in the development of historical discussion, supposed that the foundations of these truths were threatened by the scientific endeavors here described, and tried to contest that tendency in every point, and, so far as they could, to counteract it. Such men often concentrated attention upon the unavoidable deficiencies in such an investigation, and, thus clinging to what was confused, aroused against themselves the whole interest of the theoretical reason. Every advance in the new direction which science achieved was a defeat to such attacks upon the principle, and so the principle itself seemed to receive a sanction which the facts by no means warranted.*

On the other hand, we should recognize without

* That many phenomena which are in dispute can be very differently interpreted in different connections (as often happens to-day) is shown by Origen ("Contra Celsus," iv. 84): *ὅσα πλείονα λέγει τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἐγκώμια, τοσούτῳ πλεῖον* (*κἂν μὴ θέλῃ*) *αὔξει τὸ τοῦ πάντα κοσμήσαντος λόγου ἔργον.*

hesitation both the particular investigations and the general tendency of the monistic theory. The old desire to bring matter and mind into a more intimate connection than that in which they present themselves to the ordinary judgment has, for various reasons, increased so much that it must of necessity find expression in philosophy, and lead to new results. But, the moment the question comes up as a philosophical one, the whole treatment of the subject must be changed; for, where the question concerns only the establishment of empirical events, it may be desirable to comprehend the phenomena in the simplest manner possible; but, where we strive after a conception of primary principles, the explanation can advance only in the systematic connections of philosophy. It is one thing to endeavor to show the legitimate connection of material and mental action; it is another thing to derive the primary forces of the one ultimately from the other, or to bring them into an essential relation as concepts. The former is the problem of natural science and of empirical psychology; the latter belongs to systematic philosophy. In the province of the former, the advantage of Monism is unmistakable; in the province of the latter, it is in any case questionable. The ultimate union of both methods of consideration is an undeniable postulate; their confusion is a palpable error. It is not self-evidently justifiable to carry over to what is essential the relations of what is phenomenal without further investigation, because every phenomenon is bound up in the conditions and activities of our nature, and what is given to consciousness must perhaps be transformed before it can be definitively recognized. This especially concerns the concept of matter, for that concept, although within certain limits it appears simple, is, if more closely examined

and tested, clearly seen to be a product of mental activity, evolved from the phenomena of mental life; and thus it involves problems, and even contradictions, which drive us to a transformation of the conception of matter, and so, beyond what is immediately presented to the senses, into the realms of metaphysics.

But the man who wishes to avoid these ultimate questions is compelled to demand of our modern Monism, as a philosophical doctrine, that it shall advance at least one step: it must bring the separated provinces into a closer union in essence, and so approximate to a unifying comprehension of the world. General concepts must thus be found to which the particular concept is subordinate, or an intrinsic union of different characteristics must be constructed if we would obtain for a philosophical conception of the world anything beyond a mere collocation of events. A necessary prerequisite of this would be a new and thorough analysis of the single departments of science, and a reduction of what is heterogeneous to comprehensive forms of action. As the method of synthesis is essentially conditioned by the precedent analysis, so the significance of a Monism is measured, to a great extent, by the Dualism which it undertakes to overcome.

But, among modern Monists, we usually search in vain for a subtile comprehension of the peculiarities of different provinces of knowledge. To many of them, the concepts of mind and of matter seem to be in the same condition of inseparable coexistence as with the Ionian Hylozoists. Others in their doctrine come nearer to Giordano Bruno. Where the concepts are brought out most clearly, one could perhaps appeal to Spinoza. In fact, the theory of Spinoza, freed from Spinoza's speculative first principles, forms the philosophical con-

tent of modern Monism, so that the latter encounters all the doubts and objections to which the former was exposed.* As we have already touched upon this question several times, we would refer here only to the one fact that the inner world, as compared with the external, is so unique, has such contradictory primary forms and laws of action, that it can never be considered as a mere copy, or a parallel, provided that its specific content in general receives proper attention. Throughout the one world we find a juxtaposition and a composition; in the other, a coexistence and an intrinsic union: in the one, in a given system, all change coming from without; in the other, a designed endeavor, which in the course of its development obtains independence and subjectivity: in the one, everything is in quantitative gradations; in the other, even in the lowest forms, there are unmistakable sensations of contrast.† How can we simply unite together what is so different? It is not, then, enough to attach mind incidentally to matter, but the meaning of its sphere must be altered, if Monism is to receive a philosophical character.

Such a demand can not be avoided by supposing that the mental sphere is possibly small, and almost vanishing; for, in all its variations, there always remains something unique, which uniformly pervades all its forms. Such a treatment of the subject is to be judged as we judge that of many Materialists, when they, by an exactly inverse process, take sensation in the most subtle way possible, and at last transpose deli-

* We are not contradicted by the fact that individual investigators have obtained a deeper apprehension of Monism: in the general tendency which we are considering, the development, as explained, is predominant.

† The Pythagoreans called the soul ἀριθμὸς ἑαυτὸν αὔξων.

cate sensation into thought: the difference may be diminished so far as the imagination is concerned, but it is unshaken as regards the concept itself. The leap from mind to matter is as great as is that from matter to mind; mind remains for this stage of the discussion, according to Schelling's expression, uniformly an "eternal island."

Nor, in this connection, do we intend to surrender the recognition of the specific meaning of the higher forms of thought. The fact that, in general, mental life can soar to such a subjectivity and fullness of power as is practically the case with mankind—that alone is enough to overthrow the naturalistic empirical form of Monism. However it may have been produced, to however many conditions it may be subjected, however much it may disappear into the universe when we try to consider it—still, if such thought-power has appeared at only one point, and in one element of the universal life, it would be decisive against a theory which makes mind a simple dependence upon the events of nature. The adjustment striven after is obtained in no case in such a way. For, if the laws of mechanical events are, to the exclusion of all others, recognized as the laws of the universe, all is practically yielded which Materialism can demand. For the thing to be done is not to make for mind a place in the world, but to bring it into recognition in the forms of its life and action. If these forms are abandoned, the one member of the antithesis is simply sacrificed to the other.

But, further, if consciousness and sensation (taken in the widest sense) are added to matter, as to something extended and moved, we may well ask whether the possibility of this addition is so simple. Attributes

can not be glued together at pleasure; for they may be contradictory in the form in which they are presented, or, at least, they may resist an immediate union, so that a transformation by philosophical labor would be necessary.

Yet we are met by the objection that the question is not if the concepts seem to us to be contradictory or harmonious, since experience shows the fact of the union; and one raises perhaps, with Lichtenberg (i. 54), the query, "Can we infer that what in our opinion can not happen through things which we know must happen through things other than those which we know?" We answer, By no means; but they must happen through things in another sense, and with a different determination from that in which they are first presented to us. The concepts of consciousness and extension have no settled meaning outside of thought, but are the products of thought; and it is only a self-criticism if, in the progress of knowledge, the first form of them is changed—a self-criticism which is employed only for the purpose of arriving at the actual facts. This whole problem, which since the time of Descartes has given abundant occupation to the greatest thinkers, the problem of the relation and the apparent contradiction of effects as produced in extension and as produced in consciousness—has this problem to-day suddenly disappeared, or do we perhaps pass over the rocks because our ship draws less water?

In our judgment, if the determinations of mind and of matter remain so peacefully in juxtaposition, we accept again the Dualism which was to be removed, only it is transferred from the phenomenon to the concept, and so to the place where it is the least endurable

for philosophic thought.* In either case, we must give up the whole doctrine of the categories held in modern philosophy—which is also the foundation of exact natural science—if we admit such a concept of a being with two radically different forces. In brief, to receive the characteristic of consciousness, the concept of matter must be essentially changed; but in that case we should find ourselves again referred to metaphysics.

In this connection, moreover, the extent of this monistic theory starts a doubt. By what right is sensation attributed to all matter? Hardly from any reasons furnished by natural science; while, from a philosophical standpoint, the subject would have to be treated in a wholly different manner. And what remains of the mind in such an application beyond the province of life? If anything at all, it is a certain analogy with sensation, so that we should arrive again at the "conformable to the soul" of Paracelsus. But by what right can we assume such a concept as a fact? and what does such a concept accomplish in scientific investigation? We might not blame the liberality of the scientist who gives a soul to everything material, so long as that exerts no influence upon his explanation of physical phenomena; but of what use, then, is such an assumption of a soul? But the physicist and the metaphysician alike are compelled to be on their guard against any such influence: the former, because he would find the first principles of his exact science endangered; the latter, because he is compelled to discuss the question from a different standpoint, in different methods, and with different aims.

In brief, we confess that in this form of Monism we

* We are reminded here of the sentence: *τὸ ἐπανόρθωμά σοι μεῖζον ἁμάρτημα ἔχει ἢ ὁ ἐπανορθοῖς* (Plato, "Protag.," 340 D).

find too many questions neglected and unanswered, to be able to expect that it will be of much service in advancing our knowledge of the world. It has not touched the question of ultimate principles; it has not established the specific determination of mental existence; and within its own doctrines there appears a vacillation between physics and metaphysics, which is nowhere of advantage. It in no way touches upon the certitude or the significance of those exact investigations which serve as the starting-point of its Monism. The strength and value of the entire tendency are found in its explanation of empirical events, and in its calling attention to the problems which spring from them. Here this tendency undoubtedly has an important and a difficult task to work out. But the way in which its results are realized philosophically, and the way in which it transforms phenomena into ultimate truths, must, as we have seen, challenge contradiction. For, in place of a thorough and comprehensive elaboration, we see what, philosophically considered, is a hasty and superficial treatment. A building is erected without sufficiently testing its foundation; a synthesis is attempted before the analysis is finished; individual phenomena are suddenly bound together before the justification and condition of such a union are shown. By an arbitrary assertion is solved the ancient problem in which so many and so various considerations meet.

But many dangers follow at the heels of such boldness. The result of doubtful hypotheses appears with the claim of being exact science; specific theories serve as actually decisive, where very divergent interpretations are still possible; but, above all, that is confused which it is equally important to philosophy and to natural science to keep distinctly separate—that is, em-

pirical certainty and philosophical interpretation. The wish seems to be a justifiable one, that the step from experience to metaphysics either should not be made at all, or should be wholly made; for, by the confusion of concepts which thus arises, half-executed aims have always done more injury than real errors: *veritas potius emergit ex errore quam ex confusione.*

LAW.

"To know that one knows what he knows, and to know that one does not know what he does not know—lo! that is true wisdom."—CONFUCIUS.

IN its historical development, the expression "law" passes over from the sphere of human action into that of events in nature, obtains there a new and sharply defined significance, and in this new meaning strives to extend itself in all directions.

We find the expression "law of nature" occurring quite early in Greek philosophy (for example, in Plato, "Timæus," 83 E: *οἱ τῆς φύσεως νόμοι*), but it does not seem to have come into universal use. We often meet, to be sure, the phrase *ὁ φύσεως νόμος*, but it means nothing more than the mere contrary of positive right (*ὁ γραπτὸς νόμος*). The expression is first correctly employed in Latin literature. Lucretius speaks of *fœdera naturæ*, *fœdus naturæ*,* and, in the same connection, of *leges naturæ* as well, and the latter phrase quickly became naturalized, and was permanently established, almost without being called in question. Since, moreover, the elements of human society offer an analogy to the events of the natural universe, such

* *Fœdera naturæ*, i. 586, ii. 302, v. 310; *fœdus naturæ*, v. 924, vi. 906; *fœdus* and *leges* together, v. 57 *et seq.* Virgil, also, thus combines *leges* and *fœdera*.

events are apparently brought much nearer to our understanding by the use of this term.

If, in this concept, the perception of the uniformity of events and of the persistence of consequent phenomena is occasioned by something external to the mind, then "law" asserts incomparably more than it does when not thus referred to an external source; for, in this case, every event is taken as dependent and determined, and each one is brought into a comprehensive connection with other events. Things in juxtaposition appear to be intrinsically united, and that which is transient is judged to be the representative of some permanent substance, so that everything is regarded in a measure as a function of the whole. Yet, since this is in no way given by experience, but can arise only from thought, there lies at the basis of the concept of law an original judgment; also, a postulate which is common to all times and to all thinkers. Yet at this point the activity of the reason admits of very different productions, and every independent thinker has his own concept and use of law, so that a rich historical development is displayed to us in the course of the discussion.

As the term law was not, as we have seen, in general use among the Greeks, the meaning of the concept itself is of all the greater significance in their cosmology.* From the fact that they regarded the universe as a whole, and events as a connected process, and, moreover, defined these events as the manifestation of an eternal and essentially immutable Being, it followed that every individual object must be encompassed and ruled by a necessity with fixed principles. As, in the popular belief, Fate was superior to the gods, so, to sci-

* The concept of law appears most prominently in the Stoical system, where its consequences are first fully developed.

entific thought, the process was superior to the fact, nature to free action. Law, accordingly, is to them something immanent in the world, depending immediately upon the nature of things. Yet in all this there can be no question of a legitimate conception of nature in the sense of modern science. Aside from all the hindrances arising from the condition of the special sciences, there were two general reasons which opposed the formation of such a concept: the synthetic apprehension of nature, which did not penetrate to the smallest forces and to the original forms of action;* and the organic doctrine of the Cosmos, which was inclined to attribute to every element a specific significance, and so to exclude a complete uniformity and harmony in particular events. It is not a matter of accident that in the system of Aristotle, where both of these tendencies find their classic expression, a definite concept of a law of nature has so little prominence. In his system there is no discussion of laws which uniformly regulate all events, no thought of mathematical formulation; and the influence of the Platonic Dualism is seen in the fact that the investigator is not rarely contented if his norms are only approximately satisfactory.

In Christianity the concept of law obtained an entirely different position. Since events receive here an ethico-religious meaning, the free creating act takes the place of the process, and, with the idea of the causal necessity of events, that of their conformity to law is

* How unattainable the problem seemed to the Greeks, which modern physics has practically solved in its own province, is shown in Plato, "Timæus," 68 D: *εἰ δέ τις τούτων ἔργῳ σκοπούμενος βάσανον λαμβάνοι, τὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ θείας φύσεως ἠγνοηκὼς ἂν εἴη διάφορον, ὅτι θεὸς μὲν τὰ πολλὰ εἰς ἓν ξυγκεραννύναι καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς πολλὰ διαλύειν ἱκανῶς ἐπιστάμενος ἅμα καὶ δυνατός, ἀνθρώπων δὲ οὐδεὶς οὐδέτερα τούτων ἱκανὸς οὔτε ἔστι νῦν οὔτ' εἰσαῦθίς ποτ' ἔσται.*

given up. Consistently with this, it has been constantly considered offensive within the pale of Christianity to refer to fixed laws the decisive facts in the fate of the world—creation, the fall, salvation, the final judgment; and wherever this attempt has been made, from the insatiable thirst for causal conception, it has been rejected as a presumptuous undertaking. Luther can not be zealous enough against his "enthusiastic" and "devilish" "*Why*"; and, although he does not explicitly confess it, the passionate vehemence of this zeal shows us sufficiently how hard it was for him to reject the claims of rational knowledge. In fact, the conflict did not arise strictly from this, that the act of free will in general preceded the law; for, if it were referred to the world as a totality, and understood as intrinsically penetrating it, then a causal and intrinsic connection could very easily be maintained; but the power of will was supposed to be something which intruded itself into the world, interfered with its forms, and altered the course of events, and in this way not only was the connection of things destroyed, but also the essential nature and intrinsic property of law were given up. Understood strictly, the laws of nature seem to be the mere custom of the divine action; and, after their originality and intrinsic nature are thus destroyed, we can no longer be surprised at exceptions to them in the service of higher aims. But the admission of such exceptions, as they are allowed in the common notion of miracles, shows the positive and contingent character of the laws of nature in a form so uncouth that all modern science is necessarily compelled to take up the contest at this point.

The science of our own day stands especially firm in the position that thought deals only with a definite-

ly limited world; wherefore, every encroachment from without is to be repelled. The significance of the forms and connections of events must be greatly increased in importance by the principle that we everywhere apprehend only an action, and that the essence of a thing is exhausted in its action. But most important of all is the doctrine that the phenomenal world forms a result of simple forces, and is to be conceived as such a result, because from that springs the demand to discover the original and pervasive forms of those forces, to establish them most carefully, and then to use them, in the interpretation of varying events. But, since these original forms of action are nothing else than the laws of the phenomenal world, the investigation of them is a prominent problem, in fact, the decisive problem of knowledge. The law is the point to which analysis points, and from which development proceeds, and so is properly the central point of science. Only by law is the phenomenal reduced to an essential world, and only by law are its heterogeneous elements bound together in unity and connection. The demand of modern science that what is heterogeneous be regarded as a system is thus satisfied, since every individual is presented as an expression of laws, and the laws themselves are arranged after a comprehensive unity. Hence we can say that what were ideas for Plato are laws for modern cosmology.

With such a transformation of principles, the relation of law to the particular event is also changed. Laws are not rules according to which individuals are regulated only in the mass or in the whole; they do not work on or near some matter which is thus conditioned or limited, but they express immediately and absolutely the form of action in every individual as well as in the

whole, so that there can remain not the least residuum unexplained.* We find, then, the antithesis of universal and particular changed into that of original and derived. Thoughtful minds, even before the culmination of modern philosophy, unanimously opposed that idea of the universal which regarded it as something which is obtained by abstraction from the particular, and which finds its verification in its contrast with the particular: they supposed, rather, that something is proved to exist which acts in all things and takes them up wholly into itself. While thus, in the doctrine of method, the antithesis of analysis and synthesis appears in the place of that of induction and deduction, in a rigorous application of principles the concept of law asserts an important demand—the demand for a definite formula; since in that way only is it possible to subject what is heterogeneous to the original forms of action, and to properly conceive of what is given in the phenomenon.

It was a natural result of all this, that philosophers valued this concept most highly, although they strangely neglected the reflective consideration of it. After Descartes had brought out the modern theory as the result of his investigation, and especially after he had demonstrated the safety of the modern way of forming the concept of law by his proof of simple primary forces with established forms of action, the subject was taken up by Spinoza, who, with the greatest energy, defended the principles involved in the significance of the modern concept as opposed to the ancient principles. For Leibnitz, however, can be claimed the merit of having extended the concept the furthest, of having

* This appears in Nicolaus Cusanus in the ever-recurring demand for *præcisio*.

defended it in the province of mind by recognizing it as specifically belonging there, and also of having finally vindicated it as applied to individual forces. Since to him the prominent characteristics of law were its essentiality and originality, the decisive matter was not the determination of its extent, but the individual, as well as the group, so far as it was considered not simply as phenomenal and composite, but as essential and simple, could possess its own unique forms of action. It is, in general, a result of the whole position of law in modern science, that its extension and limitation depend upon the judgment formed of what is ultimately essential in beings and phenomena.

The carrying out of the concept of law marks the progress of modern investigation, in the course of which that general principle, the truth and significance of which became fully evident in the seventeenth century, has only gradually worked its way into the particular departments of science,* and still continually imposes new claims upon us. To realize what has been already found, to discover new applications, to unite what is apparently diverse, to give direction toward an ultimate goal—all this continually furnishes to investigation new and ever-increasing tasks

Yet it would have been a peculiar occurrence if so important and productive a concept did not give rise in turn to new problems, and if it were not exposed to many misunderstandings. The latter were suggested from the first by the expression itself. There is no doubt but that the term "law" is not adapted to the concept as employed in modern science. It may properly denote the exclusion of what is arbitrary from events,

* We need think only of the sphere of organic life, the border-land of physics and psychology, linguistics, etc.

but its originality and essentiality are not brought out, and its necessity is defectively expressed. For law seems to be a principle prepared before and superior to the individual, to which each particular event must be reconciled; while, as a matter of fact, it is only something which is in the individual, and which represents the peculiar nature of that individual. The idea of a necessity coming from outside, that is, of a compulsion, does not enter into the question at all, so that the usual uncouth opposition of law and freedom (in the sense of internal independence) is shown to have originated in a confusion of concepts. But, in the great whole, law is something immanent in the world, manifesting itself in and with it, not over and before it. It stands neither in the relation of the universal to the particular nor as the precedent to what succeeds it in time; but, out of time relations, it acts in all and through all. Accordingly, law is valid only as the form of what actually happens, not as that of what should be. It either acts simply out from the substance or not at all, while every intermediate opinion demonstrates the error of the attempt to isolate from each other the particular and the universal. And this error is increased and confirmed by the term "law," which always hints at the analogy of its relations in the sphere of its practical application.

We notice such misunderstandings in the transitional period. Law seems to be a power acting above the world, independently of things, and is judged to be something existing absolutely; it is, even, almost personified, and made an object of devout reverence. Giordano Bruno wished to found a sort of religion on the laws of nature;* the system of Spinoza is ruled by a

* See, for example, "De Universo et Immenso," 653. The Highest should be sought: "In inviolabili intemerabilique naturæ lege, in bene ad eandem legem instituti animi religione," etc.

similar principle; and even in the present day the laws of nature are often faithfully esteemed as a Deity. Especially is a principle of action often derived from simple events, which principle would be possible only by reading a will-power into those events.

As opposed to all this, we must remember that not only the entire meaning of law, but also the form of conformity to law, externally considered, can be presented only as a matter of fact, and not as something necessary. To be sure, we can not stop with that; but a deeper concept can be attained only as the position of reason in the world is recognized. And yet those very persons are accustomed to attribute the highest degree of reality to the concept of law who are the least able to justify its significance.

Moreover, all knowledge is limited by laws, so far as the power of which they constitute the forms of action must be continually presupposed, so that this whole explanation retains in the final analysis a hypothetical character. The question how far we can demand that the primary conditions of the power of knowledge be included in the explanation may receive different answers, according to the different spheres and objects of the investigation; but this limit can never be forgotten. Fichte (v. 108) has insisted with reason on the difference between an explanation according to the laws of nature and an explanation beyond the laws of nature; but, in spite of all warning, the confusion has ever increased. In the most different realms, as ethics, sociology, æsthetics, etc., the pervasive and essential form is often taken as the equivalent of the ultimate explanation of the thing: what is continually manifested in definite forms is supposed to exhaust itself in those forms. As is usually the case,

popular thought intensifies the one-sidedness of science into a positive error, so that to the popular judgment the act of obtaining a formula seems to solve the ultimate problems, and the question of essential power especially is kept in the background. Although the knowledge of a law may be sufficient to give us control over things in nature, where it can be considered as something given and persistent, yet in the sphere of mind the most difficult problem lies in the exertion of the power itself.

While the concept of law thus introduces many questions, we sometimes forget, on the other side, that the concept itself involves a difficult problem, which investigation can solve only by gradual approaches. For the idea of the legitimacy of all events, that is, of the capacity of all phenomena to be reduced to the original forms of action of primary forces, is one thing; the knowledge of the exact definition of these forms of action is another. For this, both the penetration to something primary and the presentation of a regulative formula are indispensable. The exact conception of all heterogeneity as an expression of universal law naturally attracts us here as the highest aim; yet, if we approach this only in the most gradual way, we can not in the least avoid the demand that we arrive at the simplest elements in the single provinces of science, and in no case can a purely empirical union or sequence of perhaps highly developed phenomena appropriate to itself the concept of law. Since the investigation has to pass through various stages here, it is of special importance that we continually strike a balance between claims and results.

All these difficulties and problems are magnified by the fact that this question also involves a Dualism in the modern idea of the world, since a legitimate con-

ception of the universe is striven after from the standpoint of mind as well as of nature. From the former standpoint the world seems to be produced by the creative activity of mind; everything heterogeneous presents itself as a stage in a mental process; law determines the direction of this process, and so is, to use the not very appropriate phrase, a law of development. Such a principle, which stands in connection with many points in the earlier periods of the discussion, was clearly outlined by Nicolaus Cusanus, but reached its culmination in the system of Hegel, where, in the dialectic method, it obtained a comprehensive formula.

This school has especially determined the interpretation of the intellectual life, and has obtained a general influence so far as it has everywhere furnished an estimate of the value of the concept of law regarded as a constructive principle. In this system, where the reason as a formative and measuring principle took precedence of the world, the concept of law could in its general bearing be strictly justified. But, in the concrete application, there was unquestionably more use made of the concept of law as constructed by and borrowed from natural science. According to the fundamental idea of science, innumerable simple and similar particular powers are given in juxtaposition in the coexistence of things in the world. Their forms of action are uniformly valid in time and space, or, rather, are free from time and space relations, for which reason it is asserted, not simply, as before, that under similar circumstances a like result uniformly follows, but also that this similarity of circumstances pervades the universe. The apparent heterogeneity of phenomena falls in with this view, for it is conceived as a compound, and is resolved into its elements. To render possible the carrying out

of such principles, the ancient organic idea of nature was compelled to give way to a mechanical idea, in which all coexistence was regarded as composition.

Closely connected with this is the fact that the formula of law was here determined as specifically mathematical, which, of course, is possible only under the condition that all the heterogeneity in the events of nature is not only assumed but fully proved to be reducible to purely quantitative distinctions. This view was advocated by Roger Bacon; still Nicolaus Cusanus held that a definite judgment of the mathematical relations of the universe was absolutely unattainable; and only Kepler and Galileo had maintained the laws of nature in a strict sense up to the time when Newton was able to regard such a principle as the final result of the contest concerning this subject in the seventeenth century: *missis formis substantialibus et qualitatibus occultis phœnomena naturæ ad leges mathematicas revocare.*

But, with the maintenance of such an aim, it was necessary to change the whole method of investigating nature. Especially was it necessary to change the concepts of what is phenomenally presented to us, in order to be able to regard it as an expression of a single power; and so the mathematical conception of nature is most closely connected with an analytically systematic philosophy.*

But, then, the investigation encountered new and serious problems at every point. What we usually call the exact † character of modern natural science rests espe-

* This is especially evident in Descartes.

† The expression "exact" was often used in the middle ages, and especially in the transitional period. In its modern use, it has come to us from France.

cially on this mathematical determination of knowledge. The individual is here so completely taken up into the law that it can serve purely as an illustration of the application of that law, yet it thus receives a rare value in investigation as a means of establishing the law. The antithesis of particular and universal, so far as it is possible at all, has here become balanced; no universal stands by the side of the particular, and no particular outside of the universal; wherever we may be, we labor in the whole and for the whole, so that nothing is any longer small, and every point can extend itself to the Infinite. Accordingly, in certain respects, this kind of knowledge can be regarded as the culmination of scientific investigation, and of systematic conception in general.

Thus we see the concept of law always becoming more sharply expressed in its historical development, always predicating more definite presuppositions, always making greater demands upon investigation, yet, at the same time, branching out in different directions, and becoming specifically determined in different provinces of science. But, at the present time, all its different forms act together, and so produce varied confusion. The general concept of the legitimacy of events, the specific interpretation of our own day, and the more precise definitions involved in this interpretation are woven together, in the modern use of the term, into an almost inseparable texture.

Already in the seventeenth century, in the province of natural science, the concept of law was extended far beyond the sphere which it had safely won, yet, notwithstanding this, the scientists maintained the claims which are involved in the concept, and the only matter of doubt is their belief that they were so near the ful-

fillment of those claims. But, then, the concept came gradually into a looser use, not at first so much in the particular work of investigation as in the classification and use of its results, and to-day it is customary, especially with many of the followers of Darwin (not with Darwin himself), to apply the term law simply to empirically established connections of phenomena (laws of heredity, adaptation, etc.).

It seems, to be sure, pedantic to fight about words on such a point as this, but the danger involved here is so great as to justify the apparent pedantry.

In view of the extreme significance of the concept of law in modern investigation, every laxity in its use involves weighty consequences; the danger at once arises of confusing the problematical and the certain, the complex and the simple phenomenon and explanation, and so regarding as completed something which is still in the process of conception, and thus disfiguring the entire condition of science. The name "law" seems to cause a most remarkable blindness at this point, and to beat down the best-founded doubts, as if law acted here in that position of authority which it occupies in the sphere of practical life. It has often been noticed that the assumption of false facts restrains the advance of the sciences far more than does the assertion of false theories, but most injurious of all is the influence of a false assertion of laws, since in that case both the reliability of the facts and the extension of the theory are involved.

Further confusion arose from the fact that the specific meaning of the concept "law of nature" was presented as typical of the concept of law in general, and so the task of scientific work in the other provinces was determined in just the same way as in that of the in-

vestigation of nature. Significant of such a tendency is the endeavor to raise mathematics to the position of instrument of each and every kind of knowledge, and even to make logic dependent upon it. We can trace out here a steady progress from Roger Bacon, through Nicolaus Cusanus, Kepler, and Hobbes, to Leibnitz. What was expressed in outline by Bacon * and Nicolaus Cusanus is more fully developed by Kepler † and Hobbes, ‡ and is carried out by Leibnitz, with a clear consciousness of all its conditions and consequences. He endeavored to conceive of all things heterogeneous and apparently contradictory as gradations in a series; and, where an accommodation seemed impossible, he preferred to take refuge in the help of the concept of the infinite § rather than to allow the essential principle to be overthrown. And, as he, moreover, carries the the idea out into that of a universal primary force, and reduces all difference to a degree of the development of the idea, so it seems possible to transform philosophy into a system of mathematics, like that which was the foundation of his theory of a mathematically characteristic language. This bold undertaking stopped with the Leibnitzian philosophy, but this did not put an end to the influence of its essential principle upon particular sciences.

* "Specula Mathematica," i. 2: "Omnia prædicamenta dependent ex cognitione quantitatis, de qua est mathematica, et ideo virtus tota logicæ dependet ex mathematica."

† I. 31: "Ut oculus ad colores, auris ad sonos, ita mens hominis non ad quævis, sed ad quanta intelligenda condita est." For the reduction of thought-activity to mathematical operations see viii. 157 *et seq.* These passages are the expression of a theory on which Kepler's whole philosophical system rests.

‡ See "Leviathan," chapter v.

§ The contradictions disappear, as soon as one member is taken as infinite, and especially, as usual with Leibnitz, as infinitely small.

To arrive at laws by the method peculiar to the laws of matter still seems to many to be the highest goal, though it must, first of all, be determined that the establishment of such a goal is permitted by the nature of the realm of knowledge concerned. If it were certain that phenomena can be viewed everywhere as complex, and be completely resolved into their single elements, that what is given can be regarded as a system of persistent forces, that all distinctions are in ultimate analysis quantitative, and if we could hope to be able to establish all this empirically, then it would, indeed, be a problem to strive after the laws peculiar to nature. But where the conditions are not fulfilled, or, at least, are not yet established to our satisfaction, or where they imply still other conditions, the labor involved will not have its corresponding result. Although single provinces adjacent to mind and matter may have been found to admit of such treatment better than was formerly supposed, the attempts to carry it over into that which belongs specifically to the soul do not seem to us to have overcome in any way the doubts concerning the principles involved.

We can admit many doubts on this point, without on that account calling into question in any way the strict legitimacy of all mental events;* the only question is, whether the specific meaning of a law of nature applies, and, also, whether even the general idea of the modern concept of law satisfies the peculiarities here presented. For, although the concept of law is based upon an original and persistent action of the reason, the

* Especially is it improper to infer that we can know here only rules and not laws; for we mean by a rule that which marks a method and a stadium of our apprehension, while in real existence there are for science no rules, but only laws.

definite historical interpretations of the concept can not be relied upon, since they arise from a specific theory of the world, and are valid no further than they admit of confirmation; and so, being still open to question, they can not resist a sufficiently established supplement, or any additions or changes in their meanings, resulting from a broader cosmic theory. We must also maintain here the principle that the whole method of modern science is not something self-evident and exclusively true, but only one among other possible methods.

The outlines of these problems and difficulties, which the concept of law brings with it into the realm of psychology, appear prominently in the application of the concept to the individual; but, in society and history in general, the difficulties are increased by further combinations and complications. It is here, too, necessary that the general principle of legitimate occurrence should be rendered valid, and this involves a not unimportant advance, but the distance from this principle to the discovery of definite laws of social and historical action, in any proper sense of the word "law," is peculiarly great. In the combined action of many forces, groups of phenomena may appear, which admit of a separate and relatively definite establishment. But, as soon as the attention is directed to the living whole and to the ultimate causes, the difficulties increase so as to exclude at the outset all thought of the formulation of laws.

When, in particular, the sphere of social life is subjected to an examination which seeks to discover its laws, the outlook is essentially changed by the assertion of this purpose, and both the problem and the object of the investigation have everywhere an increased impor-

tance; yet the perception that, even in what at first appears contingent and arbitrary, an astonishing uniformity is to be discovered, that apparently independent occurrences are permanently connected, and that, throughout, constancy increases with the extension of the sphere of observation—this perception seems to have almost intoxicated many an investigator. Purely empirical data are announced as necessary truths, extremely complex events as simple primary forms, the average as something belonging in essence to each individual. The concept of law lies everywhere ready to be applied; and not rarely, in an uncircumspect prosecution of single series of considerations, definite formulæ are asserted with a boldness which can hardly be explained except by the proverb *in rebus dubiis plurima est audacia.* There is less occasion to examine more closely the various errors into which such attempts, and particularly the so-called law of averages, have led, because the matter, in its scientific aspects, has been presented with perfect justice by prominent scientists;* but, unaffected by that, the errors continue in popular thought, and carry with them serious dangers.

In the other realms of mental science, the use of the comparative method, especially, gives occasion to many doubts. Since the beginning of the modern era, that method has been of the greatest service to the knowledge of law, from the fact that by stripping off what is contingent and bringing into prominence what is persistent, it has contributed, as nothing else could, to the discovery of primary forms. Especially where the application of a law of nature is established do we

* See, for example, Rümelin, "Concerning the Concept of a Social Law"; and Lexis, "On the Theory of Groups of Phenomena."

see the method of comparison at once employed, so that it would be an interesting task to follow out its gradual extension. Yet the question arises, whether that which it can furnish has perhaps anything more than a coördinate significance in the realm of pure mind, or can be justified in its claims, except by the fulfillment of certain conditions. For it is a matter of no little difficulty here to mark out the field of what in general can be compared, as distinct from what is only apparently comparable. To be sure, many a man boldly begins to compare without having clearly understood what should properly be compared; but the fact is, that every particular formation stands in connection with a coexistence of events, from which it must be freed, before its value can be estimated, and before it can be used in an actual explanation. In the way in which the individual is presented to us, an external harmony can very easily have proceeded from wholly different elements; and, conversely, apparent divergence can have an internal and essential connection. The mere prominence of a common element is not enough, in this case, to maintain simple primary forms; rather is an exhaustive analysis essential, which demands a constantly attendant systematic thought-process. Only as this is done can the production of new material really advance our knowledge; only then can we avoid the reproach of directing the attention to the abundance of what is external, for the purpose of avoiding the descent into the depths.

But in this respect, as in the others, the lax use of the concept of law is less the fault of the investigations in special sciences than of the superficial composition and employment of the results of such investigations, for in the former the pervading error is quickly discov-

ered, and the problem is presented in its purity; in the latter the confusion takes firm root; that which is the highest aim is suddenly removed from us: and thus it happens that we often deal the more boldly with the concept of law the further away we are from real things.

DEVELOPMENT.

Δεῖ δὲ μὴ λεληθέναι πότερον προσήκει λέγειν, πῶς ἕκαστον γίνεσθαι πέφυκε μᾶλλον ἢ πῶς ἔστιν.—ARISTOTLE.

THE consideration of the concept of development is involved in almost insuperable difficulties. It seems of course undeniable that mankind can be conceived of as sharing in a historical development; we gladly and easily believe in a continual progress; and then our glance turns to the universe, and it does not seem overbold to exhibit here, too, an advance. But how many problems does such a principle involve if it is to be precisely determined, scientifically carried out, and philosophically justified! The most different kinds of influences act upon the elements which determine the methods of treatment: rational postulates and special facts of knowledge, permanent tendencies and transitory moods, the whole influence of interests arising from each one's special work—all these coöperate to produce that which ultimately appears as judgment and conviction. But, since it would carry us far beyond the limits set to our investigation to even touch upon all this, we must content ourselves with bringing out some few points which are specially worthy of consideration because of their relations to the science of our day.

First let us, according to our custom, trace out the origin of the terms used. A definite term for develop-

ment was apparently first coined in modern philosophy, and the confidence with which the term was employed from the outset marks the significance of the concept contained in it. *Explicatio*, in the philosophical sense of a real, not simply of a logical, development, is a favorite phrase with Nicolaus Cusanus: its contrary is *complicatio*, for which Giordano Bruno, the pupil of Nicolaus, usually substitutes *implicatio*. In Nicolaus we find also, as an equivalent phrase, the word *evolutio*, though it is much less often used. It probably appears in his writings for the first time employed in this sense.* Kepler was the first to use *evolvi* for the development of ideas.† Leibnitz makes an antithesis between *evolutio* and *involutio:* in his French writings he generally employs *enveloppement* and *developpement*. After Wolff had established the doctrine of Epigenesis in his "Theoria Generationis," evolution became the specific term for the theory of the inclosed germ in generation.

Auswicklung and *sich auswickeln* first meet us, in philosophic use, in Jacob Böhme:‡ according to Grimm, *entwickeln* occurred first in Stieler.§ Baum-

* I. 89 a: "Linea est puncti evolutio. Quomodo intelligis lineam puncti evolutionem? Evolutionem id est explicationem." Elsewhere *complicatio* is used in connection with *replicatio;* further, *involutus* and *convolutus* are used by Scotus Erigena. In the logical sense the antithesis of *involvere* and *evolvere* is found in the classic Latin writers (see Cicero, Top. 9: "Tum definitio adhibetur quæ quasi involutum evolvit id de quo quæritur").

† V. 229: "Sensiones perceptionesque aliæ naturales—opus habent motu, quo intercedente omnia, quæ quantitatis causa confusæ essent, per tempora succedentia evolvantur, ut singula sola sensibus accidant."

‡ The most significant passages are found in the eighth chapter of the book on Election.

§ Stieler, "Genealogy of the German Language," 2530, adduces, after *Auswickeln* (*involutum evolvere*), *Herauswickeln* (*expedire se*), and then adds, *Entwickeln idem est.*

garten speaks of an *entwickelt-* and *eingewickeltwerden* of ideas: in general, the active signification is at first predominant, and especially do we often find the development (*entwicklung*) of a concept, of a proof, of a dogma, etc., spoken of. The equivalent employment of the term, in our use, I can show first in wider extent in the earlier writings of Kant: he seems, in fact, to employ *auswicklung* more frequently than *entwicklung;* yet he prefers *entwickeln*, and also *sich entwickeln* (see i. 212). Through Herder, who used the word purposely and from preference, and Tetens, who first employed it as the title of a book,* it came into the common speech, and in the nineteenth century it has been extended so far that it is nearly worn out; and, outside of certain definite spheres, it has become almost unfit for use.

Yet there is no doubt but that the expression, taken in a strict sense, does not at all correspond to the concept which the modern era would have it denote. For, in "development," the thought is practically that of something endowed from the beginning with determined properties and powers, so that what comes later unfolds itself as from an organic germ. Hence it was entirely proper that in the times when the sense of the word was still more clearly conceived, an involution (*einwicklung*) was opposed to the evolution (*entwicklung*, *auswicklung*). But the philosophy of our own day does not wish to understand the specific formation as something already furnished, or the event as a mere expansion; but the formation is supposed to be constructed originally and ultimately in the process itself. The "development" in this sense constitutes the connecting link between the material substance as presented

* His chief work is entitled "Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwickelung," 1777.

to us and the simple primary forces, and renders it possible to understand the former from the latter.

Such a theory has, of course, only gradually been carried out in full: the earlier expressions and forms of principles are closely connected with the modern ones, and, even where they do not limit them, they still act as disturbing influences.* The idea, which we can not lay aside, always pressed in, as if that which is produced had been present beforehand in some concealed way;† in brief, the pure forms of the principle force their way out only slowly; yet they are undoubtedly the impulsive force in the process, and they determine especially the distinctive feature of our scientific methods.

The genetic method is certainly, in its general meaning, nothing new, for it was used by Greek thinkers of all schools; and, especially by Aristotle, was highly esteemed for the significance of the principles involved.‡ Aristotle's "Politics" and the treatise on

* This is especially true of Leibnitz, who, in the matter of external forms, is clearly related to the past, although a correct presentation of his concept of the principle is enough to cause him to appear in a different light. How little justice there is in the ordinary criticisms upon his doctrine of development is seen in the fact that he was the first to present the possibility of the single origin of the different species of a genus (317 a): "Peut-être que dans quelque tems ou dans quelque lieu de l'univers les espèces des animaux sont ou étaient ou seront plus sujets à changer, qu'elles ne sont présentement parmi nous, et plusieurs animaux qui ont quelque chose du chat, comme le lion, le tigre, et le lynx, pourraient avoir été d'une même race et pourront être maintenant comme de sousdivisions nouvelles de l'ancienne espèce des chats."

† See Goethe, 23, 269: "The concept of production is wholly denied to us: for, when we see anything become, we think that it was already there. In this way the system of evolution becomes conceivable to us."

‡ See "Polit." 1252 a, 24: Εἰ δή τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα βλέψειεν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστ' ἂν οὕτω θεωρήσειεν. He demands genetically-causal definitions, "De Anima," 413 a, 13: Οἱ μόνον τὸ ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὁριστικὸν λόγον δηλοῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐνυπάρχειν καὶ ἐμφαίνεσθαι, *et seq.*

the production of animals can be regarded as good illustrations of the ancient genetic method. But just here the essential difference between that and the method of modern science becomes clearly apparent. Adhering to the Platonic theory, it was held that existence precedes the becoming; the type is present originally and out of time relations, and, from the beginning, limits the formation;* the whole precedes the parts, and the higher degree, as the normal, explains the lower, which serves as something restrained, which has not yet forced its way through to pure form.

To such a theory the later antiquity, the earlier Christian era, and the middle ages held firmly, so far as they concerned themselves at all with the problem as a part of a speculative system.† There was in fact no lack of divergent opinions: in the middle ages Abelard is especially noteworthy for the assertion of the proposition that everything simple is from its nature earlier than the complex;‡ noteworthy, too, for the consequences which he derived from it, as affecting

* See especially "De Part. Anima." 640 a, 18: *ἡ γένεσις ἕνεκα τῆς οὐσίας ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ οὐσία ἕνεκα τῆς γενέσεως.* B. 1: *ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τοιοῦτον, τὴν γένεσιν ὧδὶ καὶ τοιαύτην συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον.*

† Among the Church Fathers, Augustine especially paid critical attention to this: he compares (and was perhaps the first to do so) all the events of the world to the development of a tree. See iii. 148 d. Lactantius, on the other hand, defends the ordinary orthodox theory when he says ("Institut." ii. 2): "Nihil potest esse in hoc mundo quod non sic permaneat ut cœpit." The idea that the higher is the original aim of a development, and so forms the measure for the lower, appears especially prominent in the Platonizing and mystical philosophers. See Eckhart, 104, 32: "Alles kornes nâtûre meinet weizen, alles schatzes nâtûre golt, alliu geberunge meinet mensche." As regards the consequences of this to the doctrine of knowledge, compare Boëthius, "De Cons. Philos.," v. 131.

‡ "Dialogus inter Philos.," etc., chap. 4: "Omne simplicius naturaliter prius est multipliciori."

the historico-philosophical theory of Ethics and Religion.

But only after modern philosophy had placed action before existence did it become possible to recognize, and everywhere to apply, as the chief method, that which starts from the concept of becoming.* This shows the process of reducing phenomena which seem to be formed from simple forces to their elements, and so of making them conceivable. We arrive here at ultimate points which resist any further analysis; yet only those forces can be regarded as thus ultimate which are continually manifested as active, and the forms of action of which can be everywhere apprehended, and shown at every moment. That which is confused and mysterious thus disappears from the world, or is, at least, so far as possible, put into the background; in everything we recognize that which continually surrounds us. If history thus becomes a means of causal knowledge, it profits itself, since it strips off all that is strange and difficult to explain, permits us to find again that which is our own at all stages, and so comes within the reach of a systematic treatment. Since it is everywhere evident that "the old is new, and the new old," it seems as if the antithesis of historical and eternal, so far as it is at all possible, were here overcome.

Wherever such a method was carried over into any special science, it produced, of necessity, a comprehensive change. Things in juxtaposition came into inner

* Next to Spinoza, Tschirnhausen especially insisted on genetic definitions. See "Medic. Mentis," pp. 67, 68: "Omnis sane legitima seu bona definitio includet generationem." So far as the expression is concerned, genetic definitions were first spoken of in the school of Wolff (see Wolff, "Ontolog.," § 263 *et seq.*); in the last half of the last century (as by Herder) genetic seems to have been used for the real explanation of the process of becoming.

connection, and legitimate knowledge took possession of the entire realm of matter; what was phenomenally given appeared as a step in a progressive series of events, and the apparently dead wakened to full life.

Since the different primary tendencies of modern science thus find here their first verification and confirmation, the successful prosecution of the genetic method justly shows the victory of the specifically modern method of investigation. The physics of Descartes forms the first fully conscious and systematic attempt of this kind.* The method has, in general, agreeably to its nature, followed the path from the external to the internal, and from the great to the small. In the explanation of nature, it has known how to find the way from the cosmological and astronomical problems to the secrets of organic life; and in like manner, in the sphere of mind, it was first the more general formations which one sought to conceive from the process of becoming, until at last the individual elements also were included in the same method of consideration.†

But, the more this tendency was developed in the consideration of what is individual, the less prominent were its general presuppositions; so that finally that was regarded as self-evident which, nevertheless, rests

* Clauberg, "Op. Philos.," 755, aptly sums up the method employed by Descartes as follows: "Hanc methodum Cartesiana physica tenens—considerat omnes res naturales non statim quales sunt in statu perfectionis suæ absoluto (ut vulgo fieri solet ab aliis), sed prius agit de quibusdam earundem principiis valde simplicibus et facilibus, deinde explicat, quomodo paulatim ex illis principiis, suprema causa certis legibus opus dirigente, oriantur et fiant, aut certe oriri aut fieri possint, donec tandem tales evadant, quales esse experimur dum consummatæ et absolutæ sunt."

† See Beneke, "Pragm. Psychologie," 41: "Among the forms which we find in the perfected soul there is not a single one which had not become, and become through a long series of developments."

upon a specific theory of the world and of our relation to it. What is phenomenal must admit of simplification and reduction to primary forces; these forces must produce all formations in uniform methods of action; these formations must fall into a single series; and, moreover, all this process must be such that we can fully and completely apprehend it in the evident events of the world.

Yet all this taken together is not so self-evident, after all; but it needs special proof in each department of knowledge. It is by no means enough to point out some few developed forms, and to follow out from them an empirico-historical development; for it is not in the least determined that the beginning and the origin, the first appearance and the primary force, are the same; and just as little is it proved that the legitimate product appears in a pure form in the empirical event. For in the phenomena we have to recognize a coexistence; forces are given in perfectly definite combinations, in which they interpenetrate and intersect, limit and recondition, thus carrying out the results of preceding events, and accordingly forming a whole so intricate that the original production and the first appearance may be different, and the simple and essential elements in an event may be concealed way behind that which is given to us superficially. We may make use of the empirical occurrence as the starting-point of the investigation; but both the scientific precision of the investigation in general and the value of the genetic method would be most seriously shaken, if we should draw inferences from that empirical occurrence with no further tests, and should believe that we have formed concepts of things by the establishment of their sequences. By such an uncritical equalization of the superficial and

the ultimate nature of things, the most important tasks of modern science—penetrative analysis and discovery of law—would be seriously endangered. The mere knowledge and description of "development" should not so take possession of all sense and thought that we forget to ask, What, then, is developed, and how and into what it is developed?

Moreover, we should not overlook the fact that the genetic method, as it includes all the problems involved in the concept of development, can also be interpreted in all the different forms which development has assumed. In the motley variety of forms in our own day one contradiction is particularly prominent. On the one hand, the world is supposed to be produced from the original activity of one primary force, and everything individual to be legitimately determined by some unity; but, on the other hand, many forces acting in juxtaposition are assumed, only from the coexistence of which does any formation gradually acquire a distinct character. In the one case, the prominent thought is of a mental, in the other, of a material existence: in the one case, the process is from unity to multiplicity; in the other, from the simple to the complex: in the one case, we have a production from internal agency;* but in the other, a superposition of what is external:† in the one case, the chief means of carrying out the

* See Herder, "Ideas upon the Philosophy of History," v., 2; "—so, I think, we speak improperly, if we talk of germs which were only developed, or of an epigenesis, according to which the members increase by additions from external sources. It is a product (genesis), an action of internal forces, etc."

† This, of course, does not involve the assertion that no original and legitimate dispositions of things can be included in the superposition. In any case, the denial of this would give to the theory a much narrower meaning.

process is the antithesis involved; in the other, the process seems to be completed by a simple ascent.

Since the time of Nicolaus Cusanus, the former theory has been especially cultivated by speculative philosophy, and it culminated in Hegel, who found the production of all being in the development of the concept. The latter first appeared distinctly in Descartes,* and has attained a wide-spread influence, more recently, in a specific form, in the Darwinian theory. This theory has such control over modern thought that, in its popular sense, the doctrine of development is usually limited exclusively to it.

The term itself should be avoided as suggesting a confusion of concepts. For, if it is supposed to express the thought of anything definitely "developed," it is not strictly adapted to designate the modern doctrine of progressive formation, as we have seen. Moreover, if it is to be referred to one specific theory, the speculative appropriation of it would have a far earlier claim. But, in a Darwinian philosophy, there could be no discussion over a formation by internal forces, or a rigidly directed advance according to original tendencies.

It falls entirely without the province of this work

* Thus, he gives it very cautiously as his opinion ("Princ. Philos.," iii. 58), that it is also possible to explain phenomena on the hypothesis of an original chaos: "Vix aliquid supponi potest, ex quo non idem effectus (quamquam fortasse operosius) per easdem naturæ leges deduci possit, cum enim illarum ope materia formas omnes quarum est capax, successive assumat, si formas istas ordine consideremus, tandem ad illam quæ est hujus mundi, poterimus devenire." Again ("De Methode," 24 and 25): "Ut sine ulla in creationis miraculum injuria credi possit, eo solo res omnes pure materiales cum tempore quales nunc esse videmus effici potuisse." Among other things, the significance attributed here to time is characteristic. Leibnitz decidedly opposed this (144), and because of it accused Descartes of Naturalism. See "Réfutation inédite de Spinoza," p. 48: "Spinoza incipit ubi Cartesius desinit; in naturalismo."

to discuss this theory in its practical bearings; yet the concepts involved in it, especially so far as they have a universal and philosophical validity, should not be passed over. The force of the doctrine, even for the consideration of pure concepts, lies unquestionably in the fact that it carries out to its legitimate consequences the principle of explaining any formation by the co-existence of forces. Such an attempt gives to natural science this great advantage, that the phenomena called in question can be tested and precisely established; while the assumption of inner powers introduces confusion in this field, and can not come within the reach of the principles of the modern philosophy of nature. So the theory has at the outset a presumption in its favor, since it allows more room than the others to the endeavor to obtain a knowledge of causes, and allies itself more easily with established principles; and the ordinary prejudices against it are to be rejected as resting, for the most part, on a bungling handling of consequences, which is not even scientific.

Yet the theory is, of course, subjected to all the limitations and dangers of the modern concept of development, and in some respects is subjected to them to a peculiarly great extent, on account of its peculiar outcome. The genetic explanation of our day is, as we have seen, of scientific value only so far as it establishes facts of causation. While the mere establishment of sequences and the description of consecutive occurrences may be a necessary precondition of knowledge, yet, if exclusively presented, they can hardly belong to strict science. But this danger is especially prominent where the question concerns something which comes in from without. So much the more must we insist upon the imperative demand that conformity to law shall be

shown in every individual respect as well as in the formation of the whole; that is, that the phenomenal event shall be conceived as the expression of primary forces in original forms of activity. But since, in this sphere, conformity to law is determined primarily as mechanical,* it becomes a more difficult task to maintain the genetic method of explanation when closely united with the mechanical, and in no case to allow the former to drive out the latter. But very often no attention is paid to such a demand, and the collision of the two methods is overlooked.

Especially is a new formation not infrequently adduced as something which appears unexpectedly upon the scene; although it must necessarily have a causal foundation. However much justice there may be in the polemic against those ancient doctrines, according to which a new event was regarded as already previously present in some concealed way, that does not at the same time affect the theory which supposes a new form to be produced originally from the essence of the primary forces. Some primary force is not to be dispensed with, unless we would fall into a theory of absolute becoming, which puts an end to all exact knowledge. The element, not of precedence in time, but of freedom from time relations is necessary to a scientific conception of the world. Without going back to the Aristotelian doctrine that the being precedes the event, we must insist that original forms of action appear as self-manifesting in every particular event, and that, so far, everything actual is to be conceived as a something possible. Thus, point for point, by the side of a genetic investigation, which examines the production of determinate combinations, must there be a mechanical

* For the concept of the Mechanical, see the section on that subject.

explanation which derives this production from the essential action of forces, and considers each event by itself as a whole every time it happens. Both problems may support each other in many ways; neither can replace the other, or make it superfluous.

But what is thus true, in particular respects, can be extended to the formation as a whole. However little, according to this doctrine, a primary innate tendency to a definite end is assumed, still whatever happens must, according to universal laws, stand in a connected sequence and causal union. As an advocate of this doctrine, one could say that the actual event does not exhaust all the possibilities, and that it can not be inferred simply from the general properties of the primary forces, but that it always refers to the historical process itself. Yet it does not follow from this that whatever happens is not involved in original and essential forms. One is supported by a fundamental principle of modern science, if he struggles against bringing into a specific tendency the entire development from the beginning; but that involves forgetfulness of the fact that tendencies, and a general tendency, must be legitimately formed from the universal itself.

Moreover, a discussion of phenomena which is not sufficiently strict involves confusion, because it treats very lightly the question of the permanence and maintenance of what has once been obtained. Because of definite reasons, forces are brought into a combination in which they produce new forms. If these are once provided, it seems to many that the problem of the investigation is solved, and it is believed that the inquiry can be dropped. But if, as is assumed, definite formations arise ultimately from merely opportune interaction of forces, how is it conceivable that such formations

maintain themselves outside of these interactions of forces? If nothing original and essential is brought into action by the external forces, the proposition must in the strictest sense be valid, *cessante causa cessat effectus*, and we find, from necessity, only fleeting and transitory forms in the events of nature.* But, since this is not the fact, the impelling forces must either continue to act or else must be replaced by others; for a definite condition can be maintained only by reason of the persistence of forces, and nothing remains as it is at any given time without expenditure of force. Such problems become more difficult when we consider the vicissitudes of individual formations, and they offer immense difficulties to the whole mechanical theory of explanation; yet many persons simply disregard those difficulties, and cling to the concept of heredity, as if that, in its turn, did not involve all these problems.

This whole failure to appreciate the strictly causal conception, which naturally is the fault, not so much of scientists, properly so called, as of occasional writers, destroys, further, the comprehension and the proper estimation of the world-process itself. If the formative event is not understood as standing in a legitimate connection, then every formation is something contingent, incidental, and joined at random to others as regards primary forces; so that the simple elements, regardless of all combination, are all that have any essential significance in the world, while the entire result of the process from them is superficial and ultimately void of meaning. The further the development advances, the more remote does it become from what is properly real, and the more of the contingent does it involve; so that

* As soon as one employs the concept of the type, the doctrine of occasion is given up, as it finds a limit in the whole science of morphology.

the higher degrees must be conceived as the least original, and thus as the least scientific. The "evolution" would thus not lead to, but diverge from, the actual truth. The reason of all this lies in the fact, that the causal principle has not sufficient power to provide for the event, and to include the lower and the higher in one and the same world-process. The single parts break asunder, and we receive a mere juxtaposition, where science has no right to renounce a systematic combination.

All these doubts increase in force as we pass beyond the original province of investigation, and attempt to gain a philosophic view of the world. But the obligations which are involved in the essentially changed problem have been observed too little in such attempts to justify us in a closer study of them. The decisive problems are scarcely touched upon; the cosmic idea of popular thought is adopted without being tested at all, and the whole philosophy finally results in the attribution of universal validity to the conclusions and methods of natural science without any further justification. Of all this we can notice only the way in which these results are transferred to the specific sphere of mind; because we recognize here a tendency which is characteristic, and, in the present state of things, not without influence.

Above all, there is of course no doubt but that by the suggestion of those investigations in natural science much in the sphere of mind as well has been brought into a new, or a clearer light. The knowledge of the mutability of those formations which are regarded by popular thought as immutable, and the higher estimation of thought-events in general, and of external factors in particular—all this necessitated such a change in

the fundamental idea of mind, that it could no longer be regarded as something which was from the beginning completely determined, and directed toward an aim from which it could not be diverted. The significance of the contest, in which Heraclitus, and later J. Böhme and Hegel were involved, was now, by the more concrete interpretation, brought nearer than ever to popular thought. The principle of the gradual and slow advance of the mind, as defended in connection with this interpretation, found various confirmations in exhaustive special investigations; and from these and other points of view many outlooks were opened up, which extend far out beyond what is even yet clearly visible.

But it is one thing to recognize such principles within the peculiar province of mind, and another thing from this point of view to define mind according to its essential nature. The doctrine that all content comes into a thing from outside is of special significance in such attempts to give to the interpretation of mind the analogy of natural events as the only rule of that interpretation. The mind appears as a *tabula rasa*, to which the external world gives certain characters. Whether that happens suddenly or gradually, everything has ultimately the same origin; and even what seems to be justly considered as essentially peculiar, as the forms of intuition and of thought, is supposed to have arrived at the form in which it is now presented to us, from vanishing beginnings through occasional minute additions.

No small amount of shrewdness has been employed to make such doctrines conceivable, and practically to apply them. It is supposed, for example, that we arrive at our belief in causality through the fact that phenomena appear in uniform connections and sequences:

the combination of these develops a habit; this extends its application beyond the individual cases; and the unconsciously developed activity serves finally as an original law of mind. The attempt is made to form from outside forces a similar concept of the ethical endeavors and emotions. The impulse which seeks essentially simply self-preservation recognizes only what is useful. But in the life of the community enters the necessity of preserving many beings, and, therefore, of placing a limit to the rights of the individual. At this point, either an instinct is adduced, and the question thus only carried back one step, or it is asserted that education, penal laws, etc., give what is necessary in the form of what is good in itself; man becomes accustomed to such a consideration, and finally does, as if from inner impulse, that which is still only suggested to him from outside. This method of explanation, in this and in other cases, results in the theory, that the action of the external upon the internal asserts itself beyond the immediate occasion, and gradually attains such firmness that it seems to be an original primary form of thought-activity.

But the question arises whether such a process of argument, which seems to blind some men, does not have a variety of defects and more than one weak spot; and whether, further, as a matter of fact, the analogy of natural events does not hint at other interpretations than this. Above all, is not an inactive thing such as the mind must be, if considered as a *tabula rasa*, intolerable as a concept? For how can we speak of an existence without attributing to it original powers?* Further, can anything empty and inactive receive any

* Leibnitz called the concept of a *substantia incompleta* a *monstrum in philosophia*. See further, 223 C: "Les puissances véritables ne sont jamais des simples possibilités."

action from without? and is any action in general possible without a counteraction — being thus a result which is determined only on one side? * Moreover, if, in what is subjective, there undeniably takes place an essential change in what comes in from without, this, too, demands a causal explanation, and can not be dispatched by merely disregarding it. As we do not gain a concept of the meaning of a book by supposing it to be copied from some other, and so on, without limit, so in this case we can not entirely disregard the assumption of some original event. Such an element may appear in the phenomenon under various interpretations and conditions; still the decisive fact is that the mind constructs out of things something wholly different from that which they offer to direct apprehension; and in this we can not avoid the recognition of an essential and unique action of its own. Only reasoning in a circle can mistake this necessity.

In causality, for example, it can at the very outset be asked, whether the psychical processes which produce habit do not presuppose a certain original combination? In any case, the very act of transforming the perception of the coincidences of phenomena into a belief in their necessary connection would not be possible, unless the formation of the habit itself were made a problem, and an attempt made to give a causal explanation of it. Why does not man stop with it at the same point that the brute does? The mind could never, even by mistake, transpose habit into causal connection if the process had not an essential foundation in his own nature.

* All such objections can be met by placing one's self in the position of complete materialism; but the question arises whether equally great difficulties do not arise in that case from the other side.

The same thing holds true of judgments of value. The concept of something estimable in itself, in contrast with the useful in general, must be originally formed, in order that the first individual may make use of it; and this must find some foundation in his nature, provided that he is to be persuaded of it: it must always be able to arise a second time, in order to continue to act permanently. All misuse which such ideas admit of still displays the power which they naturally possess for us; and the delusive appearance as well can be understood only on the presupposition of a reality beneath it.

However much may everywhere have come from the outside, it is not enough to solve the problem of the establishment of a mental principle. How is it possible that what is foreign to the mind becomes an independent inner power; that it frees itself from all contingent connections, and strives after a dominion over the whole? It is a matter of indifference to the main question how often or how rarely this happens; if it happens a single time, judgment is pronounced upon the doctrine which makes all that is subjective absolutely dependent upon the external. It is also incidental how much in the process belongs to conscious, and how much to unconscious (better, perhaps, unreflecting), active forces; for the only point is, whether it does or does not happen in the mind. The predilection for the unconscious is often connected with the endeavor to carry the question, as far as possible, out of the field of vision, and the belief seems almost to be predominant in regard to this that what we can no longer observe is no longer present, and hence is no problem of science. To lose sight of a problem, and to solve it, would be, accordingly, nearly synonymous. But to show how many doubts

such an explanation brings with it, owing to the confusion in which it is involved—according to Aristotle's expression an ἐκνυκτὸς γευνᾶν—is not within the province of this treatise.

Yet we seem to overlook something which is essential to the correct judgment of this whole method of explanation, and that is the circumstance that it dissects the psychical structure into small factors, and so obtains a point of approach to that which as a whole it can not reach. If the beginning seems to be easily explicable as something microscopic, an advance is effected by the cumulation of new diminutive parts, and by a gradual synthesis. In a measure the result which we now have is attained ultimately by addition. But against this explanation itself many doubts in turn arise, not so much as regards the fact asserted, that the present condition is reached by a slow ascent from small beginnings, as concerning the way in which this fact is ultimately conceived.

Something small or single is supposed at the beginning; does that essentially change the problem in any way? The fact that phenomena, like those of belief in causal connection and judgments of value, are in general possible at any point and to any extent whatever admits us at once into a new world, and essentially changes the whole comprehension of the question. It may be an unavoidable weakness in our principles that we consider anything small as more easily conceivable than something great; but shall this weakness serve as the foundation of an explanation of the essence of things? Every one who is mindful of the specific nature of the thought-activity of man will hold firmly to the fact that the disjoined phenomena, although at first appearing singly, still have their roots in the whole, and

in the course of the development strive to extend themselves to the whole.

And this course of development—is it really so simple to conceive that the one part is added to the other, and the whole is thus pushed on? Is not a synthetic activity necessary to the combination of the many, and must not the mind itself furnish this activity unless every process is to be simply on it, and not in it? Whoever conceives of thought-activity as at every stage a process combining different elements and as an independent existence, in which there is mutual interpenetration of parts, and in which the one part seeks a connection with the others—whoever has such a conception of it will readily recognize the fact that the whole process is carried out only in that thought-activity; yet he will insist that, if it is to be carried out, the heterogeneous elements in the mind must be reduced to an essential unity. But, if this is maintained, the question still arises, whether the development of mind is to be ultimately conceived just as it superficially presents itself at the outset; whether there are not inner laws to be discovered here, and critical points in the development to be recognized, instead of explaining the whole as only a gradual increase.

Our judgment of the formation and the general result of the thought-activity will depend upon our answers to all these questions. He who maintains in all this process an originality and legitimacy of mental force will by no means judge the fact of a gradual formation to be a proof of a diminished significance of mind as related to the events of the world. Under this interpretation, an event may have, for popular thought, less that is astonishing and novel; while, for science, it increases in value.

But it is specially evident in the method which is sometimes distinguished by the name of "analytical," that in considering these problems many investigations aim only to make the matter as intelligible as possible to the common understanding. The truth is that a treatment which deserves to be called analytical presupposes comprehensive thought-labor; for, to be able to analyze phenomena, one must have assured himself of the leading points of view, of tendencies, even of categories, and this can be accomplished only by systematic activity of thought. But now, not infrequently, the whole is simply separated into its empirically prominent parts; these parts are exhibited in their sequences, and are brought into combinations, and thus one believes that he has comprehended the process. The great problem of philosophers and of the ages has become a sort of piece of artificial work, a matter involving only dexterity and quickness of manipulation. Whether such an analysis into single elements is scientifically possible; whether these pretended elements actually form independent primary forces; and whether the whole can be produced by a simple coexistence—all this is passed over very lightly. What appears first in the phenomenon serves as impulsive force; what is here given as single serves as ultimately simple; determinations which arise from the whole are attributed to the parts; and, since the finished form always absorbs the attention, everything seems to be immensely simple. Thus no question is anywhere raised concerning a causal conception and a strictly scientific treatment; the investigation stops at just the point where the problem begins to become a scientific-philosophical one.

So far as all originality and inner conformity to law are denied to the thought-process, there can consistently

be no more discussion of a systematic and causal conception of the thought-power; for the mind only receives, like a magazine, what comes from without, and is dependent upon an event in which it has no share. The actual unity and the comprehensive connection of parts in the thought-process, the reciprocal agreement of individuals and of ages, and the eternal truths therein involved—all these must be renounced in such a theory; and then the causal significance of the genetic method itself must also be denied.

This, if nothing else, might suggest material for reflection: namely, that with the conformity to law of the inner life that of the forms of knowledge as well is destroyed; and so science itself, with its entire meaning as science, is made worthless. For if it once comes into the mind, it must share the fate of the mind. Of course, its practical tasks would likewise be included in such a fate. What comes into the mind from without can not lay claim to any greater power than that involved in the psychical force; and this power, as entering surreptitiously, must so far as possible be destroyed by an investigation which insists upon finding the truth. This process would, in fact, involve at the outset a contradiction; but it is in any case absurd to maintain acts of reason after the reason itself, so far as it is essential and original, has been taken out of the world.

We do not mean to hold the Darwinian theory and its advocates in any way responsible for such errors in individual attempts at philosophizing. Such pseudo-philosophers only use this theory as a dress for old doctrines which in their germ can be traced back to the Sophists, but which have found their typical expression in the French materialism and sensationalism of the eighteenth century. Whoever wishes to see every-

thing internal keenly and quickly reduced to that which is external, everything original transformed into that which is derived, every whole analyzed into its parts, and everything valuable degraded to mere natural instinct, turns to those men; but he should not forget that, not only has the development in France itself passed beyond such crude ideas, but also that the great achievements of thought in Germany have resulted in a direct contradiction of them. Not simply some peculiar theories of the schools, but the whole consciousness of an age which is powerful in thought and originative in creations has opposed those doctrines, and the most prominent individuals of that age have expressed that opposition with the utmost emphasis.

The leading illustrations of this are Kant and Goethe. Kant, in opposition to that false analysis, has made valid use of an analysis which truly deserves the name. For him, refusing as he did to recognize anything as simple because a superficial Empiricism offered it as such, preferring rather to test analytically by a systematic investigation everything which is given us, even experience itself—for him, it was evident that an original mental activity must everywhere be assumed to render possible that which, superficially regarded, might serve as the simple and ultimate element.

Goethe also everywhere defended the necessity of an inner and synthetic activity, and in so doing made prominent the obstacles, even to the verbal expressions used, which arose from that atomistic sensational tendency;* and, in his own shrewd and apt style, has

* 50, 244. "We believe that we see here, in the individuals as in the whole, the after-effects of those epochs in which the nation was given up to sensationalism, and was accustomed to make use of materialistic, mechanical, atomistic expressions; for at that time the inherited vocabulary

showed the difficulties and contradictions in which that tendency is entangled. How directly suited to our own day the words seem in which he described the method of those Frenchmen (see correspondence with Schiller, iv. 127): "They do not at all conceive that there is anything in man, unless it has come in to him from the outside. Thus Meunier has recently assured me that the ideal is something combined from different beautiful parts. And when I asked, Whence, then, the concept of the beautiful parts came? and how man came to demand a beautiful whole? and whether the expression 'to combine' were not too weak for the operation of genius, since it makes use of the elements of experience? —for all these questions he had answers in his own language, since he asserted that to genius for a long time *une sorte de création* has been ascribed. And so is all their discourse. They start out resolutely from a concept of the understanding; and, if one carries the question into a higher region, they show that for this new relation they have in every case a word, without troubling themselves to ask whether it contradicts their first assertion or not."

It is a clear proof how little the studies of such men have penetrated the real thought-process, if that which they have not so much opposed, as believed to lie far beneath them, appears again with peremptory claims, and, instead of being universally and at once rejected, is commended by not a few as something new and great. Yet ever again to oppose that which has often been overthrown is of especial necessity to the interests of the principle of development itself. If the stricter

was sufficient for common dialogue; but, as soon as the conversation rose to the subject of mind, the wiser opinions of distinguished men were openly contradicted."

scientific interpretation of it is given up, and if narrow forms everywhere forcibly assume control, then not only is it obstructed in its widespread influence upon the whole realm of scientific investigation, but it is also most seriously shaken in its intrinsic validity. It is thus seen to be the duty of all who stand upon the basis of modern science to appear as opponents of what imperils its fundamental concept.

PRIMARY CONCEPTS OF CAUSATION.

"Nihil veritati prejudicare, sed hoc obtinere quod ipsius rei inducit natura."—"Cod. Justin."

ALTHOUGH our judgments of the causal relation demonstrate the existence of a mental judgment which is original and comprehensive, yet the actual investigations of science have, at different times, led in the direction of a different theory. Moreover, the concepts pertaining to causality have been formulated only by a gradual process.* Although it would be an important and attractive undertaking to follow out carefully both tendencies in their historical development, we can here, of course, refer to this development only so far as this is necessary for the understanding of the

* The oldest of the words expressive of the concept of cause is ἀρχή (*principium*, *quelle* in Wolff), for it is found in the first philosophical work of historic culture, the writing of Aximander περὶ φύσεως. We find αἰτία, after being used by Pindar and others, in a strictly scientific sense first used by Plato. Then Aristotle, as is well known, distinguished the four kinds of causes; while the Stoics first brought out a term for cause and effect (ἀκολουθία, ἐπακολούθησις), and coined the phrase αἰτιώδης, which the Latins, and especially Augustine, in this specific sense, translated as *causalis*. *Causalitas* is first found in the translations of Arabian philosophers (as Avicenna); the Scholastics probably took it from them. *Grund* and *ursache*, which are used indifferently by Eckhart, were first distinguished by Wolff ("German Metaphysics," i. § 29, ii. § 13), in that *grund* should express the *ratio*, *ursache* the *causa*.

present condition of things. We therefore content ourselves with following to some extent the history of the concepts of the Mechanic and the Organic, and also of Teleology.

Mechanic—Organic.

The expression *μηχανικός* (shrewd, inventive, artful), which is found, for example, in Xenophon, appears as an established technical term in Aristotle. Mechanics is a limited science, the sphere of which is more closely examined in the work which is so entitled.* The word was taken up by the later Latin writers, and was retained throughout the middle ages; in the German language it was first used by Paracelsus.

Bacon was the first to undertake the extension of its significance on the philosophical side, in that he called mechanical the motion which up to that time had been distinguished as violent (*motus violentus*). But Descartes made ready use of the analogy of mechanics as characterizing his conception of nature; yet he employed the expression mechanic in a wider sense only in isolated passages.† The term came into general use through Boyle, who had a peculiar predilection for it, and gladly placed it at the head of his works.

The word organic appears first in Aristotle, and, as employed by him, signifies nothing more than instrumental. It suggests particularly the idea of the combination of diverse parts in a joint production; and, when he speaks of an organic body, he is so far from denoting thereby an inner vital principle that some quali-

* This book is not genuine, but the use of the term is sufficiently attested by passages in unquestionably authentic works.

† For example, "Epist.," i. 67, where the *mechanicum* and the *corporeum* are opposed to the *incorporeum*.

fying phrase must be added to express this thought.* In this sense of the term there can be no antithesis between mechanic and organic.

This Aristotelian use of the term was maintained, without any essential change, through ancient philosophy and the middle ages.† In Descartes, also, *organicus* and *instrumentalis* are simply synonymous; first in Leibnitz do organic and *organismus* appear used in any peculiar sense. Yet even by Leibnitz they are employed to signify, not the "inner principle" essential to life, but its appropriate organization carried out to infinity. The organic is embraced in the concept of the mechanic. The organism is a natural mechanism, which differs only quantitatively from the artificial one. This definition continued through the eighteenth century. We find organic (natural) and artificial mechanisms coördinated; and, just before the change introduced by Kant, Tetens maintains the Leibnitzian principles when he says ("Philosophical Investigations of Human Nature," ii. 475): "The organization is an infinitely complex mechanism. But this characteristic, however infinite it may be, can still be regarded as a distinction of size and multiplicity."

In Kant's earlier writings, also, the same position is maintained; and it should not be forgotten that, before he, at a later date, introduced a decided change of definition, the peculiar nature of the organic had been made prominent from another point of view. Thus, Jacobi said ("Hume," 172): "To conceive the possibility of

* In his well-known definition of the soul, as *ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ*, the inner vitality is denoted by the *φυσικόν*.

† In Scholasticism, organic parts (*partes organicæ*) were usually defined as *partes compositæ heterogeneæ*. Suarez says, "De Anima," i. 2, 6: "Dicitur corpus organicum, quod ex partibus dissimilaribus componitur." Organic activities are such as are united to definite organs.

an organic being it will be necessary to conceive first that which constitutes its unity; the whole before the parts." But it was reserved for Kant to bring out the antithesis in all its sharpness, and specifically to separate what had been hitherto gradually distinguished; since he called attention to the reciprocal affiliation of the parts in the organism, and so to the independence and individuality of the whole.* By the Constructive philosophers, and especially by Schelling, the term as thus defined is very frequently employed; and from them the antithesis of organic and mechanic came into popular use,† according to which, with us, the expression organic especially has been so extended in its meaning as to have almost lost all definiteness.

Thus, these expressions which at the beginning stood very near together have, in the course of history, become ever more separated, until at last, by the change of the gradually developed distinction into a specific one, they have come to serve as watchwords of an essential and ancient antithesis in concepts. But of the contest of what we now call mechanic and organic theories of the world ancient philosophy can give us much information; and whatever the later centuries have added to these theories lies only in a more specific comprehension of them, and in their more exact development. But since the significance of the concepts for scientific use is found in this greater precision, it will be enough for our purpose to consider the modern development of the theories.

When Descartes based his conception of living

* V. 388. An organic product of nature is that in which everything is interchangeably design and means.

† Among modern philosophers, Trendelenburg especially has denoted by these expressions a decided antithesis of philosophical conceptions of the world. See "Logical Investigations," 3d ed., ii. 142, *et seq.*

forms and of natural events in general on an analogy from mechanical skill, the fact should in the first place be clearly recognized that all heterogeneity in nature can, in his view, be explained as the combination of similar particles of matter subjected to motion. The difference of living formations from others consisted only in the incomparably greater fineness of the parts and complexity of their combination, so that the human and the natural products come into the same series, and man can understand the action of nature from his own life.*

This new doctrine was especially directed against any such explanation of nature by inner forces and real qualities as was customary in the middle ages among those who followed the example of Aristotle. According to that explanation, nature appeared as an "inner principle of motion"; what was possessed of life determined the entire interpretation of the world; every formation arose from a mysterious and incomprehensible depth. But in the theory of Descartes nature loses this intrinsic unity, and what was before appre-

* To adduce only one of the passages which belong here, see "Princip. Philos.," iv. 203: "Nullum aliud inter ipsa (sc. arte facta) et corpora naturalia discrimen agnosco, nisi quod arte factorum operationes ut plurimum peraguntur instrumentis adeo magnis ut sensu facile percipi possint: hoc enim requiritur, ut ab hominibus fabricari queant. Contra autem naturales effectus fere semper dependent ab aliquibus organis adeo minutis, ut omnem sensum effugiant. Et sane nullæ sunt in mechanica rationes, quæ non etiam ad physicam, cujus par vel species est, pertineant: nec minus naturale est horologio, ex his vel illis rotis composito, ut horas indicet, quam arbori ex hoc vel illo semine ortæ, ut tales fructus producat. Quamobrem ut ii qui in considerandis automatis sunt exercitati, cum alicujus machinæ usum sciunt et nonnullas ejus partes aspiciunt, facile existis, quo modo aliæ quas non vident sint factæ, conjiciunt; ita ex sensilibus effectibus et partibus corporum naturalium, quales sint eorum caussæ et particulæ insensibiles, investigare conatus sum."

hended as a unit by the immediate perception, as by a sort of artistic intuition, is now resolved into multiplicity by a more keenly penetrative analysis; yet only by such a deprivation of soul and dissection of parts does a strictly scientific conception become possible; only in this way does man obtain at the same time a point of attack and a lever by which to gain control over the events of nature and to turn them to his own ends.

This mechanical conception of nature is distinguished from that of Democritus, not only in that it attributes only a relative validity to the factors brought under consideration, but also in that it carries out its leading principles with exactness, and extends them so as to include everything individual.* It thus suggests from the beginning that it is, in a sense, superficial, and is advanced rather as a method of explaining the phenomena of nature in the simplest manner than as a theory of the ultimate constitution of the world; and, thus understood, it obtained a direct significance as applied to science, which took possession of it at once and extended it everywhere. The one who was especially active in extending its use was Boyle, who refined the mechanical theory to such an extent that he wished to banish even the word nature, and replace it with "cos-

* The most important illustration of this is found in "Princip. Philos.," iv. § 202 (Democriti philosophandi ratio): "Rejecta est, primo quia illa corpuscula indivisibilia supponebat, quo nomine etiam ego illam rejicio, deinde quia vacuum circa ipsa esse fingebat, quod ego nullum dari posse demonstro; tertio quia gravitatem iisdem tribuebat, quam ego nullam in ullo corporum cum solum spectatur, sed tantum quatenus ab aliorum corporum situ et motu dependet, atque ad illa refertur, intelligo; ac denique quia non ostendebat, quo pacto res singulæ ex solo corpusculorum concursu orirentur, vel si de aliquibus id ostenderet, non omnes ejus rationes inter se cohaerebant, saltem quatenus judicare licet ex iis, quæ de ipsius opinionibus memoriæ proditum est."

mic mechanism." * The development of this meaning of the concept was promoted especially by Newton, in the greater prominence which he gave to the mathematical elements involved. There was also no lack of those who opposed this doctrine; but they were not able to restrain the progress of science.†

At first there was no discussion of any immediate antithesis between the mechanical and the teleological explanation, for the mechanism explained originally only the form, not the cause of the event. ‡ Boyle even, carrying this idea out strictly, held that a cause acting from design must be assumed. § First in Spinoza do we find the mechanical placed in direct antithesis to the supernatural, ‖ so that it now not only expresses a form of the event, but also at the same time indicates the presence of the cause within this same event. Since, moreover, he practically carries the mechanical explanation over into the realm of spirit, although not avowed-

* Boyle wrote a not uninteresting treatise, "The Excellence and Grounds of the Mechanical Philosophy." Further, we find in Wolff an epistola gratulatoria in qua vera philosophiæ mechanicæ notio explicatur, but it is not particularly valuable.

† Cudworth was especially prominent here with his assumption of a plastic nature. See "The True Intellectual System of the Universe" (1678), i. 3, 19. In Germany, Rüdiger, among others, defended the intrinsic peculiarity of vital force: see "Institutiones Eruditionis seu Philosophia Synthetica," p. 109: "physica vel mechanica est vel vitalis."

‡ Berkeley says, with reason, ii. 457: "The mechanical philosopher inquires properly concerning the rule and modes of operation alone, and not concerning the cause."

§ See especially, "An Inquiry into the Final Causes of Natural Things": "Only gradually has the custom developed of opposing the mechanical to the final causes, to which through antiquity the efficient causes (*causæ efficientes*) corresponded." Passages of this kind are wholly isolated in Leibnitz (see Foucher, ii. 356), while in Kant, of course, from beginning to end, teleology and mechanism are contrasted.

‖ See "Ethics," i., append.: "Mechanica—divina vel supernaturalis ars."

ly, we can say that this doctrine obtains first in him an absolute and universal significance.*

At the same time it became more extended in its application to science. We find, in Descartes, the beginning of a mechanical explanation in psychology, when he ascribes to single states a certain independence and fixedness of connection,† and, although Spinoza and Leibnitz diverge widely in their theories and estimates of what pertains to the soul, the one circumstance that they both consider the soul as a mechanism of ideas, and call it an *automaton spirituale*, shows how closely they were related. Yet Spinoza established the primary principle more distinctly and in a more one-sided way, since he resolved the whole life of the soul into single factors, reduced all those factors to intellectual processes, and finally used the law of inertia as the measure of the entire explanation.

The analogy of the mechanical explanation of nature as applied to psychology obtained everywhere all the easier entrance and greater influence, because that explanation was an outgrowth of the general pressure of modern science, and hence found the field everywhere prepared for it. This was especially true of the interpretation of political and social human life. In the discussion of this question, in the transitional period, political systems were in many ways derived from the coexistence of individuals, as original and essentially immutable forces. And from that point this first principle gained increased significance and powerful influence.

* Spinozism is distinguished from the later popular mechanical philosophy only in that Spinoza embraces all events in his one substance, and thus makes place for unity and connection.

† See "De Passionibus," XLV.

In this respect the English are most prominent. Locke disseminates the principles which are taken up and systematized by others. Everywhere the event is to be understood exclusively by the action of single forces within the phenomenon; all subjective connections and confused relations disappear; every unity results from and maintains itself by a multiplicity. The consequences of this doctrine were developed in many directions; and it was unquestionably carried out and concretely applied most successfully in the system of Adam Smith, in which it became properly a fundamental principle of general application.*

This method of explanation increased everywhere the importance of the judgment of causality. What was apparently given as a whole was resolved into individual and familiar forces, and, being conceived as originating in those forces, it was regarded as developed from them. Man thus obtained a far greater power over external relations, since his action could be regulated by his knowledge of these individual elements. Yet, in spite of all these advantages, it could not escape the notice of more critical thinkers that this solution involved many new problems, and that, taken by itself, it was very incomplete.

Leibnitz made the first attempt, under the full recognition of its exclusive validity within a limited sphere, to give to the mechanical theory a wider application. Within the realm of nature mechanism was supposed to exert a power which was uncontested, and which embraced also the forms of life. But the principles of mechanism itself in turn demanded an ex-

* The use of the expression "mechanical" outside of the realm of nature was not customary at that time: in any case, such a use involved a consciousness of a figurative extension.

planation, which can be furnished only by a metaphysical cosmology.* But from this point of view everything complex seemed to presuppose something simple; all relations appeared to involve something independent, so that it became necessary, everywhere in the world, to assume the existence of life, and therefore of an immanent principle. Thus, the organic, as opposed to the mechanic, stands forth, not as another form of a natural event, but as the inner world which lies beyond this; and only so far as it is essentially and indissolubly united with this inner world can the organic lay claim to superiority over the mechanic. Although, in this way, the natural and the artificial structures received an entirely different kind of unity, and the theory approached very near to the antithesis brought out by Kant,† still it does not separate the universe into two distinct parts; since, according to the Leibnitzian doctrine, all being is ensouled, and all matter is organized even to infinity. Still, mechanism presents itself ultimately as organic, so that this distinction treats not so much of separated realms of being as of gradations in the interpretation of nature.

The meaning and the position of the concepts were then further changed by Kant. The concept of mechanical causation was extended to all events which take place in Time and are subject to the law of causality,

* See 161: "Omnia in corporibus fieri mechanice, ipsa vero principia mechanismi generalia ex altiore fonte profluere." 155 a, Foucher, ii. 253.

† Most significant is the passsage adduced here by Jacobi ("Hume," 115), from a letter to Romond: "L'unité d'une horloge dont vous faites mention est tout autre chez moi que celle d'un animal: celui-ci pouvant être une substance dovée d'une véritable unité, comme ce qu'on appelle Moi en nous, au lieu qu'une horloge n'est autre chose qu'un assemblage." (The clock is the standing illustration in the investigations of the principles of the mechanical explanation.)

so that what is psychical was included, and the whole phenomenal world was brought under the causal relation.* But this extension is naturally accompanied by the limitation that the mechanism can not be carried over to *things in themselves*, so that ample room remains for a transcendental freedom. This wider extension of the concept has penetrated philosophy and popular thought as well; and accordingly the strict mutual dependence of individual phenomena serves as the decisive characteristic of mechanism.† The limit which Kant placed to such a concept is often neglected, and numerous misunderstandings arise from the confusion of this broader theory with the narrower physical one.

The specific definition which Kant gave to the concept of the organic was an inducement to the Constructive philosophers to use it most extensively. Following Fichte's example, Schelling, in particular, summed up all fundamental concepts of the universe in the principle of the organic as the "immediate ectype of the absolute substance," and everywhere defended its originality and superiority as compared with the mechanic. The principle was used to explain the thought-process,

* See v. 101: "For just that reason we can call all necessity of events in Time according to the natural law of causality the mechanism of nature; although we do not mean by this that things which are subjected to that law must actually be material machines. We have here in view the necessity of the connection of events in a sequence in Time, as they are developed by the law of nature; and we may call the subject in which this development takes place *automaton materiale*, or, with Leibnitz, *spirituale*, as the impulsive force of the machine is matter or ideas."

† The system of Herbart gives a good example of the wider philosophical use of it in the realm of the inner life. He attempted (iii. 255) "to dissect the organism of the reason into its simple fibers, the sequences of ideas, the production of which can be explained only by the mechanics of the mind."

as well as the entire development in the realm of nature. An "organic"* theory of law, of politics, of history was presented; and such a theory was considered far superior to any mechanic theory, which explained events by a process of mere external composition. Yet the Constructive philosophers did not, throughout, clearly establish this principle. They sympathized fully with it; yet it was often a confused feeling, which appeared here and there in their writings. They defended the independence of the whole, and the distinctive character of separate events. They maintained, in the political system, the individuality of the separate members. But, in their theory of history, they held to a gradual and legitimate development according to the method of natural growth.

The novelty in their system was not so much the principle itself as their use of terms, and their clear apprehension of the antithesis between organic and mechanic; for we might say that, taken in a strict sense, the entire theory only manifested a return to those earlier forms which are directly contradicted by the specific peculiarity of the science of modern times.

All Greek philosophers who favored idealism are agreed in representing the universe, and so, first the state, and then the human community, as a sort of organic existence; and, especially in the latter part of ancient philosophy, consequences were deduced from this principle very similar to those derived by modern philosophers.† So in Christianity, especially in the earlier centuries, the theory of the individual as a member of an organism, formed of course by the Church,

* For the organic theory of Polities, compare Schelling, vi. 575, *et seq.*

† See Marcus Aurelius, 7, 13: *μέλος εἰμὶ τοῦ ἐκ τῶν λογικῶν συστήματος κτλ.*

was often and forcibly asserted. In modern times, on the contrary, the individual, as endowed with reason and the germ of eternal life, has such preëminent significance that he can be subordinated to no general formation of the phenomenal world. The individual produces everything from himself, and continually asserts his superiority to his own creations.

Although we must recognize in the principle of the organic a general truth which is incontestable, namely, the denial of a simple composition from elements which are intrinsically indifferent to the connection; yet, if it is at all clearly developed, we must most decidedly reject the specific doctrine as an antiquating retrogression.* Likewise the theory of historical development, as a peaceable process and a self-unfolding freed from all struggle, can be no longer maintained on grounds of fact, however much we may be compelled to recognize, in places, indications in support of this view. That theory may commend itself to the immediate perception; but an exhaustive investigation shows everywhere a varied complication, a prominence of the individual, and of what, in our conception of it, is contingent, and shows also many hard struggles in the rise and fall of powers.

Moreover, the expression, from the beginning obscure, has, by its further extension, † grown so indefinite that it very easily becomes a mere hiding-place for

* There has been, too, from the judicial side, an opposition to the organic theory of the state. See Van Krieken, "Concerning the So-called Organic Theory of the State:" yet such opinions are still in the minority.

† Every theory which called itself organic was brought all the more into peculiar confusion as the higher estimate of the organic in nature was brought to bear upon it. It depended, first, upon the question whether the analogy of the organic was suitable; and then, whether the theory based upon it actually added anything.

confused conceptions; and in no case does it give to the thought communicated the certainty of being accurately understood. And since the use of the word in no case has meaning except on the presupposition that the organic signifies for us what is original, and is very easily intelligible, and, as this presupposition is not at all admissible at the present day, it seems desirable to limit the term again strictly to the specific realm of physical phenomena. Here, at least, it comprehends definite groups of phenomena, and so prepares the way for investigation; while, in its wider use, even what is confused and problematical is made to serve as an explanation.

But a reaction against the great extension of the organic suddenly appeared in the realm of natural science. By the advance of science the doctrine has been more and more clearly established that the general laws of nature control also the forms of life, and that for this reason there is no occasion for a separate classification of specifically organic forces. The peculiarity of the vitalized formation as a highly developed system, and the singularity of many phenomena in this realm need not, on that account, be undervalued, provided we recognize the fact that everything apparently specific comes under these general principles, and proves to be caused by the application of comprehensive forces.* But, if the organic is to be considered, not as something isolated, but only as a part of the general development of events, it can not demand recognition as being decisively determined in its own nature, but itself becomes the most difficult of problems.

* K. E. von Baer correctly defines the problem, as "the reduction of the vital forces of the animal body to the universal forces or vital tendencies of the universe."

Yet, however much we must grant to mechanism full authority within its own sphere, it becomes necessary to understand clearly the extent and content of this sphere. The question arises at the outset, whether mechanism shall signify only the form of an event, as in its original meaning, or whether it shall include the cause as well. In the former sense, it is a theory which demands exact verification in the sphere of natural science. But, in the latter, it involves a judgment upon the ultimate nature of events. In the former sense, it can annex itself to a broad philosophical system; in the latter, it must claim an exclusive authority.

But, then, it is asked, whether the mechanical theory is to be limited to the sphere of nature, or whether it is to embrace the world of mind as well; and, in the latter case, the concept must of course be so broadened that the physical application of it can serve only as a special case. For investigation in nature it would be advisable to maintain the narrow interpretation of the seventeenth century,* since otherwise the forcible entrance of foreign characteristics can not be avoided; yet every looseness in definition must prejudice alike the method and the content of the entire realm of science.

When the question becomes a more general one in its bearing upon philosophy, it must be treated in a wholly different method, and will of necessity drive us to the assertion of something which shall supplement it. Especially in that case is mechanism presented to us as a method of conceiving the world which is peculiar

* Of course, in the extension of the doctrines of matter, force, motion, etc., the physico-mechanical theory also has been extended; but the question here treats of finer distinctions, which are disregarded in the usual treatment of the problem.

to us, and as a conception which involves many presuppositions. Mechanism is shown to be a power which controls a single system of relations; but what is fundamental to the relations and the combination of the many elements into a system, this it can not comprehend; and, moreover, if presented exclusively, it must destroy the possibility of these presuppositions. As the idea of the world itself presents to it an impassable barrier, so does it show within the world an impotence to explain everything in view of the facts of life and its essential individuality. Whoever might deny here the applicability of the mechanical explanation (in its philosophical sense), the more closely we examine it, the more evident is it that this explanation presupposes everywhere some cause which it is unable to formulate. The form of life may thus be understood more and more in a mechanical sense, yet not the least advantage is gained thereby for the mechanical explanation of life itself.*

Teleology.

The ancient concept of design, often used in philosophy since the time of Socrates, was, as is well known, first treated independently by Aristotle, who classified it among the four kinds of cause. Among the Latins, since Cicero, *finis* assumed a technical significance, while I find that Abelard first used *causa finalis*, and Wolff first coined the word teleology.† The German

* Lotze especially deserves credit for having made prominent both the significance and the limits of the mechanical, and so of having renewed the principles of Leibnitz. See his "General Pathology and Therapeutics as Mechanical Natural Science."

† See "Philos. Ration. sive Logica," cp. iii. § 85: "Rerum naturalium duplices dari possunt rationes, quarum aliæ petuntur a causa efficiente, aliæ a fine. Quæ a causa efficiente petuntur, in disciplinis hactenus defi-

language shows a curious development in its use of the expressions. Notker, according to his custom of imitating foreign terms as closely as possible, translates *finis* by "*ende*." Eckhart has "*ende*," "*zil*," and "*warumbe*." "*Ende*" and "*ziel*" are generally employed by the philosophers of the sixteenth century. Next in order, Luther, Böhme, and others have "*fürsatz*." "*Zweck*," which I can show first in philosophical use in the writings of Böhme, in the seventeenth century, suddenly took precedence of the other expressions, so that Clauberg, for example, translates *finis* only by "*zweck*," and Leibnitz, too, in his German writings, uses "*zweck*" and "*endzweck*" throughout, without making any definite distinction between them. After the beginning of the eighteenth century "*absicht*" (which was not used in the seventeenth century) appeared, and extended, especially through Wolff, into general use, so that it interfered with the use of the "*zweck*." But, after Baumgarten, the custom was established of using "*zweck*" for the concept *finis*, "*endzweck*" for *finis primus*, and "*absicht*" for *intentio* (*finis repræsentatio*), and we see this usage gradually confirmed in the eighteenth century.* In our own day, finally, the numerous misunderstandings introduced by the word "*zweck*" have led K. E. von Baer to prefer, for investigation in natural science, the expression "*ziel*" (*zielstrebig*). Does not such a history of terms suggest certain problems in the concept itself?

The history of the doctrine of design is the history

nitis expenduntur. Datur itaque præter eas alia adhuc philosophiæ naturalis pars, quæ fines rerum explicat, nomine adhuc destituta, etsi amplissima sit et utilissima. Dici posset teleologia."

* Yet Plattner ("Philos. Aphor.," ii. 23) asserts that usage treats the words "*zweck*" and "*absicht*" as synonymous.

of a continuous contest. We can see the problematical character of the concept in the fact that this doctrine has always been called in doubt. Yet, on the other hand, the circumstance that men of the highest rank have always again assumed what was contested may serve to show that the question here is not one of simple error, and that the contest is carried on not so much between science and common sense as between parallel tendencies of science itself.

It is particularly necessary to discriminate between essentially distinct forms of the doctrine of design, for it has been, perhaps, the greatest cause of confusion, that wholly diverse elements have converged at this point. It is unavoidable that man should, at first, refer everything to himself as an active agent, and should wish to interpret all events as means for his own designs. Closely connected with this is the fact that such an idea exerts an influence upon the theoretical interpretation of the world. Yet it is as much the right as the duty of science strictly to oppose any such influence, for only after the destruction of this kind of teleology is a scientific conception of the world in general possible.

The teleology of the ethico-religious consciousness is incomparably higher. In this, it is the conviction of the absolute value of the problem involved in the life of the rationally free being which leads to the reference of all mundane events to this problem. As the object of this discussion of design, the individual, as a moral personality, stands always most prominent. But the relation of design to this problem is dependent upon so many presuppositions that it is advisable for philosophy to lay it wholly aside, at the outset, in its investigations. In so far as it presents a dogmatic system of physico-

theology, a conflict with science is unavoidable; and yet the question arises, whether the destruction of such a physico-theology is not more to the advantage of religion than to that of science.

Yet, beyond all this it must not be forgotten that there is also a strictly theoretical doctrine of design—a doctrine of design which has not come to us from ancient prejudices, and so been dragged along with them, but which has arisen in the clear light of day, and which, by supplementing and deepening knowledge, has been of valuable service to science. Whenever forms of Teleology which were unscientific or no longer satisfactory to scientific thought have been repressed, a new and higher form of Teleology has always arisen. Equally important reasons have been advanced both for and against the doctrine. The assailants of it have usually taken the lead; but, when they have believed that they have accomplished their undertaking, they have, as a result, only cleared the ground for new creations. An Empedocles and a Democritus were followed by a Plato and an Aristotle; Descartes and Spinoza by Leibnitz and Kant; an evident sign that we must recognize here a problem to which man is compelled always to return, without having been able to solve it decisively at any one point of its historical development; and that we treat here of a question which lies near the outside limits of human knowledge, and hence is affected by every disarrangement of those limits. Although this purely theoretical problem is not affected by the ordinary assaults upon Teleology, yet, on the other hand, there can be no doubt but that the principle involved furnishes directly nothing at all in support of the ethico-religious postulate; and that we do not consider here any practical interest.

The first general doctrine of design was presented by Aristotle, and with him, constituting as he did the culmination of Greek thought, it stands in the closest connection with the foundation of all philosophy. The world is considered as a vitalized and self-contained whole, to which everything individual is added as a member. It does not strive after anything lying outside of itself; but lives for itself, since internally executed activity and external realization coincide. This is the source of the theory, that everything individual in the universe is to be understood from the connection in which it stands, and also that no motion is aimlessly scattered, but that everything attains a final point where it passes into an intrinsically satisfied and self-realizing effect (*ἐνέργεια*). Aristotle, however, makes a specific use of these doctrines, only so far as he seeks to understand all the heterogeneity of organic formation by means of a single type. The normal form is the human, as being the highest. In the production of this the effort of nature includes all forms; and, although the aim is not for the most part attained because of the opposition of matter, still the discussion proceeding from it teaches how to classify diverse phenomena, and how to comprehend everything individual in its connections.

But the principle that every motion is directed toward a fixed goal was used throughout this system. Even the elements strive after a definite position in the universe, in order to obtain there external rest. Nowhere is there an effect carried out infinitely, a rectilinear motion without end. Since this principle in the realm of organic life is united with that of the superiority of the whole to the parts, the discussion of design obtains here a peculiarly rich meaning. The completed

activity of the whole is the goal toward which everything particular is to be directed, and with a view to which it is to be conceived.

Whatever judgment we may form of such a Teleology, it has greatly contributed to the subordination of the material universe to unifying points of view; and by it has been introduced the possibility of whole sciences, like those of comparative anatomy, historical development, etc. And in no respect was it behind the science of the time in which it appeared.

We can not deny that there is an antithesis in principles between this Aristotelian doctrine of design and the primary tendencies of modern science. It presupposed the Platonic doctrine of ideas by which events appeared as the realization in matter of forms acting out of time relations; while with modern thinkers matter and form coincide in a unity, and, in fact, in the unity of the process. It is not a combination of different kinds of being which gives us the process, but the process, rather, which gives us all being. Whatever formation may appear is to be considered as having its original source in the general process, and hence must always be judged simply as a provisional conclusion, and not as an ultimate end. The Aristotelian concept of the *ἐνέργεια* is given up; in mind and in nature the pressure is to the infinite; it always produces the new, and can be content with no attainment. The action of forces is, therefore, independent of fixed aims, and we can speak only of a sort of tendency which points to the infinite.

In the closest connection with this stands a second characteristic, the dissolution of the organic connection of the world, the recognition of the independence of the individual, with the subordination of all events to

simple and universal laws. It is these laws which protect the unity of the world; they are immediately manifested in every individual, and all particular formations can be reduced to these. It is no longer held that one specific form makes use of the forces of nature, and turns all motion toward itself. And so, too, the universe as an entirety is not considered a completed whole which refers to itself everything particular as an instrument. In place of the antithesis of parts and whole appears that of simple and complex; instead of, with Aristotle, interpreting the individual only through the whole, the form must be resolved into its elements to be scientifically conceived. It is, then, all things considered, the genetico-analytic character of modern science which necessarily destroys the principles of the Aristotelian doctrine of design.

Although these decisive reasons have not often been very prominent in the attacks of reflective thought upon that doctrine, yet they have determined the scientific development of the method of discussion, so that the treatment of the question has finally assumed an entirely new shape. Wherever design was defended, it was essentially changed from its earlier form. But its supporters are divided into two classes, since some combine it as well as they can with the primary principles of modern science; others wish to show it as something intrinsically demanded by those very principles. Among the former, the most prominent are Boyle and Kant, in his earlier writings; among the latter, Leibnitz and Kant, in his later writings.

Boyle teaches that a strictly applied mechanical theory needs design as its counterpart to make conceivable the tendencies observed in the phenomena of the universe and the rational order which makes itself

apparent.* The further an intrinsic character and essential connections are removed from the events of nature, the more necessary does it seem to be to supplement these events by something transcendent. But this defense of design involved a change in the general theory, since Boyle adduces the concept of cosmic designs,† to which the nature and relative position of individual forms must be subordinated.

With Boyle it was the immediately phenomenal nature of the world which led to the principle of design. But Kant, in his earlier writings, went a step further back in his analysis of principles. It seemed to him especially suspicious in the ordinary teleology that the contingency of the perfection of nature was necessary to the inference of a wise originator, and hence that any absolutely necessary order in the world should become a serious objection to that teleology. Yet, when he insisted that every special formation should be conceived as necessarily formed according to general laws, those laws themselves gave him the opportunity of bringing in design again with a new meaning. The fact that from extremely simple forces a well-ordered whole is formed by legitimate development, and that a multitude of what seemed to be mutually independent things are in reality united in a connected way, appears to him a decisive reason for believing that the whole originates from a supreme intelligence. The very fact that the forces of nature can produce this world without the interference of anything supra-mundane testifies that rea-

* See "De ipsa Natura," section iv.: "Harum autem partium motum sub primordia rerum infinita sua sapientia ac potestate ita direxit, ut tandem (sive breviore tempore sive longiore, ratio definire nequit) in speciosam hanc ordinatamque mundi formam coaluerint."

† See, especially, "Final Causes of Natural Things," Prop. IV.: "Cosmical, primary, and overruling ends."

son controls the world. All order is indeed a result of necessity; but, he says, "is this harmony the less strange because it is necessary? I consider it all the more so for that reason." (II. 138.) This doctrine comes pretty close to that of Leibnitz, which is to be judged in the same way, and which had considerable influence upon its formation. It can well be considered as the highest form of an identification of a scientific conception of nature with a religious cosmology. Yet here, too, although something situated above and beyond the world is necessarily involved in the design, we have a right to demand that the design be immediately and intrinsically combined with the world.

This last element, which must be furnished to justify the doctrine philosophically, was undertaken by Leibnitz, and by Kant in his later writings. From the outset, Leibnitz defended the doctrine of design as something coördinate with the explanation of efficient causes. He emphasized the fact that the two are in no way mutually exclusive, but the teleological consideration can be of great assistance to the ætiological. Yet, in these considerations, he does not go very far beyond the ordinary principles of design: his teleology essentially exhausts itself in mere invention; and he asserts distinctly that in ultimate analysis it is subordinate to ætiology.*

* For all this see "Works," 143 b, and Foucher, II. 357. In the latter place we read: "Cependant je trouve que la voye des causes efficientes, qui est plus profonde en effet et en quelque façon plus immediate et a priori, est en recompense assez difficile, quand on vient en détail, et je croy que nos philosophes le plus souvent en sont encor bien éloignés. Mais la voye des finales est plus aisée, et ne laisse pas de servir souvent à deviner des vérités importantes et utiles qu'on seroit bien long temps à chercher par cette autre route plus physique." In support of this, the fact can be adduced that many important discoveries of modern science are actually made in this way.

The peculiar service which Leibnitz rendered to the doctrine of design lay rather in the fact that he brought the teleological and the purely physical considerations into an intrinsic and essential relation. The problem, the prosecution of which leads him to a doctrine of universal design, is the nature of the general laws themselves. He considers these, like the whole order of the world, as something positive, in so far as they realize one of various possibilities; and the question now arises, whether this definite nature is not subordinate to some one particular point of view, and does not lead up to some one particular principle. And here it seemed to him to follow, from many considerations, that all laws of events are determined by the first principle that the greatest possible quantity of force is utilized. Everywhere the shortest paths to the goal are followed, and the simplest means to the end are chosen.* The world, because ruled by this principle, is judged to be absolutely complete and conformable to design, although, since it is a question only of the quantity of being, not of a definite quality, what is asserted is the form of conformity to design, rather than a definite purpose; it is a tendency which disappears in infinity, rather than a specific aim of development.†

Such a teleological theory is not coördinate with the ætiological-physical one; but, including the latter,

* See 147 b: "Semper scilicet est in rebus principium determinationis quod a maximo mininove petendum est, ut nempe maximus præstetur effectus minimo ut sic dicam sumtu." 605 b, he remarks, in view of the question, whether the same result could not be produced by pure necessity: "Cela serait vrai, si par exemple les loix du mouvement, et tout le reste, avait sa source dans une nécessité géométrique de causes efficientes; mais il se trouve que dans la dernière analyse on est obligé de recourir á quelque chose qui dépend des causes finales ou de la convenance."

† Practically Leibnitz considers the world, not as complete, but as developing itself to completeness.

stands above it. It is not limited to any specific sphere, as that of organic life, but is related to all events, and is found to be especially fruitful in its explanation of what the ordinary method of treatment leaves as an axiom. Even the primary laws of motion, the whole method of causal agency, etc., are illuminated by it. For special investigations, it started from the maxim that the shortest way should everywhere be sought; but, since the ultimate aim was the most complete production of power in the universe, the power of the individual could give only approximate results in this direction; and a general problem was brought out, the solution of which could only gradually be attained in the advance of scientific discovery. Meanwhile Leibnitz held that the data given, in connection with their causes, were enough to justify the reason in its confidence in the general principle, and in admitting the unsolved mysteries of the universe, by the use of the well-known maxim, "What I understand of it pleases me: I believe that the rest, too, would please me, if I understood it" (p. 548 a).

Still, the event which is conformable to design is regarded, in this philosophical theory of Leibnitz, as something occurring within the world itself, since ultimately all events reduce to occurrences having their own intrinsic nature, while these are controlled by the form of conformity to design. Since the idea (the elementary magnitude of Leibnitz) involves immediately an inclination toward something else, and exertion consists in this inclination alone, the design, the moving force, will result throughout from activity and law. Design controls the world, because it controls the thought-activity, which is the foundation of all existence; of course that which is specifically human, the

power of reflection, is wholly remote from such a concept of design. We have a metaphysical concept, to which the psychological interpretation is subordinated as a special case; but, nevertheless, it seems to be settled that the human illustration of design need not be thrown away, but finds its place in the great whole.

We need not ask, what doubts can be started concerning such a doctrine of design. This much is certain, that it is raised above the customary objections. Especially would it be absurd to contrast this theory with a strictly causal investigation of Nature, since the theory starts from the very desire to form a causal conception, with which desire scientists usually are content to stop. The idea of design, which determines everything from one principle, seemed indispensable, even for the complete removal of accident from the world. If we should make any objection to this doctrine, we should say that it attempts too much, rather than too little. It necessarily presupposed an unlimited and indestructible faith in the power of the reason concerned in the act of knowledge; and it was the destruction of this presupposition, not the attacks of adversaries made upon the theory itself, which finally repressed it.

Such an abandonment of the presupposition here involved appeared in the later writings of Kant; since all causal connection was judged to be a form of knowledge which is purely subjective. Hence, however design might be defined and employed, it was nothing more than one method of our human comprehension. But, further, all the peculiarities and excellences of the Kantian method appear in his treatment of the subject. He undertakes at the outset to give a distinct definition of the concept. Design is (v. 439) "the perceived effect, the perception of which is at the same time the

reason which leads the rational acting cause to determine its production," and that is accordingly considered conformable to design (vi. 385), "the existence of which seems to presuppose a previous idea of the same thing." It is evident that in this way the concept is much more strictly and specifically defined than it is by Leibnitz, and at the same time that such a concept can never be used, otherwise than symbolically, outside of the realm of what pertains specifically to the soul. But now experience leads our faculty of judgment (v. 378, *et seq.*) "to the concept of design in nature only when we must predicate a relation of cause and effect, which predication we are able to regard as legitimate only because we include the idea of the effect in that of the causality of the cause, as the very fundamental condition of the possibility of the former"; and, so far as this goes, it can be said (v. 383) "a thing exists as design in nature when it is of itself cause and effect." At first this concept is applied to organized being; but from that we are necessarily led (v. 391) "to the principle that all nature is a system controlled by design, by which principle all the mechanism of nature must be subordinated to an accordance with the dictates of reason." The ultimate ground of this is, that our understanding makes a distinction between the universal and the particular. The particular, regarded from the position of the universal, seems to be contingent; and hence, to establish a connection, design must be introduced; though, if we were to judge the particular in its relation to a universal which is regarded as a synthetic whole, such a necessity would not arise. Design thus serves us by filling up the gap between the universal and the particular, the possible and the actual.

It is clear how far this doctrine is related to, and how far divergent from, that of Leibnitz. In keenness of conception the Kantian theory is unquestionably as much superior to the Leibnitzian as it is inferior to it in influence upon general investigation. Yet it may be that, in the development of his first principle, Kant brought out more prominently the fact that mechanism, as well as design, is thus tinged with subjective elements; also, that every advance in the mechanical conception, so far from repressing, rather demands the teleological conception. For, with every advance in that kind of knowledge, the chasm between universal and particular, possible and actual, becomes greater, and so the connection which the idea of design offers becomes all the more necessary.

The successors of Kant attempted to go beyond the presuppositions of the Kantian doctrine. The Constructive philosophers tried to prove that what they hypothetically assumed as an intelligence which knows by intuition actually existed.

The scientists, however, endeavored to dislodge the concept of design from the realm of organic life which had been adjudicated to it, and, after many vain attempts, they succeeded, at any rate, in advancing one step by the doctrine of Darwin, according to which it seemed possible to understand the adaptation apparent in the world without having recourse to the general principle of design. The maxim of Leibnitz—to explain everything by means of the smallest amount of force—could be fully realized here, as Darwin expressly appeals to the *lex minimi* formulated by Maupertius; yet this maxim was now freed from its original connection with a teleological conception of the world. But, after the doctrine of design is thus ban-

ished from the natural sciences, we lose all interest in its philosophical application, and so it seems ultimately to be given up, and the supporters of teleology are compelled to see themselves driven out from modern discussion in company with the supporters of astrology.

Perhaps this historical discussion may serve to moderate this "teleophobia" ridiculed by K. E. von Baer. It is especially necessary that those who oppose teleology should deal with its scientific forms, and should not waste their attacks upon forms which have never kept up with the advance of the investigation. The consideration of the more important forms, which the philosophical doctrine of design has assumed, shows us especially its complete distinction from all the theories held in popular thought. There has been no assertion of any relation to specifically human interests. Design has been defended, not as the peculiar property of particular realms of its application, but as including the whole of nature and the world. Mechanism, as the form of events, has been everywhere presupposed and recognized;* and the discussion of design has been undertaken purely in the interests of a causal comprehension of the world. And, indeed, what was thus defended was not a material design, lying somewhere outside of the world, but only the form of conformity to design found within the world, and defended in the interests of a systematic monistic cosmology. The particular element which design was supposed to provide for this end differed, of course, according to the general theory; but the fact that even the most critical

* Mechanism can, in general, be opposed to the doctrine of design only so far as the latter presupposes that every event is ultimately to be conceived under the causal relation.

thinkers believed that they must reduce again to unity the world which had been analyzed in their investigation, and that, in this endeavor, they all had recourse to design, should make it evident to us that the question here is not simply one of individual mistakes.

This leads, moreover, to such a result that design stands everywhere in a close causal connection with the distinctive feature in the whole cosmology. Even a certain connection of development could be found to be manifested in the fact that the earlier forms of the doctrine are not wholly rejected by the later, but are only degraded to the position of subjective maxims. What Aristotle used as really valid, Leibnitz would defend as valuable in its suggestions; and what Leibnitz himself asserted is maintained, in their own way, by Kant, and even by those who oppose design altogether.

We easily see, from all this, how many difficulties and doubts such a philosophical doctrine of design has to contend against. It has to suffer, from the outset in the discussion, from the fact that it can be justified, not by any special topical consideration, but only by a systematic cosmology. If we approach it as an isolated problem, its principal elements can not be rendered valid, and every positive assertion must be regarded as arbitrary.*

Yet, without treating the subject specifically, the use and the meaning of the concept can be assailed. The doctrine of design is employed in the theory of the unity of the world; but is not this theory itself in the highest degree problematical, and incapable of being justified? And with what right is a concept, which

* Accordingly design, in its leading features, is not a scientific, but a philosophical problem.

is valid only within a narrow sphere, extended beyond that sphere into the universe? However worthy of consideratiou such doubts may be, we can allow them to be ultimately decisive for us only when we misunderstand the distinctive peculiarity of our judgment and of all our primary concepts, and emphasize one point only when the whole mental action should be considered. In the formation of our ultimate concepts, we must everywhere start out from ourselves; the only question is to form a connection with something essential in our nature.

But even such a significance in design is disputed. In our own life, as well, it seems to be something incidental, derived, subjected to the power of reflection. Yet the mistake in this can be easily pointed out. The special meaning of conscious design is substituted for the form of the activity of design itself. The latter alone concerns us here. Thus regarded, design does not arise simply incidentally in our life, so that in some way it is a product of the reflective activity; but the possibility of reflection itself presupposes design. And, however men may be mistaken in their use of it in the sphere of reflection, still the decisive facts are that they can form designs in general, and that they can think and act under the form of design far beyond the limits of all reflection.

Then, in the use of the concept outside of the realm with which we are best acquainted, the dilemma arises that we either give an anthropomorphic form to the idea of the world, or that, by abstract comprehension, we deprive the concept more and more of meaning. Yet we might ask at what point of philosophic investigation one believes that he can escape this dilemma. Though our concepts of the universe ever remain in-

adequate, shall and can we for that reason give up investigation?

A peculiar difficulty, then, is involved in the employment of design, from the fact that it makes use of an idea of the reason which rises above all phenomena, since it was undertaken in the interest of a monistic connection of phenomena in the world; but the world is not, by any means, given to us as a unit and a whole. Yet this question, too, becomes at once part of a wider one, because we are concerned here, ultimately, with the decisive problem of the whole doctrine of knowledge—with the relation of thought to the world, and with the meaning and the significance of the activity of thought. According to its relation to this problem, the use of the principle of design must appear either an arbitrary fancy or a duty. Yet to decide between these alternatives is not a matter so perfectly simple, especially if we bear in mind the fact that even a negative answer is still an answer. Even if we should decide to make use of design, then, too, we must not forget that it can not give us a completely exhaustive conception of the problem, but can only serve, by means of the concept of the activity of design, to bring us in some measure nearer to fundamental relations which are otherwise incomprehensible. But, even if we can approach a truth only mediately, still we should not question the fundamental principle involved, and we should not reject the means employed if they are of real service to that approximation.

Other difficulties are added to all these, and complicate the question more and more. And yet, without any regard to what we have positively attained in the contest, the problem is valuable and significant to us, because it shows us the incompleteness and insufficiency

of the theories with which we so easily round off our ideas of the world. To whatever limitations and embarrassments our thought and endeavor lead us, the process can not be regarded as something unimportant. For there is a value to us not only in those judgments which add something new to our knowledge, but also in those which teach us more rightly to value our possessions, and which open to us an outlook into the universe.

CULTURE.

Παιδεία μὲν οὖν φέρει καὶ νίκην, νίκη δ'ἐνίοτε ἀπαιδευσίαν.—PLATO.

As the concept of culture belongs far more to common life than to any special science, the expression was in general use long before it found an exact definition in philosophy. In the latter part of the ancient era, as from the time of the Renaissance, the phrase *cultura animi* was often used, and the phrase was until recently interpreted far more figuratively than it is now. Bacon first attempted to insert the concept in a philosophical system, when, in ethics, he contrasted with the determination of the highest good the investigation of the way in which the mind is led to it, and called this process culture, the "georgics" of the mind.*

Although culture is here treated as a part of ethics, it assumed, later, an independent coördinate position, so that it becomes necessary to determine more precisely their mutual relations. In German philosophy there are two antagonistic principles, and, again, it is Kant who brings out the distinction the most sharply. For, when he understands by culture the "production in a rational being of an ability to accomplish its desired

* See "De Augm. Scient.," vii. chap. 1: "Partiemur igitur ethicam in doctrinas principales duas; alteram de exemplari sive imagine boni, alteram de regimine et cultura animi, quam etiam partem georgica animi appellare consuevimus. Illa naturam boni describit, hæc regulas de animo ad illas conformando præscribit." See chap. 3.

aims in general (consequently in its freedom)," he leaves the settlement of the aim itself entirely an open question, and culture and ethics become distinct.

Fichte, on the other hand, defended their identity. When he included the ethical problem under the elevation of the mind to control over all events, and closely united form and import in the concept of freedom, it became possible for him to subordinate to culture the entire content of life. He makes culture (vi. 86) the "exercise of all one's powers in the design of complete freedom, of complete independence of everything which is not ourselves, our pure selves." But he includes all other problems in this, so that "nothing in the world of sense, none of our impulses, actions, or passions, considered as phenomena, have any value, except in so far as they affect our culture." Religion, science, and virtue are expressly reckoned as the higher aims of the cultured reason (vii. 166); culture also creates the political aim (vii. 146), so that the state which the philosopher defends can be called a culture state.*

The modern estimate of culture thus dates back primarily to Fichte, and he gave typical expression to the one principle which lies at the basis of the whole modern theory—the principle that the ultimate problem of the life of the individual and of the mass consists in this, that all the forces given to man should be

* This concept is opposed to the comprehension of the state as only a "juridical institution." But at first he drew a contrast between the culture state and the national state (vii. 212). "What is, then, the Fatherland of the truly educated Christian European? In general, it is Europe; in particular, it is, in every age, that state in Europe which is the most highly cultured." Fichte learned, later, to place a higher value upon what is national, although it was always of value to him (this is brought out also in his "Reden an die deutsche Nation") only as an expression of something common to mankind.

fully developed, should be increased infinitely, until they attain power over nature, over the life of man, over the world, and then arrive at the pleasures in existence which arise therefrom. The distinctive peculiarity of modern life consists in the fact that this is presented as the essential and comprehensive problem, and that all special aims are made subordinate to it.

To the ancient world, also, the development of power was considered important and essential; what was dormant in man should be awakened to living activity; what was formless should receive form. But it was supposed, at least in the highest attainment of Grecian thought, that the development was always directed to a goal fixed by nature, and from the beginning was controlled by regulations which referred to this goal. Greek philosophers never raised the question of an infinite advance, of an unchaining of forces, with no determination of their tendencies. Education, which with them is devoted to supplementing and supporting nature,* is, consequently, conducted from the beginning with a zealous care for the upholding and management of the activity of the soul: all powers are judged to be useless which are not subordinated to valuable aims.† But, in general, all development, as simply an endeavor, forms a mere preliminary to an activity which is completed in itself and externally manifested; this gives both the goal and the measure of the development.

All this is true of the life of the mass as well as of the individual. With the aggregate, also, not every power should be developed, but only those which can

* See "Arist. Polit.," 1337 *a*, 1: *πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ παιδεία τὸ προσλεῖπον βούλεται τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν.*

† See Plato's "Republic," vi. 491, *et seq.*; Aristotle's "Politics," i., chap. 2.

arrive at a completed activity of life, so that, under the given relations, there is only a very small part of mankind which lives itself out fully, and attains the pleasures of existence which spring therefrom. The advance of mankind does not go on infinitely, but moves toward fixed goals, then to give place to a retrograde movement. The infinite in life and in doctrine signified the endless and indefinite; but this was regarded as something undesirable, in view of the comprehensive concept of the value of order.

This whole theory was endangered in the decline of ancient thought, by the weakening of the belief in real goals in the world which surrounds us, and, consequently, the development assumed a more formal character. Although we, perhaps, might call culture the defective way of conducting life to which this theory led, still it lacked that element which gives its most decisive significance to modern culture, the power of comprehending all the relations of life and of striving after a renovation of the entire condition of the world.

In Christianity the purpose of desire and action is incomparably more important than the power developed by it or its actual execution. Innumerable utterances of Church fathers would admit of the interpretation that they were opposed to the development of culture. Yet their real wish was to make prominent the superiority of the ethical element, and to justify the withdrawal of attention from the more external activities to the intrinsic nature of man's character. It was often the most comprehensive and critical investigators who believed that they could not degrade deeply enough all that pertains to the simple improvement of powers, as contrasted with their ethico-religious use. In such utterances, too, the peculiar kind of intrinsi-

cally empty and decaying culture which then existed can not escape notice.

Yet, more than all this, we should notice that Christianity is essentially connected with the problem of culture, in that it presupposes an attempt to exercise every power in order that each might assume its own position. Only when man has done his utmost in the struggle after truth and fortune, and is moved to his innermost depths, and becomes conscious of impassable barriers, can the peculiar nature of Christianity be fully understood and justified. Wherever the element of culture is restrained and esteemed of little value, there, along with its essentially peculiar nature, the inner truth of Christianity will be threatened. But, since the primary presupposition of culture was not made an integral part of the Christian system, the further development of that system was exposed to the danger of laying aside the element of culture, or of recognizing it only so far as it immediately served its own ends. There has been practically, in the course of its history, no recognition of the principles of the problem of culture, and no intrinsic adaptation of it to Christianity. Culture has, as a whole, remained a separate province by the side of Christianity; and an indifference to all questions which lie outside of the "specifically" religious sphere has been brought to light, and even paraded on the part of the supporters of a strictly dogmatic idea of culture—an indifference which shows the unfitness of this principle to properly treat and estimate the whole circle of human interests.

Modern thought has assumed a certain form of opposition to this principle of Christianity. There has been an immeasurable extension of the sphere of life. It is not simply this or that particular aim which is al-

lowed to lay claim to all action, but whatever can become a question of human activity is to be taken up and developed. It is not a definite quality which gives a decided value to action, but the highest task is the action itself—the development of power, the increase of vital activity. Living itself is the aim of life. Nothing can remain quiet and established; and, if it is brought to its complete effect, its result becomes at once the starting-point of a new development; new faculties are ever formed by the advance, so that the pressure goes further and further toward the infinite. Accordingly, modern life is characterized by its restlessness; the glance is ever directed toward the future; the desire is never satisfied, so that there is no longer any place for the ancient concept of an activity which finds rest in itself—the Aristotelian "energy."

This definition of life is not originally supposed to contradict the others, but to include them all. Whatever of power was offered for the attainment of any particular aim should be recognized and accepted, on the condition that it subordinate itself to the decisive struggle after completeness of life.

But in this way the ancient principle receives an essentially new significance, as becomes particularly prominent in the problems of ethics. The question here is not of an inner change, a "regeneration." But perfection (*se perfectionner*) becomes the aim; yet this perfection is only the outcome of Being itself.* When the other questions also are included in this way under the one struggle for completeness of life, everything

* All the leading thinkers of modern times identify *perfectio* and *realitas*, and Leibnitz says, still more definitely, *perfectio nihil aliud quam essentiæ quantitas* (147 b). But, in general, all definitions of value are reduced to that of force.

should be used, nothing thrown away as useless. And, since the aroused activity finds its value not so much in its external production as in the inner exertion of power, the deepest depths must be penetrated, and everything motionless must be brought to life and motion.

Externally and internally as well, the striving, creative mind has an infinity before it; not only does it produce a whole world from itself, but it ever takes it back again into itself, so that the external becomes the internal, and the mind above all increases its own superiority over external things. If, in such a connection, the mind forms, according to the marked expression of Nicolaus Cusanus, a "universal seed" which unfolds itself into the world, then upon its development depend meaning and fortune for the life of the individual as of the whole. We have to think even of the universe, in this connection, as progressing infinitely.*

But, however we may include all particular developments in this universal one, and regard the question of culture as absolutely universal, still, as a matter of fact, there are always definite conditions by which the

* Leibnitz, "German Writings," ii. 36: "The perfection of creatures, and so of ourselves, consists in an unimpeded vigorous impulse to new and ever new perfections." Wolff and his school defined the highest good as *perpetuus sive non impeditus ad majores perfectiones progressus.* The concept of progress appears throughout ancient thought. Plato and Aristotle have for it the expressions *ἐπίδοσις* and *ἐπιδιδόναι*; but later the Stoic *προκοπή* became far more prominent, and we find it used (as in Polybius) in the same sense in which we now use the *fortschritt.* The idea of a progress toward the infinite was suggested by the Neo-Platonics and Mystics, but has been fully carried out only in modern philosophy, and there first by Nicolaus Cusanus. This idea reached its culmination in Leibnitz (150 a): "In cumulum etiam pulchritudinis perfectionisque universalis operum divinorum progressus quidam perpetuus liberrimusque totius universi est agnoscendus, ita ut ad majorem semper cultum procedat," *et seq.* The expression *fortschritt* (progress) seems to have become a fixed term in the latter part of the last century.

activity is controlled, and definite directions in which it moves. Our life is subjected to historico-psychical influences which specify aims and endeavors, so that there can no more be a culture than a universal religion without detailed boundaries. Hence modern culture, in the comprehensive sense, occupies a peculiar position, which must be recognized and tested before we can venture to pass judgment upon its value.

We notice particularly here the conscious refusal to admit anything transcendent. The development of power is supposed to fall wholly within and to penetrate this world. Whether the world be regarded as a whole formed by the reason or as a collection of phenomena, the principle is the same, that all action refers to it and proceeds within it. What is not attained here is, in general, not attained at all, and what is not made use of here is absolutely lost. All demands of the reason must be met here, all obstructions removed, all opposition overcome. A contradiction, a difference between reason and reality, can nowhere be admitted. From all this it becomes a necessary principle that all power should be exerted at every moment; and thus modern culture receives a radically changed character, a fact of which its leading advocates have been clearly conscious.

But intelligence serves as the peculiar substratum of life and development. When modern psychology seeks to reduce all mental events to processes of knowledge,* when practical philosophy makes happiness and capacity dependent upon knowledge, and metaphysics seeks to produce the whole world out of thought, these scientific doctrines only express the common conviction

* Nicolaus Cusanus says, i. 91 b: "Ego mentem intellectum esse affirmo."

of mankind. This conviction also makes knowledge the source of all power and all good; ignorance, on the contrary, is held to be the source of weakness and evil. Knowledge gives us control over nature, so that we can bring all its forces into our service, and thus immeasurably increase our own power. But it gives us no less power over ourselves and our race, whose destiny can be influenced by us by reason of our insight into its controlling laws.

If, in view of all this, increase of knowledge is to be considered the task and acquisition of life, the progress in which we believe is more exactly defined as an intellectual one.* Moreover, knowledge has a wholly different nature and position in modern life from what it had in earlier times. It is not a quiet intuition of the world, a θεωρεῖν, but a transformation of that intuition, in order to survey that world within its own sphere of power. The proposition that knowledge is power is now asserted so that knowledge and power are considered synonymous. The demand that theory and practice be closely united is found in all the systems since the sixteenth century, and is extended more and more until it claims that knowledge and life shall coincide. Thus a new place is made for science in the historical development. Hegel's statement that the owl of Minerva first begins its flight in the dark may be entirely appropriate as applied to ancient thought; in our own day science carries the torch before it. What has been unconsciously formed in history is not conceived as supplementary and thus justified before the reason, but science sets up its aims of itself, and then demands that their execution follow in actual life.

* See Nicolaus Cusanus (ii. 188 a): "Posse semper plus et plus intelligere sine fine, est similitudo æternæ sapientiæ."

But all demands which arise from the idea of culture receive peculiar importance from the fact that they are made valid, to a full and uniform extent, for every individual. The question in modern life is not that of a simple general process to which the individual is annexed bodily as a member or element; but, just as in the theoretical cosmology we have seen the antithesis of particular and universal overcome by the concept of law, so here, practically, the individual is not something under or in the whole; special existences are rather, to use Leibnitz's celebrated expression, *partes totales*. Each one carries in itself the whole world, since it forms a wholly rational power which extends itself infinitely. The historical development thus works itself out, not above, but in the individuals. In every individual the entire world-process goes on, so that we have an infinite number of infinite worlds. This theory is conditioned upon the principle of the essential similarity of all individuals, so that this, too, is defended by scientific thinkers.* No less necessary is the condition that the development of the individual must correspond to that of the universe, and that the latter, with all its empirical imperfection, still always finds itself on the right path. No proposition is more hostile to the modern idea of culture than the doctrine of a radical evil.

If these conditions be granted, we look out upon immense problems extending far beyond the field of vision. If the individual be the only object endowed

* Descartes, perhaps, expresses most simply the general principle when he says (in the beginning of the Method): "Rationem quod attinet, quia per illam solam homines sumus, æqualem in omnibus esse facile credo." The reason adduced here is also the basis of Fichte's doctrine of the similarity of everything "which has the human face."

with life, we must assign to him the entire result of culture, and, above all, must make all the fruit of intellectual labor attainable to him. Nothing more can be said of an isolated position of prominent individual thinkers and an esoteric kind of knowledge: it is rather our duty to carry the light from the heights into the valleys, and to spread abroad everywhere enlightenment and education.*

It is not necessary to prove exhaustively how much mankind is indebted to this general idea of culture, how the whole method of life has been changed by it, how all our thought and feeling have been determined by it, so that even those who would oppose it everywhere betray its influence, and insensibly modify the ancient theory which they try to defend. But, were we to call attention to the most prominent points illustrative of this, the increase of the power of man over nature and the world and the deliverance and elevation of the individual would be most conspicuous. Would these advantages be seriously given up by those who hardly ever speak of modern culture except to find fault with it?

And yet, can it be denied that the execution and realization of its leading principles have led to ever deeper problems, complications—even catastrophes, and that even now, however exaggerated many of the fears regarding the immediate present may be, we are in a crisis which embraces the whole world of culture? The danger to modern culture arose from an intrinsic contradiction—the relation of what we might call the imagined individual of the ideal world to the empirical

* The expression *bildung* (training) as used here is comparatively recent; only since the middle of the last century has it been transferred from physical to mental development.

individual of the phenomenal world. Since the former could not be raised too high, the chasm became ever greater, until the bridge parted, and the empirical individual then demanded his own share, and began to estimate the advantage which the modern definition of life brings to himself.

If the question were put in this form, the answer would come promptly. The modern idea of culture, with its immeasurable undertakings, demands both a combination of many forces in common action and an activity which pervades all races and times; whatever of that the temporary life of the individual can comprehend disappears in comparison with the whole, and diminishes in proportion to the advance of the whole. And this, indeed, is especially true in view of a preponderantly intellectual definition of the problem of life, while no great use can be made of the means which are offered as a remedy. If, for example, in the completed results something is to be bestowed upon the individual which he can not intrinsically live out, it is evident that the very thing is thus lost which in our day constitutes the value of knowledge—its pervasive and transforming power. But if the subjective understanding of the empirical individual would lay claim to the rights belonging to the general reason, and would refer everything to the passing moment and to what is serviceable to itself, then culture itself is essentially destroyed, together with its general work and its historical foundations. This danger was very evident in Rousseau; it increased as the idealistic tendency, which regarded man as a participant in an intelligible world, was repressed; and, with all which it involves, it remains concealed from sight only because the empirical individual at first, as a result of its historical development, has its own king-

dom in interests and feelings of a general nature, which it judges to be adapted to itself.

But, beyond this, the faith in the omnipotence of the intellectual has suffered many severe shocks. Disregarding the difficulties which oppose point for point the scientific application of its fundamental principle, we find that in popular thought doubt and distrust continually increase, however much the ancient thesis may be externally maintained. The doctrine, that by advance in "education" all the wounds of mankind can be healed, is no longer held in the confident faith of the day. One often attempts, to be sure, to lay all the blame upon semi-education, and, as this is abused, to heap praises upon true knowledge; but we thus establish at the outset a contrast which not only is far removed from but exactly contradicts the fundamental tendencies of our own day;* since the question at once arises, what is the source of this semi-education of the extent of which other times knew nothing?

Yet by all this the further question would be suggested, whether it is not in the imperfect intellectualistic definition of life itself that we find the reason for the mistake, by which doubt is naturally directed not against knowledge in itself, but only against that exclusive control given to it which keeps in the background all other elements.

All this leads to immense thought-conflicts, which are all the more irrepressible and fatal the more our

* Periods of active thought have ever the peculiarity of seizing upon and making prominent the imperfect side of an idea. The sharp distinction between a "true" and a "false" interpretation already shows the beginning of a crisis; as, in general, this distinction often only conceals the decline or the surrender of the original conviction. One is usually on the verge of an inconsistency when he insists so zealously upon the "true" form of a principle.

day insists upon passing judgment upon everything there is in the world which surrounds us. Since everything comes under a single series of events, and this serves as ultimately definitive, every gap must become a defect, every contrast a contradiction.

Yet the more the power of the idea of culture is prejudiced by such prominence of defects and contradictions, so much the more increases the danger of a compression of the original sphere of life, the danger that some of the heterogeneous elements which were at first included in that sphere might later be set off as foreign, and even hostile. Particularly, both at the outset and throughout the discussion as well, should mind and nature find equal recognition, as in science both speculative and inductive tendencies have worked together. In the contact and mutual growth of both tendencies is found by no means the least cause of the vigorous development of power in modern times; so that this must suffer a sudden decline as soon as either of these tendencies is repressed in thought or in life.

At the time when thought-power is bold, man feels strong enough to take up into his own life's plan the results of earlier developments. Perhaps in olden times, in spite of the lack of exact knowledge, men stood in a closer relation to each other than we do today; but, in any case, they wished to appropriate to themselves the substance of Christianity, and to use it to supplement and to deepen life. We can call it only an unworthy accusation to explain, as a mere regard for the ruling power, the position in reference to Christianity occupied by men like Spinoza, Locke, Leibnitz, instead of seeking a deeper reason for it—a reason which led thinkers of all schools, amid all the differ-

ences of their interpretation of Christianity, to be unwilling to give it up, and to make the greatest effort to unite it closely with modern ideas.

But, while there was thus a pressure to extend the narrow circle as far as possible, and to recognize in everything foreign some relation based on the unity of reason, the opposite tendency soon developed itself—the tendency to return to the specific, and so to what was contradictory of this. The development of culture was more and more limited in its import with every external extension, and, in contrast with the other forms of life, assumed that negative character which in the realm of mind, by its limitation of the horizon, finally injures its supporter far more than do its active opponents.

This new turn of affairs was unquestionably occasioned, not by the arbitrariness or the malice of individuals, but by an inner necessity. But for this very reason it is a fact of the greatest importance, that the idea of culture has narrowed more and more, and, what is worse, has become more superficial. For, the more it was set off by itself, the more its contradictions disappeared, so much the less opportunity was there to penetrate its depths and to solve the problem by introversion. How infinitely broader, freer, and deeper is the definition which a man like Leibnitz has given to the problem and meaning of culture than we find to-day in its most famous advocates! We often reproach other ages for narrowness and one-sidedness, and not without reason; but with the narrowness was not rarely united a grand depth of life; and is it not worse than any kind of limitation to have a narrowness of treatment which can be comprehensive only because it understands nothing of the inner nature of life?

It is unavoidable that such a state of affairs, which

endangers the acquisitions of centuries of conflict, should excite a doubt concerning the principle of culture itself; that this principle should be blamed for all the improprieties and deteriorations of times and of individuals; that every specific development should be attributed to the conception itself; and that the permanent limits and imperfections of human life should be reduced to an essential and irresistible tendency to a narrowness of content in the concept of culture. In view of such unjust and often paltry attacks, it becomes a question, how we shall defend both the significance of culture and the original aims of modern thought. Wherever the limits of culture in general and of modern culture in particular may lie, no exhaustive development of life and the world is possible without that development of power in which modern times find their goal, without a tendency of the individual toward the universe in all the fullness of its import. The ethical principle, too, which is not rarely opposed to culture, can be advanced only in the general life of mankind where action finds a rich and universal significance, in which the individual is apprehended in his whole being, is aroused in his inner nature, and is raised to active work beyond himself. Where the development of power is not attempted, everything which can come down to man remains for him something external, and the most complete life becomes paralyzed when it is not given up to the exertion of a living energy.

INDIVIDUALITY.

"L'individualité enveloppe l'infini."—LEIBNITZ.

IN our discussion of the principle of individuality we take the liberty, as before, of glancing first at the history of the word and the concept. *Individuus* was used from the time of Cicero as the translation of Aristotle's ἀδιαίρετος, or of the ἄτομος of Democritus, so that it serves to denote that which can not be further dissected.* *Dividuus*, from the beginning, was employed as its opposite. This was its chief meaning in the middle ages.† But at the end of the ancient era that signification of the term began to come into vogue which later became controlling. Developing the concept of Porphyry, Boethius calls *individuum* the single object as unique;‡ and this usage was retained in the

* See Seneca, "De Provid.," 5: "Quædam separari a quibusdam non possunt, cohærent, individua sunt." Notker translates *individuus* by "*unspaltig.*"

† Hence we must take care not to interpret the expressions of the middle ages strictly in the modern sense.

‡ See "Com. on Porphyry" (ed. Basil. 1570, p. 65): "Individuum autum pluribus dicitur modis. Dicitur individuum quod omnino secari non potest, ut unitas vel mens; dicitur individuum quod ob soliditatem dividi nequit, ut adamas; dicitur individuum cujus prædicatio in reliqua similia non convenit, ut Socrates; nam cum illi sunt cæteri homines similes, non convenit proprietas et prædicatio Socrates in cæteris, ergo ab iis quæ de uno tantum prædicantur genus differt, eo quod de pluribus prædicetur." Prantl quotes from Porphyry (i. 629): ἄτομα λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅτι ἐξ

logico-metaphysical discussions of the middle ages, and was gradually extended until it came into wider and general employment through Leibnitz.

The concept which lies beneath the term was first formulated and defended by the Stoics; but the Epicureans and Skeptics took it up at once, each, in fact, to make use of it for their own ends. With the Stoics the doctrine of the individual distinction of all beings is an integral part of a systematic cosmology. From the idea of the perfection of the universe arose the proposition that each single object is distinct, and that every one contributes something peculiar and indispensable to the whole. It was in accordance with their whole style that they should exert themselves to the utmost to give the sharpest possible expression to this principle; no two hairs, no two leaves, to say nothing of two living beings, are to be considered as alike.*

The Epicureans, on the other hand, defended the significance of the individual in order to justify the independence of each one, while the Skeptics used the

ἰδιοτήτων συνέστηκεν ἕκαστον, ὧν τὸ ἄθροισμα οὐκ ἂν ἐπ' ἄλλου τινός ποτε τὸ αὐτὸ γένοιτο τῶν κατὰ μέρος, and, in the same place, from Boethius: "Incommunicabilis Platonis illa proprietas Platonitas appelletur." How little change was made in this definition in the lapse of time is shown by the definition given by Jacob Thomasius, the teacher of Leibnitz: "Individuum est quod constat ex proprietatibus quarum collectio numquam in alio eadem esse potest." *Individualis* appeared in the first half of the twelfth century (Prantl, ii. 129, 131, 141); *individualitas* is found in Avicenna (translation): it was adopted into modern usage especially by Leibnitz.

* See Cicero, "Acad.," quæst. ii.: "Dicis nihil esse idem quod sit aliud, stoicum est quidem nec admodum credibile, nullum esse pilum omnibus rebus talem, qualis sit pilus alius, nullum granum," etc. Seneca, "Ep.," 113, 15: "Nullum animal alteri par est, circumspice omnium corpora: nulli non et color proprius est et figura sua et magnitudo." 16: "Tot fecit genera foliorum: nullum non sua proprietate signatum." Pliny, "Nat. Hist.," lib. vii.

concept of an individual distinction (mental and material) as a weapon against the possibility of any universally valid knowledge.

In its interpretation of this principle, the Neo-Platonic school goes decidedly further. Not only does Plotinus base the peculiarity of individual existence on the diversity of the creative acts of reason (and this in a method which transcends all experience), and thus clear the way for the new forms of the doctrine,* but, further, it is asserted by him, and still more by his followers, that every individual in a peculiar manner contains intrinsically the whole world, and so that it is the problem of life to fully develop what is thus intrinsically given. The ancient doctrine, that the little world is an image of the greater, thus receives definite meaning and increased importance.†

The middle ages gave to the whole question a predominantly logico-metaphysical interpretation. The most important discussions here are those of Duns Scotus upon the relation of the universal to the particular, and of the necessary to the contingent; and the way

* See Plotinus, 540.

† The doctrine that everything is contained in everything else, with an expressed limitation to the physical world, was, as is well known, first advanced by Anaxagoras, while the idea that the particular living being, especially the human, offers an image of the universal originated in the Platonic philosophy. The contrast of the *μέγας διάκοσμος* and *μικρὸς διάκοσμος* is found as a title in the writings of Democritus; see, further, Aristotle, "Phys." 252, b 24: *εἰ δ'ἐν ζώῳ τοῦτο δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τί κωλύει τὸ ἀυτὸ συμβῆναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ πᾶν; εἰ γαρ ἐν μικρῷ κόσμῳ γίνεται, καὶ ἐν μεγάλῳ.* Plotinus carries the Platonic doctrine further (see 284 G): *ἔστι καὶ πολλὰ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πάντα καὶ τὰ ἄνω καὶ τὰ κάτω αὖ μέχρι πάσης ζωῆς καὶ ἐσμὲν ἕκαστος κόσμος νοητός*) and adds the definition of the individual diversity, which was then further defended by Porphyry and Proclus; see Proclus ("Cr." iii. 103): *πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν. οἰκείως δ'ἐν ἑκάστῳ.* The word microcosm (*μικρόκοσμος*) was first coined after the development of the concept, and at a much later date.

in which the independence and positivity of the latter were defended undoubtedly exerted a direct influence upon the whole system of Leibnitz.

Modern thought, through Nicolaus Cusanus, brings the concept of individuality at once to the front. Although he is in general allied with the Neo-Platonics, yet he unquestionably makes important improvements and changes in their doctrines. The concept of the infinite development of the individual becomes far more prominent, and its independence and intrinsic nature are more clearly recognized.* But, then, the principle of individual peculiarity receives with its changed basis a new form. Separate existences are distinct, because if they were alike they would simply coincide—a demonstration which is justified only in the construction of a cosmology which comprehends all existence as conceivable in thought.† But when the whole in which the individual stands is finally considered as something gradually ascending, each individual is regarded as unique and as representing nothing else, and yet at the same time as referring to the others and to the whole, inasmuch as the one grade can not exist without the others.

* This is seen, for example, in the representation made of the mind as a living mirror of the universe, which figure may have been borrowed from Eckhart, 326, 39: "Als in einem spiegel widerschînet manigerleie bilde, wêre aber in dem spiegel ein ouge, daz möhte alliu diu bilde schen als einen widerwurf sîner gesihte." See, also, 142, 26, *et seq.* That the individual loses itself in the whole was expressly denied by Nicolaus, i. 92, a: "Si in una camera multæ ardeant candelæ et camera ab omnibus illuminetur, manet tamen lumen cujuslibet candelæ distinctum a lumine alterius."

† See i. 210 b: "Non possunt plura esse præcise æqualia, non enim tunc plura essent sed ipsum æquale." The so-called principle of indiscernibles was thus first suggested by Nicolaus Cusanus, and not by Leibnitz.

Giordano Bruno, who first employed the expression "monads" for individual unities as unities, constituted the transition to Leibnitz, in whom we find many valuable suggestions on this subject. For Leibnitz was not deceived by the apparent significance of the forms under which objects are casually first apprehended. He was original and ingenious in his consistent development and systematic construction of principles which by any other method of treatment had been left in isolation. He was equally original in his attempt to give the precise definition, and at the same time the broadest possible application, of the principle of individuality which was characteristic of his discussions of this subject.* From his earliest youth he defended this principle;† he brought it into relation to all the more important problems, and used it in the solution of them, and thus very properly introduced it into the whole realm of scientific discussion. With him the concept passes from the school into common life, and, thus receiving a prominent place in thought, it became the object of those various contests which continue even in our day.‡

These scientific investigations are closely connected with, though not directly dependent upon, the general demand, that individuality be asserted in connection with the general life of the nation and the race. Long before the concept of the individual was philosophically

* There is, of course, in all this much which is specifically new; but, to bring this out and to properly estimate it, belongs rather to a strictly philosophical discussion.

† As is well known, his first philosophical treatise is the "Disputatio Metaphysica de Principio Individui."

‡ In their discussion of the concept, the later champions of individuality, like Herbart, Schleiermacher, Schelling in his later writings, have not gone beyond Leibnitz, so that all discussion of the problem must lead back to him.

explained and justified among the Greeks, it had made its way into common life. The complete subordination and sacrifice of the individual expressed in Plato's idea of the state arose from his opposition to a tendency of the times which he considered pernicious, and so is characterized rather by moral energy and intensity of feeling than by the quiet and simple resignation to the objective which we find in the great men of the preceding periods. Aristotle tried to maintain a medium position by granting to the individual free scope and a certain recognition within the community.* The Stoics, as we have seen, wished to insure to the individual a place within the system of the world. But the popular thought, unconcerned with such replies and mediations of philosophy, went further and further in the establishment of the rights of the individual, although in fact only so far as to give to it a power coördinate with that of the whole, not superior to or conflicting with it. The relation of the ancient state to Christianity shows most plainly what fixed limits were placed upon all this freedom of action; yet, on the other hand, the principle of individuality was carried so far that even so mild a nature as Quintilian was compelled to oppose its extension into education.†

In the course of the centuries, parallel with the decline of universal principles as applied to the social relations, to the relation of the sexes, and the relation of

* For his idea of the relation of the individual to the whole in the state, the following passage is especially significant; "Pol.," 1263 b, 31: *δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι πως μίαν καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ'οὐ πάντως. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὡς οὐκ ἔσται προϊοῦσα πόλις, ἔστι δ'ὡς ἔσται μέν, ἐγγὺς δ'οὖσα τοῦ μὴ πόλις εἶναι ἔσται χείρων πόλις, ὥσπερ κἂν εἴ τις τὴν συμφωνίαν ποιήσειεν ὁμοφωνίαν ἢ τὸν ῥυθμὸν βάσιν μίαν.* See, also, 1264 b, 17.

† See "Instit. Orat.," ii. 8: "An secundum sui quisque ingenii naturam docendus sit."

man to nature, we find an increasing freedom granted to the inner life, and a greater prominence given to the feeling of individuality. Although such a tendency was powerful enough to unfold a new world to the individual life in personal dispositions and feelings, still it was not capable of remodeling the development of life as a whole. This was reserved for modern times, the productions of which are connected with the results of the decadence of ancient thought by many often invisible threads.

It is no easy task to show the relation of Christianity to the problem of individuality, because it involves different and conflicting elements. Viewed in connection with a cosmology which makes the ethico-religious element the sole meaning and design of the world and of life, the events which occur in the experience of each individual must be, above all, the most important, and the individual must thus receive an immeasurably increased significance. The Church Fathers generally believed (in opposition to the ancient theory) that every individual is the object of divine care, for which reason the activity of the Church must be directed to each individual. The doctrine of the unlimited freedom of the will, generally held during the earlier centuries, by the form which it gave to action insured an independence to the individual; and the distinctive feature of that doctrine was recognized in the idea of an organic union of individuals in a comprehensive whole.*

On the other hand, the assumption of an absolute value in the individual was contradicted by the doctrine of eternal punishment, and we need hardly explain that, at that time, nothing was said of any rights of the indi-

* All things considered, of the Church Fathers Origen has best established the principle of individuality.

vidual as opposed to the general interests. As soon as the individual deviates from the general order he is considered as one who has gone astray, and is to be brought back to the truth, even though by coercion. The whole everywhere precedes the individual; it communicates itself to it as an objective power, demanding faith and obedience, so that all which occurs in the individual is intelligible only by the appropriation of a meaning which is raised above the arbitrary judgment of any one man. No salvation is possible for the individual, except as salvation for the whole has been and is an all-comprehensive fact, "that the opposition in itself has been removed constitutes the condition, the presupposition of the possibility that each subject should remove it for himself" (Hegel, xii. 228).

Whether these two tendencies have been equally worked out is more than questionable; we must rather answer negatively, because, as a matter of fact, the recognition of the individual was ever more and more repressed. No one contributed more to this than Augustine, who, above all others, both in his whole idea of the world and of life, and in his personal appropriation of Christianity, made the fullest use of his own individuality.

To be sure there was no lack, in the middle ages, of a counter-tendency. Among individual thinkers, Abelard was especially prominent in defending, in life and in doctrine, the rights of the individual, and he made permanent additions to the discussion, especially by his theories of conscience and personal disposition. Moreover, as a general tendency, the influence of the Mystic was felt, who could not insist, as he did, upon the subjective nature of the religious life, without applying the whole process of life far more directly to the individ-

ual.* But it was reserved for the Reformation, and especially for Luther, to recognize the religious life of the individual person as the basis of Christianity as a whole, and so, as a matter of principle, to insure to the individual a complete independence.† Only we must not forget that the freedom which Luther so energetically demanded, he struggled after, not for mankind absolutely, but only for Christians, so that it has a fixed condition and a determinate content. An abstract and vague freedom finds no defender in Luther.

Yet, on the other hand, for modern thought, individuality and the individual freedom of man as man are the basis of the whole doctrine of life. Every one is supposed to refer the whole world to his own inner nature, to receive and appropriate it to himself, and then to establish outside of himself what has been formed within. There are involved here a release from all limitations and an expansion of the sphere of life which essentially surpass the most extreme extension of the horizon of the world. As, in the conception of nature, after the destruction of the narrowing horizons, the field of vision opened without bounds, so here, too,

* Eckhart says, characteristically (3, 6): "Ez sprichet sanctus Augustînus, daz disiu geburt (nämlich Gottes in der Seele) iemer geschehe. Sô si aber in mir niht geschihet, was hilfet mich daz? Aber daz si in mir geschehe, dâ lît ez allez an." So Luther ("De Libertate Christiana") desires, "ut non tantum sit Christus, sed tibi et mihi sit Christus."

† His work "De Libertate Christiana" is especially to the point. See, further, "De Capt. Babyl. de Sacr. Bapt.": "Neque papa neque episcopus neque ullus hominum habet jus unius syllabæ constituendæ super Christianum hominem, nisi id fiat ejusdem consensu; quicquid aliter fit, tyrannico spiritu fit." "De Matrim.": "Quis dedit hominibus hanc potestatem? Esto, fuerint sancti et pio zelo ducti, quid meam libertatem vexat aliena sanctitas? Quid me captivat alienus zelus? Sit sanctus et zelotes, quisquis volet et quantum libet, modo alteri non noceat et libertatem mihi non rapiat."

was shattered all that had confined man and his action to restricted circles; here, too, every one was supposed to have the immeasurable as his task; yet here the infinity, in which, in the other case, the individual was lost, could be comprehended and experienced in the "universal seed-corn" of the rational being. Instead of one world, there exist worlds so numberless that the possible progress of the life of mankind is indefinitely extended.

Hence it is not so much the element of extent, as it is that of depth, which distinguishes the new theory from the old. When the individual receives the world into itself, it reduces it to its own intrinsic and essential nature; what is external is changed, animated, spiritualized; mental life itself is thus filled out and strengthened, so that the success of the one goes with that of the other, and they advance together in the unlimited progression. Depth has here no more a limit than breadth.

No order of the phenomenal world can confine the individual as thus conceived. For, as the germ of the infinite, and the supporting as well as transforming power of the universe, it is as incomparably superior to every other formation, of whatever value, as is the infinite to the finite, however developed. Neither State nor Church can exhaust the aims of the being which has immediately within itself the whole world of reason. Such combinations, instead of appearing as organisms which include the individual as a member, are rather formed from and supported by the individual as the point where the infinite and eternal enter into phenomena. If we seek for a form of coexistence, it can be found only in the society in which everything is reduced to the free, though not always intrinsically indefinite, will

of the individuals. State and Church are now seen to be simply kinds of society.* The freedom of the individual goes so far that it can not recognize any compulsory opposition. It has the law of its own life in itself, and produces from its own being the forms of its action, so that, just as in the legitimately ordered events in nature, the antithesis of the individual and the universal seems to be removed.

But such an exaltation of the individual was originally united with very definite conditions. Every individual is regarded as a participant in an intelligible rational world, and it is only his relation to this which can justify the infinite value attributed to himself. It is, then, not the actual but the ideal individual—the individual as an ideal concept—to which this principle is adapted. Yet, as such an ideal individual, it is not something ready-made and completed, but something which develops itself and advances infinitely; not something isolated and opposed to the world and humanity, but something which includes the world and humanity, and receives them into its own circle. If the individual ever lives only for itself, from its very nature it can not do this without at the same time living for the whole world; and if it is its right, and, under some circumstances, its duty, to place itself in opposition to all established order, this can happen only because it has a fixed position in the rational world, and because it is from this relation that its freedom is realized and directed. It is not the reflective arbitrariness of the subjective reason of the single man which controls life, but the law of the objective reason, the meaning of which coincides with the universe.

Though such a theory may protect the principle of

* This principle is brought out with special clearness by Locke.

individuality from the ordinary attacks made upon it, it undoubtedly involves in itself a difficult problem and a serious conflict of opinions, found in the practical difference between the individual as he actually exists and the individual as thus idealized. In actual fact the individual is something situated by the side of other things, dependent, limited, selfishly standing aside and shutting out the ideals of reason. Now, this empirical individual is supposed to develop, broaden, improve itself; and it is strictly held that what is apparently irrational is only a lower degree of what is rational, and that there is no such thing as a radical evil. But in any case the distinction exists at the outset, and what is empirical is undeniably a power in life. To lay stress on only one point, How, in this view of it, is a coexistence of men according to rational principles to be made possible? Can a system of social ethics, defended alike by ancient and by Christian thought, be maintained here; and is there not danger that a systematic unity in human life and action will be destroyed by such a theory as this?

Moreover, in modern times, the contrast between the idealized and the actual individual has become greater than ever before. As the former is made prominent, the latter falls into the background. While in olden times it was possible for a single man, like Aristotle, to fathom all knowledge, in modern times even a Leibnitz must be contented to determine simply outlines, and to sketch distant views, and the share of the individual in the general possessions becomes continually smaller. For, however rapid advance the individual may make, the whole moves forward still more rapidly.

Moreover, the technical control of man over nature,

which is a distinguishing characteristic of our day, is obtained only by the fact that the individual takes his place as one member of a series, and, in his place, accomplishes only his own work. When Franklin calls man a "tool-making animal," it is evident how far that presupposes the community of labor. For what more can the most distinguished individual do than in some single respects to take a few steps forward, thus presupposing and using all earlier productions? In the business of a manufactory there appears a peculiarly tangible problem, which is common to the whole of modern life; there are a danger and a necessity that the individual must consider himself as a part of a great machine, and give up all claim to the whole. However immeasurably the grand result may be advanced, we can not keep back the question, Who, then, is profited by it in strictly mental culture?

In the development of social life, too, there has appeared an increasing dependence of the individual. In the place of a free society, we have the economy of the community, in which the individual seems to be more restricted than ever before by the regulations of Church and State.

But, aside from the fact that such problems have appeared only gradually, it is also true that, whenever they have been present to consciousness, they have themselves, in times of bold thought, served to urge power on to the utmost, rather than to deter it from the risks involved. Moreover, where one granted the incongruity between the ideal and the actual, despair did not seem to be in the least degree justified, since from the contradiction between the infinite and the finite arose the very problem of the world and of life, and no events had any significance except as they

tended to overcome that contradiction in the process of the development.

Yet still further complications arose from the fact that another theory of the individual was united with the one just given—a theory which is based upon a strictly physico-mechanical conception of the world. This considers the individual as given only empirically, as the medium through which all other events are evolved. It is the unchangeable atom, out of which all further formation is constructed, and to which everything must be reduced, if it is to possess any reality in the world. Its significance, then, does not consist in any relation to a rational realm, and consequently no principle involving the employment of a concept of value can be introduced; but the individual can find recognition only so far as it exists and acts as a force. Power and right must be considered here as coinciding perfectly. Regarded from this point of view, the development of the community seems to be a physico-mechanical problem: it serves to bring the single powers into such a relation that they mutually disturb one another as little as possible, and, of course, ideal questions here find no place.

Such theories (which we find fully developed in Hobbes, the most consistent political philosopher of modern times) are open to critieism in their fundamental principles, and they do not furnish the least assistance in elearing up the confusion of concepts involved in the discussion. But they add greatly to the embarrassment, from the fact that to this empirical atomistic individual is transferred the whole estimate of value which had been won for the ideal concept of an infinitely advancing microcosm. The single individual as empirically given is considered as valuable in itself. Inde-

pendently of all combinations in communities and in history, without any connection with an ideal world, it is presented as rationally justified, and as both the basis and the measure of all truth. The normal condition, which in the earlier theory floated before the endeavor as its goal, seems to be given from the outset here, and the whole arrangement of life is constructed on this supposition.*

The consequences of such an idealization of the phenomenon can be easily seen. The deification of the contingent element in the single individuals must necessarily lead ultimately to the degradation, even to the negation, of those operations involved in the reason, and must seriously endanger all ideal meaning in life. The individual is now judged to be something which can everywhere demand absolute recognition and enjoyment of existence, and, independently of all determination and activity, can establish its rights and claims;† everything arbitrary and base can screen itself behind the principle of the infinite value of its individuality, although, as a matter of fact, only the ideal concept has any right to appeal to such a principle. Moreover, the absolutely worthless and subjective freedom here de-

* Up to the present day, to presuppose normal men and normal relations is characteristic of all practical life, as in theories of education, and especially of legislation.

† It is worthy of notice, at the present time, that the priority of rights over duties is frequently proclaimed without any attempt at concealment, although evidently without any suspicion of the ultimate consequences involved in it. See Bourdet, "Vocabulaire des Principaux Termes de la Philosophie Positive," p. 55: "Les religions, soit révélées, soit metaphysiques, placent les devoirs avant les droits; mais la science expérimentale les pose inversement. Pour elle, les prérogatives personelles sont le fait nécessaire de la vie et de la civilisation." But, for such a confusion of concepts, no one individual nor one school can be especially blamed, since it is a result of the general development.

fended, if assumed as an ultimate principle, must render impossible, not only this or that particular form, but every rational development of the general life; and, although at first it exerts its dissolving power on what comes to it as foreign, ultimately it must make a most destructive attack upon the principles by the misrepresentation of which it has become an historical power.

In this connection we should remember that this idealization of the empirical individual at first served to stimulate to effort all the powers of man. Men seriously believed in the perfection of the theory, and from this faith derived an inducement to great deeds; but it was inevitable that the contradiction should soon become apparent, and the intrinsic falseness of the whole process of idealization be established.

The germs of this confusion in concepts can be traced back to the beginning of the modern era. Such confusion is clearly prominent in Spinoza; while in Locke it is the foundation of his whole practical philosophy, and from him it exerts an influence in all directions. Yet among the English the principle of the absolute value of the individual, and his absolute freedom from the general historical development, was supplemented and toned down to such an extent that its full consequences did not appear. It was left for Rousseau to develop them by a broader application of the principle. He carried out, in a classic style and in a complete form, the subjection of the entire content of the world to the intrinsic nature of the empirical individual. But in his writings, more clearly than anywhere else, appears the absurdity of ascribing to the isolated individual endeavors and feelings which are formed only in the life of the whole, and as the consequence of a long and gradual development.

A reaction naturally entered with the culmination of these doctrines in Rousseau and in the French Revolution which put his theories into practice. Various attempts were made to overthrow the principles which were thus practically illustrated. German idealism, with all its diversities in other respects, was agreed in maintaining the necessity and universal validity of the aims of the reason as against the contingency of the empirical individual. In common life the recognition of the facts of general development gained ground, whether one's sympathies were with the Church or the State, and the desire for a better defined social regulation of life and action became ever stronger.

But, however far we may agree on this point in our criticism, and in single abstract propositions, as soon as it becomes a question of a positive concrete system involving the topics discussed, the paths diverge, and we meet difficulty after difficulty. Socialism, in its narrower sense, can be recognized as a reaction which proceeds from a consistent application of this principle of individuality, and, so far at least, as an historical power which is a peculiar growth of modern times; but it maintains and even increases the confusion of the ideal and the actual, and satisfies the deeper mental needs so little that, with all its justification in the individual, it is very far from solving the problem before us. Yet just as little can we expect to find that solution in a straining and idealization of the churchly concept of the middle ages, or of the ancient concept of the state.

Such developments are not broad enough to comprehend the fullness and depth of the life which modern times have opened to the individual. That which constitutes the real meaning of the world can not again return to narrower forms, and that which presses into

unfathomable depths can not exhaust its being in the organizations of the phenomenal world. The thought of the infinite value of the individual as a whole endowed with reason can no more assume a secondary place than it can be lost sight of. Our own day thus stands in the midst of contradiction and contest, and is all the more agitated the more directly these influences affect the life of the individual man.

HUMANITY.

"L'homme n'est ni ange ni bête; et le malheur veut que qui vent faire l'ange fait la bête."—PASCAL.

IT is no easy task to gain a limited meaning for the concept of humanity. In scientific and popular definitions alike, narrower and wider significations are generally confused, almost without being noticed; and it is not the least important consequence of this vacillation that it often escapes our attention how many different problems are involved in this concept. For our consideration, two ideas are in particular to be distinguished, though the distinction does not involve the impossibility of their being combined—that of humanity as a special virtue in a system of ethical life, and humanity as a comprehensive principle which controls all action and feeling.

Both concepts first received distinctness of expression and general significance as the vigor of ancient thought began to decline. The term *φιλανθρωπία* is found among the older writers, but was first employed by the Stoics * in the specific sense in which we here consider it. It was necessary that the narrower forms of life, which had till then laid special claim to man,

* *φιλάνθρωπος* and *φιλανθωπία* served at first only to signify a friendly conduct toward men (as especially on the part of the gods); how little scientific significance the concept had is shown by the fact that the substantive *φιλανθρωπία* never occurs in Aristotle.

should be, if not destroyed, at least restrained sufficiently to allow man to consider what is human as the essential element. The Stoic estimate of the value of man rested upon his position in relation to reason; but the concept formed from such a connection was very soon taken hold of on other sides, brought into other relations, and so transformed. In the later part of the ancient era, the different theories, with all their problems and distortions, diverged and interpenetrated one another as they do to-day.

Yet from that time the histories of the stricter and the broader principles become distinct. After it was once clearly presented, the thought could not of course again be lost, that certain tasks and feelings arise from the relation of man to man. But the principle that this relation is regarded as the one which penetrates and controls the whole activity of life is involved in certain cosmological presuppositions, and must be considered a characteristic of the times in which it is found.

Yet, in the concept of humanity, in the narrower, and, as a principle, the generally accepted sense, as soon as we question more closely the definition of its meaning, we find so much divergence of opinion that we can make the concept include what is exactly contradictory. At the outset, the origin of this humanity is twofold; namely, the conviction of the peculiar value of the human being, and then that complex feeling which is generated by the social life of man. The conviction involves the consideration of the whole theory of the world and man's position in it. According to what man seems to be, in relation to the whole, will he be esteemed by his fellow man; and so the meaning of humanity, and its significance in the questions of human life, assume different phases, and have their share in the his-

torical development of thought. Yet the action caused by such humanity is always conditioned and limited by fixed general aims; and, moreover, it is a common element in all varieties of theory to conceive of humanity as a duty, the defense of which by a man lends value to himself so far as he esteems and promotes the interests of other rational beings.

But the purely natural impulses are of no less value to humanity. It is the similarity of the conditions of life, of destinies, of feelings, which makes the interests of one the immediate concern of the others. Spinoza has keenly shown how sympathetic feelings and actions must arise from the common mechanism of the psychical life; and although perhaps influences from other directions are involved in what he prizes so highly, still it is not necessary that we should give up that element of the simple impulse of feeling, in order that humanity may become a power to individuals and to the whole.

This humanity of feeling has no previously determined content and definite task arising from its nature, but it allows objects to approach it that it may seize upon them here and there where it is most aroused. And it is not so much the vigorously active man, who calls for a share in it, as the one who suffers; not the rational being, ruled by design, but the empirical individual, with all his contingencies and needs, which are here considered only as weaknesses.

The significance of this kind of humanity, so nearly related to pity, consists especially in its intrinsic application to the individual of the rational obligation to assume a human relation to his fellows, and in its participation in man's natural instincts. It consists, further, in its presentation of a counter-weight to what might otherwise become defects in the interpretation of the con-

cept. Yet, exclusively adopted, it would decline into an indefinite and formless condition, since we could be sure of meeting the greatest confusion of concepts, where this kind of humanity was made the starting-point in the management of life. Moreover, humanity as arising from these feelings has never become an historical power; for such feelings, with all their significance for the individual life, are still too deficient in persistent and common content to be able to furnish anything of importance to the general relations of mankind. Everything contingent and defective can take refuge under the protection of those feelings, and can demand and receive recognition, just so far as such a humanity conflicts with moral order and the general designs of the race.

In the historical development of the concept both kinds of humanity are naturally interwoven, sometimes the one and sometimes the other being the more prominent; yet to the specific meaning is always given the preponderance over the ideal. To follow out these developments is beyond the limits of our undertaking; but, in the endeavor to explain a possible confusion of concepts, we can not refrain from pointing out the essential difference between the Christian and the modern idea of humanity.

In the view of Christianity, man did not possess by nature an incontestable value, but all his importance came from his relation to God; so that, in the general life of the race, he can be an object of value and of active care only as he is presumptively a member of the divine kingdom. The humanity of Christianity, as well as its whole ethical system, can not be severed from its religious basis. The ultimate purpose of active humanity must, therefore, be the winning of the individual to the ethico-religious life, for which reason it directs its at-

tention chiefly to the inner nature, in the endeavor to transform and re-create it. So far as external things are concerned, misfortune and misery are considered as something which can not be removed from this sinful world; it is of no use, then, to try to remove them entirely; we can only escape their consequences where they endanger and oppress the individual. Yet here a rich abundance of feelings finds expression, and Christianity proves itself to be far more mild and tender than were the Idealists of the decline of the ancient era.*

But, when modern thought raises its estimate of man because of his share in the common reason, humanity must free itself from all dependence, and take precedence of the other duties. When, moreover, the aim of life is taken to be the development and employment of every power, the new age must consider it its duty to the individual to bring him into such an activity, to realize all his endowments, to provide the external means by which action is conditioned, and to remove all impediments which stand in his way. The individual is thus intrinsically regarded as something naturally and normally developed, so that it is not a question of a change, but only of an increase of life. Yet the modern idea of humanity can not be criticised, as paying attention only to the external relations; it taught rather, originally, that everything external ministers to the inner life; until gradually the dangerous tendency appeared of looking for all happiness, as arising from the care for the external relations, and from the removal of external impediments. But, so far as these impediments are concerned, they are regarded, not only

* This appears in the way in which the Fathers, especially of the Latin Church, defended, as against the Stoics, the principles of Christian charity.

as something which is to be opposed here and there, and the results of which are to be reduced to a minimum, but as something which in a rational world should nowhere be allowed to exist, and which, by the exercise of activity, should be utterly removed. Hence, in view of the evils of the world, a far more comprehensive and pervasive activity is displayed than ever before. Yet the ultimate aim of this activity everywhere is not, as it is in the case of Christianity, to mitigate suffering, but to positively increase active exertion and prosperity.

While, beneath all divergencies of opinion on this point, there is a common and uncontested ethical basis, we still find a broader idea of the concept in the view which regards human existence, with the determination of action which springs from it, as the essential meaning of life; and this broader idea not only involves a specific cosmology, but also is dependent upon the historical development of the principle. The significance of the particular connections in which the individual is otherwise placed must have been withdrawn, to make place for the operation of the human reason in general; and the demand of the reason, in its general endeavors and feelings, must be admitted and maintained, if it is to become a power controlling the life of the whole. There must be certain great common aims and destinies, by which mankind may learn to understand and feel its unity in the universe, through which individuals may find themselves brought into mutual relations and driven to community of action.

We find these views confirmed in those two epochs in which the concept of humanity assumed a controlling position in life—in the decline of the ancient, and the ambitious rise of the modern era. In the former, the theory of the philosophers was based upon the practical

universality of culture. Yet the significance of humanity was found, not so much in any power to produce a thorough change in the life of the whole, as in the fact that it freed the results of the restricted sphere of life from their original limitations, and extended and developed them in all directions. Its problem was to raise the content of life to a universal power. Yet, for that very reason, considered from the standpoint of those times, it had a preëminently abstract character; and, as the earlier thinkers used it, contributed directly rather to the dissolution of what existed, than to its reconstruction, and it became more closely united with constructive forces only in Christianity, to which it was a necessary condition. But, as the earlier interpretation of life was undermined, and faith in the great objective position of man in the universe was shaken, so much the more did humanity become simply a sentiment founded on the consciousness of the common misery and common need of help, such as serves to bring men together.

The humanity of modern times, on the other hand, is characteristic of a period of ambitious development. New and important duties are opened up to life, from before which everything recedes which pertains to special realms of action. Only mankind as a whole can undertake to know the world, to receive it into its sphere of power, to subject it to its aims. In order to approach such goals man must extend the hand to his fellow man, and all must work together for the common end. In this connection, humanity is especially the formative principle; it does not advance from the particular to the universal, and so analyze all specific forms, but it derives everything particular from a comprehensive cause, and limits, constructs, and forms it by that

cause. But, by this activity, not only the position of the whole but that of the individual also is incomparably advanced. Of the being which internally and externally controls, forms, and even creates the world, we can not have too high an opinion; so that, in fact, scientists can hardly find words in which fittingly to express so high an estimate of the position of man.

In so close a connection of the idea of humanity with the peculiarities of modern cosmology, it was unavoidable that the former should be drawn into all the conflicts in which the latter is involved. There is all the less necessity of our entering upon this question more fully, since there is here a repetition of essentially the same development which we have discussed when considering the principle of individuality. Here, too, we find a confusion of what is ideal with what is actual, and connected with it an alienation of the general principle, a gradual development of the contradiction involved, and, finally, an insupportable incongruity between the doctrine and practical life. The conception formed of the relation of man to the universe is in marked contrast to the estimate of his value in the realm of practical ethics. The latter takes into consideration, not so much the fact that man is brought by his physical organism into a series with the other living beings, and is conceived as subject to universal laws (for this would not help at all in the ultimate decision of his value), as the fact that the ideal concept of mankind and of men, and the theory of their participation in an ideal world, although not given up, are still seriously shaken. Thus the individual as actually existent, with narrowly limited power, remains subjected to his selfishness, and usually degrades the highest things to the littleness of his own private aims.

And even if we are not ready to give up the transfer to the actually existent individual of the comprehensive estimate which arises from the ideal concept of mankind, and is based upon that alone, this, theoretically regarded, is only holding on to the consequences when the premises are surrendered. But, practically, the danger arises of glorifying that which is phenomenal and contingent, and of employing the idea of humanity in the palliation of all that is wrong, and in the weakening of all the nobler duties of mankind, and also of awakening claims and justifying estimates, the foundations of which are perhaps exactly contradictory to the real meaning of life.

REALISM—IDEALISM.

"Non quia difficilia sunt non audemus, sed quia non audemus difficilia sunt."—SENECA.

THE term idea has a history long and full of vicissitudes, which mirrors with tolerable completeness the decisive changes in philosophy. As is well known, *ἰδέα* first received a specific meaning in Plato, who used it to denote the forms which lie at the basis of every existence, but which are not considered as arising originally in the mind, although comprehended by it. In this sense the expression remained specifically a scholastic term, so that it was always used with express reference to Plato.

Toward the end of the ancient era, with its entire transformation of the theories of the world, this definition also was changed; so that ideas were considered as originally existing in the mind of God, and thus received an essentially spiritual nature. Philo is the one in whom this change first appeared; many Church Fathers followed his example; and the new usage was fully established after Plotinus, on the basis of the Greek philosophy, had completed the transformation of the idea into something purely spiritual.

Accordingly, in the middle ages, ideas were considered as archetypes of things in the divine mind (Eckhart usually translates by *vorgênde bilde*), in which man has

a share only through his relation to God. But gradually, and especially through Nominalism, the transition was made to a purely subjective and human interpretation.* In this sense the word seems to have been first used in popular speech in France (we find in Montaigne *idée* as about synonymous with the German *vorstellung*); but it received a specific coinage at the beginning of modern philosophy, when it was used by Descartes, and others who followed his example, to denote all that is immediately apprehended by the mind, and so as the expression of the simplest psychical element.†

Yet it was necessary from the beginning to carefully avoid referring the word simply to the sensuous pictures of representation. Wolff translated idea by *vorstellung*, to which term it has been restricted by the Germans from the outset; and, as a scientific term, it has gradually lost its original meaning, except in its special uses, as in Locke's "association of ideas."

After a number of attempts in the eighteenth century to give a more precise and expressive definition, a new tendency, starting from Kant, was more successful. In so far as he understood by idea a necessary concept of the reason, to which no counterpart in the

* See Goclen, "Lexicon Philosophicum," under *Idea:* "Ideæ sumuntur nonnunquam pro conceptionibus seu notionibus communibus."

† Descartes, "Responsiones," iii. 5: "Ego passim ubique ac præcipue hoc ipso in loco ostendo me nomen ideæ sumere pro omni eo, quod immediate a mente percipitur, adeo ut cum volo et timeo, quia simul percipio me velle et timere, ipsa volitio et timor inter ideas a me numerentur, ususque sum hoc nomine, quia jam tritum erat a philosophis ad formas perceptionum mentis divinæ significandas." Spinoza, "Ethics," ii. def. 3: "Per ideam intelligo mentis conceptum, quem mens format, propterea quod res est cogitans." In England, following the lead of others (as Cudworth), Locke, in particular, made a place for the new signification, though not without a struggle. In our language, Leibnitz was the first so to use the word.

senses can be given, he in a measure followed Plato; except that what Plato considered as something actually existent previous to the existence of the mind, he located in the mind itself; and what had been before a form of being superior to all becoming was now limited to impulsive force and law of action. The later philosophers carried out further the tendency here suggested; and although each one has given to the concept something peculiar to himself, yet in its general meaning the controlling influence of the Kantian definition can not be mistaken. Most other nations have held to the use of the term as seen in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

We must, then, distinguish four stages in the history of the term. What had been at first the primary concept of an æsthetic-metaphysical cosmology passes over into a religious sense, and there receives a purely spiritual significance, and then that which belongs to the power which controls the world is gradually transferred to the individual thinking being, until at last the expression is limited to a subjective psychological signification. But then a reaction sets in, since a universal and objective force acting within the mind is recognized as the impulsive power of thought.

The meaning of "ideal" naturally follows that of "idea." Ideal is first found in the best period of Scholasticism, in Albert, Thomas, and others, in the sense of archetypal. Although "real" is often opposed to it, yet the ideal should not for that reason be degraded to the imaginary.* But then the same change took place in this term as in the leading concept; and, especially

* *Realis* I find first in Abelard's "Dialectics"; *realitas* is a coinage of Duns Scotus. *Realista*, as a party term, is found first, according to Prantl, in Silvester de Prieria (x. 1523).

after the time of Gassendi, ideal and real, as well as idea and reality, became antithetical. Yet, in the specific phraseology of the schools, the whole mental being, so far as it consists of ideas, was called ideal; and the name Idealist was thus formed, to signify those who, in direct opposition to the Materialists, reduce all being to ideas, and deny the existence of external things.*

Kant follows this definition; yet, in place of the "material or psychological" Idealism, he substitutes the "transcendental" (also formal, or critical) Idealism, according to which "all objects of an experience possible to us are only phenomena; that is, mere ideas, which, as represented, have no existence in themselves outside of our thought" (iii., 346, 347). Fichte then gave to Idealism a decidedly practical tendency, since he understood it as the philosophical doctrine which explains the determinations of consciousness by the action of the intelligence. In opposition to this is Realism, particularly Dogmatism, which considers the phenomenal world as an existence independent of the mind. This signification given by Fichte, notwithstanding the many divergent definitions of the later philosophers, has remained the standard for the general understanding and use of the term. At all events, the reference of the term to the practical side of the question now predominates over its purely theoretical signification.†

If, in examining the question, we employ this in-

* Wolff especially establishes the phraseology, when he enumerates "three erroneous sects among the philosophers," namely, the "Skeptics, Materialists, and Idealists" (see in his "Works," 583). But Leibnitz, in whom I find the first antithesis of Materialists and Idealists, uses the expressions in a less specific sense, since he calls Plato the greatest Idealist (186 a).

† The distinction between the expressions "*ideal*" and "*ideell*" is worthy of notice.

terpretation, which has now become prevalent, the history of Idealism must involve the discussion of the tendency and nature of all human action. Though in all kinds of Idealism it may be an essential and common principle that man, in knowledge and action, is determined rather by the world present to the mind than by the phenomenon given through the senses, still this principle has received in its historical development very different forms, of which three are specially prominent.

In the ancient Idealism the world of pure forms is something which is objectively present, and manifests itself in the phenomenon, so that the mind is not under the necessity of producing it, in order that it may exist; the ideal powers act from eternity to eternity throughout the whole world; but with them the antithesis of what is material is eternally present, and it can never disappear. The ideal presents itself in the world, and constitutes in all events the essential and valuable force; but it can not form the world wholly as an addition to itself, and absorb it completely into itself. Our function is to know it, to recognize it, to use it in action without mistake; but ancient thought was far from demanding that the ideas be brought to a full realization in the world, and that the phenomena be conformed wholly to reason.

In Christianity, the antithesis of two worlds is not original and eternal, but an outgrowth; it is never formally recognized, and, if recognized, is to be, in part at least, again removed. The events of a higher world overarch and temporarily include empirical events, and are evidently manifested in them; but within this world the antithesis can not be removed; the evil is considered as empirically the more powerful; so that the problem here is, not so much to transform what is

permanent, according to the demands of ethics, as to rise essentially above the pressure of what is antagonistic, and not to allow one's faith in the reality of the higher world to be shaken by anything apparently contradictory to it in the phenomenal world.

With all the difference there is between these two kinds of Idealism, we can not fail to detect essential characteristics which are common to them, as contrasted with the modern doctrine. Each in its own way makes it possible to unite with all struggle and pain the certain rest of ultimate possession. This earlier Idealism has none of the restless, impetuous, timidly doubting, passionate nature, which at the present day we often necessarily associate with the concept.

Modern Idealism has from the outset a thoroughly peculiar character. We have here, too, an antithesis; the antithesis of reason and phenomenon in an intelligible and an empirical world. But this antithesis is comprehended in a single universe. Reason is not something floating over the world, and only participating in it; but it has its home in it, and lays claim to the very place which the phenomenon occupies. Its elements meeting thus in one point, the antithesis becomes a full contradiction, which must be absolutely removed; and the process of the removal of this contradiction is, strictly speaking, what we have given to us in the events of the world.

The ideal is thus not something archetypal, which one can make his aim, with the consciousness of never being able to attain it, but it is a power exercised wholly in the phenomenon. It is not so much something in itself estimable as something simply powerful in being and in action. In this view, mind, which seeks to be self-active and to determine everything by

itself, is not given as something ready-made in the world, to manifest itself as representing or creating, but it goes through a process of development, and attains full control only gradually, as it advances from one stage to another. It always requires a more vigorous effort of thought to develop this theory, because it strikes far more deeply into what is empirically given than was the case with the earlier forms of Idealism. Since there can not be the least gap left between reason and phenomenon, the whole world must be apprehended, transformed, and worked over into a thought-realm. The ever-returning and ever-repeated demand is to make everything rational real, and everything real rational. Here, and here for the first time, it is considered as precisely the same thing to show anything to be rational and to claim that it is realized.

Hence, while Idealism before was always in danger of mistaking the mutual dependence of the internal and the external, and of leaving the visible condition of the world unchanged, and while it was formerly a favorite way of avoiding disagreeable demands to praise the intrinsic elevation of the mind above the world, it afterward came to be considered an unavoidable task to make the phenomenal world itself the abiding-place of reason, to establish everywhere the conditions of a rational life, and to remove every opposing element.*

We need not follow out the immeasurable influence

* See Fichte, "Reden an die deutsche Nation" ("Works," vii. 379). It is a natural instinct of man, to be given up only in a case of real necessity, to find heaven already on this earth, and imagine something as floating along before him, which is eternally permanent, in his daily work on earth; to plant and cherish what is imperishable in what is itself temporal, and to connect this life with the eternal, not merely in an inconceivable way and only by a chasm which is inscrutable to mortal sight, but in a way evident to the mortal eye itself.

of this general tendency in special lines of illustration, since the whole of modern history bears witness to it. But a part of its general effect is found in the two tendencies which we have so often seen acting with and against each other in modern thought.

The theory which judges the reason to be the rational explanation of the world's existence and the force which directs its history may explain all events by the speculative tendency of thought reaching out far beyond the philosophical schools; but, for the apprehension of the phenomenon, and its union with the problem of the reason, the empirical tendency takes the precedence. In the former, the danger arises of being satisfied with a purely theoretical transformation of the phenomenal world; in the latter, there is great danger of limiting one's self to the activity of what is external, and, without deeper insight into the nature of the rational process, of demanding its immediate realization in actual occurrences.

Out of this latter tendency arises the peculiar form of modern Radicalism, which, in the course of time, has always gained ground. In fact, modern Idealism is thoroughly radical, since it desires to carry out in the phenomenal world the demands of the reason, wholly and without abatement, and not to let the least thing remain without a rational justification. But it gives to this problem, at the outset, so deep an interpretation that it attempts to understand the inner reasons of the development of things; and, as soon as that happens, it follows as a matter of course that the attainment of the goal is not possible in any given moment, but involves the entire process of the events of the world. Not that it should be made an objection to any such tendency, that it follows out its aims too regardlessly, or with too

much energy; for we can not understand how one in carrying out the principles of the reason is bound to regard any other claims, and how he can exert too much energy. The mistake is rather that the interpretation given is too foreign to the subject, and the aim is fixed absolutely or predominantly only on the development of the external relations and bearings of life, while the subjective relations are assumed as a side issue, and so are usually disregarded. In fact, what is to be attained is considered an external production, for the delaying of which there is not the least reason; so that, of course, from the given premises, Radicalism alone is the legitimate conclusion. But with all the development of external power which it adduces, the depth of human nature remains untouched, and all the deeper interests of life are neglected. But if the peculiar nature of rational existence and action finds no recognition, we can say that, philosophically considered, the whole school derives its name of "Radicalism" from its real contradictory, since it never goes back to the primary root of things.

In any case, in the historical development of this school, the value of the subjective relations has been diminished, as the demand for an immediate realization of the ideal has become more pressing. It is not so much that greater claims have been made as that their relation to actual events has been changed. So far as claims are concerned, one can hardly demand more from any one, and can hardly express himself more explicitly, than did Sir Thomas More. But his Utopia lies outside of the world, while these ideal formations approach the world more and more closely, and finally claim to entirely absorb it.*

* For this reason thoughtful minds have clearly foreseen great transformations. Even Leibnitz spoke of the general revolution which threat-

It is further worth our while to notice the contradiction between the real doctrine of this school and the form which it assumes. For, so far as the doctrine is concerned, one can not at all maintain here an idealistic cosmology as a system which has for its fundamental presupposition the predication of the thought-element of human life and of the universe alike; and yet this whole system is carried out under the form of Idealism, and there are, perhaps, relatively more idealists in the subjective sense in this than in any other school.

Whatever theoretical objections may be made, it can not be denied that modern Idealism has ever assumed more and more the form of Radicalism in the sense just explained. This development, as we have seen, tends to alienate itself, and becomes narrowed with every advance; and whatever is not included in it has for the most part lost its foothold among the first principles of that Idealism itself.*

But doubt and dissent have extended beyond this, and led to a general reaction which has frequently called itself "Realism." Reality is here supposed to be the measure and the goal of the endeavor. Whenever idea and experience become contradictory, the latter is to turn the scale; all advance is to be limited by the rela-

ened Europe (p. 387 a), and Rousseau said with great definiteness, "nous approchons de l'état du crise et du siècle des révolutions" ("Emil," Bk. iii.).

* It is not for us to explain the reason of this; we would only show that it is a most superficial view to take of it, to suppose that the whole commotion is produced by the fact that some parties have gone "too far" in carrying out their modern principles, and that the whole blame thus lies with the "excesses" of Radicalism. For, whatever objections may be made to modern culture, it is by no means to be treated so slightingly as to suppose that it could be seriously endangered by such elements as these. These could never have obtained influence, had they not been fairly deduced from the doctrines laid down.

tions which are given in the phenomena, and so is to be a gradual process.

Of the latter truth, the leading idealists themselves might apparently be called as witnesses, provided it were certain that the unattainableness of the idea was caused purely by the immeasurableness of its content, and that it was not our own weakness which removed the goal far from us. Yet, if the meaning is that ideal and reality should never be brought into contradiction, such a view is free from danger only when there is no doubt involved in the concept of reality. Are we to understand by that what is momentarily present in the phenomenon? Then every one must contradict it who acts and strives with design. And, further, does reality signify the world with or without mind? The usual method of the opponent of Idealism is to represent the world as already existent without the aid of the mind, and then, to the endeavors of thought, to oppose what is thus permanent as an insuperable power; but this assumption presupposes the very point at issue. All Idealism starts from the principle that mind can enter into the phenomenon as an active and formative power, and, of itself, can change the condition of things—a principle which is emphasized by modern Idealism, in that it considers the mind as something which continually increases, and is capable of infinite development. Where shall such a being find stationary and impassable limits? Where, as opposed to it, shall anything external establish an absolute compulsion?

Such a faith is the possession of ambitious times. Nations and individuals dare to indulge it in the consciousness of inner power to oppose the relations in which they are placed, and to make the world a work-

shop of the mind. It is not what is given which forms here the measure of the possible; but one desires to pass beyond this, and boldly dares to strive after and obtains that which to the reflective consideration seems utterly impossible. For to such reflection everything great must appear incomprehensible before being realized, since its ideas are limited by what is commonplace and ordinary. That, too, which ultimately brings resistance and obstruction does not at such times act at the outset to invalidate the determination of the problem, but makes itself felt only in the struggle to carry it out. And, finally, man prefers to yield externally rather than to surrender absolutely, since even in his failure he saves that which constitutes the content and worth of life, and raises himself into an intelligible world.

But, on the contrary, it is very different when the intellectual activity of a period has passed its culmination; when the insufficiency of the individual life as contrasted with the universal problem of the reason is clearly seen; when the antitheses present from the beginning show themselves, in the decay of the power of penetration, to be contradictions, and thus fall asunder. Then what is external appears immense, the pressure of its power over us invincible, the mind, with all that it can undertake, insignificant. It is not that the world has thus become different, but we have changed; things appear larger, because we have become smaller: yet we involuntarily seek to lay the blame on something outside of ourselves, and wish to explain as absolutely impossible that for which we have no longer the strength.*

* In the decline of ancient thought, Seneca especially has made this fact prominent (see "Ep.," 116, 8): "Nolle in causa est, non posse prætenditur"; likewise the passage before quoted. Among modern writers, Fichte especially has opposed the comfortable yielding to circumstances. See vi. 70, *et seq.*

And if we have once lost faith in our own strength, we are really, as a matter of fact, weaker, and every additional doubt and failure increases this weakness. Reflective wisdom, the virtue of old age, shows us most vividly the contradictions of theories and the impossibility of their execution; the more closely we examine them, the more do the opposing elements seem to increase, while our own force shrivels up; everything human becomes small, persons and actions alike; and, in fact, regarded from this point of view, they are small; only the view is not broad enough to include any living, active, creative being in the world.

That ideas are then degraded to abstract thoughts, even ultimately to arbitrary images of imagination, is as little to be wondered at as that opponents of such ideas believe that they are superior to all those who maintain them in any form. But, in such tendencies of thought, of course nothing is decided concerning the ultimate signification of ideas in history and in life. Whatever occurs here that is great, for this they remain the most important power in the world; and, at all times, the development of thought will be ultimately determined by the school which can show that its doctrines are based upon ideas, and can be defended by the ideal theory.

OPTIMISM—PESSIMISM.

"Tu audeas dicere, hoc et illud est in mundo malum, cujus explicare, dissolvere neque originem valeas neque causam?"—ARNOBIUS.

I CAN give but insufficient information concerning the origin of the terms Optimism and Pessimism. Optimism is the older, as it was generally used in the first half of the eighteenth century to denote Leibnitz's doctrine of the best world; while Pessimism seems to be a production of this century, and to have been brought into general use especially by Schopenhauer.

We have no occasion to discuss the varied and vacillating meanings in which the terms are employed as applied at present; only it is important to distinguish carefully their use in a system of philosophy from their use in common life. The former concerns especially a theoretical judgment upon the significance and value of the universe; the latter, an estimate of the lot of mankind, or of the individual life; so that the answer will depend, in the one case, on an entire system of philosophy, but, in the other, on the relation of the human race to the problems of its life.

The many doubts in which the first undertaking is involved are as evident as is the fact that the question itself can be raised only upon certain presuppositions. The question can find no place, except in connection

with a system of cosmology which hopes to pass judgment upon the essence of things and the final causes of events. But the circumstance that, practically, it assumes a prominent position in all systems of the kind leads us to suspect that we are dealing here with something more than a mere logico-dialectical trifle. It is founded rather upon the instinct which leads us to justify to the practical reason as valuable that which the theoretical reason has wrought out as the essence of the world, and thus to overcome a dualism in the reason itself, which is at the outset as unavoidable as it is ultimately unendurable. However much the ontological consideration of things and the estimates of their value are to be kept separate; however little we can from the one arrive directly at the other; and however much it may seem a superhuman undertaking to try to combine the two as a unity; still, as they both concern the same world, our thinking, so far as it remains true to its highest functions, will be unable to give up that attempt, and will feel itself impelled to new hazards by every failure. From this point of view there is not merely a single kind of philosophical Optimism, but there are as many species as there are attempts to obtain an adequate knowledge of the world. Every great general tendency essentially justifies itself when it proves that what it shows to be essential is at the same time valuable.

At the basis of every theory there is a common presupposition: the conviction that, ultimately, good and being are essentially united, and that evil is not something substantial, but something which manifests itself on the surface of things and in coexistence with them. This presupposition, which arouses at once all the objections to a philosophical Optimism, was ex-

pressed by Plato in the statement that the truly existent (*τὸ ὄντως ὄν*) is coincident with the good; and this is the origin of the doctrine which has pervaded history, that evil is to be regarded as a privation.*

But this general theory receives in every great system of cosmology a concrete meaning expressive of the peculiarity of that system. Throughout Greek thought Optimism has an æsthetic character. The world is good, even perfect, because it reveals everywhere measure and order, connection and balance. We find this principle expressed even before the time of the Socratic school.† Plato and Aristotle carried the idea out to its full extent,‡ and it maintained itself throughout the entire Greek philosophy and cosmology, extending as they extended.

There was a development or, rather, a change, only so far as, with the entrance of contradictions into the world and into life, it became necessary to yield to discords their rights, and so to transfer harmony to a position beyond the immediate phenomenon, provided one wished to maintain it as a general principle. We find in the Stoics the doctrine that what is antagonistic to the good is likewise necessary to harmoniously supplement the whole; but Plotinus finally brought out most emphatically the doctrine that a completed harmony must

* Augustine gave to this doctrine its most pregnant expression, especially in the "Enchiridion ad Laurentium de Fide, Spe et Caritate." According to his phraseology, evil is not *causa efficiens*, but only *causa deficiens*.

† See, especially, Diogenes of Apollonia (Frg. 4 by Mullach); *οὐ γὰρ ἄν οὕτω δεδάσθαι οἷόν τε ἦν ἄνευ νοήσιος ὥστε καὶ πάντων μέτρα ἔχειν, χειμῶνός τε καὶ θέρεος καὶ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρης καὶ ὑετῶν καὶ ἀνέμων καὶ εὐδιέων. Καὶ τὰ ἄλλα εἴ τις βούλεται ἐννοέεσθαι, εὑρίσκοι ἄν οὕτω διακείμενα, ὡς ἀνυστὸν κάλλιστα.*

‡ Aristotle applies it to life, "Eth.," 1170 a, 19: *τὸ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων. ὡρισμένον γάρ, τὸ δ' ὡρισμένον τῆς τ'ἀγαθοῦ φύσεως.*

contain sharp antitheses, which are fully unified only when considered in their relations to the universe. The different arts offer numerous examples of this: a Thersites has his place in the epic; pictures can not be painted wholly in light; and artistic music must contain discords. Even if the harmony of the world remains incomprehensible to us, Plotinus can refer to the saying of Heraclitus that a concealed harmony is higher than one which is revealed.

The historical influence of this transcendent æsthetic Optimism extends far beyond the Grecian world, and in this form the primary principle has been able to adapt itself to all later systems. When Augustine understood the world as the self-manifestation of the divine being, his concept of order as all-comprehensive took precedence of the good, the true, and the beautiful, and in ultimate analysis evil seemed to disappear. After him Scotus Erigena advocated this kind of Optimism with great energy; Scholasticism appropriated it, and Leibnitz endeavored to make it intelligible by further analogies.*

Christianity, according to its general interpretation of the world, would have had to defend an ethical Optimism, in which the order of the world is shown to be one which in the most complete way realizes the moral laws. This would have involved the appearance of the antithesis between a stricter and a milder interpretation, which is seen in the old dispute, whether the world is created for the sake of the glory or of the goodness of

* See 548 b: "C'est comme dans ces inventions de perspective, où certains beaux desseins ne paraissent que confusion, jusqu'à ce qu'on les rapporte à leur vrai point de vue, ou qu'on les regarde par le moyen d'un certain verre ou miroir.—Ainsi les déformités apparentes de nos petits mondes se réunissent en beautés dans le grand.

God, whether justice or love is ultimately decisive, and, in either case, Optimism would have become strictly a Théodicée.* There was no lack of sympathy with such attempts. But, to the common thought, evil was too real, and moral guilt especially was viewed too positively as something which absolutely should not exist, to allow of its recognition in any connection which justified it. In the fear of weakening the antithesis between good and evil by such speculations, it was the usual custom to meet only the superficial objections, while the fundamental question was set aside as transcending the power of the human reason.

Modern thought, however, with its unconditional confidence in the power of reason in the world and in the human mind, applied to the problem its full strength. There was agreement from the outset in believing that what is valuable is to be sought not in any one specific quality, but in the fullness of power and life itself; yet the two directions of thought which we have so often met are developed here also, and produce two forms of Optimism—the logical and the physical. In the former, the world is justified in that, when exhaustively considered, it is seen to be a work of reason itself. But reason is here considered as, in its essence, theoretical; and the world is judged to be the best because it begins and ends in thought. In such a case it is the formal determinations of thought which are assumed to control the world; and, only when every real content of every kind is reduced or, rather, is sacrificed to these, is the real proved to be rational and the rational to be real. What thought furnishes here as essential is, on that account, considered also as good; and to show that anything is necessary means the same

* Leibnitz seems to have originated the expression Théodicée.

thing as ultimately to justify it.* This doctrine is defended especially by Spinoza and the German Constructive philosophers, and it may be considered as culminating preëminently in Hegel.

Against this derivation of the value of the universe from the logical process as thus conceived, Leibnitz fought with the utmost energy. Yet, when he charges this doctrine with confusing different concepts, the question arises whether his own attempt at a solution be not open to the same objection. When we work our way through the varied and not entirely self-consistent mass of material which he has heaped up in the Théodicée in defense of his own opinion, and reach the germ which is peculiarly his own, we find that his doctrine is not precisely what it would seem to be at the first glance. He considers the world the best, because it brings the greatest amount of existence into reality and develops vital force in the greatest degree. All completeness consists in quantity of being; perfection is increase of that quantity, and all pleasure is the sensation of completeness and perfection. However much he thus endeavored to determine being and power by this most general concept, the image of physical power always forced its way in, as was evident in the fact that to him the universe appeared as an aggregation. The many are so united that the greatest exertion of power takes place in the whole, and thus a kind of "metaphysical geometry" is practiced in the universe.†

* See Hegel, viii. 193: "Essential and good are synonymous." Fichte, vii. 14: "Necessary, and therefore good;" ii. 135: "The moral world is not the best, but it is the only possible and completely necessary world, that is, the absolutely good."

† Among the numerous passages adducible here, that from the "De Rerum Orig. Radic." ("Works," 147 b) most clearly expresses the Leibnitzian doctrine: "Hinc vero manifestissime intelligitur ex infinitis pos-

Everything which apparently contradicts such a theory disappears before the consideration that we can view as decisive, not the individual of any kind, but only the whole; and that, in connection with this whole, the combination of individual things judged to be of less importance can often be more productive than the combination of greater things.* Evil, too, is here justified, in that the world which contains it realizes more force, and so is better than a world devoid of evil.

This attempt at a defense of the universe has exerted an influence upon scientific thought far beyond that involved in its purely scholastic form. Leibnitz derived from it the law of the least possible exertion of force; men like Lessing and Herder approved of its fundamental principle; and at the present day many prominent scholars adhere to it, and even in Darwinism we can discover a certain application of it.

It does not concern us how many objections may be urged against all these forms of philosophical Optimism

sibilium combinationibus seriebusque possibilibus existere eam, per quam plurimum essentiæ seu possibilitatis perducitur ad existendum. Semper scilicet est in rebus principium determinationis quod a maximo minimove petendum est, ut nempe maximus præstetur effectus minimo ut sic dicam sumtu. Et hoc loco tempus, locus, aut ut verbo dicam, receptivitas vel capacitas mundi haberi potest pro sumtu sive terreno in quo quam commodissime est ædificandum, formarum autem varietates respondent commoditati ædificii multitudinique et elegantiæ camerarum. Et sese res habet ut in ludis quibusdam cum loca omnia in tabula sunt replenda secundum certas leges, ubi nisi artificio quodam utare, postremo spatiis exclusus iniquis plura cogeris relinquere loca vacua, quam poteras vel volebas."

* See "German Writings," i. 412: "An unimportant thing added to an unimportant thing can often produce a better result than the combination of two others, each of which is in itself more worthy than either of the others. Herein is concealed the secret of predestination and the solution of the difficulty. Duo irregularia possunt aliquando facere aliquid regulare."

in general, and against each one in particular. The mere consideration of such theories will be seriously affected particularly by the objection that all attempts at solution presuppose a complete absorption of the individual in the whole, while the individual existences of the world must lay claim to different kinds of independence, according as they are parts of a work of art, elements of a logical process, or members of a sum-total. Yet in every particular form of Optimism, philosophical criticism will show the onesidedness and insufficiency of its concepts and propositions as compared with the general problem. All these it will disintegrate, at least in so far as they seek to offer dogmatically an ultimate solution.

In connect on with such a criticism, theoretical Pessimism undoubtedly finds justification. Whether it refers to the lack of definiteness of concepts in those positive systems, or opposes to them the immediate results of experience and sensation, it presents a well-grounded opposition. But the matter assumes a different aspect when Pessimism believes that it is able to estimate the real nature of the optimistic attempts, and ultimately to overthrow them, so as to establish itself as superior to them in approximation to the truth. For it usually fails to notice the deeper motives of those attempts, and its strongest weapon is its reference to the phenomenon which stands in opposition to every kind of Optimism. But none of those systems refer to the primary phenomenon. They do not assert that what is immediately given to the senses presents itself as rational, but only that in the events of the world something rational ultimately effectuates and realizes itself. But to attain this we must rise, perhaps, far above the phenomenon, and even come into opposition to it; so that philosophical

Optimists, like Plato or Augustine, can be admitted to be Pessimists, so far as Empiricism goes. In any case, such men do not need to go to the school of our modern Pessimists to be instructed concerning the severe side of life. The German Idealists, too, especially Fichte, did not in their judgments overrate the world of the immediate phenomenon;* and, if Leibnitz can be quoted as unconditionally an Optimist, and can be brought forward as the type of that school, this is the result, not so much of his philosophical theory of the universe, as of the combination with that of a purely personal characteristic—the endeavor to look, as far as possible, on the bright side of everything.

Optimism is certainly assailable, but, in fact, only because it ventures upon a task which surpasses our powers, and unavoidably imposes limits too narrow for the solution of a problem which stretches out into infinity. In this respect, however, it only shares the fate of all such ideas of the reason as can be contradicted and ridiculed equally well from the standpoint of passing events and from that of the reasoning understanding. Optimism may be attacked in the wittily frivolous style of a Voltaire or in the bitterly coarse manner of a Schopenhauer, and in particular cases may be justly open to criticism; while its fundamental tendency is not touched by any such attacks.

But, if Pessimism then wishes to build itself up into a philosophical system, and to maintain positively

* See Fichte, ii. 97: "Often we can not form too low an opinion of the immediate phenomenon. However mean an image we form of it, it is often superior to experience. Yet he who thinks evil of the general power of mankind calumniates mankind, and incidentally condemns himself." V. 537: "Since things are as they are, misery is still the best of all that is in the world." Moreover, it should not so often be forgotten that Hegel discriminates very definitely between phenomenon and reality.

the doctrine of the worst possible world, we must assert that such an attempt shares all the dangers and errors of Optimism, without being justified by any fundamental tendency of the reason, or showing itself successful in comprehending an abundance of phenomena under a positive principle. If Optimism applies concepts of value to the universe, there is sense in this, at least so far as it proceeds from the postulate of an essential connection of phenomena with reason; but, how, by a separation of the two, one can succeed in carrying over such concepts into the universe, it is difficult to understand. Though one may prove again and again that misery predominates in the life of the individual, of the race, of all sensitive existence, what would that prove in regard to the whole, in which all this externally disappears? * All the great Optimists have made the fate of mankind a part of and subordinate to the fate of the universe; and, if Leibnitz, especially, holds that imperfections in particular lines may be essential to the good of the whole, his philosophy would not (though his feelings might) prevent his explaining all human misery as one of these imperfections necessary in the interests of the whole.†

In brief, we can not yield to Pessimism, as a theory, any more significance than it attains from the simple fact that it is a reaction from Optimism. The whole question of the value of the universe is open to attack;

* Pessimism is still less successful than Optimism in explaining that which offers the greatest difficulty to any estimation of the world—that is, the (apparently) indifferent.

† In opposition to the Pessimists, he agrees with the idea of Maimonides (p. 582 b): "Que la cause de leur erreur extravagante est, qu'ils s'imaginent que la nature n'a été faite que pour eux, et qu'ils comptent pour rien ce qui est distinct de leur personne, d'où ils infèrent que quand il arrive quelque chose contre leur gré, tout va mal dans l'univers."

but, if it *is* once started, then Optimism represents the positive impulse of science.

But Optimism and Pessimism as philosophical theories are utterly different from Pessimism and Optimism as feeling and conviction in practical life. For the question here concerns not an estimation of the universe, but a judgment upon the events connected with the human race and the interpretation of our personal relation to our duties and our aims. Such questions will at all times be occasionally raised, and will ever receive different answers, according to the nature and situation of the individual. That these, for the masses of men, become the most prominent questions, and include all phenomena within their horizon, indicates the existence of a definite crisis in the historical development of the race.

For reflection upon the value of one's actions and fate is not instinctively original to mankind. The race, as well as the individual, is so occupied with its activity in the pursuits of ambitious development and successful creation that it does not give up much time to meditation upon its own condition. This question presupposes a cessation of activity, a certain ascendency of reflective consideration over intense action; it thus arises from a certain relaxation and irresolution, just as, for its own part, it increases these. The movement, once commenced, usually extends itself quickly. The lamer the creative power becomes, so much the keener becomes the eye to detect that which restricts and disturbs, so much the more powerful becomes practically whatever counteracts it, so much the more quickly widens the chasm between task and ability. Doubt is at first directed toward particular conclusions; but it soon takes a broader hold, all the problems and contradictions of

life become prominent, and in everything the antinomy is exemplified which arises from the unsuitableness of finite power to infinite tasks. The endeavor before was aimed at the perfect, the whole, the all-comprehensive; while now limits become everywhere apparent, and even the highest thing attainable hardly seems to lead us any nearer the goal. Under such circumstances, the disagreeable side of particular circumstances weighs the more heavily, being developed in its transitory and permanent elements alike. The problem of eternity oppresses the temporal experience, and the temporal experience with its suffering seems to extend into eternity. To whom can it seem a strange thing, if, under such a pressure, no joy in activity or in life can arise?

Pessimism finds its true location where the consciousness of such a chasm between the ideal and the real gives a character to thought and action. For idealism likewise recognizes an incongruity between the two. But, since it assigns to the difference no fixed quantity, and does not consider the obstacles as an invincible power, it admits as the result only an occasion for a so much greater exertion of power. But Pessimism considers the chasm as something which can not be diminished, so that man, standing helpless before it, can only grow weary in life and in action.

Yet such a view of the matter involves a self-contradiction. Pessimism is possible only so long as an ideal is everywhere supposed, though it may then be explained as unattainable: there must be something valuable in the world, if mourning over the deprivation of it is to be justified. The Pessimist is situated in this respect much as the skeptic is, who likewise forms the concept of truth, and only blocks up for us the approach to it. Both must be led by the logical conse-

quence of thought and life, either to give up the ideal, and with it all interest in it, or to formulate it anew in some shape which shall render an approximation to it possible.* There is no middle position which can be permanently maintained.

It follows from all this that Pessimism is not something fixed and easily determined, but it runs through a variety of stages, according to which its value also must vary. At first it is only a doubting idealism, and, as such, a necessary element even of the strongest convictions; but soon the uncertainty becomes confirmed, doubt becomes positive, the ideal becomes ever more distant, and is finally transformed into a mere phantom. Thus, only the empirical world and the empirical man are left; and, if the claim to any valuable element be not then given up, a contradiction must be everywhere established. Measured by the principle of reason, which is no longer a power penetrating the world, everything presented to consciousness seems small and paltry. A man can prove the insignificance of everything which he can ever attain, and show as well that the lower elements completely control mankind; although, with constant inner hypocrisy, he may represent himself to himself and to others as led by something nobler: and in all this he may be right, yet he is right only in view of this contradictory position which he assumes.

But this line of thought quickly advances a step

* Through this, Pessimism would become Nihilism. The word Nihilism, which has of late been employed so frequently, has its origin in theoretical philosophy, and designates the doctrine which denies absolutely all existence. In this sense Krug ("Philosophical Lexicon," 1st edition, iii., pp. 58, 59) employed the word, in 1828, as one which was well known. The transfer of the term to religious, political, and social life seems first to have occurred in France about 1830

further when the question of happiness is substituted for that of the significance of life. One begins to consider, not so much what is thought and done, as what is felt and experienced. The attempt is made to measure off, in comparison, the pleasure and the pain in life; and the answer to this can not be a dubious one, because activity, the most valuable thing in life, is left out of the account, and because, with that, man abandons the ability to withstand the relations in which he is placed. In fact, the circumstances in which we stand have not in themselves an unchangeable value. But their value is affected by the peculiar disposition of the person concerned, the connections into which the individual is brought, the forces which he can call to his assistance.* If the ultimate value can thus diverge widely from the superficial, and even a certain transformation (of course, in the causal-legitimate connection of the inner life) can be possible, it is evidently absurd to allow that which befalls us externally to be decisive by itself. If all that concerned particular individuals remained essentially unchanged in the course of their history, were there not thus special reasons if certain times made this fate of individuals so prominent? Not only have individuals and nations alike maintained the joys of life in the hardest struggles against opposing circumstances, but it has been the great destinies which have been the most safely protected against Pessimism, because they stirred man to his inmost soul and developed all his powers.

* See Augustine, "De Civit. Dei," i. 8: "Una eademque vis irruens bonos probat, purificat, eliquat; malos damnat, vastat, exterminat. Unde in eadem afflictione mali Deum detestantur atque blasphemant; boni autem precantur et laudant. Tantum interest, non qualia, sed qualiscunque patiatur."

But if the mind is once regarded as passive, and feeling, not action, is considered the determinative element of our lives, then, of course, Pessimism alone is justified, and it is folly to continue then to haggle with it over small details. For it has been sufficiently proved from antiquity down that, in the mechanism of the feelings, displeasure and pain easily conquer pleasure; and life, thus considered, is shown to be a continual vacillation between ennui and pain. Yet these facts can be explained in a way different from, and even opposed to, that adopted by the ordinary Pessimism. But we need waste no words over the insignificance of the suppositions on which this form of the doctrine rests.

There is, then, in the general historical development an antithesis, not so much between Pessimism and Optimism, as between periods of pessimistic reflection and of realized activity. There might perhaps be a thought of Optimism only when mankind has a full consciousness that its power is a match for its tasks, or even believes it to be superior to them. Yet, though such periods occur in the course of history, when forces till then repressed become free to act, and the power of mankind is proclaimed in spite of a disposition to renounce it, still, these are naturally transitory periods. For the task will very soon strain that power to the utmost, and repress any feeling of superfluous strength. Yet, if one applies the name Optimism to the acquiescence in all that happens, or the idle accommodation to circumstances for the purpose of avoiding all occasion for action, such mental dullness is lower than the lowest forms of Pessimism, since it indicates the extinction even of the capacity of reaction on the part of man, and we could well ask, with Marcus Aurelius, what reason there is for

living, if even the consciousness of failure is lost.* Yet what this practically amounts to is not a theory of life, but a surrender of all theories, with which scientific discussion has really nothing to do.

As thus, in the theoretical systems, Pessimism is only a reaction against the attempts to form optimistic concepts of the world, so, conversely, in practical application, Optimism is only an era of transition, in which a reaction is aroused against predominantly pessimistic doctrines. What are usually contrasted as Optimism and Pessimism do not at all come into contact; the one belongs to science, the other to man's disposition—the one to thought, the other to feeling.

It follows from all this that Pessimism, in its general bearings, is to be understood and estimated not as a scientific theory, but as an element in history; and from this point of view no one will deny that it has been an important question in the rise and fall of historical forces. Every particular method of conceiving of the world and of life will be shown as too limited in its details when compared with the general problem of rational existence, and so, in the progress of the development, will necessarily be given up as a particular and dogmatic theory. In the advance of history man may unite all his exertions upon some one form in particular, and overcome the antithesis of finite and infinite in the creative act; for it is the very nature of classic times to find in the phenomenal something eternal and universal, to blend the two together, and to apprehend idea and phenomenon, content and form, in an inseparable unity. Yet, in a further advance and self-development, the elements of insufficiency must become

* See Marcus Aurelius, 7, 24: *εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ συναίσθησις τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν οἰχήσεται, τίς ἔτι τοῦ ζῆν αἰτία;*

prominent, contradictions and conflicts must be established, and the process of dissolution must commence. The historical process in the world involves the tragic element, in that the very fulfillment of the inexorable demand that the particular life be justified before the thinking reason leads to its own overthrow. For, when we seek to show the particular life as of universal validity, the antithesis of specific and general, of limited and universal, must come into consciousness, and with it must also appear the tendency to that retrograde process which we have just attempted to follow out.

Pessimism has here, unquestionably, an important function, so far as it defends against all finite forms the infinity of what is rational, and its incapacity of realization. The reflection and criticism which it practices act, to be sure, directly, only as an abstract force, and so destructively; yet, in the contest and dispute which are thus brought out, the bounds are set further away, new forces are aroused, the meaning of life is deepened by the struggle and pain, and the way is thus at least prepared for positive results. The general forces which were bound up in the particular formation are loosened from this groove, and so left free for new applications. The whole may at first seem mere destruction; yet analysis, too, is of service to life, provided we do not bring the reason down to the antitheses of the phenomenon, but regard it as embracing these, and protecting itself in its destructive as well as its constructive work. In this way Pessimism is recognized as a valuable means of historical development.

In any case, as regards its treatment, it follows from such an idea of it that, were every art of dialectics exercised, it can never be ultimately overcome on theoretical grounds. It follows also that we must seek the

explanation of it in its historical development, and, by that, form our conception of its specific meaning.

At the present day, too, the specific element in Pessimism must be brought out, and distinguished from other forms. Above all, the predominant disposition of Christianity should not be brought too near to modern Pessimism. Christianity, in fact, not only establishes an antithesis between the real and the ideal, but it considers the evil as the stronger power in man's actual experience, and explains passiveness rather than action as the problem of life;* yet faith in the reality and superiority of a higher world is not shaken, but only the more vigorously held in opposition to this doctrine. In distinction from the wearied and despairing Pessimism of the decline of ancient thought, we see here an immense impulse given to life. This world is given up only to obtain again another in the place of it; and thus, taken in connection with an ethico-religious system, the importance of human life is immeasurably increased, so that most of the Church Fathers can not depict its misery without, at the same time, defending its real value, and thus consciously opposing ancient Pessimism.†

In such a theory of the world and of life conflicting opinions are maintained, and even brought together, without restriction. Grief over the evil in the world can not be treated lightly, for it continues to be felt, and in its consequences can never be entirely removed;

* Only, in fact, passivity here is more than mere sufferance. We call attention to the phrase of Luther's so readily quoted: "passio ist summa actio."

† Thus Lactantius opposes it ("Instit." ii. 1): "Ne se, ut quidam philosophi faciunt, (homines) tantopere despiciant, neve se infirmos et nihili et frustra omnino natos esse putent, quæ opinio plerosque ad vitia compellit."

but the good still remains the prevailing and victorious power; and, since as supra-mundane it is removed from the contest, and from subjection to incompleteness, even as it is shown beyond all doubt to act upon the world as an historical fact, it becomes possible to recognize the full meaning of suffering and pain without at all diminishing or casting doubt upon the ideal, and thus to include both members of the antithesis in the theory of life. It could even happen that the one might enhance the other. The higher the goal was placed, so much the more painful its remoteness appeared; and, the more keenly the misery of life was felt, so much the more firmly was the assurance of ultimate victory maintained.

In fact, as historically developed, sometimes one and sometimes the other element has been the more prominent, and few persons have succeeded in bringing the two into an adjustment which was free from contradiction. While especially in the earlier centuries, and in the middle ages also, a sensitive Pessimism of purely human character was established, with an exclusiveness which renders it difficult to annex it at all to a Christian system of life,* in modern times the danger has arisen of leaving out of sight the immediateness and intrinsic truth of the feeling of pain. Usually many a man has lamented the suffering and misery of life, who was, nevertheless, at the same time, inwardly perfectly contented; and those have often been the most industrious in emphasizing the limits of human endeavor who have made the least effort to attain the highest good.

* This is illustrated by Gregory of Nyssa, the most famous Pessimist of ancient Christianity, whose complaints often accord with the modern world-pain, and also by Innocent III., whose work "De Contemptu Mundi" occupies a prominent place among the pessimistic writings.

Yet, in spite of all such misconceptions and mistakes, there is no doubt of the value of the general tendency. The immeasurable deepening of the inner importance of life, established by Christianity, has been attained mainly through the antithesis and contest which we have just described, and which affected directly the endeavor and the feeling of men; and the formation of the Christian doctrine of life, the characteristic product of Christian skill, has also been considerably influenced by it.

In view of all this, it is necessary to say, that in fact the recognition of the evil in the world has been to Christianity the starting-point of its whole view of life; yet there is no question here of a strict Pessimism, since it does not conclude with that, but rather from the beginning keeps its glance directed to a certain goal beyond it.

Modern Pessimism is, on the contrary, Pessimism in the strictest sense, and it must appear as such with special force in its connection with the whole process of development. Modern thought opened with an endeavor arising from the feeling of an abundance of force. Man believed that he was strong enough to accomplish great things in the world; * he even dared, as we have seen, to undertake to make the world an ex-

* Bacon can be adduced here as the type. Since he allotted to Pessimism a somewhat ironical treatment, he himself wished rather to represent the power and greatness of mankind. See "De Augm. Scient.," iv., chap. 1. "Deploratio humanarum ærumnarum eleganter et copiose a compluribus adornata est, tam in scriptis philosophicis quam theologicis. Estque res et dulcis simul et salubris. At illa (sc. contemplatio) de prærogativis digna visa res nobis, quæ inter desiderata proponatur." He explains it as desirable, "ut miracula naturæ humanæ viresque ejus et virtutes ultimæ, tam animi quam corporis, in volumen aliquod colligantur, quod fuerit instar fastorum de humanis triumphis."

clusive habitation for the reason, and to realize everything rational in it. Such an endeavor called for the outlay of more strength, and exerted more influence on actual events than had been the case in any earlier epoch; yet the danger increased with the venture. Everything was staked on a great question, which must be decided in history and in actual fact. The citizen of modern times has no world in which he could save his ideals from the improprieties and distortions of the phenomenal life, so that all there is of obstruction, disturbance, hostility, must meet him in his ultimate doctrines. If the rational element can not be maintained in what is accepted as reality, it is hard to see how it can be defended in general.

We have seen brought out, point by point, the facts that practically, in the modern concept of the world and the modern doctrine of life, the attempts to complete and carry out first principles have ever run against greater problems and dangers; that a pervasive and intrinsic contradiction has been prominent in them; and that as the endeavors have been concentrated, and have become distinct, the leading tendencies themselves have been involved in doubt. Relaxation and dissension were the natural results of the crisis which, though less clearly recognized, was still vaguely felt; and it is easy to understand how such tendencies should appear with special force, after the vigorous exertion of power and self-laudation of mankind which preceded them.

In view of all this, we consider the Pessimism of our own day as a phenomenon which is historically well founded, and which can not be kept back by any theoretical considerations. However firmly we may maintain that the whole statement of the question as

between Optimism and Pessimism is a wrong one, and consider it the problem of philosophy, as of all activity of the reason, to raise man above the point of view which the question supposes; still, if one does enter upon it, Pessimism is the more correct answer, since it gives expression to a crisis which is actually present.

Yet many tendencies are practically united with it, which have had an important share in producing the state of things which relatively justifies Pessimism. Especially has the whole littleness of the reasoning understanding now taken refuge here. While in former centuries this understanding was inclined to find the world endurable, and even good, and was never wearied with praising the best of worlds, it has now turned to the negative criticism which in self-sufficiency prejudges the universe. Yet, more closely examined, should not rationalistic Optimism and critical Pessimism stand pretty nearly on the same ground?

Then, too, we find associated with Pessimism sentimental and romantic ideas, which likewise run back into the past. One revels here in the confusion and incomprehensibility of tender feelings, and, floating between a sublime mysticism and a rough naturalism, makes a luxury of pain. By the side of such tendencies, which always keep a certain connection with general historical fact, the dogmatism of party feeling and the self-sufficiency and paradoxism of individuals are maintained —all of which simply suggests the saying of Seneca, "*Non potest fieri, ut omnes querantur, nisi querendum est de omnibus.*"

Yet, beyond the mistakes of individuals, the significance of the general tendency can not be mistaken;

and, however much any particular form of Pessimism, or professional Pessimism in general, may challenge contradiction, still that is not decisive of the deeper problems which the tendency indicates. As ultimate truth, Pessimism may be rejected; as a warning, it can not be mistaken.

CONCLUSION.

We take the liberty of glancing back at what we have thought it necessary to show regarding the history and present position of the concepts discussed. We saw at the outset how that which is to-day involved in the concepts is evidently the result of a long historical development, and how, even in the expressions used, the labor of many centuries is concerned. We are indebted for these, perhaps, less to ancient thought than to the middle ages, the scholasticism of which is of especial importance in the establishment of a scientific terminology. Yet nearly all that is borrowed from Scholasticism externally is intrinsically changed—at first by the original thinkers of the seventeenth century, and then by Kant. What we have of independent German expressions dates back no earlier than the sixteenth century.

The case is different as regards the concepts themselves. The action of the middle ages here is almost restricted to opposition, which, to be sure, forms no small element of power, while usually the threads lead back to ancient thought. Little as we would wish to lessen the importance to us of the Socratic school, there can be no doubt that we owe far more than is generally supposed to the Stoics and Neo-Platonics, and in general to the closing era of ancient philosophy. The Stoics offer to modern concepts more points of contact than any other system of the past; while the Neo-

Platonics have left upon the history of concepts traces which, though less numerous, have still made extremely deep impressions. The original thinkers of modern times, passing over the middle ages, have joined on to this later part of ancient thought.

In modern times the seventeenth century is unquestionably prominent, and, when in the general development two opposing schools here diverge, we can not neglect either of them if we wish to understand the modern treatment of concepts. The speculative system-makers have, without doubt, created more that is positive; yet the analysis and criticism of the empirical inductive thinkers have been of no less importance to the advance of the whole.

Considered from this point of view, Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant should occupy the first rank among the leading minds: Descartes, because he established the general tendency of modern thought with original power, and spoke decisively on the most important points; Leibnitz, because he made up a comprehensive system from modern ideas, and attempted to overcome, by the unifying force of his own mind, all apparent and actual antitheses; Kant, because, in penetrating the positivity of things, and in his microscopic analysis of what is composite, he brought out everywhere most clearly the peculiar properties and presuppositions of the concepts, and so sharpened and deepened all the problems involved.

Yet, were we to select from them the one who has the most positively and directly determined the concepts of the present day, we should name, not Kant, but Leibnitz.*

* We do not here, of course, express an estimate of the ultimate value of philosophers, since what they may have accomplished in regard

Of less prominence, in comparison with these, was the influence of the followers of Kant, and of the Constructive philosophers, although they accomplished more, directly and indirectly, than is generally supposed.

Yet, at any rate, the school is far more important which, starting from opposition to the Constructive and Systematic philosophy, rests upon the natural sciences, and, becoming positively constructive, forms not only its own theory of the world, but also a certain system of concepts. When critically considered, it is found to be virtually a carrying out of the primary tendencies of modern thought, and its strength lies, in the main, in the fact that it seems to defend, with peculiar resolution, something which, in our day, counts upon the general recognition of its self-evidence.

In general, we can say that our concepts, regarded separately, can be traced back to three main roots; that is, to ancient thought, to the seventeenth century, and to the Kantian philosophy; but, if we consider their combinations and general tendencies, we should select from history, first of all, modern thought since the fifteenth century, and from that again the present day in the sense so often explained. In this the later always intrinsically presupposes the earlier, so that it is impossible to understand the tendencies of our own day without casting a glance at the whole.

In such a variety of elements the presence of what is diverse and even contradictory in the modern system of concepts is to be expected. If we disregard the re-

to modern concepts does not at all sufficiently express their real position and importance. This is especially true of Spinoza, whose influence upon the present we are compelled to consider as in the main unfavorable, though we do not, for all that, question his peculiar greatness. But this is decided by other elements than those which are here considered.

lation of what was taken from earlier times to what is modern, we find that in modern thought the difference between the inductive and the speculative tendencies produces everywhere a dissension, and, for the scientific interpretation of concepts, the difference in principles of method in Leibnitz and Kant shows still further the results of this dissension—results which still continue. In Leibnitz, we find the endeavor to classify everything, and to show that what is heterogeneous is only one stage of the manifestation of a single force; in consequence of this, we find a denial of the specific, a change into the cosmic, an immense synthesis of individuals into a comprehensive mechanism. In Kant, on the other hand, we find an assertion of the specific, and so a reappearance of the antithesis; an analysis of what, till then, had appeared simple into still simpler elements; a resolution of the world into its ultimate factors, the union of which naturally remains inconceivable. While Leibnitz superordinates and subordinates the heterogeneous, with Kant it remains, in the main, coördinate. Our system of concepts has been taken from all this; can it be supposed to have thus preserved completely its intrinsic unity?

Further difficulties arise from the relation of the expression to the concept. Modern thought found a completely formulated terminology, dropped out much from it, to be sure, yet still retained what was important and essential; and did this all the more because, at the outset, the change to the modern use of terms was not fully understood, and its distinguishing features were, for many reasons, brought out very slowly. Modern thought was thus interpreted through the ancient, and the way opened to much confusion. Moreover, within the whole system, different tendencies laid claim to the

same place, so that things really very divergent were mixed and interpenetrated together. Hence it frequently happens that concept and expression are not equivalent, and that the expressions are far from sufficient for concepts actually existent. A large number of concepts often meet in a single expression, and we have in general far more numerous, and far more peculiar, concepts than would seem possible from the verbal symbols. All this involved little danger so long as, in the ambitious thought-life, the concepts were energetically and clearly presented in their distinctions from earlier forms, and in their peculiarities as related to opposing concepts; but, as soon as a change took place in the vigor of thought, the inadequateness of form to meaning necessarily led to great confusion.

But such confusion was increased by the haste and restlessness of modern life, which no longer allowed time for the elaboration of the concepts; by the dissipation of thought-activity into various directions, which restrained the endeavor to discover agreement; and especially by the attempt to bring the results of scientific investigation into an immediate participation in and application to common life. For, when this aim becomes prominent, thought must ultimately be intrinsically lowered. The part which one ever endeavors to act becomes finally his nature, so that one thinks on the very same level to which he at the beginning wished to descend. But it is evident that the concepts especially must suffer in such a lowering of thought. For most men are interested, not in these, but in the results, the most tangible results, perceived by the senses.

The consequence of all this is, that confusion of concepts which we have been throughout compelled to no-

tice. And the dangers of this are not insignificant. The community of thought-life is shaken; and, when we can no more explain the most important and subjective problems, there is danger that the individual, with the germ of its being, will be isolated, alienated from the common life, and this must result in a sudden decline of the activity of thought.

Yet we meet still greater problems and dangers when we consider the nature of the concepts, and we must again call attention to the fact, that our present object is not a criticism of the work of special sciences; and, also, that a complete cross-section of cotemporary thought can not be given; but that we pretend to judge only the prevailing tendencies which do the most to unite single forces in coaction, and to determine directly and indirectly the development of thought.

We can not fail to notice in these tendencies a great degree of activity, an endeavor to follow out the leading thoughts on all sides, and to establish them in every particular. Yet, so far as the execution of this is concerned, there is unmistakably in the general concepts of the world and of life a lack of strict consistency and of systematically constructive force. A development is commenced looking to the transformation of the naïve idea of the world into a scientific idea, certain elements are established, directions of thought are marked out; but then it is not carried out to the end, but one breaks off in the midst of the process, and turns back suddenly to the point of departure of the naïve view of the world, which is now regarded as having been won and justified by scientific work. The explanations employed, which it might have been necessary in the process to deepen, expand, supplement, are used now in their original interpretation as entirely sufficient. He who

would go beyond them is said to oppose the "reality," and to turn investigation into scholastic subtlety. In this way something is easily presented as an ultimate determination, simply because it seems self-evident to the common feelings, the passing consciousness. The danger arises that obscure endeavors and scientific productions will be confused, and that the same certainty which is employed in the essential meaning of the postulates will be claimed also for those specific applications of them which are scientifically crude.

Thus we see that the independence of penetrative and systematically constructive thought, as opposed to the original phenomenon, is called in question throughout; which again, on its own part, shows the general tendency to deprive mind of its substantial importance in the events of the world, and to form all concepts and convictions by eliminating the thought-element as far as possible. Following out this idea, then, all activity which the possession of thought contributes to the possessor must be understood as an arbitrary and disfiguring addition, which is to be removed if we would penetrate to an objective truth. But, where this tendency obtains control, the central unity and fundamental basis of the system of concepts must ultimately be lost; the foundation of ultimate principles must be endangered; and, through the lack of an endeavor to include the totality of things, what is empirically prominent will necessarily make a vigorous effort to usurp the whole realm of science.

We have noticed in detail the lowering of the concepts produced by this, though less in their concrete application than in their nature, as they are obvious to the general consciousness. For the present condition of things is such that we, in fact, possess and actually

use much more than we believe we have before we begin to reflect. Instead of repeating in detail what has been already said, let us only glance at the way in which the investigation of causality reflects itself in our consciousness. Mechanism is from the first considered the only method of causality; the suppositions and conditions which it involves are not taken into account; the many questions to which it gives no answer are considered not as open to discussion, but as positively decided in the negative; the point where it leaves off the investigation forms the conclusion of the whole, as if the world came to an end where we are wearied of investigating.

Moreover, this kind of explanation is confidently carried over to the realm of mind, as if the question dealt with something self-evident, though such extension, as regards the possibility of its application, presupposes an interpretation of the principles of mind, which has been for centuries the subject of dispute. And, in all this increase of its claims, the explanation lacks utterly any firm foundation and intrinsic justification of the causal connection itself. How the product of a subjectively psychical and externally conditioned process—for causality as usually understood is no more than this—how this can be objectively and universally applied in the universe, and can attain even a repressive force as against the mind, all this remains completely unexplained.

We find a similar state of things in regard to the other concepts, and, in fact, even more in their practical application than in their theoretical treatment—everywhere misapplication, limitation, lack of intrinsic foundation and justification, without the surrender, on that account, of any of the claims asserted for them; so

that we might say that the thought-life of to-day has a meaning, the premises of which are shaken, or, at least, are not established in the general consciousness.

Yet, further, we have noticed an antithesis in principles between the concepts as theoretically and as practically considered. For the theoretical cosmology of modern times, the scientific conception of the external world of nature has been from the beginning the standard. Even with the Idealists, for the most part, the concrete nature of ultimate principles and concepts has been presented as if determined by the analogy of physics. Modern philosophy is essentially a universal mathematics and physics, in which mankind in general and still more the individual man assumes an extremely modest place.

But, on the other hand, as practically applied, this doctrine presents an estimate of the value of thought which presupposes mind as the essential and fundamental thing in the world. The philosophers, too, who proceed in purely theoretical investigation by the empirically inductive method, practically interpret mind as an ideal concept, which is determined by a rational meaning, and by an inner nature valuable in itself, and superior to everything external. By this our practical life is, as a matter of fact, formulated. In law, in sociology, in education, this estimate of mind forms the foundation, though often unconsciously recognized. Science and life are brought thus into open contradiction. We are unable theoretically to justify that which practically we will not and can not give up. As a result of all this, it is not only philosophers and theologians anxious about their systems who stir up problems and contradictions in the present state of things, but every man who reflects deeply upon his own life must feel them directly, and fight his way through them.

But, whenever we find in the general thought-life a misapplication of principles, and so a contradiction between doctrine and practice, we can well call it a crisis; and science is always right, in such a case, in subjecting the foundation of the whole to criticism. When we once find ourselves in doubt, we must turn back to the principles of modern thought itself. For that the present crisis arises from the insufficient carrying out of these principles can not well be asserted, in view of the wonderful mental force which was employed in their formation. Who would dare to solve the problem which defied the genius of a Leibnitz? Still more erroneous is it to throw the whole blame upon the excesses and mistakes of particular persons or parties; for how did it happen that these obtained so great a power, and that the truth was so weak to resist them? One man may contribute more to the result by what he does, another by what he leaves undone—the blame and destiny are common to both.

The present condition of things is, in truth, different from that of the thought-culmination of modern times,* but it has been developed from it in causal connection, and has only brought out what had been already established. How was the misapplication possible, if the foundation was firmly laid? How could there be a doubt as to the value of the reason, if it originally held

* There is an essential difference between the present day and the period of culmination, in the fact that, in that period, not only were there other forces, especially Christianity, which acted still more powerfully, in connection with the modern principles, but also that both members of the antithesis, which we have met throughout, were still a match for one another, and by their reciprocal interaction increased and deepened each other. Idealism is not now refuted, but, in common life, it is limited to an ever-narrower sphere. After the supplementing and the contest thus subside a falling off must be the result.

a secure position? How could discord become prominent and powerful, unless it was present from the beginning in the principles?

We find ourselves thus ever referred back to an impartial estimation and criticism of these primary principles. It is especially necessary that we do not fabricate dogmatically a self-sufficiency in our own range of thought, or faith in the all-sufficiency of our own principles; and that we oppose orthodoxy as a boastful confidence in our own reason, not only in its forms of development, but also in itself.

Yet, if we understand the problems of the present day in their historico-genetic connection, and know that the force which impels our present thought is derived from the primary tendency of the times, and if we are further convinced that this tendency has been of incomparable service in history in general, and has produced results which can not be denied even by their most resolute opponents (as, for example, exact science, the development of culture, and the recognition of individuality), if we bear all this in mind, it will not be possible to criticise without at the same time making prominent the greatness and fruitfulness of modern principles, and without rising above all petty partisan strife. Whether one man appears as a friend, or another as an enemy of those principles, is a matter of the most complete indifference; for we treat here of the forces of the world's history, which are independent of the arbitrariness and opinions of individuals and of parties. The only question is, whether those principles exhaust the whole content of human life, and whether they do not need to be taken up into a higher connection if they are to assert themselves in their original purity, depth, and power.

IMPORTANT WORKS.

I.

The Life and Words of Christ. By CUNNINGHAM GEIKIE, D. D. New cheap edition. From the same stereotype plates as the two-volume illustrated edition. 8vo. Cloth. Price, $1.50.

This edition of Geikie's Life of Christ is the only cheap edition that contains the copious notes of the author, the marginal references, and an index.

"A work of the highest rank, breathing the spirit of true faith in Christ."—*Dr. Delitzsch, the Commentator.*

"A most valuable addition to sacred literature."—*A. N. Littlejohn, D. D., Bishop of Long Island.*

II.

Mind in the Lower Animals, in Health and Disease. By W. LAUDER LINDSAY, M. D., F. R. S. E., etc. In two volumes, 8vo, cloth. Price, $4.00.

"I have studied the subject of mind in other animals, as compared with that of man, for a series of years, simply as a *physician-naturalist*. . . . Regarding the whole subject of mind in animals from a medical and natural-history point of view, I have studied it from first to last without any preconceived ideas, with no theory to defend, support, or illustrate. . . . All that I attempt is to outline the subject of mind in the lower animals, to illustrate their possession of the higher mental faculties as they occur in man."—*Extract from Introduction.*

III.

Memoirs of Madame de Remusat. Complete in one vol., with an Index, 12mo, 740 pages, cloth, price, $2.00. In three vols., octavo, paper covers, price, $1.50; or, 50 cents each.

"'Madame de Rémusat's Memoirs' will remain as the most finished picture of the Napoleonic Court in its outward glory and its inner pettiness."—*London Athenæum.*

IV.

Memoirs of Napoleon, his Court and Family. By the Duchess D'ABRANTES (Madame Junot). New edition. In two vols., 12mo. Cloth. Price, $3.00.

The interest in the first Napoleon and his Court, which has recently been so stimulated by the "Memoirs of Madame de Rémusat," has induced the publishers to reissue the famous "Memoirs of the Duchess d'Abrantes." These memoirs, which hitherto have appeared in costly 8vo volumes, are now published at a much lower price, to correspond with the De Rémusat 12mo volume. The work at the present juncture will be read with attention, especially as it presents a much more favorable portrait of the great Corsican than that limned by Madame de Rémusat.

V.

The Life of David Glasgow Farragut, First Admiral of the United States Navy, embodying his Journal and Letters. By his Son, LOYALL FARRAGUT. With Portraits, Maps, and Illustrations. 8vo. Cloth. Price, $4.00.

"The book is a stirring one, of course; the story of Farragut's life is a tale of adventure of the most ravishing sort, so that, aside from the value of this work as an authentic biography of the greatest of American naval commanders, the book is one of surpassing interest, considered merely as a narrative of difficult and dangerous enterprises and heroic achievements."—*New York Evening Post.*

D. APPLETON & CO., Publishers, 1, 3, & 5 Bond Street, N. Y.

Herbert Spencer's Late Works

ON THE

SCIENCE OF SOCIETY.

I.

The Study of Sociology. 1 vol., 12mo. Cloth. Price, $1.50.

II.

The Principles of Sociology. Vol. I. 12mo. Cloth. Price, $2.00.

III.

Ceremonial Institutions. (First part of Vol. II. of "Principles of Sociology.") 12mo. Cloth. Price, $1.25.

IV.

Descriptive Sociology; OR, GROUPS OF SOCIOLOGICAL FACTS. Six Parts, in royal folio. Price, $4.00 each.

"Of all our thinkers he is the one who, as it appears to me, has formed for himself the largest new scheme of a systematic philosophy, and, in relation to some of the greatest questions of philosophy in their most recent forms, as set or reset by the last speculations and revelations of science, has already shot his thoughts the farthest."—*Prof.* DAVID MASSON, *in* "*Recent British Philosophy.*"

"His bold generalizations are always instructive, and some of them may in the end be established as the profoundest laws of the knowable universe."—*Dr.* JAMES MCCOSH, *in the* "*Intuitions of Mind.*"

"One who, whether for the extent of his positive knowledge, or for the profundity of his speculative insight, has already achieved a name second to none in the whole range of English philosophy."—*Westminster Review.*

"The work ('Descriptive Sociology') is a gigantic one; its value, when complete, will be immeasurable; and its actual influence on the study of sociology, and help to that study, greater perhaps than any book yet published. It is a cyclopædia of Social Science, but a cyclopædia edited by the greatest of sociologists."—G. W. SMALLEY.

For sale by all booksellers; or sent by mail, post-paid, on receipt of price.

D. APPLETON & CO., Publishers, New York.

WORKS OF HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE.

I.

The Life and Writings of Henry Thomas Buckle.

By ALFRED HENRY HUTH. 12mo. Cloth.

"The book deals with Mr. Buckle less as a philosopher than as a man. . . Mr. Huth has done his part well and thoroughly."—*Saturday Review.*

"Mr. Huth has produced a striking and distinct portrait out of his materials, and he has done his work with a simplicity and modesty which are highly effective."—*Pall Mall Gazette.*

"This work, we think, will revolutionize popular opinion about the philosopher."—*London Daily News.*

"Buckle was a man whose story must excite interest and rouse sympathy."—*Scotsman.*

II.

History of Civilization in England.

2 vols., 8vo. Cloth, $4.00; half calf, extra, $8.00.

"Whoever misses reading this book will miss reading what is, in various respects, to the best of our judgment and experience, the most remarkable book of the day—one, indeed, that no thoughtful, inquiring mind would miss reading for a good deal. Let the reader be as adverse as he may be to the writer's philosophy, let him be as devoted to the obstructive as Mr. Buckle is to the progress party, let him be as orthodox in church creed as the other is heterodox, as dogmatic as the author is skeptical—let him, in short, find his prejudices shocked at every turn of the argument, and all his prepossessions whistled down the wind—still, there is so much in this extraordinary volume to stimulate reflection and excite to inquiry, and provoke to earnest investigation, perhaps (to this or that reader) on a track hitherto untrodden, and across the virgin soil of untilled fields, fresh woods and pastures new, that we may fairly defy the most hostile spirit, the most mistrustful and least sympathetic, to read it through without being glad of having done so, or, having begun it, or even glanced at almost any one of its pages, to pass away unread."—*London Times.*

"We have read Mr. Buckle's volumes with the deepest interest. We owe him a profound debt of gratitude. His influence on the thought of the present age can not but be enormous, and if he gives us no more than we already have in the two volumes of the *magnus opus*, he will still be classed among the fathers and founders of the Science of History."—*New York Times.*

"Singularly acute, possessed of rare analytical power, imaginative but not fanciful, unwearied in research, and gifted with wonderful talent in arranging and molding his material, the author is as fascinating as he is learned. His erudition is immense—so immense as not to be cumbersome. It is the result of a long and steady growth—a part of himself."—*Boston Journal.*

III.

Essays.

With a Biography of the Author. Portrait. 12mo. Cloth, $1.00; half calf, extra, $2.50.

D. APPLETON & CO., Publishers, 1, 3, & 5 Bond St., New York.

PROGRESS AND POVERTY.

AN INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSE OF INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSIONS, AND OF INCREASE OF WANT WITH INCREASE OF WEALTH: THE REMEDY.

By HENRY GEORGE.

One vol., 12mo, 512 pages. Cloth. - - Price, $2.00.

From The Popular Science Monthly.

"In 'Progress and Poverty' Mr. Henry George has made a careful and systematic inquiry into the conditions of the production and distribution of wealth, the relations of labor and capital, and has traced out the action of what he considers the cause of the continued association of poverty with advancing wealth. However unpalatable its conclusions to certain large classes of the community, this book must, from its clearness of statement, ingenuity of argument, its large human sympathy, and the broad and philosophic spirit with which the question is treated, claim the attention of all who realize the paramount importance of the subject and the value of a thoughtful contribution toward its elucidation. . . . I am not here concerned with criticising Mr. George's work: my purpose is served if I have succeeded in drawing attention to what seems to me one of the most important contributions yet made to economic literature.

"C. M. LUNGREN."

From the New York Sun.

"Let us say, at the outset, that this is not a work to be brushed aside with lofty indifference or cool disdain. It is not the production of a visionary or a sciolist, of a meagerly-equipped and ill-regulated mind. The writer has brought to his undertaking a comprehensive knowledge of the data and principles of science, and his skill in exposition and illustration attests a broad acquaintance with history and literature. His book must be accounted the first adequate presentation in the English language of that new economy which has found powerful champions in the German universities, and which aims at a radical transformation of the science formulated by Adam Smith, Ricardo, and J. S. Mill. The author does not expect the scheme which he propounds in this remarkable book to gain a ready acquiescence; he will doubtless be content if it secures a patient and respectful hearing. This much he unquestionably deserves. Few books have, in recent years, proceeded from any American pen which have more plainly borne the marks of wide learning and strenuous thought, or which have brought to the expounding of a serious theme a happier faculty of elucidation. A large class of readers, who are too often repelled from the study of social questions by an abstract and technical mode of treatment, will be attracted to this volume by the brisk, transparent style, by the author's command of fresh metaphor and simile, by the affluence of concrete facts and homely illustrations. Nor will any reader, we imagine, lay aside this book without a haunting sense of the breadth and urgency of the problem here examined. He may not, indeed, accept the solution propounded, but he will not reject it without grave deliberation; or, we venture to affirm, without a twinge of misgiving and regret."

From the Chicago Tribune.

"Mr. George's book is welcome, because it will cause a discussion of a subject the magnitude and importance of which none will deny. It is a bold and frank exposition of theories now forcing themselves upon the public notice: moreover, the writer is in earnest, and he is also original."

D. APPLETON & CO., PUBLISHERS, 1, 3, & 5 BOND ST., NEW YORK.

EMINENT MODERN SCIENTISTS.

HERBERT SPENCER'S WORKS. 14 vols., 12mo. Cloth, $25.25.

FIRST PRINCIPLES.....$2 00
PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY. 2 vols... 4 00
PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 2 vols. 4 00
PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY. Vol. I. Parts I., II., and III..... 2 00
CEREMONIAL INSTITUTIONS. Being Part IV. of the Principles of Sociology..... 1 25
DATA OF ETHICS..... 1 25
STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY. (International Scientific Series).....$1 50
EDUCATION..... 1 25
DISCUSSIONS IN SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, AND MORALS..... 2 00
UNIVERSAL PROGRESS..... 2 00
ESSAYS: Moral, Political, and Æsthetic..... 2 00
SOCIAL STATICS..... 2 00

PHILOSOPHY OF STYLE. 12mo. Flexible cloth, 50 cents.

DESCRIPTIVE SOCIOLOGY. To Subscribers, for the whole work, per part, $3.50; single part, $4.00. Published in folio, with Tables. Six Parts now ready, namely: 1. English; 2. Ancient Americans; 3. Negritto and Malayo-Polynesian Races; 4. African Races; 5. Asiatic Races; 6. North and South American Races.

CHARLES DARWIN'S WORKS. 11 vols., 12mo. Cloth, $24.00.

ORIGIN OF SPECIES.....$2 00
DESCENT OF MAN..... 3 00
JOUENAL OF RESEARCHES..... 2 00
EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION..... 3 50
ANIMALS AND PLANTS UNDER DOMESTICATION. 2 vols..... 5 00
INSECTIVOROUS PLANTS.....$2 00
CLIMBING PLANTS..... 1 25
ORCHIDS FERTILIZED BY INSECTS... 1 75
FERTILIZATION IN THE VEGETABLE KINGDOM..... 2 00
FORMS OF FLOWEES..... 1 50

THOMAS H. HUXLEY'S WORKS. 11 vols., 12mo. Cloth, $18.00.

MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE.....$1 25
ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES..... 1 00
MORE CRITICISMS ON DARWIN, AND ADMINISTRATIVE NIHILISM..... 50
A MANUAL OF THE ANATOMY OF VERTEBRATED ANIMALS. Illus'd.. 2 50
A MANUAL OF THE ANATOMY OF INVERTEBRATED ANIMALS. Illus'd.. 2 50
LAY SERMONS, ADDRESSES, AND REVIEWS..... 1 75
CRITIQUES AND ADDRESSES.....$1 50
AMERICAN ADDRESSES..... 1 25
PHYSIOGRAPHY..... 2 50
ELEMENTS OF PHYSIOLOGY AND HYGIENE. By T. H. Huxley and W. J. Youmans..... 1 50
THE CRAYFISH: An Introduction to Zoölogy. (International Scientific Series).. ..... 1 75

JOHN TYNDALL'S WORKS. 10 vols., 12mo. Cloth, $19.75.

HEAT AS A MODE OF MOTION.....$2 00
ON SOUND..... 2 00
FRAGMENTS OF SCIENCE..... 2 50
LIGHT AND ELECTRICITY..... 1 25
LESSONS IN ELECTRICITY..... 1 00
HOURS OF EXERCISE IN THE ALPS.$2 00
FARADAY AS A DISCOVERER..... 1 00
ON FORMS OF WATER..... 1 50
RADIANT HEAT.. ..... 5 00
SIX LECTURES ON LIGHT..... 1 50

BANQUET AT DELMONICO'S, paper, 50 cents; BELFAST ADDRESS, paper, 50 cents.

D. APPLETON & CO., PUBLISHERS, 1, 3, & 5 BOND STREET, NEW YORK.

WORKS OF HENRY MAUDSLEY, M. D.,

Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians; Professor of Medical Jurisprudence in University College, London.

BODY AND MIND:

An Inquiry into their Connection and Mutual Influence, specially in reference to Mental Disorders. 1 vol., 12mo. Cloth, $1.50.

PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY OF MIND:

PHYSIOLOGY OF THE MIND.

New edition. 1 vol., 12mo. Cloth, $2.00. CONTENTS: Chapter I. On the Method of the Study of the Mind.—II. The Mind and the Nervous System.—III. The Spinal Cord, or Tertiary Nervous Centres; or, Nervous Centres of Reflex Action.—IV. Secondary Nervous Centres; or Sensory Ganglia; Sensorium Commune.—V. Hemispherical Ganglia; Cortical Cells of the Cerebral Hemispheres; Ideational Nervous Centres; Primary Nervous Centres; Intellectorium Commune.—VI. The Emotions.—VII. Volition.—VIII. Motor Nervous Centres, or Motorium Commune and Actuation or Effection.—IX. Memory and Imagination.

PATHOLOGY OF THE MIND.

Being the Third Edition of the Second Part of the "Physiology and Pathology of Mind," recast, enlarged, and rewritten. 1 vol., 12mo. Cloth, $2.00. CONTENTS: Chapter I. Sleep and Dreaming.—II. Hypnotism, Somnambulism, and Allied States.—III. The Causation and Prevention of Insanity: (A) Etiological.—IV. The same continued.—V. The Causation and Prevention of Insanity: (B) Pathological.—VI. The Insanity of Early Life.—VII. The Symptomatology of Insanity.—VIII. The same continued.—IX. Clinical Groups of Mental Disease.—X. The Morbid Anatomy of Mental Derangement.—XI. The Treatment of Mental Disorders.

RESPONSIBILITY IN MENTAL DISEASE.

(*International Scientific Series.*) 1 vol., 12mo. Cloth, $1.50.

"Having lectured in a medical college on Mental Disease, this book has been a feast to us. It handles a great subject in a masterly manner, and, in our judgment, the positions taken by the author are correct and well sustained."—*Pastor and People.*

"The author is at home in his subject, and presents his views in an almost singularly clear and satisfactory manner. . . . The volume is a valuable contribution to one of the most difficult and at the same time one of the most important subjects of investigation at the present day."—*New York Observer.*

"Handles the important topic with masterly power, and its suggestions are practical and of great value."—*Providence Press.*

For sale by all booksellers. Any volume mailed, post-paid, to any address in the United States, on receipt of price.

D. APPLETON & CO., Publishers, New York.

66[illegible] NY
JAN 31 1899
DEC 3 0 1900
JAN 13 1904

ETHICS AND MODERN THOUGHT

RUDOLF EUCKEN


SIGILLVM · VNIVERSITATIS · CALIFORNIENSIS
MDCCCLXVIII
FIAT
LVX
EX LIBRIS

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

http://www.archive.org/details/ethicsmodernthou00euckrich

By RUDOLF EUCKEN

Senior Professor of Philosophy in the University of Jena

The Truth of Religion

The Life of the Spirit

Religion and Life

Ethics and Modern Thought

Ethics and Modern Thought

A Theory of Their Relations

The Deems Lectures

Delivered in 1913 at New York University

By

Rudolf Eucken
Professor of Philosophy, University of Jena

Translated from the German Manuscript by

Margaret von Seydewitz

G. P. Putnam's Sons
New York and London
The Knickerbocker Press

BJ1114
E8

Copyright, 1913
by
RUDOLF EUCKEN

Second Printing

UNIV. OF
CALIFORNIA

The Knickerbocker Press, New York

PREFACE

THESE lectures, delivered at New York University from February 20th till March 1, 1913, appeal less to students and philosophers than to the cultured public at large. I take this opportunity of expressing my sincere gratitude to the New York University, and especially to Chancellor Elmer E. Brown, for all the kindness and interest shown to me during my stay in New York.

RUDOLF EUCKEN.

JENA, June, 1913.

292294

CONTENTS

		PAGE
I.	The Ethical Problem in the Present Time . . .	1
II.	The Ethical Principle . .	23
III.	A Defence of the Ethical Principle	43
IV.	Evolution of the Ethical Principle	63
V.	Morality and Religion . .	87
VI.	The Present Status of Morality	107

I

The Ethical Problem in the Present Time

UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA

I

THE ETHICAL PROBLEM IN THE PRESENT TIME

IN former times, nothing seemed more plausible and more certain than morality. It was a tower of strength, where men sought refuge in the midst of all the doubts and conflicts of life. This was especially the case during the Age of Enlightenment (Aufklärung). Men were beginning to believe less absolutely in the religion handed down to them, but they clung all the more to morality. Metaphysical speculation and theoretical endeavours to reveal the innermost essence of things encountered growing opposition, yet morality was welcomed as something superior to all complications, and valuable to all. It was held to be the pivot of Archimedes, which gives stability to the whole of life.

In our days morality has ceased to be a

TO VIEW
ARCHIVES

matter of such unquestionable certainty, and has been drawn into the wave of disintegration which is passing over our minds. Formerly the scientific definition and accurate conception of morality were matters of contention; but it is now the fundamental idea of morality that is questioned. Many of our contemporaries are of opinion that the revelations of modern science and the claims of modern life have destroyed the foundations of morality and made it untenable in the old sense. Morality in the old sense demands dissociation of our aspirations from our own personal interest, and devotion to something that is esteemed higher; whenever an action that appears good is seen to proceed from selfish motives, it can no longer claim any moral value. There is a widespread tendency in modern life, to question the possibility of such detachment from the *Ego*, and to acknowledge the coercion exercised over man by his instinct of self-preservation. Emancipation from this restraint is not even considered desirable, for constant strife and

competition seem necessary to life and progress, and a softening of this strife would inevitably reduce the energy of life.

Morality further demands independence and spontaneity of action. An action performed under the pressure of external coercion or mechanical habit, loses immediately its moral character. Now such independence and spontaneity are not possible apart from some kind of free choice, yet this would contradict the law of causality, which in the present age is generally considered to rule the whole of reality. In man's soul, the supremacy of this law of causality is strengthened by our growing insight into the power of heredity and of social environment. Yet morality in the old sense stands and falls with man's power of spontaneous and independent decision.

It is difficult also for morality to retain in modern life the position and estimation it formerly enjoyed. It used to be invested with unique significance, and placed high above all other manifestations of the inner

life. This conviction found its strongest expression at times of great historical import. We all remember the words of Jesus: "For what shall a man be profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and forfeit his life? or what shall a man give in exchange for his life?" The same conviction is expressed in philosophical language by the greatest antique philosopher and the greatest modern philosopher: Plato and Kant. Plato says: "All the gold on the earth and under the earth is less precious than virtue." Kant says: "If righteousness should perish, it would not be worth while for men to inhabit the earth."

But this conviction of the absolute supremacy of the moral task requires an inner gradation of life, for which modern conditions offer no scope. For modern life subordinates all aspiration and endeavour to the aim of enhancing the process of life. Every action is valued as a means to this end; and morality could only hold its own as an instrument of human welfare. But such degradation of morality would mean annihilation

of morality. The present time is not entirely dominated by such a movement against morality, only a few currents of thought are so absolute in their negation of ethical claims. But these currents could never have attained the strength and expansion they undoubtedly exhibit, if in our day morality were more securely established and more distinctly formulated. It is the want of union in moral ideals (never before so strongly marked) which gives added power to the enemies of morality.

There are to-day no less than four kinds of morality, often crossing and opposing each other, which claim men's allegiance. These are:

Religious Morality,

The Morality of Reason or of Immanent Idealism,

The Morality of Work,

Social Morality.

Religious Morality and the Morality of Reason have come down to us from past ages, and grow out of an inner world of

ideas. The Morality of Work and Social Morality are specific results of the present time, growing out of work in a visible world of realities. The two older forms of morality form an antithesis to the two newer forms, as will hereafter be seen.

The most effectual kind of morality is still the religious one—for us, the morality associated with Christianity, the religion of ethical redemption. Christianity, which is founded on a holy will superior to the world, exalts moral action far above arbitrary human choice and human aim. It completely severs moral action from all natural inclination, dissociates it from all external performance, and gives it a purely spiritual character. It supplies a most powerful impulse to action, by connecting man's destiny with his attitude to his moral obligations. The awakening and ennobling power inherent in Christianity was not confined to individuals, but was embodied in a large section of the human race, creating a spiritual atmosphere which still acts powerfully on individual souls, even if they them-

selves are not conscious of it. Religious morality still continues to influence us in this way. All other kinds of morality could not be as effectual as they are, were they not constantly supplemented and deepened by religious morality.

And yet we cannot ignore the fact that in our day the supremacy of religious morality is often contested. The world of religion no longer encompasses man as a matter of course, and this also weakens its moral influence. At the same time many objections are raised against the nature and demands of religious morality. Owing to the closer connection between man's endeavour and his environment and to the accentuation of the struggle for existence, this kind of morality appears too mild, too soft, too subjective, and there is often a desire for a sterner and more virile kind. Religious ethics do not seem to have sufficient latitude to transform the whole of life. We can therefore understand the widespread desire for something which can sufficiently supplement religious ethics.

At all periods of higher civilisation, religious morality has been supplemented and completed by the morality of reason, which was developed above all by the philosophers, from the Stoics down to Kant and Fichte. Here morality does not proceed from a superior and divine will, but from man's own reasonable nature. This nature seems to demand recognition of a universal law, and voluntary submission to it; only then does man bring his own being to perfection. The morality arising herefrom is strong and manly; it incites man to a proud independence of spirit, and exalts him far above everyday life. To this morality of reason we owe the scientific development of the moral world of ideas, and the distinct formulation of conceptions like Duty and Conscience. By means of such conceptions, the morality of reason also influences our own time, without however taking the lead, as it did during the Age of Enlightenment (Aufklärung). The idea of reason as the sure foundation of our spiritual life is no longer universally

accepted, and has little influence on the man of to-day. He is too fully conscious of his subordination to the world of sense, of which he is a member, to be able to enfranchise himself completely from it, and to assert his own superior power. The rationalistic conception of life reckons with strong, self-centred personalities, who, as we know, do not abound in our time.

Morality could not be in close touch with the movements and problems of the present day, if—either as religious or as rational morality—it were inseparable from belief in an invisible world. But the latest development of life supplies morality with valuable motives derived from the visible world, and even creates new specific forms of morality. On the one hand, the impulse comes from modern work; on the other hand, from modern society. In both cases, we have forces that were always at work, but that gain considerable significance from the conditions of modern life.

All really earnest work is directed towards

some object which it seeks to penetrate; it impels us to value the object for its own sake, and to treat it according to its own requirements. Man is thus exalted above his own personal opinion and inclination. Only in modern times has work reached its full development as a factor of education and of moral culture. For work has now become more and more independent of separate individuals; it is becoming a concern common to all mankind, and it forms its own great complexes. Such a complex is modern science. It is no longer dependent on individuals, but has formed a fabric of its own. In accordance with the development it has attained, science dictates to individuals the channels and methods of their work, presents problems to be solved, and indicates the means of their solution. The individual works in vain, if he detaches himself from the movement of the whole. His enrolment in the movement of the whole imparts to life a distinctly ethical character. For the individual must subordinate himself com-

pletely to the demands of the whole; he must repress everything bearing upon his own will and desire; he must feel that his own efforts are part of the great sum of human endeavour, the promotion of which must be his highest satisfaction. Single workers come and go, but through the work of generations the proud edifice of science is ever growing. As Bacon says: "*Multi pertransibunt et augebitur scientia.*" (Many will pass by, and science will grow.)

What applies to science is equally true of the other provinces of life. In modern times, mighty complexes are everywhere springing up, which encompass individuals with their superior power. We see this above all in technical and industrial work, but also in state organisation, in education with its schools and other organisations. All these finally unite in the comprehensive conception of civilisation and culture,—in the idea of man's supremacy over the world by means of his work.

It is evident that a strong moral force is

here engendered. Without this ethical factor, without a constant enrolment and subordination, modern civilisation could never have reached its present development. Yet we cannot deny that this morality of work has inner limitations. The technical side of work does indeed repress and even destroy all individual will; but it is an open question in what spirit the work is done, whether from love to the work or from petty and selfish motives. It is quite possible for a petty and narrow frame of mind to be accompanied by the greatest technical skill. Further, work reaches out towards achievement, and the worker is judged by what he achieves. What becomes of his inner life, of his whole personality, is a matter of indifference. Here we are only parts of a structure, and are nothing at all in ourselves. This must become so more and more in proportion as work is specialised and in proportion as it vitalises an ever smaller part of the individual's powers. Moreover the union of men which in this direction takes place, is only

confined to their common work. However closely connected they may be through their work, their individual principles and convictions can be very different, if not absolutely hostile. It is, in our day, above all, the social problem, which divides men into hostile factions. In one special direction—that of work—there is an ethical development of life; but we cannot base on it an inner entity of right and humanity. The morality thus developed is cold and impersonal; it lacks inner warmth, and cannot appeal to the whole personality.

In this respect, social morality is infinitely superior to the morality of work. For social morality proceeds from the immediate relation of man to man. Here also, something old and familiar acquires a new form and stronger influence. It was an old conviction that man could only develop in connection with his fellow-men, towards whom his activity was mainly directed. But what has re-cast the idea of society in a new mould, is the modern doctrine that men are not

united by their common relation to an invisible world—ruled either by a Divine Being or by an all-pervading Reason—but by their actual living together in the realm of experience. This modern doctrine points out that individuals not only meet during the course of their life, but that they are interdependent from the very beginning,—that union and life with others is a fundamental necessity for every human being. In developing this idea, modern sociology shows, by means of innumerable statistics, how the nature and welfare of the individual depends upon the condition of the whole. It tries to prove that all progress—even for the individual—is inseparable from the amelioration of the community at large; such amelioration therefore becomes the main object of endeavour. Modern sociology at the same time advocates the idea of a common responsibility, a solidarity of all human life and action. Strong motives are thus offered to the individual to direct his activity, beyond his own personal interest, towards the welfare of all, and to

find in work for the welfare of others—in "altruistic" action—the highest value of life.

The "social" ethics thus developed are further enhanced by the growing conviction that the traditional form of life in the community is capable—nay needful—of fundamental changes. Formerly the structure of society was above all aristocratic in character. The conduct of life was in the hands of a small minority. They alone acquired full development of all their powers and full possession of earthly goods, which the rest could only enjoy in part and through the agency of the favoured few. This division of mankind appeared to be too firmly established by the divine will or by a mysterious destiny for human endeavour to try and alter it. The modern man, in the consciousness of his power, by no means considers these things incapable of change. For him, it is a sublime task to suppress such distinctions, and to let "all who carry a human face" (Fichte) participate in the work and enjoyment of life.

We can here discuss neither the possibility of solving this problem in all its bearings, nor the complications resulting therefrom. But we cannot deny the strong ethical stimulus of such a movement. It has resulted in an eager desire to strengthen the weak, to raise aspiring spirits, to oppose injustice, to eradicate suffering as far as possible, and to increase the enjoyment of life. In all this, there is much warmth and vigour, a strong feeling of responsibility, and recognition of the rights of others. No other ethical force so strongly influences the men of to-day, as the social idea; we see this in legislation, in education, in every relation of man to man. This idea counteracts egoism, and produces such a wealth of humane action, as was hardly ever witnessed at any period of the world's history.

But even here, in spite of so much that is admirable, inner limitations are evident. Life and morality are concentrated on activity for others. But this activity is more for man's external welfare than for that of his soul,—

more for the *conditions* of life than for life itself. Inner problems find too often only a secondary consideration and the personality as a whole is apt to be neglected. This morality of social activity believes in the existence of goodwill and its growth by means of external activity, and takes human virtue for granted. But it has nothing to offer that could allay the inner conflicts, or could overcome the dark, wild, and passionate element in man's soul. Nor does this kind of morality sufficiently realise what complications and passions are inseparable from life in the community: the strife for power and supremacy, the vanity and unreality which arise and rapidly spread among its members. Social morality shows a very optimistic conception of man, which is often contradicted by experience. However great therefore the merits of social morality may be in one special direction, it takes up the problem too superficially, and offers no firm foundation for morality, which it presupposes rather than creates.

Morality to-day thus appears to be accompanied by much confusion and many complications. There is no lack of separate developments, but these cross and oppose each other. What one kind of morality takes to be its chief source of strength, appears to another to be mere weakness. The inner and spiritual character of the older forms is condemned by the younger forms as a subjective illusion, while the unremitting activity of the latter seem to their opponents to be an exclusive concentration on external work. Life as a whole has become uncertain to us in its deepest aspects; and we are no longer satisfied with the moral impulses coming from the life around us. We hesitate between absolutely different kinds of morality, which can only fully develop their individual characteristics by injuring one another; this must inevitably weaken the influence of morality on the whole of life. At the same time, movements hostile to morality encounter less opposition, and gain ground in spite of their inherent super-

ficiality. Morality, once an undoubted possession of mankind, has thus come to be a difficult problem; instead of ruling over man from the height of its superiority, it seems now to depend on his opinion and choice.

The condition of things resulting herefrom is becoming more and more unendurable. If morality is weakened, then life is robbed of a strong impulse, an ennobling power, and a dominant aim; it is in danger of inner insignificance and disintegration. The salt of life is then lacking, which alone can keep it fresh and healthy, and with all its outer brilliancy, it is threatened with inner decay. If we are to resist this danger with all our might, then science must help to overcome the uncertainty and want of concentration so characteristic of our time, and to gain full recognition of morality as a whole. To do this, it is above all necessary to find some point of view whence we can successfully combat this disintegration.

We shall therefore have to consider first of all how such a point of view may be attained.

II

The Ethical Principle

II

THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE

THE intricate situation of to-day necessarily incites us to reflection. We must consider our life as a whole; we must ask ourselves whether human existence comprises various kinds and gradations of life, and whether a task thus arises which embraces all man's endeavour. There can be no doubt that human life is not confined to one single plane,—that all variety of endeavour does not easily unite to form a definite entity, but that heterogeneous elements meet and mingle in man.

Man at first appears to be part of nature, of the world of sense, subject to its laws and impulses. Dim and unreasonable instincts pervade man's soul with compelling force. Our conceptions grow out of sense impres-

sions, and form at first the purely mechanical concatenation which we term "association," while all our efforts are directed towards individual self-preservation. In all this, man is entirely within the limitations of nature. Yet though this natural life at first predominates, it does not represent the whole of our life. We become aware of new features, which we characterise as "spiritual." We see how man grows independent of his environment, and strives to subdue it from without and within. By thought he frees himself from the shackles of his environment, and asserts himself against the whole world; at the same time he is driven back to the world, and feels impelled to fathom it and to make it his own by personal experience. His actions do not always remain a mere part of nature's concatenations. He can detach himself from all cohesion. In unbridled egoism he can subordinate every event and action to his own well-being; or he can absorb into himself all that at first existed beside him and apart from him, and

that often appeared hostile, and can thus manifest boundless love and sympathy. His natural instinct of self-preservation will then appear too small and insignificant; he can even come to feel its narrow restrictions as intolerable.

If we pass from the individual to the whole of mankind, we see in civilisation and culture a new form of life opposed to mere nature. For man is no longer swayed and ruled by what assails him from without, but he confronts it with new aims and ideals. He judges and weighs; he approves and rejects; he forms new complexes, like those of state organisation and of science. In all this, man is the representative of a new and specific kind of life; he manifests an independence unknown to nature.

This new life differs from nature and from what may be attained on the basis of nature, not only in single characteristics, but in all its manifestations and even in its fundamental essence. Nature forms a tissue of separate elements, which come into recip-

rocal action but lack all inner cohesion. Great complexes are thus formed, but no combination amounts to real cohesion: there is no inner whole, and no life proceeding from such an inner entity.

All life grows out of contact with the environment; therefore intellectual participation is indissolubly bound to the world of sense. In this life of nature, the intellect can create no conceptions independent of sense impressions, and action cannot free itself from the power of natural impulse. All inner values can here be nothing more than an accessory and reminiscence of what reaches us from without.

We see something essentially different, wherever *spiritual* life develops. Here life is not decomposed into a multitude of separate elements, but inner cohesions are formed, which embrace and dominate all achievement of individual beings. This is especially the case when human thought aspires after Truth. Every individual has his own sum of conceptions and his own

special associations; but he does not possess a truth of his own. All search for truth is based on the conviction that something must be acquired which is common to all men, and which embraces and governs them all. Aspiration thus extends far beyond separate individuals. We have here not a disconnected mass of assertion and dogma; all is gathered into a well ordered cohesion, and all separate efforts result in progression to the whole. Every kind of intellectual endeavour presents a similar situation. Thus the Good and the Beautiful are not values confined to single individuals; every man striving after them, only contributes towards the sum of common endeavour, and what he wins for himself is at the same time a gain for all. Aspiration is not confined to a limited number of separate results, but the manifestation of a great whole is sought for: a comprehensive realm of the good and the beautiful.

Once the mind is thus concentrated on the whole, greater spiritual independence in-

evitably ensues. For it is necessary to rise above the sense impression and constantly to assert the autonomy of the soul, if aspiration *from the whole and to the whole* is to be successfully developed. From being a mere accessory, the soul now becomes in all respects a source of independent life. In science ideas gain a significance of their own, apart from the impressions of sense; they develop their own laws, and react with transforming power on what they have absorbed, as we see in the case of mathematics. Our own mind supplies the forms in which we shape our world. Feeling also frees itself from sense impressions. Sense enjoyment no longer suffices for man's happiness. His relation to other human beings does not remain confined to external contact; pity and love can embrace the whole of mankind, as is proved by the great religions. We can no longer doubt man's capacity of aspiring to values far beyond external possessions; and his inner life, the development of his own individual personality may

become a matter of paramount importance to him.

But this inner life, with all its distinct manifestations, can cope successfully with the outer world and its forcible inroads, only by developing an *inner realm* which it extends to an independent world of its own. This does in reality take place. What was at first beside us and apart from us, can be transferred to the soul without merging into it. The antithesis between internal and external values, which at first seemed to disintegrate life, can be overcome, if spiritual endeavour absorbs the object and brings it into reciprocal action with spiritual forces. Where spiritual development is at its highest, life does not fluctuate between the subjective and objective, but unites both in itself, brings them into reciprocal action, and develops one by means of the other. Such a triumph over antitheses is to be seen most clearly in the province of art. Art is not merely capable of copying external objects as exactly as possible, or of rendering with the greatest

possible truth the feeling of the individual: really great art must embrace both factors and blend them to a perfect unity. This is how a real work of art is created, which then gives to life an inner expansion and a new reality.

As in art, so also in the other provinces human life. In the mutual relation of man to man, the spiritual phase by no means does away with all distinctions, but it exalts us above them, and embraces them all from a higher point of view. Individuals are not to be merged in a hazy and colourless totality, but in rising towards a higher life an inner communion becomes possible, within which even what is alien becomes to a certain extent our own. This enables men to understand each other, to put themselves in the place of one another, to find themselves in others. Man acquires in such communion a vaster self, which is not dependent on one tiny atom, but has a whole world of its own.

If scientific research is not to degenerate into barren scepticism, it must also overcome

the antithesis of the subjective and the objective. To do this, it assimilates external objects by means of thought, and strives to embrace at the same time both the inner man and the outer world, developing one by means of the other.

We observe everywhere this tendency to subject everything to the operation of spiritual forces—to create and develop an inner world. Here all problems are confined to life itself, which is no longer concerned with extraneous matters, but with itself alone. In this inner world, life develops in its own way; it finds its aims and ideals in itself, in its own perfection, in its complete triumph over the antitheses it embraces.

How are we to interpret this new life and its origin? It cannot have proceeded from that nature inferior to man, from which it differs even in its most elementary fundamental forms. It cannot be a creation of man alone, in whom—as experience proves—it is far too weak, too much alloyed with lower and sensual elements, for a new gradation of

life to originate in him. Nothing therefore remains but to recognise in this inward tendency a movement of the universe—a movement in which man is privileged to participate, but which he could never engender from out of his own nature. The recognition of such a movement completely changes the aspect of reality. The universe now seems to embrace two planes, and to be rising—at least as far as humanity is concerned—from one plane to the other. A new light is cast on reality, which ceases to be a collection of separate and non-cohesive elements, and becomes capable of comprehensive operation and of self-concentration. We realise that what at first appeared to be the whole of reality was only its outer aspect, which is supplemented by the new depth revealed to us. It is only the development of these depths that gives life its real significance; values come into existence which lie beyond the natural instinct of self-preservation—such values as the good, the true, and the beautiful.

Let us now see how this order of things strikes and influences man. The new phase of life at first appears—in man—only in a few individual operations, while his life and aspiration are still mainly determined by nature and natural self-preservation. A certain spirituality does indeed appear wherever there is human life, yet only as something subordinate, as an accessory to another kind of life, but without the autonomy necessary to a comprehensive and self-centred *whole*, which could develop its own specific character. If man is to participate in the movement of the universe and bring the spiritual into full operation in himself, this autonomy of the spiritual life is of paramount importance. It can only develop where a movement reaches man from the universe, embraces him, and determines his further course. But, at the same time, man must recognise and seize this impulse, thus taking possession of this new life. We have seen that what used to be considered of secondary importance, is now of paramount

value. This requires a reversion of the original order of things, a readjustment of the values of life. We have not to realise any new achievement within a given sphere of activity, or to further develop existing conditions; we have to acquire an essentially new life.

The requirements thus formulated lead to a system of ethics. Its fundamental doctrine is man's power to rise by free action to the higher plane of cosmic life, and to develop it with all the strength of his soul. We have shown that the new object of our endeavour is not something unfamiliar that suddenly invades our consciousness. For it is the working within us of some spiritual force, that exalts us above the animal world to the status of human beings. But the spiritual life undergoes an essential change, as soon as it acquires autonomy within us. As long as it was held to be of secondary importance, it was chiefly appreciated as a means towards human ends: spiritual forces were to give us more power over external realities, and

fuller enjoyment of life, but we did not penetrate into the life of the spirit and there find a *new world.* If we do this in accordance with the transformation of life we have been considering, great results will soon appear. In science and art, as well as in law and morality, our efforts will be accompanied by such strength, devotion, and gladness as we never before experienced. We shall operate with the laws and powers inherent in the things themselves; we shall become indifferent to outer profit and success, and shall find full satisfaction in the manifestation of genuine spiritual life, in spite of the trials and difficulties it may offer. If the spiritual life can thus grow towards perfection, undisturbed by human aims, it will manifest all its values in rich and pure abundance; it will reveal a new world, and will open up a new depth of reality. We thus take possession of a world which exalts us far above all petty human considerations, yet which is not alien and unfamiliar to us, but is essentially our own life and being.

With autonomy, the spiritual life also gains more unity. As at first manifested in human life, it is divided into a variety of separate branches—such as art, science, law, technical knowledge—which lack all inner cohesion and mutual understanding. If the autonomy of the spiritual life reveals a new phase of reality, it must also form a comprehensive whole, of which all the separate provinces are but the various manifestations. They themselves now appear in a new light, and every province must determine its position and significance in the whole, and must submit to the operation of the forces proceeding from the whole. This will give more depth and more soul to the activity in each separate province, while all will seek to come into closer touch and to supplement one another.

All this implies a great task for man. He is an imperfect and unfinished being, full of contradictions. He has to seek and achieve genuine life; he must penetrate from the

sphere of effects to that of their causes; he must recognise the great cosmic movement as a personal concern of his own, and must thus give meaning and value to his life and aspiration.

We have here a matter of vast import. Not only must the new world be recognised and taken possession of by the individual, but a new order of things, valid for all humanity, must be created and triumphantly asserted against an entirely different order of things. Instead of the mere juxtaposition which the world of sense at first presents to us, we must establish inner cohesion in society and history. The efforts of all humanity must supplement the visible world, to which we remain bound, by an invisible one, and must make of this invisible world the chief seat of human life. While time is forever flowing onward, permanent truths and values of life must be found, which can sustain from within all aspiration and endeavour. We human beings must realise a higher life within given natural conditions; and to do this, we have

first to create and establish a new order of things within our own sphere of existence. This transforms our life into a never ending task, but also imparts to it an incomparable greatness. While thus striving forward, the individual must first of all submerge himself in the new world as a whole, until he finds there his true life, his real and higher self. A complete negation of the "small self" and emancipation from it are requisite. This does not mean that the individual is to disappear and be absorbed by the infinite. The infinite becomes a living present at this special point, and the individual must take possession of it and assert it. He must also promote the forward movement of life, and must enrich reality by the culture of a spiritual individuality, very different from the one nature has given him. This spiritual individuality can only develop on the basis of the spiritual life, from which it takes its aims and standards; and it must always be in harmony with the movement of the whole.

It is evident that all these factors have laid the foundations for a system of ethics. As we have seen, life as a whole challenges man to a great change, to a decision, an action, but also to unremitting work for the establishment of a new order of things. That which gives us human beings our pre-eminence and constitutes our innermost essence is not to be gained without our own efforts, and pervades our life as a continuous task. We may call the morality arising thence the Ethics of the Spiritual Life, for the centre of life and its ruling motive lie in man's relation to a superior spiritual life, which is at the root of his own being and yet has to be acquired by his own action and effort. Morality represents the principles underlying this great change. Morality grasps the question as a whole. Morality elucidates the fact that all the variety of work is dominated by strife for a spiritual self, a strife which can only be successful if the original situation is reversed.

We must now try to determine more

closely what form these ethics are to take, and whether they are able to overcome the objections which confront every kind of morality.

III

A Defence of the Ethical Principle

III

A DEFENCE OF THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE

BEFORE we proceed further in the direction indicated, we must see whether our own convictions are capable of overcoming the opposition and impediments to morality, presented by widespread currents of contemporary thought. Were we unable to overcome them, then all further advance would be stamped by inner uncertainty.

The first objection was, that all human action must tend to the preservation and advancement of the performer, so that action apart from self-interest, as required by morality, is impossible. We are told that man cannot be inspired and moved to action by any aim outside his own personality, and that even where this appears to be the case, closer examination reveals some hidden

motive of self-interest. This was the doctrine of Spinoza and is now a widespread conviction. There is undoubtedly some truth in the fundamental idea, but it is by no means certain that this truth is rightly applied. It is true that all endeavour must start from the life and being of a man and reflect back on him. Something absolutely alien would necessarily leave us cold and indifferent; by his action man must in some way grow and gain and assert his own inner self.

But we must ask ourselves whether the natural self, to which the opponent of morality binds all human action, represents the whole of man's life, and whether all endeavour is obliged to serve the interests of natural self-preservation. If a man recognises any kind of spiritual activity in its specific working, he will reject such limitation; and the more he sees in the spiritual life a new and independent phase of reality, the more decisively will he declare that a real self is not contained in the natural self,

but must first be acquired by means of the spiritual life. In spite of all the subjective force and passion displayed in the self-preservation of the natural Ego, this Ego and its life are without inner significance: it plans and acts, without being absorbed and illuminated by an inner force; it remains alien and dense.

On the spiritual plane, on the other hand, man acquires an individuality, and is able to embrace a whole of reality, into the life of which he submerges himself; and in developing this life, he is able to find full satisfaction and joy. The spiritual life does indeed demand repression, subjection, and even sacrifice of the little Ego; yet the experience of humanity clearly proves that life thereby suffers neither degradation nor disintegration, but rather, that it is thus strengthened and regenerated. Life is certainly not weakened or extinguished in the efforts to gain truth and beauty, in the activity of the scholar and the artist, in social and philanthropic work. By enfranchisement from

the small self, life has gained in expansion and strength. Man is conscious of finding his real self and of developing his innermost being in such work, not of promoting ends outside himself. All deeper religions and systems of philosophy have in common this requirement that man should give up his small self, and they promise that from this renunciation a new life shall be born, which is of infinitely greater meaning and value than the old life. The movement towards spirituality is not a mere negation, but leads to an assertion founded on the basis of negation. Once man has found the right plane of life, and has acquired a new individuality, the gulf between man and the universe is bridged over. Man can then come into inner relation with reality, and can take possession of the infinite. This is the meaning of Goethe's lines:

> Und so lang du dies nicht hast,
> Dieses "Stirb und Werde!"
> Bist du nur ein trüber Gast
> Auf der dunklen Erde.

(Till thou hearest the behest
To die for a re-birth!
Thou art but a dreary guest
Upon the gloomy earth.)

If this is the case, then all spiritual work contributes to the development of a new, real self; then no blame can be attached to morality for advocating the absolute necessity of this change, and for recognising, in all ramifications of work, the one great task of developing a new human individuality. Morality will not thereby weaken and suppress the impulse of life, but will direct it into the right channel and ennoble it. By treating man's task as a harmonious whole—which at the same time forms part of the one great entity—it will act as a stimulus on all the separate provinces of life. The gravity of this ethical task is heightened by the fact, that we must pass through a negative stage in order to reach one of positive affirmation, and that all action which denies or obscures such negation, remains one-sided and imperfect.

Closely allied to this first objection to morality is the second: the assertion of the Determinists that human action is but part of an immutable concatenation, and that the decision of the moment arises, with inevitable necessity, from what is and what has been. This is an old assertion, reaching back to the latter days of antiquity. It has frequently aroused men to passion in the domain of religion. It permeates modern philosophy, and has found classical expression in the doctrine of Spinoza. In our day, it is often confirmed by a more careful study of the universe. Favourable to Determinism is also our modern insight into such forces as heredity and social environment, and our greater knowledge of psychology. Everywhere the single atom appears as the result of some cohesion, of which it at the same time forms part. Closer observation only accentuates such dependence; we can no longer consider a separate atom or moment as something absolutely self-centred, nor can we interpret any action as really taking

place suddenly. There exists, without doubt, more cohesion and more subordination than was formerly believed, or is often accepted even now.

However legitimate these considerations may be, it does not follow that they exhaust all the possibilities offered by reality. If we declare that man is completely absorbed in such concatenation, we must assume what is by no means unassailable: that man is simply part of a given order of things, of a natural mechanism, of a network of causality. Were he in reality no more than this, there would be no possibility of his own decision, no freedom of action, and consequently no morality. This would destroy, not morality alone, but much that its opponents could not well give up. If our life were merely part of a natural mechanism, it would necessarily cease to be our own life; it would be only a process realised in us without our co-operation, and our attitude to it would resemble our attitude to our bodily functions. It is difficult

to see how we could then be made responsible by society, or how we could ourselves feel any responsibility,—how such conceptions as those of good and evil could come into existence and engross our attention. Neither would there be any real present, for if there is no demand for decision, and no room for original action, all action would, with inevitable necessity, grow out of the past, like a flower out of its bud, without our co-operation.

We might be able to endure such determination of our life for all time, if the various movements could easily meet and mingle in our soul, without any complications. But if our life contains great problems, grave conflicts, various and often opposed planes, then we human beings, did we submit passively and unresistingly, would be chained like Prometheus to a pitiless rock. Determinism, if followed to its logical conclusion, is nothing less than inner annihilation of life.

Such recognition necessarily brings us to the question whether the hypothesis held by

the Determinists is unassailable. Do we really appertain absolutely to a given and distinctly limited existence? From the point of view of a new plane of reality manifested by the spiritual life, our reply must be a decided negative. As we have seen, this new phase does not embrace us from the beginning, but must be grasped, appropriated, and developed by us; our own decision and action are here indispensable. Our life must indeed reckon with certain given factors; we must recognise the powerful influence of heredity and environment. Our individuality is determined for us by nature; we cannot in all things remould ourselves as we would wish to do; we are on all sides encompassed by fate. But man is not entirely at the mercy of this fate. The spiritual life which can grow up in him gives him a new, spontaneous source of life; he can originate something new, something entirely his own, and can oppose his own action to fate.

Our life thus becomes a struggle between freedom and fate; and to this struggle it

chiefly owes its expansion and greatness. The idea of development is therefore not applicable to the progression of human life. There is no inevitable sequence on a well established basis and in one definite direction; later results are not simply determined by what has gone before; one thing does not follow another naturally and easily, but various elements meet and clash. Time after time, we are in danger of losing what we seemed to have won; over and over again, we must climb to the summit of life. But this struggle constantly calls forth new powers. We see that there is much more in us than appeared at first sight, or than we ourselves were wont to believe. Great shocks and strong emotions often produce new convictions or set free new forces within us. It is, above all, suffering which rouses and regenerates, which teaches us to see and cultivate the deepest that is in us. What hitherto seemed to constitute our whole being, now proves to be but a single stratum, which it is quite possible to transcend.

The real man is only a part, a section of the possible man. The possibilities dormant in us are an integral part of our being; and these possibilities enable us to attain something higher and greater. On this power of inner growth rests the confidence of those who, while recognising the evils of this life, fight bravely and hopefully on the side of progress. The statesman wishing to raise his people from within, builds on such a capacity for inner growth, and believes in the realisation of new possibilities; so does the educator in his efforts to cultivate and ennoble men's souls. Art and religion are ever at work, in order to discover new possibilities and bring them home to man. Were it not for such new possibilities and the regenerative power of man, his life could retain nothing of its youthful vigour, and would lapse into stagnation and senility. The same would apply to human civilisation: it would drift away from simplicity and truth, and would become more and more artificial.

It is in our own power to maintain our

vitality, and to oppose increasing inner strength to all alien and hostile forces. It is by no means certain that we shall always be victorious; it is one of the tragedies of life that a man's soul is filled with longing for something better, yet is held captive by circumstance, and is finally driven back to that from which he would fain escape. And yet it is this struggle which gives to life its vitality and its greatness; and wherever there is religious conviction, there also dwells the hope that what could not gain full victory in our life, will not be lost before God. To quote Browning:

> What I aspired to be,
> And was not, comforts me. . . .
>
> All instincts immature,
> All purposes unsure, . . .
>
> All I could never be,
> All, men ignored in me:
>
> This, I was worth to God.[1]

If all this helps to prove the autonomy of

[1] From "Rabbi Ben Ezra."

man and his independent power of decision; it does not mean the dissociation of man from all inner cohesion. This freedom only becomes possible by the revelation within him of a new world. There could be no spontaneity of action in single cases, if a world of independent and spontaneous life did not exist and embrace us from within. Thus the individual appertains to the whole, even in the exercise of freedom. That of which he is capable by himself alone, is only his ability to bring his own will into accordance with higher laws. All deep thinkers have seen, in the grasp of the essence of life and the development of its possibilities by means of this individual capacity, not an achievement of man alone, but the manifestation of a higher power, a gift of grace. Life did not seem to them to be so divided between grace and freedom, that one of these factors could only be enriched by what was taken from the other; they considered both to be so indissolubly united, that freedom and the power of inner

growth appeared to them to be the highest sign of grace. The most energetic natures, if possessed of any spirituality, have generally felt themselves to be instruments of a higher power and compelled by an inner necessity. This feeling gave them the strength and self-confidence indispensable for their work. In the case of achievement for the visible world, this higher power was mostly looked upon as a dark fate, which protects man as long as it needs him, and abandons him as soon as he ceases to be useful. But in the case of inner change and regeneration, this fate was superseded by a power of love and mercy, which sustains man even in the midst of the greatest dangers. In religion especially, the consciousness of complete dependence on a superior power has not led to a suspension or restriction of activity. This is clearly proved by such men as St. Paul, St. Augustine, and Calvin. They were not the soulless vessels of a truth committed to them; they grasped, by their own recognition and decision, what seemed

to them to be the truth. Yet in their own consciousness, achievement was of small value compared to what they revered as a gift of grace. "Quid habemus quod non accepimus?" (St. Augustine). "What have we that we have not received?"

Hitherto we have been concerned with refuting widespread objections to the possibility of morality. We must now consider the violent opposition against the appreciation which morality demands—and must demand. It seems impossible for morality to be unquestionably superior to everything else in life, and to demand absolute obedience to its requirements, since it does not fill the whole of life, but must share men's allegiance with other obligations, and must seek some compromise with them. This objection could only be valid, if our whole life were a homogeneous structure,—if one single aim dominated all activity, and achievement in this direction could alone determine the value of our action. But the case is very

different from this. Even the one fact that two planes unite in our life makes it impossible to apply the same standard to all the variety we encounter. The various values determined by these two planes are too different to be compared with each other. How could we judge sensuous enjoyment and outer success in the same way as we judge values like truth and honour?

Further, morality is not concerned merely with single values appertaining to the higher plane, but with the recognition and appropriation of this higher plane itself: it is a movement from a whole and to a whole. Once the conviction obtains that the spiritual phase of life is something entirely different from nature, the acquisition of it becomes the chief problem of life, and the claim of morality—which upholds the principle of such acquisition—can assert its supremacy over all other claims. Wherever this was contested, the new world revealed by the spiritual life was not fully recognised. The experience of history shows that no artistic

or intellectual achievement could prevent a rapid abatement and deterioration of the spiritual life, if the ethical task was not fully recognised. Morality is like religion: neither can take a secondary or even a co-ordinate place; they must be valued *more* than everything else in life, or else they will inevitably come to mean *less*.

We have now seen that the doubts assailing morality generally proceed from a particular conception of the universe and of man's position in it. This more or less naturalistic conception, in spite of all it claims to be, by no means exhausts the resources of human life. As soon as we recognise the limitations of this conception of life and free ourselves from its tyranny, we are able to acknowledge fully the claims of morality. Nay, more: these claims must then appeal to us as being both legitimate and imperative; and what might at first appear to be unintelligible, will become absolutely clear and certain.

IV

Evolution of the Ethical Principle

IV

EVOLUTION OF THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE

HAVING removed the obstructions which oppose the development of morality, we can now inquire into the special characteristics of the morality based on the spiritual life. Since morality recognises the principle of the spiritual life, which it absorbs into its own volition and being, therefore the nature of the spiritual life will also determine the nature of morality itself. We have already seen that the life of the spirit constitutes a new world as compared to the life which originally encompasses us in nature and society, and which, though it contains certain processes of a spiritual character, is yet mainly and fundamentally bound to the senses. The spiritual element is here disintegrated into separate manifestations, and

is never free from the alloy of sense. In the new life, the spiritual gains autonomy, becomes a comprehensive whole, and is able to cultivate its own individuality. It reveals a plane of life essentially superior to that of nature. On man devolves the great task of attaining and developing this plane, on which life first acquires self-concentration and inner significance, and becomes real, genuine life.

Let us see how this affects morality. It is not confined to individual provinces of life, but extends over its whole expansion and into every ramification, demanding a change and an uplifting. This refutes a conception of morality which limits it to the relation of man to man, and makes it synonymous with altruism. Morality undoubtedly has much to do in relation to our fellow-men; but does it not also find great tasks in the culture of the soul,—in spiritual work for the world, as expressed in science and art? The quintessence of the Stoical teaching was the development of personality, the pro-

clamation of man's inner autonomy and superiority to the world around him. We can hardly refuse to acknowledge the moral character of this teaching, as also of the Christian teaching, which found expression in men like Augustine, who brought all moral action into immediate connection with God, and derived it from love to Him.

Let us now turn to science and art. We see how, in spite of all inner and outer difficulties, a man like Kant devotes himself in unremitting activity to the lifelong task of finding pure and adequate expression for the perception of truth struggling into consciousness within him. We see how, in the same spirit, an artist scorns all external advantage, and strives only after a pure cultivation and assertion of the creative power within his soul. Must not such fidelity to oneself and to one's own work strike us as being in the highest degree moral? The ethical obligation consequently extends to all ramifications of life. Everywhere we must take possession of the spiritual life for

its own sake, transpose ourselves into its inner movement, and exalt it above all concerns of the individual or even of mankind. Therefore we must not seek the highest aim of our actions in the welfare of society, of the community to which we belong.

The welfare of society is a conception capable of very different interpretations. It may mean the mere subjective well-being of people living together. In that case, a new plane of life is not attained; a social utilitarianism develops, which destroys all inner values, and the sole *aim* of life is to provide the *means* of life. But the condition of society can also be our chief aim because the new plane, with its essentially new values, is best attained through life in the community. Then we do not place ourselves merely in the service of humanity, but we labour for the development of a spiritual world within the life of man. Then humanity as a whole is uplifted, and acknowledges a great task, while social utilitarianism limits life to the human sphere, and takes from it

all possibility of inner uplifting. Utilitarianism is the most dangerous opponent of spiritual productive power, for it degrades to a means what should be valued for its own sake and as the highest aim. Utilitarianism does not change its character by becoming *social* utilitarianism. Inner progress of life is only possible if the spiritual values, as the true, the good, and the beautiful, are striven after and appreciated for their own sake, and not as a means for promoting human welfare,—if creative production is not actuated by any consideration of results, but is an inner necessity of a man's own soul.

We have seen that the attainment of autonomy in the spiritual life implies a reversion of the original order of things, and that the whole of life is thus seen in a new light. It follows that no real morality can be engendered merely by developing existing conditions, or heightening natural forces. Wherever this was attempted, closer investigation will always show the presence of both the lower and the higher

phase, and the consequent weakening of morality. Here Christianity has achieved something of world-wide historical importance: it clearly demonstrated the gulf between all merely natural development and real moral action; it has also shown us that something essentially new appears in morality, something unattainable by merely ennobling nature.

This was not only the case with religion, for the deepest thinkers of all times have seen in morality not a mere intensification, but a complete transformation. Plato made real virtue dependent on aspiration to the world of ideas. He distinguished this virtue from all that men call virtue, though to him it was little more than physical ability. Kant advocated something similar, by forbidding man to base action on inclination alone. He even went so far as to make action against natural inclination a sign of good principle. The requirement thus formulated does not preclude fruitful moral germs and impulses in the existing order of things; but their full

development is only possible when a distinct reversion has taken place, and when an independent spiritual life purifies, unites, and exalts all beginnings. This existing order of things alone can never, by a slow process of evolution, raise life to the plane of genuine spirituality. As we have seen, the morality of the spiritual life rejects a merely natural origin. But because it represents something essentially new, its main object cannot consist in the denial and suppression of mere nature. This was the aim of asceticism, especially in its development as a reaction against the antique over-estimation of nature. In the latter days of antiquity, life was swamped and enfeebled by a refined form of the sensuous. Life could only develop if this sensuous was resisted and full supremacy was advocated for the spiritual. We can understand that those engaged in this struggle went so far as to see the highest morality in the complete suppression of sensuous life. This bears witness to admirable personal feeling; and yet it was a dangerous error,

for it diverted men from the great task of giving inner significance to life, and of filling it with strong and healthy love. The strictest asceticism can exist along with inner hollowness, to spiritual pride, and to want of love. An ascetic element is inseparable from all morality, but only an element subject to higher aims. We feel it to have been one of the great merits of the Reformation, that it set aside the mediæval appreciation of asceticism.

If it is true that autonomy of the spiritual life results in progression towards a new plane, then only such forms of morality can satisfy us as fully acknowledge such progression and the consequent affirmation of life,—as establish the value of man, and stimulate him to strenuous effort. All systems which base morality on pity alone must therefore appear inadequate. Sympathy does much to free man from narrow egoism, and to inspire him with consideration for others, even for all mankind; but sympathy alone shows only one side of life—only limitations and difficulties,

suffering and gloom. It restricts man's outlook to this single side of life, so that he can acquire neither glad courage nor any impulse tending to the uplifting of his existence. Sympathy reveals no new possibilities as love does; complete resignation here forms the highest pinnacle of the philosophy of life and not the creating of a new world.

Neither can a system of morality which only draws up laws and regulations satisfy us,—which indicates definite channels of action, without vitalising action or giving it any progressive impulse. This might suffice if man only had to take his place in a given order of things. But it is quite inadequate if the whole soul is to be gained for a new plane, and if a new order of things is to be built up within the human sphere. There is, besides, the danger above all of interpreting morality as a narrowing, a police system of life, and of thus forfeiting man's sympathy. We do not deny that the uplifting, inseparable from spiritual life, demands many struggles and renunciations. We can only

rise to an affirmative by means of a decided negation—a negation rendered necessary by the brutality of mere nature and the pettiness "of mere man." In the history of mankind, morality at first operated chiefly through prohibition: it was necessary to restrain the wild natural impulses and destructive passions of man, in order to prepare the way for spiritual activity. We have but to think of the frequent recurrence of prohibitive laws in the older legislation of all nations. But there is a great distinction, even in this primitive form of morality. The lower kind may remain permanently on the level of negation, while higher forms will work their way through the negation to affirmation, and will retain consciousness of this affirmation even in presence of negation. Morality must consequently be creative in character, not merely regulative. Creative morality will press forward, not waiting till man is brought face to face with a new requirement or an opportunity of action, but taking the

initiative, seeking new points of attack, bringing everything into movement, and promoting the growth of the spiritual life.

Even then, morality cannot confine its task to the ordering of private life, but must extend its activity to general conditions and human society. Life in the community must be exalted, and fitted to become the representative of spiritual life. It is one of the chief demands of modern times, that not only private life, but the whole of human society, should be subject to moral judgment and moral operation. Hegel condemned as "paltriness of faith," (Kleinkrämerei des Glaubens) men's belief in the guidance of their personal destiny by divine might and wisdom, while at the same time they believed the fate of mankind, as manifested in the history of the world, to be governed by blind unreasonable chance. We must also combat a paltriness of morality which concerns itself with the private affairs of individuals, but shows no interest and recognises no obligation with regard to what concerns

humanity at large. In former times, when man was conscious of his weakness with regard to his environment, the most hopeless situation could be accepted as the will of God or as a decree of fate. But the modern man, with his consciousness of power and of his obligations towards the community, cannot reject the idea of the moral solidarity of all. He must therefore concern himself with the general conditions of mankind, and must display active interest in this direction.

Let us further consider what has been achieved by the autonomy of the spiritual life. We must first of all return to the new depth of life which we have already recognised as one of its most important results. This means that we must cultivate in ourselves a firm basis, a continuous activity which determines, vitalises, and permeates each individual action. We must develop a distinct nucleus, an essential character which is not a mere background to our activity, but an integral part

of it. This being the case, morality cannot be satisfied with stimulating man to certain achievements, and setting free the forces within him; it demands of him a new life, in which he must strive to make the deepening of activity we have been considering, an essential part of all his action. This is the ideal we try to realise in the development of personality and moral character. We want not merely to *act* but to *be* something, to make something out of ourselves, to put our own personal self into our action, and to so act that we ourselves thereby grow and advance. Only then life is so concentrated on itself and becomes self-conscious and self-centred—only then can it gain significance; it will otherwise be empty and hollow inwardly, in spite of unremitting activity. This is what justifies the estimation in which the meaning of personality and character are held. Why indeed should we value such a meaning so highly, were it but an accumulation of natural forces and impulses, and not the representative and starting-point of a new life?

Not only in individuals must such a depth of being, such a spiritual individuality be developed; but in every community, in every nation, in all mankind. Everywhere must a spiritual character be formed, and this spiritual character must inspire and permeate all action. Only thus can a spiritual atmosphere be created,—can a really civilised nation be differentiated from other nations; only thus, and not by means of outer victories and conquests, can any nation gain lasting significance for all humanity. So, for instance, Greek culture is a possession forever.

In all this, it is evident that in striving for morality, we are not seeking something alien, but rather our own essential being. Yet this being does not already exist in us, but has first to be acquired; it lies not behind us, but in front of us; we cannot take for granted a firm basis and positive continuity, which we see before us as high tasks and ideals. From the imperfect and incomplete life we generally lead, we must resolutely

advance towards real and genuine life. While striving after morality, we are at the same time battling for our own spiritual self; we cannot but feel morality as a living inner presence, a source of strength and of joyous impulse to action. Thus understood, morality needs no reward from without; indeed, it sustains grave injury, if action is dominated by the thought of reward. For then the autonomy and independence which are above all aimed at, must be given up; and we force under an alien yoke that life which should be based on itself alone.

Such accentuation of autonomy in life and morality, might seem to exalt man unduly, and to inspire him with self-conscious pride. But we have already guarded ourselves against such misapprehension. We have seen that every undertaking possible to the individual lies within a sustaining and impelling movement of the whole. The recognition of morality is therefore not a matter of personal option or caprice. The life of the whole operates in the individual;

but, on the other hand, his decision influences the whole of reality in the direction of progress or retrogression. In this way the conception of *Duty* arises, in which the whole of life, the whole of the cosmic movement formulates a claim on us. Kant rightly pointed out that duty cannot come to us from without, but must proceed from our own being. This can only be the case if our being experiences an inner gradation. A spiritual world speaks within us, not as something alien, but in union with our own innermost being, as the depth of our own soul. The idea of Duty is necessary in proportion to the consciousness and recognition of the difference between man as he is, and the inner world which corresponds to his innermost being. Wherever this consciousness grows dim, there morality speedily experiences an inner weakening. Duty is the salt of life. Where it is lacking, life, however brilliant externally, becomes inwardly tame and insipid, while on the other hand, Duty can impart inner greatness and dignity to

what appears small and insignificant. But as we do not wish the presence of salt to be everywhere perceptible, so also the idea of Duty must not always force itself on our consciousness, but must be a latent power in our soul and life, lifting us above all that is arbitrary and capricious. We must take Duty up into our inner being, and not place it there as something alien or hostile. Moral life can quite well unite earnestness and joy, reverence and love—earnestness and reverence towards the superior majesty of a higher power operative to us, joy and love arising from the mighty presence of this higher power within us.

Thus constituted, morality can fully acknowledge the various moral impulses at work in the present day; it can, at the same time, oppose their disintegration, and help them as far as possible to promote one another's best interests. We have seen how, in our day, invisible and visible impulses are in operation, which easily come into

mutual opposition. The morality of the spiritual life can in such cases acknowledge both aspects, even if it cannot value them equally. For this morality must take up a position in an invisible world, since the progression from a visible to an invisible world goes through the whole of the spiritual life. At the same time work in the visible world is most important for man, if not indispensable. He is driven to it not only by the necessity of natural self-preservation, but also by the real interests of the invisible world. He does not find this invisible world ready for him, or waiting to develop steadily from within, but he must acquire and strengthen it by battling against the visible world and its resistance. The spiritual movement is sure to become subjective and uncertain, as soon as it severs all connection with the visible world, in relation to which our work gains strength and confidence. Love, strength, and continuity are thus acquired, which must then be transformed into activity for our fellow-men.

This applies both to individuals and to all mankind. Such valuation of activity for the visible world does not mean that we constitute life out of the visible and the invisible as out of two factors of equal value, for wherever spiritual life develops, the invisible is of paramount importance, and everything else must be brought into relation with it. The visible is valuable only as a means for the development or manifestation of the invisible. But as such, it is of considerable value. Thus the morality of the spiritual life is quite able to recognise—and to benefit by—the great civilising work of the modern age and its untiring social activity, even while insisting on their assimilation by a vaster cohesion which is to vitalise them.

We shall see, later on, that the invisible world cannot hold its own against doubts and obstacles, unless it is aided by religion. But although the morality of the spiritual life must seek to be in close touch with religion, it must do its best to counteract the

dangers arising from an exclusively religious system of ethics. Religious morality in former times often directed man's endeavour too much towards a world of faith and hope beyond our world, and was inclined to neglect earthly matters as being of secondary importance. It often transferred to human affairs the humility and pliability born of its relation to God; and it consequently lacked strength and vigour when dealing with the evils of human life. These perils can be counteracted by a morality of the spiritual life, which sees the operation of the Divine Being above all in man, even while acknowledging its superiority to man. Such morality will urge man to seek and appropriate eternal values, not only in a future state, but in this our earthly life. Such morality will teach man not to accept the unreasonable conditions as he finds them, but to struggle against them with all his might, striving to impart reality to the reasonable and reason to reality.

The morality of reason and immanent

idealism contains a virile strength and educational power that the morality of the spiritual life is bound to acknowledge. Yet spiritual morality must counteract certain undesirable results frequently brought about by mere rational morality, which is prone to overrate intellect and abstract ideas, to overvalue the strength of the individual, and thus to encourage undue pride and self-consciousness.

Thus great tasks are evident in all directions. From the standpoint of the spiritual life it is possible to take them up hopefully, and to counteract antitheses which would otherwise disintegrate human life. In all these tasks, taken together, we see how life may be quickened and strengthened by the ethics of the spiritual life. Everywhere it is necessary to proceed beyond an order of things as it merely exists and is given to us,—to rise above merely human aims and conditions,—to develop the consciousness of the marvellous depth of

reality, in which man is privileged to participate. We discover a great cosmic movement, and we see our own greatness in our co-operation in this movement, by which we contribute something to the growth of the spiritual world. To speak with Leibnitz: "Man is not a part, but an image of the divine, a presentation of the universe, a child of the City of God."

V

Morality and Religion

V

MORALITY AND RELIGION

WE have hitherto confined ourselves to the inner development of morality, without considering the attitude of the world *around* us and *within* us to those claims which morality, from its very nature, is bound to assert. At all times, this question has presented grave complications, which are magnified rather than diminished by the philosophy of the spiritual life.

If morality is the first condition and an essential factor of all independent spiritual life,—if this spiritual life is the central point of reality, and dominates all its manifestations: then we might expect to see, throughout the visible world, the triumph of good, the repression of evil, and the rule of a moral order of things, moulding reality to

its requirements. Man's desire for such an order of things does not rise from petty motives, but from an imperative desire for the unquestioned supremacy of the good: what is in itself of such absolute value, must be strong enough to enforce its dominion over reality, otherwise it might come to be considered merely as a subjective illusion.

The world, as we see it, does not come up to this requirement. It evinces—as every impartial observer must acknowledge—absolute indifference, not only to the weal and woe of man, but also to his moral conduct. How often, in the destiny of nations as of individuals, does good succumb and evil triumph! It may be that we often judge too exclusively from external impressions, and that there is more justice in the world than appears at first sight. But this is no more than a possibility, and we cannot assert that it is in any way realised. Much remains dark, and has not been explained away, in spite of the efforts made by religion and philosophy during thousands of years.

These efforts have made the darkness less evident, but have not brought light into it. We can deny neither the indifference of nature to our moral action, nor the incapacity of man to enforce, in his own sphere, the triumph and supremacy of the moral idea. And this gulf between what we must *demand* and what we *find* in the world, receives further accentuation by the recognition of an independent spiritual life closely allied to morality. For the impotence of morality now appears as the impotence of the whole spiritual life. At the same time, the human sphere seems to lose all its own special significance, since it cannot enforce universal recognition of the power to which it owes its privileged position.

Distressing as is this contradiction between the inner requirement and external experience, it does not necessarily lead to a weakening of the moral obligation. This is plainly shown by religion, more especially by early Christianity. The early Christians were fully conscious of the sorrow and gloom of

human life; they realised the unreasonableness of the world we live in, quite as fully as the pessimists of our day. Yet their faith and courage remained unshaken. The contradiction of experience only intensified their inner conviction, and gave it an almost defiant superiority. This was only possible, because the possession of a new life and the certitude of a new world made it easy to bear all the contradictions in the existing order of things. From their certitude of a new world, arose the conviction that the good could only be impotent in a certain phase and for a certain time. The early Christians were so sure of the ultimate triumph of good, that they found strength to persevere in the battle of life.

The present time lacks this joyous certitude of a higher world and a new life. Therefore the contradiction between the course of the world and the requirements of morality, is felt in all its rigour, and doubt is intensified by the unsatisfactory moral condition of human life, by the inner weakness

of morality in our day. Single individuals are not without good intentions, but they lack the power of achievement. Spiritual activity is generally treated as of secondary importance; infinitely greater value is attached to the natural self-preservation of individuals and of society. Life in the community ought to give greater prominence to moral claims, and be governed as far as possible by moral law. But on the one hand there is not enough power of volition, and on the other hand there is, here also, a wide gulf between volition and achievement. Social life also displays so much self-interest, selfishness, and passion, so much unreality and hypocrisy, that morality cannot reach any adequate development. The spiritual powers which should raise man to a higher plane are mostly withdrawn into the service of the lower plane, and life is thus diverted into wrong channels. This contradiction between human conditions and the requirements of morality has been expressed in various ways by the great

thinkers. Plato lamented, above all, the evanescence and unreality of everyday life; Augustine the overweening conceit of man; Kant the insincerity and injustice everywhere apparent. But to one and all, the moral condition of mankind appeared most unsatisfactory.

All these contradictions, obstructions, and distortions are so deep-rooted, that we can hardly expect any essential progress to result from a gradual amelioration. In other directions—such as science and technical knowledge—humanity may make steady progress; but it is not so easy to prove that humanity will also experience moral improvement. The progress of civilisation brings with it the development of much that is good, but also of much that is evil, for civilisation develops great power, without providing for its moral guidance. History shows us how mankind has always seemed to alternate between periods of moral growth and periods of moral decay; but it is doubtful whether, on the whole, much has been gained.

How often have the nations longed to return to simpler and more innocent beginnings!

All these impressions might seem to prove that morality has no power in the life of man. A doubt easily arises as to whether, if morality is so powerless, we ought to acknowledge it as the guide of our life, or whether we should not rather expel it as a mere illusion. But the experience of history shows us unmistakably that the roots of morality lie deeper, and are not so easily removed. Even if morality is not the ruling power, it is unquestionably efficacious as man's lawgiver and judge. Again and again, the nations may resist the claims of morality, and the conceptions of morality itself may be widely divergent; yet wherever human life develops, moral judgment develops with it. Certain actions are highly esteemed, others are decidedly condemned. Something operates in man which is not confined to his own interest, and which forces him to judge his actions. Such judgment must inevitably

influence both the action and the spiritual condition of man; in one direction it promotes, in another it represses.

History gives us an indirect proof of the power of morality over man. There are times in the history of mankind when the moral idea, with its decree of duty, recedes into the background, and is even scoffed at as an irksome instrument of control. But such times, however brilliant on the surface, cannot resist inner decay and hollowness, till at last they become unendurable. Then, if there is a return to morality, it is superior to, and triumphant over all other interests. It was moral earnestness and moral strength that were above all instrumental in causing early Christianity to overcome the pagan world that was, in all outer respects, superior and more powerful. It was moral energy that gave the Reformation its power to advance and conquer, while the soft and beautiful Renaissance perished because it lacked morality. Look where we will, we see that the moral task, if fully and

clearly grasped, is stronger than anything else.

It is therefore impossible for mankind to renounce morality. But we have seen that morality, as a rule, has little power over external life or man's soul, and is forced into a subordinate position. This produces inner discord in human life. Man acquires inner insincerity by not recognising and developing the depths of his own being. This inner contradiction can be fully appreciated by a system of philosophy which attaches special importance to the idea of the spiritual life. For in the light of such philosophy, we see one great contradiction pervading the whole of life: the spiritual activity—which ought to lead man to an independent inner life, thus making his existence one of joyous creative work—is used by average life as a mere means and instrument for human ends. Spiritual activity is thus degraded, for the good has mostly to give way to utilitarian considerations. This is the case, when the motive of scientific research is its utility,

and not an aspiration after truth. This is the case, when art does not reveal a new world to man by means of genuine beauty, but appeals only to his senses. This is the case, whenever the subjective welfare of man —either of the individual or of society—is the highest aim,—whenever man is not led to a higher life by spiritual activity, but is only confirmed by it in the lower life.

Such conflicts, such inner discord, such stagnation of life impel morality to seek close contact with religion. We see that man has in himself an ideal, on which depends all the greatness and dignity of his life; but he cannot reach it unaided. Something strives to assert itself within him, without his being able to accomplish it. He remains chained to a lower level, above which his innermost soul longs to rise. Doubt and uncertainty proceed from the fact that what is of the very highest inner value should have so little power in the world and in the sphere of human life. For deep and earnest natures as St. Augustine and as Luther, such uncertainty has often

become unbearable; from inner conflicts was born the sure and triumphant conviction of a higher power in the movement towards morality,—a power which not only imposes moral obligations on man, but which, by the revelation of a new life, gives him strength to fulfil them. Morality here appears as something infinitely superior to the uncertainty of human conditions, and completely independent of man's attitude towards it. If morality does not attain the power due to it in man's life, this is now attributed to the weakness, not of morality, but of man. The majesty of morality is by no means prejudiced by man's line of conduct. Kant could therefore declare that "it is most unjustifiable to derive either the origin or any restriction of the laws telling me what I ought to do, from that which is merely done."

It is the essence of all deep religions, especially of Christianity, that a new life is created in man by a revelation of the Divine by means of a direct union of the

soul with God. This new life is held to be superior to the complexity of existing conditions, and is sure to triumph, because it is founded in God. A source of life is thus opened up, which imparts new activity to the life hitherto stagnant. Man regains courage and confidence, because he feels himself sustained by divine strength and love. No contradiction in the world of external realities is now able to weaken man's inner certitude. A powerful impulse towards work and creative activity will be born of the gladness within him. This explains the unquestioning confidence and joyous energy manifested by all the leaders of religious life; the consciousness of their deliverance from dire distress filled them with unbounded gratitude, which sought expression in unremitting work for their fellow-men. Luther says: "From faith flow love and joy in the Lord, and from love a free and joyous spirit of voluntary service of our neighbour, quite irrespective of gratitude or ingratitude, praise or blame, gain or loss."

Further development of life by means of religion is sure to stamp morality with characteristic features. The consciousness of deliverance by a higher power will arouse not only gratitude, but humility and child-like confidence. If everything man has is but a gift, then he will see, in his highest achievement, less his own work than that of God. Gentleness and toleration will gain ground; arrogance and harshness will disappear; all decisive action will have an inner rather than an outer significance. The value of an action depends on loyalty to principle, and not on the greatness of what is achieved. This is shown by Jesus in the parable of the talents.

But this accentuation of softer elements and inner values by no means paralyses activity. For the new life must be energetically developed and bravely asserted against an alien, not to say a hostile, world. Man finds a great task, first of all in his own soul, but then in the whole of his life with other men. We may here apply a principle of

the Reformation, which has thus been expressed: "The word of God, whenever it comes, comes to change and renew the world." There is one thing on which a philosophy of the spiritual life must emphatically insist: this return to religion must not be confined to the individual, but must embrace all the conditions of human life. Only thus can the whole of man be won. This can only be done by creating a specific religious sphere of life, a specific religious community. Many of us may wish the Church to be, in certain respects, different to what it is; but that should not make us ignore the necessity of a religious community. It is indispensable, if we are to establish the new life in the human sphere, and bring it within the reach of the individual; it is indispensable, if the struggle is to be maintained by great entities, and is not to degenerate into small skirmishes. At the present time, when the state is engrossed by economic and other constantly changing problems of the day, we need a community which

attaches paramount importance to the inner problems of humanity and which directs our life towards eternal aims and values.

In this union with religion, morality will be inclined to see more gloom than light in the life around us. For morality will then judge by higher standards, and will emphasise the insufficiency of human achievement, the unsatisfactory character of the present situation. But morality cannot lead to despondency, once it is emancipated from the world of immediate environment, and has gained a new world. Morality will then see, in the world of strife and antithesis, only a special kind of reality, and not the whole of reality; it will recognise in this world only one act of a great drama, and not the whole drama.

Much that is dark thus remains unexplained. To speak with Goethe, we "walk among mysteries." Even if we cannot enlighten what is dark, the new beginnings established in us will save us from becoming cowed and despondent. We are certain

that great things are being accomplished in us and through us,—that a higher power is present within us throughout the struggles of our life. At the same time, we feel sure that our inner renewal is not mechanical, but requires our own decision and action, thus making us co-operate in the movement of the universe, and giving to our activity a significance for the whole. That must and that can be sufficient for us. We can agree with Luther, when he thus characterises human life: "It is not yet done and accomplished, but it is in working order and in full swing; it is not the end, but the way. All does not yet glow and shine, but all is being burnished."

We know that so close a connection between morality and religion is often contested nowadays. But we believe that religious morality can only be attacked by those who have too low an estimate of morality or too high an estimate of the actual condition of humanity. If morality is but a means of tolerable order in the social community of

life, and is only looked upon as a controlling force, then it can dispense with religion. But this means a lowering of the moral requirement, the fulfilment of which brings but little gain or profit. It is possible, on the other hand, to value morality more highly, but to over-estimate man, as experience shows him to be. He is looked on as a good and noble being, easily won for the highest aims. Were this a true conception of man, then morality could attain its ends by its own strength alone. But we are clearly shown that this is not the case, both by the conviction of all great religious and philosophical teachers, and by the general impression of human life. At all times, the pessimists—and not the optimists—were held to have the best knowledge of human nature. We need only consider more closely the delineation of human life left us by the so-called optimistic philosophers (like Aristotle and Leibnitz), in order to see that even they found in it much that was dark and gloomy.

If we maintain a high conception of the moral task and an impartial conception of the actual condition of human life, there remains but one dilemma: either complete hopelessness and inner collapse of life, or the acquisition of further cohesions, such as that offered by an alliance with religion. But religion must then mean more than a sum of doctrines and institutions. It must influence the whole soul. It must not only cling to the past, but must, above all, be a power in the living present. It must not only be a source of comfort to individuals, but must raise the whole of mankind to a higher and purer level. In all these aspects, religion is both action and life, not mere thinking about the world, or subjective emotion. A connection of morality with religion thus understood, can be only a source of profit—not of loss—to morality, which will thus be strengthened in its bearing on external reality, and will experience a great deepening of its inner life.

VI

The Present Status of Morality

VI

THE PRESENT STATUS OF MORALITY

WE must now consider, in conclusion, the position of Morality in our day. Let us see what profit and loss accrues to morality from the present, and what its prospects are for the future. There can be no doubt about the fact that great changes are being effected—changes not only in the world of ideas, but in the whole range of life and work. These changes at first result in manifold losses to morality. The pillars which used to support it have begun to totter, or have given way altogether; new ones have arisen, but are as yet too weak to offer an adequate substitute for what is lost. We cannot therefore look upon the present status of morality as a satisfactory one.

The weakening of religious conviction

and practice is unfavourable to morality. Imperfect as the influence of religion often was on mankind at large, and excessive as was the importance attached to the idea of reward and punishment, men yet recognised a power superior to all human action and all arbitrary human decision. This power was to become an object of reverence; and when this happened life was raised above the care for purely material possessions. It was also a gain for moral culture, that religion established the inner solidarity of man, and facilitated mutual understanding. Thus it is a loss for morality, that religion no longer maintains its former ruling position.

The general condition of our intellectual life is unfavourable to morality, inasmuch as this intellectual life lacks a uniform aim which could unite scattered aspirations, strengthen every single undertaking, and counteract, as a whole, the interests of mere individuals. These interests at all times made themselves felt, and life was always in danger of being dominated by petty human

considerations. But the difference between period and period depends on whether or not this danger is counteracted and man is raised above himself by some high aim. In our day, such counteraction is lacking. Where have we an aim embracing the whole man, which is common to us all and binds us together to inner communion? Every party and faction preaches some ideal of its own, the attainment of which will, it believes, unite men, making them good and happy. But these individual aims are very different in character; they are a cause of mutual hindrance, and they divide mankind in that which should be a means of union.

Another disadvantage for inner culture is the rapid pace of life, as compared to former times. While we are hastening from moment to moment, we have neither repose nor leisure for the culture of our inner man, for the development of a character, a personality. We are more and more in danger of being absorbed by the whirlpool of life, and robbed of all possibility of self-conscious

action. Other perils also beset us. In our thirst for achievement and success, our moral judgment is often repressed; the accentuation of the battle of life can even make us indifferent to the moral quality of the ways and means employed by us. All this necessarily weakens morality, and makes it appear unimportant and shadowy.

To these dangers arising from the general conduct of life, we must add others, which originate in the modern development of work in the community. In former times, the conditions of life were at once narrower and less subject to change. Social environment exercised a stricter and more exclusive control over the individual, holding him within the bounds of law and custom. This influence was often only an external one; correct behaviour was frequently mistaken for moral integrity. This gave rise to much unreality and pharisaical hypocrisy. Still, a certain result was attained in the direction of moral culture; certain restraints were acknowledged, which cannot, without

impunity, be dispensed with. Restraints play an important part in the life of the soul, as well as in that of the body. Modern freedom of action makes the individual depend on himself alone, and we must be very optimistic to believe him able to completely withstand, unaided, all the temptations of life.

We cannot omit one characteristic modern development: the change of men's mutual relation from a personal to an impersonal one. We have but to think of the difference between the cordial community of life established by the old arts and crafts, and the cool, almost hostile manner in which, in our great labour complexes, "employers" and "employees" nowadays associate. There is no longer the slightest personal relation or personal sympathy between them.

If we survey all these losses, the balance of the day will hardly appear to be in favour of morality. But we must not forget that the present age has also supplied morality

with new and valuable impulses. This is above all the case with labour—the modern form of work to which we have just alluded. There is a strong moral element in the ever increasing formation and organisation of great labour complexes, not only in the factory, but also in science, state organisation, education, and so forth. The individual is thereby obliged to work in close union with others, and in accordance with objective requirements. He must adapt his own activity to the general character of the work; and yet he must do his own part conscientiously, so that the mass of separate achievements may blend harmoniously and ensure the steady progress of the whole. This requires such loyalty, self-control, and sacrifice of personal taste and opinion, that a strong moral effect is undeniable. In this respect, man now learns more implicit obedience than at any former period. Another moral element in modern labour is the concentration of man's whole strength on his work, to the exclusion of all inert repose.

If the impersonal element predominates in work, the social side of modern life offers, on the other hand, more direct union and more reciprocal action between man and man. This was, at first, mainly theoretical. It was pointed out how much one man depends on his fellow-men. People realised that the individual develops with other individuals and as part of the community, with which his aspirations are indissolubly connected, even when he imagines he is striking out a path for himself. But such theories could only have so much influence, because they were in harmony with the realities of life. Modern life, with its technical developments, brought individuals into close touch and created new opportunities of mutual intercourse, uniting men both in success and in failure. Thus grew up the consciousness of human solidarity, the recognition of men's interdependence, the idea of mutual obligation. The result is a wealth of humane activity, which penetrates into all the ramifications of life, attacking and

seeking to eradicate all forms of want and misery, instead of merely helping to relieve individual cases. We encounter the earnest endeavour to impart material and spiritual possessions, as far as possible, to all men; to help and strengthen the less favoured section of humanity; to further the interests of aspiring spirits. These efforts are but various aspects of one great duty, which we feel we cannot ignore; we can no longer look upon them as works of mercy, which it is a virtue to perform. This is at the root of the social idea. And this social idea is, in our day, the greatest bond of union between human beings; not only does it stir individuals,but it also exercises a strong influence on law, education, and so forth. In this respect our time has a right to claim undoubted superiority over all former times.

These moral achievements of the present, valuable as they are, yet have their inner limitations. Nearly all movement here proceeds *outward*, and is directed towards distinct single achievements, while the culture

and welfare of the inner man are mostly treated as of secondary importance. Zeal for surface ends leads to the neglect of the central values of life. Yet all outer achievement only means real gain for us, if it promotes the growth of the whole man, of his soul, of his personality, making him nobler, greater, and happier. If there is no development and strengthening of the *centre* of life, achievement on the surface is apt to result in grave complications, and all that is great in the present may thereby be driven into the wrong channels. Another danger grows out of the ever increasing tendency to organise work. Owing to the necessity of specialising and differentiating, the amount of work is restricted which the individual can comprehend and master. He is tempted to concentrate his interest on his own little province, to be indifferent to everything outside it, and to lose all consciousness of a leading idea and of a great whole. He thus falls a prey to the narrow conceit of the specialist, and finally pushes aside as worth-

less accessories all matters of general interest, all the questions and sorrows of humanity at large.

By furthering a spirit of sympathy for human want and misery, without at the same time giving to life an inner value and a higher aim, we are in danger of becoming sentimental and of producing inner languor in spite of all outer activity. We are often more anxious to procure for a man a comfortable and pleasant life, than to promote his inner growth; and our care for the weak, which is quite justified, leads us to take such weak individuals as a criterion and to lower life to their level.

Modern life often lacks the necessary hardness and vigour; in our care for the rights of individuals, we are inclined to neglect the rights and requirements of the whole and also of the spiritual life. So we are in danger of losing that Reverence which, according to Goethe, "no one brings into the world when he is born, yet which is all important to possess if man is to become *man* in a genuine sense."

If we review the whole and consider the balance of moral profit and loss in our day, the result cannot be a favourable one. No full substitute is offered for what is lost. We have gained in breadth, but we have lost in depth and strength. Above all, morality is in danger of losing its former ruling position, and of having a subordinate one assigned to it. It can therefore no longer call forth reverence, or be treated as an independent aim and ideal. We realise at once the gravity of this loss.

But this unfavourable aspect only holds good, if we consider the present time as something complete and incapable of further development. If, on the contrary, we seek to grasp all that is struggling into life, all the requirements of our time that yet await fulfilment: then the situation is quite different and far more favourable. What mainly told against morality was the prevalent over-estimation of everything pertaining to the visible life which surrounds us in nature and in human society. The invisible

realms of religion and the ideal have, as we have seen, often grown dim and shadowy. Many of our contemporaries deny them altogether, and look to the visible world for full satisfaction of all man's wants, even of his spiritual and intellectual requirements. This could only appear possible because, in reality, the invisible world of spiritual values continued to influence even those who denied it, and because it supplemented and completed the achievements of the visible world. It is, however, characteristic of our time, that the old fusion is no longer possible, and the irreconcilable antithesis between these two conceptions of life stands out in bold relief. With increasing zeal, the movement in favour of the visible world—that is to say, Naturalism—tries to eradicate everything appertaining to the invisible world, and to fashion the whole of life in accordance with its own principles. Naturalism tolerates no rival, and declares war to the death to Idealism.

We now see the truth of Bacon's words: "*Veritas potius emergit ex errore quam ex*

confusione" (Truth can more easily emerge from error than from confusion). For if we accept naturalism as the only valid conception of life, and develop it consistently in all its bearings, we cannot but see its incapacity to embrace the whole of life. The apparent victory of naturalism thus contains the germ of a defeat, the beginning of a great reaction. What becomes of man and of human life, if the visible world means to him the only form of reality? He is then but part of nature—dark and soulless nature. The vast expansion and range of nature overwhelms him with the consciousness of his own insignificance, while, at the same time, nature is absolutely indifferent to his wishes and aspirations. What he makes of himself and his life has not the very slightest significance for this world of nature. All aspiration which transcends his natural instinct of self-preservation must appear to be mere folly. Such ideals as personality and character are but held to be illusions.

If man turns away from the outer world

and takes refuge in his own sphere, in the social life among his fellows, naturalism shows him there a mere juxtaposition, but no inner community which could offer new aims or develop new values. What remains is only a number of individuals inhabiting the same little corner of the universe. Each of these individuals strives to gain recognition of his own merits, and to assert himself, to the detriment of others. Much sordidness and hypocrisy thus become rampant, and it is impossible to counteract them within so narrow a range, or to hope for the growing up of a nobler and purer race of men and women. The individual remains bound to the condition of society,—a condition which also determines his own nature; he appears to be but a product of the social environment. Having no deeper source of life within himself, how should he be able to escape from the trammels of society, to rise above it and oppose it? Society and environment thus become the destiny of man; and there is no scope for freedom, for initiative, for independent action.

If we survey and appreciate all this with unbiassed minds, this kind of life must appear empty and meaningless and scarcely worth living. At the same time, we shall discern a development of mankind far transcending these narrow limits, as indeed has already been pointed out in this our study of morality. The degradation of life effected by naturalism might be endured in feeble and senile periods conscious of no great tasks, but not in our time —a time which teems with stupendous tasks it is earnestly striving to carry out. These great tasks and problems can only be grappled with, if we are fully conscious of concentrated energy and increased spiritual power. Modern life has developed in various and opposite directions. Its expansion is greater than its concentration, and this threatens it with disintegration. There is an increasing and imperative need of more unity and cohesion, of some universal and harmonious character of the whole. How should this be attained without a vigorous deepening of life, without the development of invisible

values? We observe, in our day, the encounter of an older and a newer age: of an old conception of life hallowed by the traditions of history, and of a new one that is struggling into existence; there is thus a sharp conflict between the past and the present. We cannot but admit in the old an imperishable germ of truth, and in the new, an inalienable right to impress and influence us. We must prove and sift, differentiate and unite. But how were any progress in this direction possible, could we not find a superior point of view, such as can be offered only by a world of thought, and not by the visible life? This problem gains vastly in significance by extending to the social life of all humanity. We see here a struggle between an older, more aristocratic form of society, and a newer, more democratic one. This struggle engenders violent passions, especially in the province of economics. We are here placed before a grave question: shall we be able to impart the benefits of civilisation to all men alike, and thus broaden every in-

dividual soul, without injury to its inner depths?

These are problems which do not originate in ourselves, but which are forced upon us by the movement of history. Their very necessity bids us hope for progression, in spite of all impediments. The power which has imposed these problems on us will enable us to solve them. But we shall also need to put forth our uttermost strength, and to quicken all our latent spiritual forces; we must grasp our life as a whole, must acknowledge its high aims with all our heart and soul, and must find our real self in these ideals. Only thus can we gain the sense of *inner necessity* which alone can lead us onward.

In this manner, our aspiration becomes closely linked to morality. Let us see wherein we have already recognised the nucleus of morality. Life and aspiration are detached from the "small self," and take root in a spiritual world in which we find our own essential being, so that while working for

this spiritual world, we are at the same time working for our own depth and spiritual self-preservation. Such a change and reaction, such identification with the movement of the spiritual life, means no less than that our aspiration has gained a moral character. This moral character brings us, at all points, into touch with our time. By means of our own aspiration, we can now grasp, unite, and deepen all the goodwill, genuine feeling, and untiring activity of our day—an activity which was hitherto inadequate only because it lacked inner unity and quickening spiritual power.

We can thus face the future with courage and confidence. Humanity has by no means exhausted its vital power; it is full of new possibilities which demand realisation; and therefore we may expect an inner development of life and a rejuvenation of morality.

What is true of mankind in general, is especially true of America. The multitude of grave problems cannot discourage a nation which feels in itself so much youthful vigour,

that it will not submit to a dark fate, but should be able and ready to mould its own fate, and to aspire to yet greater heights than it has hitherto attained. But to achieve this, moral force is as necessary as unshaken confidence in the power of the spirit. We believe in a bright future for this great country. We believe also in the development in America of such moral strength as will successfully overcome all conflicts and lead to splendid results, for the benefit not only of the American nation, but of all mankind.

THE END

Works by

Dr. Rudolf Eucken

Professor of Philosophy, University of Jena

In 1908, Dr. Eucken was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature. His books have been translated into many languages and their influence is widespread.

Through his sustained and heroic appeal to what is most spiritual in man, Eucken has ennobled the significance and the mission of philosophy. He aims at developing, not a new category, but a new culture, and holds that it is the privilege of philosophy, by penetrating to what is most inward in human nature, to bring a religious inspiration to bear upon the problems of the world of human labor. Eucken's philosophy is a philosophy of life. It is a philosophy of reality as well. It treats of the sources of man's strength, and the meaning and purpose of his spiritual endeavor. And can there be anything more real than the activity of a life that has consciously realized the true sources of its power and the goal of its ultimate aspirations?

New York G. P. Putnam's Sons London

Works by Dr. Rudolf Eucken

In the Crown Theological Library Series

The Life of the Spirit

An Introduction to Philosophy

Translated by F. L. Pogson, M.A.

12°, $1.50 net. By mail, $1.65

Second Edition. With Introductory Note by Author

"Germany has again given us a great constructive philosopher, whose influence has gone out through all the thinking world. . . . No one can read these powerful pages without understanding that a strong thinker has arisen among us, and without enlargement and deepening of his own thought."—*Congregationalist.*

"With Bergson of France, he is the most influential personal factor in arming contemporary thinkers for the fray against materialism and irreligion."—*Christian Science Monitor.*

Knowledge and Life

12°,

"No one is having more influence upon the spiritual life and religious thought of Europe, at the present time, than Prof. Rudolf Eucken. His books . . . are making a deep impress upon thinking people."—*Christian Work.*

Religion and Life

16°. Frontispiece. 50 cts. net. By mail, 60 cts.

"The work is able, as may naturally be expected of Prof. Eucken. But it is more. The author is very much in earnest and he is anxious for men to see the great need of religion in their lives. In this book we have the best of his mind and heart."
Boston Transcript.

"The philosophy of Eucken shares with that of Bergson the keenest living interest of thoughful men of all classes at the present day. . . . Eucken has endeavored in this book to put his constructive system into the clearest and most elaborate form."—*Continent.*

New York **G. P. Putnam's Sons** London

Works by Dr. Rudolf Eucken

In the Theological Translations Series

The Truth of Religion

Translated by W. Tudor Jones, Ph.D.

Second English Edition. Translated from the Third and Revised German Edition with a special Preface by the Author

8°. $3.50 net. By mail, $3.75

"When a book of really original thought appears it constitutes an epoch in literature. Such a new era is introduced by this work. The ideas of Prof. Eucken are startling, and revolutionary in some respects, but are at the same time inspiring and reassuring to all the essential features of Christianity as the true, the supreme and the final religion."—*Watchman.*

Contest for the Spiritual Life

8°,

"In Professor Eucken, we have the philosopher as preacher. He not only handles life, he would spread, enrich, and fortify it, and he is a great force for the restoration of idealism in his own land. He is a preacher equipped with philosophy and an inspired lecturer on the spiritual life and its integration in the Whole."—*The Nation.*

An Interpretation of Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy

By W. Tudor Jones, Ph.D. (Jena)

12°, With Portrait. $1.50 net. By mail, $1.65

The main aim of the volume is to present the essentials of Eucken's teaching, to show its genesis and growth, its connection with Science, Philosophy, Sociology, History and Religion. The whole volume is an attempt to present the nucleus of Eucken's teaching, and to show its fundamental importance in the individual life, the society and the religion of the future.

New York G. P. Putnam's Sons London

Knowledge and Life

By Rudolf Eucken

Author of "The Truth of Religion," "The Life of the Spirit"

Crown Theological Library. 12°. $1.50

Through his sustained and heroic appeal to what is most spiritual in man, Eucken has ennobled the significance and the mission of philosophy. He aims at developing, not a new category but a new culture, and holds that it is the privilege of philosophy, by penetrating to what is most inward in human nature, to bring a religious inspiration to bear upon the problems of the world of human labor. Eucken's philosophy is a philosophy of life. It is a philosophy of reality as well. It treats of the sources of man's strength, and the meaning and purpose of his spiritual endeavor. And can there be anything more real than the activity of a life that has consciously realized the true sources of its power and the goal of its ultimate aspirations?

G. P. Putnam's Sons

New York **London**

THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW

AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS

WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY WILL INCREASE TO 50 CENTS ON THE FOURTH DAY AND TO $1.00 ON THE SEVENTH DAY OVERDUE.

APR 10 1935

15Dec'63JV

FEB 12 1945

4Dec'61CK

REC'D LD

DEC 12'63-3 PM

REC'D LD

NOV 20 1961

1Mar'62JW

IN STACKS

FEB 15 1962

REC'D LD

JUN 7 1962

LD 21-100m-8,'34

292294
Eucken
BJ1114
E8
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY

Cornell University Library

BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME
FROM THE
SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND
THE GIFT OF
Henry W. Sage
1891

A.260629 30/1/17

1357


Cornell University Library
BD431 .E86 1911
Life's basis and life's ideal, the funda
3 1924 028 932 022
olin

The original of this book is in
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.

http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924028932022

LIFE'S BASIS AND LIFE'S IDEAL

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

THE MEANING AND VALUE OF LIFE

Translated by W. R. BOYCE GIBSON

Crown 8vo, cloth, price 3s. 6d. net.

And by W. R. BOYCE GIBSON

RUDOLF EUCKEN'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

Second Edition, crown 8vo, cloth, price 3s. 6d. net.

A. AND C. BLACK, 4 SOHO SQUARE, LONDON, W.

AGENTS

AMERICA . . . . THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
64 & 66 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK

AUSTRALASIA . THE OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
205 FLINDERS LANE, MELBOURNE

CANADA . . . . THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF CANADA, LTD.
ST. MARTIN'S HOUSE, 70 BOND STREET, TORONTO

INDIA . . . . MACMILLAN & COMPANY, LTD.
MACMILLAN BUILDING, BOMBAY
309 BOW BAZAAR STREET, CALCUTTA

LIFE'S BASIS AND LIFE'S IDEAL

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

BY

RUDOLF EUCKEN

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF JENA

TRANSLATED, WITH INTRODUCTORY NOTE

BY

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

FORMERLY SCHOLAR OF ST. CATHARINE'S COLLEGE, AND BURNEY STUDENT, CAMBRIDGE, AND MEMBER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF JENA

LONDON

ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK

1911

V.

KB

CONTENTS

PAGE

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE vii

AUTHOR'S PREFACE xxi

I. INTRODUCTORY: THE PHILOSOPHIES OF LIFE IN THE PRESENT DAY 1

PRELIMINARY REMARKS 3

I. STATEMENT AND CRITICISM OF INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS OF LIFE 6
(*a*) The Older Systems 6
1. The Religious System 6
2. The System of Immanent Idealism 15
(*b*) The Newer Systems 22
1. The Naturalistic System 24
2. The Socialistic System 41
3. The System of Æsthetic Individualism 61

II. CONSIDERATION OF THE SITUATION AS A WHOLE, AND PRELIMINARIES FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION 81
(*a*) The Nature of the New as a Whole and its Relation to the Old 81
(*b*) The Condition of the Present 86
(*c*) The Form of the Problem 92

II. THE OUTLINE OF A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE 99

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND CONSIDERATIONS 101

I. THE MAIN THESIS 110
(*a*) The Ascent to the Main Thesis 110
1. Man as a Being of Nature 110
2. The Growth of Man beyond Nature 113
3. The Inner Contradiction of the New Life 134
(*b*) The Development of the Main Thesis 144
1. The Main Thesis and the Possibility of a New System of Life 144
(a) *The Development of the Spiritual Life to Independence* 144
(b) *The Demands of a New System of Life* 150
(c) *The Spiritual Basis of the System of Life* 152
(d) *Human Existence* 161
(e) *Results and Prospects* 166
2. The Transformation and the Elevation of Human Life 168
(a) *Aims and Ways* 168
(b) *The Nature of Freedom* 174
(c) *The Beginnings of the Independent Spiritual Life* 183

PAGE

I. THE MAIN THESIS.—*continued*
(d) *The Transcending of Division* 187
i. *The Spiritual Conception of History* 188
ii. *The Spiritual Conception of Society* 196
(e) *The Elevation of Life above Division* 201

II. THE MORE DETAILED FORM OF OUR SPIRITUAL LIFE 216
(*a*) The Problem of Truth and Reality 216
(*b*) Man and the World 226
(*c*) The Movement of the Spiritual Life in Man 233
(*d*) The Emergence of a New Type of Life 240
1. *Life's Attainment of Greatness* 240
2. *The Increase of Movement* 247
3. *The Gain of Stability* 251
(*e*) Activism, a Profession of Faith 255

III. THE SPIRITUAL LIFE IN MAN IN CONFLICT AND IN VICTORY 262
(*a*) Doubt and Prostration 262
(*b*) Consideration and Demand 267
(*c*) The Victory 273

III. APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT: CONSEQUENCES AND REQUIREMENTS 287

Introductory Considerations 289
I. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FORM OF LIFE AS A WHOLE 298
(*a*) The Character of Culture 298
(*b*) The Organisation of the Work of Culture 315

II. THE FORM OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEPARTMENTS 322
Preliminary Remarks 322
(*a*) Religion, Morality, Education 324
1. Religion 324
2. Morality 335
3. Education and Instruction 343
(*b*) Science and Philosophy 345
(*c*) Art and Literature 354
(*d*) Social and Political Life 358
(*e*) The Life of the Individual 369

CONCLUSION 373

INDEX 375

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE

WITH the consent of the author the title " Life's Basis and Life's Ideal " has been adopted for this translation of " Die Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung," with the hope that thereby the purpose of the work will be more directly indicated than by a literal translation of the German title. It is hoped, further, that the title adopted will make an appeal to the general reading public. To make such an appeal is not the desire of every writer on philosophical subjects : but in the present instance it is the case. The author feels that he has a message for the present time, and one that is vital to the true interests of all. It has been remarked, and the present writer would be among the first to acknowledge the truth of the statement, that the voice is that of a prophet in the sense of an ethical teacher, rather than that of a philosopher in the more technical sense. Nevertheless, the use of a philosophical terminology, and the constant implicit reference to the results of philosophical endeavour in the past and present, combined with the peculiarities of the author's own views, make it difficult to understand his message. To non-philosophical readers who are not already acquainted with the more popular works which have been translated under the titles of " Christianity and the New Idealism," " The Life of the Spirit," and " The Meaning and Value of Life," the present work will appear of considerable difficulty. Difficulty in such a work is, however, by no means necessarily an evil, for it may compel more careful reading and thought. The present work is the latest and best general statement, by the author, of his philosophical position. By some reference here to

certain ideas, principles, and aims of the philosophy, the attention of the reader may be drawn to those aspects which, in personal contact with the author, one comes to feel are regarded by him as of most importance. It is not invariably so, but in this case to know the man is to gain immensely in the power to understand and appreciate the message. He inspires us with his confidence and enthusiasm, even when we have doubts as to the adequacy of his philosophical creed. His philosophy is, indeed, the outcome of an attitude of life. To know the man is to understand more fully than from all his written works what he means when he speaks of the development of *personality* and *spiritual individuality*. Whatever may be the value of what is written about Professor Eucken's position, no substitute can be found for reading his own words in as many of his different expositions as possible.

Should anyone seek in this work for a systematic discussion of philosophical problems on the lines of traditional Rationalism, which, though often assumed to be dead, still asserts a strong influence upon us, he will not only look in vain but will also lose much that is of value in that which is offered. The aim of the philosophy is not to discuss the basis and ideal of thought, but to probe to the depth of life in all its complexity, and to advance to an all-inclusive ideal. The starting-point for us all is life as we experience it, not an apparent ultimate, such as the *cogito ergo sum* of Descartes, the *I ought* of Kant, or the *pure being* of Hegel. At the outset, therefore, it is necessary to note the nature of the relation between philosophy and life. Philosophy arises within life as an expression of its nature and general import. Life may assume various forms, may be, that is, of different types ; with different individuals and societies it is organised in divers ways. Life so organised, having certain definite tendencies, is called by Professor Eucken a *system of life*. In the philosophies of life which arise in these types or systems of life, life becomes more explicitly conscious of its own nature. Further, a philosophy of life is also a means of justification and defence of one system of life in opposition

to other systems. Life as experienced, as organised in some way, is prior to any definite intellectual or conceptual expression of it. On the other hand a type of life may be influenced and modified by changes in the accepted philosophy of life, or by the adoption of a new philosophy. A philosophy, therefore, is to be judged by the system of life it represents and by its spiritual fruitfulness. As the roots of the differences between philosophies are in the systems of life from which the philosophies arise, the conflict is primarily not between theories, but between systems of life. The ground of the author's general appeal thus becomes apparent. The problem is a vital one ; in one form or another, at one time or another, everyone is faced with it : how shall I mould my life ? And it is here that we must insist upon the importance of Professor Eucken's contention that we have to make our decision for one system of life as a whole, and thus for one philosophy of life as a whole, as against other systems and other philosophies taken as wholes.

Life as experienced is a process, a growth ; and in this growth it oversteps the bounds of the philosophy in which at an earlier stage it expressed itself, and according to which it strove to fashion itself. The need for a new philosophy is then felt. Generally, the need is for a philosophy more comprehensive and more clearly defined than any of the previous philosophies. Now, Professor Eucken contends that none of the philosophies of life which are common among us in the present time are adequate to represent and guide our life at this stage of its development. He calls us to turn for a few moments from the rush and turmoil of modern life to " come and reason together " as to life's basis and ideal. In justification of his view, and in accordance with his own principle that we must start with life as we experience it, he considers in the first place the common philosophies of life of the present time in relation to the systems of life from which they spring. Few will disagree with his negative view that Religion—at least as ecclesiastically presented—Immanent Idealism, Naturalism, Socialism, and Individualism involve limitations, and sometimes

unjustifiable tendencies and claims, and are inadequate to satisfy the age. His next and chief endeavour is to indicate the direction in which a new philosophy is to be sought, and also tentatively to sketch the outlines of such a philosophy. In the nature of the case—as life is a process—no such philosophy can be regarded as complete. It can and should strive to take up into itself all that is of value in the discarded philosophies. Any attempt to outline a "new" philosophy will be judged by how far, with the incompleteness on all hands, it takes the different threads of life, and blending them into a unity aids their growth individually and as a whole.

Brief reference may be made here to an attitude, common in the present time, especially among English-speaking peoples, which the author does not explicitly mention. I mean the attitude of Agnosticism. This, he would contend and it would seem rightly, is in the main theoretical and does not, as such, correspond to or represent a system of life. The agnostic's system of life is formed of aspects of the systems discussed, with a strong tendency to Naturalism. The case of Huxley, who coined the term *Agnosticism*, is an excellent example: notwithstanding his frequently insisting with considerable force upon truths essentially idealistic, no one can doubt the predominant naturalistic tendency of his thought. As a rule the adoption of the attitude of Agnosticism is an attempt, as Dr. Ward has so clearly and forcibly argued in his "Naturalism and Agnosticism,"* to escape from the difficulties of Naturalism, which in the end it betrays. Agnosticism is, in fact, only an assumed absence of a theory of life. Professor Eucken would insist that the instability of the position is intolerable in actual life. Life's demand for unification, for consciousness of a meaning and a value, drives us beyond it. "Mere research," he writes, p. 272, "can tolerate a state of hesitation between affirmation and negation; it must often refrain from a decision in the case of special problems. Life, however,

* "Naturalism and Agnosticism." 3rd Edition, 1906, Vols. I. and II. A. & C. Black.

cannot endure any such intermediary position; for life, such hesitation in arriving at a decision must result in complete stagnation, and this would help the mere negation to victory."

The great objection to all the systems of life mentioned is that they are too narrow, and in some aspects superficial. The new system must unite comprehensiveness with depth. The insufficiency of Intellectualism is now generally recognised: the desire of the age is to do justice to the content of experience. Though the new system of life is to include all that is of value of earlier systems, it is by no means an eclecticism, for it has its integrating principle. The nature of this we shall best see by considering the method and the result. Life as experienced has already been referred to as the starting-point. To whatever extent we may seem, on the surface of experience, to be under the antithesis of subject and object, when we probe deeper we recognise that both are within life: they are a duality in unity. Here again reference may be made to the above-mentioned work* of Dr. Ward, in which probably the best exposition in English of this same truth is to be found. Life as experienced is not simply the empirical states of consciousness: its basis lies deeper. The method of the philosophy is in consequence described as *noölogical* in distinction from the *psychological* method, which treats of man out of relation to a world, and ends with the examination of psychical states; and from the *cosmological* method, which treats the world out of relation to man and aims chiefly at comprehension in universals of thought. Expressed in another way, life is fundamentally spiritual. Self-consciousness is the unifying principle: it is only by relation to life as self-conscious that we can predicate meaning or value. All that is regarded as true and valuable in all the above-mentioned systems presupposes this relation. The self-conscious life is not to be confused with the subjective life of the "mere" individual. In fact, there is no "mere" individual, for in all there are tendencies which transcend the limits of

* *Ibid.* Vol. II. Lects. xiv.–xx.

individual experience. For example, life includes the relation of man and world; and the life of society is more than a mere sum of the lives of the individuals. Perhaps a more correct way to state the author's position is to say that the individual shares the self-conscious, or, otherwise expressed, the spiritual life which transcends nature, the individual, and society. This world-pervading and world-transcending self-conscious life—*the Independent Spiritual Life*—may be regarded as an absolute or universal life. The pursuit of the ideals of truth, goodness, and beauty carries us far beyond considerations of the welfare of the mere individual, or the mere society, or even humanity as a whole. In our activities we often attain something quite different and far better than we aim at. Nevertheless, unless truth, goodness, beauty, and all tendencies leading to them are self-consciously experienced they have neither meaning nor value: viewed universally, they presuppose the Independent Spiritual Life. The highest development of the spiritual life known to us is personality, our "being for self," which is not to be identified with subjective individuality. We are not personalities to begin with, but have the potentiality to become such through our own effort. Personality is our highest ideal: in it, as self-conscious experience all other values for us are included. The author calls us, therefore, from that excessive occupation with the environment in which we forget ourselves, to spiritual concentration and the pursuit of spiritual ideals. The spirit of his message may be expressed in words familiar to all: "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul." Remembering that life is fundamentally self-conscious or spiritual, it may be said that life's basis and life's ideal is life itself—life completely self-conscious and following out its own necessities. The basis of man's life is the Independent Spiritual Life which is appropriated but not created by him in his striving for a comprehensive and harmonious personality. The ideal of man's life is such a personality. The more man "loses his life" in the pursuit of the ideals of truth, goodness, and beauty, the more

surely will he "save it," the more comprehensive, harmonious, and spiritual in nature will he become. Then he will realise himself as a personality, and become conscious of his unity with the Independent Spiritual Life. The dominant Idealism of this philosophy of life is evident: but the meanings of truth, goodness, and beauty are different from what they appear in many of the older presentations of Idealism. Truth, goodness, beauty, are not abstract ideals, but concrete experiences. The present writer has long been of the opinion that much of contemporary idealistic philosophy, including that of Professor Eucken, might be better termed *Spiritualism* than *Idealism*.

If life as experienced is a process, it is not difficult to understand that importance should be attributed to history. In the author's exposition not only is constant reference made to historical development, but the nature of history is made a definite subject of discussion. I would call attention to this aspect of the author's work: it appears a means of doing more justice to the content of experience than is done in most forms of Idealism. On the one hand a Rationalism which tends to shut out the historical as transient and merely appearance is avoided, and on the other a Historical Relativism which denies all stability and permanence is strenuously opposed. While the absolute and eternal—the Independent Spiritual Life—is the presupposition of the temporal manifestation of the spiritual life in man, for man the historical is real. Our spiritual life and its forms are the product of our own acts and decisions. It is in this connection that the fundamental nature of our spiritual effort may best be seen. The author's voice is that of a prophet in so far as his whole exposition is presented as an endeavour to arouse men from their apathy and from the pursuit of what they themselves know to be unsatisfying ideals. The importance attached to spiritual effort in his philosophy leads Professor Eucken to adopt the term "*Activism*" as a definite philosophical badge. The activistic note is evident throughout, much more so perhaps in the present volume than in those which have preceded it. The significance of

this emphasis is most clear in its bearing upon our relation to the past and the present. The present is neither to be dominated by the past nor sacrificed to the future, but the past is to be appropriated by our activity in the present, and the present, while possessing reality and value in itself, looks forward to the future. Historical content, spiritual endeavour in past, present, and future, must be unified by a common task. The past is ours only so far as we appropriate it. Spiritual inheritance is not the same as natural inheritance. We may by our spiritual effort adopt or reject ideas or a system of life which have come to us from the past. The character which the past will have for us will depend on our present spiritual condition. All spiritual progress involves a break with the past. In the same way we may take up an attitude of antagonism to the confusions which exist in modern life, and we may follow a new course. All this is not to deny the value of history in itself and for our present efforts : the reverse of such a denial is nearer the truth. For if we realise the depths and independence of our own life we are not only in a position to understand and appreciate the movement of history, but, by the nature of life, we are then driven beyond the mere present. The past relives with a new spiritual meaning in the consciousness that makes it its own. History is more than a succession of facts ; it must be revalued as a present experience. Life is not subjectively individual, and to realise it we must find our place in universal tendencies which are working themselves out in history. The content of history cannot be pressed into the narrow scheme of moral effort and attainment, as that is usually conceived, but in it all spheres of life assert their independent right. History is not an evolution of categories, but a conflict of concrete realities, of systems of life, of personalities. Though the great man cannot be understood out of relation to his time, he is not simply a product of the social environment. The great man strives to raise the time to his own level. It may be said that in order adequately to appreciate the author's position in regard to history the book translated into English under the

title of " The Problem of Human Life as viewed by the Great Thinkers from Plato to the Present Time " should be read in the light of the general principles of his philosophy. The reality of evil and of antitheses in life are fully acknowledged ; but by the spiritual life being thereby called to assert its independence and to strive to overcome them they may be an element leading to good. Evil, so regarded, is not explained away, but the solution is essentially a practical one. The theoretical problem of evil remains an enigma to us. The author's message is positive, not negative : it is a call to pursue definite positive aims rather than to eradicate painful experiences. " Not suffering, but spiritual destitution is man's worst enemy " (p. 314).

It has been said with, it would seem, a large amount of truth, that the philosophy of Hegel has been most fruitfully studied on English soil. There is reason to believe that it will be somewhat the same in the case of Professor Eucken's philosophy. His debts to Kant and Hegel are obvious, but it is interesting to notice that the points in which he more especially diverges from Hegelianism are largely the same as have been emphasised in England. The importance he attaches to personality and ethical activity, his insistence upon human endeavour as a determining factor in reality, and his emphasis on the dialectic as being not one of categories but of concrete realities, are in accord with much of the best of recent English philosophical thought. In the present work there is much of value for those who—while dissenting from such perversions as Pragmatism—hold what is commonly termed a " Personal Idealism." The position of our author is not the same as that of English Personal Idealism, nevertheless his work aids it in many ways, and especially in its insistence upon the distinction between personality and subjective individuality. A comparison of some of the views of the three philosophical writers who have been most discussed in our time—the late Professor James, M. Bergson, and our author—would be of interest. To enter upon a systematic and exhaustive comparison here is far from my intention, but a few points may be suggested. The modes

of exposition, which in a greater or less degree indicate the respective methods, manifest striking contrasts: in many respects the positions of M. Bergson and Professor Eucken appear totally dissimilar. The acquaintance with natural science, and the constant reference to its data, that we find in the works of M. Bergson, are not found in those of our author. Their place is taken, however, by what some will regard as more interesting, and even more important, an acquaintance with the present condition of human life, and also a constant reference to history. Common to these writers is a reaction against formalism and intellectualism, and in one form or another there is in their writings a strong element of empiricism. Freedom in some sense is insisted upon by all; though so far as we may judge from their published expositions there would seem to be considerable differences of view in this matter. Together with this assertion of the reality of Freedom, both M. Bergson and our author definitely acknowledge the reality of Necessity and recognise the importance of struggle in development. Neither of these claims that we can gain more than the knowledge of a direction in which the solution of the problem may be sought. Our author himself might quite well have said, though with application in the main to different classes of facts, what M. Bergson has said: "It seems to me that in a great number of different fields there is a great number of collections of facts, each of which, considered apart, gives us a direction in which the answer to the problem may be sought—a direction only. But it is a great thing to have even a direction, and still more to have several directions, for at the precise point where these directions converge might be found the solution we are seeking. What we possess meanwhile are lines of facts.*. . . " "But what is this new reality," writes Professor Eucken (p. 135), "and this whole to which the course of the movement trends? The more we reflect over the question the more strongly we feel that it is a direction rather than a conclusion that is offered to us in this matter. . . . " There is another

* *Hibbert Journal*, October 1911: p. 26.

passage from M. Bergson the quotation of which in the present context is justified by its harmony with so much that Professor Eucken himself says with regard to man's ideal of life: "If, then, in every province, the triumph of life is expressed by creation, ought we not to think that the ultimate reason of human life is a creation which, in distinction from that of the artist or the man of science, can be pursued at every moment and by all men alike; I mean the creation of self by self, the continual enrichment of personality by elements which it does not draw from outside, but causes to spring forth from itself?" * Whether in the works of the late Professor James there is a lurking desire for an Absolute may be left undiscussed. M. Bergson certainly gives more than a hint of something like an Absolute. Of the absolutist (not rationalistic) tendency in the philosophy of our author there can be no doubt. Notwithstanding the antagonism to Intellectualism shown in this philosophy, the influence of Hegel would seem to be evident in its absolutist tendency. Dr. Ward has justly said that, "with Hegel, the Absolute seems at one time to be a perfect Self with no hint of aught beside or beyond its own completed self-consciousness, and at another not to be a self at all, but only the absolutely spiritual—art, religion, and philosophy—the over-individual ends, as they are sometimes called, which become realised in subjective spirits: not self-conscious Spirit, but simply the impersonal Spirit in all spirits."† How far a corresponding criticism is applicable to the ideas of the Independent Spiritual Life, and the spiritual life in humanity and the world, in the present philosophy, its readers must be left to decide.

The relation of philosophy to life as Professor Eucken conceives it may justify him in treating primarily of what may be called in a special sense the problems of life. The difficulty of the problems of the theory of knowledge no one will deny, though many are impatient of considerations of them. In any general appeal such as we have to do with in

* *Ibid.* p. 42.

† "The Realm of Ends; or, Pluralism and Theism" (1911), p. 46.

this work it is almost impossible to deal with them. Nevertheless the problems of the theory of knowledge force themselves upon us, and will not be thrust on one side. The late Professor James did his best to leave us in no doubt as to his position in this matter : we have more than a glimpse of the attitudes of M. Bergson and Professor Eucken. We await, however, as likely to aid us in a fuller understanding and estimate of the philosophy, the volume the author has promised us on the theory of knowledge. Whatever the points of similarity may be in the views of those mentioned, we cannot fail to note the differences—to some of these in the case of Pragmatism the author has himself called our attention ; further, we cannot mistake the dominant Idealism of the philosophy of life here presented to us. One word must be said as to the author's attitude towards Mysticism ; an attitude that has not always been understood. The Mysticism he opposes is of the type that is virtually the negation of the Activism which is to him fundamental. But when that is recognised, the careful reader cannot fail to see that, ultimately, the philosophy is essentially mystical.

As I understand it, the suggestion that our author's philosophy would form a rallying-point for Idealists of various kinds is a tribute to its unity and comprehensiveness, of which there can be no doubt. Roughly, we may take up one of two attitudes to the work of a philosopher. We may accept his general point of view, his main principles, in a word his " system," however tentative, and modify it in detail. On the other hand we may reject his main position, and yet find much to accept in his working out of various aspects of detail, and we may incorporate this in some other general system. It is not for me to state here the attitude I take or the difficulties I feel in the philosophy ; but I do think that there will be few who will not gain much from the inspiration and originality which are shown by the author. For his own philosophy of life he seeks no other treatment than that which he has meted to others : a sincere endeavour to understand its basis and its ideal. His hope is that however much its limitations may be pointed out, the truth

in it may be acknowledged and appropriated, if possible in a higher view. The acquisition of a higher view would cause no one more real joy than Professor Eucken.

I have to thank the author for his personal kindness in the discussion of some difficult points and in the revision of a portion of the proof sheets. At his suggestion or with his consent a number of small alterations, as, for example, in the titles of sections, have been made from the present German text. Owing to an accident, the time for the preparation of this translation was unfortunately curtailed : I should be indebted for any suggestions for its improvement. I am indebted to the Rev. Felix Holt, B.A., for reading through the whole in manuscript and making many valuable suggestions. For all defect and error I alone am responsible.

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

CAMBRIDGE, *October* 1911

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

We may hope for a friendly reception of our investigation only by those who acknowledge that that which occupies us here is a real problem. It is hardly open to dispute that life in the present time displays a serious incongruity between an incalculably rich and fruitful activity with regard to the material, and a complete uncertainty and destitution in respect of the spiritual, side of life. Attempt after attempt is made to deliver us from this state of perplexity, and to give more soul and unity to a culture which outwardly is so imposing. But in the main these attempts are far too irresolute in their advance from superficiality to depth, and from individual appearances to the whole : in their innermost nature they are under the influence of the temporary conditions beyond which they wish to lead us. In truth, we cannot make an advance in relation to our life as a whole unless we win a new basis for it. This, however, we cannot do without raising the problem of our relation to reality, and, if it is in any way possible, to mould this relationship in a new way : further, we can be of service in the satisfaction of the needs of the time only when we gain an independence of it and a superiority to it.

Here, therefore, so far as the realm of conviction is concerned, we have a task for philosophy. The confusion that reigns, however, makes the way difficult for philosophy also, and sets insuperable limits to its power. We do not meet in immediate experience with facts upon which a new type of life might be based : much toil and trouble are necessary to arrive at that, which, when it is once attained, may seem to be simple and easy. He who finds the problem too complex, and shirks to expend the necessary effort, can do

nothing else than resign himself submissively to the prevailing confusion. To-day we are unable at first to sketch more than the outlines and to indicate fundamentals : we must be quite sure of the basis and the main tendency of life if we would undertake the construction of systems ; and yet it is just these things which are to-day the cause of agitation and conflict. Not for a moment do we doubt the imperfection of our own attempt ; we can but hope that others will take up and pursue the matter further.

Notwithstanding these limitations and this trouble, a pressing inner necessity compels us to recognise that there can be no enduring life of genuine culture unless humanity is inwardly united by common aims. More and more clearly this main question is seen to be involved in all the particular questions of the time ; more and more does it become evident to us that our achievement in individual matters can be but insignificant, if life as a whole is in a state of stagnation and exhaustion. Though some who may already have taken up a definite course, or who in their attention to work in some special sphere have lost all sense for the whole, may refuse to consider the matter, yet wherever life is still flowing, and where fresh impulse resists the tendency to division which deprives it of all soul, to deal with the problem will be felt to be a necessity. Above all, therefore, we trust in the young, who, among all cultured nations, are striving for a deeper and nobler life. The more successful this striving, the sooner shall we advance from a state of confusion to one of order and clearness, from a realm of illusions to the kingdom of truth, and in face of the chaotic whirl of appearances we shall attain stability within ourselves.

RUDOLF EUCKEN

JENA, *Christmas* 1906

I

INTRODUCTORY

THE PHILOSOPHIES OF LIFE IN THE PRESENT DAY

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

He who strives after a new philosophy of life confesses himself thereby to be of the conviction that the philosophies of the present no longer satisfy mankind; and so we must begin by giving reasons for sharing this conviction. In doing this we hope to be able to take a positive survey of the present situation as a whole, and also to gain a firm starting-point for the course in which the new is to be sought, and not simply to remain fixed in a mere negative attitude. A precise statement of the question is the first condition for a correct answer; to satisfy this requirement is the chief concern of the first part of our treatise.

Philosophies of life, representations of human life as a whole, surround us to-day in abundance and court our adherence. The fusion of rich historical development with active reflection gives occasion to the most diverse combinations and makes it easy for the individual to project a representation corresponding to his circumstances and his mood. Thus, to-day, the philosophies of life of individuals whirl together in chaotic confusion, gain and lose the passing favour, displace one another, and themselves change kaleidoscopically. It is not the concern of philosophy to occupy itself more closely with opinions so accidental and so fleeting.

There are, however, philosophies of life of another kind, conceptions of life, which unite and dominate large numbers of people, hold up a common ideal for their activity, and constitute a power in the life of universal history. These philosophies of life are rooted in particular concrete forms of life, in actual combinations of working and striving, which with dominating power surround the individual

and point out his course. With such ascendancy they may seem to him to be unassailable and a matter of natural necessity; in reality they are a product of the industry of universal history, and from this point of view appear merely as attempts to comprehend the boundless stream of life and to win a character for our otherwise indefinite existence. For at first we stand defenceless and helpless in face of the wealth of impressions and suggestions which throng upon us and draw us in opposite directions. Only in one way are we able to prevail: life must concentrate and acquire a controlling centre within itself, and from that begin a process of counteraction. We lack distinction of centre and environment; we need an inner aspiration, an aspiration which seeks to draw the whole of existence to itself and to mould it in its own particular way. This, however, is impossible, unless at the same time a philosophy of life, a profession of faith as to the nature of the whole, a justification of our undertaking, is evolved. A philosophy of life established in this manner will be incomparably more powerful, and fuller in content, than the mere foam on the surface of time.

Nevertheless, with all its advantages, such a philosophy of life, like the corresponding system of life itself, is not ultimate truth: it remains an attempt, a problem which, ever anew, divides men into opposing camps. For the experience of history teaches us that the effort after concentration and an inner synthesis of life does not follow one clear, direct course throughout, but that different possibilities offer themselves and, in course of time, struggle upwards to reality. Different systems thus advance by the side of and in opposition to one another, each with the claim to undivided supremacy, to a superiority over all others. Philosophies of life now become means and instruments to justify and to establish such claims. They must enter into the severest conflict one with another, and the strife keeps up a powerful tension and pressure because here, by means of the ideas, tendencies of life compete with one another; because not mere representations of

reality but realities themselves struggle together. It is manifest from the existence of these last problems that we do not grow up in a finished world, but have first to form and build up our world. We are concerned not merely with interpreting a given reality, but first of all with winning the true, primary, and all-comprehensive reality. By this our life is made uncertain and laborious, but it is raised at the same time to an inner freedom and a more genuine independence.

And now for the first time we see in its true light the fact that its own views of life can become inadequate to an age. For the fact that an age lacks an inner unity, that cogent reasons drive it beyond the extant syntheses, is now a sign that it is not clear and certain as to its own life. To open up a way for a new synthesis, to organise life more adequately, becomes the most pressing of all demands, the question of questions. Even the most cautious and most subtle reflection will not lead us far in this matter; all hope of success depends upon our life containing greater depths, which hitherto have not been fully grasped, and more especially upon a transcendent unity present in it, which hitherto has not come to complete recognition. Thus all thought and reflection is called to direct itself to the comprehension of such depths and of such a unity. Everything here depends on facts; on facts, however, which do not come to us opportunely from without, but which reveal themselves only to the eye of the spirit and to aspiration.

I. STATEMENT AND CRITICISM OF INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS OF LIFE

It must be admitted that the first glance at the present conditions of life shows a chaotic confusion. A more careful examination, however, soon discloses a limited number of schemes of life, which, although they are often combined in individuals, are in their nature divided and remain differentiated. We recognise five such systems of life: those of Religion and of Immanent Idealism on the one hand, and those of Naturalism, Socialism, and Individualism on the other hand. For, two main groups may be clearly distinguished: one, older, which gives to life an invisible world for its chief province; and one, newer, which places man entirely in the realm of sense experience; within these groups, the ways again lead in diverse directions. Let us see what each of these organisations makes out of life; on what each supports itself; and what each accomplishes. Let us see also where each meets with opposition and in what it finds its limits; and this not according to our individual opinion, but according to the experiences of the age.

(*a*) THE OLDER SYSTEMS

1. The Religious System

The religious organisation of life has influenced us in the past with especial power. This has worked in the form of Christianity, which, as an ethical religion of redemption, occupies a thoroughly unique position among religions.

As a religion it unites life to a supernatural world, and subjects our existence to its supremacy; as a religion of redemption it heightens the contrast between the two worlds to such a degree of harshness that a complete revolution becomes a necessity; as an ethical religion it regards the spiritual life as a power of positive creation and self-determination, and insists upon a complete change of the heart. Arising in an age of decay, an age weary of life, it confidently took up the conflict against this faintness; it did not carry on this conflict, however, by a further development of the natural world and of culture, but through the revelation of a supernatural order, of a new community of life, which, through the building up of an invisible Kingdom of God—which wins a visible expression in the Church—becomes to man in faith and hope the most certain presence. Christianity ratified an affirmation of life; still, it did not accomplish this immediately, but by the most fundamental and definite negation; and thus to a cursory consideration it might appear to be a flight from the world. In reality, it unites the negation and the affirmation, flight from, and renewal of, the world; the deepest feeling of, and the happiest deliverance from, guilt and suffering, and thereby gives to life a greater breadth as well as a ceaseless activity in search of its true self. Religion does not mean a special domain by the side of others; its intention is rather to be the innermost soul and the supreme power of the whole life. Through its ideals and its standards it lends to the whole sphere of life a distinctive character; it produces a fixed organisation of mankind and offers powerful opposition to all dissipation, all merely individual caprice. It comes to the individual as a supreme power which brings to him salvation and truth, shapes him for the highest ends, and connects his thought and feeling with an invisible world.

With such an undertaking Christianity has exercised most deep-reaching influences on the course of history; in the first place it implanted a new vitality in an exhausted humanity; then in the Middle Ages it worked to the education of a new race; and now that it has become mature

it has not ceased to exercise strong, though quieter, influences; considering all the facts, it appears as the most powerful force in the life of history.

But all the greatness of past achievement could not prevent the arising of a strong movement of the modern spirit against Christianity; a movement which still continues to increase in power and which undermines the position of Christianity, where outwardly it still appears quite secure. It is true that there never was a period when it was not opposed by individuals, but through the lack of any spiritual import these isolated oppositions had never combined so as to produce a united effect. An effect of this kind was first produced with the emergence of new systems of thought and new streams of life since the beginning of the seventeenth century; as long, however, as this movement was limited to the cultured classes and left the masses untouched, that which existed in it as a menace did not produce its full effect. It was the conviction of Bayle, that the Enlightenment would never penetrate to the masses. In the nineteenth century this "unexpected" happened, and the nature of spiritual endeavour and the disposition of men join together in an assault upon Christianity; an assault which no one with insight will call anything but dangerous.

The thing most perceptible and most talked of is the subversion of the old conception of the world; a conception which is usually associated with Christianity. This conception is less and less able to assert itself in face of the triumphant onward march of modern science. The representation of nature, like that of human history, has been broadened immeasurably and at the same time has acquired inner unity, law, and order; a direct intervention of a supernatural power is felt more and more to be an intolerable derangement. The earth, hitherto the centre of the whole and the chief platform upon which the destiny of the universe was decided, sinks to a position of more correct proportion, and man is much more closely linked to nature and fitted into a common order. How then can that

which takes place in him decide what shall be the destiny of the whole ?

If we would withdraw from such a shattered conception of the world, as from a mere external matter, to the substance of Christianity, this substance must be much more clearly and much more forcibly present to us than it really is. For, in this change we are concerned not simply with individual phrases, but with the whole mode of thought. We have learnt to think far more causally and critically ; we perceive the peculiarity of the historical circumstances in which Christianity arose, and, along with this, become aware of a wide disparity from the circumstances of the present. We question all historical tradition as to its grounds, and so overthrow the weight of authority ; our thought has become throughout less naive and we strive to transcend the form of the immediate impression. From this point of view it comes about quite easily that the religious mode of thought appears to be a mere anthropomorphism, a childlike, imaginative interpretation of the world, which, to an intelligence equipped with the clearness of objective consideration, can pass only for a stage in evolution, which has once for all been overcome. Such is the teaching of Positivism, and it is just in this reference to religion that its influence extends far beyond the limits of the positivistic school.

The change of thought would not be so far-reaching and so dangerous if it did not give expression to a change of life as a whole ; but this is what it really does : the Modern Age through the whole course of its development sets a universal—a system—over against the religious system of life. That all departments of life should subordinate themselves to Religion, that every activity has value only so far as it either directly or indirectly furthers Religion, appears to the Modern Age a much too narrow conception, and it regards it as a mischievous denial of the truth which these departments of life contain. So the different branches of the spiritual life—for example, science and art, politics and economics—liberate themselves radically from the supremacy

of Religion, and feel this to be an incalculable gain in freedom and breadth. Since, unimpeded, the new life increases in comprehensiveness, and draws the whole content of reality into itself, it seems to rest firmly and securely in itself and to need no completion of any kind whatever.

Religion, however, must first seek a place in this new life. It finds this place with greater difficulty, in that modern life, as it works out its own peculiar characteristics, ever more directly and ever more harshly opposes Christianity. The initial assumptions of the two are fundamentally different. Early Christianity spoke to a generation which had become perplexed concerning the rationality of the universe and concerning its own capacity; a generation which could attain to an affirmation of life only through the building up of a new world in contrast to that which lies before us. The world, then disdained, has acquired in the Modern Age an ever-increasing power of attraction. New peoples and times have grown up, which have a feeling of power and wish to exert the force of their youth in work upon the surrounding world; this world meets such a desire since it shows itself to be still in the midst of change and full of problems. If formerly the world surrounded man as an unchangeable fate, it now proves to be capable of change and of upward development; man can work and strive to transform it into a kingdom of reason. The more that power and object unite in this, the more victorious is the advance of work; the nearer the world is brought to man's inner life, the more does it become to him his true and only home. The idea of immanence comes to have a magical sound; everything which oversteps the boundary marked out through the work of the world soon comes to be regarded as a flight into a realm of shadows, into an "other" world. Life obtains its satisfaction in grappling with realities; in the display of masculine strength; while the religious attitude to life, with its waiting and hope, its expectation of supernatural aid, seems lifeless, feeble, and altogether lacking in spirit.

At the same time, all capacity for understanding the

world in which Christianity had set the soul of man disappears. That world was one of pure inwardness, a world in which the fundamental relation of life was that of the spiritual life to its own ideal conception, to absolute spirit; a world in which the questions of character and of the determination of the will were the chief problems. To earlier Christianity that world was anything but a mere "other" world; rather it constituted that which was nearest and most certain; the chief basis of life, from which the world of sense first received its truth and its value. But the more significant the world of sense becomes to man, and the more powerfully it draws his affections to itself, the more does the relation to this world become the fundamental relation of life; the more does that pure inner world fade, the more does it appear to be something artificial, shadowy, and as something added as an afterthought; and the turning to it comes to be regarded as a flight into an "other" world. Christianity must necessarily be alien and unintelligible to anyone who feels the world which was to Christianity the chief world to be a mere "other" world; for him all the assertions of Christianity must be distorted, every element of joyful affirmation and heroic victory which it contains must be obscured; the whole must present a miserable and morbid picture. Now that the centre of life has changed its position in relation to the world, is it possible to avoid the consequences of a growing tendency to displace and dissolve Christianity?

The inner world was to Christianity essentially a realm of conviction and decision, a relation of will to will, of personality to personality; free action, in power and love, in guilt and reconciliation, formed the essence of all events and gave to the world a soul. Only as ethical, personal power did the spiritual life appear to find its own depth and to be able to govern the world.

Here again the Modern Age takes a directly antagonistic course. Its work is considered most of all to lead beyond the subjectivity of man to the content and under the objective necessity of things. For we seem to attain genuine

truth first, when we place ourselves in the world of fact, reveal its relations, and take part in its movements; we have to follow the objective and immanent necessities of things; to interpret every particular case from the standpoint of these necessities and to harmonise our own conduct with them. Life seems to acquire greatness and universal significance only insomuch as the process comes before the effect, the law before freedom, fixed relations before the resolution into individual occurrences. To the Modern Age, not only has nature been transformed into a continuous causal chain, but in its spiritual activity the age also forms great complexes, which, through the force of logical necessity, are moved beyond the influence of all caprice, and of all the interests of the narrowly human. From the point of view of such an evolution the realm of ethical life appears to be a mere subjective sphere; a tissue of human opinion and striving; something which falls outside of genuine reality and which can never be forced into its structure. To continue in the position of early Christianity is looked upon as a remaining at a lower level of life; conceptions such as freedom of the will and moral judgment become regarded as childish delusions which are the more decidedly rejected the more the new life displays its fundamental character. Again, that which to Christianity was the highest in life and dominated the whole is regarded, with a transvaluation of all values, as a mere accompanying appearance; indeed, a danger to the energy and truth of life.

Hence a mode of life has arisen which not only regards the answers of Christianity with indifference, but does not even recognise its problems; and this mode of life is attracting to itself more and more the convictions and energies of mankind. Even now the antithesis which the centuries have prepared is being forced with unmistakable clearness into prominence. It was possible for us to deceive ourselves with regard to its implacability so long as a rationalistic and pantheistic mode of thought presented Christianity in the most general way, and tried to comprehend its nature as something universal, and at the same time placed nature

and the universe in the transfiguring light of speculative consideration. But, in the course of further experience, that mode of thought has been severely shaken and has become more and more a mere aggregate of phrases; thus the antitheses face one another unreconciled and a decision is not to be evaded. In this matter mankind is under the influence of a strong reaction against the religious, and especially the Christian, mode of life. Throughout many centuries Christianity has given life a unity and has thrown light upon reality from its standpoint; further, it has presented its way as the only possible one; one to which everything which in any way strives spiritually upward has to adapt itself. If the truth of the whole now falls into doubt, everything which was intended to give to life a stability and a character soon comes to be felt as heavily oppressive and intolerably narrow; and everything which in that mode of life was accidental, temporal, and human advances into the foreground. It is clearly perceived that much passed current as true only because we had become unaccustomed to ask questions concerning it, and also that many things owed their acceptance not to their inner necessity, but only to social sanction. With such feelings it may come to be considered a great deliverance to shake off the whole, and a necessary step towards truthfulness of life to eliminate every aspect of that mode of life which through custom or authority continues to exist.

These tendencies are tendencies of reaction with all their one-sidedness. But can we deny that a great change of life has been accomplished, a change which reaches far beyond these tendencies, and which is still working itself out? That which previously was most proximate to us is now made to recede; what held currency as absolutely certain must now be laboriously proved, and, through continual reflection, loses all freshness and power to convince; immediate experience, axiomatic certainty, immovable conviction are lacking. The self-evident certainties in the light of which earlier ages lived and worked are wanting, and we are compelled to acknowledge that some things become uncertain,

even impossible, when they cease to be self-evident. Again, it cannot fail to be recognised that we are tired of a merely religious way of life ; we feel its limitations ; new needs are awakened and seek new forms of life and expression ; even the traditional terminology displeases us ; even the acutest dialectic cannot lend to the old the power of youth.

Of course the matter is not finally settled by these judgments of the age. For, the later age is not the infallible judge of the earlier ; much which to us moderns seems certain may soon become problematic ; much which satisfies us may soon be shown to be inadequate. It may be that the old is capable of asserting the ultimate depth of life in contrast to the new ; that the world of inner spiritual experience which it discloses may finally show itself superior to every assault. But, in any case, the new contains a wealth of fact not only in individual results but in the whole of its being ; through its emergence it has transformed the whole condition of things ; it is impossible to decry it as a mere apostasy and to appeal to the consciences of individuals. It may be that spiritual power here stands against spiritual power in a titanic struggle for the soul of man ; victory must fall to the power which penetrates to the primary depths of life and is capable of taking possession of what is true in the others. But if in this the older should be inwardly superior, it could develop such superiority only through its own complete renewal and energetic inward elevation, through the most fundamental settlement with everything antagonistic in an all-comprehensive whole of life. But how deeply the age is still involved in its search ! How far it is from the conclusion ! For the present, as far as the life of culture is concerned, Religion has fallen into complete uncertainty ; its chief support and realm lie not within but outside of that life. It is this which makes all affirmation of Religion weak and all negation strong ; it is this which threatens to stamp, as something subjective and false, every conception of a " supernatural." Religion has become uncertain to us not merely in single doctrines and tendencies, but in the whole of its being, in its fundamental

contention as to the nature of life; and what it offers in the traditional form, in which it has come to us, no longer satisfies a life which has been aroused to greater breadth and freedom.

2. The System of Immanent Idealism

By the side of the religious system of life, for thousands of years, now as supplementary, now as contradictory, there has been another which may be designated as Immanent Idealism. The latter system is not so fixed and overawing a structure as the former, but with a quieter force it penetrates the whole of life. It is not of a simple nature, but is found in many different forms; still, there exists so much in common in these that they clearly exhibit and emphasise one common tendency. Like the religious system, this Idealism also places life primarily in a world of thought, from which it organises sense experience; it is distinguished from the former system, however, in that it never separates the two worlds one from the other, but conceives them as related elements or aspects of a single whole. They are related to one another as appearance and reality, as cause and effect, as animating and animated nature (*natura naturans* and *naturata*). The divine is not so much a power transcending the world as one penetrating it and living in it; not something specific outside of things, but their connection in a living unity; it does not make demands and present us with problems so much as give to the world its truth and depth. Thus, reality appears as an inwardly co-ordinated whole, the individual finds his genuine being only as a part of this whole. And so, here, the fundamental relation of life is that to the invisible whole of reality; with the development of this relation, that which seems lifeless becomes animated; the elements which seem isolated are brought together; and the world discloses an infinite content and gives it to man for a joyous possession.

But it would be impossible for man to accomplish the

transition from appearance to reality, if he were not rooted in the fundamental permanencies and if, in the comprehending of the world, he did not find his own being. If this is the case, however, and if, through courageous turning from the superficiality to which he in the first place belongs, he is able to set himself in the depth of reality, then a magnificent life with the widest prospects opens out before him. For, now, he may win the whole of infinity for his own and set himself free from the triviality of the merely human without losing himself in an alien world; he may turn all the movement of life to something positive, since he guides it from within and from the whole. This life will find its centre in the activities which bring man into relation with the whole and broaden him from within to the whole; thus, in science and art spiritual creation becomes the chief concern; its forceful development allows us to hope for an ennobling of the whole of existence. Around this creative activity as centre, the rest arranges itself as its environment; its means, its presupposition; but there remain a clear distinction and gradation between that which a creative life evolves immediately, and that which forms a mere condition for this and may never become an aim in itself. Thus, the beautiful is separated sharply from the merely useful; the inner life from all preservation of physical existence; a genuine spiritual culture, as the revelation of the depth of things, from all perfecting of natural and social conditions, from mere civilisation. Here life finds an aim and a task in itself; they are not presented to it from a transcendent world; it can evolve a morality in the sense of taking up the whole into one's own volition, the subjection of caprice to the necessity of things.

A life, thus full of content and joyous activity, arose when Greek culture was at its height, and exercised its influence through the course of the centuries; Christianity also soon laid aside its original suspicion against this life and joined it to itself. This life, however, has first attained complete independence and self-consciousness in modern culture so far as this culture followed the way of Idealism. It feels

itself now to be superior to religion and hopes to be able to shape the world of man more satisfactorily than religion can. In this system formulated conceptions and complicated doctrines of the divine are not necessary, as they are in religion, because the divine is present immediately in the process of life and surrounds man on all sides; his powers are not drawn in a particular direction and nothing is discarded, but everything is to be uniformly developed and united in an all-inclusive harmony; natural instincts are restrained and ennobled through their relations in a larger whole. A power of organisation is displayed which reaches the finest vein of the soul, which throws the genuinely human into relief against its environment and tradition, and makes it the matter of chief concern: with all this it deepens life in itself and finds incalculable treasure in such depth. Everywhere there is powerful effort and creative activity on the part of man, but at the same time the consciousness of an invisible order; a joyful affirmation of life, but at the same time a deliverance from unrestrained curiosity and coarse enjoyment; a breadth and a freedom of life, and with this a clear consciousness of the greatness but also of the limitations of man. Such was the state of conviction in the classical period of German literature.

This form of life has, with remarkable quickness, been relegated into the distance; with all its external proximity it has become inwardly more alien to us than the world of religion. All this has come to pass, however, not so much through direct conflict, which its free and comprehensive nature could scarcely provoke, as through an inner displacement of conditions and strivings, which have now thrust other facts into prominence and driven men to other tasks. The transformation could hardly have been effected so quickly and so fundamentally if this mode of life did not involve fixed limits and problematic presuppositions which man has now become fully conscious of for the first time.

It is the aristocratic nature of this Immanent Idealism which first awakens suspicion and opposition. Spiritual

creation, from which it expects complete salvation, can take possession of and satisfy the whole soul only where it breaks forth spontaneously with great and powerful effect, where, with overwhelming power, it raises man above himself. An incontrovertible experience shows us that this takes place only in rare and exceptional cases; there must be a union of many forces before man can rise to such a height and be swayed by the compulsion of this creation. Now, it is true that the gain of such red-letter days carries its effect into ordinary days and that from the heights light pours down upon lower levels. But in such transmission there is a serious and inevitable loss in power and purity; indeed, in veracity; what exclusively fills the life of those producing it and arouses it to its highest passion easily becomes to the receiver a mere subsidiary matter, a pleasant accompanying experience. Thus we see epochs of organisation follow upon times of creation, but we see that such organisation sinks more and more into a reflective and passive reproduction. Such organisation tends to become mere imagination; the man imbued with the spirit of such organisation easily seems to himself more than he is; with a false self-consciousness talks and feels as though he were at a supreme height; lives less his own life than an alien one. Sooner or later opposition must necessarily arise against such a half-life, such a life of pretence, and this opposition will become especially strong if it is animated by the desire that all who bear human features should participate in the chief goods of our existence and freely co-operate in the highest tasks. It must be observed that this longing is one which, at the present time, is found to be irresistible. Thus the aristocratic character of Immanent Idealism produces a type of life rigidly exclusive, harsh and intolerable.

But not only does this type of life lack complete power and truthfulness in regard to mankind as a whole; it experiences similar limitations in relation to the world and to things. All success in our relation to the world and to things depends on the spiritual constituting the thing's own depth,

on things finding their genuine being in it, and where this depth is reached, on the visible world uniting with it willingly, indeed joyfully, and moulding itself solely and completely for spiritual expression. Spirit and world must strive together in mutual trust and each must finally be completely involved one in the other; reality must form itself, if not at one stroke, at any rate in ceaseless advance to a kingdom of reason. A solution at once so smooth and so easy bluntly contradicts the experiences of the last century. Both without and within the soul of man an infinite concreteness makes itself evident, which withstands all derivation from general principles, all insertion into a comprehensive scheme, obstinately asserts its particularity, forms its own complexes, and follows its own course. The realistic mode of thought of the Modern Age has brought this aspect of reality to full recognition. If the spiritual life cannot take complete possession of things, if a realm of facts continues to exist over against it, there is a doubt whether it belongs to the ultimate being of the world and reveals the reality of things, or whether it merely comes to them from without and only touches their surface. The external limitation therefore inevitably becomes the cause of an inward convulsion. This is a fact which we find corroborated when we come to reflect that Immanent Idealism treats human spiritual life much too hastily and boldly as absolute spiritual life; that it attributes to human capacity, without further consideration, that which belongs to spiritual life in general. The experiences of modern life place the particularity and subjection of man more and more before our eyes; they enable us to see with what difficulty and how slowly any kind of spiritual life whatever has emerged in the human sphere, and with what toil it maintains itself there; they insist that, if the spiritual life is not to sink down to a mere appearance to man, a sharp distinction must be made between the substance of the spiritual life and the form of its existence in man; in every sphere modern life puts questions which lead beyond the position of Immanent Idealism. Immanent Idealism

seems to treat the problem of life much too summarily and not to penetrate sufficiently to ultimate depths.

The conflict between Immanent Idealism and modern life is still more keen in regard to the problem whether reality is rational. It is essential to this Idealism to affirm this rationality; it need not conceive it as present in a complete state, but it must be sure of an advance to it; the movement of reality, with its antitheses and conflicts, must pass in elements of reason. Immanent Idealism tolerates no inner division of the spiritual life; wherever spiritual movement emerges, there can be no doubt concerning the aim; the development of power must bring the right disposition with it; every limitation can come only from weakness or misunderstanding; there can be no radical evil. With an optimism of this kind the leading minds of German classical literature are imbued; but how greatly, in the midst of all the progress of civilisation, the nineteenth century has darkened the appearance of the world! We see now with complete clearness the indifference of the forces of nature towards the aims of the spirit; we see the incessant crossing of the work of reason by blind necessity; we see the spiritual life divided against itself, eminent spiritual powers drawn into the service of lower interests, and carried away by unrestrained passion. In a time of extraordinary increase of technical and social culture, we see the spiritual life win scarcely anything, in fact, seriously recede; we see it become perplexed concerning its main direction, and oscillate in uncertainty between different possibilities. We experience in everything a violent convulsion of the spirit. How could Immanent Idealism satisfy us under such circumstances; how could it assure to our life a firm basis?

Indeed, the doubt may now arise whether Immanent Idealism signifies a type of life at all; whether it is not merely a compromise between a religious shaping of life and a life turned towards sense experience; a *via media*, which as merely transitional is only able to maintain itself for a time. The historical experience of the Modern Age

seems to show that the latter hypothesis is the true one. At the beginning of the epoch religion stood in secure supremacy and the divine acted on man from a sovereignty that was supreme over the world. Then the divine came ever closer to the world that it might spread itself over it and sink into it, till finally there was no longer any separation, and God and world blended together in a single whole. At first this seemed a pure and a great gain: the divine put off all rigid sovereignty and spoke to us immediately out of the whole extent of life; the world joined itself, through the power of the divine, to an inner whole and, illuminated by it, received a transfigured appearance. And yet the solution was only apparent; it contained an inner contradiction, which ultimately was bound to break forth with a power of destruction. The divine had developed its power and its depth in opposition to the world; will it retain that power and that depth if the opposition ceases; will not the renunciation of supremacy, the fusion with things, rob it of all distinctive content? As a matter of fact, with this increase in proximity and extension, the divine fades and dissolves more and more; ever less power proceeds from it: and so the world is ever less transformed and elevated by it; its transfiguring light is dissipated and its inner connections fall away. From being a life-penetrating power Pantheism becomes more and more a vague disposition; indeed, an empty phrase; the living whole, which in the beginning raised things to itself, has finally become a mere abstraction which cannot hold its ground before vigorous thought. Thus, with an immanent dialectic, such as historical life often enough shows, the movement, since it strove for breadth, has been destroyed in its life-giving root; it has abandoned the basis from which it derived its truth and power. Immanent Idealism therefore appears to be one great contradiction; a fascinating illusion, which, instead of reality, presents us with mere appearance.

Of course, with such doubts and convulsions Immanent Idealism is not finally refuted; it puts forward demands

which need to be satisfied in some way; it contains truths which in some manner must be acknowledged. What would become of human life if it should abandon its striving forwards to the whole; its spiritual penetration of the world; its advance in greatness and breadth; its joyous and vigorous nature; the excellence of its disposition? But the indispensable truth that is involved in Immanent Idealism must be brought into wider relations, and thus made clear and modified, so that it may be more secure and more fruitful in its effect. Meanwhile, we see that here also we are in complete uncertainty; that which was intended to give a firm support, and to point out a clear course to our life, has itself become a difficult problem.

(*b*) THE NEWER SYSTEMS

No attack from without and no relaxation from within could have brought the older systems of life into such a state of chaos as we actually find existent, if the experience of sense had not become far more to man and had not given him far more to do than in earlier times. Hitherto genuine spiritual life seemed to be able to unfold itself only in energetic detachment from the world of sense; it reduced this world to a subordinate sphere which received a task and a value only from a transcendent order; thus, all tarrying with the things of sense seemed to be a sign of a lower disposition, a falling from the heights of human life.

This view has been radically altered by the course of the Modern Age. Since the invisible world became uncertain to man and the life directed towards it shadowy, an intense thirst for reality, for a life out of the abundance and truth of things, arose, and only the visible world seemed to promise satisfaction. This world had been seen hitherto in a particular light which is now felt to be artificial and distorting; if this light fails and the world can

unfold itself unaffected, it shows a far richer content, far firmer relations, far greater tasks. All this is more especially because the world no longer appears to be a finished conclusion, but as still in process and as capable of a thoroughgoing elevation ; because great possibilities still lie dormant in it which human power is able to awaken. In diverse directions sense experience advances far beyond the older form ; natural science analyses the visible world into its single components and makes it penetrable to our thought, and at the same time technical skill wins power over its forces. The political and social relationship of men finds new tasks not only in regard to isolated questions, but throughout the whole of its organisation, and great hopes of an essential elevation of life are raised. The individual also appears more powerful and richer, in that the decay of traditional ties gives him complete freedom for his development. Even if, in the struggle for the control of life, these movements in many ways fall into contradiction one with another, still, in the first place they unite to advance the world of sense in man's estimation, to fix his love and his work there, and at the same time they make men more and more disinclined to consider the life-systems rooted in the invisible. Sense experience presents itself ever more decidedly as something which can tolerate neither partner nor rival ; the life directed towards it loses more and more the nature of being an opponent, which it hitherto had, and it undertakes to shape the whole existence characteristically in positive achievement and also to satisfy the spiritual needs of man completely. All this signifies an entire reversal of the order of life ; for, since the world which formerly had seemed secondary now becomes predominant, indeed exclusive, all standards and values are changed, and the old possession appears also as a new gain. It is true that the new mode of thought misses the advantages which a long tradition gave to the old, but in place of this, it has the charm of searching and finding for itself, the joy of first discovery and successful exertion ; here an infinite horizon is disclosed ; before the research and effort of man

lies an open way. Endeavour derives particular force and confidence from the conviction that the new is nothing else than the old and genuine, but hitherto misunderstood, nature; it is a return of life to itself, to its plain and pure truth, which permits us to expect a new world epoch. Thus, mankind, exalted in mind and with cheerful courage, enters upon the course which promises so much.

1. The Naturalistic System

The movement towards giving sole attention to the world of sense cannot make sure progress without a more definite decision concerning the main bearers and the main direction of work. Different possibilities here offer themselves; three, however, in particular. In reality, these have all evolved, sometimes blending together and strengthening one another, at other times crossing and hindering one another.

None of these movements has displayed more energy and exercised more power than that which makes the sense experience of surrounding nature its basis, and strives to include man's entire being within this experience. This is Naturalism, which, starting out from the mechanical comprehension of nature, which has been developed in the Modern Age, extends the magnitudes thus obtained over all, and subordinates even the life of the soul to them. The movement originated at the dawn of the seventeenth century, when an independence and autonomy of nature began to be acknowledged. Nature had been covered with a veil of explanation, mainly æsthetic or religious in character, which gave it a colour corresponding to the prevailing disposition, but at the same time excluded the possibility of a scientific comprehension. A comprehension of this kind could only be attained by getting rid of all subjective addition which had been made by man, and by investigating nature purely by itself. Since Descartes and Galileo that has been accomplished, and nature now appears as an

immense web of single threads, as a complex of fundamentally mobile, but soulless, elements, whose movements take simple basal forms, while the combination of these elements produces all constructions, even the most complicated. This mighty machinery never points beyond, and as it runs its course solely within itself, so it requires to be understood solely from itself. Everything spiritual is thus eliminated; this realm of fact has no knowledge of aims, or of the meaning of events.

This new scientific conception of nature had, first, with much toil and difficulty, to wrestle with the traditional, naively human, representation; this was chiefly a matter of reducing first appearances to their simple elements, and of constructing the world anew from these. By this process, nature at the same time became accessible to the operation of man. For, the technical control of nature presupposes the analytic character of research; only such a research, with its discovery of the single elements and tendencies, places man in a relation of activity towards nature; while in earlier times only an attitude of contemplation had been granted to him. Natural science thus created a new type of life, a life energetic, masculine, pressing forward unceasingly.

This life, like science itself, in the first place forms a special part of a wider whole. As the expulsion of the soul from nature at first brought about a strengthening of the soul in itself, nature was the less immediately able to govern the whole. The individual of modern times strengthened and asserted himself against nature, and insisted upon a realm of independent inwardness. The contest was a severe one; but the more nature extended, on the one hand, towards the infinitely great, and, on the other, towards the infinitely small, the more fixed relations it showed, so much the more overwhelmingly did it draw man into itself, the more did its conception tend to include the inner aspects of the soul also. The final blow in the struggle was given by the modern theory of descent, since this theory asserts man to be the product solely of natural

forces, and maintains that everything which man ascribes to himself as characteristic and distinctive is derived from a gradual development of natural factors. Nature is thus exalted as an all-comprehensive world—nature, that is, as represented in the modern mechanistic theory, which is thus transformed into a final theory of the world, a naturalistic metaphysic. The human and spiritual world, which hitherto had been felt to be an independent realm in contrast with nature, appears henceforth as its mere continuation, as something which fits completely into a wider conception of nature.

A conviction of this kind must fundamentally alter the position of the spiritual life, as well as its magnitudes and values; such a conviction is no mere theory, but desires and strives to take possession of the whole of existence and to change its form completely. Indeed, a particular naturalistic type of life arises and wins a powerful influence over the thought and activity of the time.

This Naturalism denies all independence of the spiritual life, which it regards as nothing more than an adjunct to the realm of nature, and one that can only exist along with sense existence, as a part of or as a supplement to it. Spirituality has, therefore, to subordinate itself and conform entirely to the life of nature; it can never produce and guide a movement from itself, never evolve a basal and comprehensive activity, never withdraw itself into its own sphere as into an independent realm. All self-existent spirituality fades to a world of mere shadows; whatever makes itself felt in us can only become a complete reality by winning flesh and blood through the appropriation of physical forces. Life, thus understood, possesses nothing in itself; it receives everything from its relations to the environment with which it is bound up: thought brings forth no new ideas; all ideas are merely abbreviations of sense impressions. Effort can never realise purely spiritual values; the essence of all happiness is sensuous enjoyment, however refined that may in some cases be. The naturalistic system of life receives a more definite delineation from the

representation of nature, which the mechanical theory, together with a theory of descent adapted to it, sketches and impressively holds up to the present age. By this theory nature is completely resolved into a co-existence of individual forces, which, within the narrow bounds of existence, must clash violently together, assert themselves one against the other in ceaseless conflict. This conflict, however, is a source of progressive movement, in that it brings together, establishes, and employs everything useful for self-preservation; it keeps life in a state of youthful freshness, in that new conditions continually arise and demand new accommodations with respect to the biologico-economic environment. A biologico-economic mode of thought is evolved which revolutionises all previous estimations of values. Everything intrinsically valuable disappears from the world; its expulsion seems a deliverance from a confused, indeed a meaningless, conception of things; the useful, that which promotes the interests of living beings, each after its kind, in the struggle for existence, becomes the all-dominating value. No mysterious being of things is apprehended in the True; but those presentations and systems of thought are called true which ensure that the best accommodation to the conditions of life shall be attained, and which just in this way hold the individuals together. No longer does a Good speak to man with austere demand from a transcendent sovereignty; but that is good which, within our experience, is of service to the preservation of life. The Beautiful, also, is subordinated to the useful, and it is solely through its value in regard to this that it asserts itself. In everything, it is only one's own welfare, the interest of individual preservation, that directly inspires conduct; but real life shows man in so many relations, so closely implicated with his environment, that he can strive for nothing for himself without also striving for others. This extension of interests has no limits; there is nothing in the whole of infinity which could not in this way become to man, indirectly, a means of self-preservation and thus an object of desire.

The naturalistic type of life extends from the most general of impulses to every branch of activity, and forms every department of life in a distinctive fashion. Knowledge depends entirely upon experience; every speculative element must be excluded as a subjective illusion; in all its branches, knowledge is nothing else than a broadened Natural Science. Art may not pursue imaginary ideals; it finds its single task in the faithful and pure reproduction of the natural environment. Social life and endeavour will develop, above all, natural powers, and will seek to adapt itself to the conditions given by nature, and, rejecting all aims based upon mere imagination, it will care chiefly for the physical welfare of the whole, as the source of all power and of all success.

It is not difficult to understand how this form of life was able to win and carry away the minds of its contemporaries. In the first place it has the character of simplicity and immediacy, which, in contrast with the complexity and the remoteness of the traditional position, appears a great advantage. For, in this scheme, life, with all its multiplicity, is dominated and unified by the idea of natural self-preservation; and the things which immediately affect us, which lie physically and psychically near to us, come most directly into relation to this aim. It is a further tendency of this scheme of life to bring the whole of existence into a state of activity and restless advance. For the state of conflict which prevails under the naturalistic system allows nothing to persist merely because of its present existence or through the weight of tradition, but everything must always be reasserting its right to existence; it must stretch and extend itself in order to be useful in the life of the present. What cannot satisfy this test is unmercifully thrown over as a mere dead weight. It is also of great importance to the theory in question that nature and the world are involved in ceaseless change, and that, along with the conditions of life, the requirements also alter: the matter is one of continually accommodating oneself anew; and so life is placed entirely in the present, and the

fixity of an absolute conception and treatment of change yields to the instability of a relative one. Last of all, and most especially, life according to its own conviction bears the character of truth. For human striving appears to attain the firm basis of reality, and to become truthful in itself only when it is firmly connected with the surrounding world; while, so long as it trusted to the capacity of the subject—which fondly imagined itself independent—it fell into unspeakable error. Only when delivered from subjectivity, only when fixed within the web of the whole of nature, does life seem to awake out of a dream, and to become fully real, a genuine, securely grounded life.

The energy of negation which this theory employs and with which it drives out everything which has become old adds strength to the elements of assertion and positive achievement in these changes. In this theory there is nothing indefinite which could soften the opposition, nothing mediatory which could overcome it, but, distinctly and harshly, affirmation and negation stand face to face and call for a plain decision between them. Whatever remains in doubt and under suspicion is forced into the background, indeed eliminated altogether, through the victorious onward march of modern Natural Science and the increasing triumphs of technical skill, which seem to demonstrate, immediately, the truth of the naturalistic type of life. Thus, this movement spreads in a mighty flood through humanity, and seizes with a particular power the classes which are struggling upward, and which meet science and culture with a faith yet undisturbed. On the basis of time there is hardly anything which seems able to withstand such an attack.

Nevertheless, that which gains the support of many contemporaries is not thereby proved to be the supreme power and the final truth. In that movement there may be far more, and something far more important than it itself admits. It may be that it achieves that which it does achieve only with the help of elements of another kind; perhaps, indeed, it is able to maintain its truth only in so far as it enters into broader relations in a wider whole and

thereby changes its meaning essentially. Whether such is the case must be ascertained by reference not to subjective opinion, but to the conditions of the life of humanity.

Now, the first movement of opposition is produced in just that sphere which seemed Naturalism's strongest bulwark, that is, Natural Science, the Natural Science based on mathematics and physics. Only the most fleeting survey can lead to the confusion of Natural Science with Naturalism ; in reality, the naturalistic thinker cannot with justice acknowledge any exact Natural Science, and a natural scientist cannot be naturalistic in thought in consequence of his science, but only in spite of it. For, Natural Science is anything but a mere copy of the sense impressions which we experience ; its origin and progress are due to the fact that thought fundamentally acts upon and transforms those impressions. If our intellect were no more than Naturalism could logically make it out to be, it could, at most, only refine the animal presentations a little ; it never could have advanced beyond the single presentations to a representative conception of the world as a whole. Such an advance could be achieved only by thought raising itself above the stream of appearances and placing itself over against it ; but how could a mere bundle of perceptions, to which Naturalism reduces the intellect, achieve this ? Incomparably more unity of being and freedom of operation are necessary for this achievement than such a bundle could produce.

In earlier times, no doubt, man went very much astray in the interpretation of his environment ; he transferred his immediate feelings into it ; he coloured the whole world in human colours, and associated with its realities as with beings of the same nature as himself ; but even the error shows a seeking and an interpretation ; the simple putting of the question proclaims a being becoming superior to mere nature. The most important thing, however, is that man has not regarded the matter as finally settled with this anthropomorphism ; he has come to regard it as inadequate and has pressed forward to a new way of

thinking. What could drive him to that change but a desire for truth, and how is such a conception as *truth* attainable from nature? And if thought has succeeded in breaking through the misty veil of anthropomorphism and seeks things in their own relations, if an objective consciousness of the world has emerged, a consciousness which is as different from the immediacy of sense impressions as the sky is distant from the earth, has not man also grown in himself beyond mere sense impression; is it not a work of thought which supports and governs the whole construction, and differentiates genuine nature from appearance? How much power of comprehension and of relating together is exhibited even by Natural Science, in that it analyses the sense presentation of the environment into its single elements, ascertains the laws of these, and traces the movement from the simplest beginnings right up to its present stage of development. All activity of thought is thus subject to a certain reproach in that it must continually bring itself into relation to perception: nevertheless it will interweave all that is imparted to it by perception into a framework of thought—transform it, in fact, into a realm of thought. Spirituality is bound; but how dull one's thought must be to confuse such a bound spirituality with mere sensuousness!

The error of Naturalism is obvious; concerned solely with the object and its form, it entirely leaves out of account the psychical activity which operates in the perception of an object; it overlooks the life-process within which alone we can have knowledge of an object and occupy ourselves with it. As soon, however, as we regard the object from this point of view, it will be transformed and will assume far more spiritual traits. Reality will then burst asunder the framework into which Naturalism desires to press it.

The type of life which Naturalism gives rise to, also contains more than Naturalism is able to explain. At first sight it seems as though man is taken up completely into a wider conception of nature; as though his life obeys its

forces and impulses exclusively ; as though all the asserted superiority to nature is mere imagination. As a matter of fact, in this turning to nature, man, with his spiritual activity, stands not within, but above, nature. For he does not appear as a mere piece of nature, but experiences it and thinks over it : its kingdom, its organisation, its stability become to him a joyful possession and a widening of his being. The spiritual life has developed in relation to nature ; nature has not welded it together. The same may be said of the idea of the increase of power, which constitutes the main gain of life in the naturalistic system. For, in the naturalistic type of life power is not directed towards externals, as in nature, but is experienced and enjoyed, and only thus does it constitute a source of happiness ; yet how could it be that, without an organisation of life in an inner unity which transcends individual occurrences ? Thus, the intellectual and the technical control of nature which the Modern Age has acquired attracts men and prevails over them chiefly as a growth of life, as an increase of self-reliance. Even material goods, wealth and property, do not determine the endeavour of the man of culture so much through sensuous enjoyment, the limit of which is soon reached, as through their possibilities as means to activity and creation, to the advancement of human capacity. It is this in particular which has filled the material civilisation of the present with the spirit of restlessness and extravagance, and gives it its demoniacal power over men. It is this relation alone which explains and justifies the present estimate of material goods, so much higher as that is in modern culture than it was in the older systems of thought, which branded as unworthy all endeavour directed to the acquirement of such things.

In short, even Naturalism in no way eliminates the subject with its inwardness ; rather in its own development it everywhere presupposes the subject. It does not shape life out of mere and pure nature, but out of a close union of a transcendent spiritual life with nature, and out of an energetic insistence upon elements of nature within the soul.

However, man experiences not so much the things themselves as himself in the things; the relating together, the surveying, the experiencing of the whole is always a spiritual performance. This performance makes something different out of nature, just as the naturalistic culture that is striven for is different from the mere state of nature that is found at the beginning. The misconception of the relation of nature to the mind; the postulation of nature without mind, in place of nature with mind, makes Naturalism self-contradictory and untenable. Naturalism therefore struggles vainly against the following dilemma: if it is really in earnest in the elimination of spiritual realities, it must inevitably destroy its own fundamental basis and, as a system of life, must break down; while if it in any way acknowledges a transcendence of mere nature, and a transcendence just in that which is fundamental to it, then it is necessarily driven beyond itself.

But such contradiction in the basal position must be present through the whole development of Naturalism and must make all its factors variating in colour and double in meaning, since at one and the same time they involve the spiritual element and reject it, eliminate it and bring it into the foreground, the former openly and explicitly, the latter concealed and implicitly. Such is the case, in particular, with the fundamental conception of the *struggle for existence*. In the context of Naturalism, this conception can signify nothing else than the preservation of natural existence, of mere life; such a conception, however, is as incapable of comprehending the whole wealth of the work of civilisation and culture as it is of developing within itself. If the preservation of existence in this sense were really the highest aim, then, all the work of humanity, incalculable and great as it is, all the toil and creative activity of history, would be without result; in no way would it lead beyond the starting-point; we should, of course, have life, but nothing along with and in life. Indeed, the movement would be a continual retrogression, for the experience of the present shows us clearly enough

that the conflict of life becomes ever more difficult, toilsome, and embittered. If all this toil does not yield more than was possessed in the original condition, that is, physical existence, then this implies that we have to make an ever greater detour to establish that which formerly devolved upon us immediately. In such a case our life would be a continual sinking, a toil continually increasing in difficulty, in order that we might simply be something, without being anything in particular. Or, will anyone assert that there is no retrogression when the achievement of the same aim costs ever more effort, ever more labour and turmoil of spirit ?

The fact is that Naturalism also gives to life, which is seen to be thus immersed in conflict, some kind of content, which it conceives as increasing continually in the course of the movement, and as attaining for us through the conflict an ever richer and more comprehensive existence. But how can a conception such as that of the *content of life* originate in mere nature ? How can it be even conceived unless life possesses some consciousness of itself, unless there is a transformation of what is external into something internal—a thing which nature can never accomplish ?

With the conception of the *struggle for existence*, the useful becomes the dominating power of life ; it attempts a transvaluation of all values, since it lays stress rather on the relation of things to us than on their own nature. The conception won acceptance from and power over the minds of men because it was a complete change from the generally accepted explanation, and at the same time seemed to simplify matters greatly. Unfortunately, on further consideration this transformation proves to be a complete reversal of the general scheme of life, indeed a destruction of it. Man, it is true, does not preserve his physical existence without toil ; he must continually win it anew, and nothing can occupy him which does not acquire some relation to this necessity and make itself consistent with it. But the further question arises, whether anxiety for the useful is also able to crush out that which is distinctive and

characteristic in the world of humanity. If we recognise the limits of the endeavour after the useful, we shall soon become doubtful concerning its claim to be the sole aim of conduct. That endeavour is spent solely on the welfare of the individual; it can never free itself from that reference to the individual, and never, beyond that perceived, can it take up anything as an aim in itself. Interest is centred solely upon the external products of the activity of men and of the process of nature, and not at all upon what men and nature are in themselves. We find here nothing but isolated spheres of existence which are devoid alike of inner relation to themselves as to one another.

Now, Naturalism can appeal in its own defence to the fact that real life shows its individual departments to have thousands of inter-relationships, so that the welfare of the individual is inseparably bound up with that of his environment, his family, his home, his state; and that therefore, in order to prosper himself, his endeavour must be for the good of these also. It may even serve his own interest to give up a direct advantage in favour of a greater indirect one. Further, Naturalism is able to assert that, however little the inner disposition of others may affect us directly, this disposition can acquire a value for us in so far as its persistence alone assures to us a continuance of achievement. As considerations of this kind may be extended without limit, there is nothing in the whole breadth of existence which the utilitarian view of life could reject.

But, in the midst of all this extension in breadth, this development of life retains a fixed limitation in its inner nature, which cannot be transcended: we can never strive for the alien, the other, the whole, for its own sake, but only as a means for our own welfare; everything inward becomes a matter of indifference if, sooner or later, it is not transformed into an external result. Human life, however, through its own development has grown beyond this limitation; if not in the breadth of existence, yet in its inner nature, and at its highest, it manifests something significantly more. Man is capable of a love which values another, not because

it hopes for this or that which is useful from him, but because with the whole of his existence he is valuable to it. Man is capable of a love which can lead him to the willing subordination, indeed the joyful sacrifice, of his own existence ; of a love in which the first self dies and a new self is born. " Love is the greatest of all contradictions, and one which the understanding cannot solve, since there is nothing more impenetrable than this individuality of self-consciousness, which is negated, and which yet I should retain as positive " (Hegel). Into what a state of poverty humanity would fall if a genuine love of this kind were struck out of the number of its possessions ! But can Naturalism in any way understand and estimate such an inner expansion of the heart, such a *Stirbe und Werde* [a dying to live], to use the words of Goethe ?

A deliverance of life from the mere *ego* is effected in another direction, in work. Of course, work also stands in close relation to the preservation of life ; it must demonstrate itself as in some way useful. But work would never fill the soul and attain to anything great if it did not also become an aim in itself ; if it were not carried on in complete submission to the object and according to its requirements. How low all educational endeavour, personal guardianship, all advancing of humanity would sink ; how humanity would lack all self-forgetting devotion to it, all bold pressing forward ; how unintelligible the joy in a life's vocation would be, if the idea of utility solely and entirely determined conduct, if the chief concern were always how the work paid ! Should we not sink, in such a case, into a slavery which would enthral man far more oppressively than any command which a tyrant could be capable of ?

It is true that on the average level of existence much is turned to the service of the merely useful which was produced from love and work, and this reversal of spiritual goods may be the first thing which comes definitely under our attention. In order, however, even to be so applied and reversed, they must originally have been generated in some

manner, and this original generation can never proceed from the useful, but only out of the inner force and compulsion of the thing, as, for example, in the case of the great transitions of thought, of artistic creation, and of religious conviction. And, as these have proceeded from inner movements, so they have also brought about powerful inner changes. They have not altered this or that in a given world, in order to make it more comfortable to man, but with an energetic revolution have transformed our world from its very foundations, and have constructed a new world in contrast to that which immediately surrounds us. How much or how little individual men, or indeed even mankind as a whole, have appropriated of this; how far man has corresponded and still corresponds to the necessities of his own nature, is a matter and a question in itself: in the spiritual life of humanity the new magnitudes are extant, and they operate here as norms for testing all achievement. At the same time, they show that our life and our nature are of a kind different from what Naturalism represents them to be. However much Naturalism may boast that it is possible for even the highest to be drawn into the service of the merely human, with all its boasting it has not explained the origin of the highest: can a thing proceed from its own shadow? The naturalistic attempt to trace everything back to the useful really reverses the condition of affairs and results in inner destruction wherever disposition stands first. For conduct changes its character completely according as it is regarded as a mere means, or as an end in itself; according as its aim is striven for directly or only indirectly. Do such things as love, fidelity, honour deserve these names if the thought of selfish advantage is their motive power? It lies in the nature of certain things that they must be treated as ends in themselves and as matters of primary concern: to degrade them to a subsidiary position is in their case only a finer kind of destruction; to be opposed to utility is an attribute inseparable from their very being. Where disposition is valued only as a pre-condition of achievement, as in Naturalism,

at the highest only a tolerable appearance, a substitute for a genuine disposition, can be reached in the whole moral sphere. Naturalism affords us an example of such a substitution when it sets up an altruistic action, that is, an action which produces something useful to another, in place of an inner expansion of life, which takes the other up inwardly into our own volition and being, and which alone leads beyond egoism. Naturalism is able to overlook all this ; is able to make what is the secondary view of things the primary one ; the derived, the original ; is able to put the relation to human perception in place of the thing itself, only because its interest is so completely occupied with external relations that it does not independently evaluate the inner, and again, because a reflection that appeals to the understanding hinders all immediate relation and spontaneous appropriation. Otherwise, it also would feel how deep, how intolerable, a degradation of man ensues if his innermost experience, his striving after truth, his wrestling for unity within himself, his love, and his suffering are made a mere means to physical self-preservation, and are thus regarded from the point of view of utility.

If we glance over the life of universal history, we see that a history of a distinctively human character only extricates itself from the machinery of nature through man's acquiring an independence over against his environment, evolving a life conscious of itself and from it exerting a transforming power upon all presented to it. Only thus does a civilisation grow up in contrast with the mere state of nature. In civilisation and culture man enters into conflict with the infinity of the external world, but he cannot carry on this conflict victoriously without setting an inner infinity in opposition to that external one. In the struggle between these two worlds the life of man is transformed no less than the appearance of reality. More and more the visible world becomes an expression of an invisible one ; more and more life draws the world into itself and finds the chief problems in its own sphere. Thus life becomes raised above merely physical preservation ; that which serves in

this preservation is regarded as a mere condition and as something merely preliminary.

Among the peoples situated nearest to us, this tendency has taken different forms; but the separation of creative spiritual activity from all mere utility is common to all. Thus, Greek culture gave birth to a life resting in its own movement, a life satisfied in itself. In the sharpest manner it marked off the beautiful, that which could produce pleasure immediately and of itself, from the merely useful, everything which served something else. It lauded the life filled with the perception and appreciation of the beautiful as the only free life, and pronounced every other way of life to be servile. Further, if in Christianity, in the comprehensiveness of its relations, the care for the welfare of the narrowly human takes up a great amount of attention, and a utilitarianism of a religious kind is evolved, the height of its creation and disposition is not affected: in it the winning of a new life superior to all selfishness, the becoming one with the divine, is the one end in itself. If Clement of Alexandria could say that, if it was a matter of choosing between the knowledge of God and eternal bliss, he would have, without hesitation, to renounce the latter, or if Thomas à Kempis said, "I would rather be poor for Thy sake than rich without Thee. I choose rather to be a pilgrim with Thee on the earth, than without Thee to possess heaven. For where Thou art, there is heaven; but where Thou art not, there is death and hell"—then these are not merely the lofty sayings of individuals, but a faithful expression of that which gave to the whole system its world-penetrating and world-reviving power.

The Modern Age, too, which has conceded so much to utilitarian striving, is in the innermost essence of its effort far removed from the spirit of mere utility. For, from the two poles of its life, from the subject as from the object, it breaks through all that is merely given and forms a new, self-existent world. In modern times the subject frees itself from the environment, places itself proudly over against it, and finds its securest experience in the self-certainty of

its own life. At the same time it in no way renounces the surrounding world; but through the activity of thought it reconstructs that world, and in this conceptualises and idealises all its magnitudes. The more the subject becomes assured of seeing all things spiritually and scientifically through its own organisation, the more true is it that all sense experience is sustained and modified by spiritual power. Natural self-preservation cannot possibly satisfy the striving of the subject. For this striving can never be reduced to a mere means, but finds its power, as its joy, in becoming a world in itself; in the proud maintenance and establishment of its own nature in face of every opposition; in the impression of its particularity upon the infinity of things. On the other hand, over against the circumstantiality of man, great systems of thought are formed; evolve a characteristic content and independent powers; and, as forces in the life of universal history, press forward their consequences with inevitable necessity. These systems seek to bring reality under their sway, and do not manifest the least concern in regard to the continuance and the interests of mere man. Science and art and the political and economical aspects of life afford examples of what we mean. Accordingly, in the modern world and in the modern man, two movements towards infinity clash together, and from these there arise immeasurable movement and violent unrest. Whatever may remain enigmatical in this, the fact of the transformation of the first, the sense experience of things, is beyond doubt. It is also beyond doubt that man, regarded spiritually, does not find himself a member of a given world, but must first seek and make clear his fundamental relations to the world. From this position Naturalism, with its naive assertion of the finality and permanence of the sense impression, appears to be an intolerable dogmatism.

Thus, Naturalism is seen to be far below the highest point of universal historical development; it cannot appropriate the experiences and results of that development; it consists of a confusion of naive and scientific modes of thought,

which win the adherence of many individuals, but which, through their contradictions, can never guarantee to life a sure hold and a clear course. Only because it evolves in the atmosphere of a world of another kind, and thereby imperceptibly enhances its own conceptions, does it acquire a plausible appearance. Nevertheless, even so, it is a mischievous confusion of thought which must act detrimentally upon conduct. Those especially will be opposed to it who recognise in human life great tasks and severe perplexities, and desire that the highest powers and clearest thought shall be called forth for the accomplishment of those tasks and the solution of those perplexities. But Naturalism, obscuring, as it does, the inner problems of life; with its backwardness in the movement of universal history; and with its attempt to take from human life all proud and free self-consciousness, indeed all soul, can tend only to reduce the energy of life.

The rejection of Naturalism by no means signifies failure to appreciate the increased attention to nature, out of the wrong interpretation of which Naturalism has proceeded. Not only has visible nature become more to our knowledge; it has also become incomparably more to our life. The fact that we feel ourselves conditioned by it, and have become more closely associated with it, can be fully appreciated and must force us to a radical revision of the traditional form of life. Such a revision, however, can be successful in achieving its aim only if the new experiences are systematised to form a consistent whole with the remaining facts in a comprehensive, universal life; spiritual endeavour is solely and alone capable of offering this universality and of accomplishing this task.

2. The Socialistic System

The socialistic system of life is often closely bound up with the naturalistic, and blends with it so well as almost to form a single whole; indeed, there is so much affinity in

their fundamental principles that the one may appear to be the completion of the other. But when we come to details, we find that a different character and a different emotional life are yielded according as the relation to nature or to human society governs life, especially as we are parts in an infinite nature, or as we place our own province in the foreground and seek a new form for it. On the one hand knowledge takes the lead, on the other activity. While the former, according to its nature, is more concerned with reaching a consistent whole, the latter feels the contradictions of experience most intensely. With the one progress appears as a gradual accumulation, with the other it does not seem possible to dispense with a radical change ; while the former is broader in its outlook, the latter has more warmth of enthusiasm. Through the domination of thought and life by the problems of society, a distinctive form of culture may therefore be expected.

In modern life different motives have led to a closer unity of men on the basis of experience. Religion no longer accords to the individual firm support as in earlier times, and with every advance of scientific research nature is removed inwardly further from us ; ceaseless criticism and reflection tend to prevent us more and more from comprehending the whole as a unity. Man, thus isolated in the whole, seems to himself to be lost, unless he succeeds in discovering relations between himself and others of the same nature as himself, and unless in co-operation with them he helps to build up an independent realm of their own, which may lend support and value to the life of the individual.

In the Modern Age social life has tended to this end under the influence of fresh impressions and new prospects. Hitherto that life was under the influence of an invisible world of thought, especially of one of a religious kind. The union of men had particular presuppositions and was realised in a particular manner ; here, the more closely a certain group held together, the more sharply was it separated from others ; the calling forth of power in one particular

direction meant diverting it from other tasks. A changed mode of thought was also able to take exception to the view that the ties which bind men together came from a transcendent order, which is now felt as an " other " world and is the subject of doubt. At first, therefore, we are apt to think it a pure gain if modern society no longer concerns itself with these invisible bonds, and regards the union as arising solely and entirely out of the immediate experience of life. For then there is nothing to hinder the balanced development of all the relationships of men among themselves ; the social life serves no other end, but finds its task and happiness in itself, and in its actuality is disturbed by no kind of doubt.

With this deliverance from all external constraint, a positive advance of the life of society on the basis of the Modern Age is associated. A life more free in conduct, and which through progress in the arts ceaselessly expands, brings men nearer to one another, and forces them into closer union ; action and reaction accelerate each other. The opinions and strivings of the masses are formed more easily and exercise more influence ; the whole and its influence upon the individual become incomparably stronger. At the same time, the energetic attention that men bestow upon the surrounding reality throws into bold relief relations which have existed from the earliest times, but which hitherto had not become prominent, and enables them to acquire a greater value for life. Since the old appears in a new light, and the new arises, diverse streams of social life are formed, and through their diversity operate to the strengthening of the main tendency.

Modern Sociology shows the individual to be far more dependent upon the social environment, upon general conditions, than we are wont to assume from the first impression, which usually throws differences into relief and overlooks common traits, generally fails to pay sufficient attention to the growth of the individuals, and is too apt to take the positions which they possess as essentially the result of their own work. In contrast to this, the one

thing which now has power to impress us is the fact that the dependence reaches back to the earliest beginnings; that the individual has become what he has become through the overpowering influences of heredity, education, and environment. Further, the conviction that the differences lie within ascertainable limits, and that there is a certain average level throughout all the multiplicity of life, is gaining a firmer hold. To ascertain these average levels now becomes the chief problem of knowledge, and to realise them the chief task of practical political provision. Inner changes are also brought about. The fact that, with these changes, responsibility, guilt, and desert are transferred more and more from the individual on to the society tends to call forth more humane sympathy and more mildness of judgment, and tends to discredit all excessive self-esteem of a self-righteous Pharisaism. At the same time it constitutes a powerful motive to work for the whole; to strive to raise the whole, morally and physically; to develop a social morality and a strong feeling of solidarity.

To the modern man, therefore, the life of the State advances through changes in content and form. The State, which in the Middle Ages had to leave all problems of inner training to the Church, in its new function of culture State now assumes all tasks, influences the whole life of the individual, and is confident in its power to transform our existence more and more into a realm of reason. Along with this there is a strong tendency to place the State increasingly on the power and insight of individuals; all through the nineteenth century this tendency won an ever more overwhelming power. The more activity we bestow upon a particular sphere of work, the more valuable does it become to us, the nearer does it stand to our inner nature. Thus, the ancient mode of thought, that the individual is a mere member of the political organism, and that he receives his tasks and obtains his power from it, was able to be revived.

With this the stronger emphasis laid upon national peculiarities, and the more definite self-assertion and more vigorous development of nations are associated. Formerly

national character had been veiled and, as far as the spiritual ideals of humanity are concerned, as though lost. Now nations appear as points where the spiritual life manifests itself and concentrates distinctively. To work out their peculiarities clearly, and manfully to assert them in the competition of peoples, promises great gain for the organisation and energising of life; for the first time, the divine seems to pass into daily toil on earth.

Most of all, the modern organisation of labour, with its enhancing of technique and its advance beyond the capacity of production of the mere individual, heightens the power of impression of the picture as a whole. Work brings about a deliverance from the passivity of the subject; it organises itself into independent complexes, which develop into a state entirely foreign to our nature. It produces its own motive powers and necessities, and requires from the individual the strictest obedience. The performance of the individual attains a value only in definitely ordered co-operation with others; it loses all worth if it attempts to ignore this relation. This is shown with particular clearness in the evolution of the factory with its production by machinery. It is shown further in every specifically modern work in administrative government, in military organisation, in knowledge and education. Everywhere we find great organisations; an enormous growth in the capacity of the whole, but a sinking of the individual to a mere link of the great chain, a proscribing of all individual will. If all thus depends upon the whole, the success of endeavour and the happiness of life will be decided chiefly by the organisation of the whole. It is not to be wondered at, then, if the antitheses which arise in reference to this organisation agitate people in the strongest degree; if a faith in the omnipotence of political and social forms grows up, and if over these the keenest fight rages.

In this connection there is no problem which gives rise to greater complications and severer conflicts than that in regard to the preservation and raising of the standard of material existence. If, in general, we attribute incom-

parably more value to the material in life than was done formerly, so here also the problems of modern labour reach their climax. The organisation and concentration of labour have made by far their greatest progress in this matter; a gigantic accumulation of capital on the one side and of labour power on the other has intensified to the uttermost the opposition between man and man. In this conflict more than in any other the whole being of man comes into play; here, therefore, the most powerful passions flame up. No wonder that, if the thought of a fundamental reorganisation rises to the surface, it wins an influence amounting to fascination, arouses the hope of an essential advancement of the whole of human existence, and impels men to vigorous activity.

Thus, then, this sphere, in which fact is regarded as principle, and in which the problem of the development of society is elevated to a position of importance above all others, and seeks to impress its stamp upon the whole of life, is first and foremost. From this point of view the organisation of society is the central problem of all culture, and a distinctive social culture, a social system of life, is evolved. But that which emerges at this point with especial power and clearness would not have been able to win men so quickly and influence them so strongly if it did not constitute a high-water mark of a wider movement, of a general tendency of the modern man to regard the social relation as being of the essence of life, and to shape life anew from this. Viewed historically, this tendency arose as a reaction against the practice of placing the individual in the foreground, a practice which since the beginning of the Modern Age had been resorted to in the most diverse departments of life. What was felt to be unconditionally right in opposition to the bondage of the Middle Ages has, in the course of time, shown a reverse side. Many painful experiences have led us to favour a movement in the direction of the whole again; and so it comes about that all hope of amelioration is able to be regarded as inevitably bound up with the complete victory of this movement.

A distinctive social type of life can be formed and can strive for supremacy only if great problems arise within society and if its position in the whole of our life is capable of and in need of change. It will soon be seen that the case is so in respect of both these things; and also that two movements, one more general in kind, and another more precise but also more uncertain as to its goal, are connected.

The point at which the new development of life institutes a new demand is the relation of the individual to the means of existence and the goods of culture. Formerly an aristocratic order preponderated, which allowed only a few to share in the abundance of these goods, while it was only afterwards that the many were able to partake of the poor remains. In material, as in spiritual, things man was concerned less with the equitable distribution of the possessions of humanity than with increasing them. The matter of chief importance, and this with regard to questions of inward culture also, appeared to be in some way to incorporate the contents and goods within the sphere of human existence, and to fix them there; the extension of these goods among men was a matter of secondary consideration, and often one that was only very lightly thought of. The limitation to a small chosen class, indeed, seemed to be quite indispensable for a secure and worthy organisation of life. Thus, this culture acquired its character at the highest levels of society, and from there descended in diminishing degrees to lower levels: it was regarded as inevitable that in this descent much should be lost, and that the less privileged classes must perforce be satisfied with very little.

A movement in opposition to this state of things arose in the first place among the individuals who were placed in the background by such an organisation, and who, not convinced of the validity of the doctrine of the immutability of their fate, began to make comparisons and to ask questions. Their desire was not merely for more happiness, but included spiritual advance. In humanity there is an energetic striving and advance, and in this a far greater spirituality and a far keener thirst for truth are often shown in the classes

of the people who are struggling upward and pressing forward than in those classes which from early times have had possession of power and wealth and which are hampered by a feeling of self-satisfaction.

That which at first is striven for by merely a part of mankind acquires, through its inner necessities, a power over others also, and becomes a requirement of the whole. We experience here what earlier was called the power of ideas in history, that is, the fact that in certain periods certain thoughts and demands acquire an overwhelming power of penetration and impel men to a line of conduct which is even opposed to their special interests. We may so far speak of the supremacy of the social idea in the present, as not only in the disposition of individuals but also through organisation and legislation there is an endeavour to bring help to the poor and the weak, to raise those who are struggling upward, and to convey as directly as possible both material and spiritual goods to all who bear human features. It is not only that this appears a matter of justice ; a rejuvenation and an energising of the whole of culture are also hoped for. Without a radical rejection of all that which in the traditional position has decayed, become alien, or is now artificial ; without a deep-reaching simplification and a greater proximity to the soul, how could all partake of culture, and how could it become a concern of all ? The old demand of leading educationists, of Comenius and Rousseau, of Pestalozzi and Froebel, the desire for a rejuvenation of our culture, antiquated as it is in many respects, seems to be approaching its fulfilment now that the matter is a concern of the whole of mankind.

However, this striving, which in itself cannot be rejected, enters upon a narrow course and at the same time upon much that is problematical, in that it unites with the positivistic tendencies of the age in the rejection of all invisible connections and the restriction of life to the experience of sense. Instead of the whole, we now have the average and the masses, and instead of a creation from the whole, a building up from below ; the needs of the masses are the

main motive power of life. But as with the masses the chief questions are those of the physical preservation of life, and of economic existence, it seems as if, with their solution, with the deliverance from oppressing cares and necessity through a radical revolution, a complete state of happiness and a ceaseless spiritual advance of humanity are assured. Material welfare, which in earlier organisations of life was so depreciated, in the new system becomes the matter of chief concern; it is regarded as that which more than anything else leads to the development of every power and makes culture the truth for the whole of humanity.

The life of society is thus seen to be full of problems. Nevertheless, the position of society in our life as a whole has been changed and raised. We have become far more uncertain concerning our relation to ultimate and universal reality; we doubt the possibility and the validity of first winning, through religion or speculation, a world beyond human experience, of the conveying it to that experience, and from the point of view of such a world giving the human its light and setting it its task. In short, the centre of life has changed from the object to the subject; we know that we cannot abstract from our own nature our spiritual organisation, but that we carry it into every aspect of the whole; that we see and form the world through man. With such a transition, the movement from man to world becomes the chief movement of life; and the conception of man will decide the nature of the conceptions of life and of reality. Henceforth greatness may be attributed to these only if human nature is capable of an advance beyond what it appears to be in the first impression. That, however, will scarcely be possible unless humanity is conceived as a whole and, with such a unity, has more power and depth than it has as it exists immediately before us. This also will operate to the strengthening of the social order, in which sense experience controls thought.

Thus, many different factors unite to make the condition of mankind as it is, that is, the state of society on the basis of experience, the starting-point and final aim of all

endeavour, and the relation of man to surrounding men the fundamental relation of his life. But, as in the case of culture as a whole, the individual departments of life must also win a distinctive character if the welfare of the social whole, the achievement for man and the influence on man, becomes the all-controlling task which sets the aim and points out the way for all activity.

In this context science does not reveal hidden depths of things, but aids man in winning power over appearances; it leads him to a more zealous and a more active life. Art does not lift him into an ideal world; but, within experience, softens the pressure of existence and fills life with pure joys. Morality does not subject our conduct to an invisible order, but directs man beyond himself to men around him; it develops the feeling of solidarity and raises the standard of the inner relationships of society. For religion as the revelation of an "other" world there is no room; this world shows in humanity an object worthy of reverence; so understood, religion also must work to the inner elevation of society.

In everything that which distinguishes the individual is thrust into the background to make way for that which is common; work has in the first place to concern itself with that which is common to all. In that here science makes man the chief study of man, it considers him especially as a social being and finds its chief theme in the knowledge of social conditions. Similarly, the chief subject of art is not, as was formerly the case, the doings and experience of individuals, but the forceful representation of these social conditions. The raising of the general level becomes the chief care of all practical activity, as also of education. According to this scheme the individual is of consequence and of worth only through those elements of the common life which he brings to expression, and through the way in which he reacts upon that life. The industry of universal history is understood, therefore, not from that which relates primarily to individuals, but from that relating to the movements and destinies of society.

Such an estimate of the whole involves a conviction which seldom finds expression, but which silently exerts its influence everywhere: the belief in a summation of reason by the organisation of individuals into a whole. Only a belief of this kind is able to establish the supremacy of the mass over against the individuals, also in spiritual things; only such a belief is able to justify the hope of a victory of the good in the sphere of humanity.

The net result of all these ideas and tendencies is a co-ordinated system of thought, a distinctive type of life. In this system man is first and foremost a member of society; he originates in it; he remains in it; and his activity carries implications far beyond his own life. Not community of labour only joins him with his fellows, but also the general tone of thought and feeling. This type of life is not one without sacrifice; for it has to give up many things which in earlier times seemed a secure possession and were a source of joy. Yet these things were only illusions which vanished, and mankind seems to find a compensation, more than equivalent for all that has been lost, in that it is more closely united and through this wins new powers; and henceforth out of its own capacity can venture to take up the struggle against every irrationality of existence, and to advance its own well-being without constraint. A life is therefore evolved, conscious of its limits, but at the same time active and courageous.

In this manner, then, transcending all subjective opinions and wishes, a distinctive social culture has arisen, and its growth and results are clearly evident to us. Through combination of forces and through diligent activity on behalf of one another, and this with the aid of a highly evolved technique, we have brought about a magnificent elevation of our being; necessity and disease have been successfully fought against; the standard of education and the amount and kind of joy in life have been raised in many ways; in life and suffering men have been drawn together inwardly and associated together with a greater degree of solidarity. If one accepts the creed of the socialistic

movement in the narrower sense: that human society can be placed on a new basis and at the same time raised essentially in its achievement, one can conceive that social culture may grow to the comprehensiveness of culture in general, and arouse the hope of a kingdom of reason among men.

But here also there is a limit set to things, not from without, but from within; not from a rationalising criticism, but through the actual facts of the life of humanity. This limit appears with especial clearness when we consider the relation of the individual, together with his work, to the society in which he stands. If social culture should be regarded as absolute culture, the individual must spend himself solely and entirely in relation to his environment; all his activity and endeavour must be exerted in achievement for this culture—must, indeed, represent itself as a mere part of a common work. In such a system man could never attain an independent position and a superior right in opposition to society. Let us examine whether the experience of history establishes the truth of this system or whether it does not much rather show the opposite to be more correct.

It was only in the earliest state of culture, and under very simple conditions of life, that the individual was solely and entirely bound up with the social organism, a mere member of family, of tribe, and such like; entirely swayed by custom, authority, and tradition. All further evolution was a differentiation and led to the greater independence of the individual. There came a time, however, when, in contrast with his mere membership of the society, the individual felt himself to have arrived at a state of maturity; when he questioned the right of the traditional order, and ultimately found himself coming into opposition with the whole of society; his own thought thus became the chief basis of his life and the measure of all things. At first that

may have appeared to be an impious break and a destructive negation; in reality, the positive results which have been thus effected could never have been produced out of a mere revolt. For, a deepening of life in all its branches went hand in hand with the individual's attainment of independence; now, for the first time, religion developed a personal religious experience, and art filled man's whole soul; now only did science set a distinctive world of thought in opposition to the traditional presentation; thus the whole of life gained enormously in independence, mobility, and depth. How could this point have been reached if an immediate relation to reality had not emerged in the soul of man; if an inner world had not been formed from this reality, as the representative of which the individual might feel superior to the society and, from inner necessities, criticise the prevailing condition of things? The fact is that all deepening of culture, all awakening of life to self-consciousness, is a rising above the life of society, a summoning of the individual to creative activity. Never have real advances in religion, science, and art, or great transformations of life, originated out of a combination of the activities of the majority. Only in isolated cases has an incomparable individuality, supreme in the entire range of creative activity, been reached, and spiritual tasks been treated as ends in themselves; without which there is nothing great. Only out of the necessity of spiritual self-preservation, only as an overcoming of intolerable contradictions within our own being, could creative activity find a sure direction and a lofty self-confidence in order to lead the whole of humanity along new paths. The individuals in whom this was accomplished were, to be sure, under many influences from historico-social life; but, in order to overlook the essential elevation above the entire domain of merely human interests into a realm of self-conscious truth, which was accomplished by these individuals, one must confuse the conditions with spiritual activity itself.

As this spiritual life has transcended mere social life from the beginning, in the same way its effects are by no

means exhausted in that life. It has, it is true, exerted its activity upon the social environment, and, after the initial opposition has been overcome, has often been superabundantly honoured; but even so, it has been accepted in isolated and external relations rather than in the whole of its being, and in its appropriation through society it is apt to lose what is best in it. Ever anew, even after centuries and centuries, it has attracted aspiring souls to itself, and has always been able to offer something new to them; in fact, in its essence it stands not in time but above it. The more such genuine creative activity and production in all its spheres become unified, the more a kingdom of truth spreads like an arch over the whole machinery of human history, and, measured by the standards of that truth, human standards are seen to be extremely low, like the size of the earth when contrasted with the region of the fixed stars. This realm of eternal truth, however, reveals itself immediately only to the soul of the individual, who must convey it to society.

Such an estimate of spiritual depth in the individual is quite compatible with the fact that in the course of history the individual has often fallen into utter uncertainty; has felt destitute and lonely, and has passionately sought a support in society. For the individual may cut himself adrift from the invisible connections in which his greatness is rooted; he may base himself on his own isolated power and groping intellect. When he has indeed done this, he has soon perceived and experienced his insufficiency; after such experience he has longed for the building up of a new society by spiritual activity, and when this has been attained he has fled to it as to a sure haven. Men strove for such a society in the later period of Antiquity; one such was founded by Early Christianity, by which the centre of life was transferred from the individual to the society. But in this transition the individual did not again become simply a member of society. For the new union that was sought could not come to men from without, but could proceed only as a result of spiritual endeavour; for its origin and

in the early stages of its life it required great creative personalities of the kind of Augustine; for its preservation it needed appropriation by individuals, who unless they made an independent decision could not come to a complete knowledge of the truth. Wherever such individual activity languished, the inwardness of life at once became weak, the whole threatened to lose its spiritual nature and to be transformed into mere mechanism. But after, in the course of history, the individual has developed so far as experience shows him to have done; after that, as microcosm, he has found an immediate relation to reality and to himself, his transcendence may for a time be obscured, but he can never be deprived of it. As the individual has grown strong only as the representative and champion of a culture that is spiritual, as opposed to one that is merely human, so at the same time that spiritual culture asserts itself and criticises all which limits man to his own sphere. After having attained a greater comprehensiveness, a pure self-existence, and other standards toilsomely enough, a merely social culture must be absolutely intolerable to us.

This assertion is valid especially in regard to the social culture of the present. This culture, as we saw, makes significant and justifiable demands which have arisen from historical conditions; but its right gives place to error, if it makes these demands the central point of life as a whole, and subordinates everything else to them. The unsatisfactoriness of this system of culture and the impossibility of achieving its aims would be still more manifest if it did not constantly supplement its own results out of the other organisations of life, and did not boldly and unjustifiably idealise the man of experience.

This social culture may be shortly described in some of its tendencies: (1) Work for society was the compelling motive in the shaping of this life of social utility. Some such social principle may suffice for the distribution of goods; it never suffices for their original production. We saw how spiritual experience could arise only from the compulsion of an inner self-preservation, in which man

did not think in the least of the effects on others, but of himself and the object. Only that effort which has sprung up without regard to its mere utility has been able to achieve great things. If, therefore, merely social culture rigidly binds up vital energy with the direction of all thoughts on the effect, in the long run it must seriously degrade life. Can we deny that in the chief departments of the spiritual life the present already clearly shows tendencies to such a degradation? And can this be otherwise when we only more widely diffuse the inherited possession, but are unable to increase it through our own activity?

(2) Social culture makes the judgment of the society the test of all truth and requires from the individual a complete subordination. It can only do this, as we saw, under the assumption that reason is summed in a judgment by the people as a whole; but, in face of the experiences of history and the impressions of the present time, can this assumption be ratified? Upon its emergence, truth has nearly always been championed by a minority so small as to be hardly discernible; and what in its case is called victory is usually nothing else than the transforming of the struggle from an external into an internal one. He who continued firm in his faith in the victory of truth did so because he trusted, not so much in the wisdom of the majority as in a reason transcending all that is empirically human, and which begets a truth with power to constrain. The present gives us the opportunity of testing this assertion by an example. We see movements of the masses in plenty, but where do we see great spiritual creations arise from the resulting chaos? Even Socialism in the narrower sense has to thank but a few men for its vital power and character, as, for example, Marx; the masses are indeed a condition and an environment, but never as such the bearers of creative activity.

(3) Where man, as he is, governs all thought, his well-being, his complacency, an existence as free from care as possible, and as rich as possible in pleasure, will become the highest of all aims. But would not one find an inner emptiness, a monotony, even more intolerable than all

suffering if this aim were reached and were to remove all pain and necessity from life? Intelligible as it is that, to the classes whose life is spent in hard struggle against necessity and care, the deliverance from these appears the highest good and an assurance of complete happiness, it is just as unintelligible that anyone who is conscious of the work of universal history and the inner movement of humanity can share such a belief. For that movement has given rise to difficult problems and severe conflicts within the soul of man; a wrestling for a truth and a content of life, where we now drift hither and thither on the surface of appearance; a longing for infinity and eternity, where now a finitude and a past fascinate and charm us; a clashing together of freedom and destiny, of nature and spirit. The tendencies and tasks which this movement produces may for a time be thrust into the background, but they continually reappear and claim their right. It is a foolish undertaking to try to make man happy by directing him to give up what is distinctive in him, and to give his striving a less worthy character.

(4) From a radical improvement of the conditions of life, the socialistic way of thinking expects a continuous advance of culture and an increasing ennoblement of man. To some extent this expectation would be justified if a strong spiritual impulse and a sure tendency towards the good were found everywhere; if it were only a matter of opening the door to an inner striving that was everywhere operative; only a matter of removing restrictions. The actual picture of human conditions corresponds but little to such an optimism. How small a place spiritual impulse has in human conduct and effort! How wearisome to the indifferent and reluctant average man any thought of spiritual goods becomes, and what severe restrictions moral development meets with in selfishness, avarice, and jealousy! The impressions which reality gives speak too plainly in regard to this for even the believers in socialistic culture to be able to hide the facts from themselves; but it is noteworthy enough that not that which they see with their eyes and grasp with their

hands determines their judgment, but that which, unconsciously, they add to it : an invisible humanity, a greatness and a dignity of human nature, a nobility in the depths of the soul ; conceptions for which, in this context, there is not the least justification.

All these considerations show clearly enough the limits of merely socialistic culture, and the sharp contradictions of its adherents. This culture only throws man back increasingly upon the merely human, and unmercifully holds him firmly fixed in it. It chains him to his own appearance and suppresses all tendencies towards depth. It knows nothing of life's consciousness of itself ; it knows no inner problems, no infinite development of the soul ; it cannot acknowledge a common life of an inner kind, but must derive all from external relations. At the same time it excludes all understanding of the movement of universal history ; for the chief content of this movement constitutes just those problems which socialism regards as foolish illusions. To be sure, the striving after an inner independence of life has brought much error with it, and it may involve much that is problematical. But that a longing after such independence should arise at all and prove itself able to call forth so much endeavour sufficiently demonstrates that man is more than a mere being of society ; more than a member of a social organism.

Ultimately, socialistic culture presupposes, in its own development, a greater depth of life than it is itself able to produce. It can make so much out of its data only because it assumes in them a more comprehensive and a deeper world of thought. Like Naturalism, Socialism reaches a tolerable conclusion only by much plagiarism from the old Idealism, before the principal conceptions of which it crosses itself as before something atrocious.

This inner inconsistency of socialistic culture, its remaining bound up with something which inwardly it contradicts, is most plainly shown by the historical experience of the Modern Age. Men were at first led to take up the movements towards the strengthening of society chiefly by the

expectation that the invisible forces in human existence would be invigorated, and by the hope that the inner life of men would be raised. The more they have cut themselves adrift from these invisible connections and have placed themselves simply on the basis of experience the more have they lost in spiritual content.

The movement towards the modern free State arose in association with religious strivings; the desire for political independence attached itself to and inwardly grew from the longing for more complete equality before God. The more this relation to religion and, further, to an invisible realm receded into the background, the more difficult did it become to guard the striving for freedom from being diverted in the interests of individuals, classes, and parties; the more did the movement inwardly lose by external expansion. We saw that the idea of nationality acquired power from the conviction that there results in an independent people an individualisation of the spiritual and divine which is the first thing to ensure to existence a definite character and a firm support. So long as this conviction predominated, each people had a great inner task in reaching the highest point of development of its nature, and, which is more important, did not need to direct its energies upon externals. With the obscuring or the complete surrender of this spiritual foundation, a blind adoration of one's own country, an increase of unfruitful pride of race, a passionate struggle for external expansion and power, inevitably accompanied by the surrender of humanity and justice, threatens us.

When in the nineteenth century the modern idea of the State again came into currency, the State came to be regarded—as, for example, in the system of Hegel—as the realisation of an absolute reason, and desired to be honoured as something "earthly divine." Its leading administrators, however, men of the kind of Altenstein, were imbued with the philosophic spirit; were men who could be regarded as philosophers in Plato's sense. To-day we still hear of such spiritual bases of the State, in syllabuses

of courses of study ; but we count so little on a philosophical training that when anyone gives any sign of such a training he is regarded with astonishment as a rare exception. Even the socialistic movement in the narrower sense, the longing for an economic revolution, at first stood in close connection with philosophical endeavours, and the hope of an inner ennobling of humanity, the hope of raising the whole of culture, worked in it as a powerful motive force. More and more, out of this a mere desire for power and enjoyment has developed, a passionate struggle of class against class, of interest against interest, and how this might lead to an inner raising of humanity is not apparent. The more socialistic culture, in its pressing forward, has cut itself loose from a richer and more inward culture and has trusted solely to its own resources, the more distinct have its limitations become, the more has its incapacity to include the whole of human existence been made evident.

To assert this does not mean to depreciate the significance of the facts which the social tendency has made us conscious of and the tasks which it has imposed upon us. Not only do the advance into prominence of the economic side of life, and the desire for a more energetic realisation of a social organisation in this direction, remain unimpeached, but there are demands of an imperative kind which extend beyond the scope of this narrow conception. The increasing isolation and separation of individuals make us feel the desire for reunion more and more strongly. Man, with that which is near him and in him, acquires an ever greater significance for the shaping of our life and our world ; from no other point of departure than from him can we attempt to reach the depths of reality and from these to build up a realm of reason.

Socialistic culture, however, treats these problems, to which it gives rise, far too externally and too meanly to hold out any hope that its method should lead to their solution ; and so, as we see it immediately before us, it brings truth and error into a melancholy mixture. Only

a broader conception of life could bring about a differentiation and give to each factor its right. In this case also the promised solution of the problem is itself seen to be a problem.

3. The System of Æsthetic Individualism

The naturalistic and socialistic tendencies unite in the modern life of culture for action in common. How near they stand to each other, notwithstanding all their differences, our accounts of them will have shown. Not only do both make the world of sense the sole world of man, but both also find life entirely in the relation to the environment, be it nature or society. Again, both maintain that all happiness arises from work upon this environment, whether the work be in the main scientific and technical, or practical and political. Thus the culture of both systems bears throughout the character of a culture of work; in one as in the other great complexes of work arise, and draw the individual to themselves; all trouble and effort are for the sake of the result; in both a restless progressive movement surrounds us and directs all reflection and thought to a better future. With such a tendency we have grown closer to the environment and we have ascribed more value to the world and to life. With an ever-increasing activity, a proud self-consciousness has developed in humanity.

But the limitations and defects of such a culture, centred as it is upon results, could not remain concealed. The age, alert and fond of reflecting upon its own nature, was compelled more and more to perceive the negation which accompanied the assertion made in that system. The striving for results alone made care for the soul impossible; the being fitted into a complex mass impaired the development to complete individuality. The more that industrial and social activities have become specialised, the less significant has that part of human existence become which is embodied in the individual as such, the more have all

aspects of his nature other than those involved in his work degenerated. The continual thought of the future, the impetuous movement ever further and further, also threatens to destroy all appreciation of the present, all self-consciousness and independence of life. If we exist merely in order to serve as means and instruments to a soulless process of culture, does not the whole enormous movement finally amount to nothing, if it is not experienced and appropriated?

Once such questions arise and make man concerned about the meaning and the happiness of his life, a sudden change must soon take place. Man may at all times fall into error concerning the aims of the culture of work; indeed, concerning work itself. It may appear to him as something which, originally his own creation, has broken loose from him, placed itself in opposition to him, enslaved him, and finally, like a gigantic spider, threatens to suck his life's blood. From this point of view it may be regarded as the most important of all tasks again to become master of work, and to preserve a life inwardly conscious of itself, in contrast with the tendency of work to occupy itself solely with externals; to realise a true present in contrast with the restless hurry further and further; a quietness and a depth of the soul in contrast with work's noise and agitation. To those with such a conviction the culture of work must seem sordid, secular, profane, and in contrast a longing for more inspiration, more soul, more permanent splendour of life will arise.

Many movements of this kind make themselves apparent in the present; the longing for a return of life to itself, for more joy and more depth in life, grows ever stronger and stronger. Of all these movements, however, one stands out with definite achievement—one which, upon the basis of the present and with the means of sense experience, seeks a remedy which, while in these two aspects it shares the general initial assumption of the culture of work, within the limits of this assumption is entirely opposed to this culture of work. We mean the system of Subjectivism

and Individualism. In that this system is blended with a kind of art of its own, and gains strength from this, it boldly undertakes to govern and shape our whole existence.

He who wishes to rise above the culture of work without transcending the region of experience will scarcely discover any other basis than the individual with his self-consciousness, his " being for self." For, however far work with its influences may penetrate into the innermost recesses of the soul, there always remains something which is able to resist it. Something original seems to spring up here, which fits into no scheme and bows down to no external power.

If, therefore, a newly aroused longing for greater immediacy and happiness in life drives man once more to the subjective and to the individual, he can emphasise this factor conceptually in order to depreciate the other systems of life. For, whether the individual belonged to an invisible world of thought or to a visible structure, his task and his worth would be assigned to him by the whole ; his activity would have a definite direction determined by the whole, his power would be called into play only so far as it fitted into the framework of the whole organisation. If all such relation to the whole is discarded, and the individual acquires the boldness to place himself simply upon his own capacity, and to acknowledge no other standard than his own decision, an infinite course seems to open up before him. What lies in him is now able to develop with complete freedom, and he need take neither a visible nor an invisible order into anxious consideration. The individual, raised to such sovereignty, will make far more out of himself, and will mean far more than the narrow and often overawed individual of earlier ages. True, even in those times opposition from the individual was not lacking, but the circumstances of the Modern Age are especially conducive to his development and recognition. We know how the modern man extricated himself from the ties which bound him, and how he boldly placed himself in opposition to the world. We know how much more freely thought rules in modern life ; how much more deeply an over-subtle

reflection penetrates everywhere and takes all stability from things. We know, too, how the external form of civilisation, with its acceleration of intercourse, and its development in a thousand directions, sets the individual more free. Is it to be wondered at if the modern individual regards himself as the centre and undertakes to shape the whole of life from himself?

The individual can attain complete independence only when he liberates his soul from all external connections, from every objective relation, and, as a free subject, simply lives his own states of consciousness. This is achieved above all in the disposition—transcending all form and shape and bound to no particular object—which has obtained an independent position chiefly as a result of the Romantic movement. In this a complete detachment of life, an inward infinity, and a complete independence seem attained; every individual has his own course and his own truth; no limit is set to life, no command given, but he can with the utmost freedom develop every impulse and exhaust its possibilities according to its nature. Thus a life arises, profuse and extremely active: a life fine and delicate in nature; a life which in no way directs itself beyond itself.

But all agitation, profuseness, and refinement could hardly have prevented this emotional life from becoming hollow, if, when it turned to the individual, it had not united to itself another movement, which is flowing with a powerful current through the age. We mean the movement towards art, and beyond that towards an æsthetic conception of life. From ancient times endeavour has always shown an antithesis of an ethical and an æsthetical fashioning of life: of a preponderance on the one hand of the active, on the other hand of the contemplative relation to reality. Emphasis on the activity of man has led to the formation in modern systems of life of a culture of work and utility. An æsthetical, contemplative mode of thought can with good reason feel itself superior to such a view. In contrast to utility, it promises beauty; over against the heaviness

and weariness of the way of life of a culture of work, it promises a joy and a lightness; in opposition to effort, hurriedly and continually striving further and further, it promises an independent self-consciousness, and an inward calm. But, as this movement towards art blends with that towards the subject, it lapses into a narrow course and assumes a distinctive character. Here, art has less to comprehend the object than to stimulate and please the subject; it will strive less after content and a further construction than with lyrical cadences, to give expression to changing moods. It has a difficult task given to it which can only approximately be solved—the task of expressing something fundamentally inexpressible and resisting all attempts to give it form. But in that art undertakes such an impossibility, and exerts its power to the uttermost, it brings about a refinement of the soul as well as an enrichment of expression. It enables much to be grasped and comprehended which without it passes like a fleeting shadow. It permits the observation of the most delicate vibrations of the soul, and throws light into depths which would otherwise be inaccessible.

A distinctive type of life is thus formed from the side of literature and art, and this feels securely supreme over all the embarrassments of the culture of work and of the masses. The centre of life is transferred into the inner tissue of self-consciousness. With the development of this self-consciousness, life appears to be placed entirely on its own resources and directed simply towards itself. Through all change of circumstances and conditions it remains undisturbed; in all the infinity of that which happens to it, it feels that it is supreme. All external manifestation is valuable to it as an unfolding of its own being; it never experiences things, but only itself—that is, its own passive states of consciousness—in the things.

A life of such a kind gives rise, in different directions, to distinctive tendencies, which, through their antithesis to the traditional forms, are sharply accentuated. This system thinks especially to turn the whole of human existence

into something positive, to limit it on none of its sides, to raise it everywhere to activity, joy, and pleasure. In the older systems of life, especially in the religious, it finds far too much feeble renunciation, far too much sad negation; such a depreciation of life is henceforth to give way to a complete and joyful affirmation. Such an affirmation appears to be possible because in this system, through that reference to and excitement of subjectivity, all that in any way affects man is transformed in activity and advance; because before all else the subject feels its own life in every experience and takes pleasure in this. It must be added that the self-refinement of life, its mobility and delicacy, free it from all the heaviness of existence, and that the free play of forces which exist here transforms the whole of existence into something lightly poised. We find this to be especially the case when we turn to art, which joins beauty to power, or, rather, strengthens life in itself through its embodiment in the beautiful.

This free, joyous, and as it would seem purely self-conscious life is throughout of an aristocratic and individual character. In that it adapts itself to the old experience, that to only a few is given the power and the disposition for independent creation and independent life, it addresses itself to these few and summons them to the greatest possible development of the individuality of their nature, to the most decisive detachment from the characterless average of the masses. For, without a completely developed consciousness of individuality, without an energetic differentiation and isolation, life does not seem to attain its greatest height. Thus the matter is one of making all the relations and all the externals of life as individual as possible. Everything which places the development of life under universal standards, and, through these, limits that development, is rejected as an unwarrantable limitation and an intolerable restriction. This individualising of our existence extends also to the matter of our relation to time. One moment may not be sacrificed to another; the present may not be degraded to the status of being a mere

preparation for the future, but every moment should be an end in itself, and, with this, life is considered as being solely in the present. Thus life is a ceaseless change, a perpetual self-renewal, a continuous transition; but it is just this which preserves to life its youthful freshness and gives to it the capacity to attract through every new charm. Hence this system presents the most definite contrast to the interminable chain and the gigantic construction which the culture of work makes out of the activities of the individuals.

Æsthetic Individualism appears most distinctive in the way it represents the relation between the spiritual and the sensuous. It cannot take its attention from the external world, in order to centre it upon human perception, without strengthening the psychical. But, as its own system is based upon sense experience, it is impossible for it to acknowledge an independent spirituality and to contrast it with the sensuous; the spirituality which it recognises always remains bound and blended with the sensuous. For it an entirely mutual interpenetration is the highest ideal, a spiritualising of the sensuous, and a sensualising of the spiritual to an exactly equivalent degree. This high estimate of the sensuous, and the endeavour to harmonise the spiritual with it, put this new system of life in the sharpest opposition to the older systems, especially to religious Idealism, in which the supremacy of the spiritual is essential.

From such a basal character this system evolves a distinctive relation to the individual values and spheres of life. Artistic literary creation becomes the soul of life; the source of the influences for the fashioning of a new man. The social, political, sphere is reduced to the level of a mere outside world, which urges less to activity on our own part than provokes a sceptical and critical attitude. The lack of attention to all that which fits man into a common order, be it into the State with its laws, or the civic community with its customs and arrangements, permits the free relation of individual to individual in

social contact, friendship and love, to develop so much more forcefully. In particular, it is the inter-relationship of the sexes, with its many-sidedness and its inseparable interweaving of spirituality with sensuousness, which occupies thought and dominates literary production. Strike out the erotic element from specifically modern literature, and how insignificant the remainder would appear! It is also in the relation of the sexes that this scheme of life insists on the fullest freedom. There is a strong tendency to regard an acknowledgment of fixed standards and of traditional morals in this connection as a sign of weakness and of a narrow-minded way of thinking.

Since this scheme seeks to realise an æsthetic conception of life and an artistic culture in opposition to all the restraint of tradition and environment, it will come into particularly severe conflict with traditional religion and morality. It must reject religion, or at least what hitherto has been called religion, because, with its blending together of the spiritual and the sensuous in a single world, it can by no means acknowledge a world of independent spirituality; its thought is much too "monistic" for that. It must reject religion also for the reason that, with its immediate affirmation of life, it cannot in the least understand the starting-point of religion, the experience and perception of harsh inner contradictions in our existence. Religion, with all the heroism that it truly shows, is here regarded as a mere lowering of vital energy; a mere chimera which pleases the weak.

In relation to morality the matter is not much different. A foundation of morality in the necessity of its own nature is lacking in this system. What motive could move a man who whole-heartedly accepted Æsthetic Individualism to acknowledge something external to the subject as a standard, and in accordance with this standard to put a check upon his natural impulses? Indeed, with the denial of spiritual activity and the division of the world into for and against, the entire antithesis of good and evil loses its meaning and its justification. Reality appears from the point of view

of this system to be rent in twain in an unwarrantable manner at the command of a human authority. What is usually called morality is considered to be a mere statute of the community, a means by which it seeks to rob the individual of his independence and to subordinate him to itself.

All this reasoning presents itself as an offspring of our own time, and wishes to establish the correctness of its claims on its own ground through its results. Yet it by no means lacks historical relations: often in the course of the centuries the subject has shaken off every constraint and sought a solution to life's problems in its own realm. This happened, first among the Sophists; then in a form less marked and with more direct attention to happiness in Epicureanism; later, in proud exaltation and in a titanic struggle with the world, in the Renaissance; and again in a more delicate and more contemplative manner in the Romantic period. Tendencies from all these operate in the Æsthetic Individualism of the present time and enrich it in many ways, though their contributions are not always free from contradiction. But, even with these historical elements, Æsthetic Individualism is essentially a modern product; and it cannot be denied that it has won a great power in the present; a movement of culture in this direction is unmistakable. It is the very nature of this scheme of life not to hasten to a definite form, and for this reason it does not manifest itself with very definite features; but, with invisible power, it permeates all relations and creates a spiritual atmosphere from which it is difficult to withdraw ourselves. Notwithstanding all the attacks it is subjected to and the doubts as to its validity, it draws power continually from both the main tendencies which it unites; from the evolution of the subject and from the growth of art. Thus, here again we are concerned not with mere subjective willing and wishing, but with an actual movement in universal history.

Whether this movement be the primary and the all-dominant remains to be examined by consideration of the total possessions of humanity. Such an examination is in this case peculiarly difficult, because in this Individualism and Subjectivism diverse forms mingle together and give to the movement very different levels. There is, therefore, an obvious danger that, viewing these forms from the position of an average level, at which we may attempt to arrive, we may judge one too severely and another too leniently. And yet we cannot dispense with the assumption of such an average level; only, it must not be applied mechanically to the individual forms which are so numerous.

In forming our judgment in this matter, it is necessary in the first place to distinguish the aims and the methods of this scheme of life. There can hardly be any doubt or dispute concerning the aims. For, if we are called to give to life an independence, a content and a value; to raise it to complete power; to press forward from anxious negation to joyful affirmation; to reduce the monotony of existence; to organise the whole realm of individuality so that it shall be fully clear; and if, at the same time, the fact of the degeneration of the inner life through a culture of work lends to such demands the impressiveness and the voice of a present need, it is difficult to see how this system is to be effectively opposed. Æsthetic Individualism here appears as the champion of truths which may be obscured for a time, but which, nevertheless, continually gain in significance in human evolution as a whole. A further question is whether its aims, which cannot be rejected, are attainable along the ways which Individualism follows and beyond which it is not able to go; whether the means suffice for the attainment of the end. If this should not be the case, we are in presence of a great difficulty, in that something, in itself of the highest necessity, is desired, but is desired in a way which not only is inadequate to the aim, but directly contradicts it.

And yet that is how the matter really stands. It is essential to Individualism—with this it stands or falls—that it

lead to an independent life, to a self-consciousness ; that it transform our whole condition into something of positive value on the basis of sense experience. That the actual condition of human reality, the nature of human experience, inexorably resists such a transformation, and that on this account the individualistic scheme of life is contradictory, we intend to indicate more in detail.

Man desires a self-conscious life, a deliverance from all external ties, a removal of all oppressions. This desire is a lofty one, but one which, as things are, is very difficult of attainment. For not only in what happens to us, but also in the innermost depths of the soul—in our spiritual constitution—we are bound up with an overwhelming and impenetrable world. The mechanism of nature as well as the organisation of society surrounds us with visible and invisible coercion. At first sight we are no more than parts of an immense whole, and appear to be completely determined by that which happens in this whole ; we come from it and sink back into it, and every moment we are dependent upon that which takes place around us. What is Individualism able to do against such forces, and what does it succeed in achieving towards life's attainment of independence ? The means it employs are the arousing of an unrestrained mood, and the withdrawal of life to the greatest possible concentration in its own passive states of consciousness. Because by these means man is in some measure relieved from the oppression of things, he imagines himself to be fully free. But is he free simply because he appears to himself to be so, free, to take the example of Spinoza, in the way in which the stone thrown up into the air might during its motion suppose itself to be free ? As a matter of fact, as everyday experience shows us, it is just in his moods that man is least stable and least lord of his own soul, and that the most diverse circumstances, physical and psychical, visible and invisible, great and small, influence and compel him. The transitoriness of appearances, which form the matter of fact as far as moods are concerned, is lacking in all firm relation, all inner construction of life ;

for nothing is more mobile, nothing more subject to sudden changes, than mood—nothing except the surface of the rolling sea, or a reed shaking in the wind. The life of mood is, in reality, a merely superficial life; a projection of the psychical nature on to the surface of the immediate passive states of consciousness. Life in this case attains no depth, content, or independence, but only subjective opinion, the mere semblance of independence. We shall see that Individualism so persistently offers the semblance instead of the real thing that it has come to believe that with the production of the semblance it has acquired the reality. Life can only attain a real independence when it has been widened to a realm in itself, when inner relations, antitheses, problems thus become evident; and when, through the exercise of activity upon these, an inner world is raised up, which confidently places itself in opposition to the endlessness of the soulless world and is able to take up the struggle with it. We must show unrelenting hostility to any attempt to identify mood with an inner spirituality, with the soul's self-consciousness; for, really, there is no greater contrast than that between mere disposition and spiritual depth, between the man of mere sentiment, with his dependence and vacillation, and the personality rooted in an inner infinity.

Thus, the independence and the predominance of the individual over the social environment, which Individualism asserts, are nothing more than an appearance. For what is offered in this system is far less a self-conscious life and an undisturbed pursuance of our own course than the inclination to say and do the opposite of that which is said and done by the majority of those who surround us. It is easy to see that life, as a matter of fact, always remains related to its environment and to the standard of that environment; and that what is represented here as independence is nothing but a different kind of dependence, an indirect dependence. To the endeavour of Individualism to provide a free course for the individual, with his particularity, it is scarcely possible to offer any opposition. Unfortunately, however,

intention and realisation are different things, and Individualism is apt to assume as something simple and self-evident that which of all things is the most difficult, that is, individuality itself. Just as Socialism promises a sure advance of life as a result of the removal of external hindrances, so Individualism expects a magnificent advance of an inexhaustible individualistic culture, if only the statutes by which the community oppresses and limits the individual are nullified. What, then, is the real state of the matter? Are men so full of spiritual impulse that it is only necessary to open up a course for it? And further, does that which is peculiar in a man signify, as a matter of course, that he is an individuality with some sort of value?—and is it at once capable of forming a centre of life? How indefinite and how lacking in consistency the psychical nature of man usually is! How much that is lofty and how much that is mean, how much that is noble and how much that is vulgar, is found here! Shall this chaos display itself and be extolled as an individuality? In truth, an inner unity appertains to a genuine individuality, and the ascertaining and realisation of this are not simply a gift from nature, but a result of spiritual endeavour. To attain to a genuine individuality requires an energetic concentration of life; an overcoming of the spirit of indifference; a unifying of the multiplicity of experience; often, also, a transcending of sharp contradictions. How difficult it has been for even the most prominent individualities—men such as Luther, Kant, Goethe—to find their true selves, that is, the essence of their being, the aspect in which their strength lay! How great a problem, and what an object of the keenest conflict, their genuine individuality formed to them! How could a task of such difficulty find fulfilment, and life a unification and elevation, in superficial and fleeting mood? If in order to make men independent individuals it sufficed to declare them so, we should indeed be much further advanced than unfortunately is the case.

The new life ought not to be merely autonomous, independent and individual, it should also be powerful and

great. Is the mere evolution and cultivation of sentiment able to give such power and greatness to an unrestrained passivity? Of course, in its own estimation unrestrained mood can raise itself high above the whole world, and so magnify the supposed independence as to give rise to a feeling of supreme power; but again, it is only a representation of power, a semblance of power, and not a real power, that is reached. Mere mood and genuine power constitute an irreconcilable antithesis. Attention to and cultivation of sentiment may refine life; it will at the same time weaken and dissipate it. Power develops and grows only in grappling with resistances, whether they be outside or within one's own soul. Life will acquire a powerful character only where an active spirituality is acknowledged, which, drawing from its own nature, holds up standards and aims to the actual condition of reality, especially to its own soul, and undertakes to change this condition in accordance with the requirements set by these standards and aims. Æsthetic Individualism, however, as we saw, conceives of the spiritual life as chiefly receptive and contemplative; as an appropriation, a mirroring and an enjoyment of an existent reality. Thus for it the spiritual life might be closely connected with this existent reality, indeed might be one with it; but at the same time the view robs that life of the power of arousing and elevating, of independent construction and secure advance.

An aristocratic character, the separation of an exoteric and an esoteric sphere, has been distinctive of an æsthetic conception of life from ancient times even until now. The fact appealed to in justification of its assumption of this character is beyond doubt: it is that, not only in art but in all spiritual creation, only few among those creating or reproducing stand high; that genuine creation always comes about in opposition to the mediocre; that if it identified itself with the interests and conditions of the majority it would be deeply degraded, indeed inwardly destroyed. But this is a contrast between spiritual creation and human circumstances, not a division of humanity according to two sets

of circumstances ; in truth, fewer of the really great than of those great in their own estimation have boasted of greatness. For the genuinely great have been occupied far too much by the demands of their task, and been too deeply conscious of the inadequacy of human capacity, to have been able to indulge in a reflection upon and a vain enjoyment of themselves. The infinity of the task by which, rather than by other men, they measured themselves made even the highest result appear inadequate to them. It is necessary to Individualism to represent the unmistakable distinction between a culture that is genuinely spiritual and one that is merely human, as a difference between two classes of men ; and it is only because it knows no objective restraint, no inner necessities, and can measure men only with men, that it is able to believe itself justified in looking down upon other men from its standpoint—as though the mere profession of faith in its programme at once effected an elevation of nature.

The undertaking to transform life completely into something of positive value, suddenly and directly to advance to complete affirmation of life, is associated with the desire for power. So far as this is merely a desire to abandon an irresolute and narrow mode of thought, false humiliation and self-belittlement, and mere accommodation to circumstances in tasks where the beginning is difficult and calls for great effort, we may frankly admit its justification. But the matter is not so simple as it is represented in this train of thought. Ultimately no spiritual movement which would win mankind can give up its claim to a final affirmation of life. Even the most completely pessimistic systems, systems of absolute negation—as, for example, the original Buddhism—could not conquer wider areas without making that negative milder and transforming it into an affirmative. But the question is whether, after all that humanity has experienced and suffered, a quick and immediate affirmation is possible ; whether the way to a final affirmation does not lead rather through an energetic negation. So long as the restriction which life felt seemed to come from outside only,

and not to reach the inner recesses of the soul, as the prevailing mode of thought in Antiquity represented the case to be, the decisive rejection of all suffering, the proud armouring of the soul against all pain, could be accepted as the crown of all virtues. In face, however, of actual experience, Antiquity could not continue to hold such a conviction. For good or for evil, it was compelled to regard suffering as something more important and to occupy itself more with it, and, until Christianity opened up new paths, it fell into the danger of losing all vital energy. Whatever position one may take up with regard to the dogma and the tendencies of Christianity, the fact cannot be struck out of history that it has laid bare infinite perplexities in the soul of man in regard to his relation to the world, and at the same time has taken up suffering into the centre of life, not to perpetuate it, but to rise above it by the revealing of a world of spirit and of love. This has not made life easier, but more difficult; yet at the same time it has made it greater, deeper, and more inwardly determined. Every scheme of life which light-heartedly professes to be able to lead us quickly over suffering and to cast it off proves itself to be intolerably superficial, if not frivolous. Superficiality easily triumphs over men and becomes their first opinion; men seem to welcome first every way of thinking which makes life comfortable and presents no demands of any sort. But the problems of our existence, and the longing for genuine and not merely illusory happiness, remain, and in face of the seriousness of these problems it soon proves to be fleeting and vain to try to find satisfaction in that which is merely comfortable.

The case is no different in regard to Individualism and the problem of morality. The value of an energetic opposition to laws of convention and external etiquette is beyond question; but it should not be forgotten that such a conflict has been carried on within the sphere of morality and religion from ancient times; that in every age that which was spiritually highest has forcibly withstood the efforts of men illegitimately to claim absolute validity for their

statutes and tendencies. But Individualism commits the error of asserting that the mean morality which is reached at the average level of humanity constitutes the essence of morality, and in so doing excludes from itself the feeling for everything great and deep which lies within morality. With all its talk of greatness and breadth, Individualism makes life narrow, since it leads man solely to the cultivation and unfolding of his own passive states of consciousness, and permits the pleasure-seeking *ego* to draw everything to itself and hold it fast there. Everything, however, which exists beyond his sphere it interprets as a mere "other" world, and thus declares all submission to the object for its own sake, all forgetfulness of self, all becoming more comprehensive, and all renewal through genuine love, to be mere illusion. Further, in this system, in which mere natural impulse governs everything, the conceptions of responsibility and guilt, and with this the antithesis of good and evil, must be held to be the result of a narrowly human way of thinking, as something which, though serving no real purpose, still alarms men and overawes life. Yet through the development of a spiritual activity which places it in a more inward and free relation to reality, humanity has really advanced beyond the position in which man acted as a part of mere nature. In this, too, Christianity also marks a great advance; we have only to picture to ourselves the life-work of Augustine in order to have a clear example of the separation of a genuine morality, as the expression of a new world based upon freedom, from mere attention to and cultivation of natural instincts. The greatest thinker of the Modern Age, Kant, has only established this distinction in a newer form. In regard to this, responsibility and guilt, as transcending nature, also become a witness of greatness; they give expression to the fact that man is an independent co-operator in the universe, and regards the world as in some sense his own; to the fact that life does not happen merely to him, but also through him. For, along with freedom and its world, the old world of given existence remains and holds us fast, not merely

externally but inwardly also; life is a severe conflict between higher and lower, between freedom and destiny. With so much that is complicated and perplex, life must be regarded as in the highest degree unfinished. But just because of this it involves an incalculable tension, and even in its constraints and pains it leaves the self-preservation and the welfare of the mere subject at a level far beneath itself. When, therefore, Individualism, neglecting the movement of universal history, wishes to limit us to this mere subject, and, effacing all dividing lines, calls upon us to submit to every force which plays upon us, and to enter into the glad enjoyment of life, there is really no difference between this and advising a man, who has gone through the many and difficult experiences of life, to throw to the winds all he has thus gained, and to please himself again with the games of childhood.

The position is similar with regard to the relation of the spiritual and the sensuous, as Individualism represents it. It is rightly opposed to both a monkish asceticism and a conventional, feigned, low estimate of the sensuous; it is indeed with good reason that Æsthetic Individualism defends the right of the sensuous. But to give the sensuous its right does not mean to permit it to be joined together in an undifferentiated unity with the spiritual, as though it were of equal value. Naive ages were able to strive for a perfect balance of spiritual and sensuous; but, with the increasing depth of the life of the soul, a division has resulted which no toil and no art can simply remove again. Now, therefore, either the spiritual will be dominant over the sensuous or the sensuous over the spiritual. In Individualism, with its amalgamation of the spiritual and the sensuous, by which all claim to spiritual activity, and therefore to all independence of spiritual life, is given up, the sensuous will inevitably dominate over the spiritual. The result is simply a degeneration of the spiritual, a refined sensuousness; and it is defenceless against an intrusion of vulgar pleasure. Will any one seriously assert that we find ourselves to-day in a naive position in relation to sense?

In this respect, as in all others, the strength of Individualism lies chiefly in criticism; its refined perception makes it especially capable of apprehending clearly the errors of the traditional conceptions of life. Its influence, however, suffers from the contradiction which it involves, in that it purposes to solve the problems, to which only an independent and self-determining spiritual life is equal, with the means of sense experience. Such a spiritual life is to be attained only by transcending this sense experience. Owing to the fact that Individualism places its sole attention upon the surface of sense experience, its aims, in themselves of the highest necessity, must be distorted and grossly misrepresented. Independence, greatness, and certainty—ever hovering before life—cannot be attained by Individualism in reality, but only in picture and semblance. And it can lend to this appearance a moderate power of conviction only because, just in the same way as the other modern organisations of life, it enriches itself imperceptibly from the same traditional modes of thought and of culture, in opposition to which it stands, and of which the impelling motives are to it a sealed book.

Thus, in truth, it does not offer mere and pure subjectivity, but subjectivity on the basis of a rich life of culture, which it is itself unable to produce, but without which it would lapse at once into complete emptiness. The æsthetic-individualistic scheme of life proves to be a mere appearance, accompanying a ripe, indeed an over-ripe, culture. An independent culture, with its labour and its sacrifice, it is unable to produce.

To reject Æsthetic Individualism means to attack modern art and its service to life just as little as to reject Naturalism and Socialism is to estimate meanly modern natural science and present social endeavour. On the contrary, it may be said that, as Naturalism has no keener antagonist than modern natural science, so modern art, with the energy which is bestowed upon it and with its many-sided expansion of the soul, stands not in agreement with but in opposition to Æsthetic Individualism. For, indeed, a creative

artist of the first rank has never subscribed to a merely æsthetic conception of life. Still, however much artistic endeavour and a merely æsthetic conception of the world may be associated by the individual, in their nature they remain differentiated, and no appreciation of art is able to justify the æsthetic conception of life, which subjects all life to a contradiction; works against life in striving to attain its own ends; neglects the development through the centuries; and, instead of the substance hoped for, offers only opinion and appearance. How can life find a support in this?

II. CONSIDERATION OF THE SITUATION AS A WHOLE AND PRELIMINARIES FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION

(*a*) THE NATURE OF THE NEW AS A WHOLE AND ITS RELATION TO THE OLD

FROM the description that has been given of the modern systems of life, we have seen that the Modern Age is by no means homogeneous, and that the conception "modern" has more than one meaning. Culture, in particular, has a character fundamentally different according as life finds its basis on the one hand in something external to itself, in nature, or in society, or on the other hand in the subjective states of consciousness. But that a common striving is present in spite of every difference, indeed of every antithesis, is proved by the energy with which all deny and reject the older form of culture and its transcendence of sense experience; by the vigour of the struggle against that which is regarded by the more modern systems as mere phantasy and deception, but which nevertheless continues to dominate social life. The kinship of these systems extends, beyond a common acquiescence in a negation, to a common affirmation. On all sides a thirst after a more forceful reality, and a more imposing immediacy of life, is to be found. Sense experience manifests itself throughout as fuller in content and more plastic; and so the chief point of support is found within it, and, though in different ways, the whole of life is organised from it. Still, granted that this could be effected only in opposition to the traditional conduct of life, the new is by no means desirous of remaining in a state of mere opposition. It

seeks rather to unite the opposing elements to itself, to adapt them to itself, and to satisfy to the fullest extent the ideal demands of human nature. It is an attempt entirely to renew and completely to revolutionise life—a vast undertaking! Whether it has succeeded, or whether it is still engaged in bringing the attempt to a successful issue, is the problem that we had to investigate.

As far as our chief question is concerned, our result was a decided negative. True, much that is great and much that may not be lost again has been achieved. The new systems of life have indeed appropriated whole groups of facts; have invigorated whole groups with new powers; have revealed new tasks of the most fruitful kind, not only in the individual but also for the whole; and have given to life dominating impulses and a powerful impetus. But all this gain becomes problematical, indeed it threatens to become a loss, if particular experience and achievement desire to govern the whole of life, and to impress upon it their own peculiar stamp. Not only does life become intolerably one-sided in such a case, but its wealth of experience is cut down in order to fit it into the given framework. We also saw that a serious inner inconsistency originates. For a long period this inconsistency may be concealed, but where any great energy dominates life, it must break forth with a disturbing force and become intolerable. Since the modern systems regard the whole of life as arising from relation, whether it be to the environment or to the subjective states of consciousness, they must reduce everything inward and universal to the level of a derived and secondary product; they must repudiate and oppose an original and independent spirituality, a self-conscious inner world. Such an inner spiritual experience has evolved through the whole of history, and transcends all forms of life-organisation: it is impossible to explain it away. The modern systems must themselves experience this. For they could not possibly transform the abundance of diverse appearances into an organised whole; they could not pass from universal to universal,

without presupposing and employing the same transcendent and encompassing inner world, which directly they attack. At the same time, however, they give to every factor of life a position and a depth wholly inconsistent with what they are justified in doing from their own mode of thought. They cannot perform their own tasks without drawing incessantly upon another kind of reality, one richer and more substantial. In truth, they are something other, and something far more than they believe themselves to be. Does this not show, beyond possibility of refutation, that they do not fill the whole of life ?

The contradiction immanent in the modern systems of life is especially apparent in the fact that they are unable to banish supersensual powers and to limit life to sense experience, without attributing to sense experience more content and more value than that which experience itself justifies, and which, to be consistent, they should not overstep. The naturalistic thinker ascribes unperceived to nature, which to him can be only a co-existence of soulless elements, an inner connection and a living soul. Only thus can he revere it as a higher power, as a kind of divinity ; only thus can he pass from the fact of dependence to a devotional surrender of his feelings. The socialist bases human society, with its motives mixed with triviality and passion, on an invisible community, an ideal humanity, which he clothes with the splendour of a power and dignity that transfigures the immediate appearance of society. It is only in this way that he is able to direct his whole effort upon the welfare of mankind, and to expect a pure victory of reason within its sphere. The individualist in his conception exalts the individual to a height far more lofty than is justified by the individual as he is found in experience ; for his thought, the individual is far more powerful and far more prominent and noble than immediate impressions indicate. Only thus is he able, from the freedom and the development of the individual, to hope for the beginning of a new epoch.

In these newer systems of life the conception of reality

as a whole is also subjected to the same groundless and, therefore, false idealisation. As in these systems nothing may be acknowledged which transcends sense experience, there can be no universal which pervades and holds together the manifold. This being the case, reality must be a co-existence of single pieces; but no one will readily confess himself of this opinion. A pantheism, vague to the highest degree, is therefore seized upon as a cure-all, that man may have something which penetrates and connects; but of this something, however, all more detailed description is lacking, and is carefully avoided. A conception so vague allows us at the same time to think and not to think something; at the same time to affirm and to deny. It seems to accomplish so much and to demand so little; it makes the impossible possible; and offers the most convenient asylum to all indefiniteness and confusion. It is a pity that in all this it is not a reality that surrounds us, but a mere *fata morgana* which deceives. And a conception so vague is to displace religion and accord support to the new life! Truly, this requires a stronger faith than that with which the older religions were satisfied.

The modern systems of life desire a more forceful reality; in this they set work an aim which cannot be rejected. The course they have entered upon, however, does not bring them nearer to this aim, but rather removes them further from it. Neither the self-evidence of the senses nor the oscillation of mood can ever represent genuine reality to a being who, for good or for evil, has once learned to think. Many and varied impressions may come and go in sense experience; but their abundance cannot prevent the chief conceptions, by which they are here accompanied, from receiving a character abstract and vague in the highest degree. We hear continually of the whole, of reason, of power, of evolution; but all these conceptions have no stability and little content; they are like shadows and phantoms which vanish as soon as we wish to take hold of them. So, by an irony of fate, just those modes of thought whose chief impulse was the desire for more reality dissipate,

dissolve reality. We see that the spiritual life may be denied by the individual, but not driven from the work of culture. It is true that immediate experience, outer and inner, has become much more to the present age than it was to earlier ages; but it has become so only through spiritual endeavour. If, therefore, the Modern Age now turns definitely against this spiritual activity, to rob it of all independence, it destroys that which first gave it its own power.

The modern systems of life have raised the standard of human existence enormously in regard to power and content; but they have done this at the cost of its spiritual concreteness. They have suppressed the life of inner spiritual experience and denied the problems of man's inner nature. They know of no grappling of man either with the infinite or with his own nature; they recognise no conflict between freedom and fate, and no inner development of the soul. And all this because their view of life as a whole takes away all depth, and transforms existence into a mere series of appearances. Thus, for anyone who regards such depth as the basis of life, and who, therefore, will not reject the experience and the result of the work of universal history, it becomes a necessity to reject and oppose the modern systems as guides of life. The more explicitly and exclusively they are presented, the more decided must his opposition be. For, what shall all the gain on the circumference of life profit man if through attention to that the centre of his life becomes empty and weak, if there emerges no content and no meaning in life itself? What is the value of all the advancing and refining of human existence if it does not bring with it a genuine spiritual culture and an inward elevation of mankind?

The increasing experience and perception of such limitations in the new may lead men to give more attention again to the old. The striving to transcend mere sense experience can no longer appear as a mere flight into an "other" world of dreams, or as due to a feeble and cowardly disposition; it may now be admitted rather as a deeply

rooted endeavour to reach greater depths of life. Yet such a relaxation of the opposition to the old, and such an inclination to estimate it more highly, by no means justifies us in simply taking it up again in the form in which it lies before us. For to this not merely the modern system of life, but the whole development of life and work, is opposed. The contradictions and doubts which have grown up in the course of this development are not in the least overcome by the failure of the modern systems of life. For we do not find ourselves confronted here with an "either—or," in which the invalidity of the one alternative immediately establishes the validity of the other; but both may be inadequate. So we remain surrounded by the old and the new, under powerful influences from both, but not in a position to accept either the one or the other exclusively.

(*b*) THE CONDITION OF THE PRESENT

This situation, with its juxtaposition of the new and the old, is so full of confusion and perplexity that only a feeble disposition is capable of acquiescing in it. In the old we respect or surmise a depth; but this depth does not know how to give itself a form suitable to the present, or to influence us with the means available in our own time. The new directs all our attention to the immediate present and fills us with its intuitions; but this present becomes superficial to us, and with increasing power a desire for more substance and soul in life rises up in opposition to it. The old lifted us to the proud height of a new world, but this height showed signs of becoming severed from the rest of existence, and lapsed therefore into a state of painful insecurity. The new builds up from the experience of sense, but it finds no conclusion without fleeing beyond this experience and thus contradicting itself. The old regarded the spiritual life of man, if not man himself, as occupying the centre of all and thereby fell into the danger of a

hastened conclusion and of an anthropomorphic conception of reality. The new takes from man every position by which he is especially distinguished, and ignores all connection with ultimate depths, but in so doing it overthrows more than it intends; it undermines nothing less than the possibility of all spiritual work, all science, all culture.

Thus we find ourselves in the midst of contradictions, and drawn first in one direction, then in another; that we are at a crisis in life as a whole and in culture, that we are in state of spiritual need, cannot fail to be recognised. This crisis is made all the more acute through the peculiarity of the historical circumstances which have led up to it and the social conditions which surround us. Historically, we are under the influences of two cultures: one older, which up to the seventeenth century was in undisputed supremacy and which has asserted its authority up to the present day, especially in regard to the arrangements of social life; and one newer, which, after the influence of many varied preliminary tendencies, has arisen since that time with the energy of youth, and which, in the minds of individuals, has easily become the dominant power. The two cultures had different starting-points and followed different main courses. The old culture carried within itself the experiences of Greek life, the inner progress of which may be seen especially in the development of its philosophy. In the old culture endeavour was driven more and more beyond the world of sense to a world of thought, in which it went on from a universal to an ethical and ultimately to a religious conviction. To the thought of Greece, as she grew old, the world of sense experience sank more and more in reality and value, and life found its basis and chief realm of experience in a region transcending sense. Christianity definitely established this view of life, and made the invisible Kingdom of God the true home of man, the most immediate and the most secure that this life knows.

New peoples then grew up in this way of thinking; peoples who still had their work before them; to these, that break with the world of sense came more as the

imposition of an overpowering authority than as due to their own experience. This fact constituted a point of weakness in every way; but no serious complication arose so long as these peoples were not yet ripe for spiritual independence. As soon, however, as this was the case, it was inevitable that contradictions should manifest themselves, and that a newly awakened impulse should urge the movement into an entirely opposite direction.

That is what really happened; the main tendency of life is now directed just as much upon the world as earlier it went beyond it; it has been transferred from the invisible to the visible, from the supernatural to the natural. We see this most clearly in the case of religion, which, as though with immanent necessity, runs through the sequence of a predominating transcendent Theism, a Panentheism, a Pantheism—gradully becoming colourless—an Agnosticism, and a Positivism. Everything supernatural disappears from thought, and life is concerned solely with sense experience. Thus, finally, we appear to have arrived at the same point as that from which the Greeks started out: the Monism of the most modern coining, for example, is hardly to be distinguished from the Hylozoism of the ancient Ionian thinkers. But is the whole result of the movement of universal history really a mere deception? Has it simply brought us back again, from the false paths that we have tried, without according us any kind of positive profit whatever? We have become men of another kind; we think and feel differently; we have built up a rich culture, have transformed the world, have created a spiritual atmosphere; and we are capable of striving after infinite life and ultimate truth. Could all of this spring out of mere error? If that were so, should we not be compelled to reject the whole of this as phantasy and deception? But if the error was a means and an instrument in the attainment of truth, and if mankind in its going out from itself and in its return to itself is inwardly developed, where does the boundary between truth and error lie, and what is the meaning of the whole?

So here again we lapse into uncertainty; history, to other ages a secure support, leads us into still greater doubt.

Finally, we must add to this crisis of culture the onward march of the social movement, which continually increases in power; the passionate longing of ever-growing groups of men for immediate participation in culture and the joy of life. Such movements can accomplish themselves within a fixed and acknowledged sphere of culture and of life; what changes they then bring lie within this sphere; they do not place the whole in question. Thus, the democratic movements of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries left certain principles of religious conviction untouched; they left the conception of the world entirely unchanged. But the matter is quite otherwise when a movement of this kind comes in contact with a culture which is inwardly unstable and which is growing uncertain concerning its final aims. We cannot fail to recognise what a great danger of degeneration there is under such circumstances. The masses, thus struggling upward, then seek their own way of life, and in so doing they naturally concentrate their attention upon that which lies immediately before their eyes and affects their immediate well-being. From this position they will advance all the more quickly to a finished conclusion, in that they are unconcerned with the experiences and perplexities of the work of universal history, and therefore, with unclouded enthusiasm, expect complete truth and pure happiness from freer exercise of their powers and the rejection of all authority. If we wish to ignore the dangers to culture which thus grow up, we must either estimate man as he is too highly, or spiritual tasks too meanly. Until the present an independent spiritual life, making man more comprehensive in being, raising and freeing him, has manifested itself only at individual points; in the first place in chosen individuals, from whom it has been conveyed to the common life. The spiritual world made its appearance as a power superior to the interests and the opinions of individuals and of the masses. Only in such transcendence of the merely human did it develop

any characteristic content, find an inner unity, arouse respect, and lead man beyond mere nature. If all this should now become different, if man in the mass should come to feel himself to be the measure of all things, and should relate all to his perception as the centre of infinity, would not a severe contradiction arise between human enterprise and spiritual necessity, and would not the full development of this opposition threaten the whole state of culture with a violent convulsion? Ultimately the inner necessities of our being would certainly win the day against all errors of superficiality, but what severe conflicts and losses the division must cost!

The consideration of all these facts reveals us under the power of different, indeed antagonistic, movements, and most especially in the midst of the great struggle for supremacy between the visible and invisible world, as the conflict between Positivism and Idealism gives expression to it. Life for us contains two movements, one of which starts from the centre and the other from the circumference; the former cannot embrace the fullness of reality, and its basis is also insecure; the latter gives no inner unity to life and lowers the standard of the whole. As each of these main tendencies again divides, movements the most varied surround us, tear us asunder, and crush our souls under their oppositions. God and reason have become uncertain to us, and the substitutes that are offered—nature, society, the individual—fail to satisfy us. The unrest and uncertainty that arise from this are not limited to the single sphere, they extend to the ultimate basal principles of life. The new mode of thought declares the chief world of the ancients to be an illusion; but we saw its own world dissolved in shadows and schemes by spiritual activity. Since the one dissolves the reality of the other, we are threatened with the loss of all complete results; our own being becomes a dark problem to us; we know neither what we are nor what we are not.

The impression that we get of the condition of the present as a whole may also be represented in the following

manner: the historical movement of humanity unfolds an incalculable wealth of life; this life, however, cannot reach its own highest point and cannot win a character of a spiritual kind unless it organises itself into a whole, unless it attains an inner synthesis transcending all isolated states. Such syntheses have been realised, and have led to distinctive organisations of life; but these organisations have all proved to be too insignificant and too narrow, and none has been able to overcome the rest and to embrace the whole wealth of life. So life as a whole has broken them down; and since it has thus lost all inner structure, it must inevitably fall into a state of rapid degeneration, and must threaten to lose all content and meaning.

The evil effects on the development of life that are caused by this convulsion and division, and by the lack of a dominant tendency; how this condition leads to the destruction of everything simple and self-evident, and lends to an unrestrained reflection an unwarrantable power; how it robs endeavour of all its main tendencies, and permits true and untrue, good and evil, to run confusedly together, all this and much else is to-day so much and so widely discussed, and presents itself with such overpowering clearness to our vision, that its description need not detain us even for a moment.

Ought we to submit to this disintegration and degradation of life as to an inevitable destiny, or is it possible to work against it and to strive after a unity transcending the division? The fact that the division makes so strong an impression on us and that we feel it to be so intolerable is at once in favour of the latter alternative. How could this experience be possible if all multiplicity did not fall within a comprehensive whole of life—if our nature were not superior to the oppositions and did not drive us compulsorily to seek a unity? The life which, in distinct contrast to decaying Antiquity, flows through our age in a powerful, ceaselessly swelling flood; the unwearied activity of this age; the excellence of its work; its passionate longing for more happiness and fullness of life,

all forbids a hasty and light renunciation. It is true that there are hard contradictions, and that spiritual power is at present not equal to cope with them; but this power is not a given and fixed magnitude: it is capable of an incalculable increase. Thus we ought not to be too ready to assert that the limitations of the age are identical with the bounds of humanity, and we ought not faint-heartedly to discontinue the struggle for a unity and a meaning for life.

This problem cannot be acknowledged without at the same time being admitted as the most important and the most pressing of all problems. For, on the decision concerning the whole, that concerning the spiritual character of life depends, and, as this character extends through the whole of life, every single matter will be differently decided according to the decision concerning the whole. Only purely technical and merely formal matters of work may remain unaffected by the problem, but wherever a content comes into question it will at once arise and manifest its urgency. This problem, therefore, will not suffer itself to be thrust into the background; we can neither delay it nor turn aside from it. The individual, indeed, in this sphere of free decision and of independent action can withdraw himself from the question, but he can do so only at the price of the debasement of the quality of his life, only in that, from an independent co-operator in the building up of the ages, he becomes a dependent underworker.

(*c*) THE FORM OF THE PROBLEM

Only a few words are now necessary to come to a more definite understanding concerning the form of the problem, which, with compelling force, rises into prominence out of all this complexity. Where the convulsion is such a fundamental and universal one as it shows itself to us to

be, it is of the first importance to rise above the existing chaos, and to avoid all that which, even indirectly, would lead us back to it. Many of the aids which would-be healers of the time's evils recommend with vigour therefore need not be considered.

Every attempt to make a direct compromise between the different forms of life, to appropriate eclectically this aspect from one and that aspect from another, is inadequate. The view that none of the systems of life could have won so much power over mankind without containing some kind of truth, which may not be lost, has, to be sure, a good deal of truth in it. It is first necessary, however, to attain a position from which this truth in each case may be ascertained and rightly appreciated; and we can only reach such a position in opposition to the confusion which surrounds us.

A recourse to history and an adherence to a high achievement of the past promise just as little help. One thing is certain: history cannot be eliminated from our life; its highest achievements invite us to consider them again and again. But what is to be accepted by us as "high," indeed, what as "spiritual" history, is not at all definite without further consideration. It is what is esteemed in our own conviction as true and great which decides in this matter. We look at history from the position of the present and with the spirit of the present. If, therefore, as we saw, the present has fallen inwardly into a state of complete uncertainty and doubt, our consideration of history must be affected in the same way; and not, of course, its external data, but its inner spiritual content and meaning must be made uncertain. At the same time, we cannot fail to recognise that in reference to the central problem with which we are concerned, the present situation is quite peculiar, and lacks historical parallel. Sharp contrasts have always been found in human experience; and in transitional periods in history they have been felt with painful acuteness. But never did they so extend over the whole of life and so deeply affect fundamentals; never was

there so much uncertainty with regard to what should be the main direction of endeavour, and the meaning of all human existence and man's relation to the universe, as in the present. Everything which to earlier ages appeared an inviolable possession has become to us a problem. What gain, therefore, in respect of the chief matter could a return to the past bring ? In his investigation of the far-off ages the scholar may for a time forget the present : the attitude of mind which may result in bringing him fame for his work would be dangerous and destructive as a disposition of the whole of mankind. For we cannot treat that which is foreign to our nature as something of our own, without losing our distinctive character and degrading our own life to one of mere imitation.

Further, it has become impossible to strive for the ideal by selecting from the realm of experience a single point and treating it as an archimedean point, as absolutely fixed, and shaping our life from it. Descartes attempted to do this with his " I think," and Kant with his " I ought." But it is very doubtful whether there is an archimedean point in man ; whether to make such an assumption is not to over-estimate man. The experience of history shows further that that which some have taken as absolutely primary and axiomatic has been regarded by others as derivative, and has been explained in an entirely different manner. The presentationalist does not deny the actuality of thought, or the naturalistic thinker conscience ; but he understands it as a subsidiary phenomenon, and therefore can find no support in it. How then can that overcome all doubt which itself calls forth serious doubt ?

A whole sphere can be withdrawn from the confusion and used to overcome it just as little as can a single leading point. For the uncertainty with regard to the whole extends far into every individual sphere ; and such a sphere may appear, to one in one way, and to another in another.

Science is not infrequently treated as though it were enthroned on high, supreme above all the struggles and the

doubts of existence, and as though, from its sovereign capacity, it were able to give a secure content of truth to life. It is true that science has much in its forms and in its work which is not the subject of dispute; but that with which we are here concerned—its intrinsic value, its spiritual character, and its place in life as a whole—is by no means a matter beyond dispute. As a matter of fact, every system of life has its own assertion in reference to this problem: to each to know signifies something different and is capable of something different. Whoever decides for one of these assertions concerning the nature of knowing has at the same time made a decision concerning the systems of life. He stands not outside, but in the midst, of the struggle. The same thing holds good with regard to morality, which is often welcomed as a secure refuge from the doubts of science. For, however certain it may be that in this sphere also there is no difference of opinion in respect of many things, as, for example, concerning the goodness or badness of certain types of conduct, still, the more we come to be concerned with principles the more do problems arise. In the immediate present the fact is most unmistakably clear that in this field also the fight does not rage around the interpretation of a given and acknowledged fact, but around the fact itself. What a different purport and meaning morality has in the systems of Religion, Immanent Idealism, Naturalism, Socialism, and Individualism respectively!

Finally, the attempt to give to life stability and peace by turning to the subject, to personality, as to a point removed from all perplexity, also fails. We should be the last to place a low estimate upon personality, but the conception receives its meaning and value only in its spiritual connections, and without these it soon becomes nothing more than a mere term, which blurs and blunts the great antithesis of existence. If that which is called personality exists as a merely individual point by the side of things, then we can never discover how occupation with things is capable of transforming life as a whole. If, however, in

this activity we should win an inward relation to infinity and a spontaneity of life, then this admission involves a confession concerning reality as a whole which can never be justified by a theory which regards the mere individual as the starting-point. That the idea of personality implies a problem rather than a fact is indicated by the different conceptions of it which we meet in the different systems of life. In considering personality, Religion thinks of the immediate relation of the soul to God ; Immanent Idealism, of the presence of the infinite at the individual point ; Individualism, of the supremacy of the free subject over against the social environment. It is only by reason of the common terminology that we fail to recognise how great the differences are in the thought on the matter ; how that which one regards as of value in personality is severely attacked by another.

All these attempts therefore prove to be inadequate because they lead back to the state of uncertainty they were meant to overcome. To reject them, however, involves us in a certain assertion, which to some extent points out the main direction which further investigation must follow. No external compromise can help us, but only the winning of a transcendent position which is capable of giving to each factor its right without reduction ; no flight into history can lead us to the truth, but only an activity of the present, not, however, of the present of the mere moment, but which embraces the work of universal history ; no placing a single point or sphere into a supreme and all-dominant position can help us to overcome division, but only a conflict for a new whole ; no mere turning in personality is of value before a sure basis is given to it from the whole ! All leads us to this conclusion : we must strive for a new system of life. And to achieve this is not impossible, for, as we saw, a system of life is not imposed upon us by fate, but must arise from our own activity. If the systems which have previously been formed no longer satisfy, why cannot mankind evolve others ? Or is it

proved that the existent forms exhaust all possibilities? A too narrow conception of life was seen to be a common defect of all these systems; its richness broke through the attempted unifications, and with this they fell into irreconcilable contradiction. Should not a synthesis be possible which would do more justice to the whole extent of life; which need not deny and exclude so much; and which might also unite what at first seems absolutely contradictory? Doubtless such a synthesis would not be achieved all at once; it is inevitable that growing life should take up many discords and movements into itself. Yet this synthesis would present itself at least in a manner similar to that of the extant systems; and, since it strives after something human, it must always be mindful of its limits.

Should such a universal synthesis be at all possible, it must certainly be something which has to be found and disclosed rather than something which simply has to be produced from ourselves. How could we hope to advance to it if it were not somehow involved in the depth of our being, and in our fundamental relation to the world, and if it did not already exist here in some way? It is a matter, therefore, of arousing to fuller independence and at the same time of raising inwardly something which exists within us; of recognising something new and even astonishing in the old and the supposedly self-evident, so that the truth of the universe may become our truth and give power to our life.

A task of this kind is a matter of the whole soul and not merely of the understanding; it is a concern of humanity, not of the individual alone. Of that which the single individual may contribute towards the attainment of the aim it is hardly possible to think humbly enough. And yet each has to use his power to the best of his ability; if in cases of great necessity and of ill-fortune in matters of an external kind the individual considers it only right to hasten to help, how could he withdraw himself where

the task is the satisfying of a spiritual need of mankind? Still less than in the former case is he able to disregard the matter as something alien and indifferent to himself. For, in the struggle for the whole, he fights at the same time for the unity of his own being, for a meaning for his own life.

II

THE OUTLINE OF A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND CONSIDERATIONS

OUR inquiry ended in a definite negation; it showed the present condition of things to be marked by severe internal conflict and in danger of dissolution from within. Many movements of thought and life cross, disturb, limit, and oppose one another. Since what to one seems a wholesome truth seems to another pernicious error, all inner community of life disappears, and with it all firmness of conviction and joy of creative activity. The more these conflicting tendencies develop the more do they crush and destroy all the traditional elements of our life; the more are the spiritual contents and goods, which the necessities of life compel us to adhere to, deprived of their basis in the depths of the soul. The confusion which prevails in the present time, with its continual change, its rapid alteration of circumstances, its power to convey the most diverse impressions, its production of ever new combinations, might even attract and entertain us if it were no more than a drama. But if the confusion is more than this, if it includes our destiny and is meant to signify the whole of our life, then, by reason of its detrimental effects upon the whole of life and upon man's inwardness, and by reason of its lack of content and soul, it must completely fail to satisfy us, and must provoke an energetic resistance. True, a condition of things so full of contradictions has also its advantages; it accords to the activity of the individual the greatest liberty and gives him a feeling of supremacy; its dissolution of everything previously regarded as fixed enables uncontrolled feeling and unstable mood to acquire power, and at one time to flatter man pleasantly, and at

another to carry him away impetuously. The individual's attainment of freedom, however, gives as yet no content to life; and the feeling of supremacy is as yet not a real supremacy. These feelings and tendencies, which, within a wider whole of life, certainly serve to add to its animation, inevitably lead to a state of vagueness and emptiness when they put themselves forward as the whole. The supposed aids which are offered us are no more than mere pretences; and they become dangerous and harmful so far as they deceive us concerning the seriousness and tension of the situation.

The feeling of tension was increased through the historical treatment which accompanied our inquiry. For, from the point of view of history, the present confusion shows itself to be not a temporary obscuring of an indisputable truth, or a tendency on the part of man to become feeble and weary in the appropriation of such a truth, but to involve in doubt the basal nature of truth itself: the meaning of our life as a whole was seen to have fallen into uncertainty. The systems of thought, in the light of which we have hitherto regarded reality and steered the oncoming flood of appearances, have broken up and dissolved. We have become defenceless in face of the impressions of the environment which affect us with increasing strength, and impel us now in one direction, now in another. It is not simply this or that aspect in human existence, but the whole of man's nature which has become problematical in this dissolution. Formerly, the chief result of the effort of universal history had seemed to be that man rises more and more above nature and builds for himself a realm with new contents and new values. Now, the desire to be something higher than nature appears to be a bold presumption; the idea that man has a special position is ably contested, and every distinctive task is denied him. Man appears to be far too insignificant and to possess far too little freedom to be able to take up arms against the world and to obtain the mastery of it. Doubts such as these are all the more painful because they are the result of our own work; in that we

toiled, investigated, and pressed forward, we undermined the foundations of our own life; our work has turned with destroying power against ourselves. With the increase of external results, life as a whole has become increasingly hollow; it has no longer an organising and governing centre. Is it to be wondered at if the finer spirits of our age are weary, disheartened, and repelled by the feeling of the disharmony of the whole of present culture, which calls for so much effort from man and yields him so little genuine happiness; speaks of truth and lives from semblance and pretence; assumes an imposing mien and utterly fails to satisfy when confronted with ultimate problems? Is not the power of attraction which the figure of St. Francis of Assisi was recently able to acquire an eloquent witness to the reality of the longing for more plainness and simplicity in life? And yet we cannot take up again the position occupied by an earlier age; we cannot take up a past phase unchanged. No return to the conditions of the past can bring satisfaction to the spiritual needs of the present, for a device of this kind always leads by a detour back again to the starting-point. Ultimately, it is from ourselves alone that help can come; and we can have recourse to no means other than those of the living present.

First of all, our state of necessity must be admitted to the full, and the danger of a further degeneration of life in respect of its spiritual nature adequately estimated. It is always a gain to obtain a clear idea of the condition of the matter in question and to grasp the problem as a whole. For, through this, we are saved not only from illusions leading to error, but also from the authority of the mere present and from a feeling of anxiety and fear in the presence of contemporary opinion. If this age is in a state of such uncertainty; if it achieves so little for that which concerns the foundations of our spiritual existence, then neither its agreement can impress us, nor its opposition frighten us; but the endeavour to make life firm again can seek confidently what is needful for it, and, with care in regard to what it shall affirm and deny, can follow the way which its own necessities point out.

One fact in particular must tend to increase our confidence in this endeavour: the fact, namely, that a negative result, which proceeds from our own work, cannot be a mere negation, but must contain an affirmative element within it. From what reason could the traditional systems of life have become inadequate to man other than that they do not satisfy a demand that we ourselves make upon them, and must make upon them? It is plain that we need and seek more than we possess, and this seeking betrays that our being is wider or deeper than was assumed in those systems. Why did each of the different systems become inadequate, unless it was that life itself rejected as too narrow the standard involved in them? Why could we not regard the different systems as having a certain validity, and, allowing them to continue side by side, divide our existence amongst them, if not because we cannot possibly give up all claim to an inner unity? If, then, the present confusion is rooted in a wrong relation between our desire and our achievement, we need not faint-heartedly surrender ourselves to it. It is plain that there is something higher in us, which we have to arouse to life and realise to its fullest extent. We may be confident that the necessity of our being, which gave rise to the desire, will also reveal some way by which it may be satisfied.

A closer consideration of the results of our inquiry leaves no doubt with regard to the direction which research has to take to accomplish this task. Diverse, fundamentally different systems passed in review before us; each came forward as the unadorned and true expression of a reality that seemed common to them all; their struggle appeared to be a conflict concerning the interpretation of this reality. It became evident, however, that the conflict is, on the contrary, in regard to not the interpretation but the fundamental nature of reality; different realities arise which are irreconcilably opposed. The systems do not originate in a common and secure basis: the basis itself is sought, and may assume various forms. The conflict

therefore is much more over ultimate problems than is usually supposed; it arises primarily out of the nature of life itself, out of the inner movement which advances against the illimitable world around us, and seeks to gain the mastery over it. Our life and our world acquire a definite character only by our taking up such a movement of counteraction, the particular nature of which decides over all further moulding of life. We have seen that when we ourselves became active we took up and emphasised one of the possibilities which lie within the range of our life, and held it as supreme over all the rest; we took as the fundamental relation one of the relations of which our life is capable, as, for example, the relation to God, to the immanent reason of the universe, to nature, to society, to one's own individuality. A particular sphere of life was thus marked out; a scheme of life was yielded which appeared capable of taking up all experience into itself: according to the starting-point adopted, we sketched a distinctive outline and sought to include the whole content of human industry, man's universe of work—as we might call it—in order to lead to our own perfection. This scheme, assumed to be true, then had to show what it was capable of; a powerful effort was brought forth to overcome the resistance of a world which, even when it was grasped from within, still remained alien to our nature; and, ultimately, to form the whole into a unity. We were not, as it were, an empty vessel into which a content flows from outside, but we generated from within a movement which extended further and further, and desired to take up everything in itself; it was a matter of radically transforming the external into an inner life. We could succeed in this only in that life self-consciously pressed forward to win new powers; formed connections, branches, and graduations; accomplished an inner construction; and with progressive self-elevation became an all-inclusive whole, which did not possess a reality by the side of itself, but itself became complete reality. Thus, life took possession of the world only in that it widened itself from within to the world, and,

in the appropriation of everything alien to it, advanced from the original outline to full concreteness.

According to the results of our inquiry, the chief decision in the struggle with regard to the nature of the world also lies in the moulding of life. We convinced ourselves that there was no conception of life common to the different systems, but that from its starting-point, throughout its whole development, each of them shaped life differently from the others; and we saw that the differences even went as far as complete opposition. Each system of life had its own kind of experience; each formed its own instruments for the appropriation of the world; each saw of the infinite that in particular which corresponded to the main direction of its own movement. A consideration of all the facts makes it quite clear that a decision depends neither upon externals nor upon the individual, but upon the inner life and the whole; and further, that cognition does not give a solution to the problems of life, but that life itself has to reach a solution through its own organisation and construction, its own advance and creative activity.

However, that which was the compelling and deciding power in the systems of the present day—the struggle for life itself—has not attained to complete recognition in them. Rather, they were too quick to begin to occupy themselves with objects, and sought to show themselves superior in this respect to their rivals; the attention to results prevented the correct appreciation and estimation of experience itself. The impossibility of coming to an agreement concerning the object then forced us back to the life-process; and we were led to the view that the object appeared different because we ourselves placed something different into it, and that we saw less the object itself than ourselves and our life in the object. Thus we were induced to place our attention chiefly on the subject; but then there was a strong tendency to leave the world outside as a special realm; and the division of work between subject and object drove us still further into uncertainty.

In the midst of such confusion, we did not come to the point of making a decision; we did not attain the position from which alone an agreement is possible; at one time one system, at another time another carried us away. We failed to recognise that, however much we come into contact externally, we live spiritually in separated worlds; that, while using the same expressions, we speak different languages, and therefore cannot possibly understand one another.

The gain is by no means an insignificant one, and a distinctive treatment arises, if we become clearly conscious of the fact that the shaping of the process of life itself is the chief object of conflict; that the movement is not one between world and life, but lies entirely within life; and that the essential matter is the perfecting of life itself. The recognition of this fact leads us to an immanent mode of treatment that has many advantages. The facts involved are now seen to lie deeper. The source of experiences is not so much the relation to the environment as the movement and expansion of life itself. Striving and conduct can now involve a certain concreteness; indeed, the actual experiencing of limitations and negations can lead to an elevation above them. The type of life does not seek to justify itself, to show its truth, through harmony with an external world; it is justified by its own advance, its increase in strength, and its upward growth. It is only a justification of this kind, a justification within its own realm, that can acquire a power to convince and to restore again to life that concreteness of which, in opposition to the excess of unrestrained reflection and vague feeling, it is to-day in the direst need. If we desire to arise above this state of division, and to attain a greater unity, we can achieve our aim only by the power of an inner unification of our life.

Instead, therefore, of considering the internal from the point of view of the external, we must consider the external from the point of view of the internal; our knowledge must be essentially a knowledge of self, our experience an

experience of self, if we would come any nearer to the attainment of the aim. Our inner nature is not given to us as something complete; it has first to be aroused to life and developed; we need to attain to a state of self-determining activity if we would reach the highest that we are capable of. From the recognition of the necessity of greater activity, and of seeking the roots of the problem at greater depths, we become aware of a new relation of thought to life. Although thought may involve certain fundamental forms, and may adhere to them in all its activity, it is life in its totality, as we understand it, which first gives to thought its more detailed form, a characteristic nature, clear aims and sure tendencies. Thought, therefore, is inseparable from the movement and the advance of life; all hope of progress rests on the hope of a further deepening of life; a revealing of new relations, and a development of new powers. It is not from mere knowledge, but only from the movement of life as a whole that we can make any advance; but the life here referred to is one that includes knowledge, and not one that takes up a position independent of knowledge, and, in opposition to it, bases itself on supposed practical needs.

A treatment such as the one we have indicated has to be followed in the investigation upon which we are about to enter. The chief aim of this investigation is to reveal and to call forth life; it is not its chief aim to interpret life in conceptual terms. It is from this position, therefore, that we ask the question—which the conflict of the different systems of life forced upon us—whether a unity transcending the oppositions exists in us and can be aroused to life through our self-determining activity. It is from this position also that we ask the further question—which springs out of the struggle between the older and the newer modes of thought—whether ultimately man must give up the superior position which from early times he has adjudged himself,

or whether an inner elevation is possible which gives him the power to cope with new tasks and new conditions. Whether such a treatment leads to a positive result is a question of fact; and what the answer to this is cannot be decided by a preliminary consideration, but only by the actual investigation.

I. THE MAIN THESIS

(*a*) THE ASCENT TO THE MAIN THESIS

THE most expeditious way of arriving at a comprehensive conception of human life is to begin with the impression which we get of it as a whole; ascertain what problems arise from this, and seek to make what headway we can in solving them until we reach a stage where the necessity of a particular assertion becomes apparent. From the outset, however, the attention will be centred chiefly upon that which differentiates human life from other forms of life existing within our knowledge; it is from a consideration of this that we shall most readily see the whole in its proper light.

1. MAN AS A BEING OF NATURE

No one doubts that human life forms the highest point of development that comes within our experience; that it is in some way more than mere animal life. But what it is that is characteristic in human life as distinct from animal life, and how it is to be interpreted, is a matter of dispute. From the earliest times there has been a great diversity of opinion and conviction concerning this matter, and absolutely contradictory views have been maintained. Some thinkers have believed it possible to regard human life, in spite of its uniqueness, as essentially the same as that of the animal, and to trace back all difference to a difference in the quantity of the fundamental nature which they all possess; these thinkers did not concern themselves with presenting the higher as developed from the lower by a

gradual growth. Others, on the contrary, regarded human life as something essentially new and in its very nature distinct—the beginning of another kind of world—and denied to the uttermost a derivation from lower forms; these held it to be impossible to avoid the recognition of a break between animal and human life. According to which of these positions was accepted, life obtained a fundamentally different prospect and a fundamentally different task; activity necessarily had different aims and sought different paths; the conflict around this problem affected the whole extent of existence.

As a result of the movements and experiences of the nineteenth century, this conflict has entered upon a new stage. In earlier times the decision had generally been made as a result of the immediate impression of the civilised man who was conscious of his superiority; it did not seem possible for him to lift himself far enough above his environment; the life of his soul, through its distinctive spiritual character, seemed to be as distinct from every impulse which nature exhibited as the sky is distant from the earth. Science and art, morality and religion were accepted as an original possession of man and as the power which had dominated his life from the beginning. He appeared to be a higher being; and to direct all thought and endeavour towards the strengthening of the distinctively human was regarded as the chief requirement of life.

The movements which have arisen in the Modern Age have led to a radical change in our treatment of this question: this change is chiefly due to science. Modern science breaks down the authority of the immediate impression, and, in contrast with it, projects a new representation of the world. Man is no longer looked upon as occupying a position of lonely elevation, but is seen to be in the closest concatenation with nature around him, and is regarded, finally, as a mere part of its machinery. Many movements of thought tend toward this conclusion and support one another. The physical relationship which exists between man and the animals could not have been so clearly perceived,

and traced with such exactitude of detail, by modern science had not the fixed boundaries, which in our representation had hitherto divided the life of the human soul from that of the animals, been abolished. The new view was further supported by the results of a keener investigation into the nature of psychical life, since in this investigation the traditional conception was analysed into its individual constituents, and it was sought to explain from their combinations even the highest spiritual achievements. The result of this modification of ideas was that the inner life of man was assimilated much more closely to nature than before; the juxtaposition and the succession of occurrences gained in significance; it was recognised that relations did not hold from the beginning but are developed gradually. The forces and impulses which were operative in this development seemed to have arisen from an actual process of nature, without any co-operation of human caprice. Our psychical life appeared to be nothing more than a continuation of nature. The great divergence between the heights attained in experience, and the theories that were formulated to account for them, caused no misgivings because the idea of a gradual evolution during an indefinite period of time was sufficient to bridge the widest gulf. At the same time the conception of society allied itself with that of history and lent its support to the general tendency. Every higher aspect of life that was accepted formerly as a proof of a supernatural order now became a witness to historico-social relationship and, with its new interpretation, lost its old mysteriousness. All this was, of course, only on the assumption that human life brings nothing essentially new with it. Not the least doubt as to the validity of this assumption came to those who entered upon this train of thought.

Thought was able to follow this course with the greater confidence because it went hand in hand with a change in practical life. By reason of the development of modern life, man's relations to the environment have become increasingly significant to man. Modern industry and

technical science have led him from a preponderatingly contemplative relation to his environment to an active one; infinite prospects have been disclosed; the forces of nature have been pressed more and more into the service of mankind. But even in the service which they render man these forces have won a power over him, since with a determining power they keep his activity and his thought bent upon themselves. The material side of life has escaped from the mean estimation in which it had previously been held, if not in the conduct of individuals, yet at the height of spiritual culture: to the present age it has become the indispensable basis of all development. The social movement, with its summoning of the masses to complete participation in happiness and culture, supports the tendency to estimate material goods more highly. With the cessation of oppression and necessity, and with the increase of material well-being, a general advance and an inner development of life seem assured. The whole tendency which we have considered exhibits man as solely and entirely a part of nature, even though nature may be conceived of more broadly than it was formerly; and the life of the society and of the individual as being determined by natural forces and subject to natural laws. How, along with this tendency, the traditional conception of the world has been completely transformed; how biology, in the sense of natural science, has been taken as the leading point of view for the explanation of life, it is unnecessary to follow further, since our consideration of the naturalistic system of life has already given us an insight into this matter.

2. The Growth of Man beyond Nature

But even after we had seen an older type of life disappear and a new one with the power of youth rise up, gain mastery over souls, and transform conditions, despite all its triumphs the new movement manifested limitations—limitations which did not arouse the criticism of the thinker,

but with the compulsion of an actual power the opposition of the developing life of mankind. That which we became aware of in this connection will become even more clear to us, and impel us to seek for new aims, if we now concentrate our attention upon the process of life and follow it throughout its experiences.

There cannot be the least doubt that we belong to nature: it cannot but be recognised that it penetrates deep into the life of the soul, and to a marked extent impresses its own form upon that life: the boundary therefore is not between man and nature, but within the soul of man itself. But whether nature is able to claim the whole life of the soul, or whether at some point there does not arise an insuperable opposition to such a claim, is another question. Even the most zealous champion of the claims of nature cannot deny that man achieves something distinctive: we not only belong to nature, we also have knowledge of the fact; and this knowledge is in itself sufficient to show that we are more than nature. For in knowledge, be it in the first place however meanly conceived, however much concerned with the simple representation of external occurrences, there is a kind of life other than that which is shown in the simultaneity and succession of events at the level of nature. For it is a characteristic of knowledge that in it we hold the single points present together and connect them into a chain; but how could we do that without in some way rising above the mere succession and surveying it from a transcendent point? In this survey we pass from earlier to later, from later to earlier; and at the same time we are able to hold the multiplicity together: there must be a unity of some kind ruling within us; but the mechanism of nature can never produce such a unity. A transcendence of nature therefore is already accomplished in the process of thought, even when it only represents nature, only displays it to our consciousness. Intellectual achievement, however, is by no means exhausted in the representation of nature. The development of a new scientific conception

of nature sufficiently demonstrates, as we saw reason to believe, that thought has far more independence than such representation implies; that in arranging and transforming phenomena it opposes itself to the environment. For the scientific conception of nature is not offered to us immediately as something complete; it has to be won from the naive view with toil and difficulty. In order to arrive at this scientific conception, thought must have a position antecedent to the impressions, must become conscious of itself, realise its own strength, and in its activity lead from universal to universal. The work of thought is not a mere transition: without its continuance that which has been gained would be quickly lost. Mere existence gives to nature no present reality for our thought and life. To follow the pathway to reality involves the overthrow of manifold illusions; and this necessitates such a longing for truth, and a power to gain truth, as only a thought, which transcends the sense impression, can produce. Not only is transcendence of nature demonstrated through the fact of the existence of thought with such independence, thought also carries within its being unique demands, measures the life of nature by their standard, and in that life recognises limitations not simply on this side and that, but also in the inner being of the whole. Thought cannot possibly be satisfied with the state of things as they are presented; it desires to illuminate, penetrate, and comprehend it; it asks "Whence?" and "Why?"—it insists that events must have a meaning and be rational. And from this point of view it feels the mere actuality of nature—which excites no opposition within its own sphere—to be a painful limitation and constraint, something dark and meaningless. To thought, a life which is swayed by blind natural impulse must be inadequate, indeed intolerable. Similar conflicts arise in other directions. Thought embraces a whole and demands a whole; it cannot refrain from passing a judgment upon the whole. If this treatment is applied by thought to nature, the predominant concentration of life in the single

individuals and their juxtaposition will appear to be a serious defect ; all the passionate strivings of the individual beings cannot deceive us concerning the inner emptiness of the whole. For in nature there is nothing that experiences the whole of this movement as a whole ; makes the experience self-conscious and something of value in itself. In the movement of nature everything individual is sacrificed ; and there seems to be nothing to which this sacrifice brings results which are experienced as a good. The same holds good of a culture that resolves human social relationship into a simple co-existence of individuals, regards them as battling together in the struggle for existence, and believes all progress of the whole to be dependent upon their ceaseless and pitiless conflict. Even if such a conflict leads to further external results, there is no spiritual product : the results are experienced by no one as an inner gain. The indescribable meanness of this whole culture, swayed as it is solely by the spirit of egoism, the slavish dependence to which this culture condemns man, the rigour of the individualism that rules in it, cannot possibly escape from the activity of thought. Thought, in transforming this condition of things into an experience—that is, in making us conscious of it—at the same time makes it impossible for man to accept it as final. Since it makes us more conscious of the limitations of this state of life, thought demonstrates—and that through this very consciousness of its limitations itself—that our whole existence is not exhausted by that individualisation and detachment, but that there is a tendency of some sort within us which strives towards the unity of the whole.

Problems no less complex arise in relation to time. Looked at from the point of view of nature, no inconsistency is felt in the fact that only a short span of time is granted to the life of individuals ; that they come and go in most rapid succession. For here the individuals do not rise to the consideration of anything beyond their own time ; their presentation and desire are exhausted

in the present; they feel no longing for a continuation of life. The position is radically changed with the entrance of thought. Thought does not drift along with time; as certainly as it strives to attain truth, it must rise above time and its treatment must be timeless; a timeless validity appertains to truth, a comprehension of things "under the form of eternity" (*sub specie aeternitatis*). To a being who, in his thought, rises to comprehension of experience from the point of view of the eternal, all temporal limitation, and especially the short duration of human life, is a source of surprise and a contradiction. The rapid sequence of generations, the perpetual decay of all that impels us so forcibly to desire life and holds us so firmly to it, seem to deprive our endeavour of all its value, and give to the whole of existence a shadowy, phantom-like character. Feelings of this kind have been aroused anew in our own time. The restlessness of the activities of our civilisation and the lack of real meaning in this civilisation, which to the present age seems to constitute the whole of life, need only to be clearly and energetically comprehended by thought, and all its noise and all its passion cannot prevent the emergence of an acute feeling of the dream-like nature of this whole existence.

This feeling of the lack of reality and depth in the life of nature will become the keener in proportion to the degree of independence thought evolves. For the more thought finds its own basis in itself, the more will it treat nature as an appearance, the more clearly will it recognise that sense, with all its obviousness and palpability, does not guarantee the possession of truth; for truth comes to us only through thought. In thought, therefore, the world of nature loses its immediacy and becomes a realm of appearances and phantoms.

A consideration of all the facts leads us to the result that a life consisting solely of nature and intelligence involves an intolerable inconsistency: form and content are sharply separated from each other; thought is strong enough to disturb the sense of satisfaction with nature,

but is too weak to construct a new world in opposition to it. Life is in a state of painful uncertainty, and man is a Prometheus bound in that he must needs experience all the constraint and meaninglessness of the life of nature, and must suffer therefrom an increasing pain without being able to change this state in any way.

The experience of our time confirms this conclusion in no indefinite manner. In that, with regard to the material and the technical, we have attained heights never before reached, the bonds between us and our environment have increased a thousandfold, and our work has united us more closely with the world: we seem now for the first time to attain a sure hold of reality. At the same time, however, the activity of thought, and with it unrestrained reflection, have also increased immeasurably in modern life. This reflection forbids all naive submission to the reality of nature; destroys all feeling of security; and comes between us and our own soul, our own volition. We are thrown back once more on to the world of sense, that we may seek in it a support and a scope for our life and effort; and from the point of view of this world the work of thought appears to be a formation of clouds. But this formation persists; draws us back again to itself and, with all its insubstantiality, proves strong enough to make us regard the physical as appearance. Our life is divided into two parts which cannot and will not coalesce. The emergence of a new life, which can do nothing but comprehend the other in thought, and which, while it is indeed capable of depreciating the other, cannot itself advance further, is seen to involve a monstrous inconsistency.

If the union of nature and intelligence produces so much confusion, we are inevitably led to ask whether man does not possess in himself more than thought; whether thought is not based upon a deeper and a more comprehensive life, from which it derives its power. It is not necessary that such a life should be manifest to us in all its completeness; we shall also be compelled to acknowledge it as a fact even if in the first place it has to struggle up in face of

opposition; however, in its development it must show distinctive contents and powers which could not be the work of a subjective reflection. If there is a life and a development of this kind, it will be necessary for us to comprehend it in its various aspects and tendencies, and only when we have accomplished this may we endeavour to obtain a representation of the whole.

Now, developments of life which defy limitation by the mechanism of nature and set a new kind of being in opposition to it do, in truth, appear. We recognise such developments in the processes by which life liberates itself from bondage to an individualism and its subjectivity, and afterwards attains a self-conscious inwardness. We may consider both these developments somewhat more in detail. So far as man belongs to nature, his conduct is determined solely by the impulse to self-preservation; every movement must either directly or indirectly tend to the welfare of the individual; everything may be traced back to what happens to the individuals. This by no means indicates a distinct separation of man from his environment. For even the mechanism of nature closely unites that which happens to the individual with that which happens around him; the individual can progress only in so far as he is united with others: he cannot advance his own well-being without advancing that of others. Even in a "state of nature" man takes his family, his nation, and the whole of humanity indeed, up into his interests; and as this tendency is not bounded from without, but may be immeasurably refined and extended in an indefinite number of directions, it easily comes to appear that this involves an inner deliverance from self, and that another is of value to us for his own sake. But it is no more than an appearance; for with all the external agreement the inward separation is far greater, and amounts to opposition. Within the limits of nature we can certainly concern ourselves with something which is only indirectly useful to us; but we can never be concerned with anything which is devoid of all use to ourselves; we cannot take such a

direct interest in the welfare of others as will tend to our own disadvantage. If experience gives evidence of such an activity and such an interest, in so doing it demonstrates a transcendence of nature. Now, experience does give such evidence, and indeed with irresistible clearness. A witness to this is seen in the zeal with which man habitually attempts to give to his struggles for mere self-preservation a better appearance, a semblance of conduct performed out of genuine regard for the interests of others. To what purpose all this trouble to acquire such an appearance; for what reason this hypocrisy which permeates the whole of human existence; and whence this appearance itself if we belong solely and entirely to nature? Further, whatever elements of semblance there may be in the average state of human life, the development of that life is by no means nothing but semblance. The social life of man is not explicable as a simple collection of individuals related with one another in different ways; but in the family, in the state, in humanity as a whole there is evolved an inner unity, a sphere of life with distinctive values and contents. And as it is of the nature of these to transcend the ends and aims of the individuals, to arouse other feelings and stimulate to other efforts, so their demands may be directly opposed to those of individual self-preservation. Man sees himself compelled to decide whether he will pursue his own welfare or that of the whole; from the necessity of a decision it is impossible to escape. However much in the majority of cases self-interest may preponderate, we cannot dispute the possibility of his acting in direct and conscious opposition to his own interest; of his subordinating and sacrificing himself; and of his doing this "not grudgingly nor of necessity," but willingly and gladly; of his feeling this subordination to be not a negation and a limitation, but an affirmation and an expansion of his life. All who strive for some essential renewal and elevation of human life base their hope and trust upon such a disposition. A renewal and an elevation of life involve far too much toil, conflict, and danger; they demand a renuncia-

tion and a sacrifice far too great for them to be commended to us by consideration of our own welfare, or for them to dispense with the necessity of counting upon an unselfish submission, a sincere sympathy, a genuine love. That which was produced with glowing passion in heroic beginnings must with a quieter warmth pervade all progress also. An inner community of minds is indispensable if the whole of culture is not to become a soulless mechanism and inwardly alien to us. It is true that the external way of regarding the facts of life often fuses together as one, lower and higher, a continuation of nature and the beginning of a new life. Language also supports this tendency, since it indicates fundamentally different psychical states with the same terms. Yet the love in which the union with others is sought only in order to advance one's own interests, and the love which finds in this union a release from the limitations of the natural *ego*, and gains a new life, remain distinct. The sympathy which feels the sufferings of others to be unpleasant because one's own complacency is disturbed by them, and which in consequence fades away and disappears as soon as the sight of the suffering comes to an end, is absolutely separated from a sympathy which extends to the soul of the other, and possessing which, in order to contribute to the relieving of the other's need, one willingly sacrifices one's own complacency: a sympathy, therefore, which extends its interest and help without limit beyond all that simply has to do with the relation to the environment. How much real love and genuine sympathy the experience of humanity shows is a question in itself. Even as possibilities of our being, as matters of thought which occupy our attention, and as tasks and problems, they give evidence of a development of our life beyond the limits of nature.

This forgetfulness of self is a kind of deliverance of life from the limitations and the interests of the individual: a new relation of man to man, of person to person, thus arises and brings about an essential change, indeed a complete transformation of aims and feelings. The deliverance

is effected in another direction with the emergence of a new relation to things, to the object. In the realm of nature everything that is external has a value for man only as a means and an instrument to the advancement of his own welfare; from the point of view of nature, it is impossible to understand how a thing could attract us on account of a content and a value of its own. As a matter of fact, the object does attract us and acquire a power over us in this manner, and this not merely here and there but over a wide area in movements which affect and transform the whole of life. Nothing else differentiates work—viewed spiritually—from other activity, and nothing else elevates work above other activity than this: that in work the object is inwardly present; and that man may adopt its moulding and extension as a motive, and find this a source of joy. This seems to be something self-evident, only because it happens daily to us and around us; and we do not recognise a new type of life in it, simply because in human existence it is usual to find that work only gradually attains complete independence. For it is the pressing necessity of life, the impulse to self-preservation, that first arouses us from our natural inactivity and compels us to occupy ourselves with things; and in this change from inactivity to activity it is our own advantage that we first seek. But that which to us, to commence with, was simply a means; that which was perhaps most unwillingly done, begins to attract and hold us more and more for its own sake; becomes an end in itself, and is able so to charm us that it forces the idea of utility completely into the background. It is possible for work to become so attractive, and of such a value in our estimation, that to ensure its success we can make sacrifices, and can pursue it in direct opposition to our own welfare. Only when the object is regarded and treated in this manner can it win an inner proximity to us; reveal to us its relations; develop characteristic laws; make demands upon us and call forth our power to meet them. In this way it constrains us, but the constraint is not exerted

upon us from without, but proceeds from our own decision and activity. We do not feel the relation to be an oppression, but rather as a witness to our freedom; in the subordination to the object we feel that we are caught up into a life more comprehensive, clearer, and richer than any we can develop from the subjective. We reach a stability and a calm in ourselves, and have within our own being a support against all vacillation and error. Work, therefore, produces relations which on the one hand unify the endeavour of the individual and fashion his life as a definite whole; and on the other, bind humanity into a creative community. In the former case we have vocation, with its demands and its limitations, it is true, but with them also its strengthening and its elevation of life; in the latter complexes of work develop in whole departments of life, in which the individuals find themselves side by side and are ultimately united into the community of an all-inclusive whole of culture. From this something is evolved which is independent not only of the choice but also of the interests of mere man: a kingdom of truth, a world of thought transcending all human subjectivity is formed. Thus we see something grow up within the human sphere which leads man beyond himself, and which is valid not merely for him but even in opposition to him. The whole matter bristles with problems: from the point of view of the life of nature this new life must appear to be an insoluble riddle; and yet it has far too much value and certitude to be banished as imagination.

Along with this detachment of life from the mere individual and the mere subjectivity of man, there is a liberation from external ties, and the development of a self-conscious spirituality. As at the level of nature life is spent in the development of relations with the environment, in action and reaction, so the form of life in man remains bound, since the life of the soul cannot dissociate itself from the experience of sense. The apparent inwardness that is evolved at this level is simply an after-effect of sensuous feelings and desires. So far as the life of nature

extends, the forces and laws of the life of the soul will only refine what the external world exhibits in coarser features. The mechanism of nature also extends into human life ; natural impulses of conduct, as well as association of ideas, reveal the fact that the life of the soul is in complete dependence upon natural conditions. From this point of view it seems impossible that inwardness should ever become independent. The actual experience of human life, however, shows that what is thus regarded as impossible is indisputably real. The detachment from the mere subjectivity of the *ego* and the development of universal values, which exist over against us, can be effected only if the basis of life lies deeper than the contact with the environment. It was a work of thought which brought about the transition and gave birth to the new life ; only with the help of thought did it ever become possible to form relations of a new kind and to rouse man's interest in them. The realities which arose were not of sense but conceptual, ideal. The more this movement increased in extent, the more human existence was transformed into realities of thought. Is not such a transformation evident when in ourselves we see before all else, not the sensuous being of nature, but a personality or an individuality ; when in relationship with one another we form the idea of the state, and feel that we are ourselves members of the state ; when we regard and value the cognate beings around us from the conception of humanity ? As a matter of fact, a strong tendency in this direction runs through the whole history of humanity : sense does not disappear, but is taken up more and more into something conceptual ; the world of thought gives us increasingly the point of view from which we conduct life. We find a progressive spiritualisation of religion, of morality, of law, indeed of the whole life of culture. In everything life seeks a deeper basis ; an inwardness wins an independence of the environment, and exercises on the environment a transforming power. The relations and the order of the realities of thought manifest a law different from that of sense presentations

with their mere juxtaposition. For in the former case an inner unity, an objective relation is evolved, and the significance of the individual member is estimated according to its position in the whole. The distinctive attributes in a conception form no mere collection, and the statement of a syllogism no mere sequence ; rather, in both, a comprehending act of thought grasps the manifold and arranges the separate elements according to their relationship within the whole. The course of presentation with its mere succession is by no means simply suppressed through this development of thought ; it persists and governs consciousness on the surface. But the surface is not the totality of the intellectual life; through it and transcending it an activity of thought manifests itself, forms new connections, and maintains itself against all opposition.

Accordingly, the power that thought exercises is fundamentally different from the physical power of association, or even of custom. In the case of thought there is an insistence upon a consistent and related whole which, even though externally insignificant, produces most powerful effects. If contradictions exist in our world of thought and condition of life, they can become intolerable, and the desire to remove them lead to the emergence of impetuous movements. If, on the other hand, we recognise that certain things which formerly seemed to be unrelated, even though they existed side by side, are really inwardly related ; or if, again, an assertion involves a consequence that has not hitherto been deduced, then the demand, that these things shall be unified and this consequence developed, is capable of breaking down even the strongest opposition. In this matter an invisible is capable of more than a visible power. Of course, thought in isolation has not such a power ; it acquires it only through its relation to a wider life and in championing the cause of that life. For thought is wont to defend the life of the individual, of a people, a historical situation of humanity, on the one hand from an abundance of inconsistencies, and on the other from dissolution and incompleteness, without any conflict growing out of it :

life as we experience it immediately is anything but a regular logic of the schools. In itself simple perception of the fact that an inconsistency exists, or that ideas which have been regarded as valid require further development, need not arouse the feeling of man and lead him to assert his activity; he can acquiesce, and leave the condition of things unaltered; he can voluntarily resign himself to the inconsistencies and incompleteness. But, nevertheless, there is a point at which this condition of inconsistency can be endured no longer, at which to transcend it becomes the dominant task of life. This point is reached when the confusion is no longer an object external to us which we contemplate, but enters into the substance of our life, so that the inconsistency becomes a division, and an attitude of inconsequence towards it a limitation of our own being. The solving of the problem then becomes an essential part of our spiritual preservation. And in that it commands the whole energy and passion of such preservation it can do that of which thought, with its necessity, is not in itself capable, it can rouse our whole life to activity and break down even the strongest opposition. It is from the inner presence of a determining and moulding process of life that thought itself first obtains a characteristic form, and is able to impress it upon things, and so subject them to itself. A spiritual self-preservation of this kind is fundamentally different from all physical self-preservation: for the former, it is not a matter of the self asserting its place in the co-existence of things, but of becoming an independent inward nature, and of establishing a distinctive whole of life. The exact significance of spiritual self-preservation is for the present obscure enough; but whatever it may be, it derives its power from within and not from contact with the environment.

How deeply these inner movements are rooted in human life the so-called historical ideas show with particular clearness. Certain thought complexes, or rather certain tendencies of life, arise, and win an overwhelming power in opposition to all narrowly human concerns. They force the

activity of mankind into particular channels; they follow out their consequences with pitiless rigour; they speak to us in a tone of command, and require absolute obedience. Neither the interests of individuals nor those of whole classes prevail against them; every consideration of utility vanishes before their inner necessity. The history of religions, for example, has often shown such an astonishing consistency in the following of characteristic tendencies that their adherents could see in it the working of a divine spirit. Similarly, the Enlightenment, in its time, with overpowering might, seized minds and penetrated deeply into every department of life; to-day we have a similar experience in the case of the social movement. On all sides something is acknowledged as an imperative requirement, as indispensable for the spiritual persistence of man—something which cannot be brought in from outside, and which may indeed be entirely inconsistent with external conditions. Has not the conflict of inner necessities with the external circumstances that were opposed to them been a leading motive power in history, and is not all essential progress achieved through such an opposition?

Again, the great force that has been exerted in the movement of history in the detection and the elimination of contradictions can be explained only in this context. Logic, as we saw, played an unassuming rôle in this matter, and the indolence of man always inclined to easy accommodation and compromise. It was the increased vital energy, the adoption of a particular issue as the main issue, that made movements, which had long existed in a state of harmony and peace, irreconcilable enemies, and drove them to a life-and-death struggle. With a lower level of spiritual activity the Middle Ages unsuspiciously united a religion of ecclesiastical organisation with a religion of personal feeling and disposition; and it did not feel that there was an inconsistency in their union so much as that one was the completion of the other. As soon and so far, however, as in the Modern Age spirituality won more independence and more self-consciousness, and

felt itself to be the centre of the whole, it was inevitable that a dependence upon an external order should be experienced only as an intolerable oppression; and the division of life between the one and the other became an impossibility. It was necessary only that a powerful and passionate personality, like that of Luther, should take up the problem, and make it the sole object of his effort, and the hour of revolution had come. How meanly they think of the controlling forces of history who would trace back such changes to the selfishness or the vanity of individuals! Looked at from our point of view, the inner changes within the life of universal history often appear to be simplifications—cases of energetic concentration on the essential, and of fundamental separation of the subsidiary. The truly great carry on a ceaseless conflict against the chaotic confusion which the life of the majority is wont to produce ever anew—a confusion in which matters of the first importance are confused with those that are subsidiary; all inner gradation is lacking; and the great is treated as something insignificant, and the insignificant as something great. There is a struggle to secure a clear differentiation and gradation; to establish a centre, and to transform life into a genuinely self-conscious life. Have not all the principal revivals of religion, of morality, of education, been simplifications?

These movements show life in a particular form; something emerges in it which, unconcerned with the weal and the woe of man, follows its own course and makes absolute demands; and which, more than anything else, disturbs and destroys his calmness and complacency. How heavily Germany has had to pay for the movement of the Reformation by being thrown back politically, nationally, and economically! It is inevitable that all movements of an ideal kind, the social movement of the present included, should. appear from the point of view of natural well-being, troublesome and pernicious disturbances. They can be regarded as something higher only when we acknowledge that life does not consist entirely in external relations,

or in the endeavour to attain harmony with the environment, but that an inner task grows out of life itself, and first gives to human existence a value and a dignity.

In the development of a self-consciousness and of a movement of life itself, we rise above the motive of utility, by which nature is swayed. It is a moral element in the widest sense; it is the consciousness of something objectively necessary, unconditionally transcending the ends of the narrowly human, that first gives to convictions axiomatic certainty and to conduct the right energy. This moral element attains to a more independent display in the moral self-judgment of man that is called "conscience." True, this conception has been the subject of much error and has been much over-estimated. Not only has the moral judgment less power over man than is frequently assumed, but that which is called conscience is often—generally, in fact—nothing more than a by-product of custom and of accommodation in human social life. In this case the inner life has still attained no independence, but remains dependent upon the environment; and the disposition thus produced is nothing more than a feeling of aversion to the results of conduct, nothing more nor less than concealed fear of punishment; a state of the soul which the most prominent thinkers have, with good reason, stigmatised as a manifestation of weakness and cowardice. But, however much that is foreign to it and of an inferior order may have been associated with conscience, nevertheless, judging conduct, as it does, according to the inward disposition and not according to consequences, conscience is a unique, original phenomenon. To whatever extent conscience, as we know it, may have had its source in something external, and in however great a degree it may depend upon changing circumstances, it is nevertheless impossible to explain the fundamental fact by reference to the environment. For, if our life depended solely and entirely upon the environment and no movement arose from within, all influence from without could do nothing but subdue us by sheer force; there could never be an

independent recognition and acceptance of the command addressed to us; never the feeling of an inner responsibility for conduct; never an independent extension of the original precept; and yet all these phenomena are in fact found in human experience. True, we are affected very greatly by external forces; but that they may achieve what they do a movement from within must meet them, take them up, and carry them further. The enormous amount of pretence which flourishes amongst us with regard to matters of morality, and which so easily obscures our vision for the chief matter, would be unintelligible if the spiritual did not manifest some kind of independence in the moral judgment. Unless there is such a development towards independence, the moral judgment must also, as far as its content is concerned, be determined by the condition of the social environment: it could never follow a course of its own; never give rise to anything new; never enter into inner conflict with the environment. Yet, as a matter of fact, we find these tendencies in abundance. The individual is able, in the light of his own moral conviction, to approve and value something which all around him reject; and conversely, to condemn and reject something which all around him esteem and respect; and this he is able to do under the compulsion of inner necessity, and not simply out of a love of vain paradox. This opposition of individuals to the condition of things in the social environment has been the main source of all inner progress in matters of morality. For it is in matters of morality, in particular, that that which hitherto had given no offence has become intolerable to individuals; and that new and imperative demands such as had never been made before have emerged with constraining power. Or did the idea of humanity, the abolition of slavery, and the commandment to love one's enemies, for example, arise in some other way? If in respect of such matters as these that which on its first appearance was paradoxical quickly came to be regarded as self-evident, what else was operative in bringing about this result than an inner

necessity, from which, when once we become conscious of it, we can never again escape? Suitable conditions in the social environment were, of course, also necessary for the fulfilment and the extension of those moral requirements; but they could never have originated from the environment, or have derived from it their unconditional nature, their certainty of victory, and their indifference to all external consequences: qualities without which they could not have effected what they have.

In the life of the individual the moral judgment manifests its power in assertion as well as in negation. If it approves one's disposition and conduct, it gives to life a greater stability and joyfulness; if it condemns, then existence is paralysed by division. In this experience it is implicitly assumed that the distinction of good and evil has its source neither in the preferences of the human individual nor in those of the human society; but that in this antithesis a new order, that is present only to the inner nature, is revealed.

We see, therefore, that in contrast with its attachment to the external, life attains an independent inwardness which we are compelled to acknowledge, however mysterious the inward may at present be to us, and however little we may be able to define its nature more closely. Earlier in our investigation we were led to recognise a movement of life from the narrowness of the individual to the comprehensiveness of the whole. It is obvious that our two results are closely connected with each other and refer to each other. For we attain a unity, as contrasted with the juxtaposition of the elements of the visible world, only through a powerful activity from within; but this activity cannot emerge unless life forms a whole in contrast with its dissipation into disconnected points.

These two developments are obviously sides of the same life—a life which bears a totally different character from that of the psychical life which forms a mere continuation of nature. Within the soul itself there is a distinction between two levels of which that other than nature may

in agreement with established usage be called "spiritual," however little may be implied by this expression; however mysterious, indeed, the conception as a whole may for the time be. In contrast with the old, this new level is unmistakably at a disadvantage. The old seems to include the whole range of human existence; the new, on the other hand, must toilsomely struggle for a place of some kind. Nevertheless, in spite of its external insignificance, the spiritual gives birth to a movement of no mean character; in face of all opposition it seeks to form a centre of life of its own, and to make this the chief basis of effort; it is to be found thus in the life of mankind as revealed in history, and also in that of the individual. Within the conception of culture we comprehend all achievements distinctive of man. But what is culture if it does not assure to man a position independent of nature; if it does not set up ideals which can arise only out of a new life? Ultimately the chief motive-power of culture is the longing of mankind for a new kind of being in contrast to that of nature. Culture necessarily becomes superficial and empty when it directs human striving to external objects and does not lead through all occupation with externals to its own development and to the advance of its own being. The work of culture is genuine and powerful only when man seeks in it his own true and ultimate self.

How every development of the spiritual advances towards the attainment of a new unity of life may be more clearly seen in the case of the individual, in relation to whom we meet with the conceptions of personality and of spiritual individuality. However much confusion there may be in the ordinary use of these conceptions, the conception of personality merits the estimation in which it is held only if it is regarded as the bearer of a new life, in contrast to that of nature, and not simply as something added to nature. The development is more evident with the conception of spiritual individuality. For such an individuality is by no means something given to a man in the natural characteristics which he brings with him into

life. Within this particular nature, as a rule, many things, significant and insignificant—things which are original in himself and things which are due to external influence—are chaotically confused; and, as it lacks an inner unity and an adjustment of the different aspects, one aspect may directly contradict another. If the individual is no more than these natural characteristics, he can become active as a whole only through a summation of the multiplicity, and not through a dominating and organising unity. With the transition to the new kind of life a desire for such a unity awakens and gives rise to a definitely characteristic movement. A unity must be found within us in some manner; it must be included in the range of possibilities open to us. But in order to obtain supremacy it must be grasped, be appropriated and strengthened by our self-activity. We ourselves therefore become a task in the treatment of which it is possible to fall into serious error. Looked at from this point of view our spiritual nature is seen to be the product of our own activity. We cannot fail to recognise a peculiar interweaving of freedom and fate in our existence.

The inner history of all creative minds shows how great may be the inspiration and the tension which arise in this striving to realise a spiritual nature; an inspiration and a tension which are evident even when the main direction for the realisation of this nature has been easily found and only the more detailed form has to be sought: they are still more apparent when the main direction itself is in question. How toilsome it often was for a man to come to the position in which his strength lay, and with the aid of reflection to attain a state of secure creative activity; to unite all forces to a common achievement; and to make a distinct advance beyond the traditional position of the spiritual life! Life was by no means a completed gift and something to be easily enjoyed, even in the case of natures lavishly equipped by destiny—as, for example, Goethe; it was in a struggle for itself that it won a complete independence and a proud superiority over everything external.

This struggle was being fought in all his cares; in all thought for natural and social well-being, all utilitarian considerations in regard to the externals of life. It gave to the man amid all his doubts and agitations the certainty of being something unique, something indispensable; at the same time it lifted him into an invisible world, and enabled him to understand his own life as an end, complete in itself. How different this is from the struggle for existence, for the preservation of physical life; and how clearly a new life, another kind of reality, arises in these movements! The new life does not appear by any means only at the heights of spiritual creation; rather it would be true to say that the life which is present in the whole of human existence becomes most easily discernible at these heights. The movement towards a spiritual individuality may be begun in the most simple conditions; and it is not to be estimated according to the degree of its achievement. For, where world stands against world, everything depends upon the decision with regard to the fundamental principle, and this may be made at any point. The mere possibility of making such a decision testifies here irrefutably to a reality: the reality of a new order of things.

3. The Inner Contradiction of the New Life

The conclusion we are led to is that a new life distinct from that of nature arises in our soul. With a great diversity of manifestations, it surrounds us with an indisputable actuality; no one can fail to recognise that something of importance, something distinctive comes to pass in us. But as soon as we try to comprehend these manifestations as a whole, and to ascertain the meaning of the whole, a difficult problem arises. It is comparatively easy, however, to come to an understanding as to the negative aspect of the matter. It is obvious that the new life is not an embellishment or a continuation of nature; it would bring with it something essentially new. Again, it is obvious that it is

not a product of a single psychical function, such as thought or feeling ; it would form a whole transcending the psychical functions, and from this whole determine the form of each function distinctively. But what is this new reality and this whole to which the course of the movement trends ? The more we reflect over the question the more strongly we feel that it is a direction rather than a conclusion that is offered to us in this matter ; something higher, something inward and so on is to evolve, but what is embedded in the inward and in what this supremacy is based is at present not apparent. Further, every attempt at a more definite orientation at once reveals to us a wide gulf, indeed a harsh contradiction, between the content of that which is sought and the form of existence from which it is sought. The chief impulse of the spiritual life is that it wills to liberate us from the merely human ; to give us a share in the life of the whole ; to remove us from a happening between things to their fundamental happening. Seen from within, the history of humanity is primarily an increasing deliverance of life from bondage to the narrowly human, an emergence of something more than human, and an attempt to shape our life from the point of view of this : it is an increasing conflict of man with himself. At the same time, however, it is a taking up of the whole into himself ; since man in all his planning and striving is related to the whole, it seems to him that his own nature must remain alien to himself, if the whole does not disclose itself to him, and allow him to participate in a life which has its source in ultimate depths ; if in the life of the whole he does not find a purer and a more genuine self. The idea of truth impels us beyond all the limitations to which a particular being is subject, beyond all communication of things from without. There must be nothing between us and reality ; the inner life of reality must become ours, and thus our life will emerge for the first time from a shadowy existence to full reality, from the narrowness of the mere individual to the comprehensiveness of infinity. The idea of the good makes similar demands.

To the spiritual movement, the advancement of merely human well-being is far too mean an aim. This movement makes us clearly conscious of the triviality of mere happiness; of the oppressive and destructive effect of a continual reference to our own subjectivity; and of the unworthiness of treating love and justice as mere means to our welfare. It becomes at the same time an urgent duty to break through the narrow limitations of the natural *ego*, and to conduct our life from the point of view of objective truth and comprehensiveness, and so for the first time to become capable of genuine love and justice.

It is true that these aims are lofty, and, we feel we have the right to say, aims that may not be rejected. But it is not at all evident how they are to be reached from the position of man; it is not at all clear how man shall press forward from mere existence to the creative basis, from the part to the whole: for his particularity and his mere existence hold him fixed. But in his existence nature preponderates by far: individual tendencies of a new order do appear; but how could they in their state of isolation and weakness bring about a revolution and place life on a new foundation? As a matter of fact, we usually find these impulses to a new life drawn into the service of natural and social self-preservation, and, over against the passionate struggle for existence, condemned to complete impotence and shadowiness.

The whole life of culture makes us clearly conscious of this perplexity. The essence of that life consists in this, and through this alone did it acquire a truth—that it willed to build up a new, spiritual reality within the sphere of humanity. But to what extent is such a reality recognisable on the basis of experience? In and throughout all culture man continues obstinately bent upon the attainment of his own ends: the struggle for material goods exerts an immense influence upon and controls men; an indescribable amount of pretence and hypocrisy accompanies and surrounds the spiritual movement. Between that which man really strives for, and that which he asserts

that he is striving for, and which perhaps it is his intention to strive for, there is great divergence. Falsehood like this is not limited to individuals; the whole culture is one monstrous deception in so far as it promises to develop humanity to something new and higher, while in reality the new is occupied mostly with polishing up the old, the life of nature, to give it a glittering appearance. It is on this account that in times of criticism and introspection so much opposition has been offered to culture; that such passionate scorn has been aroused against the hypocrisy and pretence which pervaded its whole life. But although we are fully aware of its deplorable state, we do not break its power over us. It is perhaps the most bitter of all our experiences that we are held fast under the spell of a condition of things concerning the vanity and futility of which no one with any insight has the slightest doubt.

However, in moralising over this state of things we ought to guard ourselves from becoming too passionate. For it is a question whether it could be otherwise; whether the fault is in any way in the will, and is not solely and entirely in the nature of the being itself. For it is certainly a contradiction throughout that man, who is an individual being existing by the side of others, and whose life belongs to the domain of experience, should set himself in a universal life transcending all particularity and live from the bases of reality. How can that which is primarily a part of a given world build up a new world? Ideas like those of the true and the good are, from this point of view, mere illusions, manifest impossibilities; man may trouble and weary himself with them, but all his endeavour only leads him into a state of greater confusion. These ideas are to him for ever an "other" world; he may expand himself and develop, but he does not come a step nearer by doing so.

It is true that in striving for truth, man advances beyond sense presentation to the activity of thought; but the thoughts always remain his—thoughts of mere man. However much he may widen his own sphere as a consequence of his reflection upon them, he does not go beyond it. In

history also the striving for a scientific comprehension of truth appears to be a vain struggle; the passing through different phases has not brought it nearer its aim so much as, with ever-increasing clearness, it has manifested the impossibility of attaining what is sought.

The ancient conception of truth, with its belief in a relationship of the being of man with the whole; with its assumption of an easy transference of life from one to the other; with its view of truth as an agreement of thought with an external reality, has through the course of life become untenable; it has been rejected through the influence of the tendency of our being to become more inward. For this tendency necessarily led to a detachment from the environment of the world, and to a separation of the two sides of our experience. We became clearly conscious of this separation at the beginning of the Modern Age. We saw that, if we were not to give up all claim to truth, only one course remained possible: to make a division within the human domain, a division between a merely human and something else which might be regarded as the presence of universal and genuine life in man. And so Spinoza distinguished an objective thought from the springs of the emotions; Kant distinguished practical reason from the theoretical which is bound up with the limitations of human nature; and Hegel elevated the thought-process, which manifests itself in the work of universal history, far above the opinions and the wishes of individuals. Each of these maintained a distinctive conception of truth and a characteristic form of the spiritual life; but with regard to all attempts there arises the doubt whether even that proclaimed as more than human is not still within the domain of man; whether in every case we do not wrongly declare the last point which we reach to be the deepest basis of reality.

The position is somewhat similar with regard to the idea of the good. In the attempts to which we have referred, it passed current as a deliverance from all selfish happiness, which was felt to be intolerably narrow.

A new, purer, and more comprehensive life is to proceed from the winning of a new position. Now, there are many diverse conceptions of happiness, and higher levels are distinguished plainly from lower. But the highest level does not transcend human desire; man must bring all into relation with his own well-being. He cannot in opposition to his own well-being adopt something alien as an end in itself; his activity can be aroused for nothing which has not some value for himself. In this case also, therefore, the bounds of his life hold him fast, and, unless these bounds are transcended, the good cannot be distinguished from the useful. Of this a clear confirmation is furnished by the experiences of religions. In their origin they wished to free man from himself and to set him in a new life—whether they promised tranquillity in a surrender to the infinite whole or won a positive content by the revelation of a kingdom of divine love. How soon the succession of events has led back to a quest of happiness! How soon has it become evident that the religions have far less revealed a new world to the majority of mankind than chained them more firmly to the old; and that they easily arouse to greater power the raw instinct of life, which they desired to overcome!

We seem to be shut in on all sides; it seems a monstrous inconsistency to wish to build up from man a world transcending man; to remove him into a world other than that of a man. A world of this kind is, however, essential to the spiritual life; with its abandonment that life becomes an illusion; and the less intelligent people who reject, as a meaningless folly, all striving for the true and the good seem to be right.

Why do we refuse to adopt this view, and to discontinue an endeavour the aims of which appear to be unattainable? In the first place, because that movement cannot be given up so easily as those critics imagine who adopt this view; for it does not consist simply of explanations and theories

that might be completely refuted by rigorous argument, but a certain reality was evolved, desires were aroused, forces called into life, and movements inaugurated. Even if they halt in their course they were something; they do not disappear therefore before the attacks of scepticism; further, however mean their results may be, they prove to be strong enough to indicate the limitations in the life of nature, and to make it inadequate for us. The matter is the more mysterious in that the striving is anything but a product of the natural desire for happiness. For the movement disturbs all our complacency; it leads man to be discontented with that which hitherto had fully satisfied him; it surrounds him with fixed organisations; desires from him much labour and sacrifice, and makes existence, not easier, but more difficult for him. Illusions are wont to deceive us by pleasing pictures; to attract us with the promise of pleasure and enjoyment. How does an illusion, that imposes so much toil and trouble upon us, win so much power over us? There is another matter to be considered in this connection. A complete renunciation can appear possible only because it is not clearly perceived how much which we cannot give up and which ultimately we have no desire to give up is involved in it. Only a want of clearness of thought, and still more a weakness of character, could wish to retain in the particular case what was given up as a whole; could affirm as effect what it denied as cause. As soon as this course is recognised to be impossible, it becomes evident that with the rejection of the spiritual life everything is abandoned which gives to our life dignity, greatness, and inner unity, and joins us to others with an inward bond. Realities such as love and honour, truth and right, must be regarded as empty illusions; and even science must come to an end, because there is no longer any inner unity of work, no objective necessity.

Such considerations again show us that a complete negation is impossible; and it seems that we must remain for ever in painful suspense between an unattainable affirmation and an impossible negation. We might be able

to endure this condition of affairs if it concerned a problem which arose in reference to something of little importance to our life, something that we could relegate to the background, and simply permit to lie there, without compromising our life. But our problem lies at the centre of life; is, in fact, itself the centre. To be left in suspense here means to condemn life as a whole to a state of paralysis, to surrender it to complete dissolution. Against this everyone who has any vital energy in him will contend; with his whole might he will seek to escape from a condition so intolerable; he will not hold back from making a bold venture, mindful of the words of Goethe, "Necessity is the best counsellor."

In seeking a way out of the contradiction, it is essentially necessary not to forget the source of the contradiction. We saw that source to be in the fact that the spiritual life would set up a new world, and at the same time remains bound up with the merely human and presents itself as an endeavour of mere man. To the spiritual life a universal character is indispensable; of this claim nothing can be abated. There must therefore be a change as regards man; it must be that more comes to pass in him than the first impression makes evident. It must be that the spiritual within him, which seems at first to be his own product, is a participation in wider connections; the spiritual must be operative in man, but not originate out of the merely human. It is true that this makes a reversal of the traditional position necessary, and not merely of its representations; and such a reversal provokes serious doubt. Modern science, however, has taught us sufficiently often that the first appearance of anything need not be the ultimate one; that there may be cogent reasons for regarding something that at first seems based in itself as the proof of something existing beyond. Thus, modern natural science has transformed the world of sense into a world present only to the eyes of research. Certainly, science accomplishes these changes within the bounds of experience; on the contrary, in regard to our problem, in which the fundamental form of reality

is in question, it is indispensable that we should transcend these bounds; without a change in respect of the whole, and hence without a resort to metaphysics, it is not possible to accomplish our purpose. It is quite clear that the tendency of our time is opposed to appeals to metaphysics: yet it is a question how far this attitude is justified. So far as metaphysics assumes the same form as in the past—that of conceptual speculation of a thought, hovering unrestrained over the existing world—then it is rightly opposed. But the attitude is unjustifiable which assumes that with the overthrow of the older metaphysics all metaphysics may be ignored. For a metaphysic can proceed also from the whole life, and need not be a product of mere thought. The implication therefore is this, that the centre of life itself must be changed, and thus a revolution of the previous condition accomplished; that an actuality already operative in life has to be given its rightful place and brought to its full effect. The business of metaphysics, therefore, is not to add something in thought to a reality which lies before us, or to weave such a reality into a texture of conceptions; but to seek to grasp reality in itself, and to rouse it to life in its entire depth for ourselves. Every change of thought then rests on a change of life. Such a metaphysic may appeal to the saying of Hebbel, "Only fools will banish metaphysic from the drama; it makes a great difference, however, whether life evolves out of metaphysic or metaphysic out of life."

Even if our age rejects a metaphysic of this kind also, if it surrenders itself without resistance to the inconsistencies of the world of sense, this would be the last thing which could deter us from an appeal to metaphysic. For the inner cleavages and the superficiality of the life of our time—and we saw reason to believe that these are facts—stand in the closest relation to the rejection of metaphysics: this rejection has made the age inwardly insignificant. If an indirect proof of the necessity of a revolutionary transformation of life, and at the same time of a metaphysic may be offered, our age furnishes one quite sufficient in its

own experiences ; its opposition can be only a recommendation of an appeal to metaphysic.

The one main thesis which it is essentially necessary to establish is analysed in sufficient detail throughout the whole course of our investigation ; it simply sums up that which has already been advanced point by point. The intolerable contradiction arises, as we saw, from this, that the spiritual life with its new world should be a product of mere man, and that that life should remain within man and at the same time lead in its essence beyond him. This contradiction cannot be overcome otherwise than by our recognising and acknowledging in the spiritual life a universal life, which transcends man, is shared by him, and raises him to itself. That this transition brings with it a change in the appearance of life and of the world as a whole, and that as a result our striving is brought under entirely different conditions, needs more detailed presentation.

(*b*) THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MAIN THESIS

1. The Main Thesis and the Possibility of a New System of Life

(*a*) *The Development of the Spiritual Life to Independence*

Our investigation reached its highest point in the demand that the spiritual life should become independent of man. Man cannot produce a spiritual life of his own capacity: a spiritual world must impart itself to him and raise him to itself. It must be shown that this does not by any means signify a mere change of name, a new labelling of an old possession, but implies far-reaching changes, and indeed involves a complete reversal of the first condition. At the same time the course of the investigation must establish that this transition to the spiritual life is not something subsequently inferred or offered simply for the explanation of an otherwise unintelligible fact, but that it would overcome a false appearance, and help a misunderstood truth to its right. The fact that is affirmed should become an immediate experience of one's own and should advance life rather than knowledge. Only the whole investigation and not an introductory consideration can furnish a proof of our contention.

There are within our own soul distinctive movements tending in directions different from those of nature. We recognised that there is a life which proceeds from some kind of comprehensive whole; a life which transcends the opposition of subject and object, and evolves a self-consciousness in contrast with the relation to externals. All these features present a quite different appearance, form a more coherent whole, and will occupy a more definite

position in the representation of reality, if in them an independent life superior to mere man is recognised and acknowledged. The principal reason for this is that it is only by means of that deliverance from the merely human that the new life is able to express its own nature clearly and to realise as part of its own nature what otherwise seemed to have its source in something external. The individual traits that become evident are the revelation of a universal life, if they are no longer regarded as limited by the idiosyncrasies of mere man. With this acknowledgment they can gain ascendancy over man and prove their power upon him.

We saw that it is characteristic of the spiritual life that it is conducted from the whole; the elements are moulded by a comprehensive unity; the different complexes and tendencies which arise with this life strive ultimately towards a single realm. We saw also that it was absolutely impossible that the tendency to universality should be originated by man, whose chief movement is towards differentiation and division; and, further, that it should be realised by him in face of the opposition of nature, which extends to the immeasurable in matters great and small. The unity essential to this purpose cannot arise out of the many as an ultimate result; it must be original and be operative from the beginning. We may postulate such a unity only if the spiritual life is itself a universal life transcending that of the isolated individuals; if it bears in itself a unity which takes the multiplicity up into itself. And so the whole from an abstract conception is for the first time raised to a living reality; and only on thus becoming a reality can it exercise a distinctive power upon individuals and in contrast to individuals; and inwardly unite and essentially raise them. Only in this way is it conceivable that another kind of activity having its source within the soul may exert itself in opposition to the mechanism of nature and transcend it; and that selfishness and spiritual weakness may in some way be overcome. Man, so far as he shares in the spiritual life, is more than a mere individual;

a universal life becomes his own and works within him as a power of such life.

Further, the taking up of the object into the life process, the transcendence of the antithesis of subject and object, is characteristic of the spiritual life. But this remained an inner contradiction, a complete impossibility so long as the spiritual life was regarded as an occurrence in a being who, with a closed nature, stands over against things, as though they were alien ; and who can take up nothing into himself without accommodating it to his own particular nature. The contradiction is removed only when the spiritual becomes independent ; for then both sides of the antithesis come to belong to each other and are related to each other in a single life ; and a life transcending the division may develop, a life that produces the antithesis from within lives in the different sides and seeks in them its own perfection. The life-process is now seen to be a movement that is neither from object to subject, nor from subject to object ; neither the subject's attainment of content from the object, nor the object's becoming controlled by the subject, but as an advance of a self-conscious life in and through the antithesis. Life, by this movement, ceases to be a single, thin thread ; it wins breadth ; it expands to an inner universality. At the same time a depth is manifested in that a persistent and comprehensive activity emerges which lives in the antithesis. In this manner life first becomes a life in a spiritual sense, a self-conscious and self-determining life, a self-consciousness.

That this change is possible and brings with it a new type of life is shown with complete clearness by experience in the separate departments of the spiritual life. Thus, artistic creation at its highest is neither the production of the truest possible copy of an external object, the artist painfully abstaining from all subjective addition ; nor a presentation of subjective situations and moods, the artist endeavouring to the utmost to avoid everything objective ; but a transcendence of the opposition of soulless objectivity and empty subjectivity by an art that is sovereign,

autonomous, and with a character of its own; the creative activity belonging to which gives life from the soul to the object, and moulds the soul by means of the object. This kind of artistic creation is directed primarily towards an inner truth, not towards a truth that is produced by the object, but one that arises only in the contact of the object with the soul. It is manifest that creation is effected here not as an inter-action between subject and object, but above and through this antithesis; it is only by transcending the antithesis that the artist can give himself in his work, lend to it a soul, place an infinity within it. In this respect conduct manifests a character similar to that of creation. Conduct would never attain an inner stability and enter upon an independent course, if it could not raise itself above the opposition of a submission to orders that were forced upon it from without, and a mere play of subjective inclination; if it were not able to become the self-assertion and self-development of a life transcending that opposition. At this point also the acknowledgment of an independent spiritual life teaches us to comprehend as a whole that which, in a many-sided development, the different departments of life show to be real.

The obscurity in which the conception of inwardness was hitherto involved begins to disappear when the spiritual life is raised from a supplementary addition to an independent life. It cannot be denied that, within humanity, there is an endeavour to develop the life of the soul to a state of self-determining activity and, at the same time, to free that life from the bondage to sense, in which it remains at the level of nature. But definite affirmation that should correspond to the negation of sense was lacking; it was not clear how inwardness should find a content and characteristic forms; there was no advance from the subjective to the substantial. Now, however, since a universal activity is operative within the multiplicity and through the division, and since it sets itself in the division and from this returns to itself, a self-conscious inwardness becomes conceivable which has a life of its own with new

experiences. Since within this life " to receive " presupposes the comprehending power and the self-determining activity of a vital whole, something other than sense is able to evolve and through all the persistence of sense to become the chief matter. The spiritual life is not directed to a reality adjacent to it, but evolves a reality out of itself; or rather, it develops into a reality, a kingdom, a world; and so it advances from vague outline to more complete development; it struggles for itself, for its own perfection, not for anything external.

It is directly implied in the above conception that the spiritual life is something different from single psychical functions, such as cognition, volition, and the like; and that man, so far as he shares in it, is more than one such function or a sum of such functions. For these functions come under the antithesis of subject and object, while the spiritual life transcends it. It is also clear that the spiritual life does not change this or that in a life which already exists, or add this or that to it, but that it introduces a new kind of life—a life by which man is distinguished clearly from everything inferior to him.

If the spiritual life is an evolution of a reality out of the life-process, then the question arises as to how this reality is related to the world, that immediate experience shows us to be surrounded by. As surely as man in his subjective reflection is able to free himself from the world and to place himself in opposition to it, so there can be no doubt that the spiritual life belongs to the permanent reality of the world and, as we see it, grows up out of its movement. The transition to an independent inwardness is not something which comes to pass external to the world but within it: no special sphere, separate from all the rest, is originated; but reality itself evolves an inner life: it is the world itself that reveals a spiritual depth, or, as we might say, a soul. We are not justified in doubting and attacking this view simply because the spiritual life meets us only in man, and thus, in contrast with the infinity of nature, is in its external manifestation so insignificant.

For something essentially new appears in it, something that carries another order of things in itself: that little falls within our range of vision is in this connection not at all relevant. If anyone is disturbed and driven to denial by the external insignificance of the manifestations of the spiritual life, he shows only that he misunderstands what is distinctive and revolutionising in that life. The spiritual life is not to be thought of merely in reference to the experiences of the individual, but also to the work of humanity, to history, to the advance of culture. All these show us a development of life that presents the world from a new side; and this must be an important factor in the estimation of the world, especially if the spiritual is recognised as having a life independent of man.

The inward must necessarily present itself as the fundamental and the comprehensive; as that which in its invisibility sustains, dominates, and unifies the visible world. Nature, which there was a tendency to regard as the whole, is now of the essence of a wider reality and a stage in its development; it is impossible now for the conception formed from it to be regulative of the whole. Ultimately, therefore, reality cannot be regarded as something dead, detached, and given: it signifies to us something living, something experienced in itself, something sustained by incessant activity. At the same time, the lateness of the appearance of the spiritual life within our realm and the many ways in which this appearance is conditioned force us to acknowledge that the life of the world as a whole has a history. The conception of history that we have become familiar with in its application to nature and to the spiritual life throughout is now extended to the relation between the two. So many mysteries that it yet involves, a vigorous development of the conception of the world must be admitted.

Most of all, however, it is man with his life and endeavour that appears in a new light. Two worlds meet together in him, and, indeed, not merely in such a manner that he provides the place in which they meet and enter into

conflict, but so that he acquires an independent participation in the new world, and through his own decision co-operates in its development. For spiritual life, with its self-determining activity, can never become itself as a mere effect; to become this it must be apprehended and roused to activity as cause. But it is cause and animating power only in its being as a whole; so, as a whole it must be present to man and become his own life. Thus in contrast to the particularity of his natural existence a life, having its source in the infinite, grows up within him: in the former a mere part of a world; in the latter he becomes a world in himself: in the one, bound up with the particular nature of man; in the other, he is elevated above all particularity to something more than human, to something cosmic.

To such changes in the content of life there must be corresponding changes in its form. Empirical consciousness with its juxtaposition and succession of presentations and states cannot possibly comprehend the new life; to do that the soul must acquire a greater depth. It must be capable of an activity which, with single phases, extends into this consciousness, but which as a whole and in its creative work must transcend it. With the acknowledgment of an independent spiritual life in man two questions giving rise to different methods of treatment necessarily become distinguished: the one as to the nature and extent of the spiritual that is revealed in him; and the other, how, under the specific conditions of his nature, it emerges and establishes itself. It will become evident how important it is to distinguish these sufficiently, and yet on the other hand to associate them closely.

(*b*) *The Demands of a New System of Life*

If the acknowledgment of an independent spirituality thus alters the view of reality as a whole, and in particular of man, the question soon arises whether we do not attain

a new synthesis of life from this spirituality, and whether it does not begin a characteristic formation of our world. Our treatment of the philosophies of life of the present day makes it possible for us to approach this question with definite demands. We saw life branch off in different movements, each of which took up into itself a wealth of fact; but we found none of them strong enough to absorb the others into itself, or even able to estimate them. If life is not finally to fall into dissolution, it needs, in contrast to these movements, one more universal in character, and this can be more than a weak compromise only when there is a still more fundamental relation of life than that which the developments that we have considered proffered. It is essential that the more original basal relation shall be able to manifest itself as a presupposition of those developments; it must make intelligible how divisions can originate in the condition of man; in particular it must illuminate the opposition between the idealistic and the naturalistic systems of life—an opposition which, like a deep gulf, divides the life of the present. In short, it must depend upon whether the change that results with the acknowledgment of the independence of the spiritual life makes it possible for us permanently to transcend those oppositions and to work towards their reconciliation. But we should have to see that, with its universality, the system of life striven for did not fall into a state vague and lacking in character. Through its whole being, in affirmation and in negation, the system of life must definitely express itself; it must synthesise and differentiate, elevate and exclude. But it will be able to do this only if it produces a new kind of life-process and a new web of life: only thus can essentially new evaluations and tasks, new experiences and genuine developments, originate; only thus can life as a whole be definitely raised. Of course, this new cannot signify something that has just been discovered and that has arisen suddenly. How could it become a truth which gives us security, and how could it dominate our life, if it is not rooted in our being, and if

it had not exerted an influence at all times? But it makes a great difference whether the new has been concealed, obscure and against the tendency of our own activity; or whether it is taken up fully in our own self-determining activity and thereby essentially advanced. If, on the one hand, the new must be something old, on the other hand the old must become something new if it is to liberate, strengthen, and elevate our life where its needs are so urgent.

(c) *The Spiritual Basis of the System of Life*

There can be no doubt that the acknowledgment of the independence of the spiritual life involves the recognition of a new fundamental relation of our life. This relation is no other than that of man to the spiritual world, which is immanent in him and at the same time transcends him. It is more original than the relations implied in the systems of the present day; for these, even though contrary to their own knowledge and intention, all presuppose this fundamental relation to the spiritual life. Religion could not be so violently attacked and so zealously denied by so many, if the relation of life to God were the absolute relation and were present before all others. The value of religion depends essentially upon the content of the spiritual life which it serves. With the mere relation of life to a supernatural power, the nature of which is not more closely defined, with mere blind devotion, nothing of value is attained. An honest religious attitude of a formal kind can go together, on the one hand, with spiritual emptiness and blindness, and, on the other, with hatred and passion. How sad the condition of things in general has often been even when religion has shown a strong development of power! How often the help of divine power has been invoked even in the commission of crime! If, however, the value of religion and its effect on the substance of life are measured according to its spiritual content, then this content necessarily becomes the chief object of attention

and conduct. We can assure ourselves of the relation to a supernatural power only from the experiences of the spiritual life, and not previously to this life and independently of it. The relation of life to the spiritual life must therefore necessarily precede its relation to God; life must be certain of a universal spiritual character before it can assume a truly religious one.

We find the case to be no different as regards the system of Immanent Idealism. It is open to considerable doubt whether the world as it lies before us can be transformed into a pure unfolding of the spiritual life, as this Idealism asserts. In any case, for the spiritual life to comprehend the world within itself it must itself be established as a universal power, and clearly distinguished from mere man. Otherwise the way of Immanent Idealism leads to an anthropomorphism of a more refined kind; and there is a danger that the whole world which this system champions may be criticised hostilely and rejected as merely human. Immanent Idealism, therefore, also points to the problem of substantial spiritual life.

The naturalistic systems do the same thing in a different way, and this, indeed, in contradiction to their main contention. For, when they attempted to produce a system from themselves, they could achieve their object only in that they were implicitly based upon the spiritual life, and introduced again indirectly that which they had previously rejected. They are developments of the spiritual life in particular directions and under particular circumstances: they think that they are able to accomplish out of their own resources something which they accomplish only with the help of a fundamental spiritual life; and so the more consistent they are in their denial of an independent spirituality the more inevitably they lose all internal coherence.

Thus from whatever point we start we come to the question of an independent spirituality; an answer to this question is involved in every system of life. But as its implications are not distinctly recognised, it does not receive its proper

due: If we consider the question adequately, it will be found that a universal life must precede all differentiation and division; and that from this life each movement must receive a new elucidation. A multiplicity within the whole is quite intelligible, because it is a development of the spiritual life, not absolutely, that is in question, but in relation to the position of man and under the conditions to which he is subject. The desire to give greater stability to our life in opposition to the never-ceasing flow of appearances that constitutes our immediate existence, also compels us strongly to emphasise the importance of the relation to the spiritual life, which is acknowledged as independent. Without an elevation above this constant change all spiritual work must inevitably become disintegrated, and no truth of any kind would be possible to us. In the Modern Age especially there is a keen desire for a firm basis, as a secure support of life as a whole. But it is useless to seek this basis in life as we immediately experience it, whether in thought, in activity, or in anything else; for in the whole life of immediate experience there is nothing that is free from change. To seek this basis in a particular point is also to no purpose, even if one could be raised to a position above change; for it could not operate beyond itself in such a way as to support the rest of life. If, therefore, we would not submit to a dissolution of life, we must seek a basis for it beyond its immediate state and in a whole of life. Such a whole of life is offered only by the spiritual life, which, transcending man, is also immanent in him. Of course this cannot be taken possession of immediately at the beginning of the journey of life; but it is held up to us as an aim, and we can only gradually approach it. But how could it operate within us thus, if our life had not some kind of participation in it from the beginning; if our life were not in some way based in the spiritual life; and in progressive activity only developed the spiritual that is in it? For unless we are based in the spiritual life we should drift helplessly to and fro in uncertainty, and our endeavour would never be intelligible. From this

point of view also our relation to the spiritual life is seen to be the fundamental problem that must precede all others.

If there can be no doubt that the problem of life is comprehended most universally when we view it in relation to the spiritual life, there may be all the more uncertainty whether all characteristic form and, with it, all deep-reaching effect are not lost by reason of this universality. If the conception of the spiritual life involved its usual vagueness, this would in reality be the case, for recourse to it would not effect any fundamental transformation of the immediate condition of life; and we should not rise above the mere combination of its various movements. The case is quite otherwise if the spiritual life is distinguished clearly from the human and is acknowledged to be an independent world. So understood, it must show a particular content, a new structure of life, and must give a distinct form to everything that it takes up into itself. It is necessary to consider, also, its relation to the world of sense, and we may expect to be faced in this matter with complications and problems that will agitate our life in its whole extent, and set it in a new light.

In the spiritual life we recognised a new world, a realm of inwardness, which has become independent. Within this realm life cannot be directed to something alien, but can be occupied only with itself, with its own development. Its experiences cannot be related to externals; they must lie in itself. Now, have we any knowledge of a movement that reaches back in this manner to the elements of life? We perceive a movement of this kind clearly enough. In the first place, all development of the spiritual life shows, even within the individual, the attribute that a universal mode of thought, conviction, disposition, sets itself in the single function and continues present within it. The tendencies and manifestations of the spiritual are not all at the same level of development, but since a universal activity, a comprehensive and persistent deed, is present in the particular manifestation, the process acquires a

depth, and a single act is able to give expression to a tendency of the whole as well as to react upon it.

But this movement extends beyond the immediate state of the soul of the individual to spiritual work, and gives it a particular form. Life as a whole, as reality's consciousness of itself, may be regarded as throughout capable of a multiplicity, as containing within itself different sides and possibilities. Since its evolution produces this multiplicity, life as a whole can be present in the individual aspects and tendencies; expand them till they become different departments; experience itself in particular ways in these departments, and in so doing achieve a development of its own; it is able also to bring these departments and their developments into their relation to one another. Since thus, within the world as a whole, life concentrates in different ways, and the particular tendencies which thus arise meet and enter into conflict with one another, and since their conflict is in particular a contest to determine the form of the whole, there is revealed the prospect of a wealth of experiences which come not from without but out of the movement of life itself, and spring from its occupation with itself. The conflict between the different movements of life must bring the whole into a state of tension and lead it to further development. In the progressive formation of itself, in the development of a reality conscious of itself, life through its movement finds itself and develops a content. This movement will summon all the psychical powers of man to activity; it cannot possibly proceed from them. If we are to take part in the building up of that inner world, a spiritual creative activity from the basis of our being must be operative through these psychical functions, uniting them, and applying them as means and instruments.

If, for us men, life becomes conscious of its content only through movement and conflict, nevertheless this content may not be regarded as ultimately proceeding from them. If, as a whole, life did not transcend movement and conflict, if they were not comprehended within a self-conscious

and self-determining life, then they could yield no inner result, and could not lead to the further development of the whole. The attempts to derive this self-conscious and self-determining life from ontological conceptions such as "being," "whole," "movement," and so on, as the older metaphysics often undertook to do; or the tendency to treat it as a mere supplement to them, are to be dismissed most decisively. The fundamental qualities that the spiritual life evolves always presuppose a self-conscious life and become intelligible only in relation to it. Without it, the conceptions of the true and the good remain in complete obscurity, as will be shown later in more detail.

If our human reflection often advances from the indefinite to the definite, from the abstract to the concrete, this does not involve that the latter is originated from the former: this advance could not be achieved unless that which comes at the end was operative from the beginning as its basis and presupposition.

If a self-conscious life unfolds itself with an increasing content through all departments and activities of life, then these departments will have their meaning and their value primarily in that which they accomplish for the further development of that life, and in the particular tendencies that they add to it: this yields a treatment and a standard of value different from those which we are led to if we make the psychical states of the individual our starting-point. The treatment of religion, for example, as a mere occurrence of an unrestrained psychical life may understand by religion a particular agitation of this or that psychical function; but with this we do not obtain a spiritual content. Again, it is not evident how a world of thought formed from such an individual psychical life could acquire an independence of man, and lift him above the position in which it finds him. The problem of religion attains to quite a different basis if the spiritual movements and contents which emerge with it are emphasised; with this it develops and discloses the reality of the spiritual life more deeply. Then through it we may discover and

win something that alters the condition of life, transcends the immediate life of the soul, and is able to exert an elevating influence upon man. The value and the truth of a particular religion will be judged in the first place by the nature of the spiritual substance that it offers, and the degree in which, in its advance, it is able to join itself to the movement of life as a whole and to guide it further. A great divergence is possible between this spiritual substance and the movement and passion that call forth a religion on the basis of humanity: the real is, in human relations, by no means without further consideration to be regarded as rational.

The case of the other departments of life is the same as that of religion: the character and the value of all achievement depend entirely upon the range and the kind of substantial spirituality that they evolve. The same is valid of whole epochs and cultures, of peoples and individuals. The exertion of the greatest energy upon externals and the most revolutionary transformation of human conditions cannot protect us from becoming inwardly destitute, or lead us beyond mere appearance to genuine reality. On the contrary, the experience of history shows often enough that spiritual revivals have been accompanied in their origin and growth by manifestations externally insignificant; and that something which struggles against the broad stream of human life fundamentally changes the standards and values of our existence.

Our whole spiritual life, therefore, constitutes a problem; it is an indefatigable seeking and pressing forward. In self-consciousness the framework is given which has to be filled; in it we have acquired only the basis upon which the superstructure has to be raised. We have to find experiences in life itself, to reveal something new, to develop life, to increase its range and its depth. The endeavour to advance in spirituality, to win itself through struggle, is the soul of the life of the individual and of the work of universal history: where there is no endeavour of this kind, there is no true life and no genuine history; our

activity in relation to the world as a whole assumes a different form, and the world is represented differently and presents to us different problems according to that which is attained here in the basal structure of life. Life's struggle for itself, for its own content, its own truth, is the greatest and most intense of all struggles.

The passion which animates all the endeavour after a revelation of life and to win life itself is no other than the desire for a genuine reality : for a being within the activity, for a full as opposed to an empty life. If the formation of reality from within once begins, and the desire for a substantial inwardness gains the day over the merely subjective, then the intolerable inadequacy of all that is usually called life is bound to be strongly felt. The growth of intelligence has led man beyond the mere life of nature and its blind actuality. In intelligence, the inner life already proves far too independent to be satisfied with being a mere appearance accompanying nature. With this evolution the psychical powers win a greater freedom, and man is able to face his environment more boldly : indeed, in his thought he can grasp an infinity ; and in arousing and using all his powers he may hope from his own position, in the interaction of subject and environment, to give to life a content, and thus to make it a genuine life. But here the limitation of man and the contradictory character of life as it is immediately experienced soon come to be felt. All the rousing of forces, all the passing backwards and forwards between subject and object that we experience in the immediate condition of life, does not lead beyond interaction, and yields no content : it does not raise life to a self-conscious and self-determining life ; so that, in spite of all its activity, our life in this condition remains inwardly alien. There is thus an enormous disparity between the means that are offered and the aims that are reached ; an inward unrest ; an incessant conflict, without any prospect of victory, against the ever-recurring tendency to become spiritually destitute ; a state of dissatisfaction in the midst of all results of an external kind.

Only the revelation of a self-conscious life, a life which evolves to a reality in itself, can be the source of progress, and lead from appearances and shadows to a genuine life.

It is apparent that with such an aim a task is presented that dominates and comprehends the whole extent of our existence. We have to take up everything into that self-conscious and self-determining life and to transform the condition of life as it lies immediately before us. A demand of this kind is not limited to a change of this or that; it implies a complete transformation and renewal. It not only involves the whole multiplicity of life, but it must also itself tend to bring about an increase in the multiplicity; indeed, this task first gives the multiplicity a firm foundation and an inner value. For the development and the formation of self-conscious life, it is essential, as we saw, that life concentrate in particular tendencies and departments; that the whole place itself in them, and return to itself from them; and that by this they develop a life of their own and give rise to their own experiences. To act thus, to advance the whole in its own development, the individual concentrations of life must possess an inner spiritual unity which comprehends and dominates all multiplicity. This is seen in the case of individuals, peoples, epochs, and whole civilisations: only by overcoming the state of confusion and division in which they at first find themselves do they come to wrestle with the spiritual life as a whole and win a spiritual character. These unities of life, however, will enter into the most diverse relations with the whole and with one another; and since in so doing they further self-conscious and self-determining life, they develop reality without limit. From all the facts we have considered we see that, with the attainment of independence by the spiritual life, there emerges a distinctive kind of being which everywhere exerts its activity, holds up a new aim, and desires a transformation: life is for the first time placed on a firm foundation, and taken possession of in the deepest source of its movement.

(*d*) *Human Existence*

For the construction of a new system of life, this independent nature of the spiritual life is primary and most essential. This construction is dependent in the second place upon the relation in which the development of the self-conscious and self-determining life of reality stands to the position and to the activity of man; in particular whether it wins this position and activity for itself with ease or meets with definite opposition. Now, there cannot be any doubt that the recognition of the fact of the development of the spiritual life to independence of man, as we traced it, must make us feel that the condition at the average level of human life is most unsatisfactory. It is not that one or another aspect is inadequate, but that as a whole it is definitely opposed to the requirements of an independent spiritual life. For the spirituality that is evolved here is treated for the most part as a mere means in the pursuit of human welfare. Civilisation, at the level at which we are most accustomed to it, lifts man above mere nature, but at the same time it forces him into rivalry and conflict with his equals, and leads him to expect happiness from victory. This is the case not only among individuals but also among nations. Since the desire and the conflict for more generate an indescribable amount of excitement and passion, life seems to be full, whereas in reality it is entirely lacking in content, and behind the tumult is felt to be empty. But man has no intention of giving up all claim to a share in genuine spirituality: and so he gives a better outward appearance to his endeavour and his conduct, and practises deceit upon himself as well as upon others. Genuine spiritual life cannot possibly proceed from circumstances so contradictory and so confused. Neither can such circumstances produce the concentration of life that is necessary for the strengthening and advancement of the spiritual life. It is not the abuse of some one thing that provokes attack: it is not a particular failing, but the ordinary daily course which, unresistingly, man is accustomed

to accept as his world, that shows in its successes no less than in its failures the greatest divergence from genuine spirituality. It is just at the point where man becomes proud of his own doings and makes much ostentatious display that he can least of all conceal the inner emptiness and the foolishness of his way of thinking.

Attempts to attribute the responsibility of all limitation to man and his will, to find the root of all evil in the moral failings of humanity, have not been wanting. Universal religions have given these attempts an embodiment. It has seemed as though the harmony of reality is only disturbed by man, and as though his moral restoration were the only thing necessary to lead to all good. To be sure, such a way of thinking manifests a disposition of great seriousness, and it may appeal to the fact that the perplexity of our existence is nowhere more real than in reference to the ethical problem. Still, there is no possibility of doubt for the man of the Modern Age that this conception is too narrow; that it not only contradicts indisputable impressions and experiences, but also takes the question much too subjectively and too anthropomorphically, and thus falls into the danger of doing harm to the cause that it wishes to serve. It is not simply our disposition, it is our being as a whole and the circumstances that we are in, which obstinately oppose the emergence and the development of an independent spiritual world. It is the most elementary forms of life themselves that prevent the elevation of our existence to the level of a genuine spiritual life. We cannot blind ourselves to the fact that the greater part of our life is bound up with a form of existence in which it is not able to embrace the spiritual life. Any kind of appropriation of the spiritual—if it is at all possible —can be effected therefore only in opposition to that form of existence. In genuine spiritual life all movement should proceed from the whole and should be sustained by the whole, even when it is concentrated in the individual departments and tendencies. Human existence presents the spectacle of individuals ranged side by side; and if

a movement to overcome the original inertia is to begin at all, their impulses, their desire for happiness, and their conflicts are necessary. The spiritual life knows no limits; it works and creates from the infinite whole; the individual is narrowly limited, and with all his activity and work constitutes but a tiny point in the infinite whole. The spiritual life presents its content as transcending time; even if for us it is only gradually revealed, time is in this a mere means to the presentation of an eternal and immutable truth: man, however, drifts with time; is dependent upon the momentary situation, and experiences himself in an incessant change: how can he comprehend the eternal? Spiritual creation is effected in the transcending of the antithesis of subject and object: human endeavour is conditioned by this antithesis. The former with its self-determining activity transcends from within the attachment to sense: man even in the highest flight of his endeavour cannot withdraw himself from it. From the altitudes occupied by the spiritual life submission to the impulses and the goods of sense seems to be something mean and base: and yet without these man cannot possibly preserve his life; he has not conferred sensuous needs and desires upon himself by an act of will, but finds himself endowed with them from the beginning. Spiritual life with its formation from within banishes from itself all mechanism; all compulsion of blind actuality: without a mechanism in thought and in conduct, without habits and methods determined by custom, human life cannot attain to an enduring stability either in the case of the individual or in that of society. Thus, through the ever-present necessity of self-preservation and self-renewal, human life is compulsorily related to something, bound to something, that not only is not adequate to fulfil the tasks of an independent spiritual life, but is directly opposed to them. There is something in our life which we cannot dispense with, yet which, from the spiritual point of view, it is an imperative duty to shake off.

We see clearly enough that it is not merely our will that

is in play, but that two worlds conflict within us, and that the world to which we primarily belong, according to the testimony of experience, holds us fixed with superior power, and draws back to itself all movement which strives upward. If, in particular, the dimness and the weakness of the spiritual life in man; its severance from its source; its disintegration into isolated powers; and, finally, the moral perversity which human existence exhibits, and the debasement of spiritual power to a mere means for natural or social self-preservation, become clear to us, then it is evident that a compromise between such a pitiable and shallow confusion and a genuine spiritual life is absolutely impossible. The acknowledgment of an independent spiritual world tends only to increase the contradiction and make us more clearly conscious of it.

A clear consciousness of the inadequacy of mere man is especially important and necessary in contrast to the utter confusion which reigns with regard to the spiritual life and vitiates the whole of the endeavour of the present. The increasing transference of life to the world of sense has led the present age to abandon all inner bonds of mankind. The endeavour of Antiquity to lift our life above the insignificantly human by giving it a share in the greatness and magnificence of the whole, and the attempt of Christianity to give a new nature to life from the relation to God, appear to the present age to be Utopian. Since the faith of modern Idealism in the immanent universal reason has become more and more dim, man is thrown back more and more exclusively upon himself, upon man as he is, upon empirical society. There has grown up a strong belief that this empirical existence is quite sufficient in itself, and is able to satisfy its spiritual needs from itself. The ennobling of man, the improvement of his condition within this existence, becomes the aim of aims. Now, this presupposes that within the province of man, the good, even if it does not entirely preponderate, is still confident of a triumphant advance. It presupposes, further, that the establishment of a certain state of life will bring complete

happiness with it. At the same time, all that is disagreeable in human experience—the power of selfishness and pride; the weakness of love; the feebleness of all spiritual impulse; the incessant increase of the struggle for existence, with the consequent degeneration of the inwardness of the whole—appears with dazzling clearness to the more refined perception of the modern man. After even a little consideration he cannot doubt that, if, in spite of all limitations, an unclouded state of human well-being could be established; if all pain could be banished from our life, life would fall into the power of the other and worse enemy—emptiness and monotony. As a refuge from such perplexities there is a tendency to flee to society and history. From the point of view of humanity as a whole and with the thought of a better future, all defects and losses of individuals seem to vanish; the hope of an unceasing progressive development rises above the feeling of the unsatisfactoriness of the condition of the moment. But what are these relations of empirical humanity other than those of a mere collection of individuals who never become an inner community, and what is empirical history other than a mere succession which never produces an inner unity of movement? In the appeal to the former, as in that to the latter, it is only surreptitiously that something essential can appear to be acquired. In reality, conceptions are here made use of which in other relations have a meaning, but which here signify nothing more than empty abstractions, merely subjective constructions of thought. However, notwithstanding all the glossing over, the real state of things must ultimately assert itself: pessimism would have the last word, and the belief in a rationality in human existence would finally be given up. The faith in the greatness of the empirical man is, indeed, of all faiths the boldest. For, if the other faiths proclaim a new reality in contrast with the world of sense, they have the possibility of one in an invisible world. In the case that we are considering, however, experience itself must offer more than mere experience; we must not only be certain of a thing that we do not

see, but that which we do not see must coincide with that which exists immediately before us. Such a position is no longer a faith, but a gross contradiction, a complete absurdity.

(e) *Results and Prospects*

The immediate experience of man may by no means be rejected as a whole on this account ; if it were, spiritual work itself would degenerate and lack content. However, we only need to take up into a whole the impressions and experiences which each in his sphere acknowledges to be indisputable, and it will be clear that a movement toward spiritual independence can never proceed from such a pitiable state of confusion as that which is thereby seen to exist. It is essential that the movement toward spiritual independence have an independent starting point, and proceed on its own course. Only then is it able to select and appropriate the spirituality that exists in those confused experiences, and at the same time purify and strengthen it. We may most decisively reject all presumption to sovereignty on the part of the human realm ; nevertheless, for the construction of a spiritual world that realm cannot be dispensed with. For this construction is not peacefully and securely accomplished through the self-development of a spiritual power placed in us, as was supposed by those who attempted to construct the whole reality from a cosmic process of thought. If through the joyfulness of its faith and the definiteness of its undertaking this attempt captivated the minds of men for a time, at last it was frustrated by the fact that we men do not find ourselves immediately in the atmosphere of reason, but have first through toil to raise ourselves into it ; that we have to do not with absolute spiritual life, but with spiritual life under the conditions and limitations of human existence. Thus, in the first place an independent spiritual life, a universal self-consciousness, must work in us and be changed in our activity ; and this can

be accomplished only by a revolutionary transformation of life as we immediately experience it; only with the attainment of a new point of view. But if at this point of view certain fundamentals of a new world become evident, they are as yet only fundamentals, and, without the help of a world of immediate existence, without recourse to the movements and experiences of human life, they cannot be completely developed and embodied. The complete development of a self-conscious reality is by no means made possible through combining an original spiritual movement with experience, brought to meet it. For the spiritual life can be furthered by coming into contact with existence only so far as the spiritual life takes it up and transforms it; the situation is rather that the spiritual movement wrests a content from immediate existence and at the same time is raised in itself; it is a realisation of self through the other. The further the movement advances the more one may win one's own in what is apparently alien; the more that which is really alien may be separated and opposed. Thus we have a characteristic picture of human spiritual life; only the more detailed treatment can confirm it.

The matter of greatest importance to the whole, and the one upon which all hope of success rests, is that the movement towards an independent spirituality, to the building up of a new world, should, in spite of the opposition of immediate circumstances, become manifest also in the human sphere in characteristic operation, and that it should establish stable bases in this sphere and rise upon them to the heights by means of work. We have now to investigate more closely, to demonstrate more exactly, and as far as possible to show that at all the chief points of life such a movement begins; that one such movement advances another; and that all are associated in a community of striving, and that from here the spiritual movement that we see in history is lit up, strengthened, and for the first time rendered practicable.

2. The Transformation and the Elevation of Human Life

(a) *Aims and Ways*

The question before us is whether any kind of transcendence of the gulf between the spiritual world and man is effected; whether that world, in spite of its antithesis to the world of sense, manifests itself also with a characteristic effect in our sphere, and thereby inaugurates a movement which takes possession of our whole life and advances it. Only on the result of such an inquiry can we judge whether man is able again to establish his position, which has been so shaken in the course of modern culture; and to save the courage and faith of life from violent changes and convulsions. At the same time we must ascertain whether the representation of the spiritual life that we have sketched is true in reference to things as they are found in the human sphere.

To be sure, proof or verification through experience is, in the case of this problem, in the highest degree peculiar. No definite reality spreads itself before us by which we must test the validity of our representations of thought. Representation and object cannot be simply brought into coincidence, but as life, which we wish to comprehend, is found in movement, and as, further, in its immediate experience genuine fact and the form assumed by it in the idea of man are confused, so the revelation of the spiritual life does not come to us immediately, but has first to be extricated and wrested from the most diverse errors and half-truths. Every attempt to obtain proof from experience rests on the conviction that a movement of the kind, the recognition of which is being fought for by us, is already in some way in process everywhere where human life goes beyond mere nature; and that only the clear comprehension of the aim and the taking it up with complete self-conscious and self-determining activity are lacking. If now the aim which is presented is the right one, that is,

that which is implied in the spiritual movement of life itself, then its acknowledgment and appropriation must tend to the elucidation, the unification, and the stengthening of all endeavour tending in the direction of this movement; it must lead to a development and an elevation of life above the condition in which it is immediately experienced. In the first place, it must be shown that the connections, preparations, directions in life in its general condition, are for the new in accordance with its chief demands, but further it must be shown that the existing condition is raised essentially through becoming comprehended by the revealed universal movement, and is led to its own perfection. Again, it has to be shown that thus life wins a more precise content and a greater power in its every aspect: that which is present in all human endeavour as a necessary requirement must now become more intelligible, and at the same time from something impossible of fulfilment to something possible, and reveal new aspects and new tasks. Further, those elements which at first sight exist unconnected side by side and tend to limit one another must unite, and must strengthen one another. On the other hand, divisions must arise: it is as necessary energetically to reject that which follows wrong aims as to come to a peaceful settlement with that which errs only in the means. The antitheses which the work of humanity contains must also become intelligible, and at the same time a way must be prepared by which these antitheses may be overcome, not one by which merely a compromise between them may be arrived at. The breaking forth of the new must tend always toward the self-elevation of life; with arousing and strengthening power, it must take up the whole of life into its movement: it must demonstrate a transcendence of all the reflection and subjectivity of man, and this can be accomplished only through the disclosure of new forms and contents of life. Accordingly attention must in the first place be centred upon the pointing out of such new forms and contents.

The union of the spiritual life with man, its being firmly rooted in him, is seen to be at the same time something old and something new—something old in so far as it must have been existent and in some way effective from the beginning, something new in so far as its distinct emergence and its transition to a state of self-determining activity must alter the condition of things essentially; in fact, must turn life as a whole into a problem. Where the reality of man is reduced, as by Hegel, solely to an unfolding of thought and cognition, the present may find its most important task in the complete clarification and appropriation of the past; life comes to complete satisfaction in the drawing of historical achievement to itself. Where it is a question of the building up of a reality based on self-conscious and self-determining activity, when we ourselves share in such activity, we must find ourselves in an essentially different relation to things; and with all the connection with the past, life will press forward, changing and elevating in contrast with the whole past.

A contact, indeed a union, must therefore be established between the independent spiritual world—which in some way must be operative in us—and the activity of our own which struggles upward; and, through the gain of such a contact, that world must be led to more complete organisation: that which strives upward made secure, unified, and advanced. In this, it is essential that the movements and the demands which the fundamental idea of the spiritual life contains be present to our minds. The spiritual life appears, so we saw reason to believe, in the first place, to be something essentially new in contrast to the life of nature. The spiritual life is not the product of a gradual development from the life of nature, but has an independent origin, and evolves new powers and standards: new beginnings must, therefore, be recognisable in us if the spiritual life is to become our life. The new, however, manifested a development of the inner life, to

independence in opposition to its state of subjection at the level of nature, and so thus in man also the inner life must in some way come to itself and attain to freedom. We saw, further, that this development to independence cannot be brought about through new achievements in a given world, but that it needs the building up of a new world—a new basis for life: it extends even to the final basal forms; not any kind of activity could suffice, but a being within the activity, or, rather, a division of activity into something sustaining and comprehending on the one hand, and something demonstrating and producing on the other, is necessary. It is only thus that life became turned toward itself and elevated to a self-conscious life; activity to self-determining activity; experience to self-conscious experience. Man could not participate in such a self-conscious and self-determining life, if in him also a new life, a spiritual self, had not begun to form in some way. It is impossible for this self to be merely individual in nature: it can change the form of things and convey a new world only if it encompasses the multiplicity and experiences it as its own. An infinite self-conscious and self-determining life must not only include man within itself; it must become his own life, his true self.

To realise this life, this self, in more detail and to pass from mere impulse to fruitful work, such as the building up of a new reality necessitates, man must in some way transcend in his own sphere the mere juxtaposition of individual powers; connections must be formed within the realm of man that somehow deal with that task and advance towards its accomplishment in a way that is beyond the capacity of individuals. A transcendence of the antithesis of subject and object, that dominates the greater part of life, is also essential to the new life; an energetic revolution must raise life to a state of resting upon itself, to autonomy: and so in man also movements must appear in opposition to this antithesis—condensations and concentrations, in which life from being a movement hither and thither becomes a forming of reality from within. In

these connections only out of a self-development of life did a reality arise at all; and its content was not there complete at the outset, but was yielded only through the continuance of that self-development: it must be shown, therefore, that in man also life begins to turn toward itself, and that this makes it possible to attempt tasks which to our capacity are otherwise inaccessible.

It is necessary to acknowledge that in all the spiritual movement which appears in the domain of man, there is a revelation of the spiritual world: as merely human power cannot lead the whole to new heights, in all development of the spiritual life the communication of the new world must precede the activity of man. At the same time, where we are concerned with a life that is independent, and of which the activity is conscious and self-determined, the change cannot possibly merely *happen to* man: it must be taken up by his own activity; it needs his own decision and acceptance.

We shall consider the question of the possibility of this almost immediately: so much, however, is certain—that this necessity of a decision by man himself makes the matter far more complex and of far greater risk. The establishment of an independent spiritual life in man finds its chief enemy not in nature, but in the limitation and perversion of spiritual impulse through man's subordinating it to his own ends. The chief conflict is not between spirit and nature, but between real and false spirituality. Thus thought emerges in man, seeks a representation of the world and would in this attain to truth; but when this striving first appears, man is wont to treat himself as the central point of the whole, to measure the whole of infinity according to what it achieves in relation to him, and to see reflections of himself throughout its whole extent. And so we have the anthropomorphic way of thinking, the nature of which we have become aware of only through toil during the progress of the work of culture; a way of thinking from which it has needed even more toil to protect ourselves, and which, in forms often hardly noticeable,

is ever ready to appear again and to draw the spiritua movement into its paths. With the emergence of the spiritual life, man becomes more free in relation to his environment; more free also in relation to the necessities of mere nature: his activity can exert itself more independently, concern itself with lofty aims, strive towards the infinite. But all this capacity becomes drawn into the service of mere man; the wishes and the desires of the individual grow to an enormous extent. Since out of the struggle for existence, with its natural limitation, an interminable struggle for more existence arises, naive self-preservation becomes transformed into an unrestricted egoism. That the more-than-human which appears in the domain of man should be employed to the advancement of the merely human is a danger that is present even at the highest stages of development: at one time man would prove his own power in the more-than-human; at another, and this more especially, he treats it as a means to attain his material welfare. Religion, for example, would reveal to man a new depth of reality, and so create a new life for him; and yet, how often even this new reality is degraded to a means for the preservation of his insignificant personality and regarded as something which on his behalf guides the whole world aright!

The development of the spiritual life in the human sphere can thus be seen to be anything but a sure and steady progress; every step forward brings new dangers; unutterable confusion arises through the use and the perversion of the new in the interests of man. But, if the development of the spiritual life within man is thus an unceasing conflict against human error, this conflict, despite its exhibition of the littleness of man, is at the same time a witness to his greatness. For it shows not only that the spiritual movement needs the active co-operation of man, but also that there is a conflict within humanity itself against the perversion of the spiritual; that there must be more within man and operative in him than the narrowly human. Indeed, in nothing does man seem greater than in this

development of a more-than-human within the domain of man; in this severe and untiring conflict with himself. How could this conflict arise and become the soul of universal history if man did not possess a life and being transcending his particularity, and if he did not realise more in himself than we at the first glance see in him? The error of Positivism is that, although it shows most clearly how this spiritual movement dissolves the forms of life as it is immediately experienced, it does not perceive and value the fact that, at the same time, a new life, an inner life emerges; that, indeed, the negation itself is possible only through a more comprehensive spiritual revelation. To consider the negative and the positive in their relation to each other, and to weigh them one against the other, is the indispensable condition for the adequate understanding of human life.

(*b*) *The Nature of Freedom*

The rousing of a new world to life within man is a problem and a task: it cannot be effected unless the spontaneity and self-determining activity that are distinctive of this world also manifest themselves within him. Further, it cannot be effected unless within man, who with the greater part of his being belongs primarily to nature, a deliverance from nature is accomplished and the centre of life is removed to its spiritual side; and this cannot happen without the co-operation of man. We need freedom, therefore, in two senses: as the presence of an independent inner life, and as man's capacity to change—and we cannot fail to recognise that these are closely related.

Now, the impressions and experiences of modern life are opposed to freedom in both of these senses; indeed, with apparently insuperable force they oppose freedom in every sense. Modern science most clearly shows that man belongs to a great world-whole and world-movement; his life and work seem to be completely determined through

his relations in this whole; his whole life is subject to an irresistible destiny, and in all his undertakings and conduct he can only follow the course directed by it. This destiny assumes for us the most diverse forms; and through this diversity surrounds us on all sides. Through the power of heredity we enter life with a definite nature: in the family, the state, and the society a particular kind of environment surrounds us and gives to our nature its more detailed colouring: the age meets us with particular tendencies, takes us up into itself with a supreme power, and just as decidedly directs us towards certain ends as it diverts us from others.

Even in earlier times all this was not ignored, so far as the individual aspects are concerned; but the Modern Age was the first to conceive the problem as a whole, and with this it has pursued the idea of determination even into the inner structure of the life of the soul, with the demonstration that here also nothing is spontaneous, nothing unmeditated, but that even down to the most primary impulse everything depends upon something else, and proceeds from definite relations. From this point of view the idea of freedom, and in particular that of a freedom of choice, appears to be a mere remnant of an unscientific way of thinking. The fact that man feels—as an immediate impression—free in cases of hesitation between different possibilities has lost its power to convince the individual of the Modern Age. For the new mode of thought has evolved point for point along with an increasing divergence from the naive manner of representation, and it has won its greatest victories in opposition to this manner of representation. The revolution that Copernicus accomplished in the representation of the world has become typical of the whole of modern work; and as regards our problem also, dissent from ordinary opinion is less a cause for doubt than a recommendation.

However, our attitude in regard to this problem has, indeed, been essentially changed by modern thought. There can be no further talk of a vague freedom of the will, of a

capacity to act in one manner or another unaffected by anything that preceded and by the whole environment; the fact of the subjection of man to a destiny, both external and internal, is forced upon us with overwhelming power. Whether the idea of freedom in every sense is shown to be invalid is another question; perhaps the problem is not so much solved as put on one side. In any case, if a fundamental problem—one that has been discussed from the earliest times—is suddenly declared to be finally solved, the suspicion must soon arise that the solution appears to be self-evident only because certain presuppositions which are in no way self-evident are implicitly assumed in it.

The surrender of every kind of freedom meets in the first place with the suspicion that thereby far more is lost than we think or intend; that much is lost to which it is impossible to surrender all claim. Great trouble is taken to prove that the denial of freedom by no means does away with the possibility of an ethical moulding of life; but it might be shown without difficulty that, in attempts of this kind, either the freedom, rejected in its ordinary sense, finds entrance again altered and deepened—as, for example, in the philosophy of Spinoza—or the ethic that remains after freedom has been denied retains only the name, and in itself signifies something merely mechanical. But why do we insist upon the ethical; why does so much depend upon its continuance? For this reason: that upon it depends whether life merely *happens to* us or also *from* us; whether we are merely parts of a rigid world-mechanism or self-determining co-operators in the building up of reality. If the former hypothesis is true, we are no more than the platform upon which events become connected; and we can possess no other unity than a mere summation of the multiplicity. A unity of this kind could not possibly attain to independence and transcendence; could not make an inner judgment upon events, could not take up a conflict in opposition to the condition of life as it is immediately experienced. The conception of conduct would

inevitably be degraded to that of mere occurrence. We should cease to be an inner whole and a comprehensive self; we should not be able to speak of disposition and conviction: for it is of the essence of all these things that they cannot be imparted, but must arise newly and spontaneously just in the individual, and for this a concentration of life, an elevation to self-conscious and self-determining activity, is necessary.

Where an inner whole and such an activity are lacking, a true present does not exist. For if, through the all-dominant relation of cause and effect, that which comes later proceeds in certain sequence from that which came earlier, our whole existence is a mere stream of occurrences, and that which is called present is nothing more than the point of transition from the past to the future. Now, from such an apparent present a real present could be reached only if an independent task originated at this point, and a decision had to be made: the more our whole life and being here become a problem again, the more securely might we trust to the possibility of advancing beyond all previous achievement, and of a spontaneous breaking forth of new powers, the more would our life be transformed into a genuine present. A genuine present does not exist within the sequence, but above it; it cannot come to us opportunely, but must be attained through our own activity: it is our own work. It is, therefore, not a common and equal possession, but is differently constituted according to the individual. The present is the more real and comprehensive for us the more spiritual power we evolve and the more spiritual content we give to life. Thus the present is not a mere point in the succession of times, a mere ripple in the stream of appearances, but involves a counteraction to this flow; its formation is to be accomplished only with the placing of life in the region of the spontaneous, the independent, the time-transcendent.

All the losses in individual matters are, however, only appearances and parts of a universal loss that the surrender of freedom involves. This loss is no other than

that of an independent nature-transcending spiritual life in general. Spontaneity is no subsidiary quality, the disappearance of which might only involve a modification; with it, the spiritual life as a whole stands or falls. The experience of history also shows clearly enough that that which has in any way reached a spiritual height never persists by simply existing, but that, if it is not to degenerate rapidly, it must proceed ever anew from spontaneous creative activity. The law of nature, that everything remains in its existent state of rest or motion until it is acted upon from without, is not true of the spiritual: of it nothing abides that is not continually brought forth anew.

The surrender of freedom, therefore, means no less than the inner destruction of the spiritual life. And before we submit to this we shall feel compelled to make a more careful inquiry, to see whether the arguments against freedom are really so cogent as they are represented. They do exert a compelling force, but only so long as their presuppositions are admitted and held to be unassailable. That they are not unassailable will become evident as soon as we clearly recognise their nature and implications.

If the world forms a closed and "given" system, in which every particular is determined completely by its position in the whole, there is no place for spontaneity. The question of freedom has no meaning for man if he belongs solely and entirely to such a world, and within it has only to weigh his aims one against the other. But in accordance with the results of our investigation we contest these two presuppositions most decidedly. To an investigation that begins with the life-process as the basis of its treatment, it is certain that a "given" world never can be primary, but only secondary. That it may attain to an inner present it needs a life that is not itself "given," but with its activity encompasses a multiplicity, unifies, and makes it definite; for anything to be experienced as "given" a self-conscious and self-determining activity is necessary. If this self-determining activity can struggle upwards to complete power and consciousness only slowly,

still it is the first and the sustaining world; and at the same time it can never be asserted that the forms of its life are mere ideas and appearances. Life is not formed from existing individual points, and does pass between these points, but all multiplicity is sustained by an active whole, and from this whole animated ever anew: this active whole may not be conceived as dependent upon another, and it is quite capable of advance. We have endeavoured to show that the matter is not one of subtleties of thought, but of different natures of the world and of activity; and that with the attainment of independence a new world emerges. We have also shown that in us the new world must first wrestle with another, to which we primarily belong; that inner changes must take place in us; and that, if all our toil is not to be in vain, the relation of the two worlds must be changed.

Man, therefore, has a special significance in that the two worlds meet together within him, and in that there can be no change in their relation to each other at this point without his co-operation. The problem of his life concerns more than his conduct, it extends to his being; the question is, how far the different worlds become his own world, his life. The matter is one of shifting the centre of life from the position in which it is in immediate experience. Thus, the tension and the conflict involve the ultimate elements: each of the worlds has its own tasks and evaluations; things do not affect man with a given and fixed value, but they receive their value first from their relation to the main course upon which his life enters; and so all conflict concerning particular matters implies a decision concerning the whole. Of course, such a decision is not being made from moment to moment; and more especially, it is not made simply by reflection, but it is involved in the whole of life. Only that which in him, in endeavour and work, participates in such decision is true life; individual acts of external conduct only bring to expression that which has happened and still continues to happen inwardly and in the whole.

In all this the possibility of an inner elevation is presupposed. Everything that strives for an inner development of man, everything that, with clear insight into the meanness of the general condition of human affairs, unswervingly continues to strive for the advancement of humanity relies on this possibility: without it there is no hope of a development and a growth of one's own life, of an elevation of it above the condition in which it is first experienced. And so without this possibility endeavour loses all its true tension, and all that we are able to accomplish in ourselves and in others is no more than a dexterous use of existent forces. But is this condition of the matter, spiritually discerned, more than a mere discipline?

It is true that the possibility of an elevation has its fixed conditions; it necessitates particular convictions with regard to the world and to man. We must view the world as being still in a state of flux and regard man as not being merely a closed and limited individual. The infinite spiritual life must be present as a whole to him, and arouse a new world to life in him; his conduct must be rooted in the power and content of the infinite life: only thus can we understand that in man also a movement begins and a change is brought about. And so it remains ever an inderivable, original phenomenon, which we must acknowledge as a fact, that a spontaneous life breaks forth in man, a new and relatively independent life-centre originates. We always come back in the long run to original phenomena; the origin of living being in general is also an original phenomenon. May we deny the fact of such original phenomena, even though they make our representation of the world less uniform and simple? To do so would be nothing else than to make our previously formed conceptions the measure of reality; it would be a new, specifically modern anthropomorphism.

This freedom, with its requirement of a world of inner life that introduces new contents, and also that we belong in some way to this world, is by no means a capacity to make a decision capriciously at any moment; it is not a

denial of the power of necessity. Of course, it implies that there may be some kind of counteraction to this necessity; and that if this counteraction can attain success only as a result of the activity of life as a whole, even the individual moment need not be a matter of indifference. For, as the spiritual life has always to win its own height anew, so the present in its relations is not a mere consequence of the past: times of temptation can come repeatedly when all that which has been achieved becomes doubtful again; but times of elevation also come when an advance is made beyond that previously achieved. It is not possible for us simply to reject the present existence and all the conditions which constrain us, and to choose for ourselves a new kind of existence, instead of the one we have; from that it is impossible to free ourselves: in all further endeavour we have to take it into account, to make our peace with it. Nevertheless, life can attain to a transcendent point of view, from which the world of sense becomes the object of judgment and of adaptation; from which, to be regarded as completely ours, it needs acknowledgment and appropriation by us; and from which it is seen not to constitute our whole life, as that which is ultimate. Indeed, the tendencies within us, which are concerned with nature, first reach their highest through such acknowledgment and appropriation by us: placed on a spiritual basis they lose their rigid exclusiveness and become unified; our particular nature no longer constitutes our whole being, but becomes the central point of a more comprehensive life, which extends further and further to infinity.

Our life, therefore, is a conflict between fate and freedom, between being "given" and spontaneity; and this conflict may be followed through all life's divisions. The conflict appears primarily in the individual in the development towards personality and spiritual individuality. For, as personality, unless life has a spontaneous source, is an empty word, so also spiritual individuality does not come to anyone, but has first to be won by the work of life

essentially elevating that which destiny brings: so far, it is our own work; but it is not entirely our own work, because that which comes to us from nature, and the condition of life gives us fixed points of support and points out a certain course. Similarly, peoples have in their nature, environment, and history definite conditions of their being, from which they cannot withdraw. But spiritual creation and inward greatness do not grow simply out of these conditions, however favourable they may be, but out of a spontaneous activity which takes up that which has been presented to it, gives it a central point, and from this develops it. The deciding question is always whether and how far individuals and peoples attain to and preserve such a self-determining activity; this activity alone makes it possible for life to be unified inwardly; for its elements to be distinguished and separated, and for some to be brought into prominence and others relegated to the background; for life to be made secure and elevated, and as the result of all for a spiritual individuality to be formed. The same thing holds good of the condition of a particular time, and man's relation to it. At first man appears to be a child of his age, a slave of his age. But by the spiritual life he is able to win an independence of the age, and to make himself its lord. Again, he cannot free himself from the problems of the age; he cannot alter them just as he likes, cannot divert into an opposite direction the power which they exert upon him. But there is always an "either—or," either submission to the succession of experience, or the beginning of an opposition from spiritual self-determining activity; in this, also, the possibility of calling new powers to life presents itself. From this spiritual point of view activity centred upon the concerns of the particular age is no longer regarded as the whole life; the particular age with its work is comprehended in an infinite life. As through all its different stages and constituents, so ultimately humanity as a whole also carries on a struggle for a spiritual being, an advance to a new level. Humanity may not be

regarded as something finished ; it must evolve to a nature other than its present one, bring about a transformation of its life, and win a spiritual individuality : the life of humanity is in a state of motion and it must become self-determined.

The idea of freedom thus reveals far-reaching prospects and the greatest tasks ; it manifests its truth and power in taking possession of common experiences and illuminating them, and in the arousing and re-organisation of our life. With the acknowledgment and the adequate appreciation of freedom, with the revelation of its universal relations, man is elevated in the most essential manner, for it manifests the new world as active in the midst of his life and capable of appropriation by him : it calls him to independent co-operation in the conflict of the worlds ; it gives to the simply human and the apparently commonplace an incomparable greatness. However powerful destiny may be, it does not determine man entirely ; for, even in beginning opposition to it there is a liberation from it. However mean man's activity, it carries in it a decision between worlds ; however vanishing the moment, it is not entirely lost. True, the idea of freedom involves definite presuppositions : it involves, indeed, a profession of faith concerning life and reality as a whole, a profession of faith that contradicts every form of Naturalism and Intellectualism, and, in opposition to their representations of the world, champions another. But this profession of faith does not concern this problem only ; it is involved in our work as a whole, and so the whole may support and confirm it.

(*c*) *The Beginnings of the Independent Spiritual Life*

As the problem of freedom gains in clearness and depth in the relations which have been discussed, so also the beginnings of independent spiritual life which are manifested in the domain of man become much clearer in them. Without such beginnings, which represent a

new order in contrast to nature, and which oppose the degeneration of life to the merely human, a movement towards independent spirituality could never emerge in us. They are really intelligible and acquire power only when they are unified and acknowledged as the activity of a new life and being.

These beginnings appear in an elevation of life accessible to every individual, an elevation above the forms as well as the content of mere nature. We perceive this in the norms with which the research of the present is busily occupied. Our life does not consist entirely of simple matters of fact, but in certain directions qualities and forms are presented to it which are able to contradict the immediate state of things and to exercise a certain power over it. Thus the norms of thought, the norms of conduct and of artistic creation are evolved, each making particular demands, and being different in the manner of its operation. However, we are concerned here not with the aspects of difference, but with that which is common to all; and this consists in the working of an actuality in us that is something other than natural occurrence, an actuality that needs our acknowledgment, and through this acknowledgment first wins power over us. The demands which these norms make upon us are in no way convenient to us; they limit our caprice; they often cost hard toil and heavy sacrifice; our desire for natural happiness does not commend them to us. How is it then that we do not simply reject them? what is it that gives to them a constraining power over us? If they remained isolated and impenetrable experiences, if they adhered to us as something alien in nature, were mere foreign elements in our being, their power would be unintelligible. It is to be explained only upon the hypothesis that they are unfoldings of our own life, which by these unfoldings is proved to be something other than a mere life of nature. Unless they are rooted in such a life, the norms are like misty forms in the air. They obtain complete reality and motive power first as movements of our self, which then is no mere point by the side of other

points, but an independent manifestation of life of the spiritual world.

This is in particular clearly the case in the idea of duty, the elucidation of the inner meaning of which is Kant's greatest and most enduring service. A duty is always a command; it presents itself as independent of all caprice. At the same time, however, it can never be forced upon us by an external power; it needs our own assent and acknowledgment. Our own volition and being must operate in it, and, in this, being must present itself otherwise than as it appears to be at the first glance. We must bear and maintain within us a new world; in submission to its orders we must assert and develop ourselves. In this manner alone can we explain the joyfulness which accompanies all genuine performance of duty, and without which duty is no more than a task forced upon us. How much power duty, and the norms in general, may acquire in the greater part of human life is a question in itself; but they could not exist for us even as ideas and possibilities if they were not in some way based in our own being. However, as they show this being in a new light, it follows that they must themselves gain in clearness and in power and become more closely united if they are understood and treated as developments and modes of self-preservation of our own life.

It is with regard to content as well as to form that beginnings of a new life appear. At the level of nature only that which serves the self-preservation and the advancement of the life of the individual being is estimated as a good; all that is involved in this may be comprehended under the conception of utility. But notwithstanding its great power over man the consideration of utility does not form the only motive of his life. For a detailed treatment of this matter we may refer to what was said in the discussion of "The Growth of Man beyond Nature." At present we are concerned especially with the view that the new that appears in us should be acknowledged to be the manifestation of a new world and the expression of our real being. In the growing of man beyond nature negation usually

preponderates; he must limit the impulses of his natural *ego*, acknowledge and respect the rights of others, be ready to subordinate and sacrifice himself. It is for the most part not evident what could commend such a negation to him and give it power over him; and an impulse aroused to clear consciousness and strong desire may, therefore, feel this entire connection with a new world to be an unwarrantable limitation, and reject it as a violent intimidation and a degradation of life. The matter is seen in its right light only when negation is regarded as the reverse side of affirmation, and even then only if the winning of a new life and being is acknowledged in this affirmation. The positive impulse of self-preservation is indispensable to complete vital-energy, but mere self-assertion on the part of an individual in opposition to others does not constitute a genuine self; a genuine self is constituted only by the coming to life of the infinite spiritual world in an independent concentration in the individual. Only thus does life, which otherwise were empty, acquire a content; now the individual is no longer compelled to develop his powers in conflict with other individuals, but in directing his life towards this infinite spiritual world, in its complete appropriation and organisation. Hence, only that which raises the spiritual content of life can be regarded as good, and goods will be compared in value in accordance with this standard; the more they lead beyond mere results to the development of a new being and self, the more essential they are to spiritual self-preservation; everything else becomes a means or a preliminary condition. Negation, also, has greater significance and importance from this point of view. The new affirmation can acquire no complete truth and no real power in man without a fundamental deliverance of life from mere nature and its particularity: without earnestness of renunciation the new life sinks back to the old or both are combined in an undifferentiated unity, with the consequence that the new life loses its power to stimulate to new endeavour. As human beings are, this negation must always be a sharp one.

In this connection, it may be said that life needs the stage of law which restricts natural impulse, and constrains to the acknowledgment of superior organisations of life; but from the stage of law there must be a progress to the stage of love, which for the first time reveals an inner relation to reality and reacts upon the stage of law, giving it a soul. On the other hand, a love that would be genuine comes not to destroy the law, but to fulfil, to take it up into itself. As love and law are indisputable powers in the life of humanity, so they also proclaim the emergency of a new world and the development of a new being within the domain of humanity.

(*d*) *The Transcending of Division*

A particularly severe conflict with regard to the problem of the unity of life arises between the natural condition of man and the requirements of an independent spiritual life: the spiritual life demands an enduring whole which includes all multiplicity within itself and of which the movement originates within: human existence is primarily a juxtaposition of individuals and a succession of moments; no union seems to be more than that which is constituted by a mere collection of the individuals. If the division were not in some way transcended no spiritual life could grow up within humanity, and man have no share in the building up of a spiritual world. The nineteenth century gave a confident answer to the problem: it contended that history and society of their own capacity bind the elements of life into stable forms which take up all multiplicity into themselves and raise our existence to spirituality. We most emphatically deny the validity of this contention, and hope to show that history and society themselves involve difficult problems; further, that only when we conceive them in a particular way are they able to help in the unification of life and then only in a limited manner; and lastly, that they do not so much produce a spiritual life as presuppose it.

as essential to their own existence. Naturalism and Intellectualism have also confused the outlook; if we free it from this confusion, history and society will take a secondary place in our estimation; they will themselves be seen to be deeper and more comprehensive and to involve movements which extend further than appears in immediate experience; and they will become witnesses to the living presence of the spiritual life within humanity.

(*i.*) *The Spiritual Conception of History*

The nineteenth century transmitted to us a conception of history that is far more peculiar in nature and far more open to attack than is usually recognised: history is represented as a great stream which takes up all individual achievements into itself, unites them, and, regardless of all human error and caprice, leads surely to its end. No genuine achievement is lost, and all gain seems to be permanent; beyond all the trouble and uncertainty of the moment appeal is made to the power which, directing and elevating, permeates the movement, clarifies and refines it. In this conception the necessity of a process that has the power of determining its own activity and making its own decision is primary. The fact that the matter is not so simple as this conception of history represents is shown by the experience of the age itself, which directly contradicts it. For according to this conception the whole past should discharge itself into the present and so impart its whole result immediately to us, and the direction that our activity ought to take should be pointed out to us with complete certainty by history. But we are distinctly aware of the extent to which this direction is a matter of question and doubt, and of the uncertainty into which we have fallen with regard to the relation of the present to the past: in the process of our investigation we saw this in particular in the division and conflict between the different systems of life. History is seen to be a difficult

problem far more than a secure fact ; and we are compelled to take up a new consideration of the question.

In this consideration a distinct delimitation of the achievements characteristic of man is primarily necessarily. Modern science already recognises a history of nature, and much that was formerly regarded as complete is now seen to be in a state of flux and movement. Since every event leaves effects behind, in the course of ages the results accumulate, develop, and act upon one another, that which comes later is conditioned by the influence of the earlier and is intelligible only in relation to it, a distinctive historical method gains currency. Geology presents to us with particular clearness a history of this type. In so far as man belongs to nature and the spiritual life has not yet developed to any degree of independence in him, he is also the subject of such a history. That which happens within him leaves behind effects that become the conditions of later occurrence. This conception of history, as determined solely by mechanical causes, is still maintained in some quarters in spite of further development of thought ; but it is not apparent from this point of view how, even with the greatest accumulation of effects, history could yield anything of gain to an inner unity, to a life from the whole : for that, man must bring with him something essentially new ; and as a matter of fact this is what he does.

Not only do events happen to us and change our condition, but with our own activity we are able to hold fast to these events, to give to them an inner permanence, to bring them ever anew from the dim distance into the living present. We do not drift onward with the stream of time, but withstand it ; seek to wrest something fixed from " becoming " and change, and salvation in the eternal. We cannot do this without altering the whole view of things and manifesting a new spiritual capacity.

The retention in mind of individual events by means of annals, monuments and similar methods is the beginning of a history of a higher kind ; even so much shows a greater activity, since it involves a judgment of the significance of

events, and on the basis of this judgment begins to wage war against the destroying power of "cormorant devouring time." The achievement is incomparably higher, if certain spiritual unities and tendencies are adhered to and are given permanent currency: thus religion in particular gave a stability to life and delivered men from the tyranny of the mere moment. The matter remains simple so long as the movement is within a single people or a definite sphere of culture. But in its progress it goes far beyond these limits. New peoples arise; the state of culture undergoes great changes, indeed revolutions; life is taken up from new starting points, from which everything of importance to earlier ages loses its value. But it is lost only for the time; a desire to return to it and to bring it into complete harmony with the new is soon felt. The circle of vision is thus increasingly widened, and all multiplicity is finally united into a whole. This retention of the past is primarily a matter of knowledge and of intellectual appropriation. But it is not limited to this; it would operate not only in the extension of knowledge but beyond this in the development of life. Whatever has been won by human power is to be preserved, unified, and used to advance the present. Thus, there arises a historical culture; an education on a historical basis; religion and philosophy, art and law derive power and content from the work of universal history, and life as a whole seems to win a greater comprehensiveness and stability. And so it has come to appear as though the past imparts its whole result to the present without any effort on the part of man and without incurring him in any risk.

In reality the case is entirely different. The stream of the ages becomes spiritually significant to us only in so far as we develop an independence of it. The stream does not itself, automatically and independently of us, select the elements of value which it contains or unite the ages to a harmonious result: we ourselves must achieve this. Spiritually regarded, we do not from the beginning stand upon a sure foundation, on which we might peacefully

build; we must first acquire such a foundation through endeavour, and in this matter we see doubt and violent change continually make that uncertain which is apparently most secure, and make it necessary to seek greater depths.

For this treatment of history, involving, as it does, self-determining activity, an elevation above time is essential. Without in some way transcending time we could not survey individual events and unite them in one representation, but we would do far more than that; we would select and take up into our own life that which is valuable in the earlier, in order thereby to enrich and strengthen our life, and to lead it as far as possible from the present of the mere moment to a present encompassing the ages. How could this come to pass unless we were able to secure an independent vantage ground transcending the stream of the ages; a vantage ground from which we may survey and judge the ages, appropriate some elements from them and reject others? Experience shows clearly enough that the tendency and the content of life, with which we meet the past, decide what shall be its spiritual representation, and how we shall stand in relation to it. For experience shows that each main tendency of life has its own view of history and its own treatment of history; it shows further that every change in life which is in any way far-reaching involves an alteration in our relation to the past; gives prominence to the new, and relegates the old to the background. There arises therefore a history of history; a history, for example, of that which in the life of Antiquity has seemed essential and valuable to the different later ages. For us, therefore, history, in regard to its spiritual nature, is involved in constant change, the past does not decide concerning the present so much as the present concerning the past; the past is not something dead and fixed behind us; ever anew it becomes the object of passionate conflict.

But does not this dependence of the past upon the present deprive history of all independence and of all value? Does it not surrender life completely to the contingency of the changing moments? Does it not destroy all inner unity of

the ages? This must, in fact, be the case if the matter remained on a merely human basis; if a spiritual life transcending time were not manifested through all the changes of the ages; if a spiritual history could not be distinguished from a narrowly human one. Spiritual history is concerned with that which through all human activity and endeavour reveals a self-conscious inner life and which, as such a revelation, is valid not only for a particular age but through all ages and independently of all ages. Spiritual history would be impossible unless there is active within us from the beginning an independent spiritual life which first realises its content through the historical process.

Such a transcendent nature is most evident at those highest points of human development which we call "classical," not because they should dominate and bind all ages, but because in them the spiritual life attained to a complete independence over against man, lifted him above himself into the fire and flood of creative activity, and made it possible for him to produce characteristic contents. These classical achievements are especially important for the development of life if they not only bring something new in individual departments and in particular directions, but also shape and present the whole to us in a distinctive manner, and seek to appropriate to themselves, and in the appropriation to elevate, the spiritual impulse that exists in man; if a new being, in contrast to nature and society, emerges and would become lord of the whole. Life as a whole is thus transformed into a problem and a conflict. The question is whether this movement is able to take up everything into itself and to lead life to its highest level, or whether it meets with an insuperable resistance. In this matter life tests itself by itself, by its own development; a thing which is possible only if its experiences arise out of its being as a whole. If in a particular case it proves that essential requirements remain unsatisfied, that the movement is not able to include the spiritual life within itself, a severe convulsion is inevitable,

the spiritual life as a whole comes to a standstill, and there can be no advance until life concentrates anew and the new concentration gains ground. It is to be expected that a new concentration will bring forward and develop that, in particular, which formerly did not find complete satisfaction. In the first place, therefore, there is an abrupt break and the emergence of an apparently irreconcilable opposition: the old is relegated to the background; tested by the new, the old soon comes to be regarded as a complete mistake. In reality it is not so. For, as certainly as a spontaneous creative activity was operative in the old and produced characteristic contents, it involves something which, superior to all the change of time, will survive convulsion and doubt, and assert itself in some way in a more comprehensive life; but the old will not survive and re-assert itself unless the timeless reality within it separates itself from all human and temporary addition; unless it manifests what lies behind its historical form.

The same thing happens in the case of the new movement that arises. With all its greatness of achievement, limitations become manifest in it; even more comprehensive forms arise; and so in the historical movement as a whole the spiritual life is revealed in forms continually increasing in content. In opposition to the tendency for one age to be separated from another, however, a desire for unity, for a life which in some way embraces the multiplicity of movements and concentrations of life, and binds them into a whole, makes itself felt. A unity can hardly be achieved by simply regarding the different concentrations and tendencies as on the same level and making a compromise between them; rather it is necessary that the different concentrations and different movements contend with one another; it is just their conflict which may elevate and deepen life. The movement to secure this unity and to retain elements from the past is not an accumulation of elements and tendencies in time, but an increasing deliverance from time, the establishment of a timeless truth

independent of the change of things. Experiences, of which the external manifestations no longer exist, are again called to life, and preserved for all time by spiritual power; indeed, that which is lost in immediacy by the absence of the external manifestation is more than compensated for by an advance to the source of the power: things which in their temporal form are a mere coexistence are transformed into an organised whole. Movements, which in history have often been engaged in passionate conflict, may enter into a relation of interaction, and may be regarded as a sequence of stages, in which the earlier prepares for the later, and the later presupposes the earlier; in which all give life to and further one another. A universal life thus progressively arises within the domain of man; the individual achievements unite more and more in order to build up a new, enduring world; the whole realises itself in the individual occurrence, and through the development of a time-inclusive present transcends the mere moment.

This movement of life in history involves more unrest, conflict, and doubt than the nineteenth-century doctrine of evolution implied. For this doctrine saw in the historical movement the unfolding of a spiritual life, sure as regards its foundation and its main direction; the antitheses within that movement seemed to be involved in a single process, which determined the limits of each tendency in relation to the others; a transcendent necessity was regarded as leading to the development of all in their relation to one another. As a fact, the conflict is also concerning the substance and the main direction of the whole; the spiritual life must first realise itself within the region of mankind, and it is realised through the toil and work of man himself. It is just the fact that the problem is an ultimate one, that even the fundamental forms of life develop only in conflict and experience, and that we are concerned not with winning simply this or that in life, but genuine life itself, that makes history significant: at the same time, this brings man into a more inward relation to the spiritual life, and this life is made more

his own life and being than if he were surrounded by the power of physical or intellectual processes. Nothing makes humanity as a whole more significant than that in its province and through its work the new world begins to develop.

With such a conception of history, the philosophical treatment of it must direct its attention chiefly to the independent spirituality which in the course of the centuries, and especially in great changes, is evolved in contrast with the merely human; and to the main direction which is given to life by this spirituality. The philosophical treatment of history ought first of all to trace the liberation of life from the mere human; the inner elevation of our being to a more-than-human. Antiquity at the height of its spiritual development began to desire a universal truth independent of man; a moulding of life in accordance with an inner right; and an order of things beyond the power of human caprice, as was shown by the giving symmetry and harmony precedence in art, and justice in conduct. Christianity brought about a liberation of the innermost disposition, the root of endeavour and of love, from merely natural impulse, however ennobled; and in this way brought men into new relationships and set them before new tasks. The Modern Age on the part of science began a relentless conflict against the anthropomorphism of the mode of life as immediately experienced; thus it has made the spiritual life even in its form independent of man, in that it has created spiritual complexes and has recognised in them movements and inner necessities of their own. Through the whole of this movement of universal history life frees itself more and more from its dependence upon mere man, and from the bondage to "given" presuppositions and "given" natural impulses, and from a "given" world in general. Life is based more and more upon its own independent nature, and from its position of independence develops a new kind of being. It is this gain of a new world through struggle that alone gives to history a meaning and an inner unity.

If history thus accomplishes the formation of great spiritual complexes, and if there is an endeavour to fit these with all their antitheses into an all-comprehensive whole, if it unites all ages and all powers with the bond of a universal task, it is a clear witness to the living presence of the spiritual life within the human sphere. Apart from this presence all these achievements would be impossible, and the whole movement must vanish into thin air. The estimate of history here given is valid only when a spiritual history is clearly distinguished from merely human history. Only when history as a whole gains a soul and a support from this spiritual history are the non-spiritual factors able to attain to any rational significance; only then can history have a meaning and transcend the relativity from which otherwise it cannot escape. On the one hand, history demands for its own existence the presence of a spiritual world within humanity; on the other, it testifies to this presence by that which is characteristic in its own content; by that which can be understood only as a progressive disclosure of such a world.

(*ii.*) *The Spiritual Conception of Society*

The problem of society is closely akin to that of history. In the life around us a certain union is attained in that men dwell together, but this immediate union does not simply of itself produce a spiritual unity, a spiritual whole: if society manifests such a unity, then in it, also, a distinctive revelation of the spiritual must be acknowledged.

Modern science shows clearly and distinctly that the individual is not an isolated atom, but exists in relation with a social environment; and that, even to the innermost recesses of his being, he is determined by the constitution of this environment. But science falls into serious error if it goes beyond the truth of this contention and attempts to represent spiritual creation as the result of the mere inter-relation and accumulation of individual

powers. For between spiritual creation and this interrelation and accumulation of individual powers, in spite of all their external proximity, there is the widest divergence. Spiritual creation requires to be treated as an end complete in itself, and must follow the laws of its own being; it claims an inalienable supremacy above all trivial human interests, which yet for a time dominate the common life. Further, it cannot succeed without the development of an inner unity which maintains and characteristically forms a whole of life. The existence of men side by side gives rise to a variety of opinions, strivings, dispositions, which mingle confusedly together; the usual condition of things that arises from this confusion has anything but a definite character. The condition of our own time must convince everyone who is unprejudiced how little this pitiable confusion can of itself produce anything spiritual and associate men together in an inner unity. For in the epoch of railways, telegraphs, and newspapers, of large towns and of factories, movements of the masses are certainly not lacking; they surround the individual and influence him more strongly than ever before. But where, out of all the fluctuation of public opinion, out of the confusion and bustle of life, does creative spiritual activity arise, give to life an inner content, and unite humanity in an inner community? Rather, we see humanity continually split up into opposing factions; we see the strife tend more and more to affect the foundation of our existence.

However, in spite of the spiritual impotency of the movements of the masses, creative spiritual activity has emerged in humanity, has overcome the separation of the individuals and inwardly unified the forces of life. It must not only be possible to effect, but we must actually effect a unity which transcends the individuals, a union which has its source in the spiritual life itself.

In reality the experience of humanity shows such a union. Of primary importance in this connection is the fact of the power of so-called "ideas" in history—the fact that certain aims transcending natural welfare win

power over the whole domain of culture, bind men together and lift them above their selfish interests. To be sure, in the movements which arise to carry out these ideas much that is insignificantly human is introduced; and the interests of individuals and of classes often largely preponderate, but the origin and the progress of these movements cannot be accounted for by the merely human; they are only to be explained as due to man feeling directly within himself the necessity of spiritual tasks. If he only feels this necessity under particular conditions, and if it is only for a short time that it asserts itself at its highest, still it extends its influence over life as a whole, and is everywhere a unique phenomenon even when limited and confused by much that is alien to it.

Further, the fact that whole peoples developed distinctive national characters is of importance in this connection. Such a character is distinguished essentially from all mere participation of common conditions, not only physical but also psychical, that social life brings with it. For the development of such a character life must rise to energetic activity and become unified; there must be an advance towards a common goal; an active relation must be entered into not only to the environment but also to itself. A national character, therefore, is not given, but is attained through the work of history; it develops only through common experiences, sufferings, and triumphs; in its origin and its continuance it involves an elevation above the aims of physical and social preservation, a development of pure inwardness.

Finally, no inner relation of humanity proceeds from the physical association of men, from their meeting in a common world. If a vital whole, a common truth, did not exist within us, all our relations would be external: we could not follow common aims in life and endeavour or have common experiences; we could not think and live for one another, or develop spiritual contents in different departments, such as those of law and religion, science and art, and give to them a cognate spiritual character. It is always

the presence of a self-conscious reality that binds humanity together inwardly. We can be as certain in our acknowledgment of this presence as we can that our experience shows such an inner unity in important achievements and in the formation of whole departments of work and other complexes.

With its acknowledgment we avoid the violent contradiction that is shown in the contemporary estimate and conception of humanity. To our more dispassionate consideration of things the disagreeable aspect of the social machinery, the growing sharpness of the conflict, the passionate eagerness of the desire for more, the inconsistency between the enormous amount of subjective excitement and the spiritual poverty, are clear. Logically, this confused and self-contradictory state of affairs ought to lead to a rejection of the whole, and to a pronounced pessimism. Yet humanity is regarded as noble and worthy of respect; it is made the value of all values; the object of our faith and our hope; all our efforts are directed towards its well-being. And this is done without it being perceived that thus the basis of experience is forsaken and that the impression of humanity obtained from experience is bluntly contradicted: the introduction of an abstract conception seems to alter everything and to lead to its being regarded as good. In the shattering of beliefs at least this one has remained: belief in the power of abstractions. He who would abandon this belief and at the same time hold fast to the high estimate of humanity must admit that a spiritual world is active in man, and in so doing acknowledge that man is more than he appears in immediate experience. Such a one would feel increasingly the necessity of actively comprehending and definitely distinguishing from the medley of trivial social concerns every manifestation of a spiritual world in man. It is not out of society but in conflict with it that everything great has grown. And yet that which is great is rooted in a whole of life. Spiritual work must have its basis in this invisible whole, not in mere society; and from this position it must protest against

the presumptuous claim of society to build up the spiritual life of its own power. The community that proceeds from a spiritual union will be primarily an invisible one; but whether this invisible unity could not realise itself better and be effective also in the visible world is a serious and difficult question that continually becomes more urgent.

If the conviction that we have here given an account of definitely contradicts the historico-social view of life which was so potent in the nineteenth century, and which deeply degraded the spiritual life and its self-conscious and self-determining activity, it by no means fails to recognise the significance of history and society; and has no intention of taking up again the mode of thought common in the period of the Enlightenment. History and society are indispensable means for the development of the spiritual life in humanity: from mere individuals and from individual moments it could attain neither content nor power. But to declare for this reason that history and society are the generating basis of the spiritual life was a definite error; though in the historical movement of the problem it certainly finds an explanation and an excuse. The higher estimate of history and society has grown up on the basis of Idealism; to Idealism the spiritual life seemed to live and first to attain to its complete truth, in history and society. Later on, life diverted its attention and activity from a world of thought chiefly to the world of sense; and with this change history and society lost their spiritual foundation and their animating soul. Nevertheless, their claim to produce the spiritual life remained; they were expected to achieve of their own power more than was possible even with the greatest exertion. In truth they can bring forth spiritual contents, and serve the development of the spiritual life within man, only under the presupposition of the presence of a transcendent spiritual life. At the same time their achievement in the combination of forces and in the production of spiritual results is a witness to the reality of the spiritual life.

(e) *The Elevation of Life above Division*

We saw that the spiritual life reaches an independence only if it does not merely bring about an effect upon a world independent of it, but produces a reality from itself; concentrates so as to become a reality itself. At the first glance man seems by no means to satisfy this demand. For his life, after, in its progress, rising above its initial stages, in which it was undifferentiated from the environment, is subject to the antithesis of man and world, of subject and object, and the divergence seems to increase continually in the course of his development. The more power the life of the soul wins, the more it produces a characteristic content, the freer and more active reflection becomes, the more does the world recede before man, the more definitely is immediate contact with the world prevented. The gulf is not bridged by the epistemological consideration that that over against which we place ourselves must also, fundamentally, belong to our own life, be in some way included within it: this treatment signifies a removal of the antithesis to another region rather than an inner transcendence of it. A genuine transcendence cannot be effected without an expansion and development of life, evolving new connections which transcend the division, and lifting us into a sphere above mere subjectivity.

Connections such as these are, as a fact, brought about by an expansion and development of life; but these connections which in their individual appearances are evident to all are seldom adequately estimated as a whole, and in respect of the problems to which they give rise. These connections are effected in work, in work as a spiritual occurrence. We have already seen how in work the object loses its alien nature and is taken up into our own life; we must now follow more closely the process by which work is extended and deepened; produces a characteristic sphere of life and establishes a spiritual reality in the domain of man.

At first we are occupied in work with an abundance of individual tasks that have no inner relation to one another. But the more work advances from an external contact with objects to an inner change of them, the more necessary is it that these tasks should be unified so as to form a whole ; and that each task should have its position in this whole, and represent in itself a particular aspect of the whole. The proof of greatness in a " work " is just that the nature of the individual aspects is determined fundamentally by their relation within the whole ; that what is characteristic in the work as a whole is manifested even in its simplest elements ; thus, for example, every independent thinker has particular views with regard to the nature of the fundamental forms of logical thought such as the concept and the judgment ; in the same way every independent artist creates his own language of forms. Work not only leads to a unity of life in the case of individuals ; but, further, without a union of individual forces for a common end, without an organisation of all human work, we should stand defenceless in face of the infinity of the world, and we could never advance to a state of culture. In such community of work man creates a new sphere of existence for himself ; he forms his world of work and sets it in contrast to everything which does not come within it. This world of work transcends the individual ; and yet it is our world ; it is sustained by human power and, directing and forming, reacts upon man. For, the more unity this world of work acquires and the more control it wins over the object, the more definite departments and relations it evolves in itself, the more does it manifest characteristic laws and methods which, with superior power, prescribe to human activity its nature and direction, but which can originate nowhere else than in the domain of man. And so within the domain of man we rise above all caprice and subjectivity : since the law of the object determines man's work, his life is raised above the antithesis between soul and object. Work is not something that man, essentially perfect, undertakes incidentally, and as something supplementary, but it is

that through which he first develops a spiritual life; through which he acquires a spiritual existence; and the character of which determines at the same time the nature of this existence. As the individual departments of work evolve characteristic modes of thought and conviction, so out of work as a whole a particular spiritual nature arises which does not exist in relation to a world external to it, but contains within itself a world formed by its own activity. All this, in conformity with our fundamental conviction, involves the implication that man is not a spiritual being from the beginning, but only has the potency to become one.

Such a raising of the aim which is set to work involves an increase in the amount of toil that it necessitates, and the dangers which are incurred: the object and the encompassing life are subject to these dangers. For the complete success of work and the formation of a genuine self, it is as necessary that the object be taken up entirely into the process of work as that there should not be another vital unity more ultimate than the self which grows up in the work, but that the self should form the final conclusion: whatever is not taken up into the process of work lessens its content, weakens its power, endangers its truth, and prevents just that from being achieved which is here in question. If, however, we consider the opposition that arises at different points, genuine work is seen to be a high ideal, an infinite task which even in favourable cases is only approximately fulfilled. At the same time it is a witness to the sway of elevating and modifying powers within the domain of man.

The object is concealed from man chiefly by his own inclination to treat himself as the centre of reality; to transform the environment into a reflection of his own being; and to measure the infinite by the standard of his own well-being. Along with this humanising of the environment, man develops the most diverse forms of occupation with it, but however far such occupation may be extended, it does not lead man beyond his own domain; it does not aid him in his spiritual progress. It is possible for occupation

upon the environment to aid spiritual progress only when things attain an independence, and from this firmly resist the tendency of man to represent them in accordance with his subjective wishes; only this independence of the objective makes it possible for it to arouse new powers in man and for his life to be based on something deeper than immediate feeling and desire, and to begin an inner transformation. But this movement has various levels which differ distinctly from one another; and from the position of a higher level it is difficult to regard the achievement at a lower one as genuine and complete work. The Modern Age with its exact research often cannot regard the work of early natural science as work of high value. A similar gradation is evident in the striving for happiness; for the raising of human well-being. So long as endeavour is directed to attaining and preserving mere subjective states of feeling, and so long as a movement beyond this subjectivity is not acknowledged to exist within man himself, and the requirements of this movement are not satisfied—as is the case with Epicureanism and Utilitarianism—endeavour, earnest as it may be, does not acquire the character of spiritual work; it does not essentially advance life, and therefore in the long run does not satisfy human needs. Epicureanism and Utilitarianism with all their results inevitably become insipid and empty to him.

If there are powerful hindrances to this endeavour for something more than the subjective, there is at the same time a wealth of movement which bids defiance to them, and the course of history shows continuous expansion and development of this movement; it shows that man is able to take up a conflict against the trivially human, and, in the building up of a new world, to raise himself essentially above his original condition. Exact science breaks away from the object of perception, removes it to a distance, analyses it there, ascertains its laws, and then restores it in changed form to men: in this it also advances human life in itself, in that thought rises more freely above perception, and a system of pure thought sustains the whole world of

sense. A further divergence between the struggle for physical existence and the building up of a new world appears in history in the endeavour for happiness and a significant content of life. In the experience of humanity, morality and religion, looked at inwardly, assume two fundamentally different forms. On the one hand they are looked upon as a mere means to support man in a given world; to bring him into congenial relation with the world; and so to organise this world that it may achieve as much as possible for human well-being. This form governs human experience at its general level, and easily comes to be regarded as the only form. At higher levels of creative activity, however, a totally different form made its appearance: there was a break with the whole world of sense and well-being as though with something intolerably narrow, and in a self-conscious life a new world arose and brought forth characteristic contents; the appropriation of this world raised life above all mere particularity and subjectivity; at the same time this appropriation became an infinite task and work for man and for humanity as a whole. If this form of religion and morality has been manifested with complete clearness only at high levels of life in history, from these heights this form has also exerted an influence upon the rest of life, animating and raising it; indeed, it is only this genuine conception of religion and morality which first gives to them an independence and a value in themselves. Thus, along with the inadequacy of merely human achievement we cannot but recognise that life transcends mere subjectivity and the separation that it involves.

In another direction complexities arise in that something objective is evolved and established which, however, is not brought sufficiently into relation with life as a whole and united with it. Then, work may progress within its own province constantly and vigorously, but it loses touch with our soul; we do not realise or develop ourselves in it. With all the feverish tension of individual powers work here is inwardly alien to us, and its power over us

may become a heavy oppression. Through such a detachment from life as a whole work loses soul and is nothing more than mechanical; in short, we have all those results of division between work and soul which we may feel with particular acuteness in the contemporary state of culture. Experiences rising from this division lead us to demand that work shall be so organised as to be capable of taking up life as a whole into itself, and of becoming with this our true self. Again, life as a whole cannot enter upon work as complete, for then it would force something alien upon work, and by this pervert it; life as a whole can proceed only out of the unification and elevation of work itself. We do not begin and carry on work as a fixed individuality, but we form individuality first through work by the continual overcoming of the opposition of subjective disposition and object; spiritual contents are not produced by a communication of something that is in itself complete to something else that is in itself complete, an interaction of disposition and object; rather must we say that genuine work sets both sides in motion and with elevating power unites them in a single life. So understood, every movement which tends to the development of spirituality in individuals, peoples, ages, and finally of humanity as a whole, is a witness to the possibility of a transcendence of this opposition, of the emergence of a reality within the life-process.

We cannot give work a spiritual nature in this way, and make it the instrument of a new reality, without being compelled to acknowledge that there is much less genuine work among men than we are accustomed to assume. On the other hand, we must also recognise that the little that there is signifies much more, and indicates much greater advances of life than it is usual to admit. Nothing differentiates individuals and ages more from one another than the extent to which they take part in genuine work; the degree to which they transform their life in such work. Mere reflection and good will can accomplish very little in this matter; without an energetic nature, a strong

inner disposition with a definite tendency, as well as the favour of destiny, not much can be achieved. What is usually called "life" is only a will to live, a straining after life; it yields but an outward appearance and a shadow of life: genuine life is first brought forth by that transformation.

But the less human existence in general immediately includes genuine work, the more indispensable is it that there should be firmly rooted tendencies to such work in the basis of our being, and that these tendencies should be developed to greater clearness of form and to greater effect in the work of universal history. So that our work may not be split up and destroyed, we need definite syntheses that establish a structure of life. On the one hand we must accomplish an analysis into individual tendencies and departments of life which, operating independently, generate life; and on the other hand we must find a unity of endeavour among these tendencies and departments; a movement from one to another; a common activity directed towards the building up of a new world. These syntheses must be an immediate experience at each point; they must be involved in all division of work; everywhere set distinctive tasks; produce characteristic achievements; and in energetic organisation of existence elevate it to the level of a characteristic system of life, full of power, which presses forward to further development. Only thus could a movement originate which might expand to a real whole and be capable of establishing this whole against the world as it is for immediate experience; only thus could humanity defend itself against the power of the environment and of destiny.

Experience alone can decide whether our life contains such syntheses, and whether by means of them it forms a whole: the movement of universal history shows that there are such syntheses. The natures of these syntheses give to the chief epochs of culture their distinctive characters, by which the natures of their elements and of the relations between them are determined; and man

acquires a definite relation to the world and can make a judgment upon it. Such a synthesis, with its life-penetrating and life-forming power, certainly contains some truth; it is not a product of merely human reflection and imagination. The course of time and the changes of history, therefore, cannot simply break it down completely; rather with the truth that it contains such a synthesis elevates life above time into the eternal. But it has not been demonstrated that life is capable of only one synthesis, or that it could not produce a variety of such: life does not necessarily realise its unity in simply establishing a single synthesis; it can seek unity in the supremacy of a chief synthesis above others: that experience in our own sphere of culture shows the latter to be actual we intend to indicate in a few lines.

A characteristic synthesis first made its appearance at the height of classical Antiquity. It was art, chiefly plastic art, that determined the nature of this synthesis. Form as a unifying and systematising power is at the centre of life, takes possession of matter and organises it, transforms chaos into a cosmos; and in this exercise of power it realises itself, even though its fundamental nature is regarded as transcending all change and variation. Spiritual work is formative and selective; it is the triumphant realisation of form; it is necessary that life in all its stages of development should be permeated by this formative spiritual activity. There are numerous independent centres of life, but the tendencies from each are towards the realisation of the whole, and find their perfection in it alone.

Thought, independent of the world, must extract from the medley of first impressions permanent forms, and unite these into a consistent representation of the whole; it finds the acme of its achievement in bringing this representation clearly to consciousness in a form that is complete and free from addition. In conduct, an organisation, a gradation, a uniting of the elements so as to produce a harmonious effect is the chief thing · from the chaotic

mass of individuals, the state by constitution and law forms a living work of art, a differentiated organism; for the individual the chief matter in conduct is to bring the diverse forces in the soul into the right relation of order and gradation, to reach the highest of all harmonies, the harmonious life.

All this involves particular estimates of value, a characteristic solution of the problems and a harmonising of the oppositions of our existence. It is a matter of general knowledge how this synthesis has elevated and ennobled life, and is still increasingly felt as an influence tending to further development and harmony. But it is equally well known how the progress of life has rebuffed the claim of this system of life to be the only valid one. We have become aware of contradictions which do not find sufficient acknowledgment in this system: a gulf deeper than it is able to transcend has made its appearance between man and his environment: in particular, the supremacy of form, which constitutes the basis of the system, has been shaken. Antiquity, at its highest development, had, without much consideration, given to form a living soul; its later course dissolved this union, the soul degenerated more and more into an inwardness of feeling, and gave up all claim, if not to the world, yet to its organisation and formation: form, deprived of soul, threatened to become superficial, and to change life into play and enjoyment. It was at this point that Christianity intervened with a powerful effect, but it has not, in the sense with which we are here concerned, produced an organised system of life.

Such a system was first produced in the Modern Age, and more particularly in the period of the Enlightenment. This system makes force the centre of life; to increase force without limit is the task of tasks. The elements of reality are centres of force; but these elements are not isolated, because force is called forth only by force, and the amount of life depends on the degree to which relations are developed; since in this way one tends towards another, they become interweaved and joined, and the many are

united. For this system the world does not appear as a work of art which rests in itself, but as a process that ceaselessly increases in volume: the main achievement of spiritual work is, with complete consciousness and self-determining activity, to take possession of this process, which actually surrounds us; to change its infinite life as much as possible into our own life, and to co-operate to the best of our capacity for its advancement. Since here spiritual work never tolerates a state of inactive peace, never accepts the world as a rigid destiny, but is concerned to develop the world, to analyse the world as it first appears into its elements in order to reach the forces that move it, life acquires a more active relation to the environment than it does in the earlier, more contemplative system, and feels itself to be more in the workshop of reality.

Knowledge and life, therefore, become changed from their traditional character. Research cannot transform the world from the apparent calm and completeness of the immediate impression into movement and development, without analysing the representation offered into its ultimate elements; ascertaining their laws, and finally, with the help of the idea of unlimited time, reconstructing from the beginning the world, which it had first of all destroyed. With such destruction and reconstruction modern research brings the world much nearer to us, and gives us more power over it than does the earlier type. Corresponding to the understanding of reality from its evolution, man finds his own life in a progressive movement. Human society is regarded less as a well-arranged work of art than as a complex of forces, which come to full development and make certain progress only in relation. The chief demand is for the greatest amount of freedom of movement; the greatest number of relations between individuals, and a ceaseless increase of the stream of life, that should take up into itself all that bear human features. The individual also must realise his existence as one of "becoming" and motion; he is not bound by a closed

standard of nature; through the power of his spiritual nature he is able to assimilate ever new capacity, and to grow without limit: nothing gives more proud courage and joyous force to his life than this consciousness of an inner infinitude. A characteristic ideal of culture and education is formed: all individual departments of spiritual work are now regarded primarily as means to the increase of human power, and must assume a form corresponding to this. And so life everywhere becomes more active and more powerful; it finds its aim within itself, in its own elevation, and has therefore no need to seek it in something external; the whole existence of man becomes more his own work. As work comes more deeply into touch with the nature of things the development of power becomes at the same time a controlling of the world. It was not to be wondered at, therefore, when the modern man, with the development of this system of life, believed that for the first time he had left a childlike condition of constraint and limitation, and entered a state of freedom and maturity.

But the further development of life shows clearly enough that this system, which makes force and movement its leading principles, is not the final stage of human endeavour; the leading idea of our whole investigation is that human endeavour is more than this. We have seen that a system of mere force and movement gives no soul to work and does not lead life to self-consciousness and self-determination. A rushing stream seizes us and carries us along with it, but we reach no position independent of it; and so we cannot unify the multiplicity, nor gain a content from its immeasurable achievement; indeed, the increasing extension of life divides us more and more into single forces, and deprives us of a self that transcends the movement. At first this was not fully perceived, since the soul was implicitly assumed to be force and the extension of movement was regarded as a pure gain to the life of the soul. But the further development and the keener emphasis on the new state attained could not but clearly indicate the contradiction here involved; could

not but lead to a separation between soul and work, and force them into conflict. Hence there is a danger of work becoming mechanical, and of the life of the soul, which, with this separation, is thrown back entirely upon the subjective, being lost in indefiniteness.

These experiences of mechanical work and indefinite subjectivity give birth to a new situation, in which the problem of the soul, a problem which in the earlier systems remained in the background, is forced into prominence. The task of life becomes a more fundamental one; it is a matter not so much of altering a given reality in one way or another as of first discovering a genuine reality, of advancing beyond all mere activity to a being which exists within the activity.

It has become evident to us in many ways that from the recognition of this a characteristic form of life proceeds; the only question is whether the change is capable of bringing about a thorough organisation of life, whether it can produce independent centres of life and unite them into a community of life, and thus lead to the development of a system of life. We ourselves most resolutely maintain the view that this is really possible; that life is in process of forming itself into a new whole, and that with the clearer establishment of this, problems which have existed from early times receive full explanation, and a definite advance is made in their solution.

We saw that, in its highest stages of development, life concentrates at particular points, and that a characteristic sphere of life is in this way brought forth, as, for example, in spiritual individualities, national character, and so on. As soon as these developments are acknowledged to be spiritual and are sufficiently distinguished from merely natural existence, as soon as the manifestation of a new world is recognised in them, they become a great problem. Then they cannot be regarded as a mere product of the particular part of nature, but must be accepted as primarily a creation from the spiritual life as a whole, a creation which at the same time must maintain itself and trans-

form in its own activity that which it receives. The relation to the spiritual world as a whole is the fundamental relation of life, and yet the further development of life does not follow immediately from the relation to the whole, but from the relation to the innumerable other centres of life; the infinitude that the individual being acquires from the relation to the whole receives that which is particular in its organisation and its content only from the experience of the relation to others. The relation to others, however, is not produced by nature, but as spiritual, only from the spiritual world as a whole and must be continually sustained by the whole; the relations of individual to individual will therefore be included within the whole, and through the presence of the whole will be essentially advanced beyond the capacity of mere nature. The love that arises here is fundamentally different from all the love which arises from natural impulse; and, understood in this manner, notwithstanding all that may be doubtful in respect of its fulfilment in individual matters, there is much point in the demand of Augustine, that, in the relation of man to man, not man but God should be set in the first place, and that man is to be loved only through God.

However, it is not a mere increase of activity that is sought in the multiplicity of relations, but a growth of being—a being not beyond all activity, but existent within it; it is necessary not only that the life-process achieve more, but also that it grow in itself, change that which is alien to it into its own, and display more reality within itself; life must experience every single activity as the manifestation of the activity of the whole, and thus, along with unlimited extension, preserve self-consciousness.

The demand for a self-conscious life, the demand for an elevation of activity to the organisation and development of being, by no means excludes other forms of activity, if only for the reason that this demand presents a high ideal to which man can only very slowly approximate. But this ideal constitutes an aim and a standard for all

other activity; the giving of form and the increasing of force must aid in the development towards this aim if they are not to fall into a state of inner emptiness. The more necessary it is to insist upon an animation of reality through the development of self-conscious life, the more must we guard against the danger of anthropomorphism, which, when we are hasty and impatient, inevitably finds an entrance and corrupts the whole of our thought and life. Only with much toil and with continual self-criticism can life be brought to the point where the transition to self-consciousness is possible; and even then the whole cannot, under human circumstances, be attained at one stroke; but at first life must endeavour to concentrate, to form a nucleus so that in this way it may acquire a firm basis, and from this take up a struggle for its further spiritualisation.

The same thing is to be seen in the differentiation and gradation of life: everywhere a movement towards self-consciousness begins, but the emergence of this movement forces an antithesis into prominence, and life is completely transformed into work and conflict. Thought cannot be satisfied with representing the world as a work of art or as a process; thought must seek self-consciousness in the world. This it finds in the emergence of an independent spiritual life and in reality's coming-to-itself; at the same time the difference between spirit and nature becomes more pronounced, and all the divergences in life increase. Men can find their highest unity neither in joining together so as to form a whole as a work of art, nor in a system of progressive increase of force; neither could prevent society from becoming spiritually destitute, nor could both together. Society also needs a self-consciousness and acquires it only through the development of a spiritual content and spiritual character; but this must be won by continual struggle from the medley which constitutes the general condition of social life. Again, the individual does not attain a content for his life through an immediate combination of his powers so as to form a

harmonious whole, or through increasing them without limit; the individual also must by activity concentrate his life and so gain the basis of a new world: never is he in his life, as a whole, personality and spiritual individuality. True, there lies within him the potentiality to become such a spiritual individuality, and this potentiality may be transformed in his own activity; the existence thus acquired can affect the rest of life, arousing and elevating it.

Thus the ideal is set completely in the distance; it is seen that we do not conduct life from a given basis, but that, on the contrary, we have first to acquire the basis and to maintain it in continuous work; it is not a particular direction of life, but a genuine life itself and with this a spiritual being that is in question. We appear, therefore, more imperfect than ever before. But in this connection the imperfection itself is a witness that important tasks are set before us, and that superior forces rule in us. In the midst of all that is obscure it cannot fail to be recognised that there is a movement towards the development of a new self-conscious reality above the capacity and the interests of mere man. This movement has been manifested in great historical achievements, in the formation of fruitful systems of life which at the same time were developments of the life of the individual. It has brought forth ever new creations; now it sets before us the task of developing a new system of life which does complete justice to self-consciousness, and in accordance with its main idea must also transform all individual aspects and departments. Where we recognise so much to do, we are certainly far removed from opinion and pretence.

II. THE MORE DETAILED FORM OF OUR SPIRITUAL LIFE

(*a*) THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH AND REALITY

WHATEVER there is peculiar in our conception of the spiritual life must manifest and prove itself in reference to the problem of truth and reality. In the first place our conception decidedly rejects the widely held view of truth as a correspondence of our thought with an external reality. For the attainment of independence by the inner life makes it impossible for something externally existing to be taken up into life without undergoing an essential change. It is also inconceivable from this point of view how something beyond us could in any way attract and arouse us. The problem of truth can do this only if it originates within our own life: it can become a compelling power only if the attainment of truth aids us to transcend a division within ourselves which has become intolerable. The representation of life, that we have given, makes it quite evident that such a division does spring up within us. Within our own life a certain activity begins, which extends wider and wider, and which would signify our whole being. But this activity finds limits and contradiction within ourselves: much takes place in our experience independent of this activity and apparently without our co-operation; a certain condition of things exists, and asserts a rigid actuality; and, so far as this condition extends, we are bound; we bear something impenetrable within us. So long as these two sides of our being remain separated life is not complete and genuine; activity lacks a foundation, a content, and a direction that is sure of its

aim; and all the bustle of free movements, all effort of reflection cannot conceal the state of spiritual poverty. On the other hand, the fact that we bear so much within us that only half belongs to us and that presses upon us like a fate must cramp and oppress us. And so life does not experience itself as a unity; it lacks an inner truth, since activity presents itself as a whole and yet is not one; life itself is therefore a problem. The problem must be felt to be the more serious the stronger the desire for a self-consciousness becomes; however, self-consciousness cannot possibly be reached without a transcendence of the division between activity and the given condition of things. Life has first to seek itself, its unity, its perfection; and it is just this that is the problem of truth: and in this problem life is turned not towards externals, but towards itself; we understand now how the desire for truth can exert such an enormous power, for, in this struggle for truth, we fight not for something alien, but for our own being.

This conception of truth determines also the nature of the effort to attain truth. The task cannot be to subordinate one side of life to the other, and to derive one side as far as possible from the other; that is, to transform the given condition of life as far as possible into free activity, or to adapt activity to the given condition in such a way that activity is merged into it; but the task is one of pressing forward to a transcendent active whole which unites the two sides, and develops them both; and in mutual relation gives to activity a content and to the given condition a soul. We have seen how a movement to attain such a unity runs through history and extends into the soul of the individual. That life is in general able to unify and raise itself is the presupposition of all striving after truth: the proof of this, however, is to be found in the actual furtherance of life, in the new contents which are thus obtained.

Such a way of regarding truth, that is, as an upward endeavour of life to its own unity, a unity not forced upon it but immanent, exhibits its unique nature especially

in its opposition to the intellectualistic conception of truth, which, notwithstanding that it has been rejected and attacked so often, still continues to assert a mighty power. According to the intellectualist, cognition should treat the problem and solve it of its own capacity; it seems that the synthesis that is sought must be found in the first place in the realm of thought, and thence imparted to the rest of life. As a fact, however, knowledge itself is affected with particular severity by the division of free activity and fixed given condition; and from its own capacity thought cannot attain to a state of full creative activity which alone is able to overcome the division, but for the attainment of this is referred to an advance of life as a whole which alone can reach an essentially new position. To be sure, cognition has particular fundamental logical principles which regulate all its work. But to regulate and to produce are two different things. The most scrupulous adherence to these principles does not lead beyond reflection to an inner relation to the object, to an inner transcendence, a penetration, and an appropriation of the object; it leaves us still in the position of merely attempting to know, in a state of mere reflection and search. All real knowledge involves a spiritual creation, an advance, and a self-formation of life as a whole. The chief epochs of culture have therefore given a distinctly unique character to the inner nature and the fundamental texture of knowledge; the character given to it by one epoch being entirely different from that given to it by another. Modern knowledge does not differ from earlier knowledge in a merely quantitative way; as soon as its connection with the chief synthesis characteristic of modern life is revealed, it can no longer be regarded as absolute knowledge, but only as a particular kind of knowledge beyond which there are possibilities of further developments.

From life as a whole the conflict will extend into all its individual departments, and give to the activity in them a greater intensity. Religion, art, and human society

all have first to overcome the opposition of subjective power and alien given condition, and thereby to win a truth. In no case does truth mean a taking up of things which are presented to the activity of life—it means rather an advance of life to its own perfection.

In accordance with this conception of truth, that which claims to be true will not be able to prove its right otherwise than through its power, that is, through its capacity to embrace life as a whole and to raise it above opposition into the state of complete activity. Every such attempt must prove its power and its right in opposition to rivals by being able to wrest from them the truth contained by them, and in new relationships to lead beyond the state they reach, and to change life more into a self-consciousness than they are able.

Hence the endeavour after truth here shows more movement, more freedom, more multiplicity: different starting points and different ways may be chosen, the correctness of the one need not involve the incorrectness of the other. The only indispensable thing is that the movement pass beyond the state of division and reflection to one of complete activity; only in that way can the content of life gain through the movement of life. And so we see the great significance of progress in work, in spiritual work; according as it succeeds, genuine life is distinguished from the mere will to live. To be sure, each piece of work that is here undertaken is a venture; it is far easier and far more secure to continue in the state of mere reflection and reasoning. But this latter does not lead us to an experience and a decision in a matter concerning the development of life, and therefore does not bring us a step further in this chief matter. Work with its failures is better than all subtle contemplation which leads to no activity; for failure can lead us beyond itself to truth; feebleness and inactivity, however, keep us in the old position.

In our conception of it truth is anything but a system of general propositions out of which, through deduction,

all detail might be derived. Rather the organisation of life into an inner unity, upon which in this view of truth everything depends, will exclude all that is merely general and turn towards the differentiation of the whole. The more life progresses in this direction the less is it a mere application of general principles; the less does it find its consummation after the manner of a conclusion from given premises; the more does it become a progressive activity, a new formation and an elevation.

In this conception, there is also room for a truth peculiar to the single individuals. As the comprehensive life-synthesis can permeate every individual detail of existence, so it is necessary for every individual life-centre to realise its own particular synthesis, and that every individual should fight for his inner unity and thus, also, for a truth of his own; he must, however, realise this unity and truth in every particular activity. A truth which is not my truth is, for me, not a complete truth. Only it is necessary that such individualisation be effected within the whole, not independent of it; it must result from the inner necessity of creative activity, not out of a vain wish to excel. In any case, it follows here that, as the immanent and universal form of truth requires more activity and power, it is also able to grant more free movement and multiplicity. Truth and freedom have often been opposed to one another in the course of history; if the former seemed to require unconditional submission, the latter had a strong tendency to shake off every tie as an oppressive yoke. If we see that truth of life can be reached only through freedom, and also that freedom acquires a content and a spiritual character only through its relation to truth, the opposition by no means entirely disappears, but a basis is won upon which we may strive to attain an agreement and a fruitful interaction between the two.

So understood, the problem of truth has the closest connection with that of reality: with regard to the one as

to the other we are concerned in a conflict against the external conception common to a naive state of life, which, though far surpassed by the inner movement of the work of history, obstinately asserts itself through the evidence of the senses in single individuals and hardly ceases to impress men with its apparent self-evidence. The naive way of thinking understands reality as a space which encompasses men and things; reality seems to be presented, "given," to man through the senses; only that which is exhibited to man in these sense-relations passes current as real. In this Ptolemaic form of life, dominated by sense impression, everything other than sense fades to a mere illusion, and this includes the spiritual life itself, although in it alone is reality known. Now, however, as science has with no mean power led beyond this Ptolemaic representation of nature, so the development of life has led beyond the Ptolemaic reality. Life could not emancipate itself from its attachment to the environment and develop an inwardness without effecting a revolution in this problem. The inward becomes the first and surest experience, with which all that is to pass current as real must show itself to be in consistent relation: everything external loses its proximity and becomes a problem; it can be established as real only through that which it achieves for the inner nature and in accordance with the standards of that nature. The power to convince possessed by sense impression is now based, not on its obviousness, but on the spiritual activity that it arouses; here also, only the experiences of the spiritual life itself can lead to the experience of something less than spiritual.

As such a revolution brings clearly to consciousness the spiritual achievement in the formation of reality, so at the same time it gives the object more movement and transforms it in spiritual endeavour. Two things are necessary to the conception of reality: an independence of man, and a realisation of the many as a unity. Now, since that which lies wholly beyond experience must for that reason be inaccessible to us, this assertion of independ-

ence can have no other meaning than that, within life itself, something becomes detached from the stream of consciousness and fixes and asserts itself as independent of it. The power thus to transcend the time-process is a characteristic mark of all spiritual activity; this activity evolves within us something in opposition to us, and in so doing accomplishes a marvellous expansion. This is most clearly seen within the sphere of thought. For all the functions peculiar to thought receive their differentiating characteristic only through such a detachment from the flow of sense-presentation and by establishing themselves as independent of it: the concept presents its content as something fixed in contrast to the stream of presentations; the judgment proclaims its connection of concepts to be something that does not pass away with the act of connecting them but persists in face of all the changes of the psychical life. Life accomplishes a gradation within itself and lifts itself above the mere stream of change. Only because life establishes within itself a fixed nucleus, and in this manner wins an independence of its own momentary condition, can it oppose a world to itself, and set itself the task of appropriating this world—that, further, that independent nucleus should remain no mere collection, but should be inwardly unified is again a requirement and an achievement of the spiritual life. How far that requirement will be fulfilled depends upon the nature and the degree of the development of the spiritual life.

Reality, therefore, is to be found chiefly in the self-consciousness of the spiritual life; from this self-consciousness we build up our reality. Since spiritual requirement is from this point of view the measure of human undertaking, our activity is judged by the degree to which the state of the world is changed in it and has thus become our reality. How far our capacity reaches in this matter cannot be decided by preliminary consideration, but only by the progress of life itself: in particular it is not permissible to assume things-in-themselves independent of us and thus to reduce our world to a realm of mere appearances. For,

so far as that independence reached, things could never enter our life, and never be inwardly appropriated; at most they could concern us only in their effects. As far as the conception of nature as a mechanism is concerned, which regards all occurrence as a texture of related individual points which exist, inaccessible, behind it, there is much to be said for the view that things are only known in their effects; but this view is an intolerable limitation—dogmatic in the highest degree—if it is meant to represent our fundamental relation to reality and to ourselves. For then we should be related to ourselves as to something alien; all the self-consciousness of life would be destroyed; there could be no development of being in contrast to single acts; but we must be completely resolved in the stream of appearances; there would be no advance in the striving after reality. As a matter of fact, we are concerned primarily with the content that life is able to give to itself; how far it presses forward to reality; its world is measured more especially by the degree in which life becomes deepened. But from the beginning man, so far as he shares in the spiritual life, is not a being adjacent to reality, but within it. He would never be able to attain to a reality if he did not bear it within himself and needed only to develop it. Thus ultimately he does not look inwards from outside, but outwards from within; and his limitation is not the chief thing, but the secondary.

The inner structure of our life corresponds with this conviction. It is characteristic of all spiritual life that it does not pass hither and thither between individual points, but includes and develops a multiplicity within a transcendent unity; by this the spiritual life grows within itself, and more and more acquires a self-consciousness. And it is just in this way that it evolves to a reality. Reality, therefore, here is not a fixed and completed magnitude, but is of different degrees. In the first place there is a difference in the energy which maintains a union of the manifold and a transcendence of the division; according to the nature of this energy the self appears,

sometimes stronger, sometimes weaker; its power of changing, at one time greater, at another smaller. Again, the force of the resistance that the given condition to be appropriated offers, differs according to the amount of its positive power; and the clash of the given condition and free activity will be harder or more gentle according to this power. One man finds intolerable contradictions where to another all is plain and smooth; one believes that things are transformed in their own being where another holds that only their surface is affected: and so, that which one regards as reality may seem to another a mere realm of shadows.

Mere energy, however, is too subjective to be able to obtain a genuine reality from life: for that, a transformation of life in work, an elevation to full activity, is necessary; but the preceding paragraph has shown that this transformation and elevation is of different kinds and of different degrees. The system of the formation of being promises to give to life the most fundamental organisation and the most forceful reality. For into the single elements embraced by the movement of life it is able to breathe a life of their own, to confer upon them an incomparably greater independence than in those systems in which they are regarded as lifeless objects which are acted upon, and which only set isolated forces in motion. When within a comprehensive life different centres of life meet, and in their interaction the activity of the whole wins an ever richer content and a more stable nature, genuine reality must increasingly unfold itself.

Looked at from this position, reality is not a fact but a problem and an ideal; it does not lie at the beginning but at the end of the course: it is different with different individuals, peoples, and times; each in its particular nature and work has its own reality. Thus we cannot comprehend the problem of reality from experience without conceiving reality as existing in flux: the assertion of an independent spiritual life, transcendent over all human undertaking, is a sufficient safeguard against a destructive

relativism. It is one of the most troublesome appearances in the conflicts of minds that they fail to recognise the many-sidedness and fluidity of the conception of reality; that each takes his conception as the self-evident one and urges it upon the others. In this way originate the many unfruitful disputes concerning this world and the next, immanence and transcendence, in which the most external and superficial conception is usually presented as self-evident; while yet, according to the fundamental relation and the chief basis of life, very different conceptions arise, and as a fact, systems of thought nowhere come into more severe conflict than with regard to their conceptions of reality. Only to a mode of thought which, without further consideration, accepts the world of sense as the genuine and only reality, can philosophy and religion, for example, appear to be occupied with things implying an "other" world, and which, therefore, are incomprehensible. On the contrary, Augustine thought to attain to genuine reality and at the same time a true life only by elevation to a realm above sense, so that to him the world of sense was secondary and derivative.

To-day we are again deeply concerned with the problem of reality. Notwithstanding all the passionate agitation of forces in the incalculable extension of and the breathless haste in work, a genuine reality fails us; our life lacks the proper character of being real; and so, in the midst of all the external results of our work, our life, spiritually discerned, threatens to become destitute and unreal. An eager desire for reality exists in our time; it is often thought possible to satisfy it by the closest possible connection with sense impression and impulse, and by expelling as far as possible all elements of thought. But thought is there, and cannot be expelled; with its power to analyse it, steps continually between us and things, takes away from them the proximity they have for us, and dissolves them into mere pictures and shadows. As a fact, the problem of reality lies primarily within the spiritual life; and it cannot be solved otherwise than in that the spiritual life

advances within itself from division to unity, from the mere movement of forces to self-determining activity, from all mere activity to a formation of being. If thus our life becomes transformed into a self-preservation, if in it we unfold and assert a spiritual being, we become certain of a reality and feel a satisfaction. Never, however, can reality come to us from without.

(*b*) MAN AND THE WORLD

Through our whole investigation we have expressed the conviction that man acquires a secure relation to the world only through his belonging to a spiritual life acknowledged as independent; otherwise, all entrance to the world is shut off. The growing independence of the inner life has broken down the immediate connection which dominates the naive way of thinking: if, however, man once finds himself set in a position of independence of the world, he can hardly draw it back to himself simply of his own capacity. All appeal to subtlety and reflection seems only to widen the gulf still more. Only the acknowledgment of an independent spiritual life offers a way out of such a desperate situation: if in the spiritual life the world attains to a self-consciousness, and if, on the other hand, the spiritual life is present and active within man, there is a possibility that man and the world are united; and that, at the same time, human life also becomes cosmic. But it is a question how far the possibility comes to be realised; how far the union that exists in the innermost basis can be developed and transformed within us in the work of life. Only the actual experience of life can answer this question. We must ascertain whether there are any particular developments of life which are not productions of mere man, but which manifest the operation of a transcendent world; and, further, whether these developments are able to find a more detailed formation in their contact

with the world around us, and to adapt themselves to the multiplicity of this world. Such a turning to the individual thing would be impossible if a complete life-form ruled merely in us and impressed itself on things only from the outside. For in this case this form must inevitably be uniformly effective in its whole extent; in appropriating the multiplicity it could not itself advance to greater concreteness. If such an advance is effected, there is a contact of life between what is here and what is there; and so the world acquires an inner connection with our activity, and the spiritual movement can take possession of the breadth of our life and with its differentiation gain a greater intuitiveness.

An immediate union of man and world is indeed opposed to the fact that the spiritual life which should unite them always exists, for us, in its particular form in human existence and that this form cannot be projected beyond man into the whole. The form of human existence constitutes an insuperable boundary; if it governed our life as a whole, then man could never overstep his narrow, particular sphere. But it is a conviction that is fundamental to our investigation that our whole life does not come under this form, but that there are tendencies in life which are operative through this form of existence, and attain to an independence of it. So far as these life-tendencies may be detached and developed, man may confidently take up the problem of the world, and feel related to the world around him; he can try to transform its life into his own. The particularity of his manner of presentation and perception then merely sets the limitation, that that which may be admitted to be certain and true in its fundamental content can be presented only through the medium of human peculiarity; the more detailed amplification of the representation is always only of a symbolic character. We see from this fact that there is a contradiction ever present within our life that prevents it from ever gaining an ultimate conclusion; however, it does not take from us the possibility of an inner union and a community with the whole.

Indeed, the contradiction itself, and the powerful movement that it calls forth, are to the train of thought here indicated a witness to a fundamental expansion of our life.

An attempt to unite our life with the whole appears in the first place in thought, in its work of obtaining knowledge. This emergence of thought involves a transformation of life that could never be occasioned by mere man, but can be understood only as the revelation of a new stage of universal life. In thought, the intellect, otherwise bound to the mechanism of the sequence of presentations, attains an independence. It places itself in a position independent of the world, and seeks to comprehend it as a whole, to appropriate it as a whole. The primary connection with things is dissolved, to become established anew upon a higher level and with an important transformation of its nature; through the deviation a real appropriation is achieved. All this is incomparably more than a merely becoming conscious of a given world, which is an experience that could arise in some way at isolated points; thought contains a development of the world which ultimately can proceed only from the power of the world itself. How can the individual matter be elucidated if the whole remain obscure? How can the desire for enlightenment obtain such a power over man, and assert itself in him in opposition to the interests of his physical self-preservation, if a universal movement were not effective in him? Man does not elucidate the world, but the world elucidates itself within him. What is thus reached is valid not for him alone, but universally; the development of this universal movement of thought enables him to win a closer relation to the world, a life embracing the world.

Our thought cannot advance in the definite work of building up science without producing and employing a definite logical structure with fixed principles: these principles are immanent in the work of thought; they are above all the caprice and all the differences of the individuals. This logical structure cannot be carried over and applied to the world around us, as all scientific research carries it

over and applies it, without implicitly presupposing an objective logic of things, a conceivability of experience: in this, man does not simply project externally and apply mechanically forms already existing in a complete and final state within him. For the multiplicity of things not only gives to those principles a particular form, in the production of which they must themselves participate, but through the relation to the world the fundamental forms are also further developed in their nature as a whole; it is only with the co-operation of both sides that the thought-structure achieves what is ultimately reached. The chief thing is that thought actually transcends the state of contemplative reflection, and advances to fully active work; that out of the movement of our thought proceed further developments, which extend to the object also; that, moreover, we come under the compulsion of inner necessities, and, possessing the highest freedom, are raised securely above all caprice. This creative thought in us, which is at the same time our own thought, constitutes a witness to a meeting of our thought with a thought that has its basis in things and in the whole. Inability to imagine such a thought should never lead to the denial of an absolute logic, with which all scientific research stands or falls. The disclosure of this relation, however, gives to our thought, in the midst of all doubt, a firm foundation, a joyful certainty, an infinite task.

Artistic creation and appreciation brings another characteristic unfolding of life; and this also demonstrates an inner relation of man to the world, and can be developed only when this relation is acknowledged. In the first place, for this creation and appreciation a deliverance of life from the turmoil of ends and interests, which at first sway our existence, is essential; artistic creation and appreciation involves a resting and a tarrying in itself. If the world were no more than this turmoil, if it did not in some way attain to self-consciousness, how could such a deliverance be brought about? If a self-conscious life were not present in man, how could a longing for an artistic

moulding of life arise in him? But an arousing of an inner life in things, the revelation of a soul, is accomplished not through imparting something from without, but through a meeting together of things and human endeavour. On the other hand, the spiritual expresses itself in a visible form and in doing so moulds itself. The chief thing in this connection is not mere beauty, a preparation for idle enjoyment, but a truth, a revelation of contents, a further development of life through and above the antithesis. How could something invisible and something visible, to express the matter briefly, find a common ground and combine together in a common action if nature were not more than the mere web of relations into which the mechanistic conception of it transforms it; if spiritual life were not more than the subjective form of life that it is supposed to be, according to general opinion; if from that form of life an inner life did not arise, and beyond all subjectivity attain to a full activity, and thus to the building up of a reality within its own province? That we do not merely become aware of a movement within ourselves, and then read it into nature, but only take up and lead to its own truth that which strives upward in nature, is again testified by the inner advance of this striving through its contact with the world, and by the infinite abundance of particular contents which are revealed to us in the world and which continually aid in our development. Again, our life experiences the most important elevation in that it takes up and carries further a movement of the whole, and is liberated from the narrowness of the particular sphere, without merging into a vague infinity. To realise clearly that we belong to the world, and energetically to amplify this relation, is of the greatest significance for artistic creation and appreciation. For it is only by becoming firmly established in these relations that artistic endeavour is able to resist the tendency to degenerate into play and pleasure—a tendency which threatens it with inner destruction; as in a similar manner the work of thought must guard itself from degenerating into mere

reflection. In the realms of thought and art there remains much that is alien, ever surmise and symbol; but even symbol is not to be disdained, if it serves an important truth.

A universal character is shown most clearly by the movements that work together to the ethical moulding of life. Without freedom there is no such moulding; but we saw above that freedom requires a world of spontaneous life and its presence within man. However, when freedom enters into these connections, it is elevated above the usual conception of it and also above the usual criticism. All moral life is pretence and shadow without the arousing and fundamental idea of duty. But where is the truth more clearly expressed than in duty, that what man does by no means concerns merely himself; and that nothing can constrain him but what he acknowledges as his own will, his own being? As duty is concerned ultimately not with something isolated but with a whole, not with a performance within the old order but with the creation of a new order, so in the moral life a whole new world appears to be taken up into man's own will and being. Duty exhibits the new world particularly in relation and in opposition to the old; the new world appears in itself to be pre-eminently a kingdom of love. Love is primarily not a subjective emotion, but an expansion and a deepening of life, through life setting itself in the other, taking the other up into itself; and in this movement life itself becomes greater, more comprehensive and noble. Love is not a mere relation of given individuals, but a development and a growing in communion, an elevation and an animation of the original condition. And this movement of love has no limits; it has all infinity for its development; it extends beyond the relation to persons to the relation to things; for things also reveal their innermost being only to a disposition of love: again, the striving after truth in science and art cannot succeed without love, and an animation that proceeds from it without inwardly becoming one with the object. How could this union and activity in the whole be possible,

how could it even become an object of desire, if the whole itself did not strive? And how could such a wealth of cultures proceed out of this movement if that which was striven towards at one time was not taken up and carried further by other times; how could the single movements tend together without the unifying and elevating power of a universal life? As a mere phenomenon to the individual, the movement involves a fixed contradiction: wherever it has been further and more freely developed it has been directed to a kingdom of love; and this was necessarily conceived as the soul of reality, and a severe conflict was taken up against the world of mere self-assertion. Thus in the realm of morality also we find ourselves in world-movements, we create out of the whole, work towards the whole, and are borne on the flood of infinite life.

Accordingly, life-developments of various and related kinds arise: with their manifold experiences they strive to attain to a harmony and a union with one another. They can seek these only on the basis of a self-consciousness of reality; find them only through their unification in a universal life, to which each individual tendency leads. Representations of the whole are attempted at the highest points of creative activity by philosophy, religion, and art; these representations accompany, indeed govern, the work in these spheres of life through history. But the limitations of our capacity, through which we are unable to give a suitable form to necessary contents, and through which we attribute and must attribute human traits, to that which should lead us beyond the human, are of particular force in this matter of forming a representation of the whole; and, indeed, this is the more so the further we remove ourselves from that which may be immediately transformed in work. These representations of the whole are, therefore, inadequate; their content of truth is clothed in a wrapping of myth, and humanity lies under the danger of taking the myth for the chief thing and thus of obscuring the truth, and this must produce an incalculable amount of error and strife. Still, it is impossible to give up all claim to these

representations of the whole; for they alone make the fact of our belonging to the whole and of the presence of the whole in our life quite clear and enable it to exert a far-reaching influence; only with their help can the degeneration of life to the intolerable insignificance of the merely human be resisted; only with their help can a movement from whole to whole begin.

Thus it is a matter not so much of abandoning these representations of the whole as to refer them continually to their essence, to those unfoldings of life which are experienced by us, to test them by these and to renew them from these. It was the error of the earlier position—much too indulgent to Intellectualism—that it did not sufficiently maintain the relation with these living sources, and so fell into the danger of losing a definite tendency, or even of failing to recognise the relativity of the myth. If a more energetic direction of life upon its own content and experiences teaches us to preserve these connections better and to develop them more forcefully, a new type of representation of the whole is yielded in contrast to the old, and far more different from it than may appear at the first glance. We may hope that with its development the truth will be seen more clearly through the myth, and that the striving, which we cannot give up, to win a universal life may not lead us astray into a world of dreams.

(*c*) THE MOVEMENT OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE IN MAN

The question of the direction in which the spiritual life moves in man is implied through our whole investigation, and in it receives an answer. Nevertheless, it requires to be definitely stated and treated by itself, so that the distinctive character of the movement and its influence in the moulding of life may be fully acknowledged. It has become clearly evident to us that an independent

and, therefore, genuine spiritual life cannot arise out of life in its usual condition, but only in opposition to this condition. For, however little this condition of life may lack spiritual elements, they are mixed and bound up with other elements far too much to be able to bind themselves immediately into a whole, and to display an independent power. That the spiritual life must and can gain a basis independent of this condition of life is the indispensable, fundamental idea of Idealism. But such attainment of independence of the usual condition would help little if the spiritual life which is based upon itself had not a particular nature of its own, and if from this it did not oppose everything alien and partly alien to itself. The doctrines of innate ideas, of an *a priori*, and so on, which have occupied humanity for thousands of years did not intend anything different from this. The details of the conception of these were indeed often open to criticism: it was sought to exhibit individual conceptions and propositions as existing complete at the beginning, where rather movements or tendencies are in question, which can find their realisation only within the work of life. Again, this *a priori* was limited to the intellectual sphere, whereas it is indispensable to all spiritual activity; for example, how can morality, rising above mere natural preservation and rejecting all mere utility, as it does, be conceived without such an *a priori*? To deny to spiritual life an original nature and power—an *a priori* in this more comprehensive sense—means nothing else than to eliminate that life as an independent factor, and to reduce it to the position of a mere secondary product. For without an original nature the spiritual life would be like soft wax that may be shaped in one form or another to suit our own pleasure: then the spiritual life could not possibly follow its own aims, could not possibly attain to an independence in the inner life, in which we recognised the characteristic nature of the inner life. As certain as it is that there is a spiritual life at all, so certainly does it bring certain fundamental tendencies and movements with it;

as surely as it develops in particular directions—and that it does this we have seen—so surely is this *a priori* also differentiated. To trace this fundamental state of spiritual activity in all its relations and multiplicity is an especially important task of philosophic research.

The revelation of such an original fundamental activity of the spirit must induce us to undertake to form our whole world from this activity, and to produce from it or to transform into it that which exists over against activity as an independent realm of experience. This has been attempted for thousands of years with the summoning of an enormous amount of spiritual power and the arousing of a proud self-consciousness. But failure was inevitable because it was not recognised that the development of the spiritual life in man is conditioned. However certain it may be that original spiritual movements must be active within us, they are not so with organised content and overwhelming power from the beginning, but they acquire content and power only through the process of life itself, only in grappling with the oppositions of experience and in the appropriation of the tasks and stimuli which experience brings to them. The incompleteness and the fluidity of that which was accepted earlier as a fixed and unchangeable racial possession of the spiritual life is to-day quite clearly perceived. What great changes has morality, for example, experienced in the course of the ages; how toilsomely has much been won which later ages have considered self-evident! To be sure, morality remains, even through all such changes, an original spiritual phenomenon, which can never be derived from an external source, but which could emerge and establish itself only as an inner necessity of the spiritual life in opposition to the realm of mere utility. But the actuality of this original phenomenon gives rise to a difficult problem, for the solution of which a closer contact with the environment, a fundamental arrangement with experience, is necessary. And so the problem is traced to a more ultimate source, and, though this makes the matter less

simple, it gives a higher significance to our work and to the movement of history.

Even the fundamental forms of thought which are often accepted as of everything the most fixed share in this gradual amplification. Man, so far as he participates in spiritual impulse, thinks, of course, in conceptions; he gives to appearances fixed points of support by the establishing of things, and relates events causally. But all this is full of problems and is comprehended only in its upward endeavour; it raises more problems than it solves; and around the solution of these the whole work of science moves. What different things the "idea" meant to Plato and to Kant, and to ancient and to modern thought generally: how every thinker of moment has given a particular conception of substance and of causality; how whole epochs have exhibited their particular nature in the treatment of these problems!

For the sake of its own perfection, therefore, the spiritual life must continually turn back to the realm of experience, from which, at first, it tore itself free. Attempts to evolve the whole life from that *a priori* have always given as a result something of a bloodless nature, abstract in the highest degree, a mere web of formulæ, in so far as experience, which had been relegated to the background, has not indirectly asserted its right again, and infused the formulæ with life. Accordingly, our life does not spend itself in one direction, but bears within itself the counter-tendencies of a tearing oneself free from the world of sense and a returning back to it, of a detachment from it and an appropriation of it to oneself. But, in this, independent life and bound life do not become combined; how could that be the case without the loss of all inner unity? A basis is necessary; and it is furnished only by self-determining activity. Experience acquires a spiritual content and value only so far as it is based upon this activity, and is taken up into a spiritual movement; experience does not share something with the spiritual life, but, through stimulation and opposition, it forces

that life to further development within itself. The state in which experience is first found itself undergoes an inner elevation in that appropriation: sense presentation, for example, is to scientific work something quite different from what it is to naive perception; even if it obstinately withstands a complete resolution into magnitudes of pure thought, it takes up more and more thought elements; it enters into conceptual relations; it answers questions which the work of thought sets. To the whole sphere of sense science gives the background of a world of thought, and transforms mere sense into a spatially bound spirituality.

The same thing is valid with regard to the things of value in life; in these, also, sense and spirit are not simply combined; but something of sense becomes a spiritual good only so far as it serves the spiritual life in some way; it cannot do this, however, without itself undergoing a transformation. This is to be seen nowhere more clearly than in economics. Money and estate had at all times a value for self-preservation and enjoyment, but in the doctrine of economics and political economy they could obtain acknowledgment only after a power to advance the spiritual life had been recognised in them. As culture in the ancient world had not yet reached this point of view, it branded all endeavour after material wealth as inferior, and as far as possible checked such endeavour. Only since the Modern Age has recognised in money and estate an indispensable means of gaining control over the surrounding world and of increasing human power have they secured a place within the spiritual life, and as a result of this have become more highly estimated. At the same time, however, they have been changed inwardly in the process, since that which they achieve not towards ostentatious display and enjoyment, but towards the increase of human power over things has become the chief matter.

As in this way the content and the value of that which is offered by the world of sense shows its dependence upon

the condition of the spiritual life, so in science also a similar relation between experience and the spiritual life is found. Science appeals to experience with particular zeal, more especially after it has first accomplished far-reaching changes in its own thought constructions; only then does experience give anything new to knowledge and exhibit a greater depth; experience can answer only in the measure in which it is questioned; the question, however, varies according to the stage of development of the spiritual life.

Such a conviction fully appreciates the significance of life-work, and must strive energetically to gain its acknowledgment. This work is not a carrying out of a complete scheme in a given condition of things, an application of firmly rooted principles to particular cases, but a self-realisation and self-perfecting of the spiritual life which builds up a self-conscious reality. In this our life is not divided between two different realms, but, in a comprehensive spiritual world, different stages of reality meet together, which must be brought into relation and developed. To be sure, the world of sense retains a certain independence; it resists a complete transformation into spiritual magnitudes, and our life, therefore, retains a certain restriction and impenetrability. But the self-consciousness of the spirit becomes more and more the chief basis and sphere of life: this self-consciousness continually takes up more into itself; it makes the world that was to us at first primary, indeed the only world, more and more secondary and subordinate.

This increasing spiritualisation of human life never becomes a sure possession that calls for no toil; ever anew it demands our attention and activity; it has continually to be won anew as a whole. As soon as the tension slackens, the world of experience with its appeal to sense preponderates, and it soon appears to be man's sole world, one which cannot tolerate anything beyond itself. For the spiritualisation of human life, a longing rooted in the whole being is primarily necessary; for this, keenly feeling

the vanity of the world of mere experience, leads to the removal of the centre of life into the invisible world of self-determining activity. Further, it needs a clear presentation of this invisible world; and in this the help of the visible is not to be dispensed with. For its own establishment the realm of the invisible must borrow means of expression from the visible, which now governs human presentation; must transform and refine them for its aims; prepare out of them an impressive presentation of the whole. Along with the energy of turning to the spiritual life a creative imagination is required, through which the invisible may become equal to holding its own against the visible.

The help of such imagination is indispensable for religion, in order that the supernatural world advocated by it may gain an effective presence in the province of humanity. And so with bold upward flights of imagination the heroes of religion have projected a new condition of reality as a whole, a kingdom of justice or of love, and have judged human existence by the standard of this new condition. Similarly, philosophy did not become an independent world of thought without the help of imagination; and of how indispensable it is to art we need not speak at all. Again, work in political, social, educational matters, at least as far as radical renewals are concerned, has really been taken up and carried on, and has won a triumphant power, only where the state striven for has been presented as something visible and clearly present; this alone has united the multiplicity, and has led with compelling force beyond the extant situation as though that were something intolerable. Humanity as a whole must be clearly present to us in an ideal condition for us to be aroused sufficiently from our indolence.

Our life, therefore, contains movements which tend in opposite directions: there are a pressing forward and a turning backward, a detachment from experience and a taking up again of experience; and so we may well speak of an action and reaction within its movement.

But the antitheses that arise aid in advancement only so long as they are encompassed by a whole of activity. In that the course of history increases far more than it diminishes the antitheses, the dangers grow more and more, the possibilities and the tasks of human existence, however, also grow.

(*d*) THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW TYPE OF LIFE

The conception of the spiritual life here developed gives rise to a particular type of life which can bring about a transformation and elevation of man from two main positions: the union of man with the spiritual life is much closer, and the spiritual life in itself is incomparably more, than is represented by the customary conception of that life. For in our conception man does not merely enter into some kind of relation with the spiritual life, but finds his own being in it, and becomes so completely united with it that it is able to determine him immediately as his own self. The spiritual life is not a particular function among others, not a part or an aspect of a more comprehensive world, but is itself a world, and, indeed, a world in which life first attains to self-consciousness and becomes a complete reality. If this world becomes the immediate possession of man himself, his life must experience a deep-reaching change, indeed a revolution of its usual condition: to trace the main tendencies of this revolution is our immediate task.

(1) *Life's Attainment of Greatness*

The placing of man in the spiritual life, becoming aware of its own independence, must make the forms of this life his own, and in this way bring about a reversal of the commonplace of every day. Life is transposed from

the narrowness of its merely particular nature to infinity; what was hitherto alien and hostile to man is changed into his own possession, and is able to arouse an animating and elevating love. At the same time a deliverance from subjectivity and its web of interests and ideas is effected, to the advantage of a life-process that takes up the object into itself, and thus advances to independence and sovereign creation; a life is attained that is not spent in movement to and fro between antitheses, but unfolds a content through them. As this life attains to complete independence only because it produces a fundamental activity in contrast to individual activities, so participation in this life must lead man beyond division to a comprehensive unity. It is this that is sought in the idea of personality —an idea which is often quite obscure and superficial, but which can in this context be elucidated, manifest its complete significance, and prove its power of development.

As the spiritual life is a self-consciousness, so man also wins from it a life that is not exhausted by activity directed upon anything external to this life, and that does not expect its content from outside like an empty vessel, but would find itself and realise the possibilities lying within itself. So far as such a life extends man does not stand on the border of things but in the centre, in the formation and creation of the whole; he experiences the world not as something external but from within. The question of the limits of this life is no longer primary but secondary, and the answer to this question is to be expected from the experience of life, not from preliminary reflections. Since, in this, life has a content in itself and develops this content through its movement, it distinctly grows above all mere play of forces with which it is often confused; if such a play of forces suffices for a lower stage it cannot suffice for further development. For the feeling of joyous excitement which accompanies the exertion of power is not sufficient in opposition to the serious perplexities that accompany all spiritual work; indeed, not even against the cares and needs that are involved in the mere

preservation of existence in an advancing culture. Life then easily comes to be regarded as constituted of trouble and work, and becomes a burden from which one wishes to be delivered; life is not from the beginning a good, but it must prove itself to be such by its more detailed development. In the spiritual life this comes to pass, since it produces a reality out of itself; it does not become valuable first in its relation to the external world, but it carries a value in itself, as is clearly shown by the joy that permeates all experience of the true, the good, and the beautiful; this joy must be further increased if all the multiplicity of this experience is regarded as the unfolding of a comprehensive and persistent fundamental life.

A life of this kind is no indefinite impulse; it cannot become an independent reality without penetrating into every aspect and making the ordinary state of things everywhere inadequate, indeed intolerable. Since the independent spirituality and spiritual character that is acquired, and that which the particular thing and activity signifies in the spiritual life as a whole, everywhere constitutes the most important question, the problem of truth will be raised at each point; and in this way a sharp division will be made between the genuine and the spurious; everything that strives within us in the direction of the spirit will unite and acquire a more stable basis; everything that would satisfy man in other ways will be seen to be empty and vain. Life now acquires a deeper reality, but this must first be reached and brought to complete effect. New forms, in contrast to the ordinary representations, must also make their appearance if life is to be equal to the task of developing content and character.

Life in the individual must have roots deeper than the immediate psychical life; for psychical life cannot itself produce and make clear that which occurs in it, for this reason at least, that it involves the antithesis of individual and environment, of subject and object, beyond which spiritual creation results. The spiritual impulse that the immediate life of the soul manifests can be based only

upon deeper realities and more comprehensive relations. And so a *noölogical* treatment is distinguished from the psychological, not in order to displace or limit the latter, but rather to complete it; and it is a problem to show the point of transition in the immediate life of the soul. The significance of the individual life, as far as content is concerned, will depend upon whether an independent spirituality arises within it, and constitutes it a distinctive life-centre; according to the new standards a free spiritual activity does not suffice, however extended it may be, and however sustained by subjective emotion. For all such activity may be without spiritual substance, and in spite of all external results the life that is nothing but this activity may remain spiritually destitute: how shallow many individuals are whose achievements deserve and obtain the highest appreciation! The inwardness that the spiritual life requires is not a mere reflex of work in the soul—from that little is gained—but the forming of a characteristic spiritual self-consciousness that lifts us above all mere achievement, and also by giving to activity a soul first makes it complete.

We have often seen how the acknowledgment of an independent spiritual life forces us to make a sharper distinction between human history and human society and all merely natural history and merely natural co-existence of men. At the same time, in that which is called history and society, a distinction between an esoteric and an exoteric kind is also required: the value of individual epochs and of history as a whole depends upon the spiritual substance that grows up in them; everything else, to whatever extent it may, with commotion and external result, assume the air of being the chief thing, is mere environment or supplement. Similarly, in the case of society, the spiritual content, if it has one at all, and human fortune and conduct must become more distinctly separated. There is far less genuine history and society than is usually assumed; but this little signifies incomparably more than both would imply without the spiritual life.

Similarly, with the acknowledgment of an independent spiritual life in us, a new light is shed upon the individual departments of life, and new tasks are set them. They have now, primarily, not to further human well-being, to be of service in the attainment of narrowly human aims, but they are characteristic unfoldings of the spiritual life. The particular nature of these departments has its basis in that life, and they must prove their capacity by advancing it. They are concerned with man only so far as he participates in the spiritual life; and so they will not so much strengthen him in his human nature as elevate him spiritually, and remould him more and more to the form of the spiritual life. A deliverance from the usual confusion of that which is merely human with the spiritual is also necessary, and, along with this, life as a whole must be more energetically based upon the spiritual life, and the spiritual life itself must be given a more distinct form. From the position of this life, that which has been handed down to us must be evaluated and new paths must be opened up for the future. Religion could obtain no content, and all change in it would be a mere advance from a more crude to a more refined anthropomorphism, if it were based solely upon human needs and aided man to attain a supposed happiness. Religion rises above such a condition of doubt only if it exhibits its roots in an independent spiritual life and is able to show its actuality and its power by aiding the development of the spiritual life. At its highest religion has always been concerned with winning a new world and a new humanity, not with the achievement of something within the old world and for the old humanity. And as we need a religion of the spiritual life, we also need a morality, an art, and, finally, an all-comprehensive spiritual culture, through which something really new may be produced and man be elevated in this being, and not simply circle round and round continually in the old paths. Everywhere the matter is one of advance and revelation; from this point of view the complexes of every day must also

be seen in a new light, and in what is apparently simple and self-evident great achievements and tasks become manifest. We now, for the first time and in another sense, win again that which we thought we already possessed; indeed, by the revolution to the spiritual life, life as a whole is transformed into a task. Every individual has such a life-embracing task in the cultivation of a genuine personality and a spiritual individuality. Humanity as a whole has such a task in the building up of a kingdom of reason within its domain, in the furtherance of the movement which comes to it from the universal whole and summons it to co-operation.

Human life through union with the spiritual life finds its basis in the inward and spontaneous, in the infinite and eternal. The development and the experiences of the spiritual life and its conflict with a world, which is only being won, are here the chief content of human life and unite individuals inwardly; the destinies of individuals receive their particular nature from such a common life. As this life of independent spirituality is possible only by detachment from the chaotic condition of life as we find it at its general level, the development of the spiritual life must make us clearly conscious of the spiritual destitution of the majority; and especially must it oppose the attempt on the part of such a life as that of the majority to present itself as the whole, and to make itself the standard of human endeavour. In such an attempt the merely human inevitably preponderates, and this now, at its highest points, invests itself with ostentatious pomp and a feeling of power; now, almost as a whole, relies on the reason of the masses, which loudly and noisily proclaims that those things which according to human opinion are valuable are of all things the highest; confidently makes its judgment and its task the standard of truth; and, with arrogant presumption, demands a reverence towards itself that is due solely to the spiritual world. From of old there have been many indictments of this, but as long as a new life, based in the spiritual world in contrast with merely human

life, was not attained to, these indictments did not lead to a deliverance. Under the guidance of religion humanity has evolved such a life and for thousands of years has found support in it; however, humanity has lost this life and this support, in its old form, and was bound to lose it: if humanity will strive after a new form and at the same time transcend mere appearance, it can attain to this only on the basis of the spiritual life, that is acknowledged to be independent. Only on this basis can it enter into the conflict on the side of gods against idols, for truth against appearance and emptiness.

The new life cannot develop without elevating the individual in his spiritual nature above all environment. For, as surely as the construction of a spiritual reality within humanity needs a union of all powers, there is a spontaneous springing up of the independent spiritual life only within the soul of the individual. All social and all historical life that does not unceasingly draw from this source falls irrecoverably into a state of stagnation and desolation. The individual can never be reduced to the position of a mere member of society; of a church, of a state; notwithstanding all external subordination he must assert an inner superiority; each spiritual individual is more than the whole external world. But as the individual does not derive this superiority from himself, not from a natural particularity and peculiarity in distinction from others, but only from the presence of a spiritual world, so he is securely guarded from all vain self-assurance and the arrogance of the idea of the Superman, which grotesquely distorts the great fact of the revelation of a universal life at individual points.

The desire for the presence of the infinite at the individual point may be characterised as an approximation to mysticism. Indeed, we need both a metaphysic and a mysticism; but we want both in a new form, not in the old. It seems to us preposterous to declare that necessary demands of the spiritual life are finally disposed of, because the older solution has become inadequate. If man does

not in some way succeed in appropriating the spiritual life, if it is not actively present as a whole within him and animating him, then his relation to the spiritual life remains for ever an external one; and this life cannot acquire a complete spontaneity in him, can never become a genuine life of his own. But the older mysticism was the offspring of a worn-out age, which primarily reflected upon quietness and peace, and was under the influence of a philosophy that sought the truth in striving towards the most comprehensive universal, and saw in all particularity a defect (*omnis determinatio negatio*). And so, to be completely merged in the formless infinite could be regarded as the culmination of life. As the spiritual life is to us, on the contrary, an increasing activity and creation, a world of self-determining activity, so its being called to life at individual points is a rousing of life to its highest energy; in this also, a continual appropriation is necessary. Further, the movement of the spiritual life does not appear to us as an advance from particular to universal, but as one from differentiation to the living whole; from the indefiniteness of the beginnings to complete organisation and distinctive form. The inwardness that we advocate is not a feeble echo and a yearning for dissolution, but is of an active and masculine nature, and rests on ceaseless self-determining activity. One may or may not call this mysticism; in any case mysticism of such a kind cannot be charged with that which now appears to us to be defect or error in the older form.

(2) *The Increase of Movement*

As certainly as a universal life must surround us and, with efficient power, in some way be implanted within us, yet only our own activity can appropriate and amplify that life for us. As the transition to the independent spiritual life changes the problem so that no achievement

in a given world will satisfy it, but only the winning of a new world, our existence must become much more active; our life must be made not only much more comprehensive but also inwardly transformed and deepened.

Naive opinion is accustomed to presuppose a fixed sphere for our activity; it is possible for it to do this only because it allows the spiritual and that which is less than the spiritual to be confused and undifferentiated. Since the attainment of independence by the spiritual life makes this confusion impossible, it may at the same time be recognised that the fixed relations in which we seem to be are also in reality due to our own activity. From this fact a method of treatment is justified, the introduction of which constitutes one of the greatest services of Kant. This method in his own terminology is the transcendental method. Unlike the ordinary opinion, it does not regard the relation of the departments of life and all its activities as being self-evident, but it inquires into the inner possibility of this relation, that is, it indicates the conditions without which the union of the manifold could not be accomplished; it reveals the spiritual activity that exists in the whole. It reveals a far finer texture of life; it shows syntheses from the whole to the elements; it indicates clearer limits and makes us more definitely recognise the differentiating nature of the individual department. This is what Kant did in the case of scientific experience, of morality, and of the realm of the beautiful. The transcendental method itself is first indisputably justified and given a secure foundation with the acknowledgment that a world of independent spirituality emerges in man, and this through his own activity, not by a mere favour and gift of destiny. For, when this independent spiritual world is acknowledged it first becomes a matter beyond doubt that the basis, and the bonds which unite the whole, could not be given, but must proceed from our own activity. The transcendental method must therefore be applied not only to the individual branches but also to the whole, and the possibility of a human spiritual life in general made a

problem. Then from the whole the method must also be extended to the departments that are not brought into prominence by Kant; it must discuss, for example, the possibility of history in a characteristically human sense. Since our reality is thus dependent in the first place upon our own activity, life and movement acquire a wider scope and a greater value.

The movement of life also tends to be increased by the fact that in our conviction the more detailed form of the spiritual life itself must first be won by our activity, and that this detail can be acquired only little by little through attempts, experiences, convulsions; that for man the spiritual life with its actuality forms a difficult problem. What more particularly separates us from the Enlightenment is that while for it the ultimately valid form of the spiritual life appeared to be immediately present and to need only an energetic working out, we extend the historical treatment not only to the representation, but also to the nature, of the spiritual life; and so the ultimately valid form of the spiritual life appears to be a high ideal, to which man can only gradually approximate. The fact that endeavour is centred not upon externals but primarily upon our own being must make our activity far more significant and more intense; and this leads to a higher estimate of history as well as of a historical treatment. As hence epochs are no longer distinguished merely by their achievements, but by the nature of their spiritual life, so the life of the present must also be given its place in the moving stream, and our innermost nature also depends on spiritual work.

If with such an increase of movement much becomes fluid that otherwise seemed to be as firm as a rock; and if, in particular, the foundations of life themselves also suffer change, life seems to lose all support and to fall into an unlimited relativism. Indeed, life must thus lose all stability if in the spiritual sphere movement does not involve something in opposition to mere change: as a fact it does involve such. As the spiritual life cannot develop

a content without presenting it as timeless, there is no great achievement in history that does not include some kind of timeless truth, and the movement of the spiritual life is not merely a flowing onward with time but also an elevation above time. In spiritual work, therefore, the achievements of the ages can be surveyed and examined; indeed, in distinguishing between past and not past the mere sequence of times can be transformed into a timeless present. Of course this is valid only with the presupposition of an absolute spiritual life, which is present in all the uncertainty and change of human undertaking, and does not allow it to become fixed in error. Unless an immanence of the absolute spiritual life is acknowledged, an essential characteristic of the spiritual work of the Modern Age remains absolutely unintelligible, namely, its critical character. Modern work is not completely objective, and occupation with the object does not completely exhaust that work; but activity realises its independence of the object, investigates its relation to the object, surveys that which has been achieved, and tests it by transcendent standards. Such a critique belongs especially to the fundamental nature of the Enlightenment, to the proud self-confidence of which a conscientious self-examination forms a necessary antithesis. The critical method reached its highest point in Kant, and we can never go back again upon the transformation of life that has been effected by it. But how could the critique be justified and exercise such far-reaching influence as it has done, if it were not more than a product of a subjective reflection that accompanies the object, and that has to do with the object externally? The critique could effect an inner transformation and elevation of work only because it set new forces in motion. And it did this in that it measured all human achievement by the demands of a transcendent spiritual life and out of it developed inner necessities, to which all achievement had to correspond. So the movement was not lost through the lack of an aim; and life did not flow onward with the stream of presentations, but found a support in itself; it was able to exert a

powerful counteraction; it did not need to acknowledge anything that had not proved its validity before the judgment-seat of immanent reason. This emergence of the question of validity in contrast to mere actuality must inwardly raise and ennoble the movement of life; it reveals to man an active relation not only to the environment but primarily to himself; it leads to a ceaseless differentiation and examination of the quality of life.

It is true that the Enlightenment, which acknowledged that alone to be true which was clearly and distinctly cognised, exercised this critique in a too narrow manner; yet notwithstanding all that may be problematical in its application to details, the right and the necessity of the fundamental idea are not thereby overthrown: the question remains; it can be fully justified only in the relations that we have indicated; but at the same time it must be transferred from the merely intellectual to the spiritual as a whole, and form in relation to the whole that which in the state of culture contains and develops an independent spirituality and a self-conscious life; but by this it gains a content of truth. This self-consciousness alone can be regarded as essence and genuine reality, while everything else is reduced to mere environment and becomes matter of secondary importance, if not of mere appearance. Task after task is revealed, more especially for the present; we see how, with the attainment of independence by the spiritual life, the movement is not only extended, but also grows inwardly and tends towards the elevation of life.

(3) *The Gain of Stability*

The movement of the spiritual life as not only directed towards the outside but also turned inwards towards itself gained for us a greater independence. But even that which emerges from within exists only in the process of formation, and in this that which satisfies us to-day may to-morrow be uncertain; and so we cannot dismiss the

question whether the spiritual life lacks the necessary stability; whether, in the midst of all becoming and change, caprice and subjectivity are not without the necessary opposition. In any case, the question of fixation must have a different appearance within a system of life based upon activity from that it would have within a system which proceeded from a given world: in the former, that which is fixed cannot be introduced from outside, but must exist within the movement itself; it can manifest itself only through a movement of a kind and form which transcends the utmost capacity of the mere subject.

Our investigation as a whole contends that the fixity is of this kind; and at this point only a short revision and a summing up are required. All spiritual activity is, as we saw, a transcendence of the antithesis of subject and object; it is progressive and formative universal activity. But this activity cannot be produced and formed according to desire or fancy; we must be elevated into it; and, as a result of this, we feel that we are under the compulsion of an inner necessity, which distinctly counteracts the caprice of the mere subject. We saw, further, that within the life-process spiritual contents are raised out of the stream of events, and that they unite so as to form a world in contrast with that stream, a world greater and more comprehensive, which nevertheless continues within our life. This applies to all the branches of our work; everywhere the deciding step to joyful advance is when activity proceeds from mere search and contemplation under the necessity of the object. No mere resolution, however, or even the most sincere volition, can of itself force us to this decisive step. Man must be taken possession of by a spiritual activity and power, and elevated above the state of groping and doubt. This is shown in all scientific work and artistic creation; everywhere success does not appear to be the work of mere man, but a gift and a grace from higher forces; everywhere those who have created have felt guided and sustained by such forces. Beyond individuals humanity as a whole develops complexes in science, in law, and so

on, which evolve inner necessities and require their recognition and fulfilment by man, and follow courses of their own regardless of the weal or the woe of mere individuals; so far as life follows these tendencies, it is elevated above doubt to a state of stability and joyfulness.

Such movements appear at first as a multiplicity, and are most directly effective through that which is distinctive in the particular departments of life. But through all multiplicity and above it, there is a striving towards a comprehensive unity; every advance towards this unity is an immediate gain in stability and certainty. Nothing helps the individual to become inwardly firm more than the unification of his life in a whole of activity, more than becoming certain of an inward all-comprehensive task in the development of a spiritual individuality. The development of a spiritual individuality is a task that comes to him from within, and which, while it is more than anything else his own, is yet above all caprice. This task may tend little to promote that which is usually called happiness; the striving to fulfil it may transform the whole of existence into a state of toil and trouble, of conflict and care; and yet it alone gives to life a meaning and a value, a sure direction and a secure self-consciousness, and by assuring man of a spiritual existence of his own makes him certain of the spiritual life as a whole. Such a unification of the manifold activities so as to form a life-work, an incomparable kind of spiritual being, is something entirely axiomatic, which is in no way derived from outside. Again, this unification does not depend upon particular representations of the world; only the fanaticism of party can bind it to definite doctrines of the human and the divine. It itself, however, is a secure starting-point for the development of convictions; its acknowledgment involves the acknowledgment of a spiritual world independent of and operative within us, and summoning us to co-operation, even though this implication is often concealed from consciousness. Where our own life lacks such a fountain-head the conviction of a spiritual life never attains to axiomatic certainty, but

depends on the thin threads of reasons and proofs, and therefore is most easy to overthrow. And so, for the overcoming of doubt and faintheartedness everything depends upon attaining to a unity of activity and creation which inwardly embraces life as a whole, and with this, upon being something, not merely doing something.

What is valid of individuals is valid also of peoples and epochs, of humanity as a whole. Whether a people feels certain of a spiritual life, and is thereby elevated to a state of inward joyfulness, depends primarily upon whether it recognises and acknowledges in itself a common spiritual task: if this is not the case, the acutest apologetic cannot prevent the increase of doubt and faintness of heart. Similarly, the disposition and life-feeling of epochs is decided primarily by whether their endeavour unites them inwardly or whether it is divided, and at the same time becomes inconsistent. The endeavour of our own time does suffer from such division and inconsistency; it is this in particular that gives the negative tendency so much power over us and in the midst of all greatness of achievement in external matters makes us inwardly despondent. Humanity as a whole can attain to a stable spiritual life which is more than the particular times and peoples only by the revelation and appropriation of an all-comprehensive task which governs it with inner necessities. Such a task alone makes life a preservation of spiritual character; and gives conviction an unshakable firmness, and a joyous confidence of victory. And so everywhere only the formation of life itself is able to guarantee to it inner stability; the movement itself by its elevation above all caprice and its inner unity is alone able to overcome the dangers which the transformation of life into activity brings with it.

(e) ACTIVISM: A PROFESSION OF FAITH

The system of life here developed receives its distinctive colour and tone chiefly because it brings into prominence the fact that we do not belong to a world of reason, which from the beginning had only to be perceived and enjoyed, but that we have first to advance to such a world; and for this we require a revolution of the first condition of things. The basis of true life must continually be won anew; and even the individual achievement always contains a decision between one and another type of life. Only through ceaseless activity can life remain at the height to which it has attained; that which life experiences and receives is judged according to the more precise form of activity. Since it gives this precedence to activity, to such activity, this system may be called "Activism." Activism, however, demonstrates its unique character and develops its capacity only if it is definitely distinguished from all other apparently related tendencies. Neither a sudden resolution nor even a mere incitement of power brings us at once into the condition of activity. For at first we are surrounded and embraced by a world of inflexible nature and of feeble spirituality, which is at the same time mixed with human pretence: this world binds us so strongly, and suppresses all independence with such force, that the mere individual remains entirely powerless in opposition to it, and could soar to no higher wisdom than that of an involuntary submission to it. Activity without release from the given world is an absurdity; but such release is attainable only through the living presence of a world of self-determining activity; the power of such a world alone is able to arouse the individual to self-determining activity. But how could man appropriate this world to himself without changing its life into his own; without acknowledging its content as valid for himself also; without making its laws norms of his conduct?

Activity in this way acquires an ethical character; it is

this which draws the boundary line between spiritual activity and merely natural impulse, and distinguishes genuine from imaginary self-determining activity. Ethical relation does not mean a submission to alien and unsympathetic regulations, but a taking up of the infinite spiritual world into our own volition and being: this relation brings things close to us and reveals them, so that they are able to impart their life to us, and we are able to grow with their growth. So understood, ethical relation is primarily not regulative but productive; it is not merely being prepared to fulfil certain demands, when they are made upon us, to live in accordance with strict regulations, but it involves the motive of aiding in the development of the world, of advancing everything good and true: it requires an untiring forward endeavour and advance to the building up of a kingdom of reason and love. If in this way conduct is lifted above the pursuit of that which pleases and interests the mere subject, this is not on behalf of something alien, but for the elevation of our own being, for the sake of this genuine being, for the sake of our spiritual self.

It is this inner elevation and this demand for a new world that distinguishes Activism from all mere Voluntarism and Pragmatism, to which it appears to approximate, and with which, in its negative aspect, it is, indeed, associated. For it shares with them the rejection of an intellectualistic view of life, in which cognition is regarded as finding truth of its own power and as conveying it to the rest of life; and, further, Activism desires, as do Voluntarism and Pragmatism also, the basing of truth upon a more spontaneous and essential activity. But the flight to the will is more a reaction against Intellectualism than an overcoming of the difficulty; as such the will does not yield a new world and a transcendent power; it may, therefore, be that mere volition is implicitly transformed into a self-determining activity encompassing the whole extent of life. Pragmatism, also, which has recently made so much headway among English-speaking peoples and beyond them, is more inclined to shape the world and life in accordance with human

condition and needs than to invest spiritual activity with an independence in relation to these, and apply its standards to the testing and sifting of the whole content of human life. But after the experiences of history the claim to this latter can scarcely be given up. After man has been seen to be particular and limited in nature, as things first present themselves, he no longer suffices for the starting-point of the endeavour for truth, but to attain to this starting-point an elevation above mere man into a universal spiritual life is necessary. And that is the intention of Activism.

The unique character of Activism becomes clearer especially in comparison with organisations of life, of which one indeed makes activity the chief thing, but gives to it the character of a mere process ; while another thinks of the fundamental relation of man to reality in general not under the ideas of conduct and progress but under those of contemplation and enjoyment. The idea that life constitutes a process transcending all human endeavour and decision has shown a strong power of attraction in the Modern Age ; and, in the system of Hegel especially, has found an imposing embodiment. This idea is asserted most definitely in the evolutionary conception of history, since it regards the motive power of history as striving to its aim, certain of accomplishing it, and unaffected by human opinion and preference. By this deliverance from the insignificance of human motive and the variations of human conditions the object seemed to gain incomparably in greatness ; but it was considered that this deliverance from man involved an elevation above the ethical conception, which then appeared to be something subjectively human. But not only does this conception of a process that ceaselessly advances with compelling necessity contradict the actual state of things as they are found in history, which shows so much stagnation and retrogression, and so many different spheres of culture existing side by side indifferent to one another, but the transformation of life into a mere process, if consistently carried out, must also destroy or seriously debase its spiritual character. If life were a mere process

it would be nothing other than a soulless mechanism; only in the case of such a mechanism can one phase proceed immediately from the others without at the same time a whole of life becoming active and exercising an animating power within the whole process. As a fact, the process is usually supplemented in thought by a universal life unifying, sustaining, and controlling the individual phases; however, so far as such a life does not simply come to us, but needs our own activity, the deed comes before the process; and a new world reveals itself to us. The disregard of the ethical element by the systems which make mere process their fundamental idea is explained by the fact that they understand the ethical only as a decision and turning of man, accompanying the spiritual life, not as the motive and progressive power of the spiritual life itself. They know only a human ethic, not an ethic of the spiritual life—as a self-assertion and a self-elevation, through which it first attains its complete freedom and independence. Still, to trace this further is the less necessary since this mode of thought lives rather from earlier achievements than works from fresh impulse springing up in the present.

The relation of Activism to the æsthetic mode of thought requires closer consideration; we indicated at the beginning of our investigation that Æstheticism forms one of the chief streams of the life of the present day; at this point, only its relation to Activism need be examined. This Æstheticism has its definite conditions. Where the contemplation and enjoyment of the world and its beauty are to constitute the essence of life, we must be assured that the world is a kingdom of reason and beauty, so that the condition in which it is incites us to no far-reaching change, and, further, there must be no perplexities in our soul, and no deep conflicts within our being, so that this contemplation may occupy us completely, and be a source of happiness; and lastly, we must be closely and surely united with the world so that a change of life may be accomplished easily and smoothly. If one of these requirements is not satisfied; if, instead of this harmony, the world manifests severe

conflicts and harsh contradictions ; if such exist also within our soul ; if, lastly, there appears to be a deep gulf between us and the whole, then the æsthetic solution of the problem of life is an impossibility. If in spite of these contradictions we attempt to entertain this solution, our life will become insincere, and will lose all spiritual productivity, and, as a whole, our life will be spent in subjective mood, empty enjoyment, feeble decadence. Now, however, the Modern Age develops in a direction which is directly opposed to the requirements of the æsthetic form of life. The great world appears to us to be a meaningless machine; and in the struggle for existence the earlier harmony is forgotten. We perceive in man far too much that is insignificant and far too much selfishness, emptiness, and mere show for us to be able to regard him as being inwardly complete. Lastly, the modern strengthening of the subject and the ceaseless growth of reflection have so fundamentally overthrown the immediate relation of man to the world that only a far-reaching transformation of life can prepare for a reunion. If our life is so full of problems and tasks ; if we do not find ourselves in a completed world of reason ; but if we must, with all our powers, work toward such a world, we shall turn to Activism as the only help possible. But we shall resolutely reject Æstheticism as a veiling of the real condition of things and a too facile solution of the great problems of life.

Activism does not imply that immediately and at one stroke our life may be transformed into spiritual activity and may quickly establish a positive relation to reality ; that would be to misunderstand the conditions under which man exists, and the necessity of undergoing experiences and changes. Such an attitude could easily lead to the formation of syntheses of life that would be much too hasty and far too narrow ; and the necessary breaking up of these would arouse a keen distrust of the whole undertaking. The power which the Romantic movement from time to time wins over minds is based on the fact that it warns us against an over-estimation of our activity ; that it demands that the soul should be open to receive the wide

world; that its impression should be appropriated without restriction and permitted to fade away completely; that in opposition to all the limitation and organisation of life, it still longs for the infinite; and that it also to some extent satisfies by turning to unrestrained feeling. At the same time, the Romantic movement makes us clearly conscious of the power of destiny, the transcendence of external and internal necessities above all human intention and utilitarian conduct. In this way life acquires a much greater comprehensiveness and freshness; it seems to return to its source, to retain far more immediacy. But it is one thing to acknowledge the significance of this, another to make it the essence of life. When such precedence is given to this Romantic tendency life threatens to become delicate, feeble, effeminate; it knows no energetic opposition to the flow of presentations; instead of a definite union it offers aphoristic thoughts and stimuli; through the lack of logical acuteness it falls into the direst contradictions; it sacrifices all distinct form and organisation to a revelling in vague moods. As in such a state of weakness the spiritual life does not succeed in gaining complete independence in face of the natural conditions of our existence, so it does not attain the necessary ascendancy over sense. Sense, in its own province entirely incontestable, becomes problematical in that it flows together with the spiritual, is undifferentiated from it, brings it under itself, and turns it from its course. And, in this, sense does not possess the naive freshness and the natural limitation of its original state, but it is over-refined and too full of excitement.

To recognise all this clearly is at the same time to acknowledge the superiority of Activism over all mere Romanticism. However much may still be lacking in Activism, through the fact that the difficult and complicated task is taken too easily and too simply, and that man sets too low an estimate upon the distance between himself and the spiritual world, there is still the superior right of the requirement to transform our life as far as possible into a state of independence, the right of an independent achievement in opposi-

tion to a world of confusion and half-reason: such a self-determining activity is by no means a mere matter of subjective disposition; it requires a particular form of life. In opposition to the desultoriness and transience of life it requires a powerful unification and organisation; it advances to methods and laws of the object in contrast to playful caprice; to a logic of the object in opposition to a persistence in contradiction; to a further construction of the first impression in contrast to comfortable complacency; to a courageous continuation and building up of life in opposition to a complacent acceptance of destiny; it gives to life a dramatic character in contrast to a lyrical, sentimental one, and along with this it can acknowledge fully that a genuine drama usually contains much that is lyrical.

It is detrimental to Activism itself if it takes the problem of life lightly; it is necessary that it should not forget or underestimate the fact that the effort to solve the problems of life meets with great difficulties, that the solution costs incalculable trouble and work, and that even when the best is achieved it is only approximate: when Activism recognises this fact it may acknowledge a certain validity in the positions of its opponents and may learn from them. But there is a harsh contradiction that extends to the innermost basis of life, an implacable "either—or," whether man merely receives the world and accompanies it with his own mood, or whether he finds courage and power to take up a conflict against confusion and irrationality, to co-operate in the building up of a kingdom of reason. But for the latter, the affirmation of reason in the innermost basis of reality as a whole and of his own being is necessary. Whether men and times find a way to such an inner establishment, to such transcendence of all external and internal limitation, is that which decides the main tendency of their life.

III. THE SPIRITUAL LIFE IN MAN IN CONFLICT AND IN VICTORY

WE intend to make the following section as short as possible, as we have treated this subject so much in detail in "The Truth of Religion" and also in "The Struggle for a Concrete Spiritual Experience." We must refer those who wish for a closer consideration of the subject to those works: the subject will be treated of here only so far as is necessary for a representation of life as a whole; a concise statement may have distinct advantages.

(*a*) DOUBT AND PROSTRATION

It is a leading idea of our whole investigation, and one which has held good in every branch of it, that for us men spiritual life is evolved only in opposition to a world other than spiritual; that reality does not surround us from the beginning, but forms a high ideal in contrast to the customary want of purpose and energy in life. The existence of a world lower than the spiritual, and the late appearance of that which arises from within as the primary and the all-dominant reality, must give birth to many questions and much doubt; from early times these facts have occupied and much disturbed reflective thought. Man might place the problem on one side without incurring any risk, if the spiritual life when it comes to the fore assumes the guidance of life and manifests itself as world-transcendent power—externally, in that it subordinates to itself and takes up into itself everything else; internally, in that with

certain progress it presses forward in the human province, wins the whole soul of man, and becomes more and more his only world. In particular, where the spiritual life is regarded, as we regard it, as the self-consciousness of reality; where, therefore, that which apparently stands in opposition to the spiritual life must ultimately have its basis within it, the demands of the spiritual life have a coercive power; and so when experiences a thousandfold, new and old, present a picture which contradicts these demands we must feel the state of things to be a particularly painful one.

That, however, is what really happens: it is the case in the relation of the spiritual life to nature, as well as in its relation to humanity; it happens, therefore, in our whole experience. If the spiritual life constitutes the fundamental nature of reality; if, in it, reality first attains to self-consciousness, it is to be expected that when the spiritual life appeared it would create for itself an independent form of existence in contrast to that of nature, and would exercise a superior power in this form of existence, to which nature must accommodate itself. But, as a fact, this is so far from being the case that even the attempt to represent the spiritual in any way leads immediately to the quixotic. In the experience of humanity the spiritual life is related in its entirety to a natural basis; in no way does it seem able to free itself from this, but in all its activity it remains dependent upon nature. If nature simply follows its own tendencies; if, indifferent to value and lack of value, without aim and ideal, nature lives its life of soulless movement, union with an order so alien and impenetrable must most seriously affect the spiritual life. The world goes on its course unconcerned with the weal or the woe, the persistence or the disappearance of spiritual being, of spiritual relations, indeed of spiritual life in general. Not only do great catastrophes, as in earthquakes, storms, and floods, show how indifferent the existence or the non-existence of spiritual life is to the forces of nature, but the commonplaces of everyday experience and of individual destiny

also show the same indifference. In nature we find no difference of treatment in accordance with any distinction of good and evil, great and mean, noble and vulgar; even the most eminent personality, who may be almost indispensable to our spiritual welfare, is subject to the same contingency, the same fate as all others. Regarded from the point of view of the world of sense, all spiritual life is a chaotic confusion of fleeting appearances, all of which are dependent; it is not an independent world, but a subsidiary addition to a world which is other than spiritual.

Experience of the impotence of the spiritual life in relation to nature has been the cause of mental disquiet from early times. But this experience was not necessarily oppressive so long as mankind was called upon to transform nature into a realm of reason, and so long as there was hope of accomplishing this. For the contrast with the cold and rigid external world has deepened the inwardness of human relationship and brought the dignity and greatness of spiritual creation to consciousness. In culture, humanity has formed a characteristic sphere of life, and in doing this has aided the spiritual life to attain a certain reality; in culture, spiritual factors and values win power; and a new order of life in contrast to that of nature is evolved. It cannot be doubted that a new reality makes its appearance; but it is an open question whether this new reality fulfils the hopes which have been placed upon it; and, further, whether perplexities and confusions, which make it doubtful whether anything has been gained, do not arise out of its further development. This question is certainly not answered lightly in the affirmative by the conviction that regards the spiritual life as a turning of reality towards its own truth, which therefore in its development must insist primarily on complete spontaneity and independence. For, if in culture the spiritual life attains an independence over against nature, it is at the same time drawn so deeply into the particularity and limitation of human life, and is amalgamated so much with the merely human, that culture as a whole is anything but the unfolding

of a realm of pure, or even of only preponderating, spirituality.

In the first place, the spiritual life does not introduce a definite and fixed content into our experience, and it does not follow paths independent of human striving and error; but arises through hard toil and only slowly finds any unity: in its further endeavour it by no means follows the same tendency, but effects great changes, indeed revolutions, into states the exact opposite of its previous states. When it is so uncertain as to its own aim the spiritual life becomes seriously involved in the seeking and vacillation, in the needs and passions, of man: instead of giving to man an immovable support and pointing out a clear direction for his activity, it seems itself unable to pass beyond a state of uncertain groping and error.

Corresponding to this uncertainty as to its content, there is a want of power on the part of the spiritual life within man. Instead of controlling the conduct of man directly, the spiritual life generally determines it through that which it contributes towards the attainment of his aims: if this is so in the case of the individual, it is even more so in the case of social life, for in it spiritual activity is regarded chiefly as a means to obtain advantages over others, and to advance socially. And so that of which it is the nature to be an end complete in itself is treated as a means to other ends; it is not itself active, and its own power is not a motive force; but even for its own maintenance it needs the help and support of things alien to itself: the artificial mechanism of social organisation must press forward toilsomely that which, unless it flows immediately from its source, cannot be fresh or genuine. Such a state of human affairs remains far below the aims of the spiritual life; it produces insincerity, a luxuriant growth of hypocrisy and pretence. For all striving for the true and the good involves the assertion that the object is desired for its own sake: if the object really serves the aims of mere man, there inevitably originates a wide divergence between what is willed and what is alleged to be willed. In respect of this, one cannot, with

the moralists, lay the blame on the mere will. For, in man, spiritual impulse in general is insignificant; without the compulsion of the social environment it would hardly prevail at all against mere nature; this social compulsion, therefore, notwithstanding its defects, cannot be dispensed with; however clearly we may see its inadequacy, we cannot renounce it altogether. Society cannot exert this coercive power without presenting itself as the champion of pure reason; without desiring an infallibility for its decisions. This attitude naturally arouses the opposition of individuals and a keen struggle ensues, but as one side may be right the condition of the spiritual life is not much improved by the struggle.

The whole, therefore, uncertain of its aims and inadequate in its means, is rather a paltry substitute for a realm of reason than such a realm itself. A noisy and self-conscious agitation, much unrest and excitement, but little substance and soul; a ceaseless anxiety concerning the means of life and hurried pursuit of them, and in the occupation with the means forgetfulness and neglect of life itself; much self-glorification and ostentation, and little reverence for the spiritual life—such is social life in general. Where the vanity, emptiness, and falsehood of the social machinery have come to be clearly perceived, man has become absolutely wearied and satiated, and has often fled from society to nature, to seek therein simple truth and enduring peace. But he could believe it possible to find such in nature only because he read this truth and peace into it from himself; as, nevertheless, he must ultimately return to those of the same nature as himself; thus he remains in a state of vacillation between nature, which is indifferent to the spiritual life, and humanity, which corrupts the spiritual life by drawing it down to the level of the merely human. If the spiritual life nowhere attains to pure unfolding and certain effect within our experience, how can the spiritual life be accepted by us in this experience as the essence of reality? In the midst of such doubt, the original suspicions, which may have receded before the hope of the emergence

of a new world, also become felt again—the insignificance of the external manifestation of the spiritual life in contrast with the immeasurableness of nature; the late appearance of the spiritual life in the world-process, and its probable disappearance as a result of the expected changes in the conditions of nature. Does not everything unite to give us the impression that the spiritual life signifies no more than an episode in the world-process; an episode which passes fleetingly, and does not affect the fundamental nature of reality at all? The necessity of such a conclusion remains concealed so long as man, in an undeveloped state of life, is able to fill the world with forms similar to himself, and to understand the control of nature on an analogy with human conduct. But the progress of culture and especially the growth of scientific knowledge have, with irresistible power, taken us beyond that state; have led us from dream and illusion to a state of complete alertness. Has not all independence of the spiritual life become doubtful with this progress of culture and scientific knowledge, and must we not give up all claim to subject our existence to its sovereignty, and to determine our life and effort spiritually? For there cannot be any doubt that, with the spiritual life, the characteristic organisation of our existence also falls. It may be, then, that we thought superficially and confusedly enough to declare something to be in itself falsehood and deceit, and at the same time to give to it the guidance of our life.

(*b*) CONSIDERATION AND DEMAND

The previous train of thought may appear to be a plain and straightforward negation, a complete renunciation of the spiritual life as the most adequate solution of our problem. But that train of thought is itself the result of a superficial treatment; every deeper consideration inevitably contradicts such a summary procedure. A contradiction

of that train of thought is found especially in the fact which governs the whole course of our investigation, that with the transition to the spiritual life there appear essentially new magnitudes and values, new forms and contents of life, which advance beyond not only the nature but also the capacity of mere man. Whence all these, if spiritual life is only illusion? The new in us may be never so powerless; still, the fact that it emerges in our world of thought and hovers before us as a possibility proves a certain reality also within us.

Further, is the spiritual life, ultimately, in every sense so powerless as it at first appears? That it does not pass by as a mere phantom in our presentation is shown by the fact that we do not simply receive the existing condition of things, and its degrading oppression of the spiritual life, but we feel it to be a cause of harm and of pain to us. Could we experience this if we belonged entirely to that condition of things; and is not Hegel right when he says that he who feels a limitation is already in some way above it? We feel the insufficiency, the feebleness, the threadbareness of all human morality; could we feel this if we did not experience a longing for a more genuine morality? And whence arises this longing in opposition to an entirely different world, if not from a spirituality implanted within our own being? We perceive the limitations in our knowledge; a growing insight into all its conditions and oppositions may lead us in this matter almost to complete scepticism: but whence came the desire for an inner elucidation of reality; and how did even the idea of it originate, if we belong entirely to the darkness of a nature that is less than spiritual, and if there is no light at all within us? We feel that the rapid flow of time, its change and course, its sudden revolutions sometimes even into the complete opposite of the previous state, is a defect, a source of serious danger to truth: could we feel this to be so if our whole being were centred in the passing moment; if we did not survey and compare the different times; if our being did not participate in something super-temporal? And lastly,

if the feeling that culture is inadequate and indeed nothing but a pretence is so strong and so painful, then here again we set ourselves in a position independent of the condition of things, and judge that condition by a transcendent standard which only our own being can supply. If all these aims were only invented by man and applied to life in an external manner, failure to realise them could not agitate us as it does.

Besides, the matter is not by any means at an end with the mere feeling of the inadequacy of our position ; a movement in opposition to this condition is also not lacking. For, as has been seen throughout our whole treatment, a spiritual operation and creative activity is to be found within human experience. It meets us with especial clearness at the heights of the work of history ; but these also belong to humanity as a whole, and the light kindled there is not entirely lost in the mist of the commonplace circumstances of every day. In relation with these heights of endeavour there is, in humanity as a whole, a movement in opposition to the tendency of mediocre culture to fill life entirely ; a longing for a more spontaneous, a purer, and a more genuine life. Our own power of creation may be dormant ; only the advent of a strong suggestion, or a serious convulsion, is necessary and it breaks forth forcefully, and shows distinctly that there is more spirituality in man than the circumstances of every day allow us to perceive. The spiritual movement manifests itself also in private life and in the relation of individual to individual ; he who does not measure spiritual greatness by physical standards will often find more genuine greatness in the simplicity of these relations than in the famous deeds of history ; and at the same time he will find that through these relations an effective presence of the spiritual life within human experience is strengthened.

If in its opposition to human perversion of it genuine spiritual life does not always reach a definite positive result, the operation of that life as the law and the judge of human things is all the more distinct. Man may try to withdraw

himself from the spiritual life; he may reject and mock at that which the age presents to him as an aim; he may seek to fill his life completely with human interests and inclinations: but he cannot do this without degenerating into a state of destitution, which even he himself soon finds to be intolerable, and without being forced, with the compulsion of necessity, to surrender much which it is impossible for him to surrender. The catastrophes of history, especially, in which that which was found insignificant sinks, and that which carries a spiritual necessity within it rises, careless, as it seems, of the weal or the woe of man, show in letters of brass that the spiritual life may not be modified by man at his pleasure, in this way or that, in accordance with his circumstances and his mood.

When we consider all the facts together, we do not get the impression that the spiritual life is simply a fleeting illusion that may easily be banished; but rather, that there are serious complications, out of which we cannot find our way; and that something occurs within us, something is begun within us, that is unaffected by mood and caprice, and that shows us to be in relations much more comprehensive, though obscure in the highest degree. In particular, for a treatment that starts out from the life-process, and sees the spiritual movement chiefly in strivings, collisions, and even in failures, there can be no doubt concerning the actuality of this movement, the emergence of a new life, and thus of a new stage of reality in man.

When we recognise the actuality of the spiritual movement the relation of the spiritual life to nature and to the world is also to be regarded differently from the manner in which the negative mode of thought represents it. It is now impossible, as it often happens, more particularly among philosophising natural scientists, to consider the representation of nature as a complete representation of reality, and to leave the spiritual life out of attention as something supplementary and subsidiary; but the spiritual life is now itself acknowledged to be a reality, and must help to

determine the representation of reality as a whole. Nature must be more than a soulless machine if its evolution is to lead, as it does, to the point where a self-conscious life emerges. Within our own experience points of transition are not lacking where nature produces something that becomes elevated to the spiritual, and furthers the spiritual life. The difference of the sexes, for example, is primarily a matter of natural organisation, and what a rich source of spiritual animation it is! Nothing manifests the union between nature and the spiritual life more convincingly than the beautiful, when, in accordance with the result of our investigation, it is regarded as a characteristic unfolding of the spiritual life, and not as something which merely fascinates man and is a source of pleasure to him. For how could the external receive a characteristic soul by being taken up into the inner life; how could the inward need an external form for its perfection if the two realms were not united, if a comprehensive reality did not transcend the antithesis?

Lastly, it should not be forgotten that it is modern science, especially in its latest phases, with its destruction of the supposed self-evidence of the sense impression of nature, that has placed the relation of nature to the spiritual life in a more favourable light than it was placed by the dogmatic mechanistic theory, which in earlier times seemed to be the ultimate solution of the problem of their relation. Nature has again become far more of a problem to us, and we recognise that our conception of it is a work of the spirit. The old facts of the connection and interaction of phenomena, of the conformity to law on the part of occurrences, of the developments of form, and of a progress to even more artistic complexes and ever finer organisation, once more make us feel, and far more keenly than before, that they involve difficult problems. It is more clearly evident to us than it was formerly that every attempt to make these facts intelligible is made by the spiritual life and by analogy with the spiritual life; if in such analogy

we do not go beyond mere symbols, yet the symbols themselves betray a depth and a secret of reality. Now, therefore, when scientific work is at its highest stage of development, the shallowness and the rashness of a radical negation are distinctly recognised.

It is true that for the particular life-problem that we are considering we have not yet gained much from this recognition; to perceive the impossibility of an absolute negation does not in itself imply the victory of a joyful affirmation. For all the perplexities that previously occupied us still remain, as do the limitation and the curtailment of the spiritual life which proceeded from these perplexities; the whole movement also remains in its state of stagnation. As certainly as on the one hand there is too much of the spiritual life presented to us to allow of negation, so on the other it is by no means sufficient for the removal of all doubt.

Mere research can tolerate a state of hesitation between affirmation and negation; it must often refrain from a decision in the case of special problems. Life, however, cannot endure any such intermediary position; for life, such hesitation in arriving at a decision must result in complete stagnation, and this would help the negation to victory. If life is faced with an "either—or" the affirmation has a prospect of victory only if the situation previously described may be in some way transformed in its favour. This could not come to pass unless the spiritual movement can transcend the limitations which appear in human life, and unless a further development can proceed out of the limitations themselves. Only such an advance can help the endangered affirmation to victory. But whether the spiritual movement does transcend these limitations, not a logical consideration of concepts but only the experience of life will decide; let us inquire therefore whether life offers what we seek.

(c) THE VICTORY

The question and the requirement that result from consideration of the state of human existence are answered in the affirmative with joyful certainty by the religions: the religions do this in that they announce to man the help of a transcendent order; an appearance of divine power and goodness in the domain of man. But after the far-reaching changes of life and of conviction that we have experienced, can this confidence still be justified? And have we a place for this assertion of help from a transcendent order when we acknowledge the reality of the independent spiritual life?

Everything of a religious character and even that which is related to it meets, at least upon the surface, in the present the keenest opposition. This opposition is aroused in the first place by anthropomorphism—the indulgence in merely human representations and desires — which is often found associated with religion. If the essence of religion were inseparable from such anthropomorphism, the dissolution and submergence of religion could hardly be prevented. But according to the witness of history, an energetic conflict against all such mere anthropomorphism has been carried on within religion itself and, in its highest stages of development, religion has demanded a complete surrender of everything narrowly human: anthropomorphism and religion are, therefore, not absolutely identical. Our investigation, emphasising as it does the radical distinction between the substance of the spiritual life and its appropriation by man, counselled us to be cautious in reference to this matter, and warned us against a hasty rejection of religion.

The essence of religion is still less affected by the charge that modern natural science, by its extension of the spatial world to infinity, leaves no room for a visible heaven. For, to take such a criticism seriously, we must not only think of religion as at a primitive stage which, in the development

of its spiritual content, it has overstepped, but we must also completely ignore the fundamental revolution that modern philosophy and the whole tendency of modern thought have accomplished in the representation of the visible world. Modern thought has destroyed the self-evidence that the naive man attributed to that representation, by the experience and the proof that the visible world around us does not come to us completely as we represent it, but that we form the representation from our point of view, and under the conditions of our spiritual nature. Our own activity is embodied in the representation ; and it will depend upon the value of this activity how far the representation may be accepted as reality as a whole and the ultimate and absolute world. Now, as in the visible world the spiritual life is always bound up with something alien and which cannot be completely transformed by the activity of that life, so every assertion of an independent spiritual life is a protest against the view that the world of sense is the only world. But in that, unless the spiritual life is independent, there is neither science nor culture, the priority of a world other than that of sense cannot be in any way a matter of doubt to philosophy.

But a world other than the world of sense is by no means the transcendent world of religion ; such a world as the latter could be reached only by a continuation of the life-process beyond the position yet attained ; the course of our investigation, however, has left no uncertainty concerning the direction in which such a world is to be sought. We saw that the spiritual life could not acquire an independence without becoming a universal life : only the immediate presence of this universal life at the individual point arouses and preserves a spiritual life in it. In spite of this immediate presence of the whole, the life of man receives its more detailed organisation and development from his relation to the environment and in the building up of a world ; the unity that exists in the whole reveals itself at first only in relation to the multiplicity. There is, therefore, still the possibility that a new and characteristic life should

evolve out of an exclusive relation to the whole; such a life, in contrast to that building up of a world, would bear a world-transcendent character. This possibility constitutes the only way of advancing beyond the position hitherto reached.

Now, however much work in the world forms the main part of our life and asserts itself to be such, yet, as a fact, our life is not taken up entirely by such work. In the striving of humanity and in the soul of the individual there is a movement towards a world-transcendent life, a life that first attains to a complete inwardness when it becomes world-transcendent. Only such an inwardness offers a firm support, a spirituality unperverted by the perplexities of the world; but this is not possible otherwise than by man's gaining participation in a world-transcendent spiritual life which is purely and absolutely self-conscious: this life must become man's own life, and spirituality in this way self-consciously advance towards divinity. This makes it for the first time intelligible how life, even when it suffers complete failure in its work in the world, even when the activity exerted upon the world is completely frustrated, by no means degenerates into a state of destitution and ruin; for a new task is now revealed to man in his own attitude to the spiritual life as a whole, a relation which may in different cases be very different in character, and he may find in the solution of the task incalculable difficulties: here activity also changes its character, since without any external manifestation it can become complete and purely inward: character can free itself of everything passive and become fully active; from being a mere accompaniment it can become an active whole. All this, however, is possible only if life is directed toward a world-transcendent spirituality and only by the power of such a spirituality.

As this new kind of life does not make its appearance suddenly, but is prepared by the whole evolution of spiritual life, which we have previously considered, so its main individual tendencies are also related to this evolution. Essential qualities of the spiritual life are manifested in

work in the world, but in this they do not come to pure formation and victorious establishment: only the elevation to the world-transcendent self-consciousness makes possible that with which the spiritual life as a whole cannot well dispense, indeed in which it has its essential nature. The striving itself, and its arousing and motive power, could not be explained if the end were not operative within our life: "Thou wouldst not seek me, if thou hadst not already found me" (Pascal).

The spiritual life in man could have no hope of acquiring truth if it were not rooted in a life which transcends all error and which in some way imparts to us this transcendence. If the spiritual life in man did not know of certain truth sustained at one innermost point, a truth that exerts a directing power on all human undertaking, and prevents it from becoming fixed in error, man would lose all confidence in truth in face of the obscurities and errors of life as they are shown by the work of culture. Further, for the maintenance of the spiritual life, the preservation of spontaneity, a possibility of overcoming all restriction by nature and of defying destiny is absolutely necessary. But in work in the world this spontaneity is subject to the most severe limitations; the power of fate surrounds man on all sides: in the natural course of things even his own work becomes a rigid destiny to him, and chains him with inexorable necessity. As in the case of the individual, so also in that of humanity as a whole, life is a gradual narrowing, an ever further exclusion of original possibilities; and this tendency is continually felt as an increasing oppression in its opposition to the freedom of the will and an independent present. How may the spiritual life be prevented from growing feeble and senile, if new pure beginnings cannot be produced from a fundamental relation transcending the relation with the world, if from this fundamental relation a spontaneous life cannot spring up ever anew? The fact that humanity is able not only to transform the nature of culture, in its particular aspects, but also to fall into error concerning culture as a whole, without

surrendering itself, is an indication that the life of humanity is not exhausted in work in the world. The spiritual life must unite in an inner community all who participate in it; and this is impossible unless the spiritual life leads man to a point where all walls of partition and all differences fall away. But spiritual work increases rather than diminishes these differences; with culture the differentiation of men also grows. We must sink ever deeper in such differentiation; lose more and more the possibility of a mutual understanding, of a life and feeling with one another and for one another, if this movement toward differentiation does not come into contact with a transcendent power that counteracts it, if some power does not unite us inwardly. What other power could this be than the spiritual life itself, and how could it effect this result otherwise than in the revelation of a world-transcendent self-conscious life which thus presents itself as an Absolute? For, then a removal of differences in negative and in positive matters becomes possible: in negative matters so far as all achievements in the human sphere, however distant they may be from one another, appear equally inadequate when they are judged by the standard of an absolute life: in positive matters so far as the absolute life produces something at each point transcending all complexity, by which the movement is freed from its restrictions and resumes its flow, and by the imparting of which to man in the innermost depth of his being, reveals a new life in which all may in like manner participate. The possibility of a finally valid affirmation of life is first attained when this world-transcendent self-conscious life is acknowledged. Without turning to the absolute life, life could not withdraw from its perplexities; suffering and guilt would crush man. With this turning, however, he acquires, not in his merely human nature, but so far as he is taken up into the absolute life, part in the perfection, infinity, and eternity of that life: in the midst of all change and becoming an immovable fixity is disclosed to him; in the midst of all dependence upon the world, a sure world-transcendence; in the midst of all darkness

and suffering, a state of incalculable bliss. From the ultimate depths the Yes triumphs over the No, which, at the first glance, seems so easily its superior.

This transition derives a power to convince primarily from the union of the individual tendencies so as to form a vital whole of world-transcendent inwardness. Such a whole, thoroughly characteristic in its nature, is never a work of mere man, a product of critical reflection; it could proceed only from the spiritual life itself. Looked at from the point of view of that life this whole cannot be regarded as something later and as something supplementary; but it will be seen that that which for us first attains complete clearness through suffering and convulsion must be effective from the beginning, and already exist in the work upon the world. If, however, it becomes our possession only when it takes precedence, then the whole prospect of reality must be altered and deepened, and for us life will be divided into the stages of the establishing, struggling, triumphing of spirituality.

It is this fact of transcendent spirituality that the religions take up and develop, and seek to bring near to humanity. The doctrines they contain are ultimately only the framework or the outward manifestation of that world-transcendent inwardness; they desire to realise its power of deliverance and elevation completely. They themselves have their support and justification in this transcendent spiritual life, and the precedence of one to the others will be judged by the degree to which in affirmation and negation they develop this spiritual life in its world-transcending sovereignty and in its world-penetrating power. From the point of view of that life, religion as a whole must maintain its truth and its indispensable nature: where that life is lacking, religion is a mere illusion, a folly the absurdity of which is hardly conceivable; but where it is developed religion must pass current as that which, of all things, is the most certain, as the fundamental axiom of the whole spiritual life. Between this "either—or" there is no middle course; historical experience shows that religion has

been to men and ages either the most certain of all things or the one about which there has been most dispute.

We can now return to the question that led us to this discussion, to the question of the rationality of our reality. To be sure, even after the further revelation of the spiritual life, the answer is not so easy as the adherents of religion often think. For they often believe that with the acknowledgment of a world-transcendent spirituality, its triumphant manifestation within our world is immediately assured; and with this conviction they attempt to present this world as a kingdom of justice, even if not of love. But all endeavour, however energetic, and all recourse to subtlety of thought, yield no satisfactory conclusion: at most, the possibility is reached that that which seems irrational may acquire some rationality in more comprehensive relations; but even if that is so, we are not free from irrationality; and those mere possibilities are far from being equal to counteracting the strong impression of the reality of evil. Even religion, which would bring about a transition to the better, is itself deeply involved in this irrationality; a painful martyrdom has often been imposed upon its heroes, and its form has continually degenerated in the course of history through the influence of human error and passion. Since in the latter the restriction is presented as an opposition to the divine, the view of the world as it immediately appears is rather darkened than illuminated.

Nevertheless, through the revelation that the world has a deeper basis, the perplexity concerning life and reality is essentially changed. Evil is not removed; the external view of things is not altered; the good is perhaps strengthened, and, indeed, life in its innermost depth withdrawn from all power of perplexity and led to a new stage. So far, the irrationality may appear in another light from this point of view, as hence the conflicts and the convulsions may themselves be factors which help life to realise its own depths and to establish it in the new world. In history, suffering has been regarded as absolutely irrational, and

has been unconditionally rejected, only where man has been regarded as essentially complete. But if an immense problem is recognised in suffering, then suffering also, by rousing us to activity and by making us less inflexible, may acquire a positive value and be of service in the development of being. This, however, does not give us a theodicy; it justifies neither philosophy nor religion in trying to act as advocate for the Deity. To us evil is an insoluble riddle: no formula can make it intelligible why a powerful and clear reason is implanted in our world and that at the same time the lower most obstinately asserts itself in opposition, treats it as a matter of indifference, offers an insurmountable resistance to it.

Thus we can hardly reach a decision in regard to our last conviction by way of intellectual consideration; rather, in the decision concerning the "either—or" which is the question here, our whole being is involved. On the one side there is the external impression of the world, the weakness of the good, its perversion into evil, the apparent indifference of the world-process towards the aims of the spirit, the apparent futility of all that would advance beyond nature. Can anything that is aroused within our inner being, and with so much toil finds any form, arise in opposition to this immeasurable world? This will be possible only when a movement of the world itself, and not a mere product of man, is recognised in that which is aroused within man: for only then will its extension be a matter of complete indifference, and, however mean an extension it shows in the human sphere, a turning of the whole would be proved, a revolution of the whole accomplished. Then that which for us emerges on the edge of our life must nevertheless be regarded as the sustaining basis and the controlling power of reality as a whole. Our whole investigation has championed the view that the turning to the spiritual life implies a movement of the world: wherever the independence of the spiritual life is acknowledged the supremacy of reason cannot be doubted.

But it is one thing to acknowledge such a thesis to be

necessary, another to give it the power to convince and impress, without which it does not leave the realm of phantoms, and does not become a living force. This is possible only where the spiritual life is taken up as our own life, and developed as our own life; where, therefore, its vindication attains to the overwhelming power and the axiomatic certainty of self-preservation. The centre of reality will be changed for us only if we change the centre of our own life, and find true immediacy no longer in sense impression, but in self-determining activity.

The acknowledgment of a self-conscious inwardness, of a world-transcendent spirituality, together with the recognition of another kind of world, full of oppositions, must give a characteristic form to our conception of our reality. Here, a rational solution of the world-problem is for ever excluded, and the world present to man must be accepted as a particular kind of reality, which cannot be regarded as the only and ultimate one. From this point of view the whole life of humanity must appear to be a mere link in a great chain; an act of a drama, the course of which we are unable to survey; the fundamental idea of which, however, glimmers through sufficiently clearly to point out a direction to our life.

Through the emergence of a world-transcendent inwardness there appear characteristic tasks and complications, also for the more detailed development of our life. Unqualified esteem for that inwardness has often led religions to demand that life should be placed solely and entirely in that transcendent sphere, in the realm of faith and of disposition, and to free life as far as possible from the work of the world; the former life seemed to excel the latter as the divine the human. But this comparison does not hold good; for the divine is to us not only a world-transcendent sovereignty but also a world-pervading power: to honour the former preponderatingly may be the only salvation for times and individuals in a state of prostration and collapse, and in this way life would be given a preponderatingly religious character; but this form of life can never

be accepted as the normal one and the one alone worth striving for. For one thing, that transcendent world, as far as its contents and tasks are concerned, is presented to us only in outline ; all its more detailed nature must result from the world of our activity, and must retain a symbolic character. If the connection of the spiritual world with the empirical world is broken it falls into the danger of being lost in emptiness ; so that religion may come to be a mere revelling in feeling ; or a devotion, indifferent to all content and which, therefore, judged by spiritual standards, is worthless. It is by hard work alone, in relation to men and things, that our life acquires a spiritual character. Religion does, indeed, elevate life above work, and give to life its full depth, but movement and differentiation must be included within a vital whole ; and the relation to activity which is the chief workshop of life cannot be given up even at its greatest depth. The high estimate of spirituality may not rightly lead to a mean estimate of nature, to a conflict with nature such as has been the case in the realm of religion in the tendency to asceticism. For as certainly as our acknowledgment of an independent spirituality involves a subordination of nature, this subordination does not imply a mean estimate, still less a rejection. Asceticism which appears to be the attainment of a high level of spiritual life soon leads to an inward degeneration. For in asceticism the chief task is not the powerful development and courageous advance of spirituality, but a mere negation and suppression of sense. Reflection and thought will thus be centred upon just those things beyond which the spiritual movement wishes to lead. Particular temporary circumstances may make the tendency to asceticism comprehensible ; such times were over-refined and diseased, and the diseased may not rightly give to life its rule.

But if we oppose a specifically religious or ascetic form of life, in this way, we are not prevented from acknowledging the strong and fruitful influence of a world of transcendent inwardness upon life as a whole. For its perfect health and breadth, our life needs two tendencies which, though

they directly contradict each other, must, nevertheless, within us be complementary to each other: it needs an energetic conflict against all that is irrational, and at the same time to be elevated into a sphere in which everything is rational, into a realm of peace and perfection. Within the spiritual life itself, tasks are given their form and are estimated on the one hand from the human point of view, and on the other from an ultimate, one might say an absolute, view of things. The significance of this distinction is to be seen most clearly in history, and, perhaps, in the contrast between the Greek and the Christian character. The former places man in the midst of the world, and requires him energetically to take up the struggle for the cause of rationality and decisively to reject the irrational. Suffering and pain were to be avoided; man was never to submit to them. Courage appeared to be the chief quality of this form of life, and in relation to others justice was its determining idea. But if this idea demands that each should receive according to his achievement, then the higher and the lower, the noble and the common, must be distinctly separated and never allowed to be confused. That the noble form a small minority, and that history hardly promises any change in this matter, is a fact that has not escaped perception; and the permanence of the antithesis of an esoteric and an exoteric form, therefore, appears to be inevitable. The difference that exists is regarded, primarily, as due to nature, not to free decision. To make nature completely active, and to unify that which it offers in a scattered and an unsystematic manner, appears to be our whole life-work.

The result, therefore, is a powerful, active, self-conscious life, which not only affects us by its results but to which we must assign a permanent significance. But as the only and exclusive form of life, it involves great restrictions and rigour; its limitations may remain hidden in days of joyful creative activity and in the highest circles of society, but they must be keenly felt if life falls into a condition of stagnation and man, as man, asks questions with regard to

the happiness of life. This destiny may then become an intolerable compulsion; mere courage, an over-exertion of human power; mere justice, severity and unmercifulness; the sharp distinction between men, an actual separation, which tends on the one side to proud haughtiness and on the other to doubt and depression. A keen perception of such limitations and dangers must necessarily force life into new paths.

The counter movement has won the victory in Christianity, which makes not work in the world but the relation to a world-transcendent spiritual life the chief thing. Man does not in the first place trust a nature that safely leads him but at the same time limits him; but his nature seems full of problems, and to need a complete transformation, which only a miracle of grace can accomplish. Men are not regarded as being separated by fixed differences, but in comparison with the divine perfection all differences vanish, and from the relation to God the feeling of equality and brotherhood is evolved. Thought of in relation to the requirement of a pure inwardness of the whole being, differences in achievement are totally insignificant: justice gives place to an infinite love that dispels all harshness, makes all differences consistent and harmonious, and tolerates no feeling of hostility.

The antithesis of a nature which is operative within the world and which elevates above the world must permeate life as a whole and must give rise to opposite tendencies in every part of life. On the one hand, there is a distinct formation in finite relations, an insistence upon plastic organisation and complete consciousness of life; on the other, an aspiration towards the infinite, a more submissive faith, a more unrestrained disposition, a higher estimate of the naive and the child-like. In the former, man, full of confidence in his own power, himself produces a rationality of reality, and disdains all aids alien to himself; in the latter, life is sustained by a trust in an infinite good and power which, in a way transcending the capacity of man, guides to the attainment of the best; in short, as a

whole and in its individual aspects each is a fundamentally different type of life from the other.

The type of life advocated by Christianity has resulted in a great deepening of life; it cannot possibly be given up again in favour of an earlier type. But this Christian type also does not suffice for the moulding of life as a whole. Most severe complications would ensue if the position of Christianity were taken up as an ultimate conclusion and an absolute evaluation in the conditions which at present exist, and its principles without further consideration were applied to our life as a whole. The annulling of all differences, even of spiritual capacity; the displacement of justice through pity; the cessation of the conflict against evil; the low estimate of man's own power, would all endanger most severely the rational character of life; an adoption of this type of life in its entirety would lead to the discontinuance of the work of culture; in particular, it is inconsistent with any kind of political organisation. Finite conditions are not to be judged by infinite standards; and we men are, after all, in the finite and remain so.

And so, from the earliest times since Christianity, from being merely one of opposing systems, became the dominant power, compromises have been sought. The system of the development of power and of justice has nevertheless asserted its influence, and though Christianity has had an external supremacy, this system has forced characteristically Christian life to be regarded as a matter of mere subjective disposition and of private life. But as such compromises do not fully and truly express spiritual necessity, they easily lead to falsity. To rise above this tendency to make such compromises, the acknowledgment of the right and of the limits of each type, the acknowledgment of the necessity of both within a comprehensive whole, is necessary. Such a whole and along with it a common ground, upon which the movements meet together, and can strive to understand one another, is given to us by the spiritual life, acknowledged in its independence. It is not for us to force our life into a finished scheme, but to develop fully and to

acknowledge the movements and oppositions which exist in our life. True, life will ever remain unfinished, but can we wish to make it more complete than it can be, and can the incompleteness cause us anxiety, when we are sure of the main direction ?

III

APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT

CONSEQUENCES AND REQUIREMENTS

Introductory Considerations

WITH a consideration of the present we set out: to the present we now return. The convictions at which we have arrived, and which have led us to a characteristic philosophy of life, must now be considered in relation to the needs of the present; we must see whether this philosophy proves to be true in this connection, and this by its own development, as well as by the simplification of the condition of a time, which, as it is immediately experienced, is confused in the highest degree.

But, at the outset of our treatment of this problem, we perceive how difficult it is for the acknowledgment of an independent spirituality to determine our relation to the temporal environment; we see how this acknowledgment transforms that relation into a problem. The conception of the "present" is by no means simple and certain, even as far as its external boundary is concerned. The mere to-day is obviously too short a period to constitute the present; but how much is to be added and where must it cease in order that we may have a genuine present? True, the present must involve a characteristic content that associates the moments and unites them so as to produce a common effect; but does our time give us such a content? The first glance at the state of life in our time reveals a chaotic confusion, which includes the most diverse endeavours, now in passionate union, now in complete indifference to one another, and yet again in harsh hostility; further, there is a constant displacement of the individual elements by a process of elevation and degradation. Even if something common and permanent is operative in the

present, its close amalgamation with this change and movement prevents it from being purely developed: the truth contained in the present state of life is inseparably mixed with human error and passion.

And yet this is not merely an experience of the present, but one common to all ages. For fundamental spiritual creation has always been effected in the direst contradiction with the social environment; what harsh judgments, and judgments that set its value at nil, have been passed upon society with regard to its capacity not only in religion but also in philosophy and art; how severe a conflict has been carried on in all departments of life against the presumption of society! The present, especially, is troubled by these problems, because, as has become evident to us from the beginning of our investigation, it carries within it movements of a diverse and contradictory nature, so that it can hardly produce a consistent impression of the whole, still less attain to a definite character. Human interests and parties seek with all their energy to impress upon the time their own character; they call that modern which is useful to them and in harmony with them. The most diverse tendencies cross one another; experiences in particular departments of life determine the picture of the whole; the different classes of society follow different courses in accordance with their different interests; much that is accidental is regarded as vital and is allowed to influence us: the extreme has the advantage of being able to make an impression upon us; and the superficial and the negative creep into favour through the easiness of the conclusion presented by them: in short, in this state of the time, that which arises in human opinion is incapable of offering to spiritual endeavour a secure support and an orientation concerning its aims.

This uncertainty cannot be overcome by turning our attention to history, by taking an interest in past ages. For, with whatever clearness a highly developed science of history may present the whole course of the ages to us, to believe that our own life is enriched and made more

stable by this, we must confuse knowledge and life, the mere present representation of earlier times and the appropriation of them in our own activity—a danger into which the merely academic mode of thought easily falls. The power and the tendency of life in the present determine the nature of our appropriation of the past and of its transformation in self-determining activity; if this life stagnates, then we are helpless in face of the stream of earlier systems of thought; even if these systems attract us to themselves, and carry us with them for a time, finally they will manifest their antitheses and throw us back again upon ourselves: we cannot escape from ourselves; we can never find a substitute from outside for want of conviction and power of our own. It is a fundamental error, not, indeed, of historical research but of a feeble historical relativism, to expect us to form a conviction of our own by concerning ourselves with the past; and to think that the later stage in history proceeds from the earlier as a self-evident final result. As a fact, by such an attitude to the past we should only fall into the half-will and half-life common to an age of decadence. If the present is thus uncertain in the heart of its spiritual nature, and it is not possible to escape from this uncertainty by resorting to the past, it may appear to be advisable that we should be completely delivered from the tyranny of time, and that we should take up an attitude of entire unconcern of its affirmation and its negation of spiritual endeavour.

But a rejection of the immediate relation to time by no means settles the matter. If spiritual work were completely dissociated from the temporal environment and the historical movement, it would be dependent solely upon the capacity of the mere individual and upon the passing moment; all relation, all community of work, would thus be given up, and the performance of others could not be anything to us, nor our achievement anything to others; there would be no inner building up of life, and no hope of reaching greater depths. It is, however, not only impossible to abandon such aims, but our experience of spiritual work itself contra-

dicts the disintegration of life into nothing but isolated points. If all spiritual creation is effected in contradiction to time, what is denied in this contradiction is rather that which lies upon the surface of time than that which is deeper; more the human accommodation than the spiritual content of time. All who believe that distinctive human history is sustained by the activity of a spiritual life will attribute to time such a spiritual content.

Every age, therefore, in virtue of the presence of this spiritual life, will contain characteristic spiritual motives, movements, and demands, and will be especially qualified to convey certain contents to man, to open up certain experiences to him, and to point out certain directions. All these must be appropriated by anyone who wishes to transcend the original state of emptiness, and to advance to spiritual creation and to a spiritual fashioning of life. In consequence of this a more friendly attitude may be taken up towards time; and we shall be far more grateful to it—though perhaps not with explicit consciousness, perhaps even in contradiction to definite purpose—than we could ever be with regard to the experiences on the surface of time. However low, for example, Plato may have estimated "the many" around him; and although with the whole passion of his soul he may have insisted upon a transformation of the immediate condition of life, what he offered of his own and the new that he required, with all its originality and uniqueness, contradicts neither the natural spirit of the Greek nor the contemporary Greek culture: Plato can be regarded only as a Greek of a particular time. His conflict with time is not the conflict of an incomparable individuality with his environment; but a selection and a unification of the possibilities existing in time; it is an arousing to life of the deeper realities of time against its superficialities, of spiritual necessities in opposition to the conduct and interests of men. In this manner the great man also is a child of his age, and is unintelligible out of relation to it. Could one think of Goethe as living in the Middle Ages, and of Augustine as living in the age of

the Enlightenment? Indeed, we may carry our contention further, and say that the great has been just that which has had the closest relation with the time; and that it has reached a permanent significance, just because it expressed the unique nature and the inner longing of the time, that which was incomparable and inderivable in it. That which has been able to work permanently beyond the time in which it made its appearance was not born from a timeless consideration of things, but from the deepest feeling of the needs of the time; only thus can we escape from the feeling of unreality which otherwise accompanies the striving after spirituality. This consideration must commend to spiritual work the closest possible relation with the time, and the spiritual life may hope for an essential advance of its own striving as a result of this relation.

Still, the matter is not so simple as it is often thought to be. The spiritual content of the ages is not a complete fact that permeates life with a sure and definite effect, so that it could be taken up by activity. Rather, that which is great and characteristic in the ages is found only in creative spiritual activity, abstracted from which it is no more than a possibility; a suggestion that is inevitably lost, if an advancing spiritual activity is lacking. Spiritual creation is not a mere copy, an employment of an existent time-character; but time first attains a spiritual character through spiritual activity, and by spiritual creation possibility first becomes complete reality; this spiritual creation is not a mere summation but a potentialisation, an essential elevation of that which exists in time. Without this activity the spiritual elements in time remain merely coexistent, and have no living unity; they realise no life of the whole, no being within the activity, nothing that means to us development of being. Temporal life then remains a mere half-life, a life of pretence; it lacks complete self-consciousness and true stability and joy, and at the same time it lacks a genuine present. Such a present in this case appears to be a difficult problem, the solution of which is not so much presupposed by the different branches

of spiritual life as is an object of their work. Art, for example, is rightly required to express the feeling of the life of the time; yet it does not find such a feeling of life already existent, but it must first wrest it from the chaos of the general condition of life. Art is great in giving to the time that which it did not already possess, but which is, nevertheless, necessary to the complete reality of its life. Spiritual work, therefore, is not something merely added in time, but that which first gives to time a genuine life and a genuine present. This task may be achieved with quite different degrees of success; it is not all times that reach this elevation and attain to a genuine present; those that do so we call great and "classical" times. The general state of life—which now, however, no longer implies the time as a whole—appears from this point of view to be especially afflicted with the defect and fault of insincerity; the age does not so much live a life of its own as a strange life; and yet this life is represented as being a life of its own. This is especially so in our own time, when along with a state of division in our own purposes we are inundated by systems of thought alien to us. We are thus in danger of falling into a half-life and a life of pretence: in religion we assert the profession of faith and the feelings of times long gone by to be our own conviction and feelings; we build our cathedrals in styles that correspond to another spiritual condition and another tendency of life; in philosophy we hang upon systems and problems of other times; in everything we lack sincerity. But why is this so, and why do we renounce all claim to a life in accordance with our own nature? Certainly not because our time lacks problems and tasks of its own, or because it is deficient in spiritual possibilities and necessities; for, of these there is an abundance; in this matter our time is not behind any other. But there predominates a wrong relation between these tasks and the central power of the spiritual life, which is equal to cope with them and out of the possibilities create a reality.

In any case spiritual work has a great deal to do with the time; and in regard to this it finds itself in no simple

situation. Spiritual work must acknowledge a given condition, which it cannot alter to suit its own preferences; but it can make something else out of this condition and also see something else in it than immediately meets the eye. The possibilities of a time are revealed only in spiritual work, and through it alone are they separated from the human additions that usually overgrow them. These possibilities cannot become clearly evident, unless a close relation to history is won: for they are not suggestions of the mere moment, but they have been prepared by the whole work of history. History acquires quite a different—a far more positive—meaning when the spiritual life is acknowledged to be independent, and when it is admitted that spiritual life is not the mere embellishment of a reality other than spiritual, but the formation of the only genuine and substantial reality, the transition to a self-consciousness of life. For, as such a formation of reality, this creative activity extends beyond the particular time in which it originated, and becomes part of a time-transcending present. True, this activity always appears in a garment that belongs to the mere time; but this garment does not constitute its being: the imperishable in it, its fundamental life, remains inwardly near and present even after great changes of temporal condition; and within the sphere of spiritual work is always capable of new effect.

Christianity, for example, in spite of the attacks that are and have been made upon it, still asserts itself as a living power. Yet there cannot be the slightest doubt that in everything that lies on the surface of our life we are as far as possible removed from the centuries of its formation; that not only the view of the world but also the tasks of life and the nature of feeling and disposition have become radically different. But life is not exhausted in these activities on the surface, which must be regarded as external manifestations which proceed from an inner unity. That which these centuries have performed for the essence of life: the realisation of a freedom of spiritual inwardness, the acknowledgment of an independent spiritual world

with great aims and tasks, may, indeed, become obscured for the consciousness of individuals and of whole periods; it remains, however, an essential part, a presupposition of all further spiritual life.

As in this manner in the case of Christianity, so spiritual reality has unfolded itself otherwise in creative epochs; and in the movement of history they have all together produced a certain condition of spiritual evolution which constitutes the invisible basis of our own activity, and from which it is first possible to elucidate the spiritual nature of a particular time. This universal, historical state of spiritual evolution indicates a level, to which all work has to correspond, which desires not only to attain the aim of the moment but also to serve in the building up of a spiritual reality within the domain of humanity. This historical condition of the spiritual life is not conferred upon us by mere history, but history only mediates an incentive that must first be transformed in our own activity and conviction. Only a mode of thought which transcends the movement of history can recognise a spiritual content in history and in our own time, and use this content for our own striving.

Spiritual work, therefore, and philosophy as part of it, has a twofold relation to time, a negative and a positive: it must possess an independence of time, and it must seek an intimate relation with it. The "modern," according to the sense in which it is taken, will arouse us at one time to energetic opposition, at another to the closest intimacy; the former when it desires to subject us to the contemporary conditions with all their contingency, the latter when it champions the spiritual possibilities of the time and the state of spiritual evolution in contrast with mere man. We are concerned in a conflict for genuine against false time; it is a matter of clearly separating the merely human from the spiritual present; the spiritual life must first give a genuine reality to time, and in doing this must advance in itself.

Every particular philosophic conviction must justify itself in its treatment of this problem; it must be in a

position to wrest the truth from the error in time; to understand and to estimate the endeavour of the time without yielding to it; to comprehend as a whole the manifold elements of truth in the life of the present, and to elucidate them from a transcendent unity. Without doubt great problems and fruitful possibilities exist in the time, but we often feel the most painful contrast between their demands and the achievements of man. To diminish this divergence; for the time to attain more to its own perfection and become a genuine present, is a pressing task in the solution of which philosophy also must co-operate; and by this endeavour philosophy can also gain much for itself.

I. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FORM OF LIFE AS A WHOLE

(*a*) THE CHARACTER OF CULTURE

THE term "culture" received its present meaning in the latter half of the eighteenth century; culture itself reaches back to the beginning of the Modern Age. The whole evolution of the Modern Age is a striving beyond the religious form of life that prevailed in the Middle Ages, which began to be felt to be too narrow and one-sided. In opposition to this type of life a new type arose, increased in strength, and finally attained full consciousness in the idea of culture. This new type has been felt to be far superior to the old in many ways; it is not limited to one side of human nature, but desires to take it, and to develop it as a whole; it does not refer man to any kind of external aid, but makes his life depend as much as possible upon his own power, and finds an aim fully sufficient in the limitless extension of this power; it directs man's perception and endeavour not so much beyond the world as to it, and hopes by this means to give a stability to his striving, and a close relation with the abundance of things. This movement has brought about a far-reaching transformation of life: that which was lying dormant has been aroused; the rigid made plastic; the manifold woven into a whole of life; the whole circle of life has acquired more spontaneous freshness and inner movement; the result of the work of history now becomes for the first time a complete possession, since above everything contingent and accidental it elevates an essential, and above everything tending to separation and hostility, a common humanity.

The animating and ennobling influence of modern culture

is nowhere more manifest than in the life-work of Goethe. For we recognise the greatness of his nature primarily in that, with the acutest vision and the greatest freedom, he entered into the multiplicity of experience and events; with placid yet powerful dominance stripped off all that was mere semblance and pretence, all that was merely conventional and partial, and fully realised the genuine, the freshness of life, and the purely human. (*V.* "The Problem of Human Life.") His treatment of Biblical narratives is a good example of this: that a king reigned in Egypt who knew not Joseph suggests to him how quickly even the most magnificent human achievements are forgotten; that Saul went forth to find his father's she-asses, and found a kingdom, symbolises to him the truth that we men often reach something totally different from, and also much better than, that for which we strove and hoped; the miracle of the walking on the water is to him a parable of unflinching faith—the holding fast to apparent impossibilities — without which there can be no great creation.

If, with this achievement, modern culture may have the feeling of being the fulfilment of the strivings of the ages, yet its own course has produced oppositions, and engendered perplexities that culminate in a dangerous crisis. Culture, as it was represented at the height of German spiritual life, was directed chiefly towards the inner development of man; it was called with especial satisfaction "spiritual culture." Its adherents were concerned not so much with finding a better relation to the environment as with growing in the realm of their own soul, and with employing whatever the experience of life brought in the development of a self-conscious personality, of pure inwardness; only in this way did they seem to advance from the previous state of limitation to the complete breadth of existence, and the exercise of all their powers. A joy in life, a firm confidence in the rationality of reality gave this inner culture a soul; and a bold flight bore it far above the narrowness and heaviness of daily life; æsthetic literary creation became

the chief sphere of its work, and the chief means for the development and self-perfecting of personality.

Inner culture has by no means vanished from our life; effects of many kinds are felt from it in the present. But it has been forced to resign its supremacy in favour of a realistic culture, which makes the relation to the environment the chief matter, and removes the centre of life to the intellectual and practical control of this environment. In realistic culture the inner development of work, of work in the direction of natural science and technical art, as well as in politics and social endeavour, is less occupied with the acquiring of a powerful individuality than with the establishment of an agreeable condition of society as a whole; since activity is related more and more closely with things, and receives laws and directions from them, culture is freed from dependence upon man and his subjectivity. Culture is an impersonal power in contrast with man; it does not lead ultimately to a good to him so much as make him a mere means and an instrument of its progressive movement. An immeasurable structure of life, a ceaseless self-assertion and self-advancement, an arousing and an exertion of all powers that can bring man into relation with the environment, are manifest in this culture: but at the same time there is an increasing transformation of our life into a mere life of relation and mediation, a deprivation and a vanishing of self-consciousness. In the midst of the magnificent triumphs in external matters there is an increasingly perceptible contrast between an astonishing development of the technical, and a pitiful neglect of the personal side of life: in regard to the former we surpass all other times, as much as we fall below most in regard to the latter. Along with a ceaseless increase of technical capacity, there is a rapid degeneration of personal life, a pauperising of the soul: where the matter is one of a technical nature there is a magnificent condition, definite progress in all departments, work conscious of its aim; but there is a painful groping and helpless hesitation, a stagnation of production, an emptiness that is only just hidden

by a veneer of academic education, where powerful personalities and impressive individualities are required.

For a time we were carried away entirely by the tendency to place our attention solely upon the environment, and we seemed to be satisfied absolutely by it. But the inner life that has been evolved within human experience by the work of thousands of years, and through severe convulsions, prevents this condition being accepted as a conclusion; that which has once become an independent centre cannot possibly permit itself to be degraded to the position of a mere means and an instrument: it is impossible to give up all claim to self-conscious and self-determining life and a satisfaction of this life. Our spiritual nature compels us to ask questions and to make claims; if they are not satisfied, then, notwithstanding all the wealth of experiences, the feeling of poverty spreads and we seek for aids, and, first, we turn back to that inner culture from which we had turned away. But we find the ways shut off; a direct return is impossible. This culture had characteristic principles and presuppositions; and the course of modern life itself has, if not overthrown them, involved them in serious doubt: we have become clearly conscious of the limitations which this inner culture had without itself feeling them; movements which it united have now separated, and have become hostile. Inner culture rested on a firm faith in the power of reason in reality, and this faith begot a joyful confidence; for it the world was sustained and determined by inner forces; to us the rigid actuality of occurrences, the indifference of the machinery of the world towards the aims of the spirit, and the contradictions of existence are present. In the former case the greatness of man was the predominant faith; and this greatness was sought in his freedom: we, however, feel much more our bondage to obscure powers and at the same time our insignificance. In the former again, it aroused no opposition to call only a chosen part of humanity, the creative, to full and complete life, and to assign a most meagre portion to the majority: we cannot possibly

renounce the concern for all mankind and for the welfare of every individual; in the former, morality and art were harmoniously united in the ideal of life; in our time they have separated and are at deadly enmity with one another. Everywhere reality has indicated more problems, more inconsistencies, more obscurities; thus, with all its external proximity, the joyfully secure ideal of life of our classical writers is inwardly removed far from us; without insincerity we cannot proclaim it to be our profession of faith. In particular the resort to Goethe, as to one with a secure standard of life, is in general no more than an expression of perplexity, no more than a flight from a clear decision of our own: the universality and the flexibility of his spirit permit a point of contact with him to be found by those whose views directly contradict those of one another, and allows each to abstract, and make a profession of faith of that which is preferable and pleasing to himself.

Thus to-day we are in a state of uncertainty and indefiniteness in reference to the problem of culture. Since the new does not suffice, and the old cannot be taken up again, we are in doubt with regard to the whole conception of culture; we know neither what we have of it nor what it demands from us. We cannot give up our claim to being something more than mere nature, without sinking again to the level of the mere animal; but in what this "more" consists and how it is at all possible to surpass nature is to us completely obscure. A developed historical consciousness and the free unfolding of the powers of the present permit many things to rush in upon us; and we are involved in much inconsistency; we have seen diverse systems of life arise and attract man to themselves; their conflict relegates to the background all that is common to them, produces the greatest uncertainty, and gives rise to the inclination, in order to avoid all perplexities, to regard life as being made up entirely of that which occurs within sense experience; and to acquire aims from this experience, as well as to derive powers from it. But in this we fall into the danger of idealising immediate existence

falsely, and of expecting achievements from movements within it which are possible only if these movements flow from deeper sources. We flee to morality, to become free from all religion and metaphysics; as though morality, elevating man, as it does, above merely natural preservation and the compulsion of mere instinct, is not itself a metaphysic, and as though it does not of necessity require the existence of an order superior to nature. Then we flee to the subject with its unrestrained inwardness and contrast this inwardness with all the restricting relations of life, as though the subject had any content and any value without an independent inner world, the recognition of which involves a complete revolution of the representation of reality; as then according to the witness of history also humanity has reached such an inner world only through wearisome toil and forceful resolutions. The whole course of Antiquity had been leading up to this inner world, but the collision of Antiquity at the time of its decay, with Christianity which was then arising, first developed it clearly. Such an inner world must ever be justified anew; and for this our own activity and conviction is necessary; if we surrender its basis, it becomes dead capital which, little by little, is inevitably spent, and then the appeal to the subject that has lost its spiritual content is but a mere semblance of help, which deceives us concerning the seriousness of the situation with sweet sounding words like "personality," "individuality," and so forth. If the spiritual life is not strengthened and does not energetically counteract this tendency, then, notwithstanding all external progress, we must inwardly sink lower and lower.

It is obvious that there is already such a counteraction in existence; otherwise, how could spiritual destitution and the insignificance of the merely human be so keenly felt in the present; how could so ardent a desire for an inner elevation spread amongst men as we experience it around us? There is no lack of attempts and endeavours after new aims and new ways. But much is still lacking for these attempts to be equal to satisfy the requirements

of the matter. We place far too much hope in external reforms, instead of primarily strengthening the inner basis of life ; we place our attention far too much upon individual tasks instead of seizing the whole ; we have far too much faith that we can rise to a new life out of this chaotic condition, instead of insisting upon an attainment of independence in relation to this condition.

How could such an independence be attained otherwise than by an energetic reflection of man upon himself, upon his fundamental relation to reality, upon the life dwelling in him, by self-consciousness ? It is not the first time that, in the course of the ages, to satisfy such a demand has become the most urgent of all tasks. The work of history has not unshakable foundations from the beginning ; but the spiritual nature of epochs always contains the activity and a turning of man ; it involves, therefore, presuppositions that for a long period may be accepted as established truths, and which, yet, finally become problematic. At the beginning of the Modern Age, especially in the transition to the Enlightenment, apparently established truths became problematic in this way : the present is in a similar situation. The threads that we have hitherto followed break ; all external help is rejected, as is also the authority of history ; nothing else remains to us than our own capacity, and the hope to find in it a new support and the basis for a new construction. Only by our own power, and after a break with the immediate present, shall we be able to strive after a new idea of culture which corresponds to the historical position of spiritual evolution, and which can take up into itself the experiences of humanity. Such times of error, of vacillation, of searching, of necessary renewal, are disagreeable and severe, but it depends only on the summoning of spiritual power whether they become great and fruitful. For, with regard to these central questions the times do not make men, but men make the times, of course, not in accordance with their own preferences, but in seizing and realising the necessities that exist in the spiritual condition of the time.

Now, as scarcely anything else in life is more called upon to co-operate in the renewing of culture than philosophy, so the system here concisely presented is placed in the service of this task; it attempts a construction chiefly by the union of three demands and points of attack: it requires a more energetic development and a complete unification of the life-process; it requires the acknowledgment and development of a spiritual life of independent nature present to us; and lastly, it requires that this life shall be understood and treated as the world's consciousness of itself and thus as the only reality. All these demands must tend towards an essential alteration of the existent state of culture; they make much inadequate that previously sufficed; but they also reveal an abundance of new prospects and the possibility of a thorough inner elevation.

It is a leading idea of our whole investigation that only from the life-process itself are we able to orientate ourselves in relation to ourselves and the world; and this idea is in agreement with the present mode of thought in science. But to apply to our own time that which is already acknowledged in general ideas is by no means simple. To give the life-process such a position in our thought and to estimate it so highly is possible only when life is distinctly distinguished from the states of the mere subject, from the mere reflex of the environment in the individual. This detachment cannot be accomplished unless we comprehend as a whole that which exists in individual manifestations of life; distinguish different levels in life, indicate relations and movements within them, and thus advance to experiences within life; reveal a union of fact, a distinctive synthesis in life, which from a transcendent unity shapes the multiplicity that it contains. But if in general it is difficult to free ourselves so much from the condition of life in which we find ourselves, to be able to illuminate this condition in this way, and to throw its inner framework into relief; so for us there is also to be added the immeasurable expansion that directs the interests and the vision to the outside, and is accustomed to treat the life, that in

reality sustains all infinity, as a mere supplement, a mere means and instrument. A culture that has made the attainment of results the chief thing has been detrimental to the spiritual, which no longer trusts itself to encompass these achievements and to change them in a development of life, to take up the conflict for dominion over reality ; it willingly flees to the passivity of the mere subject, where sooner or later it expires in complete destitution.

If inwardness is so feeble and external relations so overwhelm us, life necessarily receives its content from outside, and seems to be determined essentially by that which happens around us. It is this that lends so much power to-day to a superficial enlightenment that centres in natural science, and expects life to be advanced without limit, and man to be revived and ennobled simply by giving a more valid representation of the environment. We do not ask here how far the representations proposed overcome the difficulties of the older representations, or whether new and more difficult problems do not arise from the solutions offered ; but we do ask whether life can obtain its aim and content from outside, and whether it can be treated as a mere addition to nature without degenerating inwardly, and losing all inner motive. We ask what the theories based chiefly on externals make of man, and what they achieve for his soul ; we summon him to an examination, to see whether the picture that is held up to him by these theories agrees with what he longs for, and, by a compelling necessity of his being, must long for.

To-day it will also be evident that the final decision does not rest with the intellect, but with life as a whole. For, little as intellectual achievement is absent from truth, the masses—and to the masses belong those at the average level of all classes, higher as well as lower—will always hold fast to the external impression : the advance beyond this impression and the appreciation of the inner conditions of knowledge will always remain a concern of the minority. There is, however, a point where the problem becomes real to each individual, and where each can offer his opinion :

this is in reference to the question of the happiness and the content of life. The more this question is felt, the greater will be the thirst for a substantial truth in contrast with the mere shadows of the Enlightenment; the more will the question concerning the nature of life as a whole receive its due consideration, and the perception of things externally will give place to a comprehension of their inner reality. Only with such a revolution can our life and we ourselves be transformed from a state of spiritual destitution to one of independent energy; only thus can we discover the wealth that is within us; only thus can culture, from being an occupation with things, become a preservation and an unfolding of our own selves; only thus can we strive for more simplicity in contrast to the complexity that would otherwise be our condition; and only thus can we wrest from what would otherwise be chaos, great outlines and tendencies. Our demand, therefore, that the starting-point should be the life-process itself is in harmony with the innermost longing of the time—even if this longing is often indefinite—after a deepening of life and an attainment of its independence.

If the turning to the life-process puts the question, the assertion of an independent spiritual life gives the answer to it: however strange this assertion may seem in relation to superficial temporal experience, it meets a deep longing. For we are completely satiated with merely human culture; the movements and experiences of the Modern Age, and in particular of the present, make us so clearly conscious of all that is trivial, merely apparent, disagreeable, feeble, shallow, empty, and futile in human conduct, that all hope of finding satisfaction in this conduct, and of advancing life essentially by its means and powers, must be abandoned. We have, therefore, to face the following alternative: either absolute doubt and the cessation of all effort, or the acknowledgment of a "more" in man; there is no third possibility. But in the context of our investigation no discussion is required to show that this "more" cannot consist in an individual's elevation of himself above others; that it

cannot consist in a so-called Superman—a view that only involves us more in the merely human. Either the " more " sought for is merely imaginary, a covering of tinsel with which we conceal our nakedness, or a world transcending the merely human, a new stage of reality, reveals itself to man, which can become his own life. As it is this transcendent world alone that engenders a universal life within us and opposes the insignificantly human; so also from this alone, and as its manifestation, can culture become independent in relation to man: only when it is understood in this way can culture include aims and tasks that do not strengthen man in his narrowness, but free him from it, and make him spiritually greater.

Not only the conception but the whole nature of that which is called culture is an unstable hybrid: it should elevate man above nature, and give to his life a characteristic spiritual content; but at the same time we have a dread of a detachment from the experience of sense and of the construction of an independent world, because these must lead to that which, of all things, is the cause of most alarm, to a change of a metaphysical character, to a transformation of existence. In truth, in the work of humanity two tendencies are usually undistinguished, which, if life is to continue to advance, need to be distinctly separated: a spiritual culture and a merely human culture. The former reveals new contents and aims; with it a new world emerges within man, and transforms his life from its basis; the latter uses that which a higher organisation has given us, solely as a means for the advancement of our natural and social existence; merely human culture turns the spiritual into a mere means to increase narrowly human happiness, whereas the spiritual by its very nature makes us feel the whole of this happiness to be too insignificant, indeed intolerable. The difference of a merely human and a spiritual culture extends from the fundamental disposition to all the separate departments of life: religion, for example, is to the former a means by which the individual may make himself as comfortable and as secure

as possible in an existent world, and conduct his own insignificant *ego* through all dangers; to the latter, it signifies a radical break with that world and the gain of a new life, in which care for that *ego*, or even the state of society, is relegated completely into the background. To the one, morality is a mere means in the organisation of human social life, in the accommodation of the individual to his environment; to the other, it discloses a new fundamental relation to reality, and in the transformation of existence in self-determining activity allows life to win an inner union with the infinite and its self-consciousness. On the one hand, art, science, the life of the state, education, and so forth are the idols of utility, of expediency, the adornments of a given existence; on the other, they are the gods of truth, of inner independence, of world-renewing spontaneity. That there should be an end to the confusion of the worship of idols and of gods; that spiritual culture should be distinguished from merely human culture; that the spiritual content of the individual departments of life should be energetically developed, and the spiritual poverty of merely human culture made clear—all this is the urgent demand of the present, without the fulfilment of which its state of confusion cannot be overcome. Yet spiritual culture can never become independent unless the spiritual world is independent. Only the presence of this spiritual world makes it possible for culture, at the level at which it is generally found, to be tested by a transcendent standard to see how much spiritual substance, how much content and value, it contains. This test will prove that we possess far less spirituality than we think; and that the most of what is called culture is no more than the semblance of culture, no more than imagination and presumption. But at the same time we recognise and gain in the little spirituality that remains to us incomparably more; we win the presence of a new world, and by this, depth of life and the possibility of an inner renewal. Our life would be indescribably shallow if it were to pass on one level and were to be exhausted in the experiences

at that level; the acknowledgment of an independent spiritual life saves us from this shallowness, in that it shows an inner gradation within our own province and sets life as a whole a task.

If the acknowledgment of a spiritual world, inwardly present to us, gives to culture a distinctive character, this character receives a further modification from the particular manner in which the spiritual life makes its appearance and becomes established within our existence; at the same time, from this position there is also the possibility of different sides and tasks within an all-comprehensive work of culture. Of special significance in reference to this modification is the circumstance that the spiritual life does not possess man as a natural fact, does not operate within him with complete power and sure direction from the beginning, but is present to him at first only as a possibility, and as a transcendence of the general condition of things. In accordance with this, although the spiritual belongs to our nature, it is not so much "given" to us as set as a task; for its realisation it needs our own attention and appropriation; all development of the spiritual life within us, therefore, involves our own activity and so receives an ethical character. The spiritual life also has such an ethical character because, transcending our original condition, it must be conveyed to us, and must be maintained by an imparting and an activity. In the spiritual life we find ourselves in a sphere of activity and of freedom in contrast with mere nature; in this way our life becomes our work, our own life in a much more real sense. We see this in the case of the fundamental form of the spiritual life that is called "personality." We men are by no means personalities from the beginning; but we bear within us simply the potentiality of becoming a personality; whether we shall realise our personality is decided by our own work; it depends primarily upon the extent to which we succeed in striving beyond the given existence to a state of self-determining activity. The fact that we thus take part in the formation of our own being proves that we are citizens of a new world—a world other than

nature—and shows that we are incomparably more than we could become as mere parts of nature. Neither philosophy nor religion will convince one who, at this point, does not recognise an elevation to a higher power, indeed a transformation of existence. But one who recognises this will desire such a transformation and such an elevation of culture also; he will not come to an easy compromise with the given condition of things and draw the greatest possible amount of pleasure from this condition; but he will set culture an objective ideal; arouse it from the prevailing state of indolence; fully acknowledge the antitheses of experience, and will be provoked rather to make further exertions than disposed to abandon himself to these antitheses. Life finds its main problem in itself, solely in the development of an ethical character, and attains to complete independence and a transcendence of nature only when the spiritual takes precedence. Every culture that does not treat the ethical task, in the widest sense, as the most important of tasks and the one that decides all, sinks inevitably to a mere semblance of culture, a half-culture, indeed a comedy. The æsthetic system, with its transformation of life into play and pleasure, with its beautiful language and its spiritual poverty, is such a life. To-day, therefore, a revival and strengthening of the idea of culture can be brought about only together with the establishment of such an ethical conviction. Only a culture of an ethical character can develop an independent and positive spirituality; only such a culture can free the impulse of life from being directed to merely natural self-preservation, and in doing this not make the impulse weaker but stronger. In nothing have minds been more divided and in nothing will they become more divided than with regard to the question whether, after the perception of the inadequacy of mere nature and society, a new world reveals itself to them, or whether mere negation is the ultimate conclusion; the former will be possible only through that which we call ethical.

The conception that we have here presented of the spiritual life and of its relation to man also makes it for

the first time possible to understand and acknowledge the manifold and opposing elements of time without falling into a shallow eclecticism. Realism advances in power, and Idealism seems to be endangered in respect not merely of its form but also of its innermost nature. Idealism is, indeed, in danger so long as the spiritual life has not attained to independence in relation to mere man; for, so long as the spiritual life is regarded as a mere production of man the knowledge of man's relation to nature and his animal origin must lead to a serious prostration, to a complete dissolution of Idealism. If, on the other hand, it is established that with the spiritual life a new order transcending the power of man makes its appearance within him, then the recognition of human incapacity becomes a direct witness to the independence of the spiritual life. We must, therefore, cease to treat spiritual developments, such as religion, art, morality, as the natural attributes of all called men. Man's natural character simply offers tendencies and relations which can find a spiritual character only by the revelation of a spiritual world. The decisive point of transition is not between man and animal, but between nature and spirit. But even where culture is supposed to be at its highest, human existence is for the most part at the level of nature—and is only embellished in some degree.

In Idealism a religious shaping of life is to be distinguished from an immanent shaping of life in spiritual creation, especially in art and science. The demand for a universal spiritual system involves the rejection of the specific religious system as being in many ways too narrow and open to hostile criticism; this universal system, however, as it is presented when the spiritual life is acknowledged to be independent, is closely related to religion. Not only is all spirituality within us dependent upon a universal spiritual life, but this spiritual life within us always presents itself as something transcendent and is not coincident with our existence. This religious character must be the more clearly emphasised the greater the toil with which the

spiritual life must defend itself from a world apparently alien and hostile. Immanent Idealism, filling life as it does through art and science, cannot possibly be the whole and conclusive—for this reason at least, that it has too little with which to counteract the perplexities of spiritual and of material life, and because it concentrates life too little within itself. But a scientific character is indispensable to a universal spiritual culture, in order that life may not pass in subjective feeling and presentation, and that life may have an objective character, and be led to the clearness of a universal consciousness. An æsthetic form and creative activity pertain also to this life; for, otherwise, no representation of reality as a whole could be obtained from the confused impressions of immediate existence; the spiritual could attain to no clear present, and could not permeate reality with ennobling power, and expel all that is deformed and indifferent to it in the original condition of things.

From the point of view of spiritual culture the movements in the direction of Realism also may be regarded as of value, if only they do not desire to dominate life and to impress their form directly upon it. The tendency to place a low estimate upon the natural and material conditions of life and of human social relationship has everywhere revenged itself upon the spiritual life, since it has allowed that life to fall into a state of weakness and effeminacy, and prevented it from realising its full power and strength.

The acknowledgment of the multiplicity of tasks that are involved in all the departments must threaten life with great danger, if every department of human experience does not serve the development of an independent spiritual life. The more power the spiritual life acquires, the more securely will it tend to prevent division. Nevertheless, everything is in a state of movement; man must first win a coherent character for his life. But it is already a great gain that we are not defenceless in face of the antitheses within the human sphere, that the presence of an inde-

pendent spiritual life elevates us inwardly above them and only allows an inner unity to take up a conflict.

We may also briefly consider how the conception of the spiritual life as a coming of reality to itself, as a formation and development of being, must tend to deepen and strengthen the work of culture. How much more this work must become to us, how much more indispensable must it be, if it is not merely a matter of giving an existent material a new form, of arousing dormant powers, but if in it we first advance from a life that is only a half-life and a life of pretence to a real and genuine life; if we struggle not merely for one thing or another within existence, but for being as a whole! If once life is awakened to reflect upon itself, and if at the same time it makes a claim to self-consciousness and a content, it cannot doubt the emptiness of the life of mere nature and just as little that of the life of mere society; in the former, as in the latter, there are only suggestions of a genuine life, only possibilities, most of which do not come to be realised. Not suffering, but spiritual destitution is man's worst enemy. From this position the outlook of the life of the majority can be only a cloudy one, its value only mean. If we abstract from the experience of man that which is due to the necessity of self-preservation and to social training, how much inner movement, how much life of his own, how much that is spiritual remains in him! How many dead souls there are in all classes of society; how many who, allowing their powers to lie dormant, drift about aimlessly! Nevertheless other possibilities exist in man, and even if they are not positively developed, still they prevent him from feeling satisfied in that state of spiritual poverty, and always keep life in an insecure state of suspension.

The less we think of the immediate welfare and capacity of man, the more will the spiritual life transcend us and the more urgent will the task of the spiritual life become—to preserve to human existence in the midst of all externality and pretence some kind of substance and some kind of soul. However, we have already occupied ourselves with the

question of the nature and significance of truth and reality in the spiritual life.

(*b*) THE ORGANISATION OF THE WORK OF CULTURE

A problem from which no system of life can escape is that of the organisation of culture, the question how the work of culture can be divided into different departments and at the same time preserve a unity. To-day we are in a state of great perplexity in this matter ; an old solution has become untenable, and a new one has not yet been found.

The Middle Ages handed down to us a system of culture that may be described as a hierarchy, in the widest sense of that term. The whole multiplicity of life was united into a whole ; but this whole was dominated by distinctive religious and philosophic convictions, which assigned to each individual department its place in the whole and set it its task ; these departments attained to a complete independence as little as that system had an independence for individual forms. The Modern Age has evolved and has realised a system of freedom in increasing opposition to the earlier system. How this everywhere effects an emancipation is demonstrated by our problem of the increasing development to independence by the individual departments of life. The state and society, science and art, find their tasks more and more within themselves, in their own development ; they engender distinctive laws and methods of their own ; they seem to be able to reach their aims of their own capacity. Effort is directed more and more into individual departments, and there is a feeling of complete satisfaction in this tendency. Our life has gained immensely in comprehensiveness and breadth by the transition to this modern system : it comes more closely into touch with the realm of fact ; it produces a greater

diversity of movement, since the different departments have their own starting-points, enter upon distinctive paths, and direct their powers into these paths. The attainment of independence by the individual departments of life constitutes one of the chief gains of modern culture, and it cannot again be given up.

But the attainment of independence by the individual departments brings great perplexities with it, which make a definite counter-movement necessary. At first the tendencies characteristic of the individual departments directly contradict one another; indeed, this is inevitable, if they are not systematised in some way. For particular experiences of human life are present in each department: one feels our greatness more, another our weakness; one is moved more by the harmony of existence, another more by the antitheses; one tends more to exert power upon the environment, the other to concentration in itself; from these experiences there must originate different modes of life and different representations of the world. In this condition of life it is impossible for the different tendencies not to cross one another and to clash together; and this threatens to divide our life, and to rob it of all its inner unity. A glance at the condition of life in the present is sufficient to convince us that such dangers are more than mere fancies.

To the difficulty in respect of the relations of the different departments among themselves, we must add another, if anything greater, in respect of the relation of each department to life as a whole. To be well organised each department needs a co-operation of form and content, of the technical and the personal; the former gives the department its particular nature; for the latter a relation with life as a whole is necessary. The work of science, for example, follows certain forms of thought, which it evolves from itself, and which are equally valid for all times and parties. But even the most conscientious following of these laws does not give to science a content and a character; science can acquire these only in relation with a movement of life

as a whole, which, in its striving from whole to whole, takes up the experiences of humanity and unites them into a whole. Only in this way does science, from being a mere arrangement and accumulation, become knowledge, an inner appropriation of things. If in accordance with this the individual departments are detached more and more from life as a whole, and are made dependent solely upon their own capacity, it can hardly be otherwise than that in the midst of all perfection in execution they lose more and more all spiritual content and all definite character: at the same time, it may soon follow that the effect upon humanity as a whole will become subsidiary and a matter of indifference; the individual departments will become exclusively a matter of a circle of specialists, and strive for an effect within this circle only. In this way an art arises which, in the artist, forgets the man, and which does not so much convey new content to human life, or help the time to attain to a characteristic feeling of life, and elevate it above the meaninglessness and the confusion of commonplace every-day experience, but which is for the most part mindful of refinement in execution, and so, easily degenerates into the complicated and the mere virtuoso. Science experiences the same thing. It may, through exaggerating the independence necessary to it, assume an air of proud self-satisfaction, and, by detachment from the movement of life as a whole, that which is its main concern, namely, knowledge, may suffer. For it soon tends to become mere erudition, which treats problems as something half-alien, gains no inner relation to things, does not understand how to animate reality, indeed even rejects, as unscientific, all striving after such animation. This tendency produces, to use an expression of Hegel's, excellent "counter-servers," who do not look after business of their own, but only that of others.

No people are more threatened by the danger of this tendency than we Germans; more especially because the tendency is closely related with a most advantageous quality of our nature—willing subordination to the object, fidelity

and conscientiousness in our work. But since we follow this one tendency, aspects and tendencies which are absolutely necessary to a complete life stagnate and decay: we do not sufficiently develop a personal life independent of the object; we do not encompass and transform it from its very base by a transcendent life-process; and so we are occupied too much with the mere material, and do not completely spiritualise it; we do not bring into relief simple lines in the infinite abundance, which we require and must maintain complete. How many excellent scholars our time possesses, who are equipped with an astonishing capacity for work, who are masters of even the most complicated technical matters, and yet how few spiritual types there are among them; how few who have anything to say to humanity, and who will exert their influence in this way beyond the present! The history of German formative art also indicates a painful divergence between the amount of untiring work and the carefulness of execution, and the creation of simple and pure forms that would increase the spiritual possessions of humanity, and be permanent factors in its movement. However, the trait is rooted far too deeply in our being for even the most determined resolution to be able directly to achieve much to counteract it. Nevertheless, it is not a matter of indifference whether we give ourselves complacently up to this one-sidedness, and fortify ourselves proudly in it; or whether we resist it to the best of our ability.

Thus, the present finds itself in a difficult situation in regard to the problem of the organisation of culture. To give up the independence of the individual departments, or even merely to limit it in any way, would be an enormous and impossible retrogression; on the other hand, some kind of inner unity of life must be obtained. A transcendence of the antithesis must, therefore, be sought; and this needs a distinctive structure of life. The spiritual life offers such a structure in so far as it constitutes the development of being. For we saw how independent centres and characteristic movements arise in an all-comprehensive life. Between

these movements there may be manifold relations and antitheses, but they are within a whole life and with their experiences can aid its further development. With a transference of this to the departments of life, it will be necessary to show that each individual department has a root in life as a whole and a significance for this life; only thus can the power of this whole life be exerted in the individual departments, and penetrate them. But the department does not receive its form simply from the whole by way of derivation; but it can take up and treat the problem independently, and with its own means; that which exists in the whole as an affirmation may be only a question and a suggestion in the individual department. Yet this is in no way without value: for, nevertheless, it leads us beyond the indefiniteness of the original condition, and guides effort in circumscribed paths. What gives work in the individual departments special significance and intensity is the fact that they take up the problem of the whole in a particular sphere, and can treat that problem in a characteristic manner; that they are not mere aids and assistants, but independent co-operators. In this connection it is of especial importance that the spiritual life is not conferred upon man in a finished form; but that within him it must first be worked towards with great toil and through doubt and error, from indefinite outlines to more detailed development. It is obvious that the form of the whole will ever be questionable; and that the individual departments must co-operate in the examination and justification of the forms proposed. Indeed, it is just the mark of great achievements in the individual departments that, while they transform their own sphere, they at the same time develop the whole. It is this that distinguishes Leibniz from Wolff, and Kant from Herbart.

Such an organisation gives to life a movement in two directions: it must be conducted from whole to part, and from part to whole. The individual departments must be developed far enough to reveal their particularity

and to produce a characteristic tendency of their own; but they must remain within a whole, to receive from it and to lead back to it. The relations between the individual departments will be distinctive in such a system; the influence of one upon another will be without suspicion, and advantageous, only when it is exerted through the mediation of the whole; while disturbances are inevitable, when one conveys immediate experiences to another and imposes its nature upon another. It was necessary, for example, to reject the earlier encroachments of religion upon other departments of life; art, too, often found it necessary to resist the tendency to subordinate it to morality; and to-day there is a strong inclination to shape every department of life in accordance with the instructions of natural science. Yet although such encroachments must be rejected, and the independence of each in relation to the others preserved, the changes that are effected in one department are by no means indifferent and lost to the other departments. For, if through these changes life as a whole is developed, then the effect of the change must extend to the other departments. In this manner of mediation religion has exercised a strong influence upon the other departments of life; and in this sense, to-day, an influence of natural science upon the whole circle of existence will be readily acknowledged. But this does not involve a limitation or an enslaving of other departments, because the change in life as a whole must now be ascertained first; and, besides, each individual department must test by its own experiences the suggestion coming from the whole.

When we take all these facts into consideration we see that the organisation of culture is a difficult problem and that the organisation is unstable. In culture, different tendencies will cross one another; antitheses cannot be avoided, and collisions will not be lacking. But that which life loses in completeness and exclusiveness, it gains in wealth and movement; and division need not be a cause of anxiety so long as a powerful spiritual life embraces and unifies the multiplicity. Without such a counteraction

by the spiritual life we must drift towards ever greater specialisation; and, with this, we should not only see life become more and more disintegrated, but we should also become less and less spiritual, and be transformed into a soulless mechanism.

II. THE FORM OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEPARTMENTS

Preliminary Considerations

BEFORE we proceed to discuss the individual departments of life we may briefly consider the common task that is imposed upon them all by the distinctive condition of the time: they must become independent in relation to the earlier as well as to the more modern conceptions of them, and, if necessary, take up a conflict against both. The course of our investigation can have left no doubt with regard to the state of prostration of the older forms of life: the uncertainty affects the whole and the fundamental principles much more than it has ever done before. Formerly the struggle was concerned rather with individual departments or individual tendencies of life; it was carried on more in reference to the conception and meaning of fundamental truths than with regard to the validity of those truths themselves. The passionate struggles of the period of the Reformation left the fundamentals of Christianity untouched; in a similar manner the later attacks upon ecclesiastical religion usually had a basis of firm faith in morality, and derived their power more especially from it. To-day the authority of morality is just as seriously shaken as that of religion; and the conception of truth is itself in the same condition of uncertainty.

In this condition of things an appeal to history cannot be employed as proof of any position; a patchwork of our own and of something alien gives us still less a position above perplexity: there is no other way than to take up the problem with the means of the present itself. For this the acknowledgment of the independence of the spiritual

life forms a fit foundation. The spiritual life is not dependent upon and fixed to particular temporal conditions; ever anew it can break forth spontaneously, and from the particularity of the time advance to eternal truths. It is to us a source of joy that a time has come again when we need not follow other paths, but must go our own; when nothing can bind us but that which has been approved by our own being and our own conviction. It is not necessary for a time such as this to take up an attitude of hostility towards the whole past; rather—and especially when it thinks worthily of itself—it will seek a friendly relationship with history. But this is possible only when the present has attained complete independence, and only from this independent position; only when an eternal content is revealed in that which history conveys to us. In opposition to submission to mere authority such a time makes a demand for unlimited freedom and complete spontaneity; such freedom and spontaneity are essential if life is again to find the truthfulness and the inner power that we so painfully miss.

Such a requirement of life and thought arising out of the immediate present may easily cause division from those to whom the crisis does not seem so serious, and who believe that it is possible to transform the old in a quiet and inhostile manner into the new. The conflict will be far more acute with those who, with us, make the demand for an independent present; but who, by the conceptions of an independent present, freedom and spontaneity, understand something totally different from that which we ourselves understand by them from the point of view of an independent spiritual life. In all times of spiritual revival the freedom and immediacy which the spiritual life needs for itself have been usurped by mere man as though they were a right pertaining to him: and then it appears that only the complete emancipation of individuals, a severance of all connections, unconditional submission to the passing moment, are necessary in order to lead life to truth and greatness, and man to a glorious

state of happiness. Such a movement cannot spread without making the antitheses of life appear less acute, concealing its problems and its depths, and falsely idealising man with all the contingency of his experience: with all the bustle of its preparation and all its agitation the movement must terminate in a state of spiritual destitution; it threatens life with inner destruction. With a modernity of this kind we have nothing in common.

We must, therefore, with all our power, wage war against the merely human and imaginary freedom on behalf of one that is genuine and spiritual: this conflict is exceptionally complicated and difficult, because real life does not make such a clear distinction between the genuine and the false as the conceptions do, but rather allows them to be confused. For this reason the conflict will be carried on not only on the right hand and on the left, but also against the confusion that obscures the great "either—or," without the distinct presence of which a spontaneous life does not acquire power and consciousness. A way must be found by which, notwithstanding manifold dangers and complications, we may advance to a life that joins depth to freedom, stability with movement: this is an inner necessity of the age, and once it is recognised and taken up as such, it will in some way be realised.

(*a*) RELIGION, MORALITY, EDUCATION

1. Religion

In no sphere of life is there more inner division and uncertainty at the present time than in that of religion. To one, the rejection of all religion seems to be indispensable to the sincerity of life and to the attainment of healthy conditions, because, as a pernicious legacy from past ages, it oppresses our life, confuses our thought, paralyses our power of activity, and provokes men to the greatest hatred of one another; to another, on the contrary, religion seems

to be the only firm support in face of the needs and confusions of the age—the only thing that inwardly unites men and elevates each individual above himself, the only thing that reveals a depth in life and allows life to share in the infinite and the eternal. The adherents to each of these views show the greatest earnestness and zeal; we cannot treat the negation lightly and dispose of it with the convenient catchword "unbelief," if only for the reason that on the part of many this negative attitude is due to a sincere anxiety for the truthfulness of life. To rise above this conflict in regard to religion we must, in the first place, estimate the points at issue impartially; and nothing else is more called upon to do this than philosophy.

Philosophy will not make light of the prostration of religion; for a survey of history shows that the state of life has undergone a complete change since the epoch when religion exercised an undisputed supremacy. At that time the world and human life received all meaning and value from their relation to an invisible and supernatural order: the course of the Modern Age has made the world that surrounds us ever more significant, and since man has directed his activity upon this world, the world of faith has been allowed to recede more and more. The movement that led to our present position attained increasing power and consciousness through three stages: at the height of the Renaissance the divine was revered less in its world-transcendent sovereignty than in its world-pervading operation; then, the Pantheism of a speculative and æsthetic culture associated the world and God together in one reality; finally, in the investigation of illimitable nature and the formation of political and social relations the world of sense gives man so much to do, fetters his power so much, and gives him at the same time such a proud consciousness of this power, that the conception of a transcendent world fades entirely; and an Agnosticism that rejects as superfluous and unfruitful all reflection upon and care concerning such a world gains ground.

This change in the direction and in the disposition of life

must itself have forced religion more or less out of the field of our attention. But it is fraught with far more dangers to religion that the work of the Modern Age in all its main tendencies is directed against the foundations of life, upon which the construction of religion rests. Modern natural science has dispossessed man of the central position that he formerly attributed to himself, and has deprived nature of its soul. The modern science of history, with its demonstration of ceaseless change in all that is human, has undermined the faith in an absolute truth; at the same time, with regard to the beginnings of Christianity, there is a wide divergence between the traditional conception of faith and the new conception obtained by historical research. The tendency of modern culture has been to make the increasing of power, in work upon things and in their control, the highest ideal; from the point of view of this ideal of impersonal power, the world of pure inwardness, the home of Christianity, has been able to appear to be a merely subjective and subsidiary accompaniment of the life-process. He who estimates rightly the fact that all these tendencies of modern life work together and strengthen one another cannot fail to recognise that they force religion from the centre of life to its circumference, and transform it from an impregnable fact into a difficult problem; they destroy that self-evidence of religion which previously made life secure and calm. If, however, religion no longer springs up in the consciousness of contemporaries from a necessity of their own life, it is not difficult to understand that the complications of the problem are too great for many of them; that the burden of obsolete forms overbalances the power of their own impulse, and thus, by a sudden revolution, negation seems the only way to save truth. Then religion seems to be a mere illusion that arose in a past age—an illusion similar to astrology and alchemy; one which, in face of growing enlightenment, must ultimately be completely dispelled.

But if the philosophic treatment understands the negation rightly, it can only warn us against being hasty in our

acceptance of it. To be sure, quite apart from all the caprice and purpose of man, the condition of life has become very much changed; but it was less the state of affairs itself that permitted the changes to clash so irreconcilably with religion than the interpretation which it received and the exclusiveness which was attributed to it. The decision in this matter has depended in particular upon what is called the spirit of the age, which is often nothing more than the inclination and disposition of man; such inclination, as history shows, may change into the direct opposite; it does not form a sure touchstone of truth.

These considerations, indeed, do not make much headway in opposition to the storm and stress of the movements of the age: that which operates far more strongly in favour of religion is the experience and the feeling that the attempted negation of religion by no means easily and directly solves the problem of life; and, further, that along with religion much becomes untenable to which even the modern man cannot lightly renounce all claim. Whatever there may be in religion, it has brought man into union with the deepest basis of reality, and at the same time revealed to him a life of pure inwardness: it has set a task for life as a whole and has given to life a meaning and a value; it has counteracted the lower impulses and the egoism of mere self-preservation; and has organised humanity spiritually. These aims have hardly become superfluous and worthless; even without religion, and after abandoning its principles, it would be necessary to accomplish these aims in other ways. It is in the attempts at reconstruction that the futility of the negation of religion becomes painfully evident. Phrases concerning the greatness and noble-mindedness of all that bear human features; a blind faith in the elevating power of intellectual enlightenment or even of external organisation; a confusion of thought which, unobserved, rejects and elevates its own principles, and so maintains in the conclusion that which it rejected in the premises; all these things can deceive him alone concerning the spiritual poverty and the complete powerless-

ness of what is offered in them; whose zeal in his antagonism to religion has deprived him of balance of feeling and impartiality of judgment. If it is inquired what content and value human life still retains after the surrender of all relation to the whole and of all inner relation, it will be recognised that the complete negation of religion consistently carried out must lead to an appalling convulsion of human existence as a whole.

But if such considerations counsel us to be cautious in regard to the negation of religion, they do not justify an adherence to its traditional form. The far-reaching changes of life that we are aware of cannot possibly be explained away or their significance lessened ; they must be estimated, and brought into relation with religion. The boundary between the eternal and the temporal, the substance and the outward form in religion, has been made uncertain by these changes ; in particular they forbid philosophy to treat the religious problem from the point of view of a dogmatic confession. The antithesis between Catholicism and Protestantism is the offspring of an age that preceded the development of modern culture, with all its deep-reaching revolutions : the main problem of religion at the time when the antithesis made its appearance was differently stated from the way in which we now state it. For then it was a question whether Christianity was to be formed from society or from personality ; while to-day Christianity fights for its existence as a whole, and must defend its fundamental truths against a time in which activity is directed into other paths. The present antithesis cannot possibly be regarded as ultimately identical with the former one ; and it is for this reason impossible to take up the present conflict concerning religion under the banner of a particular dogmatic confession. Such an ante-dating of the conflict also has the disadvantage that it prevents the great antitheses which are involved to-day both in Catholicism and Protestantism from being clearly displayed. Two different streams have been present in Catholicism from its beginning : to the one, the power of

the ecclesiastical system is the main thing; while to the other, on the contrary, the religious disposition is of supreme importance. The influences of modern culture have increased this difference, both directly and indirectly, and, chiefly outside of Germany, there are signs of the beginning of a stronger movement towards a more inward Catholicism. Protestantism carries within it an antithesis of the old ecclesiastical form of religion, which adheres as much as possible to the state of things in the sixteenth century, and a kind transformed by the idealism of modern culture more into the universal, the free, the purely human, but also not infrequently into vagueness and superficial optimism. But so long as the bitterness of sectarian prejudice diverts the attention of men from the chief thing, these antitheses are not clearly expressed and energetically developed. There are serious contradictions involved in these views of religion, and they cannot be developed without giving rise to parties: philosophy must strive with all its energy to bring it about that these parties shall be formed in relation to the present situation, and not from the point of view of a past age; and that the conflict shall be raised to a higher level, to truth and greatness, by taking up into itself the necessity of the time.

The task of philosophy is not limited to estimating as impartially as possible the state of things as we immediately experience it; that task also includes a positive treatment of the religious problem. That which is characteristic in the philosophy of life advocated in this treatise, Noetism, as it might be called, must also find a definite expression and show what capacity it has, in the fulfilment of this task. In accordance with its fundamental relation to history, which has been much discussed, Noetism cannot make history most important, even in religion, and cannot read into history as much as possible of what the present demands; it must regard any such procedure as a weakness and a half-truth. Noetism must insist upon religion's justifying itself and establishing its reality before the

tribunal of the spiritual life: only then can the truth that exists in history and that which, through progressive differentiation, promotes the cause of transcendent truth and brings it nearer to humanity as a whole, be elucidated. We have not for a moment lost sight of the fact that it is essential to religion to be related not to single individuals but to all; and that religion can evolve no power without compelling men to some kind of unity.

Now, for the treatment of the religious problem, Noetism offers first a position from which demands are made compatible which are otherwise directly opposed to one another. Religion is concerned with experiences which at one and the same time must possess a universal character, belong to our own life, and be immediately accessible to each. The attempt of speculative philosophy to establish religion by deduction from the nature of the whole has the required universal character; but it introduces religion to the soul from outside, and remains a mere intellectual gain. The contrary attempt to base religion in the individual soul developed an inwardness; but this attempt shows that the soul does not know how to build up a world and to contrast it with the subject, to present this world as something transcendent; it makes no sure progress beyond the fluctuation and undulation of mere feeling. Only an independent spiritual life, inwardly present to us, elevates us above this division of subjective feeling and a transcendent world, and inaugurates universal experiences in our own domain. How with the spiritual life new realities are manifested; how the whole of a world which transcends human existence becomes evident, has already been discussed, and it is not necessary to make any repetition here. Every acknowledgment of an independent spiritual life is favourable to religion in so far as this acknowledgment makes us clearly perceive the inadequacy, the illusoriness, and the vanity of all merely human conduct and occupation, its futility in matters both small and great. So long as attention is fixed on individual matters, and so long as we may expect some improvement in these

in the present or in the future, we may not be aware of the futility of this conduct; but as soon as the situation is grasped as a whole and estimated as a whole, mere human conduct is found to be entirely inadequate, these external aids are found wanting, and there remains only the inexorable "either—or": either the power of a new world is operative in man, and makes him strong outwardly and inwardly, or the whole life of man is spiritually lost—one great illusion, one great error.

If from the point of view of the spiritual life the contour of a new world is acquired, we may turn back to history, and ask how far it indicates a movement which tends in the direction of such a world. The spiritual life itself brings a distinctive standard for this inquiry: the fundamental fact is not a single factor within life, but the existence of a self-conscious whole of life, of a spiritual process itself. From the point of view of the spiritual life, the chief thing in religions will be the kind of life they reveal; what they make of the life-process; how through the relation to an absolute life they evolve the life-process to a higher stage. Only so far as they express this life-process, and not in themselves, are the doctrines and practices of religion of value.

If we apply this test to the individual religions, Christianity shows itself distinctly to be far superior to the others: more than any of the other religions, Christianity fulfils the demands which are made by the nature of the spiritual life and its relation to the world; and so far as Christianity satisfies these demands, but not in its historical form as a whole, it may assert itself to be absolute.

If Christianity as a religion of redemption requires that we should tear ourselves from the old world and aspire to a new one, this demand receives a distinctive significance by the more detailed conception which Christianity forms of it. As evil and that which is to be overcome is regarded not, as among the Hindus, as mere appearance, but as moral guilt, which disorganises the world, it is not the fundamental reality of the world but a particular con-

ception of it that is rejected; and so there remains the possibility of life being raised to something positive; and in this the main thing is not intellectual enlightenment, but radical moral renewal, an elevation into a world of love, grace, and reverence. This view of the world makes it impossible to base life simply upon affirmation or negation; but affirmation and negation must be present within it, and thus life is given an inner comprehensiveness and an inner movement which it would not otherwise possess. Christianity included the innermost basis of human life in this movement and transformation, since it not only regarded the divine as influencing the human by individual manifestations of its power, but proclaimed a complete union of both, and maintained this through its whole development. A wearied and exhausted age may have formulated this fundamental truth in the most unfortunate manner in the doctrine of the divine humanity of Christ; nevertheless, the effectiveness of the truth involved was not prevented by this. Only from the power of a conception of a union of the divine and the human can religion acquire the character of pure and complete inwardness, of a spiritual self-consciousness: otherwise the relation of the divine and the human remains a more or less external one. But this is not the place to trace how the Christian type of life has been visibly embodied in the course of history in the personality and the life of its founder, and in the common labours of centuries, in which the Semitic and Germanic natures have been harmonised, and great peoples and personalities have given their best to the world: here we may only remark further that the whole is not a work completed at one particular point in time, but a continuous task of all ages; and that, in the fundamental life transcending all mere time, a fixed standard is offered by which to test the achievement of all particular ages, and to differentiate the results of the work of history as far as they correspond with the fundamental character of religion. Religion must maintain the fundamental character of the life that it advocates, in face of all change in the state of

culture, just as decidedly as for its development in detail it remains dependent upon the help of the work of culture.

Religion in the present, therefore, has great and difficult tasks. For one thing, religion must energetically maintain the supremacy, in opposition to modern culture, of the type of life that it advocates. The fact that there are points of direct antagonism between the religious type of life and modern culture ought neither to be denied nor in any way obscured. On the one hand, we have an ideal of a life of the pure inwardness of ethical disposition; on the other, the ideal of spiritual power: in the former the tendency is to personal, in the latter to impersonal life: in the one case there is a positive development only by a complete transformation; in the other the immediate impulse of life is the ruling motive power of the whole. It shows only superficiality and confusion to seek an agreeable compromise between these antitheses; for, in truth, either the one or the other must assume the guidance of the whole. The whole course of our investigation permits of no doubt as to our own attitude in this matter.

But it is impossible to defend the supremacy of the type of life advocated by Christianity without recognising the necessity that this type of life must be in a form which appropriates to itself the long experience of humanity and corresponds to the present stage of spiritual evolution. The changes necessitated by this evolution are far too great for the traditional form of Christianity to be able to embody them; in order to develop their own power, and to establish themselves triumphantly in opposition to a hostile world, they must acquire an independent form for themselves.

There are three kinds of changes that are especially necessary to the form of Christianity in the present. (1) The representation of the world found in the older form of Christianity has become absolutely untenable: in this matter we must not seek weak compromises between the old and the new, but without fear we must fully acknowledge the elements of fact that exist in the new.

We cannot do this unless we make deep changes in the condition of religion; we must find the courage and the power for such a renewal. (2) The whole movement of modern life has made us feel that the realities with which traditional religion has to do are far too insignificant and too narrow; a rigid insistence upon them threatens to involve us in a degeneration to the merely human and subjective. The conceptions of "inwardness," "personality," and "morality," in particular, need to be interpreted more comprehensively and deeply; the soul's "being for self" must be based upon a self-consciousness of the spiritual life. Religion must take up the conflict with the world spiritually, and through this grow in greatness in its whole effect and government. (3) The older form of Christianity was the product of a wearied and faint-spirited age; hence its fundamental attitude is predominantly passive and negative. It shows a strong tendency to depreciate human nature, and to leave the salvation of man entirely to God's mercy: in emphasising man's redemption from evil it is apt to forget the elevation of his nature toward the good. The joyousness of the Christian life is insufficiently dwelt upon; and the raising of men from their prostration and perplexities falls short of a restoration to a free and self-determining activity. What is needed is a thorough-going reconstruction which shall emphasise the importance of action and joyousness in Christian morality, without in any way weakening the opposition to all systems of natural morality based on the rights of force.

In a word, with all respect to Christianity, we demand its expression in a new form. We require that Christianity shall identify itself more definitely with a religion of the spiritual life as opposed to a religion which merely ministers to human frailty, and that it shall show greater decision in casting off the antiquated accessories that hamper its movement. We ask that it shall make prominent those simple and fundamental features of its system which have value for all time, and in this way restore sincerity and

settled confidence to life. We can hardly expect that the reunion of man on a religious basis will take place all at once, but it would be a great gain if we could only clearly realise what the oppositions are which still keep us apart. Such insight would help to check that insincerity in religious matters which must first be got rid of, if there is to be any source of spiritual health in us.

2. Morality.

From the perplexities of religion many flee to morality as to something secure and untouched by dissension. The position of morality is, indeed, different from that of religion. Of atheists there are many; but there are few, if any, who deny the validity of all moral values: that fidelity is better than deceit, love better than hate, concerning this there is no dispute. But it is a question how far this agreement extends and how much we may gain from it. Within the same sphere of culture at least it is with very little difficulty that we come to agreement in respect of individual matters of morality; if ethical societies limited themselves to practical morality, and did not at the same time wish to settle questions of principle, they would find scarcely any opposition. But, as soon as we comprehend the individual matters as a whole and ask for a foundation for the whole, problem after problem makes its appearance, and it soon becomes clear that we can neither establish nor distinctively form morality without a conviction concerning life as a whole and our fundamental relation to reality. If, therefore, there is so much uncertainty in the present concerning life as a whole and our fundamental relation to reality, we must inevitably become doubtful and unclear with regard to morality. In reality, the position may be described in this way: we lack a morality which has a secure basis and a definite character; in morality, also, after-effects of the past mingle with the impulses of the present; and we are accustomed to conceal the poverty

of our own possessions by historical knowledge and mere learning—so much is this the case that we are able even in a state of disgraceful poverty to think ourselves rich. There are no less than five types of morality which seek our adherence and the guidance of our soul: we may suppose that in each of these there is some truth, but no single one is able to win our acceptance entirely; each leads to a certain point, and then we recognise a limit. We have a religious morality, in which our volition is bound and our destiny is determined by a divine power; but this endangers the spiritual independence of man, and has a strong tendency to make his life too passive; besides, in this case, the prostration of religion also weakens the power of morality and its power to direct life. We have a morality of culture, which directs all power towards increasing the progress of humanity, and subordinates all subjective preference to the requirements of an objective operation and creation; but the ceaselessly increasing differentiation of work makes this form of morality a danger to the soul as a whole; man is in danger of being made a mere means and instrument of a soulless process of culture. We have a social morality, which makes the welfare of society the chief thing, and which, by strengthening the feeling of solidarity, produces humane efforts in abundance, but is unable to include life as a whole; in this form of morality there is a great danger of overestimating external conditions of life, and of levelling and weakening life. Certain great thinkers have advocated a morality of pure reason, which elevates man above the sphere of the useful and the pleasant, and gives to him an inner independence; but with all its greatness this morality is too formal and too abstract for us; and, besides, we lack to-day the certainty of an invisible world, which alone can give a secure foundation to this type of morality. Lastly, we have an individualistic morality, a morality of beautiful souls, which regards the complete development of one's own particular nature, the harmonious cultivation of the whole range of one's powers,

as the aim of conduct, but which not only necessitates individuals who are far greater and far more characteristic in nature than we find in experience in general, but also has little power to arouse us to effort, and, if accepted exclusively, soon tends to degenerate into a refined self-enjoyment and vain self-reflection.

The presence of all these tendencies and motives in morality subjects us to-day to an abundance of ethical stimuli; but it does not give us an ethic. At the most it conceals the fact that the multiplicity of activities do not form for us a universal task, which could counteract the separation into individuals, parties, particular departments, and give us the consciousness of serving in our work aims that transcend the well-being and preference of mere man. Hence we need a morality that proceeds from our own life; and in this we need much more than we are conscious of needing. For we have no universal aim that we could take up in our disposition, and by which we could test all individual activities; and so life must become disunified and inwardly alien; we lose all spiritual relation to the world. The world surrounds us in the first place as a dark and immovable fate; we do not make ourselves masters of this fate, just because we give ourselves too much to do with things. Rather, to accomplish this, we must transform reality from its very foundation by our own activity and decision; we must wage war against obscurity and irrationality, and this conflict must tend to divide our whole existence into friend and enemy, good and evil, but along with this first give to life complete activity, and lead it to world-embracing greatness. Only in this way does man, from being a mere spectator, become a co-operator in the building up of the world; only thus does that which occurs within him become in the fullest sense his own. Everything which obscures the ethical character of human life involves, therefore, a loss in greatness and dignity; a degeneration to a state of servitude, to being a mere part of an alien whole. Particular parties may be in agreement with and find satisfaction in this condition; humanity as a

whole will not rest content with it. As certainly as humanity confidently maintains that its life has meaning and value, so certainly will it take up the problem of morality ever anew against all attempted intimidation.

If to-day we are again to take up this problem, then in the first place the conditions and the requirements of the problem must be quite clear. We can never acquire a morality from the troubled confusion of social life; on the contrary, morality involves a transcendence of this; it necessitates distinctive convictions concerning the world as a whole and our position in it. There is no independent morality, no morality in itself; morality requires a fundamental whole of life, which is appropriated in it and by this appropriation first attains to perfection. In contrast to the existing condition of things a new condition must first be raised in ideas that precede conduct. The new condition acquires a moral character only through requiring on the one hand moral freedom as opposed to the mechanism of natural impulse, on the other a transcendent ideal in opposition to mere self-preservation. These two together reveal a new order of things distinct from nature; they must seem impossible from the point of view of the world of sense, not only freedom with its apparent annulling of all connections, but also the freeing of conduct from bondage to mere nature. For how would one conceive an activity that did not tend ultimately to the good of the agent, and so aid in his self-preservation? Does it not involve a contradiction for him to exert his power for something alien to himself?

If in the present we feel such problems in the fullness of their force, and if we must fight for morality as a whole, we must go back to the foundations of our existence, and seek primarily for a secure position in contrast with the instability of temporal experiences. In accordance with the whole course of our investigation, we can find such a position, and by further development a distinctive morality also, only in an independent spiritual life, which first conducts the world to self-consciousness and so to genuine

reality. The two requirements discussed above cause no difficulty from the point of view of an independent spiritual life. We convinced ourselves in a previous section of the validity of freedom in the spiritual life; in morality also conduct can free itself from the natural *ego* without degenerating into a state of emptiness, because the spiritual life reveals a new and the alone genuine self. Thus here activity is not spent upon something alien to us, something presented to it from outside, but is within our own being, which here, indeed, includes the whole infinity within it: activity in the spiritual life serves true self-preservation, which has only the name in common with natural self-preservation.

Wherever it is acknowledged that the spiritual life involves a turning of reality to complete independence and spontaneity, morality must take a significant, indeed the central, position. For it is clear that only the taking up in our own activity and conviction, only complete appropriation, can bring life to the highest degree of perfection. Morality does not find in existence a life-content which it must convey to the individual subject, but is itself within the life-process; a complete self-consciousness of the spiritual life is attained first in morality, and morality must develop the content of that life. It is not that mere man in morality turns toward the spiritual life, but that the spiritual life elevates itself in the whole of its nature; all human morality must have its basis in a morality of the spiritual life.

With such a basis in the innermost nature, morality must concern the whole multiplicity of life; it can include and estimate the most diverse relations and experiences of our existence. But whatever is thus brought under the sway of the morality of the spiritual life must undergo an essential change, and must be elevated above the nature of that which is not taken up in this manner. By an ethical formation and development of art and science we do not mean that the individual should be loyal and straightforward in their pursuit, and should follow honest aims; this

conception would be much too narrow. But it is that we should take possession of and treat as our own life and being that which otherwise remains outside as something half alien to us; that the work upon this acquire the power and fervour of self-preservation; and that in this unification the necessity of the object becomes a definite demand of our life, and the gain of the object an advance of our life. Only such a life which transcends the antithesis of subject and object gives to the object a soul, and freedom a content.

The experience of history also makes it clearly evident to us that the spiritual life first acquires a secure position and an indisputable supremacy over nature by its acknowledgment and appropriation in self-determining activity. For history shows that wherever morality is not central, the spiritual life, even in the midst of the most magnificent results in external matters, languishes inwardly and loses its hold. With individuals also the final decision concerning the problems of the world and of life always depends upon whether they do or do not recognise that man has an inner moral task in his nature as a whole. If this is acknowledged, then—and this just in oppositions and conflicts—a realm of inwardness is assured us which all apparently contrary experiences of the external world cannot expel from its central position; but if there is no such acknowledgment, the triumph of these experiences and the collapse of the spiritual life cannot be avoided.

The morality of the spiritual life, as we advocate it, will have distinctive features in comparison with other conceptions of morality; of these we can mention but a few here. The acknowledgment of an independent spiritual life makes existence as a whole a task, since it requires that as a whole it should be changed into a state of self-determining activity; that everything must be aroused and set in motion. Thus the morality of the spiritual life is constructive and progressive, and not merely regulative in character; it is not its purpose simply to place life under regulations and to let activity wait until there is an

opportunity to fulfil them ; but, calling forth all our powers, morality must work and create, arouse and prepare the opportunities, so that in everything the realm of the spirit may be increased within the province of humanity. Like the spiritual life itself, the morality proceeding from it must be of a transcendent nature. To-day or to-morrow may not be considered beyond good and evil ; morality may not sink to being a mere means of realising the wishes of the time. If, however, morality transcends time, and is able to separate the transitory and the eternal in time, then, within its task, it may very well acknowledge distinctive situations and problems, and present different sides ; indeed, only by a close relation with the time and by penetrating deeply into the experiences of the time will morality acquire the necessary proximity and impressiveness. To this extent, therefore, we also insist upon a modern morality, however decidedly we reject that which to-day is called "modern" morality, and which for the most part is no more than a surrender of morality to the wishes and moods of the individual.

If in these features the morality of the spiritual life already manifests a distinctive character, this distinctiveness is further increased by the particular nature of the actual relation of man to the moral task, as it appears here. The highering of the ideal will necessarily increase its divergence from man, as he is. It will become quite evident that morality is not a continuation of nature, a natural attribute of man, or a product of social relationship, but the most pronounced expression of a great change in the direction of life, the institution of a new order of things. If at the same time morality wishes to guide life, a conflict is inevitable ; and the general outlook of life and of conduct will depend upon where we find the centre of opposition and what is the main direction of the conflict. In the first place, morality must take up a definite attitude towards the sense-nature of man ; that nature must be subordinated to the aims of the spirit. But we have already seen that there is a danger that the ethical task will lose

its depth, and that life as a whole will be perverted, if the rights of nature are misunderstood and there arises the desire to suppress it completely, and if, in a tendency to asceticism, this suppression is made the chief concern. The chief moral task is the development and establishment of a genuine and real spiritual life, as opposed to a false and merely apparent one, which is found in human conditions, not merely in the state of society but also in the soul of the individual: thus a mere transition from society to the individual can never give any aid. The condition in which life is generally found evolves no independent spiritual life; but it uses the spiritual impulse that is present within it as a mere means to other ends, and thus the result is an inner perversion; at the same time man is generally zealously occupied with giving himself the appearance of intending to follow the spiritual for its own sake, and of sacrificing everything to it. In opposition to such radical insincerity, to acquire a sincere and genuine life is the chief task and the chief desire of morality; for the establishment of sincerity and truth in face of an opposing world the soul needs before all else loyalty and courage.

And so morality involves life in a great division: it cannot possibly take up a friendly attitude towards everything and readily admit everything: its chief task must be to arouse life from its confusion and apathy. But this does not prevent a morality of the spiritual life striving for universality in its inner nature. The morality of the spiritual life must, therefore, establish a definite relationship on the basis of the present with the prevailing types of morality which were previously mentioned. If the morality of the spiritual life is certain of its own nature, it is quite possible for it to recognise a certain validity in every other kind of morality without degenerating into a feeble eclecticism. The relation that we recognised between the spiritual life and religion also makes religion valuable to morality: the moral significance of culture may be especially acknowledged where a universal character is

desired for the spiritual life; the relation of man to man may also become inwardly important where it is necessary to the inner construction of the life of society; then again the morality of the spiritual life fully agrees with the demand for an independence of morality and for an elevation above merely human aims, in the manner that the morality of reason advocates; finally, individuality also can obtain its due in the spiritual life. All this, however, is valid only with the presupposition that we acquire a position above the antitheses of experience and not between them, and an inner independence in relation to the chaos of time. Only from this position and this independence can we advance in any way, even within time.

3. Education and Instruction

Education and instruction are especially affected by the difficulties that are engendered by the lack of a main tendency in life and of a transcendence of the superficiality of time. For the lively interest which its questions provoke, the incalculable amount of work and activity that is called forth in this department, do not produce their full result, because we do not possess enough life of our own of a definite character to be able to test and sort, to clarify and deepen, that which is presented to us. And so in conflict with one another we use up much power without making much progress in the most important matter.

Educational reform is the catchword, but we have no philosophy of education that is based upon a securely established conviction concerning life as a whole, and we trouble ourselves very little to obtain one. We wish to improve education, and yet we have not come to an understanding with regard to its ideals, its possibility, and its conditions. Education must be fundamentally different in character, according as man is regarded as a particular and exclusively individual being, or as a being in whom a new and universal kind of life seems to emerge; according

as he is only an elevated being of nature or in the highest degree possible a spiritual being; according as the higher proceeds from the lower gradually and surely after the manner of organic growth, or we must find a new starting-point and accomplish a revolution. Further, mere individualistic training, as it dominated the classical systems of pedagogy, is no longer sufficient; the relation to society must also be fully appreciated, and be effective. But attention to this requirement involves us in the danger of treating the problem of education too externally, and of bringing all more or less to the same level; and this danger must be overcome. Yet how can it be overcome, unless we possess securely a depth, unless we acknowledge the presence of the infinite within the human being, as it is comprehended in our conviction of the spiritual life?

The form of instruction suffers from the ceaseless onflow of new material, the constant increase in the number of claims. In itself each single demand may be quite justifiable; but whether it is better than the others can be decided only from an idea which governs the whole. If no such idea exists, a gain in the individual departments may be a loss to the whole; and an enrichment in one department may lead to a decline of the whole. In face of that which has been handed down from the past and that which arises in the present, it is difficult to come to a balanced judgment; the parties may be right in their attacks one upon another, but this does not imply that they are right in their own assertions. The immediate impression tends to give the balance in favour of the requirements of the present; from the point of view of the immediate impression, all occupation with the past may appear to be a flight from the living to the dead. The advocate of the claims of history may reply to this that man as a spiritual being is not a child of the mere moment, and that we concern ourselves with the past not on account of what is transitory in it, but for its eternal content. But he who thinks thus must throw the eternal content into relief and separate it sharply from that which is merely temporal; he must establish a relation between

this content and his own life, and make that which is externally alien his inward possession. This does indeed come to pass in a few cases; but can we say that it comes to pass generally or predominantly? We Germans in particular have far too strong a tendency to substitute scholarly occupation for inner animation, and instead of spiritual substance to offer academically correct knowledge. It is therefore not without good reason if Classical Antiquity does not so much inspire as weary our youth; yet the blame for this does not rest upon Antiquity, but on ourselves, and upon the manner in which we treat it with calm scholarship, without transforming it into our own possession. For how could that influence the whole man which does not come from the whole man? Everything points again and again to the same thing—we lack spiritual independence, inner transcendence of history and environment, we lack a characteristic life as a whole. The contact with the incalculable abundance of impressions that we experience must therefore remain an external one; and with all our increasing wealth of knowledge we threaten to become spiritually poorer.

(*b*) SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

Science, with its innumerable branches and its powerful penetration of life, is indisputably a strong feature of the age. Its effect is not exhausted in the abundance of particular achievements; by the objectivity of its work it has brought the world much nearer to us, has led our life to greater clearness, has made us more alert, and given us a secure dominion over things. Science, therefore, must also be a factor in the determination of a philosophy of life, and must raise the whole position of man. Of course, as soon as we survey and estimate its work from the life-process we find that there is no lack of difficult problems in science. Since the magnificent results of the natural sciences often give rise

to the tendency to force their particular bent and methods on the human sciences, to which our conception of the spiritual life gives a characteristic sphere of their own, there is a danger that the balanced development of the individual sciences and the complete organisation of what is distinctive in them will be prevented. However, we do not lack energetic resistance of this danger; and ultimately it is less science itself than the movement to popularise it that falls into this danger. Further, the results of science with regard to the object easily tend to obscure the subjective element, the spiritual activity, the characteristic synthesis, which forms an organised collection of pieces of knowledge into the unity of a science. It is apt to appear as though science needs only to construct further on a given basis and in a given direction; while both of these are open to much dispute: different possibilities, prospects, types may be revealed; the work of history has run through different stages, and has certainly not already exhausted its possibilities. Nevertheless, the subjective element with its freedom, mobility, and many-sidedness is becoming more adequately appreciated, and there is no reason to fear that science will become dogmatically pursued in paths that have become fixed. Finally, the problem of the relation of thought to life is the source of much perplexity: we Germans, for example, have a strong tendency to take mere knowledge for inner appropriation of the object, and instead of spiritual substance to offer an abundance of scholarship. This, however, is not a defect in science itself, but an error on the part of man, who has no life of his own with which to meet the onflow of impresssions from the environment; and so our estimate of science and our acknowledgment of its magnificent achievement cannot be affected by this charge.

Philosophy is in quite a different position: its present state cannot satisfy anyone who seeks more for a universal science than for a mere academic discipline. For our philosophical efforts lack a common aim and close relation with the innermost need of the time; they do not even

show any definite and energetic attempt to overcome the confusion from which our world of thought suffers. A great stream of philosophic effort came to an end with the speculative philosophy of the first decade of the nineteenth century; after a temporary ebb of this philosophic effort, we now wish to take up the work again with fresh power, but we have not yet acquired inner independence; and therefore, in sifting and collecting, we are unable to direct the age to definite aims, or radically expel the inconsistencies into which an indefinite relation to the past has led the present.

There are three main streams of thought which come to us from the past, and we can neither completely take them up nor withdraw ourselves from them: the Enlightenment, with its philosophic summit in Descartes; the critical philosophy of Kant; and speculative philosophy, with its consummation in Hegel. It has been thought that the Enlightenment, with its starting out from the subject, its unadorned intellectualism, its formal ratiocination, its rejection of everything that is not comprehended in clear and distinct ideas, was transcended at the height of German classical literature, because at that time a life rich in content was set in contrast with it. But, as a fact, no adequate settlement with the Enlightenment has been arrived at; the supposed transcendence is not final, because the elements of truth in the Enlightenment, especially its turning from history to the immediacy and independence of spiritual life, were not properly acknowledged. But to-day it is less the elements of truth of the Enlightenment that are a force than that which is trivial and narrowly human in it—the ratiocination of the subject which, the more empty it is, the more it feels itself to be the measure of all things, and, rejoicing in negation, applies the results of the natural sciences in an attempt to bring about the greatest possible suppression of all spiritual relations. In this form the Enlightenment gains acceptance by the masses, which formerly had seemed inaccessible to it; and thus it becomes an instrument by which life is dissipated and made

shallow. From the height of its position of research, philosophy looks upon this tendency with contempt; but it produces no movement that is able to take up the struggle with this tendency to shallowness, and pass through the struggle victoriously. Kant is often lauded as the spiritual guide of our time; and it is overlooked how much that was certain for him has become doubtful; how many new facts, new problems, new prospects, which cannot be lost to the world of thought we have received from the nineteenth century with its historico-social culture and its overwhelming widening of the horizon. Kant's critique of the reason is based on a conception of science; on a faith in the possibility of a knowledge of truth; on a conviction of a spiritual organisation of man, which are rather in contradiction than in harmony with the main tendencies of the present. His absolute ethic, the pillar of his constructive thought, is incompatible with the empirical and social treatment of morality to which the present does homage. But at the same time we cannot free ourselves from the influence of Kant. For we cannot refute his critique of the reason, breaking up, as it does, the old representation and conception of truth; and, without his ethic, our ethic would lose the appearance of truth and greatness. In the judgment of the present, Hegel experiences a treatment that is just the opposite of that which Kant receives: if in reference to the latter we do not notice what divides us, so in reference to the former we fail to recognise what joins us. For if Hegel's exaggeration of the power of the human spirit and his identification of spirit and thought appear alien to us, yet his idea of evolution, which embraces all multiplicity, and represents all realities and conceptions as in a state of flux; his elevation of spiritual factors to the form of independent powers which develop and establish their own necessities undeterred by the preference of man; his emphasis on the fact of the power of contradiction and opposition in history—all this, often in spite of our own conceptions, exerts an enormous influence over us; and

we cannot shake it off without surrendering a considerable portion of our spiritual possession.

These tendencies all whirl confusedly together and draw us now in one direction, now in another; we can get beyond the state of decadence only when we have succeeded in giving to the world of thought an independent character, which corresponds with the spiritual condition of the present, and which can do justice to the old as well as the new experiences. After the whole course of our investigation, only a brief account is necessary to indicate the directions the system of life here advocated points out to reach this; a fuller treatment would make a particular theory of knowledge necessary. We must bring into prominence three of the chief points.

(1) Only the life-process can be the starting-point of philosophy, not some kind of being more ultimate than this process, whether we conceive of such being as an external world or as a subject existing independent of the world: the ideas of "world" and "subject," as also that of "being," can be evolved and made clear only within the life-process; at the same time, they remain in a state of flux, and never are so directly opposed to one another as modern thought has represented them as being. Philosophy, with this starting-point, would, however, attain an independence in relation to the special sciences only if it were possible within the life-process to form a unity and a distinctive synthesis, which should deepen our view of reality and set it as a whole in a new light. (2) Such a synthesis must transcend the state of change of all the relations and caprice of men; this is possible only by the revelation and appropriation of an independent spiritual life withdrawn from the life of sense. Without such a spiritual life there is no release from the chaos of subjective experiences and opinions; only from the position of the spiritual life is it possible for a spiritual occurrence to be revealed in the province of man, so that we do not need to infer from man to the world, but that within him a universal life can be immediately experienced. (3) As, on the one hand, the

spiritual life is an indispensable presupposition, so on the other it is an infinite task; the former as far as the fundamental fact is concerned, the latter in reference to its detailed content. This content can be acquired only through the movement of history as a whole; thus a constructive philosophy—and not merely a critical one—could arise only where the spiritual life as a whole had acquired a characteristic form. In this case, philosophy was not a mere offspring of life, not merely something for life to occupy itself with, but, by its demand for a thorough clarification of our ideas and life, and by its raising the question of absolute truth, philosophy has exercised no little influence upon the progress of life. But that which it achieved of a fruitful nature, it achieved not in detachment from, but only in relation to, life, and by interaction with it, however much this relation may be concealed at the first glance.

Such a connection of philosophy with life as a whole is by no means new; it has existed in all times. Never has the world of thought acquired a distinctive character except in close relation with life as a whole: it is only from life as a whole that thought has received its problems, the nature of its procedure, and the demarcation of its work. A survey of the history of philosophy makes it evident that the leading thinkers differ mostly, and differ from the beginning, in that which they regard as the essence of life: in what they regard as the essence of life they have found the firm point of support for their work; from that the direction of their research has been determined; and from that the questions arose to which they required an answer from the universe. And we all know that in these matters the question often implies more than the answer, that it often carries the answer within itself.

If, therefore, this connection of philosophy with the life-process signifies an old and indisputable truth, this truth is not sufficiently acknowledged. Its adequate acknowledgment gives rise to a new situation; indeed, it tends to the development of a new type of philosophy.

With the critical tendency of the Modern Age, this type shares the desire not to surrender thought to a state of defencelessness in face of the stream of appearances, but would primarily concentrate it in itself, and in an inner independence find a standard for all further undertaking. But this attainment of independence in thought is not accomplished by turning to the mere subject, but to a central occurrence, transcending the antithesis of subject and object. If thought cannot begin from such an occurrence, and understand the movement of life as an unfolding and perfecting of this comprehensive occurrence, then there is no truth for man. Truth, as a relation of two series absolutely alien to each other, is an absolutely nonsensical conception: truth must be immanent, in the sense that one life embraces both subject and object, and that in the movement of life there is as much a coming together of subject and object as a coming together of activity from the centre and from the circumference.

That in this we have to do with a peculiar formation of knowledge and not with a merely formal modification is shown by the following considerations. If thought, in the manner previously supposed, takes its starting-point in a world existing independently of the subject, then in order to subordinate reality spiritually thought will comprehend it in the most general conceptions. Ultimately, the being of things will be sought in formal ontological magnitudes, as, for example, in "pure being." If the whole abundance of reality appears to be the mere outflow from these general conceptions, it is in danger of being transformed into nothing but schemes and shadows, and of losing all genuine life. If, as opposed to this, the mere subject is taken as the starting-point, then more life and more movement is indeed assured, and a more varied prospect will be acquired, but there is no possibility of distinguishing between that which is merely contingent to the mere individual and that which forms a common inner world; there is no possibility of a rejection of the merely human, or even of extricating a realm of ideas from the abundance

of impressions: if in the former case knowledge lost all content, in the present case it threatens to be completely dissolved. If, further, on the one hand abstract universal conceptions, and on the other the subjective states of individuals, form the stem of knowledge, then neither in one nor in the other does the fullness of spiritual reality attain its due—the reality that exists in the building up of a genuine spiritual culture. But in the type of philosophy advocated by us this is the chief thing; since in contrast to the psychological and the cosmological treatment this philosophy develops a noölogical treatment, and sees the central domain of philosophical research in the elucidation and unification of facts which, in the construction of a spiritual world in the province of man, appear in the whole and in every branch. In this connection the conception of fact is something more ultimate and universal in its relations; but it is just that which makes it more valuable for the conviction as a whole.

This conception of its task will bring philosophy into a closer relation with personal life, as well as with the work of history, without making it the mere instrument either of the one or the other. Otherwise it would seem irrational, and a tendency from which one must free oneself as much as possible, that in philosophy, personality, not only in creative activity but also in appropriation, signifies so much. The object, on the contrary, acquires a positive value, if we are certain that the standard of life is ultimately also the standard of knowledge; if with this the degree of the development of life at a particular point necessarily decides the nature of the work of thought there achieved. The near relation of the thinker to the proximate and the more distant culture environment is explained from this position in a manner no less satisfactory: the relation can then remain close, even if in the first place it appears to be one of conflict and opposition. Similarly, the whole movement of history acquires a greater significance for knowledge; far-reaching changes of life transform the situation and its nature, since they permit us to experience,

see, and seek something else; all these changes, however, demand from thought an attention and an appreciation as a whole. Nothing other than this is involved in the requirement that thought must correspond with the historical state of spiritual evolution.

This acknowledgment of personal and of historical life in philosophy makes it intelligible why philosophy manifests so much diversity and opposition, and why its work unites so little immediately into a whole. Where the conviction of an independent spiritual life rules, the faith in a unity of truth can be shaken by this fact just as little as the courage to creative activity can be paralysed. The basing of thought upon the spiritual life also has the advantage that the main types of thought can be derived from the different positions which may be taken up towards the spiritual life, and thus a limit may be set to the otherwise indefinite abundance. From this point of view there are for us five chief types of thought and world-conception. Minds first divide on the question whether we can unify life at all, and at the same time whether we may venture to make an assertion concerning reality as a whole. He who rejects this as impossible and readily surrenders himself to the conflict of immediate impressions might be called an indifferentist. If, however, a striving towards unity is admitted, then the question whether a spiritual life with a reality and values of its own in contrast with nature may be acknowledged or not becomes the point of decision, and the basis of division into opposing camps. He who gives a negative answer to the question, and regards nature as the whole of reality, becomes an advocate of Naturalism. He, however, who answers in the affirmative, and may be called an idealist, is immediately confronted with a new problem. He cannot acknowledge the spiritual life without at the same time giving it the supremacy; but now the doubt arises whether this supremacy may be easily and peacefully established, or whether it meets with strong opposition. When the existence of these oppositions is denied, or they are regarded as being easy to overcome,

there grows up an optimistic, contemplative form of Idealism, which to other forms inevitably seems abstract, and indeed shallow. If, on the contrary, the oppositions are fully acknowledged, the final division originates with the question whether finally we are to submit to the state of stagnation brought about by these oppositions, or whether by some kind of reinforcement of the counter-action to this state of stagnation life may once more be brought into motion: the former gives rise to Scepticism and Pessimism, the latter to Activism, as it has been discussed by us in an earlier section. It is easy to see what distinctive lines of conflict and what kinds of conflict must arise between the indifferentist, the naturalistic thinker, the optimist, the sceptic, and the activist. However, we cannot allow this to detain us; it must, nevertheless, be pointed out here, that in philosophy the possibilities are not yet exhausted, and that to avail ourselves of these possibilities nothing is more necessary than a close relation of its work with the life-process, and a firmer grounding in the independent spiritual life.

(*c*) ART AND LITERATURE

Nowhere does modern life throb more violently and more strongly than in art and literature. That which in this department has a claim to permanence acquires especial power from the fact that this department had to establish itself anew in opposition to an attempt to curtail it. For who could deny that a culture of work and of utility had a tendency to reduce artistic literary creation to the position of a mere accompaniment and a fringe of another kind of life, to a mere diversion for idle hours? The more we feel the limitations of the life of work and utility the more do art and literature become independent tasks. From art and literature we expect more lightness, more agility, and more joy in life; they should conduct life

from too great an attention to externals to self-consciousness, and in this way give life a soul; they should strengthen individuality in opposition to the levelling tendency of the culture of the masses, wrest simple fundamentals from chaotic confusion of life, and aid the time in reaching a comprehensive vital-feeling and a synthesis transcending its inconsistencies. In opposition to that which oppresses us and degrades us to instruments of a meaningless machinery, we desire some kind of province where life rests in itself and purposes nothing else but itself; where it springs up with complete spontaneity; and where it can express itself with complete freedom, and in this expression find its highest joy.

From such a longing a new art has arisen that permeates our life. Art must seek new means of expression for the new situation; it cannot serve the development of a new life-content without bringing about liberation from all conventional statutes; it cannot prevent a threatened tendency of life to become stagnant without desiring a fully free place for the subject, and for the development of his individuality. He who sees chiefly the dangers in everything forgets that nothing new and great can arise without bringing dangers with it.

From the point of view of the system that we champion, we can quite well understand the significance of the æsthetic movement of the present, acknowledge the deliverance of life which it has accomplished, and in general we can go a good distance with it. But there comes a point where the courses diverge; not because we think less of the capacity of art, but we believe that we think more highly of its task. This deliverance from the culture of work, this turning to individuality, promises an essential elevation of life only if a new kind of being, a new world, is able to break forth in the soul that depends upon itself; if the individual in his conflicts aids the development of the infinite life; if, through all transformations and prostrations, man wins an inner relation to the whole

and to things, and by this grows beyond the narrowly human.

If this does not come to pass, the movement remains on the surface of mere existence and related to the activity and occupation of mere man; and so it cannot make anything higher or essentially new of us; it remains subject to the oppositions of the age instead of becoming superior to them. We are, indeed, enriched by the most diverse forms of expression: even the most concealed circumstances, the most delicate pulsations of the soul, cannot withdraw themselves from being represented; none the less, the description of the world-environment acquires the most striking clearness and penetration, and in the incalculable wealth of individual forms of art virtuosi are not lacking at whose capacity of execution we are astonished. But all this gives to art no spiritual content and no real greatness; it can, indeed, bring an inexhaustible abundance of stimuli to bear upon individuals and spread a shiny gloss over existence and life, but it cannot raise life essentially: the care of the mere individual, with his changing circumstances, prevents art from taking up sufficiently the problems of the present situation as a whole; of the spiritual condition of humanity as a whole.

And so art in this form is not able to grasp the epoch with its spiritual movement as a whole, and to further humanity in the struggle for spiritual existence, in which to-day all individual problems are included. Humanity is in a serious crisis; the old foundations of life are about to give way, and the new are not yet secured: the world has rejected the standards which man had imposed upon it; it turns against him, and leaves him nothing more in particular; to guarantee a distinctive significance man needs a strengthening, and at the same time an aroused reflection forbids him all help from outside. The fact that that which is hostile and threatens to degrade and to annihilate man takes possession of his own province of life and penetrates into it gives a particular acuteness to

these problems. We are not only surrounded externally by a dark fate, but our soul also degenerates in it, and becomes more and more a soulless mechanism. Indeed, our own activity becomes the most dangerous opponent of the soul, since in forming and taking part in complexes of work which ever become greater it turns against us and takes the soul from the soul.

An art arising out of the subject and which does not advance to spiritual substance cannot possibly prevent the threatened dissolution of life. Even the most wonderful expression of disposition, even the most delicate and most fluid representations of conditions, do not free us from the chaos of the time: they might easily bind us still more strongly to it, since they weaken the power, indeed the tendency to energetic concentration, and increase the tendency to degenerate into a state of weakness and decay; while to overcome these dangers it is necessary primarily to increase our activity, to win again an active relation to reality. Art cannot free itself from that condition of feebleness without entering into a close relation with the central task of life and acknowledging a spirituality transcending the subjective circumstances and interests of mere man. If these requirements are not satisfied, no talent can prevent a decline of art into a more refined Epicureanism.

But where such a spiritual life is acknowledged, and at the same time there arises the task of winning for man a new life, a new spiritual reality, art inevitably acquires a great significance, and becomes absolutely indispensable. Without the liberation which it brings, and its presentation of things in a harmony, how could a whole with definite character be raised? How could the new that hovers before us acquire form and exert a penetrating power without the help of a constructive imagination which precedes its realisation? How could the soul's innermost experience permeate life as a whole, and ennoble its whole structure without the help of art? The higher we place the ideal of life, the more does the spiritual content which immediate existence manifests become a mere sense form, the more

is æsthetic activity necessary to prevent disunion of life, in the midst of all oppositions to give it some kind of unity, and in the midst of the passion of conflict some rest within itself. But, to achieve this, art may not purpose to form an oasis in a wilderness of life, but, hand-in-hand with other activities, must fight for spiritual experience and a genuine meaning of life as a whole.

(*d*) POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE

To treat of the complicated problems of the political and social life of the present does not come within our purpose; we can consider them only so far as the task of the construction of an independent spiritual world is affected either for good or evil by the nature of their solution.

In contrast to the epoch of the Enlightenment, the nineteenth century brought about a transition from the individual to society: social life has developed in numerous branches, has disclosed a superabundance of new facts, and has set us new tasks. But this development has also brought much perplexity with it. It becomes evident in this development also, that each spiritual movement that attains power experiences in its further course limitations, and is degraded by its contact with human conditions. Along with this social movement there has been the often-discussed change by which life from being centred in an invisible world becomes occupied with the visible one, and by which all departments of life are given a naturalistic, realistic character and tendency. There has been no lack of opposition to the movement to make society the first consideration; this opposition has gone even so far as to dispute the right of the whole. Further, the earlier and the later conception of society, the idealistic and the realistic, are often confused; and from this confusion contradictions arise that not only confuse our ideas but also degrade our life. There is a danger that a zealous and excited occupation

with nothing but individual tasks may take our attention from the whole, and that the problems which the inner condition of man involves may not obtain due consideration.

This turning to society is most manifest in the powerful advance of the State. In this, an inner longing for a more social life, as Hegel especially philosophically advocated it; and actual changes of conditions operated together, and strengthened one another. The more definite manifestation of individuality on the part of nations and the sharper division between them; the active interest of wider circles in political problems; the mechanical organisation of work, with its more exact differentiation and its more rigid organisation of forces; but primarily the longing, which grows out of the ceaselessly increasing economical and social perplexities, for a power superior to the parties in dispute and acting as arbitrator—all these have immeasurably increased the power of the State in different degrees among different peoples, but in general through the whole civilised world.

The freedom of the individual, therefore, cannot but suffer from manifold limitations; there arises a danger that the individual may gradually lose all initiative, and expect all stimulation from the State. The spontaneity and the wealth of life suffer from this tendency to increase the power of the State, and a bureaucracy which delights in correct forms, but which spiritually is entirely unproductive, indeed even indifferent, appropriates more and more to itself. The substance of the spiritual life is also threatened by the fact that the omnipotent State is inclined to treat that life, with all its branches, as a mere means in the attainment of its own particular aims; to look upon science and art, and chiefly religion and education, especially with regard to that which they achieve for the aims of the State, and to shape them as much as possible in accordance with these aims; there is also a strong tendency to follow the same course to accomplish the ends of the contemporary form of government. An independent and genuine spiritual life can hardly offer too great an opposition to such a per-

version, with its deification of human forms. But the matter is by no means simple; for not the will of single individuals and parties, but the whole tendency of modern life has given this power to the State; indeed, on the economic side the State will soon experience a further increase of power. The more the guidance on this side belongs to the State, the more necessary is a free movement of spiritual culture in opposition to it; the more urgent is the demand that the amalgamation of the Church and the State should be discontinued—an amalgamation which, by the growing disputes that arise from it, forces religion into an undignified position; the more definitely is a greater independence to be desired for school organisation in all its branches. The Germans especially have much to do in this matter; and there is much at stake. For, with the limitations of our spatial extension, we can be a permanent determining factor in world-culture only by giving our culture the greatest intensity; but this requires a calling forth of the complete power and of the spontaneity of individuals. Ultimately, in this matter also, the chief thing proves to be the taking up again of central problems and the realisation of human being in its innermost depths as an unconditional end in itself and the bearer of an infinite life. No conception can guard us from sinking to the position of mere puppets of the soulless mechanism of the State, if we do not find the power to give soul to our life and to maintain it against all attempted limitation.

The longing for more freedom and independence has therefore an indisputable validity. But this acknowledgment may easily lead to new complications by freedom and independence being conceived in a manner much too external, and also by a really questionable association of these ideas with the problem of equality. The conviction of the modern man concerning the world, on the one hand, and, on the other, the demands of life, are often in direct contradiction with regard to the conception of equality. We become aware of our limitation on all sides: we are represented as a mere product of heredity and environ-

ment: all possibility of making a decision for ourselves is rejected as a mere illusion. If thus we are deprived of all independence and all spontaneity of life, then even in social life we shall become mere bearers of a *rôle* imposed upon us by a dark fate. One does not see how freedom could retain a value, arouse enthusiasm, and lead to sacrifice in such a case. If the whole is a soulless mechanism, in which only the excess of existent power is the cause of decisions, then we ourselves cannot be exceptions.

Other complications have their origin in the democratic tendency which permeates not only our political endeavour but also our whole life of culture. How far-reaching a change, indeed how complete a revolution, has been accomplished by this tendency in opposition to a condition of things which has stood for hundreds or rather thousands of years, is but seldom fully appreciated. In the earlier form of social life spiritual work was the chief matter only of a limited and exclusive circle; to the people as a whole it was only secondary, and the benefit that they received from it was often of the most meagre character. Even the Reformation left this aristocratic form of life as it was; for as certainly as it made the care for every individual member of the church more urgent, that care was bestowed from above in an authoritative manner. The earlier Enlightenment, as it was represented, for example, by Bayle, was of the conviction that the deliverance from illusion and superstition would always be limited to a small circle of those standing spiritually high, and would never reach the masses. We know how this has changed; how the masses are determined to form a mere dependent body of the so-called higher classes no longer, but to take the problem of life independently into their own hands, and how they obtain their representation of the world and the task of their life from that which is more immediately present to them and directly concerns their welfare; and how in this way they are inclined to look upon themselves as the whole of humanity. We have already referred to

the danger that culture as a whole will thus be made shallow—a danger that arises from the fact that here the decision is made by those who scarcely participate in the work of history, and who depend almost entirely upon the immediate impression ; and, further, we have already contended that only a simplification and rejuvenation of culture are able to cope with this danger. The fact is important that this democratic movement appeals to the equality of all who bear human features. Here again there appears to be a direct contradiction between theoretical conviction and actual conditions. Experience everywhere shows a pronounced inequality among men ; it shows this not only in the traditional social relationships but also in the organisation of modern industry. More, however, than all social arrangements, nature shows the greatest inequality amongst men ; and the actual relation of individuals in work and idleness, in love and hate, in independent thinking and blind subordination shows it none the less. From the point of view of mere experience the idea of equality seems to be an empty phrase. If it is more than this, if we recognise in it a truth that we cannot afford to lose, then it implies the conviction that humanity has spiritual relations ; that each has a significance in a spiritual nature, and that there is a universal life present everywhere which opposes the guilt and folly of the individual and even in spite of himself gives him a value. Thus we have seen that in history, religion and ideal culture were the first to bring the idea of equality into good repute. But to-day the champions of equality turn with particular keenness against religion and ideal culture, and are not aware that in so doing they are destroying the foundations of their own belief.

These inconsistencies are not felt chiefly because of the power which abstractions usually exercise over men in the present day. A faith in abstractions reigns amongst us which is capable of far greater things than faith in religion or faith in reason. We are surrounded by the bustle of a fierce and ceaselessly increasing struggle for existence :

ideas are overgrown by interests; the motives of people in general are trivial, and all spiritual aspiration is feeble, and along with this there is an unutterable amount of pretence which permeates and distorts all conduct. Yet the disagreeable aspect of this condition seems to vanish as soon as the mere word "humanity" is mentioned. But what is humanity from the point of view of Naturalism other than a collection of beings of nature? How can a power to elevate and to strengthen proceed from this conception, which in the naturalistic context signifies no more than the subjective unification of the individuals? Or, again, the idea of a ceaseless progress of humanity is placed in opposition to the confusions which exist in the present. But how can this idea be established if a compelling reason is not active within man? How could the present be so incomplete and so full of perplexity as it seems, especially to the advocates of the idea of progress, if century after century had made progress upon progress? Rather, if man has such a noble nature as he is assumed to have, life should be full of reason and bliss. The old faith saved man by resorting to an invisible world; it required a firm confidence in that which one did not see. The new faith, which denies an invisible world, desires more: it desires that we should be convinced of the direct opposite of that which we see and comprehend. These considerations in no way signify a depreciation on our part of the effort to attain freedom and equality—an effort that has an indisputable validity. But this validity must be based upon a whole of life and be more definitely determined, otherwise the effort is stifled by the inconsistencies in which the conceptions of freedom and equality are involved in the minds of their advocates.

The independence of the individual and the spontaneity of the spiritual life are endangered not only by the mechanism of a bureaucracy indifferent to spiritual values but also none the less by the movements of the masses, which in modern life in particular surround and browbeat the individual. The man of the present day often believes

that he has gained freedom when in reality he has only changed the nature of his dependence. What makes the movements of the masses, with their so-called public opinion, so irksome is the falsehood that is generally contained in this opinion, which is presented as proceeding from the experience and decision of a great majority, and therefore as having a definite presupposition of truth. The fact, as a rule, is that a few venture an assertion and urge it upon the others with unobserved compulsion, since they proclaim as already existent the agreement that they are only seeking. Of course sometimes there is much more in public opinion; it may be the expression of a spiritual necessity which subjects to itself the dispositions of men. Whether public opinion is to be an interpreter of truth or a mere product of man remains to be decided; and this decision can rest only with the individual. He will be equal to making this decision if he possesses a spiritual experience, and has in this a touchstone by which to distinguish the genuine from the false.

Philosophy can maintain the rights of the individual only so far as he is rooted in spiritual relationships and derives power from them; it must absolutely oppose all glorification of the natural, spiritually destitute individual. We find such a glorification to-day more especially in that which, with particular emphasis, is called "modern" morality, but which in fact threatens rather to be a complete negation of morality; even though this negation is against the intentions of its advocates, mostly women, who display great enthusiasm for this "modern" morality. It seems as though life is limited and degraded because society, particularly in the matter of the sexual life, prescribes rigid statutes which, if they were not irrational at the beginning, have nevertheless become irrational, and tend to brand the right as wrong and the wrong as right. The shaking off of these restrictions and of the pressure of society in general seems to promise a form of life incomparably more powerful, sincere, and individual: this life is also to offer more beauty, for to-day generally the idea

of beauty is emphasised with great partiality where life has no clear ideas and no significant content.

This criticism of the statutes of society is not entirely without reason. Such statutes do not in themselves constitute a morality, as it is easy to imagine they do; but they only advocate a morality; as life undergoes such far-reaching changes, these statutes must continually be examined anew as to their validity and value. But this relativity does not make them worthless, and does not justify their complete rejection in favour of an absolute freedom on the part of individuals. We could expect an elevation of life by such an effort for freedom only if we might assume that the individuals are thoroughly noble, energetic, and spiritually rich, and if in the relations between the sexes a state of paradisiacal innocence reigned which only the evil arrangements of society had disturbed. But this is a way of thinking which does more honour to the hearts than to the heads of its advocates. He who takes men as they really are and does not paint them in romantic colours, and who at the same time recognises the dangers of a highly developed, pleasure-seeking, and over-refined state of culture, will not despise those social arrangements, notwithstanding their relativity, but value them as an indispensable safeguard against the selfishness, the greed for pleasure, and the instability of the mere individual—a safeguard not only against the tyranny of externals but also for the individual against himself. It is unfortunate enough that such safeguards are necessary; but, as they are necessary, it is better to preserve and improve them as much as possible than to reject them, and to expose humanity to dangers that might throw it back into the condition of the animals. Man is not better because he is painted more beautifully; rather Pascal is right when he says: "L'homme n'est ni ange ni bête, et le malheur veut, que qui veut faire l'ange fait la bête."

The tendency to expect that man may be transformed inwardly and the whole condition of life raised by changes in external organisation is most definitely felt in the social

movements of the age. In this there is a clearly marked opposition to the earlier mode of thought, which, placing a low estimate upon everything external and finding greatness too easily in disposition, overlooked how much the organisation of the conditions of life means for men in whom the spiritual is only in process of development; and, further, failed to notice that there is also a strong movement from external to internal. Nevertheless, the fact cannot be denied, notwithstanding all this, that the problems of the whole and of man's inner nature require to be treated as of chief importance. Otherwise, as Aristotle suggested, notwithstanding all the alteration of conditions, the old problems will continually make their appearance anew, and the substance of life might easily suffer from that which was intended to improve its condition.

In conclusion, we may briefly consider the problems that have been raised in the nineteenth century by the increased emphasis on the idea of nationality. Influences of an idealistic nature first raised the cultivation and establishment of a particular national character to the position of a matter of the greatest importance. This character appeared to be an extremely valuable form of individualisation of the spiritual life, a form in which that life attains to concreteness and greater definiteness and penetration. The co-existence of these individual nationalities gave promise of an incomparably richer formation of the life of humanity as a whole: the inner development of their peculiar natures, and their lofty rivalry, also promised to bring a wealth of arousing and elevating motives. The nineteenth century has, indeed, won an incalculable amount through this movement; to take up an abstract cosmopolitanism again would be decidedly retrograde.

But the more the idea of nationality has been brought from its high place in the realm of thought to the domain of human circumstance, the more has it been debased and the more dangers has it produced. If previously the cultivation of an ideal type of life was most prominent, and if

the nations could thus permit one another to follow their own courses peacefully, this has become less and less the case in face of the desire and effort for power and expansion in the visible world; and owing to the narrowness of physical space occupied by the nations, the different strivings have clashed together more and more severely. If this tendency continues without the counteraction of an inner task common to humanity as a whole, and of unifying and elevating ideas, it is hardly possible to avoid mutual hostility, a degeneration into obstinacy and injustice. The idea of nationality may therefore become a danger to the ethical character of life. This is the case if, by milder or by severer means, one nation tries to force its own character and speech upon another. The mode of thought based on the old *cujus regio ejus natio* is in no way better than that based on the old *cujus regio ejus religio*, which we are now accustomed to regard with contempt as a piece of barbarism. The desire for external power at the same time tends to lessen the attention to the inner development and unification of nationality, without which ultimately little progress can be made in the development of power. It is through a common national character, with its unification of the feelings and efforts of the individuals, that a people is first elevated into a genuine nation; it is a character such as this that gives to a people a power of influencing humanity as a whole; it is a character such as this that gives to the individuals the consciousness of being "members one of another," and with this a stability and a joy in life and activity. Such a national character necessitates certain natural conditions, that are like the veins in marble which prescribe a certain direction to the work of the artist. But these conditions must first be organised and by the complete elevation of their nature spiritually unified; and this cannot be achieved otherwise than through our own work, which through common events and experiences follows its ideal. So far, therefore, national character is not a gift of nature but a task which presents itself distinctively to each people according to its nature

and conditions. In this matter a people must always in the first place realise a unity in its own nature.

In the fulfilment of this task hardly any other people has had to contend with keener opposition, both external and internal, than the Germans. Our physical environment does not direct us so definitely into distinctive paths as is the case with other peoples. But our inner nature contains, before all else, harsh antitheses. Our strength lies chiefly in arousing to life depths of the soul otherwise undreamt of. Thus in music and in poetry we have been able to surpass all other peoples; again, we have been able to give to religion a wonderful inwardness, and in education to evolve the leading ideas. At the same time, however, we are driven to the physical world to take possession of and to shape things; we are not the Hindus of Europe, as other people indeed previously called us. We came into history by achievements in war, and the desire for conflict and victory has been maintained through all the phases of our varied history. By the continued diligence of our citizens in work we have subordinated the world around us to our aims; our capacity for organisation has been most marked, as the present state of industry and trade shows. However, not only have these movements towards inwardness, and towards the world, a strong tendency to oppose one another, but also, in contrast with these magnificent gifts, there are many defects and tendencies that make the development of a powerful and unified life exceedingly difficult. We show a want of form and taste, a heaviness and formality, a tendency to occupation with detail and, in general, with what is petty in life, and, as a result of this, an uncultured "Philistinism" in all spheres of society, and along with this the inclination on the part of individuals to insist on the correctness of their positions, and thus to cause division; finally—and this is the worst of all—much envy and jealousy. None of these features can be denied. There is an infinite amount which must be altered and overcome amongst us if we are to become what we are capable of becoming, and if we are to reach the highest in our nature.

The limitations that have been brought about by our history, which on the whole has not been a happy one, constitute an important determining factor in this matter. The more problems we bear within us, the more possibilities of genuine creation that exist within us, and the more we may be to humanity in the future, the more painful is it if attention and activity are diverted from the chief task, and if an externalising of the idea of nationality allows us to consider ourselves great rather than lead us to strive for true greatness. The people that has produced Luther and Bach, Kant and Goethe, cannot be devoid of true greatness, if it only remains faithful to its own nature, and if it concentrates its power and treats the chief thing really as such.

(*e*) THE LIFE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The problems and antitheses that are to be found in the life of the present penetrate deeply into the life of the individual, and often make their appearance within him with a particular power. The antithesis that exists between the conceptions of the world and the demands of life is especially harsh. The tendency of the age is to form a conception of the world which reduces the status of the individual in the greatest degree: from the point of view of nature and of society, he seems to be no more than a fleeting appearance, a matter of indifference, and to show no independence, and never to be able to take part with spontaneous activity in the course of events. On the other hand, the contemporary form of life demands the greatest independence and freedom of the individual. We see in him the chief bearer of life, and we expect salvation from the severe perplexities of the time, primarily from his strengthening. This state of inconsistency cannot be tolerated for long; either the degradation of the individual, that is found in the conceptions of the world, must be

applied to life, and lead it to a resigned submission to an impenetrable world-process, or the positive estimate of the individual which governs conduct must be acknowledged in the conviction concerning reality as a whole: only a weakness of disposition and a feebleness of thought can divide our existence between the one conviction and the other.

The course which our investigation has taken cannot leave any possible doubt as to the direction which our conviction points out to us in this matter: however much we also demand an energetic development of the individual, that the stagnation of the age may be overcome, at the same time we insist upon a necessary condition of this, on his inner strengthening by an inner world present to him, on his elevation by a spirituality transcending nature. Only if he thus acquires an inner relation to infinity, and becomes an independent centre of life, can he satisfy the demands that are generally made upon him, and, remarkably enough, especially by those who theoretically deny the inner world as a whole, and hail a most shallow Naturalism as a deliverance.

Of course that inner elevation of the individual by no means lifts him gently and simply out of all the confusion that the experience of our existence shows; at the first glance it may even seem to make the confusion greater. For, if each individual can become a co-operator in the building up of a new world, and if his activity thereby acquires a value for the whole, then the complete indifference with which, according to our human impression, the individual is treated by the course of the physical world, the inflexibility and injustice that he often experiences in this world, the defect of love and justice in this world, in which the bad so often obtain the victory and the good are led to destruction, are all the greater mystery. The more the development of the spiritual life widens the field of vision; the more it leads us beyond a lifeless resignation to the question of the rationality of events and compels us to compare the destiny of one man with that of another,

the deeper must that feeling of mystery become. All attempts at a theodicy founder on this difficulty; we must inevitably submit to the view that with regard to this problem all is obscure to the eyes of man. There is, however, no need on this account to doubt and to regard our life as hopeless; our investigation also has shown this. For, in contrast with the obscurity of the world around us, we are able to set the fact of the emergence of a new world within us. Great things take place within us; not only does a new world appear, but we are called by an inner necessity of our own being to co-operate in its development, and this co-operation is not limited to individual activities, but involves our being as a whole. For it was just in this that we were able to recognise the development of being as the essence of the spiritual life—that the chief movement of our life is to win a genuine being, and that in the development of personality and spiritual individuality such a being is in question. We saw clearly enough that we are not personalities and individuals from the beginning; but that nature gives us only the possibility of becoming this. To realise this possibility our own activity is necessary; and this activity is not a sudden resolution, but requires a revolution of our being and the development of a new nature; and this can only be achieved by a faithful and zealous life-work, and even then only approximately. Thus life as a whole is a task which includes all multiplicity within it, the task of winning our own being completely, and just in this way to increase the kingdom of the spirit at our point.

This task cannot be completely recognised and adopted without making a great divergence from the aim, harsh oppositions and difficult conflicts, manifest in the inner recesses of the soul. If our life, therefore, appears to be in the highest degree incomplete, a mere beginning, then this increase of the task demonstrates more than anything else that, in this matter, we are concerned not with phantoms and imaginations, but with realities: so here, notwithstanding all our incompleteness, we an obtain the certainty

of a spiritual existence, and even become strengthened by the direct resistance of the external world, because that world is henceforth reduced to the secondary position. Thus, as we saw, the question upon which minds separate into irreconcilable opposition is whether they acknowledge in the inwardness of being itself not merely individual problems but a universal task; if this is the case, the seriousness of the task will give to them an unshakable stability of possession and a security superior to all attacks; if it is not the case, the spiritual world is an unintelligible paradox, because the want of an independent inner life means that there is no basis for the development of an organ for the comprehension of a world of inwardness. In this matter there is no possibility of a direct agreement; only the proof of the spirit and of power can decide.

But where the life of the individual acquires a genuine being and a connection with the realm of self-consciousness, then, notwithstanding all that is fleeting and insubstantial, the individual cannot regard himself as a transitory appearance in the whole, even in the ultimate basis of his being. Where, in contrast with all the meaninglessness of mere nature and all the pretence of mere society, a movement towards inner unity and substantial being emerges, the individual will be elevated into a time-transcendent order, and must necessarily acquire some position within it. The whole movement towards spirituality in the human sphere would be vain, and all distinctively human life would be a meaningless contradiction, if the individuals in whom alone the spiritual life breaks forth spontaneously were included solely and entirely in the stream of the process of nature. If the spiritual life has once revealed itself to us, so far as to begin an independent and distinctive being within us, then this being will assert itself in some way. This does not imply agreement with the usual belief in immortality, which would preserve man just as he is through all eternity, and thus condemn him to the torture of rigid continuance in the same form; a state that would, indeed, be as unbearable as the pain of the traditional

hell. As the world as a whole is in the highest degree mysterious to us, so our future is veiled in the deepest obscurity. But, if with the essence of our being we are elevated into a universal spiritual life, and if in the innermost basis of our life we participate in an eternal order, then the time-transcendence of this life assures to us also some kind of time-transcendence in our being.

So löst sich jene grosse Frage
Nach unserm zweiten Vaterland,
Denn das Beständige der ird'schen Tage
Verbürgt uns ewigen Bestand.

—GOETHE

CONCLUSION

IN conclusion a few words will suffice. The last section showed that the present sets great problems and reveals possibilities in every department of life ; but that we men are very far from being equal to cope with these problems. We are limited especially by the fact that we are incapable of elevating ourselves inwardly above the present ; that we do not take possession of it sufficiently as a whole, and find an inner independence in relation to it ; and that therefore we do not enter with the necessary vigour into the conflict against the trivial and the poor-spirited, the decadent and the sceptical that the present contains. To point out the way to attain such independence appeared to us to be the chief task of philosophy in the present. In the service of this task, which cannot be achieved without the manifestation of a new actuality, without a fundamental deepening of our reality, we have made our investigation, which contains a distinctive conception of the spiritual life. In that everywhere we have pressed back from the results to the experience, and from the wealth of achievement to the generating basis, we have seen nature, history, culture, and human nature as a whole in a new light. We have hoped,

by widening and strengthening life itself from within, to supply a substitute for the external supports that life has lost. How far we have succeeded in our endeavour is another question; we shall be satisfied even if our work only contributes to bring the present to a clearer consciousness of the state of spiritual crisis in which it exists and concerning the seriousness of which it deceives itself in a thousand ways. There is an enormous amount of vigorous activity and efficient work, of honest endeavour and serious disposition, in the time, and the tendency to make life more spiritual is also evident. But the movement is still far from attaining the depth which is necessary to the chief question of our spiritual existence; thus the conflict, instead of being between whole and whole, is divided; that which is significant and valuable in the endeavour of the time is in danger of becoming problematic, and of producing the opposite of what it purposes, because it does not fit itself into a universal life, and in this realise its limitations and at the same time its right. A more energetic concentration of life in itself is therefore the first condition of transcending the chaos of the life of the present and of preventing spiritual degeneration in the midst of too intense an occupation with externals. As for the rest, we may say with Plotinus: "The doctrine serves to point the way and guide the traveller; the vision, however, is for him who will see it."

INDEX

ABSTRACTIONS; their power in modern life, 362 ff.
Activism; profession of faith in, 255 ff.; how it differs from a system of mere force, 255 ff.; its ethical character, 256; how it differs from Voluntarism and Pragmatism, 256 ff.
Æsthetic Individualism, 61 ff.
Æstheticism; its antithesis to Activism, 258 ff.
Antiquity; its distinctive synthesis of life, 208 ff.
A priori; its validity and its limitations, 234
Archimedean point in the spiritual life; its impossibility, 94 ff., 154
Art and literature, condition and tasks in the present, 354 ff.
Ascetic organisation of life; rejected, 281 ff.

BEING, development of; as a system of life, 212 ff., 314

CATHOLICISM; different tendencies in, 328 ff.
Christianity; its unique character, 6; the opposition to, 7 ff.; its permanent truth, 331 ff.; changes necessary to it, 332 ff.; Christian and Greek forms of life, 283 ff.
"Classical," the; its significance, 192
Concentration of life (within the whole), 156 ff.; 160
Conscience; its significance, 129 ff
Critical character of modern work; its presuppositions, 250 ff.
Culture, 110 ff.; genuine and apparent, 269 ff.; requirements of a new type, 298 ff.; organisation of, 315 ff.

DEMOCRATIC tendency of modern culture, 361 ff.
Departments of life; their relation to life as a whole, 316 ff.
Dogmatic sectarian point of view; rejected, 328
Duty; significance of the idea, 184 ff., 231

EDUCATION; problems in the present state of, 343 ff.
Enlightenment, the; its synthesis of life, 209 ff.; how far problematic, 249; relation of the present to it, 347 ff.
Equality; problems of the present conception of, 362
Eternity; how far implied in the life of the individual, 372
Ethical character of life; how to be understood, 256, 258; of spiritual culture, 309 ff.; its necessity, 337 ff.
Ethics (morality); different types in the present time, 336 ff.; conditions of a morality, 338 ff.; requirements of morality in a spiritual culture, 339 ff.
Evil; the problem of, 263 ff.; the way in which it is solved, 279 ff.
Evolution, doctrine of; spiritual, its limitations, 194 ff., 257 ff.
Experience; its significance for the spiritual life in man, 235 ff.

FREEDOM; its nature, 174 ff.; its conflict with destiny, 181 ff.; genuine and false, 323 ff.; inconsistency in contemporary treatment of the problem, 360 ff.

GERMAN character; its greatness and its dangers, 317 ff., 368 ff.
Goethe; characteristic influence, 299
Good, the (idea of the good); how it differs from the Useful, 119 ff.; apparent inconsistency, 138 ff.;

more detailed determination, 185 ff.
Great man, the; his relation to his time, 292
Greek and Christian forms of life, 283 ff.

HEGEL; relation of the present to him indefinite, 348
Historical and social organisation of life; its limitations, 200
Historical Relativism; rejected, 290 ff., 323 ff.
History; the spiritual conception of, its conditions, 188 ff.; esoteric and exoteric history, 243 ff.
Human life; how far it is from the spiritual life, 161 ff.

IDEALISATION, false; of immediate existence, 83 ff., 362 ff.
Idealism and Realism; their unification in a spiritual culture, 312 ff.
Ideas in history; their unique character, 126 ff., 188 ff.
Imagination; indispensable in all departments of life, 239
Immanent Idealism, its rise and fall, 15 ff.
Immanental treatment (from the life-process), 107 ff.
Individual, the, and the Society; problems of their relation, 364 ff.
Individual, the; his significance in the new relations, 246, 369 ff.
Individual, life of the; its form in the new system, 369 ff.
Individuality (spiritual); as a problem, 132 ff., 181 ff., 370
Instruction; problems in the present time with reference to, 343 ff.
Inwardness; its attainment of independence in man, 123 ff., 146 ff.; as the inner life of reality, 148 ff.; inwardness and the inner world, 303
Irrationality, of existence; in what manner overcome, 279

KANT; inconsistency in the relation to him in the present time, 348
Knowledge; its form in the new system, 351

LIFE; its detachment from the mere individual, 119 ff.; the two movements in it, 282 ff.
Life-process; as the fundamental principle of investigation, 104 ff., 305 ff., 349 ff.
Life's attainment of greatness, 240 ff.
Life-work; its significance in acquiring stability, 253
Love; as a witness to the union with the whole, 231

MAN; as a being of nature, 110 ff.; growing beyond nature, 113 ff.; his union with the whole, 226 ff.
Masses, the culture of the; its problems, 89 ff.
Mass-movements; their dangers and limitations, 363 ff.
Metaphysic; in what sense necessary, 141 ff.
"Modern," the; double meaning, 296
Modern Age, the (in a broad sense); the characteristic in its nature, 9 ff.
"Modern" Morality; discussed and rejected, 364 ff.
Movement, of the spiritual life in man; its uniqueness, 233 ff.; its increase in the new system of life, 247 ff.
Mysticism; in what sense justifiable, 246

NATIONAL Character, 198, 367 ff.
Nationality, the idea of; its problems, 366 ff.
Naturalism; its significance and its limitations, 24 ff.
Nature and Spirit, 270 ff.
Negation; impossibility of an absolute, 267 ff.
Newer Systems of Life; what they have in common, 22 ff., 81 ff.
Noölogical Method; distinguished from the psychological and the cosmological, 243, 352
Norms; their significance, 184

PANTHEISM; vague character of the general conception of it, 84
Past; impossibility of flight to the, 93 ff.
People and nation, 366 ff.
Personal conviction, concerning reality as a whole; where the decision is made, 253, 281, 311 ff., 340, 372
Personality; the difficulty of the conception, 95 ff.; no mere gift of nature, 311, 370

Philosophy; its present position, 346 ff.; its three main tendencies in the present time, 347 ff.; chief demands, 349 ff.
Philosophy of life; the conception of a, 3 ff.
Political and social life; condition and tasks in the present time, 358 ff.
Present, the; difficulties of determining its extent, 289 ff.
Protestantism; the different tendencies in it, 329
Public opinion; manner of its formation, 364

Reality; difficulty of the conception, 84 ff.; longing for, 159 ff.; new conception of, 220 ff.
Relation (fundamental), of man to reality; new, from the point of view of the spiritual life, 152 ff.
Religion; the system of life of, 6 ff.; its form and its justification, 273 ff.; its necessity in a spiritual culture, 312 ff.; its present condition, 324; its requirements in a spiritual culture, 330 ff.; specific religious system of life rejected, 281 ff.
Romanticism; its significance and its limitations, 258 ff.

Science; its present greatness and problems, 345 ff.
Self-preservation, spiritual; distinguished from natural self-preservation, 126
Sense; its estimate, 260
Simplification (in revivals), 128
Socialistic system; its significance and its limitations, 41 ff.
Society; the spiritual conception of, 196 ff.; emphasis upon society in the nineteenth century, 358 ff.
Spiritual culture, and human culture, 308 ff.
Spiritual life; its independence a necessity, 141 ff.; as the fundamental principle of a new organisation of the individual departments of life, 157 ff., 244 ff.
Spiritual work; its relation to time, 290 ff.
Stability in life; how won, 251 ff.
State, the; the greater emphasis upon it in the nineteenth century, 359 ff.
Suffering and spiritual destitution, 314
Syntheses of life; in history, 207 ff.

Theodicy; rejected, 279 ff., 371
Thought; its relation to life, 108, 126 ff., 141 ff., 349 ff.; its unique operation (in distinction from association), 125 ff.
Time; fundamental relation of man to, 116 ff.
Transcendent Spirituality; as the fundamental principle of religion, 278 ff.
Transcendental method; in what sense justifiable, 248
Truth, conception of; its history 138; new conception, 216 ff.

Work; its distinctive character, 122; its power to develop, 201 ff.; the world of work, 201 ff.
World, conceptions of the; chief types, 353 ff.

Printed by
BALLANTYNE & COMPANY LTD
Tavistock Street Covent Garden
London

BY RUDOLF EUCKEN

THE MEANING AND VALUE OF LIFE

TRANSLATED BY

LUCY JUDGE GIBSON & W. R. BOYCE GIBSON, M.A.

Crown 8vo, Cloth — Price 3s. 6d. net — By Post 3s. 9d.

FROM THE TRANSLATORS' PREFACE

Eucken's influence as a thinker has for long been felt far beyond the borders of his native land. Translations of his books have appeared in many foreign languages, including French, Italian, Swedish, Finnish and Russian. In our own country such articles on Eucken's works as have appeared quite recently in the *Times*, the *Guardian*, and the *Inquirer* are significantly sympathetic and appreciative. 'It seems likely,' writes the reviewer in the *Guardian*, 'that for the next decade Eucken will be the leading guide for the pilgrims of thought who walk on the Idealist Road.'

PRESS OPINION

"There are scores of passages throughout the volume one would like to quote—the thinking of a man of clearest vision and loftiest outlook on the fabric of life as men are fashioning it to-day. It is a volume for Churchmen and politicians of all shades and parties, for the student and for the man of business, for the workshop as well—a volume for every one who is seriously interested in the great business of life."—*Aberdeen Journal.*

PUBLISHED BY

ADAM & CHARLES BLACK . 4 SOHO SQUARE . LONDON, W.

RUDOLF EUCKEN'S
PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

By W. R. BOYCE GIBSON

LECTURER IN PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL

SECOND EDITION

With Frontispiece Portrait of Rudolf Eucken

Crown 8vo, Cloth — **Price 3s. 6d. net** — By Post 3s. 9d.

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

The New Idealism: Eucken's Philosophy a Rallying-point for Idealistic Effort
His Theory of Knowledge
His Philosophy of History
The Meaning of a Historical Fact
The Break with Aristotelianism and Aquinism
Eucken's Criticism of the Naturalistic Syntagma
The Great Alternative: Individuality or Personality
The Category of Action
Eucken's View of Revelation
The Problem of the Union of Human and Divine
The New Spiritual Immediacy
The Spiritual Life as Eucken conceives it: its Intrinsically Oppositional Character
Eucken's Philosophy as a Philosophy of Freedom
The New Idealism as a Religious Idealism

"No reader should fail to find pleasure in a book so full of fresh and stimulating thought, expressed with great felicity of language."
The Scottish Review

"It is done with just the proper combination of sympathy and criticism."—*The British Weekly*

PUBLISHED BY

ADAM & CHARLES BLACK . 4 SOHO SQUARE . LONDON, W

THEOLOGICAL TRANSLATION LIBRARY

Cornell University Library

BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME
FROM THE
SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND
THE GIFT OF
Henry W. Sage
1891

A.5 C C 13

The date shows when this volume was taken.
To renew this book copy the call No. and give to the librarian

HOME USE RULES.

All Books subject to Recall

Books not used for instruction or research are returnable within 4 weeks.

Volumes of periodicals and of pamphlets are held in the library as much as possible. For special purposes they are given out for a limited time.

Borrowers should not use their library privileges for the benefit of other persons.

Books not needed during recess periods should be returned to the library, or arrangements made for their return during borrower's absence, if wanted.

Books needed by more than one person are held on the reserve list.

Books of special value and gift books, when the giver wishes it, are not allowed to circulate.

Readers are asked to report all cases of books marked or mutilated.

Do not deface books by marks and writing.

Cornell University Library
BL51 .E86 1911
The truth of religion,
3 1924 031 017 936
olin

BL
51
E86
1911

The original of this book is in
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.

http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924031017936

THEOLOGICAL TRANSLATION LIBRARY

VOL. XXX

EUCKEN'S THE TRUTH OF RELIGION

Theological Translation Library

NEW SERIES

Vol. XXX.—THE TRUTH OF RELIGION. By Dr Rudolf Eucken, Senior Professor of Philosophy in the University of Jena.

Vols. XXVIII. and XXIX.—THE OLD TESTAMENT IN THE LIGHT OF THE ANCIENT EAST. By Alfred Jeremias, Pastor of the Lutherkirche, and Lecturer at the University of Leipzig. Two vols., with numerous illustrations and maps. Vols. not sold separately.

Vols. XXVII., XXVI. and XXII.—PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY: Its Writings and Teachings in their Historical Connections. By Otto Pfleiderer, Professor of Practical Theology in the University of Berlin. Vols. 1, 2 and 3.

Vol. XXV.—ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE. By Dr Theodor von Haering, Professor of New Testament Dogmatics and Ethics at Tübingen.

Vol. XXIV.—HISTORY OF THE CHURCH. By Hans von Schubert, Professor of Church History at Kiel.

Vol. XXIII.—THE INTRODUCTION TO THE CANONICAL BOOKS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By Carl Cornill, Professor of Old Testament Theology at the University of Breslau.

Vol. XXI.—ST PAUL: The Man and His Work. By Prof. H. Weinel, of the University of Jena.

Vols. XIX. and XX.—THE MISSION AND EXPANSION OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE FIRST THREE CENTURIES. By Adolf Harnack, Berlin. Second, revised and much enlarged edition. Vols. not sold separately.

Vol. XVIII.—CHRISTIAN LIFE IN THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH. By Ernst von Dobschütz, D.D., Professor of New Testament Theology in the University of Strassburg.

Vol. XVI.—THE RELIGIONS OF AUTHORITY AND THE RELIGION OF THE SPIRIT. By the late Auguste Sabatier.

Vols. XV. and XVII.—THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIANITY. By Paul Wernle, Professor Extraordinary of Modern Church History at the University of Basel. Vol. I. The Rise of the Religion. Vol. II. The Development of the Church.

Vol. XIII.—AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TEXTUAL CRITICISM OF THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT. By Professor Eberhard Nestle, of Maulbronn.

Vols. II., VII., VIII., IX., X., XI., XII.—A HISTORY OF DOGMA. By Adolf Harnack, Berlin. Translated from the Third German Edition. Edited by the late Rev. Prof. A. B. Bruce, D.D. 7 vols.

Vol. IV.—THE COMMUNION OF THE CHRISTIAN WITH GOD: A Discussion in Agreement with the View of Luther. By W. Herrmann, Dr. Theol., Professor of Dogmatic Theology in the University of Marburg.

Vols. III. and VI.—A HISTORY OF THE HEBREWS. By R. Kittel, Ordinary Professor of Theology in the University of Breslau.

Vols. I. and V.—THE APOSTOLIC AGE. By Prof. Carl von Weizsäcker. Translated by James Millar, B.D. 2 vols.

Descriptive Prospectus on Application.

THE TRUTH OF RELIGION

BY

RUDOLF EUCKEN

AWARDED NOBEL PRIZE 1908

SENIOR PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF JENA

TRANSLATED BY

W. TUDOR JONES, PH.D. (Jena)

NEW YORK: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

LONDON: WILLIAMS AND NORGATE

1911

8/II/12

~~7312~~
~~A11~~

A.260792

Now first translated into English from the Second and Revised Edition, with a special Preface for this Edition by the Author

L.L

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

It is with mixed feelings that I allow this translation to pass out of my hands. It would not have been undertaken had it not been for the affection which I possess for my old teacher and friend, and for the influence which he exerted over my life when I had the privilege of spending nearly three years with him in the ancient University of Jena. And such an experience as mine is only a specimen of what is true of thousands of other students who have passed through his classes in Jena since 1874. These students are found all over the world, and are all imbued with something of the spirit of their great teacher in connection with the problems and contents of religion.

The book presents peculiar difficulties which will be immediately acknowledged by all students of the author's writings. Much is lost at the best in a translation, and especially is this so when the work is that of a prophet of religion who cannot be tied down either in thought or mode of expression to the level of the writer on exact subjects. I have been painfully conscious of the inadequacy of language to express many of the ideas presented in the book—ideas which seem inseparable from the religious experience of the living personality. The terminology in many portions of the book moves midway between Philosophy and

Theology, and I have endeavoured constantly to take this important fact into consideration. But it is a fact of great difficulty in the midst of the present-day flux of philosophical terminology. Whatever the faults may be, I hope no one will detect a lack of fairness in dealing with various theological conceptions.

I have to thank my wife for valuable help in connection with the whole of the translation.

In the course of a few years, two large editions of the book have appeared in Germany and the work has been the subject of a large number of books, dissertations, and essays, by many eminent German philosophers and religious teachers. I hope it will meet with a similar reception in the English-speaking countries of the world, and help all who have at heart the furtherance of the things of the spirit to differentiate between the transient and the Eternal in Christianity, and to labour for the growth of the Spiritual Life in the deepest consciousness of men.

W. TUDOR JONES.

HIGHBURY, LONDON,
1*st November* 1911.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE FOR THE ENGLISH EDITION

THE author of this book has found so much good-will in England in connection with his efforts that it is a great pleasure for him to see his main work on religion appearing in English. The work does not pretend to present a system of religious philosophy; but, in the midst of the present-day controversy over religion, the most important task seems to be to present with the utmost possible clearness the solid nucleus of religion, and, along with this, to show its main rights. In the conviction of the author, religion is able to attain a secure position and an effective influence only when it is founded upon the whole of life and not upon a particular so-called faculty of the soul, be it intellect, feeling, or will. It behoves us, therefore, to possess a plan of human life as a whole, and to inquire whether life as a whole turns out to indicate the operation of a Higher Power, and, hence, to lead to religion. The primary condition of this is the consideration that human life is not a mere piece of nature, but that a new stage of reality reveals itself in it. Such a revelation is actually present in the Spiritual Life; and we are not able to grasp sufficiently this fact or to understand its effects without recognising that the Spiritual Life is a Whole,

and that it is present with elevating energy as a Whole in man.

In pursuing this path it becomes evident that a universal life—a cosmic depth—is imbedded in the Spiritual Life. It is only as a revelation of such a nature of life that spiritual creativeness, art and science, morality and right, can develop themselves and transform man. If, therefore, all genuine Spiritual Life is the effect of a Higher Power, religion is imbedded in it. The great spiritual leaders of the race were clearly conscious of such a fact. But a religion of such spiritual activity is still of a very indefinite nature, and receives a distinctive character, first of all, from the fact that, throughout a grave upheaval, in a conquest over suffering and wrong, a further stage of life—itself a kingdom of Divine Love—is unlocked. Herewith religion becomes for the first time an autonomous province of life; herewith it brings forth a new and unique life.

But Characteristic and Universal Religion—in the sense the terms are used in this work—must remain in living relationship and mutually further one another, for thus alone can the whole of religion shape itself into greatness, and thus fortify and raise not only individuals but the whole of humanity. This fundamental conception tests and measures the historical religions especially according to the manner in which they shape the life of humanity, and according to what they are able to achieve for the moral elevation of human nature. Here the conception decides resolutely for Christianity as the summit of all religions; but simultaneously it demands, in view of the situation of the present day, that Christianity

be more forcibly referred back to its essential vital content and be given a simpler and more intelligible form, and be freed from whatever is no more alive in it but is a mere heritage of past times.

The Eternal and Divine in Christianity is the depth of life which is unlocked in it. It has become necessary to differentiate more clearly the Eternal and Divine from the transient and the human which have so intimately mixed up with it in divers forms. It is only a conception of religion which binds freedom and depth with one another, and which heightens freedom through depth and depth through freedom, that will be able to overcome the storms of the present.

RUDOLF EUCKEN.

JENA, 1*st November* 1911.

CONTENTS

PART I.—THE UNIVERSAL CRISIS IN RELIGION

CHAP.		PAGE
I.	*a.* The problem of religion	1
II.	*b.* The characteristic features of Christianity	10
III.	*c.* The movement of modern times against Christianity	24
	1. The changes in the world of thought	24
	(α) Natural science and religion	24
	(β) History and religion	28
	(γ) The spiritual life and religion	35
	2. The variation of the direction of life	39
IV.	*d.* The reconsolidation of religion	48
V.	*e.* The explanation of the developing tendency	63

PART II.—THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS OF UNIVERSAL RELIGION

	Introduction	72
VI.	*a.* The complexity of human life	86
	1. The dualism in human life	86
	2. The contradiction in human life	94
	(α) The weakness of the spiritual motive-powers	95
	(β) The spiritual impotence of man	99
	(γ) The insufficiency of an alleged remedy	108
VII.	*b.* The progressive autonomy of the spiritual life	119
	1. The several stages	122
	(α) The emancipation of life from the small self and the merely human order	122
	(β) The inward antithesis overcome	131
	(γ) The winning of a universal self	142

CHAP. PAGE

2. Epitome and survey 156
(α) The meaning of the spiritual life . 156
(β) The view of the universe . . . 163
(γ) The situation of man 169
(δ) Conclusions for the method and the task of life 177
VIII. c. The fact of universal religion 187
1. The turn to religion 187
(α) The problem of religion in general . 187
(β) Nearer view of the problem . . 188
(γ) The reality above the world . . 195
(aa) The peril to the spiritual life from its surrounding world . 196
(bb) The assertion of the spiritual life over against the world . 198
(cc) The revelation of an absolute spiritual life in our world . 203
2. The content of religion 208
(α) The idea of God 208
(β) Godhead and the world . . . 214
(γ) Godhead and man 221
(δ) The psychic connections of religion . 226
(ε) The characteristic features of the religion of the spiritual life . . 231
3. The proof and confirmation of religion . 243
(α) Religion and science 243
(β) General considerations . . . 256
(γ) Special pathways 260
(aa) The aspiration after infinity . 261
(bb) The aspiration after freedom and equality . . . 263
(cc) The aspiration after eternity . 270
(dd) The aspiration after fellowship and after a soul . . 273
(ee) The aspiration after greatness 278
Conclusion 282

PART III.—THE OPPOSITION TO RELIGION

Introduction 284
IX. a. The explanation of the opposition . . . 290
1. The opposition of nature 290

CHAP. PAGE

2. The opposition of culture 296
3. The opposition within the particular province of the spiritual life . . 306
(α) The disruption of the spiritual life . 307
(β) The disintegration within the spiritual life 313
(γ) The impotence of morality . . 320
4. The darkness of the human situation . . 325
X. *b*. The opposition considered 349
1. The inadequacy of proposed remedies . 349
2. The impossibility of a negation . . . 351
3. The necessity of further manifestations . 362

PART IV.—CHARACTERISTIC RELIGION

Introduction 364
XI. *a*. The historical religions 366
1. The fact of religions 366
2. The opposition to religions . . . 374
3. Impossibility of a simple denial of religion 386
XII. *b*. Signs of a new depth of life 391
1. The idea of love of enemy 392
2. The deepening of love 395
3. Self-maintenance in the midst of hindrance and suffering 400
4. The progressive development of inwardness 403
5. The further development of morality . . 405
XIII. *c*. The unfolding of a religion of a distinctive kind 410
1. Introductory 410
2. The new life-process 419
(α) The main thesis 419
(β) The idea of God and the relationship to God 429
(γ) The verification of religion through the progressive development of life . . . 437
(*aa*) Elucidation and integration of life 437
(*bb*) The further development of the movements of life 444

CHAP. PAGE

(*cc*) Peculiar effects of characteristic religion . . . 448
(*dd*) Retrospect 453
3. Religion in its relation to society and history 457
(*a*) The problem of the Church . . 458
(*aa*) The necessity of a religious organisation . . . 458
(*bb*) The dangers of a religious organisation . . . 459
(*cc*) The reconstruction of a religious organisation . . 467
(*β*) The relationship to history . . 475
XIV. *d*. The general aspect of religion and life . . 490
(1) The persistence of evil 490
(2) The overcoming of evil 493
(3) The religious interpretation of life and the world 498
(4) Faith and doubt: the denial of religion . 518

PART V.—CHRISTIANITY AND THE PRESENT

Introductory remarks concerning historical and absolute religion 534
XV. *a*. The eternal in Christianity 539
1. The nucleus beyond all loss . . . 539
2. The maintenance of this nucleus against the changes of time . . . 547
(*a*) The further development over against nature 547
(*β*) The further development over against history and culture . . . 556
(*γ*) The further development over against the changes of the spiritual life in man 563
XVI. *b*. The transient in Christianity and the necessity of a renewal of Christianity . . . 576
1. The removal from past forms . . . 576
2. The necessity of a new mode of Christianity 591
XVII. *c*. The situation and demands of the present . . 605

INDEX 617

THE TRUTH OF RELIGION

Part I.—The Universal Crisis in Religion

CHAPTER I

a. The Problem of Religion

He who wishes to ascertain the intrinsic truth of religion need neither trace its blurred beginnings in time nor pursue its slow ascent, but may take his stand upon the summit of its development. For it is here first of all that the problem of truth obtains a clearness and, at the same time, an urgency. We need not trouble ourselves about the magic-shapes which accompany and govern the initial stages of religion; and we need not occupy ourselves with religion as a mere aspect of early civilisation or as a mythology of nature. Our problem begins only where religion engenders a world of its own, and holds forth such a world over against the remainder of existence, thus transforming the remaining world through and through. Thus, religion holds before man, in the midst of his province, an invisible order of things, an eternal existence, a supernatural life,

and claims his soul for all this. Such a stated revelation appears not merely in one but in several points in history, and, further, the contents of the "historical" and the positive religions vary. But the same problem presents itself in all the manifold phenomena of religion, and a sharp Nay as well as a joyous Yea are common to all religions.

Nowhere is religion able to gain man for its new world unless it frees him from the old world, and unless it enables him to dislike and even to hate what hitherto had swayed and enchanted him. There is no possibility of a genuine and effective turn of his life without a breach with the nearest-at-hand world—without the clear discovery of the misery and vanity of such a world. This world must displease man not only at certain points but in its entirety. All within it contains not only much pain and sorrow, but all within it is inadequate for man's highest happiness. Man is not only menaced and oppressed from without; he is troubled from within by anguish and alarm. It is only an entire revolution of the nearest-at-hand life that can engender a genuine and overwhelming aspiration after religion, and it is only through such an aspiration that religion can come to birth in the soul of man.

Indeed, the harder and sharper the Nay is, the more energetic and joyous becomes the Yea which religion holds out to man. Religion as a communication of God—of the highest power and perfection—not only alleviates in some kind of way the pain of man, and not only heightens somehow his happiness, but it promises an entire freedom from evil and a translation into entire blessedness. The new world

announced by religion signifies the highest conceivable world—the summit of all perfection. The evanescent and diminutive nature of man shall gain a portion in the eternity and infinity of this new world, and, indeed, man shall ascend to the Divine, and religion will finally bind the Divine and the human in one.

Religion sets our life in a stormy conflict and movement through the revelation of such immense prospects, through the transportation of a superhuman aim within the needs and exigencies of human existence. Our existence raises itself to incomparable greatness and intrinsic value, and into our being the essence of the cosmos enters and longs for our decision. Our circle of life dissects itself into a For or Against; the customary valuation of the excellencies of life is not only altered but inverted, so that now that alone holds valid which leads us to the Divine, whilst all that holds us fast to the ordinary world, in spite of all its captivating brilliancy, sinks to the level of an evil. "If any man cometh unto me and hateth not his own father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple."

But, besides being such a denial of the world, religion was at the same time the strongest power *within* the world. Nothing has so much united men inwardly, but also nothing has so much divided them as religion; nothing has so much deepened the nature of individuals, nothing has so obligatorily driven forward the characteristic tendencies of nations as convictions of Divine things. Whatever appears in life as heroism roots itself ultimately in religion;

nothing can inspire man in the depth of his soul, nothing can win his entire self-surrender unless it has linked itself to his religion, or has become a kind of religion in itself. Indeed, all the belief of humanity and of the individual seems inseparable from a belief in the indwelling of a Divine in human nature—of the living presence of an eternal and spiritual energy in the deeds of man. He who has experienced the religious problem in the depth of his soul is never again able to free himself entirely from such an experience; he may cast it off and banish it to a distance, but when he does this he cannot but choose to lay his strongest affection in the realm of negation; he cannot but choose to handle the question of religion as the main question of his life, so that unbelief itself becomes only another kind of versatile belief in his inmost conviction. Thus the strongest power *within* the world constitutes in reality the conviction of an *over-world.*

But, at the same time, religion has been an object which has been constantly spoken against in a harsh and callous manner. This happens not only from the outside, but also from the deep earnestness of wrestling souls. Ever anew the question raises itself whether an opening to the Divine—whether a raising of man in some kind of way to a Divine life—is possible, or whether all assertion concerning this turns out finally to be no more than a delusion. Must not all that affects man assume a mere human form? And must not all which recommended themselves to his aims enter into mere human notions? And is not all drawn into the narrowness and the gloom of the earthly circle—is not all confined within

the barriers of our nature? Often enough what served petty-human interests was considered Divine; the forces of the world tore such a Divine meaning and reduced it to a means for their own ends. Religion promises man a new life and new heart. But has it not often knitted itself faster to the mechanism of the world and heightened in a most repulsive manner hate and jealousy, vanity and hypocrisy? And, further, the external world does not correspond to the conceptions of religion. How could the external world hinder so callously the upward tendency of the life of man, how could it concede to unreason and injustice so much scope, if it stood under the secure guardianship of an all-powerful Reason and of an Infinite Love?

Thus, doubt burns like a devouring fire and leaps up into the external province of religion, and also finds its way into the most holy place and engenders a tormenting uncertainty. Deep by the side of their yearning, ardent souls have discovered with pain the contradiction of the appearance of things, and have found no consolation in the customary modes of appeasement. Indeed, with the leading religious spirits, much that had originated from a joyous creativeness is hurled back into the abyss of doubt. The stubbornness of doubt changes with one stroke the total-outlook of things: the joyous high flight is retarded; the upward energy is paralysed; what hitherto appeared evident, now appears impossible; the over-world which is to the faithful the secure and self-evident standard of life, recedes into an inaccessible distance and, indeed, threatens to resolve itself into an empty illusion. Religion then appears as a

grand error of the human spirit—as an image of man's own existence projected into the All, and as a dream of a more beautiful life to which a reality does not correspond, and on which he hangs his life. He who sees through the dream as a mere dream ought to undertake an inexorable struggle against such a falsification of life ; he ought not to tolerate patiently religion but struggle with it with the whole of his energy as a deadly error. Here all possibility of a third course falls to the ground. If religion is not the highest and most fruitful truth, it is the worst and deadliest of errors ; if it is not the work of God, it is a diabolical testimony of falsehood and darkness. How can we decide concerning this critical point on which the course of the whole of our life depends ? How can we flee from the intolerable barriers which lie between affirmation and negation ?

The historical religions have answered these questions in their own way; they have not answered them through philosophical doctrines but through the real facts of the work accomplished ; they have not reflected and disputed merely *how* the Divine glory can enter into the world of man, but have undertaken to corroborate the possibility of the impossible through the *fruits* of its reality. In the personalities of the founders as well as in the religious communities the wonder seemed to reach an intuitive presence, the idea seemed to incarnate itself in flesh and blood. Religions felt themselves in the possession of an obvious reality—a reality which liberated them from all insecurity and armed them against all doubt. But, unfortunately, the fact of all this was not so simple as the believers supposed, for even that

which was to overcome doubt raised a new and greater doubt.

It is fact of an *historical* kind which is expected to consolidate belief. Such a fact must stand out from the remainder of life and develop a distinctive characteristic feature; indeed, the more individual does such a fact become, the more energetically will it work. But, as an expression of Divine truth, the same fact must hold valid for all times; it must govern and permeate the whole compass of life. Is not an intolerable contradiction imbedded in such a belief? Does not the binding of life to one special form of life confine life in too narrow a groove? Will it not cut away all further development, and must it not become a coercive burden which incites human nature to cast it off?

The most casual view of the history of religions places this entanglement clearly before us. Every historical religion borrows peculiar convictions of the world and peculiar valuations of life from its environment. The environment states the question, and religion undertakes the answer. Thus, every Indian religion has as its presupposition a strong feeling of the transitoriness and unreality of existence. Can the imposed solution satisfy any one who rejects such a presupposition? And does the matter stand otherwise with Christianity? Can it speak to all men, races, and times if it maintains any definite character, and does it not dissolve itself into vague generalities?

The personalities of the founders constitute the centre of the historical religions. Nothing gives the presence of an over-world within the human circle more convincing energy than the unswerving

constancy with which such personalities are rooted in the Divine; than the manner in which they are completely filled by the thought of this one relation; and than the simplicity and nearness which the great mystery has acquired for them. Hearts have never been won and minds have never been swayed without the presence of a regal imagination which understands how to win visible forms from an unseen world, and to penetrate through all the multiplicity of things into a kingdom of a fuller life. Nothing so elevated above the ordinary every-day existence is to be found as this, and nothing has governed in so compelling a manner the hearts of men as such a secure growth and such a presence of a new world.

But all this is individual and distinct precisely where it is great; so that the religious life which issues from such a source bears a thoroughly individual character. Jesus, the Buddha, Mahomet, have affected humanity in fundamentally different ways. If one fundamental form is offered to all peoples and times, does it not exclude much which humanity can not and dare not relinquish?

Also, the attempt to mould one religion into a world-power on the ground of history is dependent upon the particularity of the transitory historical situation. Such a formation of religion requires a highly-explicitated realm of thought, and the means to obtain this can be no other than the environing culture and civilisation; yet though these latter seem to be no more than hand-maids to religion, they work powerfully upon religion itself. That culture and civilisation were the products of particular peoples and epochs; sooner or later the whole of humanity will outgrow them,

and if religion is indissolubly bound up with them, the breach with a past culture and civilisation yields at the same time a disunion with the tradition of religion.

Thus doubt upon doubt rises. The Eternal seems to fall under the ban of time as soon as it touches the ground of time. But, again, if it stands entirely on an immutability, it becomes a hindrance to all movement and a denial of all history. But history is ever present, and its current incessantly carries forth something new, and an indestructible need of the life of humanity rejects any imposed stagnation. In connection with this difficulty it may seem as if in the alleged Eternal it is not so much the Divine and Eternal which reveal themselves, but only a particular kind of human and temporal notions is founded and sanctioned. Why should we at this period of day bow before such particularity, and why should we renounce the independence of our own life?

The historical element which should have supported religion becomes thus a new burden; doubts seem now strengthened all along concerning an over-world and its province. Then the uncertainty concerning the whole matter bars an entrance into religion; indeed, the more we puzzle our brains and worry ourselves, the further religion seems to recede from us. "God is the easiest and hardest object to know; the first and easiest to know on the path of light; the most difficult and last to know on the path of darkness" (Leibniz).

CHAPTER II

b. THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF CHRISTIANITY

THE general problem of religion increases with the turn to Christianity. The investigator as well as the believer willingly acknowledge a surpassing greatness to Christianity among the religions of the world. In the first place, Christianity belongs to the higher of the two groups into which the historical religions may be divided. *These are either the Religions of Law or the Religions of Redemption.* To the first, the kernel of religion is the announcement and advocacy of a moral order which governs the world from on high. A fixed decree issuing out of a holy will is announced to man for his acts, words, and thoughts; a glorious reward awaits the fulfilment of this law, and a painful punishment awaits its transgression, if not in this world yet in the world to come. Life thus in the whole of its extent is linked to a super-sensuous world, is drawn to the daily task and to the decision for or against God. Such a call to man would be impossible without the conviction that he is able to select the alternative out of his own energy, and that his will suffices for the adoption

of the good. On the other hand, the religions of redemption declare such a conviction as false and superficial. The capacity of man which seems so self-evident to such a conviction becomes to the religions of redemption the most difficult of problems —becomes the most weighty question and concern. Through this growth of the problem, man appears to the religions of redemption as entirely unable in his natural state to reach God, and as a being who falls continually into evil and semblance; and consequently such religions long for an entire transformation and renewal—for a sinking of the old and a raising of the new, and for a great miracle of redemption. How such a miracle is to happen may appear in the beginning entirely puzzling, because man views himself here in the midst of the most difficult entanglements. But the possibility of a deepening of life corresponds to the entanglements; life is conceived more and more as a Whole, and is stirred, convulsed, transformed incomparably more than hitherto. The very opening of such a question relegates the religions of law, despite all the merits of their greater simplicity, transparency, and rationality, to a lower level—to a level which has been reached and passed by the most important inward movement of the world.

Two types—the Indian and the Christian—are to be differentiated in the religions of redemption. As both types understand evil differently, they seek therefore the "cure of souls" in different ways. To the Indian religions, the existence of the world is primarily an evil; the world, with the whole of its natural constitution in space and time, appears as a kingdom of empty semblance. All in it is transient and unreal;

nothing in it has duration; happiness and love are merely momentary; and men are as two pieces of wood on the face of an infinite ocean which pass by one another never to meet again. Fruitless agitation and painful deception have fallen upon him who mistakes such a transient semblance for a reality and who hangs his heart upon it. Therefore it behoves man to free himself from such an unholy arena. This emancipation will take place when the semblance is seen through as semblance, and when the soul has gained an insight right into the foundation of things. Then the world loses its power over man; the whole kingdom of deception with its evanescent values goes to the bottom, all the excited affections caused by the world are extinguished, and life becomes a still and holy calm; it reaches the summit of a dreamless sleep, and enters, through its immersion into an eternal essence, beyond the shadows; it passes through its dissolution, into a state of entire unconsciousness according to definite Buddhism. In all this, no new life with new values opens out in front of us; the emancipation is supposed to consist in a right insight, and each individual has to decide for himself; the leader can only point out the road; the energy to travel over such a road is a matter for the individual himself. A wisdom of world-denial, a calm composure of the nature, an entire serenity in the midst of the changing scenes of life, constitute the summit of life. "When I know that my own body is not mine, and that, further, the whole earth is mine, and, again, that both are mine and thine, then no pain can happen."

What a different kind of spirit breathes in Christianity! Christianity, too, finds the world full of

misery and suffering. Its beginnings and its summit are not to be glided over so easily as is done by the ordinary Christianity of our day. But even all the experience of suffering will not allow the world to be simply rejected, but far more, the fundamental construction of the world appears as a perfect work of Divine wisdom and goodness. The root of evil is not in the nature of the world but in moral wrong—in a desertion from God; and it is this moral wrong which first of all brings pain and death into the world. Such a trespass enters so deeply and paralyses so completely the energy of man's nature that the world out of its own potency can never again harbour the Good. Therefore, God Himself must come to man's rescue; He does this through setting forth a redemption over against the fall of man; He does it through the inauguration of a kingdom of love and grace which bestows a new nature on man, and puts its law within his soul. Through such a conversion man is securely raised beyond all suffering and trespass to Divine holiness and perfection; indeed, the deeper the discovery of the previous misery has been, the greater the joyousness which emanates from such a redemption. Thus, there grows a pure impetus of life from the convulsion and the misery themselves; the union with God gives man a secure foothold; the domain of his life does not sink into the abyss of nothingness as in the Indian conception, but he gains a great task—a task to build a kingdom of God upon the earth, and to gain every individual soul for the kingdom. There originates thus here out of effects and counter-effects a world-encompassing drama full of difficult entanglements and mysterious puzzles, but still of

an unfathomable depth and of an immeasurable hope.

Whilst thus the Christian life binds together a world-denial and a world-renewal, whilst it ascends through deepest pain to highest perfection, and whilst, at the same time, the consciousness of trespass and suffering endures in the soul alongside of the consciousness of redemption, it develops a breadth and depth of discernment unknown to other religions, and it gains a perennial inner movement. Nothing lies further from Christianity than an attempt at weakening and excusing suffering. For what purpose then does it need a deliverance if suffering does not oppress man with intolerable gravity? But all suffering cannot stifle man and drive him to despair, because Eternal Love raises him to a new world—a Love which all the power of the enemy cannot harm. But this new world has to be wrested ever anew from the kingdom of darkness, and even an echo of pain is heard within the realm of blessedness. Thus life remains throughout guarded from inactive repose and luxurious enjoyment, and after the conquest itself the struggle does not cease to exist. Man obtains here within the kingdom of belief and hope a secure treasure which appeared at the outset as a distant goal. Thus his existence becomes simultaneously a possession and task, rest and effort, joy and pain, certainty and doubt, and along with all this there yields itself that flow of inner life by means of which Christianity far surpasses all other religions.

Further, the Christian life is especially rich in that it includes in itself two stages—the belief of Jesus

himself and the belief of the Christian community in Jesus Christ. In the former we find the proclamation of the kingdom of God upon the earth—the kingdom of love and peace, the inauguration of a new world in the pure inwardness of the spirit of man, a joyous trust in the nature of man as grounded in God, an invitation to all to a share in the great enterprise and feast. Fresh youthful feeling, readiness to serve, world-pervading love, become here the carriers of a characteristic Christian morality. By the side of the belief in Christ as fixed by the Church a darker picture of human life and a lesser estimation of human capacity prevailed. The idea of evil has now increased to mean a delight in destruction and a diabolical rebellion; so that the counter-effect to evil must now grow. The kernel of this counter-effect is brought about through atoning and redeeming sufferings—through the appearance of the God-man for the redemption of a humanity that could not redeem itself. Suffering is thus taken up into the Godhead; man is wholly dependent upon a miracle of undeserved grace; the Divine Life descends deeper into the soil of humanity, and religion is raised far above all ordinary life and existence. This new stage brings forth difficult entanglements; the danger of a darkening of life and of falling into a blind devotion and into a mythological mode of thinking takes place. But in all the entanglements and dangers mysterious depths appear throughout, and a new life develops not only through a relationship with God, but also through its collision with an envious world is conducted into deep inferences and is carried into a more triumphant verification. Chris-

tianity through the union of these two stages carried once more the opposites of life into wider connections and elaborated more energetically than any other religion its experiences; for in the contradictions themselves a greater richness of life and a more powerful exertion of man make their appearance.

The fact that the opposites, however, did not lead to an entire discord but that the effort far more led back to some kind of union of these discords in a higher unity is due by Christianity to the supreme personality of Jesus. It is true that tradition has weaved around the personality of the Founder many lineaments which belong to the veneration and interpretation of the earliest Christian community, but through all the disguised mist there is perceptible to every unbiassed mind a unique mode of life and character of incomparable unity of an individual and intrinsic kind. Religion has here transformed itself into a human purity with wonderful energy and inwardness; an overtowering height has joined itself to a simple innocence; manly energy of action has united with gentle feelings, and a youthful joy of disposition with a deep discovery of suffering. The characteristic world of spirit has here acquired for Christianity a personal embodiment and, at the same time, an overwhelming clearness; for life and death a proof founded upon facts has been gathered for the asserted truth to which Christianity could ever return from all the entanglements of the course of the world and from all the strife of parties in order to call back to memory its own true task, in order to create fresh energy of life, and to gain clean beginnings for life. The personality of the Founder has thus become in-

comparably more to Christianity than the founders of all the other religions have become to their adherents. Christianity in this has a possession which cannot get lost—a possession that binds souls to the Founder, but a possession that protests against the caricature of the Church. And finally the excellencies of Christianity itself must not be forgotten—excellencies which its history and its development into a world-power testify. Originating on Jewish soil, Christianity found its education especially with the Greeks and soon afterwards with the Romans. Without such a contact it might have easily remained a mere Jewish sect, but through these two connections it quickly forged its way through a national narrowness and opened out its effects upon wider areas. The connection of Christianity with Greece and Rome was advantageous in two ways. On the one hand, the new aspirant met a universal and thoroughly-matured culture, and its effects for the ethical and spiritual renewal of humanity found their most precious supplement in the desire for knowledge and the sense of beauty of the Greeks, and in the energy of will and organising power of the Romans. At the same time, notwithstanding all the wealthy possessions of culture, Christianity found in the humanity of the time an opposite frame of mind. For the glory of antique life had now exhausted itself, and dark shadows announced the coming of the night. In the beginning of the third century especially a deep feeling of fatigue lay over the whole of life and effort, and even in less-resigned natures this turned into a strong longing for supernatural aid and redemption. As Christianity went out to meet this longing, its denial

of the nearest-at-hand world and its erection of a new world could gain the entire surrender of souls. Christianity thus shaped itself into a world-encompassing organisation—into a Church—which collated the belief in a present Kingdom of God with a visible object. There originated an encompassing and governing system of life and culture as religion, which confidently took over the spiritual guidance of humanity. In reality, the Christian Church became the mainstay of waning antiquity and the educator of new aspiring peoples.

In the midst of all the transformations of the times and in the midst of trials from without and worse ravages from within, the Church proved itself the most powerful ally of the life universal which we have witnessed in all the centuries of the Christian era.

Thus, Christianity appears in the whole of its effects and existence as the religion of religions. But, at the same time, it contains far more problems, meets with far more entanglements, and possesses a more intricate content than any of the other religions. All the fundamental points of Christianity clearly show all this.

Christianity develops from the connection of personality to personality a new world, and explains this as the kernel of all reality. But does not such a world, notwithstanding all its depth and soul, become too narrow for the extent and wealth of existence, and is it alone able to encompass all sides of the ethical life? Indeed, does not a danger lie here close at hand, that the inaugurated kingdom of love, gentleness, and peaceableness, through their severance from the remaining world, should become

merely subjective facts and weak inactive tendencies; that the hard opposition of the world-powers is less gripped than ran away from; that the exacting humility towards God becomes a slavery towards man, and that a willing endurance should acquiesce to all the unreason of politico-social relations? Christianity uplifts man particularly high through the union of his nature with God—higher than any other religion. But does not the deification of man produce a humanisation of the Divine, and has not anthropomorphism taken root in Christianity far more than in the other great religions? No religion has more definitely flown parallel with history than Christianity, but no religion has occupied itself so much with the problem how historical events, notwithstanding their particularity, can possess and discover eternal truths. No other religion spans so many different sides and stages, and consequently none has to fight so hard for its own unity; none has been exposed so much to the danger of a severance from one another of these sides and stages, and of their falling out of the domain of truth. First of all, this appeared in that the breach with the ordinary world was not made decisive enough, and did not establish itself firmly enough; and later, in that the transformation of man's nature did not penetrate deeply enough into the great deep, and thus religion degenerates into a mere revolving around the natural life and its tendencies; soon after, a stubborn denial of the possibility of bettering the world turns towards the mere cultivation of one's own environment and threatens the soul with freezing hollowness. Also, the two sides of a more general and a more positive

Christianity came easily into envious combat, and the unity of the whole remained an ideal beyond which the actual situation lagged far behind.

But it is the religious conception of the personality of Jesus which has caused most trouble and strife. It did not suffice the Christianity of the Church to believe *with* Jesus, but it desired also a belief *in* Jesus Christ as mediator and redeemer. In its doctrines and principles the Church fought with its whole energy for the belief that God was present in the redeemer not only in isolated aspects and energies, but in the fulness of His nature, and that in the person of Jesus the Divine and the human were bound together in an indissoluble unity. Herein is imbedded something which Christianity can never abandon. Christianity must in some kind of way be certain of an inauguration of the Divine Nature within human life if it is to possess absolute truth and to exert an abiding influence. But how is this union to be made conceivable? And has not the doctrine of the Church concerning the Deity of Christ as the second person in the Trinity been a mistake, because it has mixed up a fundamental truth of religion with philosophical speculations which hardly any Christian can understand, and because at the same time it has tacked on to Christianity the mode of ideas of a particular generation—ideas which threatened to become mythological to later generations or, indeed, which have already become so.

Also, in the history of Christianity great dangers and entanglements met the stated gains. The antique mode of life, whose ideas Christianity willed to incorporate, became more alien and hostile to the

Christians when they saw through its real nature. Christianity had previously viewed antique culture and civilisation through the medium of a religious disposition, but now it saw that such a mode of life had no meaning for historical epochs in any characteristic sense. Antique culture and civilisation were borne along by a joyous belief in a reason immanent in the world, and it was for the working out of such a reason that all the energy of man was called forth. Does not Hellenism with its equating of spirit and thought tend to entangle Christianity in an intellectualism which its inmost nature combats? And do not the Greek love of form and its longing after artistic delineation and plastic forms tend to entangle that pure disposition whose sovereignty Christianity proclaims? Also, the Roman mode of thought, with its existence upon a solid organisation and with its forensic treatment of all relationships, harmonises but little with the Divine Kingdom of love and peace. The soul of Christianity through all this was driven back and enfeebled; the same danger has taken place through ecclesiastical forms, and the Church has largely succumbed to this danger. It would have succumbed more had it not been that ever anew particular personalities had opened out once more the original fountains of life. Christianity on account of so much defacement remains yet but a high ideal.

Further, the lassitude of the civilised world at the time of its initial contact with Christianity was a great disadvantage. Christianity had, as its main purpose, to work against such a fatigue with its "glad tidings," and it has in reality planted a new

life-motive of a higher kind in the heart of humanity. But through the enormous influx of merely external elements, Christianity itself fell under the strong influence of that stagnant tendency of the age, and relapsed into a disposition and form far too passive. Saturated through and through by the feeling of corruption and weakness of human nature, man yearned for redemption and peace beyond all else; he desired to unburden himself as much as possible of his own responsibility and to be protected by some fixed authority; he established himself against tormenting doubt through belief in certain data, and brought forth the miraculous, the magical, and the unintelligible as proofs. To such a mode of thought, the spiritual seemed to lack a completeness of reality without a sensuous embodiment, and thus both the spiritual and the sensuous flowed inseparably together. The Divine seemed thus to be more highly honoured the less man and his capacity were valued. A secure rest, beyond all the life of the world, was found here in God, but no path returned from this rest to the reality around man in the world and to an energetic possession and joyous uplifting of the world. All that is of a spiritual and religious nature in such a position was experienced by the mighty spirit of Augustine. But, at the same time, he stamped for future generations a type of thought of his own age, and brought about a severance of the Divine and the human; he bound the spiritual with the sensuous, the invisible with the visible Church, and the effects of all this have continued ever since. It is out of the work of Augustine especially that the religious system of the life of the Church grew,

and it was through his energetic concentration that a sheltered ark was offered in the deluge of that epoch of humanity, but which, with all its spiritual narrowness and constraint, its rigid determinism became intolerable to ages of more courage and independence.

The first shaping of Christianity consequently could not remain incontestable. The first great counter-movement originated upon the ground of religion itself. This was the Reformation. Portions of the Roman and Greek influences were eliminated, and the inmost kernel and unique character of Christianity were once more energetically grasped; through the turn from the Church to personality a more original life, greater energy of character, and a greater discovery of difficult opposites were gained. But in spite of all the greatness of the Reformation, the whole matter stands in an unfinished state through the fluctuating tendencies between old and new modes of thought, and through the failure to come into terms with modern culture. There is thus nothing to prevent the appearance of a movement in our modern times which will not only call into question the ecclesiastical form of Christianity but Christianity itself, and, indeed, call into question all religion, and so involve us in a struggle for life or death.

CHAPTER III

c. THE MOVEMENT OF MODERN TIMES AGAINST CHRISTIANITY

MODERN thought has entered into conflict with Christianity not only in certain directions but in the whole of its tendencies and efforts; and it is not the beliefs and whims of individuals but the very nature of the work itself which has led to a stern collision. Although individual responsibility is not entirely absent in such a collision, yet this responsibility is not of the kind that can be accredited and attributed to individuals. It is thus necessary to distinguish the movement against Christianity from the work of individuals and parties, and to analyse it according to its own inner structure. It is then necessary in the first place to consider the changes in the world of ideas, and afterwards turn to the changes in the domain of life.

1. *The Changes in the World of Thought*

(α) *Natural Science and Religion.*—The collision between modern thought and religion is most visible in the realm of nature. Traditional religion has interlaced itself with a naïve view of nature which

considered the earth as the static centre of an encircling universe. Such a religion understands the creation of the world as the work of a reason superior to the world—a reason which holds and links nature together, and makes it a means for its own ends. And, further, such a religion gives man a matchless position in which all the conditions are connected with his weal and woe, and in which the destiny of the All is linked with his deeds—with his fall and misery, his elevation and bliss.

Modern science has attacked and destroyed such a view of nature at three main points. Since the time of Copernicus it has extended enormously its field of operation; it has discovered world beyond world, and has reduced the earth to a mere speck in the universe; it has removed that distinction between heaven and earth—a distinction which signified so much to religious conceptions and feelings. Can then that which is only a satellite amongst an innumerable number of fixed stars decide concerning the destiny of the All? And what becomes of an "ascension to heaven" when there is no heaven in the old-fashioned sense—no above or below in this boundless space?

Next comes the inward change of nature depicted by Galileo and Descartes. All psychic energies, all aims and ends, are removed from nature, for they resolve themselves into a co-existence of the most minute elements which work upon one another only through gravity and impact, and whose whole mechanism is entirely evident. Thus every phenomenon is reduced to the same level and nature, and it follows simple and inviolable laws; nothing individual or unique

can break this circle, and no psychic energy can turn any phenomenon out of its course.

Such a mode of thought which invests nature with entire independence and inner completion collides severely with the religious view of nature, especially in the problem of miracle; for miracle is as intolerable in the realm of this mode of thought as it is indispensable in the realm of religion. Miracle is "the dearest child of belief"; to refer each and every phenomenon back to natural causality seems to destroy religion to its very foundation. No religion has so strenuously defended miracle—even sensuous miracle—as the Christianity of the Church; "and if Christ hath not been raised, your faith is vain." Modern natural science, on the contrary, has unmercifully driven miracle out of its domain; miracle signifies to it what it signified to Spinoza — not something above nature but something contrary to nature; every particular break in the order of nature appears to modern science as a destruction of its fundamental structure, and as a denial of its validity.

Miracle is but one point of the acute collision of opposites, for in reality the line of battle extends much farther. The transformation of all into a soulless mechanism renders nature through and through equally indifferent to all spiritual values as well as to all religious and moral aims. Nature follows its course with brazen laws and has no regard whatever for what is termed good or evil by man.

"Devoid of all feeling
Does Nature proceed,
The sun shines the same
Whatever the deed;

The moon and the stars
Shine equally too,
On misdeed and darkness,
The good and the true."

Thus, the human circle becomes isolated in the All of things, whilst formerly it felt itself the ruling centre.

Finally, the doctrine of evolution in the nineteenth century appears and sets the coping-stone on the whole of the previous work. Hitherto, the scientific conception of nature found an insuperable barrier in the organic kingdom, and consequently the religious interpretation could always return to this one impregnable citadel. Lamarck appeared, and later Darwin. However much remains disputable in the theories of both, the general meaning of the evolutionary theory has passed from the realm of discussion to the realm of fact. Scientists are agreed that the forms of life did not stand side by side as completed things in the beginning, but are causally linked with one another, and the higher have proceeded out of the lower through natural changes. And it is also agreed that man is related to nature, and that characteristics of nature extend, too, into his life. There developed itself thus a biological interpretation of human and mental greatness which contradicts directly the ethico-religious interpretation. The ethico-religious interpretation measured the values of all activities and experiences according to their relationship with God and with the Kingdom of God which was above the world; the biological explanation estimates qualities according to their use and their preservation in the struggle for existence. In the former mode of

thought, eternal values are aspired after in spite of all the changes of time; in the latter mode, the valuation of things must perpetually alter according to the changes in the external situations, for what is of use to-day may become injurious to-morrow, and inversely. In the religious mode of thought, a pure inwardness should construct itself, and the gaining of the whole world could not compensate for the loss of the soul; in the scientific mode all tendencies and efforts are directed towards the external, and the "soul" has become an empty word. In all this, the irreconcilable opposition to religion is evident, and both modes cannot possibly exist together. But natural science is here in our midst, and has, step by step, further developed with a constrained kind of necessity. It has brought forth not only an immense fulness of results, but has even opened out a new course of thought—a more precise insight, a clearer line of demarcation, and a stronger affinity with causal connections and real facts; it has, through this work, turned against the thought-course of religion, and has declared religion as scientifically untenable. Is religion able to withstand such a mighty current?

(β) *History and Religion.*—History, to the opponents of religion, associates itself with nature. Traditional religion in its combat with the meaning of history has experienced a blow which has affected its inmost nature. According to the religious view, human history and even our earth have had but a short span of existence, and all that appeared on these domains received its aim and its driving energy from the Godhead who reigned above the world. The

Godhead had preordained the plan of the whole; destiny had linked itself to each individual; prophets and heroes were sent "when the time was fulfilled." The main task of history was the education of human nature—of each individual—for an over-historical eternal life whose kernel constituted the struggle between good and evil, and which connects itself as a great drama from creation morn to the day of judgment. Everything outside this remained a mere environment, and had a significance only through its relation to the soul of the whole. It is from such a conviction that all results and experiences were interpreted, and one grew so accustomed to such an interpretation that one believed oneself able to verify everywhere and at a glance such a guidance of affairs, and to discover everywhere "the finger of God."

How much all this has been altered! And the change has happened less through any sharp catastrophe than through a gradual crumbling away and a rebuilding. The extension of time, just as the extension of space, has grown into infinity; science reckons the age of the earth by millions of years; and short as human history appears in comparison with such a vast period of time, it, too, has continually extended its duration; the epochs of civilisation shrivel into insignificance when compared with the immeasurable extent of "prehistoric" times. And, further, as the presence of organic and also of mental life seems dependent upon certain indispensable conditions of existence, modern thought conceives the existence of man as a mere episode of the world-process—an episode, compared with infinite duration,

is no more than that of a meteor in an infinite sky which illumines and suddenly vanishes.

But the inward transformations have been still deeper. History as well as nature has developed an independence. As the supernatural was subjugated to nature, so the over-historical now falls under the ban of history. Certain motive-powers were acknowledged within the human domain; certain aims were exhibited; these phenomena linked themselves directly with one another, and thus united themselves into a great web. Each individual example is now understood through these connections; the highest instance is now no more valued as an isolated miracle, but as the climax of a movement, and such an instance grows out of the conditions and environment. When history is understood thus as something that has grown out of a prior history "immanent" in it, all conceptions of supernatural powers become an intolerable disturbance, and it is this which renders history such an irreconcilable opponent of traditional religion.

The same aspect appears in the knowledge that any movement proceeds and progresses from point to point—a fact which conceives history as a continuous process of evolution. Thus history as a whole gains a task and a meaning by itself; the perspective of a better and even an endless ascent of a capacious future invests present existence with an expansion and task within its own province, and raises it above all the evils of the present. The religious hope of a culminated bliss in the next world fades away before such a belief in the future of *this* world.

Where there is so much to do and to alter within the sphere of time—and, indeed here alone such a work

is able to transform reality into a kingdom of reason —such a work cannot be viewed as something futile and transitory, and consequently aspiration and hope do not depend entirely upon eternity. Simultaneously the feeling of the impatience of man disappears. He seems now, under the new conditions, posited before all else upon his own energies; he reaches his majority; he does not so much receive his destiny from a superior power as that he shapes it through manly deeds. And thus it is not towards a supernatural kingdom of God but towards the welfare of man and humanity that the focus of attention is directed.

The conflict into which the historical and the religious convictions enter becomes specially bitter in connection with the problem of truth. Religion understands truth as simply eternal and unchangeable; although the Divine revelation discloses itself within time, it is in no manner a product of time, and it does not follow the current of time; and it views all change as a degradation. The historical development, on the contrary, with the incessant shifting of its situation and its restless progress, transforms truth into a child of the times (*veritas temporis filia*); the tendencies as well as the convictions have to correspond to the exigencies of the situation of things. On account of this, all spiritual values become fluid, all truth becomes relative, all unfolding into absolute validity of the intrinsic content of thought and belief is energetically fought against. If, however, religion can never renounce an absolute and eternal truth, all decision in favour of history will be a decision against religion.

Further, the detailed formation of historical investigation becomes highly dangerous to a religion such as Christianity, which rests first and foremost upon historical events. The naïve mode of thought which accepted indiscriminately the transmitted picture of earlier ages, and simultaneously combined the manifold lore into a homogeneous whole, cannot stand before an awakened conduct of life and a keen critical consciousness. We cannot disguise the fact that what hitherto has been accepted as unalloyed truth and as a genuine expression of reality contains ever so much subjectivity of conception and adjustment, that we see the things far less than the veil which human opinion and imagination have weaved around them. How slowly and guardedly do we climb even to-day towards the facts as towards an unattainable ideal which, to earlier times, seemed so safe and certain. Growing historical criticism will not allow itself to be removed from dealing with religious tradition, for hardly anywhere else has it shown so conspicuously its achievements, purged so fundamentally the transmitted pictorial ideas, and transformed the transmitted picture. What appeared in earlier times as a totality or whole now discloses deep differences and pointed contradictions not only in subsidiary aspects, but in fundamental and essential characteristics. We find this, for instance, in the New Testament—in the widely divergent pictures of Jesus and in the fundamentally different representations of Christianity; so that much which became main facts to believers in later times was not so to the original witnesses, or if it were it was only in a hardly perceptible form; and no unbiassed mind

can fail to detect a great chasm between the dogmas of the Church and their historical foundation in the Bible. All this gives rise to problems concerning the authenticity of the sources with all their agitated and minute discussions. Whether the results of criticism are positive or negative is of far less importance than that the trustworthiness of the records depends upon scientific proof, and that the Divine is not poured directly upon us, but is to be found by man through the toilsome work of thought. The criticism and conclusions reached by this mode of thought have irreparably destroyed the halo which once surrounded the tradition; the dazzling light of science has dispelled unmercifully that dreamlike semi-darkness of the religious imagination in which heaven and earth seemed to blend into one another. Thus the gains of history become a loss to religion. As a religion founded upon history experiences a loss in so far as the more precise insight and the more essential conception of the past become clear through the necessary results of a critical mode of inquiry which fixes the boundaries more distinctly between one age and another, and along with this utilises the results of the past, an easy inundation of the effects of such criticism is forbidden by such a religion. Sacred history was pictorially present to earlier generations, and they saw the particular time and surroundings in the light of this history. Whilst historical criticism has rendered this impossible, it has at the same time destroyed the predominant position of sacred history.

But the doubt and discord reach still deeper. The inner content of the tradition becomes a problem to modern thought, but such a mode of thought finds it

impossible to establish basal convictions upon historical events. What influences the spiritual self-preservation of man must be experienced in the form of immediacy, and must be verified by man himself, and all this cannot be imposed from without. Whilst the *Aufklärung* for the first time brought this truth to expression over against all bare tradition, it differentiated too sharply reason and history, the individual life and tradition, and overestimated the power of any present moment of consciousness. But even we who view history in a more friendly manner are not able to give up the self-reliance which life has gained through such a turn; and yet history for us to-day can never take the first but the second place, because only so much in it can be valid for our life as allows itself to enter into self-consciousness. In this respect the words of Lessing hold valid for us: "Accidental—*i.e.* actually empirical—truths of history can never become proofs of the necessary truths of reason." And if life thus disengages itself from the bond of history, it becomes an intolerable coercion to bind the salvation of man to an easy acknowledgment of historical events. "To state that a historical belief is a duty and that it belongs to salvation is superstition" (Kant). "Let no one assert that it does no harm to cling to such historical beliefs. It is injurious in that subsidiary facts are given equal validity with essential ones, or, indeed, are presented as the essential facts, and consequently the main facts are suppressed and the conscience is tormented" (Fichte).

The meaning of history has thus brought forth all along the line a mode of thought other than is apprehended by religion. And no religion has received

greater shocks in this respect than Christianity, on account of the fact that it is more closely bound up with historical points of view as well as with historical events than any other religion.

(γ) *The Spiritual Life and Religion.*—Religion is so injuriously affected by nature and history that the most important point has not yet been touched by us. This point lies in the inner nature of life itself—a point which is the source of all practical proof and mode of thinking. Between that, on the one hand, which religions in general teach, and that, on the other hand, which modern culture in the whole of its development maintains, a deep cleft has been created, so that what hitherto had held valid as the kernel of all reality now threatens to vanish into a hollow semblance.

The life of the human soul, from the standpoint of an old mode of thought, was most intimately woven with the environment of the world; mutual energies swayed within and without in the particular and in the general, and all things seemed to find their true rest in the mind and soul of man. No kind of doubt could be raised as to the legitimacy of depicting the all-ruling Power in terms of human analogy, or to understand the intercourse with such a Power as a relationship of soul to soul in the manner of relationship of man with man. All the values of religion thus shaped themselves by means of the immediate life of the soul of man; from such a point of immediacy alone could such conceptions as love, grace, and trust obtain a meaning. No religion, however, places the inwardness of the soul higher than Christianity with its message of an Infinite Love and of the immediate presence of the Kingdom of God.

Now, the work of modern times, as we have already seen, has altered in an important manner the position and the valuation of the life of the soul. The soul has been banished out of nature, and, along with this, out of the world; thus it had to shape itself into a particular kingdom of its own—into a totality of life and thought within its own circle. The barriers of such an isolated life become more and more perceptible; as a mere solipsism, as a relationship of all phenomena to each other in a point outside itself, and as a subjective neutrality the soul becomes too narrow for a spiritual work which more and more decisively develops a cosmic character. Thus, the larger and wider outlook disengages itself from the immediate consciousness, turns against the soul, and sets it in a position of a mere epiphenomenon. Thus, the particular forms of life, such as art and science, politics and technics, separate themselves and form provinces of their own, and such happens finally with the whole results of culture. Everywhere independent provinces originate and engender their own tasks, laws, and motive-powers; they carry their own aims and ends in themselves, reject all relationship with the self-existence of the soul, and look upon all standards which value the deeper welfare of the individual as disfigurements. United indissolubly with modern culture are its impersonal character, its continuous positing on itself and continuous movement outside itself, and its alleged superiority over all human plans and "ends." Indeed, the true greatness of man now appears in that he lays on one side all mere self-existence, and transforms himself into a willing tool of the processes of civilisation and culture. No one has

presented such a penetrating and fundamental view of the whole processes of modern civilisation and culture as Hegel, and his ideas have operated with remarkable effect through the nineteenth century right up to the present day.

But such a work and creativeness, brought about through actual necessities, are not able to draw the life into themselves without an entire transformation of its ideals. The subjective disposition and, along with it, all the ethical relationships of man retire when face to face with the proclamation of an external spiritual energy and with the co-operation in that process of civilisation. Consequently the old inwardness of the soul with all its greatness and goodness is ordered out of the centre of life to the periphery; indeed, the soul is now driven not only out of nature but out of its own inward life as well.

We cannot conceive of a more deadly assault on religion than all this. For if the soul sinks so low to the level of a subsidiary thing, it cannot furnish the standard for man's view of reality, and, consequently, the whole ideal world of religion appears as a mere anthropomorphism and as an unbearable falsification of reality. Positivism, following such a train of thought, has considered religion as a mere stage of development upon which man, through a childish illusion, sees magnified human powers in the universe, and believes himself capable of conversing with such powers. Positivism has not the least place for religion in the old sense. If it continues to hold some kind of conception of God, this cannot signify anything more than a basal world-substance or a pervading world-energy. Here no personal relation-

ship to such a substance is gained, and conceptions such as love and grace, belief and trust, lose their meaning. It is not only this or that point in religion which now becomes a mythology, but the whole of religion itself; it becomes now a stage of life which has been passed by mental development. And along with the downfall of religion, the downfall of morality takes place, for how can qualities such as character and conviction signify a value if all independent inner life is suppressed? Such an ejection of religion and morality by an impersonal process of culture must affect Christianity in a most severe manner, as it has maintained the independence of the inner life more confidently and has developed itself more powerfully than any other religion. Indeed, according to this positivistic mode of thinking, the higher Christianity sets its aim, the deeper must its fall now be.

Thus, it is not only on account of the new conception of nature and of historico-social work but also on account of the fundamental woof of life itself that religion—indeed, all possibility of a religion—is driven out. All the counter-effects mutually protect and heighten one another. This work, in particular points, is far from creating a negation, and it is often asserted with an honourable conviction that the special changes in our views of nature and history leave untouched the entire stability of religion. But, indeed, when it happens in other points—and in all other points—that all the particular corner-stones crumble into pieces, what becomes of the construction of the whole building? The greatness and pre-eminence of this mode of thought is that men proceeded at the start not to destroy in any way, but were far more

desirous to bind and to fit into one another the old and the new; but the truths discovered cast off all the adornment and, indifferent to human views and plans, went their way towards their own goal. And this road leads towards the destruction of religion.

2. *The Variation of the Direction of Life*

It needs but few words in order to show that a change in the drift of life corresponds to the transformation of the world of ideas. Hand in hand with natural science proceeds the development of modern technics, and with the rise of this, man has ceased to be powerless against nature, and has become far more its lord and ruler. He can now with good courage take up the struggle against all limits and hindrances; he can extend his life beyond all bounds through the appropriation of natural energies; he can accelerate the richness of life, and shape it into greater enjoyment. Through the progressive inauguration of new perspectives and tasks he gains a remarkable consciousness of human capacity and human superiority. This disposition of joyous energy and courageous faith develops over against the historico-social life. Constraint and unreason cease to be conceived as necessities laid upon him by destiny whose effects he may alleviate but whose root he cannot destroy. Modern man, in the use of all the means of culture and the severe clash of energies, feels himself strong enough to shape his existence into a kingdom of reason, and to make the real rational and the rational real. However many the oppositions which stand against him, they produce a feeling of life which is

far more a stimulus than a deterrent to activity. In any case, man does not expect this result to proceed from any supernatural agencies, but achieves it through his own inmost exertions. In addition to this, that new ideal of life appears with its superiority to all human inactivity and its inauguration of an immeasurably richer Spiritual Life of an objective kind filled with independent contents and moved by inner necessities. Infinitely more clearness, breadth, and reality seem to enter into our life through all this, as well as a truth which does not proceed from a supernatural communication but from our own activity.

Indeed, our environing world furnishes an abundance of work and expansion; it is able to occupy man with itself so as to hold him fast in the inwardness of his being, so that not the least desire arises for another mode of life. The more such a tendency in the direction of the world takes possession of the whole soul of man, the more religion loses its foundation, the clearer becomes the opposition to the ages in which Christianity gained its most important achievements, and the greater appears the whole history of modern times as a progressive transference of life from a world of belief and fancy into the world of immediate existence.

Christianity in its beginnings could never have undertaken its work for humanity without setting up a world of belief and hope over against the existing world, and to announce such a new world as the true home of man. When Christianity, however, reached its conquest it laid the world "beyond" in front of a tired world devoid of any special hope;

and now the hoped-for life did not seem able to proceed from the present world, but proceeded only out of a new order of things. The character of the present world is depicted so clearly by Augustine through the ardour of his conviction and the energy of his writings. The new world is to him no distant realm but the most intimate world, which furnishes first and foremost in the toils and tangles of existence a spiritual self-reliance, and which alone justifies the will to live. But the new world drives the sensuous world to the periphery of existence, and draws to itself the work and affection of man. All the ramifications of culture and civilisation, according to Augustine, had but one aim—to raise man to a higher world, to indicate to the manifold the necessity of reaching a world-swaying unity, and to direct all activity to the point where its toil and anxiety suddenly change into an intuitive vision of Eternal Truth and into the worship of Infinite Love. An inmost kernel of the life of the soul is here raised above all the entanglement of the work of the world, and anchors securely in the Divine Life. From such a level above the world, the soul is not driven back again to the world; man feels himself most secure in the midst of the continuance of opposites and in the midst of all the knocks of all toil and anxiety. "Thou hast created us for Thyself, and our heart is not at rest until it rests in Thee." This religion of a thorough transcendental kind experiences in the Church-system of the Middle Ages a certain humanisation and mellowing, but the world of belief remained still the main world, but it had now become the nearest inmost world of the soul, and was designated

at the height of Scholasticism as Fatherland (*patria*). All this meant that religion formed the kernel of life, and that the Church became the carrier of all the ideal interests of humanity. But a new path of most important significance was soon opened by new nations with their fresh courage of life. The prior life with its belief and hope, with its weaving of a feeling alien to the world, lost gradually its power of attraction; it was discovered as being too passive, too soft and dreamy; the desire arose stronger and stronger after dealings and connections with the world around us—after an exercise of human energy in the struggle with the hardness of the things of the world, and after a more awakened and more genuine life. Man and the world were more sharply severed; subject and object were more clearly differentiated. A new morning seemed to dawn and an immeasurable day's work lay before humanity. Thus meaning and thought entered more and more into the world instead of severing themselves from it; the natural impulse of life is changed throughout, and this change was not favourable to religion.

But this great change culminated very gradually, and appeared in three main stages. The new life appears first of all in the Renaissance; the minds of men here moved freer, and the narrowness of the ideas with which man had depicted human life and the world fell away. Man now not only discovers distant lands, but before all else he discovers himself, gains a vivid consciousness of his own energy, and takes a joyous possession of the unlimited opulence of the world. What draws and holds man is, on the one hand, mainly the fulness of life which everywhere

wells up, and, on the other hand, the beauty which shines through all the forms of life. From such convictions and experiences there grows an ideal of a harmonious development of the whole man; and in the modern civilised state, the effort to adorn the "here and now" obtains a fast root, for the natural sphere of life drives ever forward new tasks, and gains ever new energies. But notwithstanding all its independence, the new mode of life does not as yet enter into a struggle with the old mode: at the height of the Renaissance both modes seem to seek one another more than to flee from one another. The natural world is conceived as beautiful and inexhaustible because it constitutes the impress and reflection of the Divine Life; religion, however, receives its most valuable development through independent art which invests the lofty contour of belief with an intuitive nearness and enchanted loveliness. Thus, religion and artistic culture walk together hand in hand, and the contradictions imbedded in such a relationship were not yet discovered.

Soon, however, the movement passes beyond such a union, and stands at last upon a closer unity of life. This step took place at the height of creativeness in the time of Spinoza. Its aim was to bind together God and the world into a unique indissoluble reality. Since the Divine permeates the whole world and gives it a depth, the world becomes more than its immediate appearance reveals, and transforms itself into a kingdom of reason without any lacunæ. The Godhead, thus drawn into the world, must, however, lay aside all that is narrow and merely human, and must be conceived as beyond all the limits of human

conceptions, and must be raised to an all-encompassing eternity and infinity. Thus, religion can no more be a particular province which governs existence from a height "beyond," but it seems to fulfil its task far better the more it lays on one side any particular and isolated formations, and permeates all its work with invisible effects. The aspects which united man with the great All constituted here the kernel of existence and raised him to a cosmic life; these aspects are science and art in the sense of an ideal culture. These create, through their world-encompassing thought and free-play of imagination, a new kind of spiritual reality over against the ordinary daily life; and, further, they ennoble all human relations, and bestow the infinite and eternal upon man in the midst of his daily life. Indeed, the more the reality transforms itself thus into a kingdom of reason, the more raises itself a cosmos out of the chaos of an initial cosmogony, and the more the need for any special religion disappears. Religion becomes now a kind of finger-post to those to whom the mental creativeness of science and art is denied. "He who possesses science and art possesses also religion. He who does not possess them, he, too, has religion."

But, notwithstanding its great achievements, this pantheistic ideal of culture has not had a permanent hold on humanity. On the one hand, its spiritualisation of reality signifies a stepping beyond experience, so that experience could justify itself less and less with the fading away of an over-world. On the other hand, there grows a stronger feeling of the mystery and suffering of the world, which destroys the calm of

the pantheistic view—a view which, in its contemplation of the whole of things, left almost entirely on one side the unreason of particular phenomena. But if our world is not a realm of reason, it demands us to seek an explanation beyond the domains of pantheism. And thus the movement proceeds towards a powerful contraction of life upon immediate existence, upon a development of a natural culture, which forbids all progress, interpretation, and elevation beyond the realm of ordinary life. The kernel of such a life is built by the empirical investigation of nature, together with technics and the practical politics of human society. There originates then a newer and more secular type of life with such energy and self-consciousness as have never been hitherto witnessed. Such a type of life has verified itself through undreamed-of achievements; it has opened out a large field of new tasks which have drawn man ever more exclusively into their vortex, and which have busied him almost breathlessly. Thus, life seems in the position to value all the definite energy of man and to fulfil all his entitled hopes. But the more the spiritual activity binds itself to such a reality, the more shadowy and untenable becomes each and every religion. True, such a secular culture can well proclaim that the circle of human life constitutes but a small segment of the unbounded reality, and that, indeed, with all its extension, it belongs to a mere superficiality, yet behind all this there lies and remains inaccessible a dark depth. But as such a culture fails to obtain any inward connection with such a depth, all its gains are of no avail to religion.

Thus, the movement of modern times has moved

farther and farther from religion, and has tied man ever more securely to the visible world. The union of religion and natural culture was followed by a culture which turned itself into a kind of religion, and this was followed finally by a culture devoid of any kind of religion. So that the tendency towards the world grew ever stronger, and more and more such a tendency divested itself of all super-sensuous connections, but, at the same time, it has given man far more to do in the realms of knowledge and action; and in certain departments it has become so rich in content that it seems to be able to satisfy the whole of life and effort.

Religion, without a doubt, roots itself too firmly in the convictions of individuals and in the organisations of society to allow such consequences of material culture to come into full and immediate effect, although nowhere is the centre of gravity of duration more visible than in these realms. For the individual in particular, the inwardness of his soul and the infinite aspiration of his mind constitute a sanctuary to which he flees out of all the struggles, and from which he can hold forth his inner experience as a shield against all attacks. But this refuge of the individual signifies no stronghold for all men. Notwithstanding the spiritual content of his life, man remains bound to the ordinary situation of humanity; it is not given to him to set forth victoriously the ideals which fill the depth of his soul against culture and civilisation, so that religion becomes more and more a mere private concern—a mere ebb and flow of a subjective kind—which degenerates into the level of sectarianism and the miraculous. And, finally, all

cautious restrictions are not able to prevent an entire expiration.

Can we then wonder that the opponents of religion consider that the matter has been investigated and decided? To such minds religion is upheld by idleness and dulness or even at the best by selfish interest. Such a total extinction of religion was anticipated with certainty and in the immediate future by the main trend of thought in the eighteenth century. Winckelmann in 1768 could write from Rome that in fifty years there would not be in Rome either a pope or a priest. Such an extinction of religion which was thought would take place as a gradual dying ember, is, in our day, aimed at through a violent attempt at scattering doubts and denials amongst the masses.

CHAPTER IV

d. THE RECONSOLIDATION OF RELIGION

THE priesthood has outlasted its supposed appointed span of time, and seems far from vanishing; and religion, too, does not exhibit the situation which its opponents expected. Though its deficiencies are seized by ever wider circles, and though the ordinary disposition of man does not correspond to the atmosphere of spiritual activity, yet on its heights, religion proves itself again the possessor of so much energy of life—an energy which seems on a deeper view of it to show that the condemnation of religion is more of an echo of the past than of a promise of the future. The Churches show such a renewal of religion in the most tangible manner. How much has their power grown, how much more definitely have they stamped the various contrasts and values of things, and how ardently do their struggles rouse the soul! True, such energy has not been limited to causes of an inward character. The democratic atmosphere of the nineteenth century increased the power of the Church since it heightened the power of the masses who were least affected by culture and its doubts. Further, the severe concentration of life and the growing potency of great

organisations have worked in a similar direction. But although such and other changes explain much, they do not explain everything—they do not explain the inner activity, the spiritual creativeness, and the aspiring power of the Churches. And this growth of religion limits itself in no way to the Churches: it appears, too, outside them and, indeed, in direct opposition to them; it forms a trait in the life of the present which grows stronger and stronger. Philosophy—the old enemy of religion—applies itself most ardently to create a free place for religion; literary art treats with great earnestness the Yea and the Nay of religious questions; the fine arts seek to approach religious forms through new explanatory forms of modern discovery; and finally the religious problem, beyond all these particular provinces, proceeds again mightily in the soul itself. Many phenomena point to a close affinity of our day with that antiquity which for the first time raised religion into a world-power, for in the midst of all the negation and condemnation a new wave of religion seems to rise and to carry humanity along on its breast.

How is this notable change to be understood? If the movement against religion has continued, and, indeed, has swelled out further and further, the cause of this lies in the fact that the counter-effect to this has grown, and that religion has exhibited a stronger potency and a deeper root in human life than its opponents had attributed to it. First of all, it has, upon a new ground, brought forth new achievements; it has, in the midst of modern life, developed a lofty benevolence over against the inflated moral and social

ravages; it has commanded a longed-for halt to many individuals over against the growing destruction of life. On account of such achievements, the extinguishing of religion can never be regarded as a pure gain. But however highly may be regarded what religion has brought forth in the form of love and service, the main cause of its vitality is not contained in such achievements; this main cause is far more of an indirect kind: it consists in the most difficult inner entanglements of the very spiritual force itself —entanglements which threatened the progress of religion; it consists in the upheaval of the belief in the all-sufficiency of modern self-satisfied and self-conscious culture and civilisation. All wavering of this belief works in the direction of the lessening of the opposition to religion; indeed, the more the doubt in culture and civilisation advances, the more is the total position of man changed; new dispositions are awakened and new avenues of life open out; religion has once more the ear of humanity who had temporarily turned away from it, and once more it is able to prove what is imbedded in it that is of priceless value.

Modern culture has had to learn that all life within the human domain is at the same time self-energising, and that self-development is simultaneously self-creativeness. The advancement of life's own movement placed it against barriers undreamed of, and drove it into consequences unwilled by the individual. Life crosses beyond the point which hitherto had been its haven of refuge, and at each farther remove man appears unable to govern the current of life and to make it a tributary of reason. What thus might be

a Whole of life, but which through such exclusiveness is bound to prove a deadly enemy of religion, must be a mere piece of a further life unless reason and culture are to fall to the ground.

The scientific, historical, philosophical and social modes of thought have developed into systems, and have made demands upon the whole of life. But the more their achievements, the more does their completion cease and the more does the denial overtop all; the more is the ground destroyed upon which they have grown and the more insufficient and even unbearable does the whole situation become. It is especially in its relation to man and in connection with the problem how to found and how to construct all activity and work from the depth of the soul that modern culture has miscarried in spite of all its value. We must now look closer at this fact.

In these systems there has originated a mighty movement to consider nature as the sole reality, and man as a mere product of nature. So far as such an attempt gains any success, man becomes a piece of a meaningless mechanism, which moves, it is true, according to definite laws; he becomes altogether a creature of his environment; he is able to maintain in no manner a self-reliance over against the process of nature, and the life of his soul must reconcile itself entirely to the standards of nature, and is able to bring forth nothing essentially new. Often has man desired and desires to-day to retain some old values of the more human kind in the process of the destruction of the old world of thought; and with such a radical denial a kind of practical idealism seems

quite easily tenable: love and humaneness may appear strengthened although they have been founded upon nature alone without the aid of any metaphysic. Whilst this is an unbearable halfness and even thoughtlessness, it further destroys conceptions such as character, deed, inwardness, to their final root, and it has absolutely no place for moral valuation and noble idealism. This appears specially clear in the biological mode of thought, which transforms our whole life into a struggle for natural existence, and subordinates and sacrifices the good to the useful. At the same time, all questions concerning the meaning of life vanish more and more, and the bare actuality of physical existence exclusively holds the field. It may be that the senselessness and soullessness of human existence is hardly noticed on account of the haste and press of modern life, and the loss is hardly discovered because science itself has not been drawn into the same vicious circle. And the reason is clear: a consistent naturalism is not able to permit science of any kind. Science is constructed through the activity of the human mind alone; but how could the mind construct it if its intellectual achievements spent themselves in a mere raising up and accumulating of isolated impressions, and if such achievements never succeed in reaching a commanding view of the isolated impressions, and still less succeed in welding such impressions into a Whole? In reality, even modern natural science, with its conquest over the naïve world-view, has become possible only through an energetic analysis and clearing away of the first impressions of things, through an advance towards simple phenomena and the discovery of their laws,

through the establishing of new connections by the aid of prior ideas. All this takes place through the observation of the different behaviour of things on the one hand, and their natural relationship and systematic union on the other hand. Thus, through the work of the mind, the path leads to a scientific conception of nature. This scientific conception could not verify itself from the things themselves, but the verification had to be traced within the mind; and, in the subjugation of the external world, science before all else remains an inner result. Now, if all inner result breaks away from its inward source —from independent inwardness—and if life is laid entirely upon its connection with external things, the result is that science, and along with it natural science, must collapse, or, on the other hand, naturalism with its equalisation of sensuous nature and reality must be given up. Whenever effective mental work found recognition in natural science, especially where it led to an illumination of things, so that the total mirroring of nature was not something given entirely from the outside but something brought forth from the mind, it develops itself into a critical mode of thought. Such a mode of thought succeeds more and more to win recognition upon the summits of modern life, and exercises a decisive resistance to the turning of the reality into a mere natural thing. And, at the same time, the path is left open for the formation of new configurations of life; and great problems, which forbid any ready-made solution, awaken.

Further, the historical treatment of things has contributed towards the superiority and sovereignty

of thought and life. By bringing an existence otherwise numb into motion, the historical treatment has given life more freedom, movement, and richness; the present has been freed from the tyranny of the past and raised to an entire self-reliance. The culminated transformation has entered so deeply into life that a simple retreat to the old situation is now absolutely forbidden. But wherever the new mode of thought holds exclusively the field, there issues out of it a destructive energy. If all stability in face of the flux of semblance gives way, all that is solid and durable melts away; truth becomes not merely the child of the age, as of the passing moment, and through stepping outside its own nature becomes an unreality; even the present itself, which before all else should have been strengthened, fades away, whilst the course of events resolve themselves into purely fleeting moments. But a life that resigns all solid aims and permanent norms, and becomes the mere play of wind and wave, must more and more fall into shallowness and relinquish all content. But man does not seem willing to be merged in the fleeting lapse of the moment: he holds himself inwardly fast; he compares and questions different aims for his life; he has no choice but to differentiate, select, and reject things. Therefore his life cannot entirely flow on the current of appearances.

"Within the hope of man alone
The highest goal draws nigh,
He chooses, raises up his soul
To that which is on high;
He can duration to the moment give,
He can in Time the Eternal live."

The fact that man experiences all changes—that each change is known by consciousness—proves that he does not belong entirely to the domain of flux. In so far as he in his deeper nature is more than a flux of isolated occurrences, the incessant changes and alternations cannot possibly satisfy him. The nobility and lightheartedness which seemed to him at first to be a pure gain proceed from an unbearable emptiness and mar the deepest life. For how could any kind of joyous expansion of life be possible if moment devours moment without ceasing, if what is honoured at one moment is thrown on one side the next moment? The nineteenth century has discovered how unbearable such a view of things is, for ideal succeeded ideal with amazing rapidity, disposition succeeded disposition with the reversal of fortune, and the duration of alleged truths became shorter and shorter. But in the midst of all this the aspiration after a consolidation of life and after a durable truth became ever stronger, and the opposition became more decisive against the immersion of the whole of human existence in the stream of historical life. Such a turn leaves no doubt in regard to the fact that history itself is more than a mere result of the succession of events. History is far more an elevation above the changes of occurrences—a commanding view of things, connections of things, a judgment of the manifold material, a raising of pre-eminent aims. So that it is discovered that history, viewed from the point of view of mind and spirit, is a portion of a further total-life, and, consequently, there is no such thing possible as "mere" history, for history, in so far as it is recognised in

its deeper meaning, includes a confession of such a further total-life. The exclusiveness of history with its alleged relativity destroys the meaning of history itself. And if we are not to give up the meaning of history, it is necessary to rise above it, and to take up once more, in some kind of way, eternal truths. Such a course does not lead directly to religion, but, at the same time, it shows the toil for eternal truth in a very different light from the ordinary mode of looking at things.

An entire change has taken place in another main point. The "immanent" method of considering history, with its expulsion of superhuman aids, has brought forth a powerful heightening of human existence and human potency. Man himself has accordingly to prepare his domain of life, and to find his highest aim in the adornment of this domain; now he has to stimulate all that is included within human energy into the greatest achievements; and now for the first time he seems to stand fast within his own world. It cannot be measured how much such a conviction has brought forth. The awakening of individual lives was followed by the awakening of the masses. Whilst all formations of relationships were drawn and measured directly from the actual situation of man, more joy and freedom, more care for others and more humaneness entered into life; and, further, the province of thought gained in clearness because it was developed psychologically from the immediate experience of consciousness. But here again the affirmation soon passes into a negation, and a shrinkage soon appears in the emancipation. To abolish all invisible ties and connections may appear as a pure gain so long

as man continued to idealise unconsciously, and so long as the consciousness contained something of its earlier greatness and values. But such idealisation was more and more extinguished before the impressions of experience. Humanity does not find the ideal of brotherhood so easily realised as it had expected, but finds more and more divisions of individuals, parties, and nations; the impulses, emotions, and passions of human nature develop deeper and wider; the tyranny of the petty common life becomes more and more brutal; and more and more we are threatened with the death of the Spiritual Life. Have not men, viewed from within, become smaller and smaller, because they value nothing other than themselves? And, at the same time, when it is discovered that the whole man even in his spiritual efforts is tied to human impulses with all their pettiness and assertions, and that all possibility of a counter-effect—of a vocation in the highest and final court of appeal—vanishes, and when judgment over the true and the false, over good and evil, is surrendered to the opinions and inclinations of individuals and masses, it becomes evident why wrath and even hatred burn against the pretence of mere modern culture; and in order to preserve a genuine spiritual culture nothing seems more necessary than an unrelenting struggle against such petty and presumptuous culture which reduces life to a lamentable level, and which destroys all genuine values. In order to possess such values man has to work his way up to something—something which he has to acknowledge beyond and above himself, and yet though beyond and above him is yet not alien to him. This leads once more to the problem

which religion has taken up from of yore, and he who places on one side the solution which religion offers will think otherwise when he comes to realise the true nature of the problem.

And, further, the expulsion of all the inwardness of the Spiritual Life—the transformation of our entire nature into an impersonal process of culture and civilisation—turns a pure gain into a serious loss. The immediate neutrality of man became too small for the content of the work of culture, and through such labours our existence has grown immeasurably in width and truth. And it is from a kind of necessity that the attention of the subject upon himself was abandoned, and life was laid entirely in the relationship to external things. But this complexity of work which had now become the main fact—indeed, of the Spiritual Life itself—needs an inner connection and an animated unity, for otherwise it cannot possibly construct a Whole and work as a Whole. But the more the inward and personal element is pushed aside without some kind of compensation in its place, the more all characteristic and inspiring energy slips away, the more each totality loses its inner unity and animation, and becomes a mere piece of mechanism which may be of value in subduing the external world and in calling forth certain exertions. But all this fails to unite man with a Whole and to raise him as a Whole, and also it inevitably decays and fails to engender a new world of intrinsic value. Thus, the impersonal work of culture and civilisation threatens to become mechanical from its very centre outwards. No growth of inner potency corresponds to the increase

of work, and expansion by far outweighs concentration; man becomes more and more the slave of his work and a bundle of isolated accomplishments. But the work itself, through its severance from the centre of life, loses all its soul. Can we deny that the last decade has placed such dangers under our very eyes? At the same time, a kind of compulsion raises the questions whether ultimately the soul of life has to be abandoned, whether the emergence of conceptions of inwardness above the old forms and beyond mere subjectivity is possible, whether a coherent and superior unity may through a great struggle be obtained within the Spiritual Life itself. If the latter happened, it would effect an entire transformation of life, and that would lead back, certainly not to the old situation of religion, but still to the problems of religion.

We are thus experiencing to-day a remarkable entanglement. The older forms of life, which had hitherto governed history and its meaning, became too narrow, petty, and subjective for human nature. Through emancipation from an easy-going subjectivity and through the positing of life upon external things and, indeed, upon the whole of the great universe, life, it was believed, would gain more breadth and truth; and in a noteworthy manner man undertook a struggle against the pettiness of his own nature and for the driving out of all that was petty-human. A great deal has been gained through such a change and new tendency of life. In fact we have discovered far more than we had hoped for. But, at the same time, we have lost something, a loss which at the outset brings forth no anxiety, but which,

however, through painful experience, proves itself to have been "the one thing needful." Through its own development the work has destroyed its own carriers; it has undermined the very ground upon which it stood; it has failed, notwithstanding its infinite expansion, through its loss of a fundamental and unifying Life-process; and in the entire immersion of man into activity his deepest being has been lost. Indeed, the more exclusively life transforms itself into mere external work, the more it ceases to be an inner personal existence, and the more alien we become to ourselves. And yet the fact that we are able to be conscious of such an alienation—an alienation that we cannot accept indifferently but is experienced as an irreparable loss—is a proof that more is firmly implanted in us than the modern direction of life is able to develop and satisfy. We acknowledge simultaneously that we have gained much but that the loss is a painful one. We have gained the world but we have lost the soul, and, along with this, the world threatens to bring us into nought, and to take away our only secure foothold in the midst of the stormy roaring torrent of material work.

This danger was not realised so long as modern ideas failed in precision of expression, and so long as life without any hesitation supplied itself from the old sources of thought and experience. Indeed, the more an immanent and impersonal culture and civilisation were posited upon their own energy, the more that universal dialectic which the experience of humanity has often witnessed reveals itself. Systems of thought and, indeed, ideal worlds either destroy one another or rail in their gained domains; evolution

itself shows limits; but the discovery of the limits leads to new tendencies—to tendencies in the main thesis. In the meantime, however, there arises a painful situation, as modern man with growing consciousness has discovered. Men have drifted from the old moorings, and the new ones which promised the highest happiness do not satisfy. They are conscious of a poverty in an overflowing kingdom, conscious of an absence of a real substance in the midst of incessant activity, and have discovered in the midst of incessant joy and pleasure the absence of genuine happiness. Is it to be wondered that desire and anxiety should turn again home towards the whole of life, and that the question concerning the inner clarification of life should place on one side all other questions and reduce them to subsidiary facts; and that the possibility of an inner elevation of human nature—of a self-maintenance in the midst of a threatening destruction of life—should become the most weighty of all concerns? And through such a revolution in the tendency and character of life, the ancient puzzles of human existence, hushed up in earlier times, raise themselves once more with lively and crude energy—problems concerning the deep darkness which veils our Whence and Whither, our dependence upon strange powers, the painful antithesis within our own soul, the stubborn barriers to our spiritual potencies, the flaws in love and righteousness in nature and in human nature; in a word, the apparent total loss of what we dare not renounce—our best and most real treasures. But we are now experiencing what mankind has so often experienced, *i.e.* that at the very point where the negation had

reached its climax and the danger had reached the very brink of a precipice, the conviction dawns with axiomatic certainty that there lives and stirs within us something which all obstacles and enmity can never destroy, and which signifies against all opposition a kernel of our nature that can never get lost. And if the call to us is heard in no domain more powerfully than in the domain of religion to return home to the unassailable foundation of our being, and to make that which we dare not renounce our conscious possession, then the message of religion acquires a totally different meaning. Then religion appears no more as a creation of childish fancy or a flight into some far and alien world, but as an indispensable helper of man in the difficult and seemingly impossible struggle for a spiritual self—for a soul and meaning of life. Consequently there rises once more, after a long brow-beaten period, an aspiration after fundamental depths and inner connections, after eternal truth and infinite love; and in the midst of all the welter of our day a new wave of life universal appears which carries man into entirely other bearings, and which is a flowing tide that heralds the inauguration of a better day.

CHAPTER V

(*e*) THE EXPLANATION OF THE DEVELOPING TENDENCY

HE who understands the religious problem in the sense already referred to is, in his treatment of the problem, pressed into a definite course of decision between Nay and Yea. That decadent mode of thought which, from grounds of utility, recommends a return to the old form of religion will appeal least of all to him. Modern culture, we hear so often to-day, has become entirely bankrupt; human society needs for its subsistence and development moral consolidation and energetic cohesion, and nothing other than a religion of authority is able to furnish this; then there is nothing remaining but to return to such a religion, to bend willingly before its authority —perchance to Rome—and to accept the traditional confession as the best doctrine concerning things which are under lock and key to the human intellect.

The way in which the awakening of religion is to take place, in our view of the matter, contradicts such a mode of thought in the most definite manner. To religion belongs an aspiration which urges man to a great depth and resoluteness of life, to a self-reliance

over against the imbroglio of the world and to an elevation above the petty-human bustle of life. Man is able to experience and live a Higher and Nobler within his own nature, and to overcome an alien and even an envious world. And here again a utilitarian mode of thought draws him into his petty-human bustle and turns religion into a mere tool for his material welfare, and consequently what enters into man's nature is perceived as a half-truth, whilst human nature at its deepest thirsts for genuine truth. How high does even the honourable atheist stand above such a mode of thinking!

It could not happen otherwise than that the knowledge of the limits of the New should occasion the return of many minds to the Old and to hold fast to it. But the present crisis of religion has in reality altered our standpoint to the Old. But still the Old comes nearer to us when we recognise in it necessary problems whose meanings have not as yet been shown in the New. But this does not warrant a justification for a simple return to the Old. The newer culture has cut too deep a chasm between the past and ourselves to make a return possible. And we have to be on the guard against underestimating the value of the New for the whole of life, because as yet it does not mean *all* to us, and because it does not immediately suffice for the inmost source of life. For the penetrating and transforming effects of the New are found in full currency, and in no manner has the New brought forth no more than a number of particular results which sagacity and dexterity dovetailed into the empty spaces of traditional ideas, but it has changed the fundamental process of life

itself. The gain in clearness and breadth through natural science, in earnestness through history, in other essentials through philosophy and criticism, will never be rescinded; and on account of such changes we are obliged to view the New in a different light, and are no longer able to adopt the simplemindedness of our forefathers. Re-fitting and patching are always anachronisms, and nowhere more so than in this province.

Further, it is not to be forgotten that the present-day expansion and struggles affect not only the content of religion, but also its position in the whole of life. It is on the ground of Christianity that religion constructs, for the first time, a Whole or, termed otherwise, the one worthful kernel of the Spiritual Life, and all the other provinces of life had no other problem than to lead into this kernel. In the Middle Ages the various provinces gained more ground, but they still remained under the guardianship of religion. Protestantism, however, brings to a consummation a cleavage between culture and religion. Neither of these possibilities satisfies us today: a mere religious life has become too narrow for us, and a mere parallelism of religion and culture can at the best be no more than a transitory phase, and cannot mean a final conclusion. Thus, there originates here a difficult problem, which no return to an old extinct mode of thought can solve.

Though the newer culture appears as an enemy, or at least as an uncomfortable critic, of religion, its effects in no way turn out to be a danger and a detriment, but far more are able to further the clarification, emancipation, and extension of life, as such effects place

new problems in front of themselves, and forge a new energy for the solution of such problems. The earlier configuration of religion—formed in a weary and evanescent age—entered into danger, for in its anxiety for the suffering of mankind the fostering of its own active conduct was weakened, and its own actions were forgotten in the midst of its perpetual submissive mood. It is a justifiable aspiration of modern times that religion should develop more and more in the direction of the ennobling of work, of the awakening of a new courage of life, of an inner elevation of all the provinces of activity; it is an aspiration that religion should not only teach man to think little of himself, but also reveal to him the greatness of his nature. The old mode of viewing things, through its sole dwelling on the salvation of the individual, has pushed largely the question of the vindication of the Spiritual Life into the background; it looked too much upon the life of man as something ready-made and not as something that is ever a "becoming"; and all this has happened because this old mode of thought could not return from its abode of seclusion and calm to the present actual world in order to impregnate it with a new spirit.

In the midst of such great changes, religion can only come to grief if the new ascending movement is fastened entirely to the old form, and if the old form is represented as being immutable in all its essentials. The representatives of religion carry such a procedure easily into a mistrust of the least scientific exactness and even of veracity, whilst, at the same time, they gloss over obvious difficulties. By removing contradictions out of sight, uncertain probabilities are made

to appear as certain realities; this most shallow mode of thinking receives through this a kind of relief in that it is championing the casting out of incontestable truths. Religion will never gain the indispensable simplicity for far-reaching effects, never the inward immediacy and the victorious energy of conviction if it binds the present rigidly to the past, if it does not speak to us in the feelings, conceptions, and even words of our own day. If so much that belongs to the older configuration of religion has become anthropomorphic and even mythological and magical, are we to ignore such a state of things, and dare we ignore it when the real true interest of religion itself is at stake?

Many who have relinquished a rigid clinging to the Old seek to escape from the difficulty by conceiving of religion, separated as it is to them from culture, as a pure inwardness of the individual feeling, and consequently they strive to transform religion entirely into a personal conviction and sentiment. In this manner they believe themselves able to verify and develop energetically the distinctive characteristic features of religion. Through such a notion, all the contradictions of the work of the world do not touch religion because it rules securely and calmly within its own domain. Without a doubt, much freshness of life, enthusiasm, and joyous labour have issued from such a mode of religion, and it pulsates with great power in the character of our age. We shall have to occupy ourselves with this movement in the whole of this book, so that for the moment we can place its discussion on one side. At present we only indicate briefly wherein the religious crisis, notwithstanding its

recognition of the turn towards the purely human mode of formation, compels us to conceive it as an anomaly. The pure subjectivity to which the tendency turns from the embroilment of culture as to an indestructible and even unassailable citadel is not so secure and certain as it is supposed to be. Our consideration of the matter has already shown us that modern culture values subjective inwardness not as a main but as a secondary phenomenon—as an accompanying phenomenon—and, further, that it considers all life developed on such lines not as the entire truth, but only as a circle of subjective stimulation and imagination. Such an inwardness can corroborate its rights, free itself from a vacillating sentimentalism, and prove itself the kernel of reality, only through its energetic union with the work of the modern world, only through the gain of an immanent and impersonal culture. In order to obtain this, such inwardness strikes more and more into the deep, and gains more extensive connections. This it is able to do only through the turn to a *Metaphysic*—a Metaphysic not of the Schools but of life. Through this the inwardness will experience a clarifying and a winnowing; all mere sentimental pathos must be stripped off, and a firmer substance must be won. The immediacy of the first impressions of things is not the genuine immediacy of spiritual creativeness and original depth, for all the latter has to be worked out.

And, simultaneously with this, culture becomes for us something quite other than such a subjectivism. And now, with all our energy, we fight against the splitting of life into subjective religion on the one hand, and into soulless culture on the other hand.

Culture as a work in the world is by no means a mere external side of life; it belongs to our nature, and has even in modern times affected deeply the configuration of total-life, whilst it has given life more clearness and has penetrated beyond mere subjectivity. So that a renewal of life is of benefit to culture in the whole of its ramifications, and thus the problem reaches beyond mere religion into the whole of our being.

The advocates of subjectivism as well as those of the old mode of thought, in spite of all their differences, agree in their undervaluation of the present-day crisis in religion. This crisis deals not only with the position of religion in life, but also with the fundamental process of life itself. Hardly at any period in human history has the upheaval gone so deep; and such a struggle which calls mankind to a revaluation of its positions and possessions has rarely been witnessed as is witnessed to-day. An old form of life has proved itself, on account of the work of the centuries, as being too petty, narrow and subjective, and yet such a form seems to contain an imperishable nucleus which we dare not renounce without encountering the severest of losses. The new mode of thought which arose over against the old one has, through its breadth, earnestness, and energy so completely mastered us as to render a retreat to the old mode simply impossible. But the new mode brings ever clearer to the surface flaws perceived in the solid nucleus and in the secure foundation; thus it is full of inner problems, and we cannot possibly enter into agreement unceremoniously with it. Now one mode hems in the other, and yet is not able to dislodge this other, still less are we to expect both to flow amicably together on the current

of compromise. Consequently, we witness the one tearing the other through the collision; we observe the disaster reaching ever deeper into the most original qualities; and the possession which is common to all breaking up in pieces. At an earlier time we had wrestled with the truths of morality, of religion, of a world-view, in order to draw nearer to such realities, but now the truths themselves have become matters of dispute, and consequently we find ourselves contradicting ourselves and carried to the most pointed opposites. When we reflect, however, on the whole of life, we are able to discover a painful uncertainty: our spiritual existence floats in mid-air without any means of support, and our fundamental relationship to reality has fallen into entire uncertainty. Therefore, a struggle for the whole of life and for a new man has become necessary. This struggle has to be led not only by religion, but also by the other provinces of life—by art, philosophy, etc. True, each province has, as in the case of religion, its special problem and its special way of attacking its problem, but it is a condition of success in connection with each province that the Whole should be recognised as inwardly present in the particular, and that this Whole withstands every kind of dissolution, contraction, and torpor. The problem of religion is only a segment—probably the most important segment—of a more general problem—of the problem concerning the struggle for a spiritual existence, for the duration, content, and meaning of life; and the problem of religion dare not sever itself from all this.

It must produce discomfort to the adherents of religion and, indeed, it may produce deep depression

of spirit to see that which forms, for the personal conviction, the most steadfast security and the highest good of life treated by science as an open problem. But this is once more our destiny that in connection with the fundamental questions of life what appears as our most secure possession, and what in reality carries along incessantly our spiritual existence, should have to be won ever anew for our own conviction, and should have to be strengthened through spontaneous decision. Though the individual may withdraw from this task, human nature is not able to do so. Religion in particular may protest against all such distressing fears: religion is either merely a sanctioned product of human wishes and of pictorial ideas brought about by tradition and the historical ordinance—and, if so, no art, power or cunning can prevent the destruction of such a bungling work by the advancement of the mental and the spiritual movement of the world; or religion is founded upon a superhuman fact—and, if so, the hardest assault cannot shatter it, but far more, it must finally prove of service in all the troubles and toils of man, it must reach the point of its true strength and develop purer and purer its eternal truth.

Part II.—The Fundamental Basis of Universal Religion

INTRODUCTION

We have already seen that the problem of religion arises out of a vast crisis in the total existence of life. The old form of life, which hitherto had marked all aspiration, became too narrow and subjective for a general expansion of our existence and of activity in the various provinces of knowledge. On the one hand, the new life which issued out of the transformation of activity had no fixed centre and consequently threatened to vanish into emptiness. That we are able to discover the contradiction and reflect on both sides of the antithesis may undoubtedly be held as a sign that our inmost nature in some kind of way is able to rise above the cleavage; but evidently the upheaval is much too deep for us to conceive and vivify without a great transformation and even a revolution of our nature. We therefore find ourselves in the midst of a great conflict for the whole of life, and are necessarily pressed to the problem whether religion can and must come to our aid in order to reconsolidate our spiritual existence, and whether it is possible to become the possessors of a reality superior to the world, enclosed within the

living present to consciousness, and which, if found, renders possible such a striving after a content and meaning of life. If, therefore, the problem of religion arises out of the Whole of life, it will mean that such a religion alone as flows again into the Whole is able to bring satisfaction. Thus, when we turn to the particular province, we must constantly bear in mind the reality of the Whole. But such a conviction involves particular methodic requirements, and, in particular, it carries us at the outset over the antithesis, which runs through the ages, of a derivation of religion from the intellect and the world on the one hand, and from the particular experiences of man in feeling or will on the other hand. What here first of all appears as a bare diversity of method is in reality a struggle for the content of religion itself; for the differences in the proofs correspond to differences in the religions, and the proofs only carry out, in each case, what was at bottom already decided by the choice of this or that kind of proof. Thus, in these considerations it is not merely the path to religion but religion itself that stands in question.

In earlier times, indeed already since the time of the Greeks, the evolution of religion proceeded by placing the emphasis on the side of thought. At the height of this development the endeavour signified no mere reflection on the world—an attempt to conclude to a supra-mundane intelligence from the seeming purpose and fitness of things — but rather the hope of man triumphantly to penetrate to the kernel of reality, from this point of vantage

above the pettily human circle, and thus opening out to him a wider, purer, richer life. Reality, apprehended thus in its very kernel, appeared as sustained by a living unity, indeed, as the unfolding of such an over-world unity. In this work of apprehension thought gained a religious character and transformed itself at last wholly into religion. At the end of this path lies mysticism, with its complete immersion of all the varied characteristics of things into the All-One, and its devotion of the whole soul to that one end.

We shall find that this course of thought contains a truth which religion cannot renounce without becoming narrow and rigid. But this does not signify that such a course of thought is able of itself to found religion, and, along with religion, to open out a new kind of life. In reality this course never attains to religion through the energy of thought alone, but always, though unobserved, through an inflow and an appropriation of feeling, into and by the thought which warms its cold form. In a word, a thinking left simply to its own resources would never be able to get beyond empty forms and highly abstract conceptions. Indeed, even when thus completed by feeling the religion that arises here is still in a high degree shapeless and lacks the power for proceeding, from the one great intuition with which it starts, to the formation of a complex of life. In addition, there springs up a painful doubt which no merely intellectual form of religion is ever able to overcome. Is thought able to reach the kernel of things through its own energy, and can its highest exertions break through the bounds of the

merely human circle and raise us to the divine? Are our conceptions in reality more than mere human conceptions? Is it not a mere world of phantoms which arises in them? Must not thought itself be recognised as a member of a wider connection of life, if it is to be valid as an expression of truth, and is to assure man of the reality of a new world? Precisely the convulsions of modern life, which we have already pursued, make this doubt acute, and consequently forbid us to base religion on mere speculation.

Less still, according to the experience of the centuries, can the reflective procedure suffice which derives an over-world intelligence from the special construction of the external world. In the phenomenal world there appeared, to such a procedure of thought, far more order, design, and beauty than was possible for the nature of things to accomplish of itself; consequently, every behaviour of physical things was considered as a testimony of the power, wisdom, and goodness of an over-world spirit. This train of thought won many minds in late antiquity; it won them in early Christianity; it won them in the period of the *Aufklärung*; and, because of its perspicuity and comprehensiveness, it will not lose its influence lightly. But whatever truth may be imbedded behind its anthropomorphic form, it has not a convincing power against the doubts of the present age. For one thing, our scientific age has discovered the drawback in this mode of thinking, that it puts science and religion into irreconcilable antagonism. For whilst science passionately endeavours to bring all particular

events into relationship with each other, and to understand them from out of this relationship, that mode of thought must consider religion to be the more securely grounded, the more immediate is the impression of design presented by the look of the world, and the more tangibly single startling phenomena contrast with the remaining happenings. If thus each gain in the scientific and inherent interpretation of things becomes a loss to religion, then religion must withdraw more and more into an unexplored region with the naïve presumption that such a region is also unexplorable, and without any certainty that the supposed mystery will not, some day, reveal its secret to the illuminating light of the activity of thought. We discover, too, to-day, much more clearly than of yore, the anthropomorphism of the method which carries carelessly human modes of thought into the All, and explains the condition of this All as though a human being had produced it. Again, for our present-day outlook on to the universe, there is, alongside of the purposive that may be discovered in it, so much that seems purposeless, so much struggle and suffering, so much rigid indifference to human welfare and spiritual good, so much limitation and precariousness even in the purposive, that for us the starting-point of that teleological doctrine is riddled with insecurities. And, finally, if we overcome all such scruples and recognise the superior energy perceptible in the physical universe, could we derive from such a consideration a new life, and could the discord of our inward nature be overcome? The older mode of thought could believe such results to be possible since it was under the

influence of a securely operative religion—a religion which heightened the intelligence which by that mode had, with considerable artifice, been inferred as present in the world to a living personality, and which gave to this intelligence an efficacious presence in the human soul. That mode asserted far more than it had proved. But that influence has by now been shaken to its very foundation, and the whole of religion has become problematic; and therewith falls all that had lifted that mode of thought above its intrinsic capacity. However much, then, in the world may remain an enigma for us, and however willing we may be to acknowledge dark depths in existence, such a method can never furnish a secure position for a foundation and living development of religion. "The amazement of the sage in viewing the depth of creation and his search in the abyss for the Creator do not furnish an education of humanity in the corresponding belief. In the abyss of creation the investigator can readily lose himself, and in this whirlpool he can drift about and miss his way far from the source of the fathomless sea" (Pestalozzi).

It was as a reaction against such an overstrain of the intellect, against the transformation of religion into speculation, and against the resolution of man into the Infinite, that there followed a turning to the experiences special to man himself. In these, religion seemed to be able to win a stable form, a living energy, and a full certainty. But here again the attempt, though above reproach in its basis, has, in its execution, led to problematical positions; and this chiefly because human life has been swerved

from the All and been treated as a separate province. For then not only are we confronted by the difficult, and even insoluble, problem, how anything that lies within such an entirely separate province can possibly reach beyond it—and such a reaching beyond is a necessary part of religion; but there also arises the danger that such a basis for religion will keep man too much tied to himself and will simply excite his simply natural self. Thus, there would here be a lack of the necessary opposition to the merely human. A closer consideration of the two currents into which this non-intellectual endeavour divides, will show this more clearly.

It is either in the softer mode of feeling or in the stronger mode of will that this way seeks access to the Divine. Man is able to withdraw himself into his own feeling, to rid himself of all connection with his environment, and, in a condition of pure apartness and of soaring detachment, to know himself to be both far above his merely physical environment, and a part of an unseen whole. The mere fact that he is thus able to free himself from all the entanglements of things, and to place himself upon his own separate inwardness, seems to prove a greater depth of reality than is to be found externally, and seems, too, to reveal a kingdom of the soul in spite of the hardness and senselessness of the immediate world. And in such a self-contained feeling, a touch-stone seemed to be won for securely deciding concerning the truth or falsehood of every religious experience. Here alone human life seemed to win full immediacy, here alone to become autonomous. Let, then, all that claims to be religion be

brought to this point in order to prove its authenticity and, in a characteristic manner, to decide between the kernel and the shell. Indeed, the claims of feeling proceed even further: they prove themselves not only an unfailing touch-stone, but become the creative source of religion itself. In these claims are contained demands of life, and further developments take place, and in these are included a new and divine world which had dawned on the consciousness. Through this winning independence of the inward there arises a longing to break through natural existence, and a desire to prove that this characteristic and novel truth which now dawns is a real longing after infinity and eternity and freedom; and the desire seems to culminate in peace and holiness through the feeling in a form of immediacy of a reality of such greatness and goodness. Thus a kingdom of ideals arises and declares its content as a definite truth over against all mere subjective experience. In the province of religion the consciousness fastens itself to a Whole and grips the whole man. The culmination of a real existence for oneself is reached in such a manner, and the full bliss is obtained by a free floating in the ether of infinity.

This, doubtless, contains a good deal of truth, but this truth is mingled with much that is problematic, and needs a fundamental clarification of conceptions in order to separate the certain from the problematic. In the first place, mere feeling is in no manner an independent inward life—a still deep, certain through itself of its truth. Feeling testifies only to the rousing of the subject—to the degree of the subjective

appropriation of the processes of life. The truth-content of these processes remains questionable and doubtful, and, also, the rousing has varied degrees because feeling can be shallow and feeble in spite of considerable amount of excitement, and can dissipate and consume itself in hasty agitation without its being able to affect the remainder of life. If feeling is, therefore, in its simple and natural state less full of value and content than when it displays its connection with real existing life, it cannot construct for itself a decisive touch-stone; and consequently a criticism of the feelings is as necessary as a criticism of conceptions. One can adopt fully the words of Hegel: "The true nerve is the truthful thought; and only when the thought is true can the feeling be of a truthful kind."

In the province of religion the movement towards feeling takes place usually within the circle of crystallised tradition and the common order of things; although the subjective experience crystallises itself in this established order, it wins through it a support and a content, and in all his advance the subject would in no way shake off an objective world. Thus it happened with Pascal and also Schleiermacher, especially after the æsthetic enthusiasm of early youth had adopted a strong religious element into itself. In both cases the close relationship of the soul of the individual to religion brought forth a pure gain in warmth and inwardness. Quite otherwise is it, however, when the feeling, rejecting all wider connections, attempts to generate religion purely out of its own nature. Then it contracts itself through such a one-sided striving upon its own particular ability,

and consequently its product proves lean and poor. This bare feeling is so fickle and soft, so devoid of stability and content, that finally it discharges itself into an entirely vague disposition. And when such a disposition attempts to weave a content out of itself in order to lead man beyond the mere human province to a relationship with the Divine, it degenerates of necessity to the level of eccentricity and fancy.

The proclamation of the predominance or even of the autocracy of feeling was thus usually on historical grounds a part of the inner process of the dissolution of religion. The receptive form estranges itself inwardly from the traditional form and yet fears to break away completely, so that one sought to hold fast to a portion of the subjective meaning whilst the substance was given up. One has the tendency to greet such a state of things because it seems to be a gain in width and freedom, but the fact is overlooked that when the real truth falls away sooner or later its reflex in the minds of men must disappear. Such a religion of mere feeling had the tendency to become more and more shadowy, until finally it vanishes completely from the mind. The turn to bare feeling is accordingly a path on which religions not so much originate as disappear.

The basing of religion upon will seems to place it on securer grounds and under stronger motives. But here also a dilemma will soon become visible, because the will, strictly confined within its own limits, falls inevitably into emptiness; while with the development of some kind of content, it enters into wider connections and becomes dependent on these connections. The will, doubtless, as a characteristic

decision and as a carrier from the domain of faculty to that of activity, constitutes a phenomenon of the greatest significance. It affirms not only freedom from all mere mechanism of nature, but also promises to become the starting-point of a new kind of world. But as soon as we begin to develop such a world, and as soon as we lay hold of a law of activity present in the will which points to morality, we step beyond the mere individual will and venture to make assertions concerning the highest ends and final grounds. When this happens there happens, too, that we are compelled to recognise a kingdom of self-activity beyond all mere psychological functions. Herewith new demands arise concerning the reconstruction of life from its very foundation, and the will must now prove its particular truth out of the larger truth of this new reconstruction.

Common to feeling and will are two different reasons which make it impossible for both to give religion a secure basis. Both appear as original and immediate events; such originality and immediacy seem to confer on both the right of sovereign value and the ability of independent creative power. But this immediacy is first of all a mere phenomenon of consciousness, and as such, through the further work of thought, is liable to the possibility of error; much can be of significance in the phenomenon which seems to the immediate impression to point to the contrary. So it is in no way certain that because the feeling interprets itself as a pure existence-for-self that such an existence-for-self actually exists. Is there not much concealed and indirect dependence here, and could not the assertion rest upon error?

It is similar with the will and its presumptive freedom. Is not the will probably a non-knowledge and an oversight of the truth of its previous ties? Does not man aim at something more than merely to feel himself free, although he is unable to penetrate to the causes of his activity? If feeling and will, however, in their present fundamental significance admit of so much doubt, how can they ever create a new world in the sense of religion, and through this fortify human life?

There corresponds to this insufficiency of the basis an insufficiency of presented content. Religion finds it difficult to disentangle us from the contradictions of life unless it culminates in an inversion of existence, and unless it exercises through such inversion a sharp sifting of the near-at-hand materials which present themselves. There is no possibility of a workable Yea without the presence of a powerful Nay; for thus alone can the transformation strike into the deep. In feeling or will, in the manner already described, such a radical Nay is wanting, and consequently human life in its particular circle may aim at and further a given religion without being able to become the possessor of the inward elevation and the essential renewal—two characteristics of the chief end of religion.

When the whole matter is surveyed, there appears no possibility for any single aspect of life to arrive at religion. Each one of these aspects is not only too feeble for such work, but is also unable to present religion with a sufficient content. The experiments made in such direction are in sharp conflict with one another: on the one side, the attention is directed

to the outward character of religion and to the building up of a scientific province of thought, whilst on the other side the standpoint is that of immanence and of the immediate energy of movement which arises out of this. The one is as necessary as the other, but on this path the two aspects refuse to coalesce: the general character of religion, mirrored in the intellect alone, endangers the inward immediacy and spiritual warmth, whilst through the individual results of feeling and will alone the immediacy endangers the spiritual width and validity which extend beyond the individual. So that a new path must be sought which will unite the discordant elements. It is certainly clear that through such discord between the two opposites, an immediate united push and a joyous co-operation are impossible. The experience of history testifies to the particular *naïveté* of basing religion on thought, feeling, or will. It remains here to seek a new path which is not, from the very outset, under the power of the opposites. We need not, however, allow man and the world, subject and object, activity and presentation, to fall outside one another. We do not proceed on this new path from any ready-made imaginative existence, but from the Life-process itself; and from this Life-process we seek to develop conceptions of existence and strive to carry the particular sides of our consciousness far enough to meet within an essentially unique Whole. That such a Whole exists—it has all probability on its side—appears in the fact that the contradictions of our existence could not be experienced collectively unless there existed a living unity which spans the separate aspects of existence.

But where is such a unity to be found? And when found, is it able to be of effect without causing a reversal of our naïve view of things? These are other questions. And it may be held as certain that no proof of religion is possible in the manner a fact of the connection of external things is proved. The path to religion leads through the contradictions of life, and allows itself to be discovered long before a clear conception of the overcoming of these contradictions is ripe. It is the great characteristic of religious problems that a great contradiction shall become visible, and also that it shall be overcome by the entrance of something within the human circle that will lift man beyond that circle. This demands energetic analysis and essential gradations. The first representation (of the contradictions) must be recognised and must become more effective in us than has hitherto been the case. Thus when we are battling with the question of religion, we are at the same time battling for a more complete picture of reality and of our own real existence. And it may be, indeed, that we shall find much that is provisional and full of contradictions. But who has given us the certainty that the universe in us and we in it are complete? Is it not far more probable that the main value of life lies in the fact that we are allowed to combat with alien elements?

PART II.—THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS OF UNIVERSAL RELIGION

(CONTINUED)

CHAPTER VI

a. THE COMPLEXITY OF HUMAN LIFE

1. *The Dualism in Human Life*

THE movement of the Life-process in the direction of the religious problem has before all else to ask if it fashions a characteristic and continuous Whole, or if it produces essential differences, and especially if it exhibits a thorough-going dualism. Such a dualism might probably offer a thread which might guide us further. Now, an unbiassed view, undisturbed by particular one-sided tendencies, holds that our life in reality contains two different aspects: that it includes the two qualities and stages of *Nature and Spirit* within itself. This hypothesis will be elucidated as we proceed. Such an antithesis is quite other than the ones between body and mind, object and subject, extension of space and conscious activity, as these were brought to the foreground in the period of the *Aufklärung*. Our antithesis lies wholly within consciousness itself. The particular psychic life shows a twofold characteristic: on the one hand, it merely carries forth its sensuous surrounding nature and adapts itself within the bounds of nature, while

on the other hand, and contemporaneously, new energies, ends, and forms are produced whose connections lead to a new kind of reality over against all mere nature. This difference is so fundamental for the whole of our investigation as to render a clear illumination and a sufficient basis for it impossible without an investigation into its very nature.

Modern Science itself has proved visible nature, out of which we have sprung, to be a fugitive web of purely particular elements or forces lying in immensity. Speculation may, accepting some supposed ground of the multiplicity and the inward connections, resolve the universal reciprocal actions as well as the course of the whole universe into simple fundamental forms. Natural Science can push back such connections and provide all explanation from the simple elements themselves. For all phenomena grow out of relationships, from step to step, on the ground of experience; one phenomenon against the other receives interchanges in the reciprocity of the effects. Nowhere does the guidance of the movement seem to proceed from a Whole, and nowhere does life itself seem to rest upon an elevated and collective end of self-maintenance. What finds itself in amalgamation is nothing other than a construction of things side by side in space. The external contiguity, in the main, does no more than bring the elements together; an inward participation collectively is throughout impossible and, indeed, unthinkable. Speculation may anew complete this picture by stating that the elements cannot possibly pass wholly into the mutual relations, and that they must possess some individual existence. But such individual

existence lies inaccessible beyond the phenomena and remains unexplored for all times. Along with this, each question concerning final "grounds" unfolds another question, and there is here, therefore, no discovery of the Why and Wherefore; the scientific investigation of the processes of nature shows them as no more than mere occurrences.

As such an existence from without, with its myriad forms, surrounds us, it extends itself also deeply into the province of the soul. Also, human activities are above all driven by the needs of individual self-preservation and self-elevation, and it is the execution of this alone which gives value to man and things; here activities are not meant for alien aims—they are not meant for any existing Whole beyond the realm of the life of humanity. Our life, primarily, creates its content out of the external relations and connections; it is nothing other than an intercourse with the environment. What is called "inward" is only echo and ashes of what originated through the friction of the connections. Our ideas or conceptions, for instance, are mere sensuous presentations; that alone can be termed good which our position utilises in the sensuous existence; all happiness, in the last resort, is rooted in sensuous stimulation; what is termed non-sensuous or spiritual is in truth only a sensuous of a finer make. Also, the connection of the psychological movements corresponds entirely with the order of nature. Isolated elements unite and link themselves simultaneously or in turns, stir and displace themselves; and it is the association of their mechanism which largely governs our life and makes out of it a complicated machine which far more moves

independently of us than helps to shape our own particular product. No superior unity spans and stirs the manifold, so that there is no room here for either ends or activities.

As, however, our position remains bound in this network, we infer that we cannot be carried beyond that position. What in themselves these things may be, we can know nothing, and there is no need for us to know; in such a beyond we could neither interest ourselves nor attain our ends. We see, too, that the psychic life in its initial stages remains within the domain of nature, and through and through exhibits the character of a mere existing thing: it comes and goes, it mounts and sinks, it is tied to sensual appetite and mechanism—a life without ends or aims, without meaning or reason, entirely sinking to the level of bare and barren existence. If we survey this psychic life in its extension over the expanse of nature right up to man himself, we find it nowhere resting in itself, but it appears with all its performances as mere means to the mere natural conservation of its own existence. What purpose does the richest equipment in the animal world serve but to put on war-footing the individual and the species in the struggle for existence? And hardly more does the mere psychic life perform for man, for it remains in his life, too, a mere piece of the natural Life-process.

But though this kind of life has governed humanity almost exclusively in its initial stages, and though it has carried the natural and commonplace to the throne, yet such a kind of life does not remain isolated, for along with it there develops a new and higher kind with other configuration and direction. Step by

step transformations appear and form an essentially higher standard. Thus human activity is not wholly held fast by self-assertion, but also reaches out in the direction of the welfare of others. Consequently, inward connections of the community arise and win the individual up to the point even of sacrifice of self for the aims of the community; in other departments of life the spiritual activity draws the man unto himself and places his striving under an actual compulsion; in art, science, law, technics, etc., great connections grow up and urge man into their service.

Such work could never be linked together into a Whole had it not been that a transformation had proceeded out of a Whole in the inward web of the soul. An inward representation of these connections must be possible; the thought of a Whole must span the manifold, and the entire mass must be transmuted into a system. Indeed, this shows in reality the erection of a connected world of thought—a general organisation of culture.

Of more importance still is the fact that the Life-process disengages itself from its mere connections with things: the process deepens the life of the soul in itself, and strives to pass beyond the mere appearance of things to their nature. This Life-process is carried further and cast into a new mould by receiving into itself from the external world; through this new forms and energies appear, and the inwardness attains the capacity for production, as, for instance, we find on the heights of science that the conceptions are not a mere thesis of sensuous presentations but characteristic creations of thought. More and more the inward world links itself together into a unity; it

seeks and finds original tracks, and exercises a counter-activity to all the mere environment. An activity arising out of characteristic energy and decision now places itself over against all mere hap and hazard. To such an independence of the individual soul corresponds the greater self-activity of humanity. The latter prepares a particular kingdom—a kingdom of civilisation—over against the realm of nature, and a corporate Spiritual Life, founded in itself, bridges all the branch provinces and calls men to a new existence far beyond the reach of nature.

At the same time, a new relationship is won towards all natural things. It suffices us no longer to know what the mere connections of things are; we must forge our way in the direction of the connections of things and transpose ourselves in the midst of their characteristic existence, and participate in their characteristic life. This is accomplished not only through mental discernment and its longing after truth, but also through the whole of the life of the spirit. What differentiates definite love from sensuous excitement but the reception of the "other" into one's own soul? How could a fact with its compulsion move us, were it not that it was born in our characteristic striving? This signifies a breaking through the narrowness of natural existence as well as the most fundamental transformation of all greatness and goodness. It is only when the Life-process draws this seeming "beyond" into itself that there arises a problem of truth, and that a good (one of the most riddlesome of all terms) grows over against the useful and the pleasurable. What satisfied us previously as happiness—the maintenance and enhancement of the individual—becomes through the

inward expansion of life small and lean, and, indeed, a hindrance to definite welfare.

This new direction of life develops into an objectivity and exhibits an activity of the soul of a very different nature from the activity known on earlier levels. This new object never gains an independence and an inward present moment from sensuous impressions, but only through its deliverance from these; this deliverance is, however, a work of the activity of thought, for thought transplants us into the very centre of things, and it is through the conception of the things as great thoughts that the things can produce in us a living movement. Thus every further expansion of life means, at the same time, a remove into the province of a world of thought, of the non-sensuous, and of ideals. Indeed, there follows an inversion of life in which the work of thought operates in the interpretation of the earlier stages of things and of the foundation of all; and through this process the sensuous aspect of things withdraws to a secondary place and sinks to the periphery of life. This basing of life upon thought is, at the same time, a gain in transparency and freedom. True, the object which we ourselves appropriate exercises a strong constraint against our previous condition—an inward necessity of our nature dispels all arbitrary choice. But this constraint of the outward fact does not work through physical pressure, but all along through the intervention of a characteristic activity—an activity which pulls out arbitrary choice and thus establishes freedom. All investigation comes under the necessities of the case, but the strongest external sway of things cannot force

open a turn to investigation: æsthetic creativeness could not discover and obey the necessities of its handling-object had not the imagination previously linked that object to itself. The thought of obligation is an absurdity without an acceptation of the fact of a moral organising power in the will.

Thus a new life unfolds itself in manifold traits; a bi-lateral life and a parting of the ways towards wider and more decisive directions now become needful in order to obtain a complete view of things. In the one, our acts are more and more flung back upon ourselves and thus strike a depth in the soil of independent inwardness; in the other, it becomes possible to plant ourselves on new objects and be filled and moved by them. The collective flow of things found on the natural level is now entirely discarded; subject and object, man and the world, activity and its object of treatment, have all separated themselves and work upon one another as independent energies. But the cleft which frees our life from numb subjection cannot signify as yet the final conclusion; indeed, the sharper and clearer that cleft becomes, the more do we discover it as an intolerable situation, and are driven with all our available energy to seek to re-establish again some kind of unity which had succumbed during the initial stages of the inward movement. The road to a Yea lies through a Nay; we must separate in order again to unite, and must depart from our ordinary state in order again to return to it. There enters thus a negative element into the work of life; all definite departure on the new road follows through toil and struggle, doubt and pain, but in all this aggravation of existence

the man is raised to a higher level, and is ennobled through the inward compulsion which drives him forward. Intertwining movements and revolutions break the ban of the fixed actuality which lay upon natural existence. Much still remains dark and mysterious, and, indeed, becomes more and more so, but already the clear discovery of the darkness heralds the beginning of a coming enlightenment. We are not allowed now to accept the phenomena as they merely fall upon us; we cannot now leave on one side a standard and a judgment, a sanction and a disapproval; over all the particular questions there arises the question concerning the aim of all action and the meaning of all life. The whole manifold must fasten itself together and obtain a characteristic view of things.

There is, thus, no doubt that our conscious life is not a mere furtherance of the movement of the natural order, but that within it a new art of life is to be recognised; our life constitutes not merely a simple superficies, but it includes two qualities fundamentally different in kind. That such a view of life is less simple, and that scientific investigation demands a greater labour out of it, must not prevent us from recognising such a fact. Or, shall we bend, enfeeble, and trim such a life in order that we may join together merely those conceptions alone which will produce our mere individual comfort?

2. *The Contradiction in Human Life*

The point of contact of two different stages of a life signifies in itself no contradiction; such con-

tradiction would arise only if a conflict between the two stages originates, and if the relationship of both became something other than what corresponded to their separate inner significance. And it is this which actually happens. The Spiritual Life presents itself as pre-eminent and as being called to wield the sceptre; it has often to content itself with a humbler position; it will thus, true to its own nature, rest in itself and construct its own particular province, but through such a treatment of it the man remains still tied to the natural order, and the pre-eminent life seems to accompany that order as a mere addendum. Such a contraction confines the effect not only from the external side, but also brings the internal formation to a standstill: the Spiritual Life, through that dependence upon an alien power, seems not able to accomplish the purpose of its own nature, and consequently must be wrecked in its search for a More, which lies on a coast beyond the natural province. Thus it becomes in itself a contradiction, and what promised to illumine our existence proves itself now a difficult riddle.

(α) *The Weakness of the Spiritual Motive-Powers.* —A loosening of the activity from the natural instinct of self-preservation and its liberation for aims of a conjoint and actual kind are essential to the Spiritual Life. This shows itself especially in the province of morality. In however devious ways morality may be conceived and founded, that it is a contraction of the instincts and signifies a direction upon common aims cannot be doubted. How do things stand in reality with the evolution of such a conviction? Over the whole field of civilisation there extends an appearance of morality, self-forgetfulness, and willingness for

sacrifice; the corporate organisations hold before themselves great aims, and mutual co-operation, love, and esteem find their way by the sheer force of their own inherent assurance into organic society. But he who accepts this appearance for the whole truth is soon disillusioned, and finds pretty quickly that the gold pieces prove themselves to be copper coins, and that that which constitutes the real experience of life is in its foundation nothing other and nothing less than an insight into, and a loosening from, the mere appearance of things. So that from of old the renown of an insight into human nature belongs to the pessimists and not to the optimists. The organisation of co-operative life, however, treats entirely the particular interests of individuals as the driving-power of all effort; such an organisation wins such a power not through the presentation of elevated aims beyond the circle of immediate life, but through the benefits which it is called to further, and through the drawbacks which it is called to obviate. Indeed, the closer these individual movements link themselves to the system of society, the securer becomes their actual strength; how poorly would the movement proceed in its love for the good if it left on one side its abhorrence of evil! Religions, in spite of all their differences, are united in the fact that they change in some degree the moral achievements of man. The optimistic character of even the religions of law does not confine itself to the natural good of human nature, but expects an obedience to the voice of Divine command which promises, on the one hand, great rewards, and threatens, on the other hand, heavy punishments. Philosophy, too, handles incessantly

the wide gap between the moral potency and the actual conduct of man; indeed, the deeper the great thinkers have penetrated into the depth of human existence, as, for example, Plato and Kant, the more they have discovered that contradiction; but the thinkers who, as Aristotle and Leibniz, presented the facts in a more friendly manner, yet became, in the further development of their thoughts, living witnesses against their earlier outlook, and in favour of another view of things. For as soon as they turned towards the expanse of life and trod on the impressions of experience, the favourable picture was inverted into its opposite. Thinkers are far more united concerning their judgment of man than could be expected from the strife of their different conceptions; for example, they present the same truth in different forms. Art also tends to the same convictions as philosophy and religion when it does not falsify the reality in shallow embellishments, but endeavours to illumine it and learns to see it in a truthful way. How many entanglements has such Art brought to the surface, and under what strong contrasts has it exhibited human existence!

In great moments, however, individuals and nations have exhibited a character free from self and capable of heroic sacrifice. This is true of particular moments when human nature was under strong stimuli, and is a phenomenon witnessed but seldom. But does not the circumstance prove, when it is considered more closely, that such achievements—prized as something miraculous and conceived as something superhuman —condemned root and branch the ordinary natural ways of man?

The problem does not limit itself, however, to the moral province in any definite sense; it is not only when man is required to sacrifice his own self, but also when he shall bring forth some earnest participation in the affairs which lie beyond his self, that the ability is denied him for such an accomplishment. It may be an activity concerning the state and society, or art and science; everywhere the ordinary mode of life shows a lamentable callousness and apathy, everywhere the effort proceeds not so much upon the thing itself as upon the advantages which promise to accrue to the individual. In order to win any energy for the actual thing itself, it becomes obligatory to take solitary circuitous paths and perilous enterprises, and then the situation seems to need a severe intimidation, and soon, too, a daring assertion of one's own self; but, soon, on the contrary, the particular interest has somehow found its vantage-point, and transforms the immovable apathy into the closest attention and the most strenuous interest. If it is now felt that the situation at the height of this creativeness is a better one, this in its turn is clearly discovered as an exception, and serves more for the corroboration than for the refutation of the assertion.

There remains, therefore, no doubt as to the weakness of the spiritual and moral motive-powers. But noteworthy enough man stands up in strong opposition to the acknowledgment of this fact. Throughout the whole of life and of corporate organisations there proceeds a striving to represent things in a better light, to show them to be nobler and greater than they actually are; an open conviction and calm acknowledgment of the real facts of the case have

fled, and men practise hypocrisy not only towards one another but more towards themselves; and even in front of his own consciousness the man speaks and imagines himself on the heights. This incessant drama has raised, from of old, the bitter jests of the satirists, the fiery indignation of the friends of truth, and the deep pain of all moral natures. There is imbedded here a problem: Why do we shun recognising that mysterious Something whose actuality is undeniable? Why do we not acquiesce in the ordinary state of things which surrounds us on all sides? There must be some kind of concealed counter-effect extant; whence that concealment—that darkness—came and whither it goes nobody knows. And thus our existence continues largely under the power of opposites, and we are unable to see how the spiritual can prevail, although the necessity of our nature even against our will holds us to it.

(β) *The Spiritual Impotence of Man.*—Hitherto the subject has on the whole handled the strength of the spiritual motive-powers in man; the will as yet has not corresponded to the demands of the new standard. But the question arises, whether the will in particular is responsible for the fault, or whether, rather, the entanglement does not extend to the very foundation of our nature. Is man able, primarily, to pursue something beyond his present situation? Can Spiritual Life, in the distinct way it expresses itself within the confines and subjectivity of his own nature, come to actual realisation? Will not all things—not only mere appearances but even truth—be drawn down to the level of the

ordinary nature and thus destroyed? Such things could transform all into an over-natural kingdom of life constructed out of the largeness and truth of things.

The aspiration after knowledge becomes truth—the particular truth of things beyond the bare impressions which surround the mind in sensations and which are deposited into percepts and ideas. The sensuous presentation of the idea disengages itself from the idea itself in order to present before the mind the existence of things in space. But how do we step beyond the province of the presentation? Does not the idea the more it withdraws itself from its object and stands upon its own particular potency become more empty and shadowy? And, too, in the most sublime ideas sensuous presentations adhere. With what ardour and toil has religion, from of old, striven to obtain pure conceptions of the Divine; and always in this procedure how greatly has it discovered anew the limits of our powers! Must it not then acknowledge even in its highest flight that all human knowledge attains to no more than a metaphor? But even so much signifies that the human notion holds man with inexorable power.

What is true of the idea is true on the whole of knowledge. Knowledge ought to subsist upon the "in-itself" of reality, and yet it is held in trammels by the subjectivity of the soul. The subject remains always with himself, and can extend and extend this particular circle, but is never able to break through the situation and transpose himself into the object; what we occupy ourselves with are never things but only our presentations and images of things. The

idea itself of any thing is not given from the external but originates in our own characteristic thought. Thus there stands continually between us and reality the ghost of our own particular thought and reflection, which threatens to reduce the world to a shadow; instead of seeing the things we see only a haze with which they are surrounded, and we only substitute one haze for another when we believe we have uncovered them.

Hence to all great thinkers the conception of truth has been the most difficult of all problems as well as a riddle full of mysteries. To such thinkers the work of knowledge presented itself not as a wandering on a paved, secure path, but as an incessant wrestling to find the main goal and the main direction of a new track. Philosophy, therefore, must take up anew the question of the possibility of truth, and must consider that the question is not altogether settled by previous work upon it. In spite of all toil the goal seemed to recede into an ever-wider distance. The Greeks considered the problem simply as the unbroken connection of man and the world, and the truth was conceived as a harmony between subject and object (*adæquatio rei et intellectus* of the Middle Ages), and found such harmony quite attainable through the accepted kinship of nature on both sides. The growing inwardness of human life slackens and parts asunder such a connection with the environment; it corresponds to the most important situation of Descartes when he tore off the subject from its entanglement with the physical universe and undertook to construct reality out of consciousness. But even he, at the same time, held fast to the existence

of an independent actual world of man in consciousness; and therefore it became necessary for him to find a connection between subject and object in a new kind of way. That happened with his successors in the doctrine of parallelism between thought and existence. Each of the two unfolds independently of the other; a pre-eminent power—of an immanent or of a transcendent nature—causes at least here and there a harmony of results. But to conceive of the truth of the problem in this manner is not to solve it so much as to push it backward; it must soon reappear as an intolerable contradiction alternately over against the world and upon the world. Such a criticism culminated with decisive acuteness in Kant; a truth seemed possible to him only in the degree it is conceived apart from all its relationships with things, and thus the problem is laid entirely in the particular thought-province of the subject. But when it is not recognised that a world of things persists by the side of this thought-process and that the subject is nothing without such a world, our world transforms itself into a kingdom of appearances and then it becomes questionable whether a truth in any definite sense remains, and whether we are not standing on a province between knowledge and non-knowledge. A way out of this dilemma as well as a conclusion of the most important movements were sought by the German speculative movement, in which the leaders allowed the things to remain on one side, and endeavoured to bring forth reality out of their own thought. That such an investigation signifies an overstrain of human ability, and that, at the same time, it robs the reality of all content

there is no doubt, as this is clear enough from the consequent disillusion which followed the speculation. What has this most important speculative movement arrived at? It seems to teach nothing other than the inaccessibleness of truth for man, and the insight that the sum of all knowledge forms the confession —unknowable. But out of all the changes and transformations of time arises clearly the one dilemma: *Either* the striving after truth points to some kind of existence beyond the human circle, and then our inability to attain a *direct* intercourse with the things will prove itself ever anew and ever clearer; *or* we create the whole reality out of our thoughts, and then such a titanic plunge soon breaks into pieces, and the overstrain of the human powers will take vengeance through the increasing emptiness of our existence.

The existence of a science can tolerate such doubts well enough because it is situated in the ordinary life, and, through untiring toil, it ranges itself into conclusions. Science can extend and codify incessantly results only in so far as it stands upon an average height and shuns the highest summit and the deepest abyss, and in so far it pushes further off or places on one side the problem of a final and definite truth. Such is a kind of indispensable compromise and no more, which has to take place in the co-operation of the work of science and in the continuance of life; and to see the solution of the main problem within such a province can only mean a self-satisfied superficiality. As soon as we demand to pass beyond mere awareness to a truthful knowledge, we discover our deplorable poverty, and must confess that that which

is termed certain seems on clearer investigation to rest upon a totally insecure foundation.

When we turn to the realm of action, the matter appears worse than in the realm of thought. The moral inadequacy of man has been, as we saw, an object of complaint from of old, but the complaint seems often to have forgotten the question, whether the "given" and benumbed nature of man is able in some kind of way to handle things otherwise. We cannot act without motives, and these adjust themselves to the good striven for, but a good for us can only be that which furthers our particular will; therefore we can strive only for ourselves and never for some external existence. In particular, it is our subjective existence—our particular neutrality—which seeks the one thing and flees from the other; to speak of effects upon this condition of things is, to our activity, as insoluble as our knowledge of sense-presentations. Pleasure and pain drive and control our life; they may be refined far beyond their raw, sensuous forms; and our subjectivity, too, binds us to great refinement, so that in the last resort we seem to act for nothing other than our own particular condition. Also, this condition may interlace and link itself to the world and man around us, in the most varied manner; we may imagine that we are striving not so much for our own welfare as for the welfare of another; we may conclude, in order to strengthen such an opinion, that we do this for another because it promises pleasure and has already proved itself of value to ourselves, so that when dealing with the seeming external we are really always dealing with ourselves; we thus find the self, in the furthest

remove from its starting-point, bound in its own subjective happiness, and linked again with it unobserved. All transformation and seeming excellence never seem to yield an exit from that embarrassment—never bring forth a transplanting of the life into the realm of over-individual and over-subjective actions. This impossibility, however, is the strict demand of morality, and with it morality stands or falls. This demand renders impossible the enclosure of man within the web of his own small self; the demand not only places his acts under definite aims but also calls him to mount to a region of definite self-denying love; it holds its message before him not merely as an agreeable play of phantasy, but as an imperative problem upon whose solution the content and value of life are decided. Thus there appears something as indispensable which is not yet discovered: it does not reveal itself, and the problem is: How may we discover it?

All along the ages thinkers have laboured in order to try to solve the problem, but the liberation of man from himself would not yield to any proposed solution; all ardent labours have alternately entangled and disentangled the skein, and the goal has always receded further away. On the summit of Greek life the good attracted man on account of its inherent beauty as an object of disinterested welfare, and not on account of its utility or its enjoyment; on account of its powerful influence on the imagination man seemed to win the good and the beautiful. Happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*) welded compactly together sensation and act, subject and object. But this supposition possessed presuppositions of a problematic character; it

reckoned with nature conceived as great and noble; it interweaved minutely the psychic nature of the observer with the objective world, and placed the increased inwardness of life as something inherent in the external world. But the question was not raised, whether this refinement of nature works in the direction of the liberation of man from nature itself and from egotistic narrowness, or whether, finally, all such attempts do not end in the mere inclinations of man. However hard and unfair the opinion may be that "the virtues of the ancients were splendid sins" (*virtutes veterum splendida vitia*), inconceivable it is not.

Christianity has, as one of its great accomplishments, freed morality from mere nature, and with incomparably greater clearness than before placed the moral problem in front of the soul of man. But the solution was not, on account of this, rendered easier but more difficult. Holding all human ability as useless, there remained only the flight to a miracle of Divine grace: such alone could create a new disinterested life. But is not the centre of gravity through this shifted outside us? And do we not sink to the level of lifeless instruments and mere indecisive receptacles of Divine decree? Also, it remains in darkness how such a regenerated man could escape from the toils and tangles of his own nature, and how his life and actions could free themselves from subjective conditions. Christian love is much praised, but it is often forgotten in the midst of this praise to ask if such love is possible, and if it really exists. Thus the knot is not so much untied as cut asunder; and the violence of the solution has, as its consequence, the oscillation, on the one side,

between a supernatural view brought forth through a powerful achievement which will destroy all personal action and morality, and on the other side, an accommodation in the egotism of his own nature which falls into the danger of relapsing into the rear of the antiquated solution of the problem. Is it no relapse to a lower level when, within the Christian world, questions concerning rewards and punishments occupy such a prominent place?

Also, our age in its own way has taken up the struggle against the pettiness of the natural forms of life. Through the transformation of the whole man into thought—into an objective world-embracing thought—our age believes itself able to transform him into a cosmic nature and to wrest him from all his embarrassments. Here, too, such liberative process pushes against insurmountable barriers. A thought and life born of external things desires an entry into the deepest essence, and fancies it receives it in all the entanglements of the problem of truth; on the other hand, the doubt is raised if thought by itself in the overcoming of the opposition can include the whole nature of man, or if the kingdom of thought, in all its breadth and fulness, does not leave unbroken the egotistic impulsive life. This seems to be the case on the ordinary level of our modern life of culture.

All in all this characteristic movement of modern times unveils here a rough dilemma. If the aim of the good is clearly grasped, it sprouts through the whole soil of human energy; and on the other hand, a mere adjustment of things to our own nature is nothing less than an inward subversion of that nature. Thus each alleged conclusion rapidly transforms itself

into a problem, and increases incessantly the distance between us and the goal of the good.

Human society has not prevented such sorrow and toil from bringing forth a certain civic honourableness and righteousness. The question is, how much good of a definite nature is imbedded in the attempt to fold together the interests of the individual into a well-authorised system, and place such interests for reciprocal movements on the chess-board, in order to make possible an endurable co-operative life. As much as this is certain, that where conventional righteousness exhibits itself as the one true and culminating virtue, deeper natures in all times have handled it as a miserable delusion and have branded it as a pernicious pharisaism. Only such human performances satisfied such deeper natures as took possession of the aim of life right down to the inward abandonment of all that is base; and, meanwhile, with a strong ardour for love and righteousness, thirsting spirits found the ordinary level of life as a hollow caricature. What is true, however, of the true and the good is also true of the whole of the Spiritual Life. Such a life holds before us a new kind of existence, but the energy to reach such an existence it verifies not, and this seems in no way verifiable. But if such a conviction of our inability to verify such an existence takes root, it transforms our previously possessed aims to bare illusions, and consequently all confederate work falls into pieces. Is the situation thus, or is there some kind of help, some kind of passable exit?

(γ) *The Insufficiency of an Alleged Remedy.*—Modern life is convinced that it has a ready exit out

of the exposed entanglements upon the particular ground of experience without any kind of transformation of reality, and it hopes to become equipped to deal with the problem by holding and overcoming the particular energies which are misplaced in the problem. The solution is to take place through a belief in the power of the progressive evolution of humanity aided by society and history—two factors which the modern man holds out against all doubt, and which enable him to take up life with a joyous courage. That such a course of thought, as it presents itself in the foreground, is peculiar and problematic, will appear clearer as we proceed.

Such a course of thought understands the band of society and history as the convincing energy of the Spiritual Life. Bred in the chaos of individual opinions, it affirms society as a connecting world of thought, and, at the same time, develops common aims and goods over against the bare self-preservation of the individual. But, as it was with the simultaneity of events, so is it, too, with succession—it engenders a combination and summing-up of energy; a later time takes over the achievements of an earlier time; the stones of the building fit into each other and rise into a pyramid of civilisation; the succession of generations eliminates the transient and subsidiary, and couples and fastens the essentials, and thus augments the fundamental inheritance of our domain. Thus humanity is able to build up a kingdom of reason far beyond the capability of the mere individual and the mere moment; although the ideal is certainly not reached at one stroke, yet, little by little, it is brought nearer home.

This unbounded ability of the ascent of the world of experience seems to render superfluous the need of splitting of reality into two different provinces. For what purpose, then, does man need religion when his wishes and hopes, little by little, come to realisation entirely on such a ground? Thus evolutionary thought becomes a rugged, and, indeed, a most dangerous enemy of religion.

It would have been difficult for such a thought to have won the mind of modern man with such convincing power had it not been that there stood behind it a significant new tendency of the life of civilisation itself. The nineteenth century has developed with characteristic energy an historical point of view; over against the eighteenth century it might be designated as the century of history. Not only do we occupy ourselves as investigators far more with the past, but also we interlace it more closely with our own present work; we seek to introduce the inheritance of the ages into our work, and in this manner to establish a richer, clearer, and more concrete work. Thus it is in law and religion, in science and art. At the same time, in consequence of the easier and more rapid intercourse, more reciprocal relationships and co-operative work originate; we feel ourselves more closely bound and connected together; we experience in such results a powerful ascent of our abilities over against all earlier times. Such an energetic development and such a clear consciousness of historico-social modes of life make it conceivable how, from such a development, the results of the main problem may be expected.

A deeper and more penetrating reflection is, how-

ever, necessary in order to read more correctly that opinion of our day, and in order to perceive that history and society in all their accomplishments on the periphery of life heighten rather than lessen the problem at the centre. With compelling force the following dilemma raises its head: History and Society are *either*, as evidences of the mere greatness of experience, testimonies of a confused and conflicting situation which has appeared clearly before our eyes; and if so, history and society participate in the entanglements of the situation, and cannot raise themselves beyond the situation or inwardly free themselves from it. *Or* there results in history and society such actual effects of elevation and freedom; and if this happens, they do not work out of their own energy, but there is imbedded in them a superior power which prepares them as means and ways. Then it is not history and society but something that in the meantime remains completely unknown that consummates the transformation.

What gain could issue out of the recognition that man, as he suffers and lives, merely links himself to his equals? The energies gather themselves together without much toil in their action upon things: whilst activities perform their work and reciprocally supplement and fold themselves, differentiate and particularise themselves, a powerful increase of behaviour and a thorough consolidation and refinement of the work are accomplished. This work, through such inflation, has transformed the contour of our existence and drawn our life more and more into its own vortex. But does such an advance of the work itself signify the gain of an inward harmony, and are men in

conviction and character—in the whole of their being—brought nearer to one another, so that the true and the good for which they strive become easier and gain a conquest of reason over all the dangers and resistance? Experience on this point reveals the very opposite. A growing disunion of mind is rendered necessary in order to support the amalgamation of work; we observe more and more contrasts opening out amongst men, which swell to ever greater passion and hatred, thus causing individual to stand against individual, vocation against vocation, race against race, nation against nation, empire against empire. When, indeed, was humanity so full of dissensions as to-day, and this in the midst of all the coherence of united practical work? Also, the admission and the belief themselves do not verify the statement that a real union of individuals is possible without a further addition of reason, or that through such a contact with one another a fixed truth easily and quickly springs forth. If we view, however, our parliaments and the great gatherings of the people, it seems clear how very little so-called public opinion is able to differentiate between the definite and the indefinite, and how defenceless it falls often before robust force, and, indeed, even before audacity and a daring to plunder. When we become aware of this, we shall think less confidently of the alleged summation of truth. There is, indeed, no joyous activity for humanity without a trust in some kind of conquest of reason in its own sphere, but this conquest must be something other than the gain of the ordinary and the commonplace; and when such a conquest comes to its own, a different kind of truth-energy must sway

humanity than that which lies in the opinions and interests of individuals and masses. Also, the evident strengthening of the convictions and tendencies of human society gives not the slightest security for their actual truth. And, too, stubborn errors can strike here their fast roots, and with a kind of sacred authority grow from generation to generation. Later times revere then calmly the undisputed truth which the tradition of the centuries had sanctioned. But this sanction is of a purely human kind; and if there stands not something more than human behind it, sooner or later the day must dawn when the usurpation is seen through and the alleged truth is stripped of its deception. And then a powerful upheaval results, and each and every truth falls lightly into doubt.

These considerations lead into the province and problem of history. Here, also, a significant achievement is unmistakable; but the question is, if such achievement, through what it receives from the doctrine of evolution, is able to create a definite cleavage between reason and unreason and to possess the security of a growing mastery of reason. In certain respects there results evidently an increase of material as well as a progressive adjustment of work; this is to be witnessed in the exact and positive sciences and in technics. What the particular movement here achieves is a gain in the duration of its material, and in the linking together of epochs into an unbroken chain of activity and production. But will this bond of union be reached if the inner existence and convictions of man are laid on one side, if the question of absolute truth remains in the back-

ground, if the activity revolves around the circumference and not around the centre of life? Was the historical movement a progressive gain in spiritual substance? Has it incessantly clarified our fundamental relationship to reality, and overcome the previously explained contradictions of our nature? Have we become greater, nobler, happier men, and has the daily life transmuted itself into a kingdom of reason? Our particular consideration of the struggle for the true and the good has already given us a decisive answer; the seeming near-at-hand solutions proved themselves insufficient, and when we dive ever deeper into the entangled abyss, we discover an ever greater cleft between wish and capacity. More and more our life tears itself away from a naïve standpoint and seeks new paths. But the energy of the denial corresponds not to that of the affirmation: energies and movements are found in abundance, but no definite aim which governs, fastens, and raises them.

The strenuous efforts with the past and the development of a historical consciousness must heighten the impression of this situation; what these efforts gain in knowledge threatens to overbalance in the loss to life. When a keen outlook on history presents before us the multi-coloured abundant material of human striving, and when it shows alternately slow and rapid changes and transformations of ideals and their ever fragile nature—material which the man had achieved with toil and which had filled his soul—then the question raises itself imperatively, whether all human toil for truth and reason is a labour in vain. With what right may we hold and defend truths as being

definite and settled simply because they were so in earlier times, but which are now seen through as errors? The Indian words, "We were what you are, you shall become what we are," should recall us to the realisation of the penumbra of such relative truths.

Let us consider impartially the situation of the present. Historical inquiry stands in magnificent blossom, it extends its kingdom ever onward, and ever more accurately it explores its ramifications. More accurate, indeed, than we realise is the validity of truth to the great investigator. But do we gain, with all our insight, a more secure support for that which is valid to us as truth? And are we not inwardly poor in the midst of this overflowing kingdom? Or, one indicates to us a particular positive truth—a fundamental truth for life and existence—which is carried to us on the current of history. The insight that all is to be conceived as in a process of flux, and that all the later comes under the influence of the former, is not likely to make valid the belief in a particular truth in the sense referred to.

This joyous belief in history has an hypothesis which it cannot verify and which soon suffers a shock. This belief accepts as true that the movement of humanity from of yore has transmuted itself into the elements of reason, and that through this the movement possesses an unassailable foundation, and consequently is able to erect its structure step by step. But reason is not a ready-made thing given to us, but presents itself to us as a task; doubts and strife ever anew draw us back, and the reasonable character of the whole turns again and again into doubt. And on account of this, our belief in such an evolution falls

to the ground. Such a denial signifies in no manner a complete transmission of history into unreason. But if any kind of reason works in history, it must originate out of an *over-empirical and over-historical* source; and such a source will hardly find its highest aim in a superstructure of the kingdom of history. History can never, out of its own capacity, create pure reason, but remains a turbid mixture of little reason and much unreason.

The untenableness of the evolution theory also is corroborated through its own history. This history shows it as a testimony of various kinds of thought-procedure and afflicted with an inward contradiction. Modern thought believed itself to have grasped directly, through the ascending scale of life, an absolute truth, and to be able to carry this truth fully into the human province. Such a course of thought took up, first of all, a tendency against history, and placed the explanations of its discovery before a powerful tribunal of reason; there resulted, however, in a calmer mood, the view that history should be conceived as a revelation of reason—indeed, it was conceived as a gradual evolution of the whole of reason. History appeared to such a mental procedure not so much as that which is able to engender reason out of itself, but as that which is encircled and carried along its course by a timeless reason, thus placing the main standard of life *not within* but *above* Time. Then followed the change to immediate existence through the realism of the nineteenth century; and to that change the over-historical life became a mere illusion and bare impossibility; history was placed entirely upon the ground of natural immediate ex-

perience. But through this happened what signifies the modern view of life: the old view is fundamentally rejected, but the claim is to be rightly maintained that the new view is able to perform less than was thought possible. The historical movement should be understood more on its empirical side, but, at the same time, it appears as a witness of reason which held unswervingly to a belief in the strong reign of law, in an incessant ascent, and in a progressive conquest of the good. Such a mixture of different kinds of mental procedure tends necessarily to a blunting of the problem, and obscures the sharp *Either—Or* which doubtless lies here; and the mixture becomes a serious danger to the energy and truth of life. This danger is rapidly growing on all sides, and the doctrine of evolution on its empirical side, with its confidence in the culture of society and in history, has now reached the masses. But on the height of spiritual activity such a doctrine has been broken and overcome. The untenableness and even the destructive energy of the limiting of life within the merely human area appear constantly before us. Where man sinks wholly into the relationship of the human environment, where his anxiety for his position in the mere simultaneity and succession of things allows him to forget all else, then he loses in inward independence, in depth of soul, and becomes inevitably a shallow and babbling nature in which finally all characteristic life and all truthful present consciousness disappear. We witness with painful clearness to-day a strong decline of inward culture; more and more, leading minds fail in creative power; ever less does man find definite satisfaction in all the bustle of our modern mechanism; ever

more is the inward life lowered in its pitch to the commonplace; and ever clearer it becomes apparent that all the gain on the periphery of life cannot counterbalance the loss which occurs at the centre. In the last resort, it is true that we live our existence from out the centre, and although this fact may be forgotten in our relationship to the environment, it can never be permanently lost. If, therefore, the proffered solution of the evolutionary theory fails, the main question faces us again with a harsh distinctness: *Either* the complete surrender of reason and, along with this, an inward subversion of life, *or* an ascent beyond the ordinary level and a new tendency which not only grapples strongly with the contradictions, but also lifts the inward life out of them and sets that life to work against all obstacles. It is a great gain in the midst of all the chaos of the present time to realise that all attempts to run away from this dilemma are more and more seen through as a delusive hybridisation of life.

PART II.—THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS OF UNIVERSAL RELIGION

(Continued)

CHAPTER VII

b. The Progressive Autonomy of the Spiritual Life

Hitherto the movement in the direction of the Spiritual Life appeared as a particularly difficult contradiction. The Spiritual Life presented great problems, and we find in ourselves no energy for their solution; it demanded a cosmic character and yet the narrowness of the self coerced it; it promised a clarification of existence and yet it was the first to bring the darkness of existence prominently before us. A contradiction which comes suddenly upon the inmost kernel of life allows itself not to be placed calmly on one side—at least not for a strong nature with its corresponding strong thought. If the aims of life are simply unreachable, every attempt to reach them must be excluded, and they must vanish out of our existence as deceitful illusions. But we, at the same time, dare not allow so much to perish, for all this exhibited what gives eminence to man above all else, and what constitutes the good and the noble in his life—in fact, what constitutes all the inner onward movement of humanity and all

the meaning and content of life. Is such a complete collapse inevitable, and does no path offer itself to meet the catastrophe?

There is one and only one possibility. The final cause of the contradiction consisted in affirming that the Spiritual Life appeared as an activity of the mere individual self, and that it was bound up in the situation and custom of this self. Man forms out of his surrounding conditions a special province over against the great All; reality stands over against him as something alien, and his life appears as a pendulum swinging between his own particular province and this great All of things. Things being thus, if the Spiritual Life is called to bridge inwardly the gulf, to unfold the infinite on a definite point, the impossibility of such an achievement becomes evident, and all attempts will be wrecked on the rocks of the contradiction. This intolerable situation is to be escaped only if the Spiritual Life were not railed simply within the human province; if it contributed in some kind of way to the winning of an independence and of a power to draw reality into itself; and if it were able from within to expand and become a universe of its own. Through this the Spiritual Life would be raised above the opposites; man would win, through his participation in the new life, freedom from the narrowness of his subjective existence; and in that which at first seemed to oppress him—as an unfulfilled demand from without—he seeks and finds the inmost nature of his true self. For the insufficiency and even the contradiction of life within the mere-human circle reveal themselves ever clearer. Then an activity of a spiritual order is no longer

satisfied to accept languidly a rigid and indifferent kind of existence which accrues from the mere motive-powers, but is able to penetrate to the depth of one's own nature and to attain to the might and ardour of self-affirmation. Thus the opposition of subject and object, of one's own individual standpoint and one's external material, can be taken up into the Life-process itself and here overcome. If this happens, there results a hope of such an illumination over the whole meaning of the Spiritual Life which was not possible so long as that Life signified only a particular speck of a universe of chaff and dust. In brief, an avenue opens in a new and opposite direction, provided that the possibility of such a Life is more than a mere possibility, and provided that it reveals a corresponding reality.

All continuation of life's movement and all success depend on the existence of such a reality. The many problems and entanglements connected with the existence of such a reality constitute a further question: in the first place, it is necessary that our anxiety concerning that question should not blind us to the real fact itself. The attention must be set on this fact alone, and set against any incidental reflection which prevents us from storming this new path, for this is not a pert merriment in knight-errantry but that which Goethe named as the best of counsellors—*Necessity.*

That a new actuality, however, of an independent kind rises in us becomes more and more evident; through this we seek to effect an emancipation of the life from the small self and from the petty-human level, in order that we may overcome the inward

opposition and gain a new self. Our object in this work will be to survey the whole of this new life, to estimate its significance, and to examine its transformation in its view of the world and of life.

1. *The Several Stages*

(α) *The Emancipation of Life from the small self and the merely human order.*—All spiritual manifestation appears first of all so vague in the isolated individual, and we need only view such manifestation from its content in order to verify the fact that it forms new connections which produce transformations upon the individual. We observe the Spiritual Life always linking the elements into a Whole; the separate elements come together not only from without, but bind and complete themselves, too, from within; within this embracing Whole each special act has to seek its location and to prove its significance. It is most distinctly so in science, and it is so wherever movement of thought extends—we find everywhere a change from mere bare aggregate to a system, everywhere general movement and dependence of the individual upon the Whole. Life, through such an extension, alters itself as well in its single states. Life thus appears, in so far as it is of a spiritual kind, not as a matter of the mere individual, or as something pivoted on its own special point; but what the individual obtains through great effort carries in itself the assertion to all others of its validity and power to bring something of value to all, and attempts to demand from all a recognition of its claims. Truth is ever a matter for the whole of

humanity and never a private possession; in the assertion of truth the individual may feel himself as a representative, indeed, as a tool of the Whole, and through this inward presence of the Whole he is lifted out of the chances and changes of his individual position. Springing from his work an inward necessity issues its call, that what he with labour achieved can become the possession of all; and that such a possession particularly gives activity its tenacity and success its joy.

The Life-process, however, could barely grow above the severance of individual from individual did there not lie in it, on the whole, a superiority above the mere human and above the web of external presentations and interests. Thought with its truth could not possess the certainty of its validity for all men if it did not hold valid over against all men; it could win no inward present moment with man without the initiation if not the culmination of a transformation in himself. The independence of truth from all human opinions and "may-bes" has constituted since the time of Plato the basal confession of science; however riddlesome the matter may be the conviction will not allow itself to give up the belief that truths originate in a sphere which lies beyond the mechanical work of ideas in the brain; man does not engender such truths, but discovers them; and they are not measured by him, but he is measured by them. It is from such a source alone that the joyous belief in the power of truth, which inspires all striving, interprets itself; and it is out of such a belief that the energy is available to stand, if necessary, against the whole environment,

and to feel one's self on the side of the right against all others, and also to take up courageously the struggle against deep-rooted errors in all their forms. Indeed, man becomes a problem to himself; he can examine and sift, and with longing and energy strive after a transformation of life. Thus, there results through the living power of the truth-content a rearrangement in man's whole view of things. On the one hand, truth shall be held valid not as one's own individual opinion but as a thing *in itself*; and on the other hand, truth is accessible within one's own individual life alone. Thus there exists and works in man something more than human, and consequently he does not become a mere bottled-up kind of vessel.

Similarly as shows itself the movement from mere opinion to truth, shows itself the movement from utility to the good. The useful corresponds to the material of the natural or social self-preservation, and is able within a given province to maintain and to improve its particular situation; evidently here the effort governs the broad ordinary level of human existence. But the effort is not able to accomplish this without opposition. Man can have no choice but to feel the useful, with its natural and social self-preservation, as indispensable; and he has no choice either but to see that all proffered happiness is too narrow and petty, and to long for wider and nobler aims. It is something of this nature that comes to expression in the idea of the good; in such an idea something is aspired after which raises man beyond his easy smugness; what appears to him now of value is to be found through struggle and pain,

and stands in direct opposition to the aims of his mere natural welfare. If such an idea of the good operates as a gravitating force on man, if it wins his particular energy and conviction, therefore it must be something grounded in his very nature, something which proves this nature to be more than a mere increase of an intelligence which issued out of the endowed animal world. What is gained here through emancipation from the ordinary effortless situation and from the small human mode of life finds its richest expression in the fact of morality. It is true that we are aware to-day of manifold opinions concerning the content of morality, yet its slow "becoming" on the field of humanity appears to us clearer than to former times, but the primal phenomenon of morality asserts itself victoriously against the one time as against the other. Though the realisation of the good may be a difficult problem and may rend asunder peoples and epochs, yet the fact remains that in all places and at all times of the historical consciousness something appears as binding and as a law above mere arbitrary action, something which abandons the mere standard of utility. What one, however, accentuates and reveres as a good is not some one thing lying by the side of other things, but something considered as a sovereign swaying thing which demands universal recognition. If, further, the good in man has climbed slowly from faint beginnings to a persistent clearness, what has altered its nature? True, the good is in that movement often drawn closer to the useful, and seems, indeed, to issue entirely out of the useful. But all this confusion of the two currents of the good and the useful in man lessens in no wise the distance

between their different natures; for however much the useful may receive by an appearance of good, to become the good itself is impossible for it. It is true that in regard to the good the movement seems to proceed from outward inward; much of the good which seems to ascend directly from within has been imported from the social environment, education, custom, and other sources. But even here the inward assimilation and the acceptation into one's will remain as a special act—as an independent achievement; all the effects from without would glide in vain as over a hard rock, or could not pass beyond a clever parrot's prattle, had not such effects awakened an inherent consciousness in human nature. The initial custom can become a moral activism, but so long as it remains a mere custom and nothing more, it is not yet moral. What, however, may be designated as moral suffers in value the moment it is considered as a testimony of bare custom.

Morality thus remains an unconquerable primal phenomenon of the Spiritual Life. In the Spiritual Life, however, there lies an entire transformation of human nature as well as the most fundamental emancipation from the smallness of the mere natural order. When it turns away from the "ends" of natural self-preservation, and turns towards the absoluteness of its demands, morality appears first of all as an overlaying imperative and brings into birth such characteristic greatness as "the ought," duty, and law. It appears usually, in consequence, to the religious conviction as a revelation of a world "beyond" and as a Divine injunction to man. But such a meaning includes one side only of the fact and needs

necessarily a completion; if that "beyond" does not in some kind of way transplant itself into a "here and now," the purity of morality is cast into the greatest peril. What works upon us from the external only could not move the soul in any other way than through the holding out of consequences—through the promise of reward and the threat of punishment. Through this, however, man would be thrown back upon the position from which morality should free itself, and the narrow circle within him would not be broken through. Man can unfold his own activities only in so far as they appertain to his own particular nature; the law, in which these activities appear, must be an inward self-willed, self-given law. Such an assimilation of morality in our own existence is, however, impossible unless a growth in the inward parts beyond the small self takes place, and unless morality casts asunder the notion of a coercion. An "ought" which we ourselves help to found must carry in itself a will—perhaps a will lying far behind the passing moment; and such an "ought" must, too, labour for the emancipation and the expression of life. As every energetic Nay hid in itself a Yea, so is morality in the denial of the old at the same time an affirmation of the new; in its onward march on this positive path morality grows to a self-affirmation, and wins a portion in all of an inward and abiding affection of a strong and joyous kind.

The testimony of experience corroborates this with a clear voice. It refutes from its very foundation that which perceives only an abandonment and denial, a diminution and depression of existence, in moral activity; and denies as well that which bewails the

creative evil of human activity. The denial was not at all of a definite moral kind when it proceeded out of an unwilling and coercive frame of mind; for love and joy failed it, and consequently it had in an inward manner no value. Humanity, indeed, in its energetic moral movement stands in no way dependent on the perception of limits and pressure, and it does not feel itself timid and humble, but experiences and perceives a raising of its own nature in all its struggles and sorrows. Thrown back, as it were, upon the primal source of its own energy, it could feel itself secure in the midst of monstrous doubt, rich in the midst of external poverty, a free lord of things though surrounded by powerful oppression; and in its seeming setting and even collapse it is able to herald the dawn of a new spirit, a new life, and a new world.

How, in the memory of humanity, stand the men whom we most have to thank for the development of the ideal world of morals, and in what did they find the kernel of their work—men such as Plato, the Stoics, Luther, Kant, and Fichte? Were they small, nervous, depressed natures, or were they rather free and energetic natures—heroes of the spirit? Brutal men of power they were certainly not, for their freedom carried in itself a shrinkage of the mere self, and it was clear to them beyond any doubt that there was no affirmation of a spiritual kind without a denial of their bare natural existence.

Morality could become a power and reality in the common life only through such an energy of affirmation. And it has become that in spite of all the contradictions of daily life and in spite of all the scorn of opponents. However much morality

remains usually in the background, it needs only greater stimulus, compulsion, and emotion, to break forth with rapturous energy as an independent force, and consequently to unlock through its own energy a new nature to man, and to offer him a fixed support and a reliable succour. All such blossoming epochs invariably blew over humanity a renewal of the religious life; and then the nothingness of all mere natural and social existence was perceived with painful perspicuity as the deep abyss in which all human life and effort became fully visible. But even in the denial of all customary help, and, indeed, in the submersion of the whole existing world, the conviction of the indestructibility of our inmost nature unfolds itself with overwhelming energy, and out of the collapse of all the customary hunt after happiness there dawns the hope and even the certainty of a newer, more definite, and purer bliss. Particular nations have shown themselves capable of a deepening and transforming power in kindred directions when their very independence was in danger, and when they had to fight for their existence or non-existence. Also, the movement and the renewal reached into the smaller circle of private life; here, indeed, where all external lustre and renown of historical acts fail, where all the fortified energy of society fails, the greatest heroism may yet develop, full of ardent love and joyous self-denial. Thus are the pessimists and sceptics wrong throughout when they assert that the matter is done with and ended in the downfall of the sham appearances in which daily life and the common impulses had wrapped themselves. For behind the standard which

rules that thought lies a further standard; behind that mechanism of life lies a depth which holds its own against all the stir and strife of the small and common on the highways of human life. Without this activity of its present moment of consciousness, human existence must fall to pieces. All energetic activity for humanity relies upon this depth, and comprehends a belief in the possibility of an inward renewal. The same may be said of all great practical, political, social, and educational manifestations. These alone give man an inexhaustible possession which he seizes in all his dire need. All culture which flings away this depth through deprecation of morality robs itself of indispensable motive-powers, and becomes in the whole of its existence, in spite of its otherwise brilliant performances, shallow and hollow; it threatens to fall into decay unless it possesses that which gives salt to life and which turns the will from mere natural impulse.

Morality is thus in its seeming weakness a mighty power, and is in its seeming strangeness the most original energy of our life. When, however, that which otherwise stands outside us is taken into the will, when a new order of things—an infinity—drives the man from within so that nevermore does he seem to stand alone, but seems as if carried by a majestic flood of life, then clearly results a deliverance from the small self, and a cosmic life, a superhuman life, reveals itself actively in the form of immediacy.

Morality is in all this not a particular province of a man's own but the testimony of a new life out of the Whole, out of Infinity. As clear as daylight the fact stands in front of us that the spiritual activity

knows no bounds, that it tolerates no external hindrance, and that it perceives all which it as yet has not made its own as a resistance and a reproach. An all-inclusive life, in this manner, dawns in man, and at the same time morality shows that nowhere is he more himself than within his moral province. Must not this kind of thing then alter fundamentally all the prior views of man?

(β) *The Inward Antithesis overcome.*—We have already observed the dawning of an infinite life in man as well as his striving liberating him from the small self and the mere ordinary level of humanity. But a doubt can arise, whether this change is energetic enough to reach the root of life; whether the cleft previously referred to between subject and object, between the individual standpoint and its opposite, does not confine man within the mere surface-level of things, and does not hold him fast to a mere subjective mood and stimulation. Our next concern and question will be to see whether this cleavage can somehow be bridged, and whether the life can disengage itself from the destructive antithesis.

The treatment of this question can easily fall into a false path when it misconstrues that such an antithesis is not endowed by nature, but has originated in the course of history. The sensuous beginnings of life allow the consciousness and its object to flow in perfect unison, the psychical impressions swim on the current of the environment, and the human sphere has not yet opposed individual and society to one another. But the movement of thought grows and works everywhere towards differentiation and perspicuity; in such work the subject begins to

realise itself, and at the same time acquires greater rigour and independence; and, consequently, the life finds itself more and more posited between an antithesis, and through this is driven further out of its previous unity. But the liberation of the object from the immediacy of sensation is in no way its complete banishment out of life; indeed, it remains present in a freer kind of way, for we saw a counter-movement originate in which the very same thing that is pressed back on the one side is again appropriated on the other side. How could thought itself without such an adherence and a reapproach of the object mark its own frontier over against the mere presentations? How could the idea raise itself above the impressions of sensation, the judgment above mere association of ideas, and the causal nexus above the mechanism of presentations, if they were not able to transplant themselves in the very midst of the facts, to develop their duration, and to maintain their necessity in a region beyond the mere impressions of sensation? The Spiritual Life thus never falls entirely on the external side, so that another side presents itself and occupies our attention because it belongs to our existence and is encompassed by our life.

Now, however, this life develops a further movement which brings both sides together into closer contact, which leads the two to some kind of union, and thus enables the one to grow by means of the other. It is the gravitation of the object from the region of work or mere external activity which translates the outward into an inward. Such inwardness alone—such acceptation of the external into the particular life—makes it conceivable how work can

become one's own aim, how we can love it and bring to it sacrifice, and how we are able to drown all our sorrows and needs in the joy which lies beyond them. The task is laid upon us mainly through an external necessity, and often in the initial stages it is discovered as a painful burden. But when the task enables us to fasten it to an inward staple, when it is able to become a thing of value for us, and when out of the obligation freedom and joy burst forth, then the seeming stranger proves itself clearly enough to be a piece of our very life: we affirm and uplift ourselves whilst we serve the necessity of the facts.

The most varied provinces of life point this out with equal clearness; each province, however, shows it in its own special way. That there is no definite knowledge without a relationship with the nature and necessity of the object has been already often noticed and needs no further explanation; but in Art it is shown even clearer how a Life-process of a spiritual kind encircles both inward and outward sides, and enables them to sail together; and how, out of the contact, an inner development issues. On its highest summits, as in the life-work of a Goethe, Art is neither a mere reception and copy of an external world surrounding us nor is it a mere setting of a ready-made inner life, but both inward and outward are raised into a corporate region of life and here in one another and through one another are carried further. The inwardness gains a solid configuration and a distinctive individuality in this recasting mould; the object, however, could not mean much to the Life-process had it not itself

received an inspiration from within, and had it not been able to communicate with this. All this is removed as far as possible from a vague parallel flow of both sides, for only where the initial chaos is overcome and a clear division has resulted can Art begin its work, for it finds itself first of all facing an opposite, and has to labour to penetrate beneath the surface-content of both sides. But this labour overcomes the opposite and holds it fast; and while it does this, if on the lower level the one might suppress the other, yet on the heights a reciprocal relationship is reached; the opposing forces of a subjective and an objective, of an idealistic and a realistic division, yield to a treatment which may be designated as the sovereign treatment in so far as here the Life-process is freed from all dependence on the "hither and thither" of things, and is raised to the level of a full self-reliance.

The creations of Goethe are admired on account of their objective quality, but this objectivity signifies in no way a slavish adherence to an external existing material, but in this very material the spirit of man proves its superiority, for he posited the material within the ground of the inner life and filled it with life anew. Through such a course alone can the material reveal its own nature and provide for the whole of life. This is the wondrous and further development: the object, even in its assimilation by the subject, does not lose its own independence and characteristic features, but through this assimilation develops those features. Thus the consciousness itself grows by means of the object, and the whole of life wins, in being raised above the opposite of mere empty sentimentalism

and dead matter, an objective and even an essential character. We can now say:

> "Nothing is within alone,
> Nothing is without alone,
> For what's inward is, too, outward,
> And what's outward is, too, inward."

The double-sidedness and inward reciprocity of life appear in another colour through the relationship of man with man and through the superstructure of political and social connections. Out of the surface-content there could never issue an inward communion and interchange of life without the ability of man to transpose himself into the soul of another, to think and feel with that other, for through this there is granted him an independence and a power to move within suitable bounds. Without such an inward pressure of another upon the individual, there is no good-will, no sympathy, no definite compassion and no reciprocal judgment concerning right and obligation. The idea of right shows with special clearness our ability to distinguish that "other" from ourselves, to transpose ourselves upon his standard, and to think and measure out of his standard; thus the "beyond" is simultaneously a "here and now," and the separation is not done away with, but the life is raised above it. Only by such an exit from one's ordinary sphere can a conjoint order of human relationships become possible—an order which strives after a kingdom of righteousness.

Encompassing all these individual provinces, activity accomplishes an inner scale of values for the individual as well as for the whole of humanity. If all which we take up in our work draws incomparably nearer

to us and becomes a piece of our life, then the whole of such activity itself may form a self-reliant province and become what we designate as our "calling"; a piece of reality is thus appropriated inwardly by us; this grants a stability to life in itself and against itself as well as a superiority over whim and caprice. In fact, it is a consciousness of unassailable worth which is secure within its inward citadel in spite of the immensity of the alien and inconceivable without. In a similar manner, humanity itself prepares a province and a world of action progressively out of an alien world. What appertains to this world of action may include, indeed, many problems, but it signifies undoubtedly an actuality; it constructs a starting-point for all further labour; it holds men and things fast together, and binds single periods of time into a continuous chain; it resists a dissolution into the small and egotistic, and resists, too, the constant change of that current which flows on the surface of time; it stands against all arbitrary action concerning the contour of things; and it feels bound to come to an understanding with what is able to produce effects in the depth and duration of things. In all such expansion the man discovers his real self through his own soul, and finds that he is incomparably more in himself than he could possibly be through the cultivation of his mere natural self; he becomes far more his own true self than he had become when under the dominion of natural impulses. Indeed, the man is now more, and comprehends his life as more than is revealed by the first glance of things; consequently, effective transformations of this glance become urgent.

Activity alone gives man a secure feeling of

reality; without activity life threatens to vanish as a shadow and a dream. Activity grants life such a consolidation through the progress of work as a superior and upholding force. Such a progress binds activity and work. The "becoming" of such a work is a highly characteristic transaction; even in the hurried design of it there originates a kernel, an idea, a governing centre, just as has happened in the growth of the physical universe and in the formation of organic life. The kernel shoots up more and more around the centre, the rough outline grows and shapes itself, it stands before our thought as a self-reliant essence which strives to pass from the region of quasi-existence to that of a complete reality; and through such movement it becomes a driving and judging force within the life. The initial insecurity is then overcome, the multiplicity of energies find their way back towards the centre, mutually form their boundaries and determine themselves in turns; the different possibilities which, at first, treat one another peaceably are now urged to a decision, and life as a whole is driven into a definite arena. The work develops an experience by itself, and it is only when the two sides of work and conscious activity are related to one another in an encompassing and fruitful manner that a definite experience originates over against a bare empiricism. Also, the work does not require that the truth should be corroborated through external proofs; the corroboration is in the man's own triumphant effort, in his own deduction, and in the active ascent of his life. In all this there is present a withdrawal from self and a return to self, and, at the same time, there is an

inward crystallisation of a reality which is durable within one's own province. Such concentration and crystallisation of life raise the man above all the groping and lingering of mere mental reflection, and make him yield to a power which may be termed the necessity of the fact, and which without question brings forth a further development of life.

But action cannot accomplish so much as all this so long as it lies sundered and isolated merely by the side of other actions. But the more it reaches a spiritual character, the more it outgrows that isolation until it becomes the expression of a universal characteristic, and a piece of an all-embracing aggregate action. Or, is not every work of art and of thought in its individuality a confession at the same time of the Whole, and is there not in it, in spite of external limits, a conception of the Infinite? And is there not in the struggle for the right of this Infinite an essential truth and a universal *Weltanschauung* contended for? Thus in definite spiritual activity all individual actions are spanned by an aggregate living activity, and it is through reaching such, and in no other way that life can gain an inner unity and a solidity—gain the character of a definite reality. Such a reality can never fall on us from without; it is obtained through a great struggle in the welding-heat of subject and object which results through a turn towards activism. This welding-process, however, takes place not somewhere between the inner and the outer world, but purely in an inner world which has taken up into itself the antithesis. It is out of the Spiritual Life alone that there issues a reality for man.

Through such inwardness of the activity—especially of the encompassing life-activity—there is also present a formation of the spiritual nature of man. When labouring along with this, he labours on the heights of his own nature and obtains in the struggle a spiritual individuality. It is this, which appears from one point of view as the construction of a new world, appears at the same time as a construction of his own nature—a lawful work against his own lower self. The mere expansion of activity is not of a true nature unless the man struggles with his own self and thereby wins the energy and the fulcrum of self-maintenance. But, on the other hand, the inwardness of his characteristic nature does not reach this through brooding and sorrowing, but only through a stepping out of his own subjectivity, through a virile wrestling with things, and through a clarification and a further development of all things on the path of their greatest resistance. Thus we seek ourselves, but we find ourselves only in the plasticity of things and in the construction of a new world. So that, after all, we are within ourselves although we seemed to have stepped outside ourselves; and in the struggle we have won a true and larger province of life. All this shows clearly enough that a bridging of the cleft reaches down to the deepest ground of life; and through a recognition of this we find ourselves undoubtedly engaged in the constructive creation of our own spiritual individuality.

When we base our individual work upon such a foundation of aggregate work and of a spiritual individuality, it appears evident that the work of great souls retains a worth when all the surface-

appearances and the incessant leakage of time pass away. It is clear, too, that those souls handled the transitory nature of the appearance of things with great indifference. Goethe made such a confession of himself: "I have ever viewed all my work and accomplishments as no more than mere symbols; and in my deepest experience it seemed to me pretty much the same whether I made pots or pans."

How spiritual individuality develops into a life-work, and how it steps forth and grows alongside such life-work, has been shown by the leading minds with illuminating perspicuity. Such a work as that of Kant did not possess its most characteristic features and its greatness from the beginning as a mere natural product. Such a work acquired its originality only after a long and toilsome quest through which finally the striving burst out into blossom and fruit. In all movement he held before himself a fixed goal, and in all multiplicity a governing unity. Such a method led the energies to their highest tension, dispersed all that was alien and irresolute, and gave to the individual for the first time his distinctive stamp. Thus the characteristics of the Whole can participate in the smallest elements and fashion each and all according to the pattern of this Whole.

If this work of the spiritual "becoming" of man signifies so much, the decision concerning the success or the ill-success of the enterprise lies above all else in this: whether the ascent to such a level is accomplished or not. The inner course of life as well as the nature of the final convictions are determined throughout by nothing more than by the manner

in which this ascent takes place — whether such ascent is easy or difficult, whether it takes place through the restful development of natural construction or through powerful feeling and renewal. Indeed, if the decision failed here, life will appear soon as an offering of fate, later as a work of free activity, later still as filled with the harmony of existence, and finally as moved by its own contradictions.

What is true of the work of the individual is not less true of the work of the race. To a participation in work many are called; to the furtherance of definite culture few are chosen. It is only spiritual individuality bent on its work of life which gives culture an inward connection, a full self-reliance, and a living soul; and such spiritual individuality alone is able to span all the various provinces and to work with a rousing and durable energy upon the whole of life.

What differentiates people differentiates also epochs. Great are only those times which fasten their strivings to an undivided task in which man is able to take part with his whole nature; where this does not happen, all fulness of work, all exertion and movement of the individual and of the masses, produce neither stability of character nor joyousness of disposition; and, too, the advance of petty-human interests is not kept sufficiently at bay, so that the life will fluctuate aimlessly between a soulless performance and an empty frame of mind. It is only with a life-encompassing work that the otherwise fleeting and unreal time obtains the consciousness of an immanent eternity and of unassailable worth.

Finally, there proceeds through the whole striving

of humanity the desire to grasp the whole infinity of existence in one characteristic reality, and to transform existence into a totality of production, and, at the same time, to gain for the self a characteristic spiritual mode of life. All definite culture is also intrinsically a striving of humanity after an inner unity of its own life and nature; for if the striving remains less than this, culture remains something, in spite of its feverish industry, which merely hangs on us externally, and which finally becomes quite indifferent to the main spiritual problems of life. But if the relation of culture is found in close contact with the characteristic mode and self-maintenance of life, the life is raised securely above all natural and civic existence, for it has won a new world within itself.

There arises, therefore, in activity and production a rich reality; it arises, too, in problems and struggles. The Life-process reaches within itself an altitude above its prior hindrances, and bestows upon man, so far as he participates in it, an existence on the heights, out of which, as out of a solid kernel, there issues a counter-effect to the natural disintegration of things. This power has shown itself to belong to an upward level of life, but it signifies not as yet the final issue of life.

(γ) *The Winning of a Universal Self.*—Work forms, as a consummation of activity, the summit of life as well as the goal of effort; it remains the axis on which all further development has to turn. But with all its accomplishments it is not yet the final aim. That which renders work great signifies at the same time its limits, and the greatness itself seems unreachable without the aid of energies which the

work far more presupposes than produces. In particular, the Spiritual Life demands more unity, more freedom, more soul than the work is able of itself to produce.

(1) In work the inward energy and the external object reach a point of contact and a reciprocal impregnation. But such a bond of union within the consciousness is at the same time a switching off of the external; nowhere more than here holds valid the word that all close determination is also a negation (*omnis determinatio negatio*). Also, work, as an embodiment of a general conviction and as a *Weltanschauung*, retains a specific and abstract character; the transference of life into work and effort is thence a differentiation which, if made final, becomes dangerous. The complete immersion of man in the sea of work resigns him inevitably to a narrowness and easily to an egoism; also the spiritual individuality contains a lofty self-existence which quickly and pointedly rejects and excludes the claims of the mere external. That the work that binds at the same time disunites is clearly shown in the union of men as labour-groups; here originates a jealousy of vocation, and a passion of class-struggle which in a spirit of the wildest hatred against its opponents believes itself justified in the advocacy of common interests. And is the situation otherwise when nations fight for the increase of their products and for world-dominion?

Such disunion and split reach beyond the individual mind into the whole mode of thought. The speciality of work prevents us from seeing both aspects of its characteristics; it cannot develop certain energies without coercing others; work thus prepares for in-

dividuals, nations, and times, in their own life-circle, a special province and a special kind of existence, and yet we can not and may not renounce the truth that we need co-operation in a sphere of life common to all, need exchange in our work, and need to think of and to live for one another. Indeed, humanity as a whole is not able to consider the need of winning a spiritual individuality for the highest aspiration necessary unless it resigns itself to the claims of a universal truth.

(2) The strengthening and the calm of life are a further product of work. But without the counter-effect of liberating energies this very quality resigns itself into a numb fixture and an intolerable bondage; the fluctuation which inheres in work threatens to overwhelm and to suppress man. Does not work hold such fluctuation? Work needs for its success not only external conditions and favourable surroundings, but far more an inward ability which does not place our will under its heel, and which makes work devolve upon us as a good and a gift. These guests, however, decide concerning the result of our efforts and the happiness and worth of life in so far as they rise into work and activity. So much hardness, so much injury and even cruelty, are not discovered in connection with work so long as the happy results and the victorious achievements are kept before our eyes. But a pure result is seldom enough to be found, and amongst the favoured minds scarcely one was truly great who did not discover a wide cleft between wish and will, and who had not far more to say than was permitted him. Now, is this surplus presented to such minds to be treated as an indifferent

and worthless thing? And are all those wide and predominant provinces of life, which are lost by peoples and times, to be denied of their rich and far-reaching effects? We resist such an assumption and greet joyously that parable of Jesus of the talents, that there rises, beyond all the distinctions of the men and beyond the whole field of their several activities, that which is located in the decision and character of each individual. But does not this itself desire a new life? And how is such a life grounded? How does it rationally justify itself?

(3) In the main, the entanglements originate out of the relationship of work with the soul. The work to us was no external performance; it proved its presence and its greatness within the soul through the fact which culminated in freeing the man from all bare neutrality and subjectivity; it was found to be something resting in its own essence, something moved to further development by its characteristic energies. Work could accomplish such a feat only in so far as it drew into itself the very life of the soul, and in so far as this life set forth characteristically a reflected light from itself. But this emancipation of work has also a reverse side. The emancipation can become numb and exclusive; the connection relaxes and parts asunder from the whole of the soul; the work tears the self-sovereignty within itself, and through this the life does not only move in a track too narrow for itself, but also sacrifices its freedom to a mechanism of its own acts; and finally its specific spiritual character is turned into an impervious mechanism. Whilst work itself tears away so much from man and turns round as master upon the

originator, life transforms itself into a soulless mechanism in spite of all the straining of energy; the character retreats before the activity of work; the work overpowers the man and finally makes him its slave. So it happened where the whole Spiritual Life was transformed through a logical process into a particular movement of thought-process; so it happens in a more evident and painful manner still where technical work with its incessant headway captivates all thought and judgment; and so it happens everywhere where man is held as a mere tool for the progress of culture, and where the waves of the most extensive movements carry and drive him along without the participation of any power of his own.

Work, without a doubt, though it withdraws itself from the life of the soul, is again drawn back to the whole of the soul, is proved, valued, and enlivened; it is only through a constant return-movement to its own origin and through a continuous overcoming by the force of a spirituality superior to itself that it can unify the spiritual character and serve as the inward growth of life. If the words are true that man is more than his work, then the whole of humanity is more than the production of work; it must be no less than the creation of a culture and spiritual individuality.

Thus through a kind of necessity there arises a desire after a further development of life beyond the level of work—after a life which returns from its immersion in work to itself, which abides in itself, which holds fast the work and also allows a self superior to it to unfold. Does such a desire corre-

spond with any kind of reality within our experience? We answer in the affirmative; for above the levels of work, justice, culture, and mental individuality, the movement mounts upward to a level of creativeness and of love, of a spiritual personality and a pure immanent existence. Religion and Art especially appropriate the conception of this creativeness as a confession; the former, in order to exclude all union of the Divine effect with an alien material and dark fate; the latter, in order to explain its own work as a donum of free imagination and as a proof of the originality of the artist. Both could not appropriate the conception were it not rooted in the whole of life, and were there not mainly a deepening possible in the fact that work previously had ruled and bound life, and now is overcome by life itself. This happens, however, through a transformation into the free development and reflection of the Spiritual Life. Herewith life outgrows the heaviness and numbness which its prior development adhered to; now all dark residuum vanishes—the alien becomes a governor and the outward becomes an inward. On such elevation above the sphere of work and through a liberation from all the coercion of the numb "given," life becomes a complete immanent existence, a definite self-life, and a transformation to the heights; and it is in this that all lies which carries an uplifting energy and good cheer in itself. This creativeness strikes its roots into the soil of all the particular fields which contribute to the growth of the Spiritual Life as well as into those of science—a science which aimed previously to relate itself inflexibly in an opposite direction. Science must abandon its highest

aim — Knowing — if it renounces this creativeness. For without such a creativeness the ascent from mere awareness to a true discernment is impossible. Definite discernment is never found through that which is alien to us, but always through that which is original in us; definite discernment is always a discovery of our own life, a finding of ourselves in that which at first was alien. How could this be possible except on the explanation that an advance of life has taken place, and has reached the level where our limitation becomes a personal testimony, and an activity of the self is discovered? How far and under what conditions man is able to accomplish this, is a question by itself, but he could never strive towards such a height were he entirely chained to a lower level.

The higher levels of life attain a greater clearness in the region of character; for to the forward-movement from work to creativeness there corresponds here the movement from justice to love. Though this conception of love has divergent levels, and though grievously the daily life weaves it in the most heterogeneous ways, yet in the midst of all the tangle definite love asserts itself as a turn of life which is both indisputable and a great mystery. Love in this sense brings not only the particular elements into secure relationship and directs life from point to point in its progress, but it also raises the relationship out of its isolation and kindles a new corporate life in which the singularity does not vanish but is raised and transformed beyond its initial position. That which does not create something new and better out of man is not definite love. With love the existence of another obtains a full inward present moment in the

soul, and becomes immanently a piece of the very life. All elevation, however, results through a willing self-denial and sacrifice. "The first motive in love is that I shall be no individual person for myself, and that if I were such, I should feel myself defective and incomplete. The second motive is that I win myself in another person, that I value in her what she in turn finds in me. Love is consequently a most painful contradiction which the understanding cannot untie, and in it there is nothing harder than that this exactness of consciousness is negated and which still has to be affirmed. Love is both the affirmation and the solution of the contradiction: as solution it is moral harmony" (Hegel).

This occurs in the first place in the realm of relationship of individual with individual, but in such a construction a cosmic phenomenon reveals itself, for through the development of the inner connections over against the numb co-existence of bare nature, a new grade of life appears. In addition to this, love disengages itself from the shrinkage upon an individual, and welds together whole nations—the whole of humanity; everywhere it becomes a product of the whole life, a product that not only brings existing elements to a level of reciprocity, but which also renews the whole existence of man with creative energy and with a transforming flow of life. It is trust in such creative energy of love that makes it possible to penetrate clearly through the existing situation of humanity, and yet enables us to hold fast to cheerful work for humanity. There can be nothing held out for man in the painful entanglements of his own soul and his seeming abiding helplessness when face to

face with the problem of his own being but what religion offers as a hope upon an Infinite Love, which unreservedly awakens a new life in him and lifts him beyond the range of conflict.

What, however, drives forward such rich developments in special directions must embrace itself into a Whole of a new form of life; the longing after such appears in the ardour and tenacity wherewith the nineteenth century as well as the present revolve around the conception of personality.

Since Leibniz each of the great thinkers has given us something original, but they all sought for a new and all-comprehensive summit of life. The meaning of our view, however, needs a further development, because first of all we have not shown that man has ascended to the level of spiritual individuality. In the midst of all his most brilliant performances such a level does not surround him altogether; he can cast a glimpse at it from below; he can posit it in the life of other individuals and through this view it in greater completeness. This he is compelled to do in order to become superior to the accidental and problematic in his own life, and in order to be able to eliminate the indefinite from his nature and to energise the definite. Through this the life desires a standard where it can survey the different levels and transform all the content into his own possession, and where it can focus Infinity and possess an immanent self. Life here remains occupied in itself although it appears as turning to the external; here is the level of mere achievement overcome, and the characteristic elevation of life forms the governing aim of all toil. This corresponds to the Christian conviction of the

infinite value of man in his pure inwardness—a conviction "that for the riches of the whole world not one individual soul can be purchased" (Luther). How could such an estimate be justified did there not arise in the depth of the soul a new manner of life, and did there not here become visible that which forms the inmost kernel of entire reality? Since the matter is usually conceived as a recommendation of a mere subjective and inactive sentimentality withdrawn from the great world into a private nook, it has no sufficient basis, and indeed, threatens to end in empty words and phrases. The above estimate of Luther is justified only if a new stage of reality manifests itself in the depth of the soul; and this can never happen out of the energy of any one individual point in life, but can only happen through the impact of Infinite Life with Infinite Life, and through the formation at this spot of a point of intersection and concentration of such life. Goethe seems to refer to the matter from a similar point of view in those noteworthy words of his: "God meets always Himself; God in man meets again God in man. Hence there is no cause to esteem ourselves lightly in comparison with the Greatest."

The matter, then, does not resolve itself into a reference of life to one special point and a subjection of it to that point's particularity, but consists in the immense task of bringing life to its own depth and giving it a support within itself. Reality can become our own life only if our activity transforms itself into a self-activity, if it brings to expression a living self; and this can happen only when the encompassing unity remains no mere point of relation, but when, through

the strenuous elaboration of a thorough-going and durable life within it, it wins a substance and a nature which affects all the remaining life. Within such a course life finds its own; without it, it misses its own. Only out of such alternate separation and reunion, out of such a scale of values and reference to the Whole, arises the question concerning a content for the life; it is only when the encompassing Whole overcomes the scattered manifold and appropriates it by a gradual and thorough reconstruction that there arises a reality resting within its own essence.

Whether such a life may be called a personal life may be disputed. In any case, the ruling unity lies not by the side of but within the life, and through the unfolding of such a unity life deepens and expands; such deepest life can be in single points only because it was previously and is now in the Whole. In all this the situation is what it is, not through severance but through something entirely the contrary. It has come about through the formation of the most inward connections with things—indeed, through a connection with Infinity—although not without an energetic penetration and far-reaching transformation of them. The language used by great thinkers points in the same direction. Ordinary parlance, on the contrary, connects too much with this conception of a deepest unity and life the notions of seclusion and of opposition, and degrades too often this conception to a designation of a mere natural force, for us to be able to advance in our investigation without continuous reservations against these several popular views. Hence it may be better for us to speak of autonomous life and of autonomies. Both expressions

become pretty indifferent when the facts of life stare us in the face with sufficient clearness. To us there lies before all else the fact that in the Spiritual Life itself a movement towards the growth of a nucleus and towards a transformation into a self-life is wide-awake and on its course; and through such a turn of the Life-process a world of inwardness dawns, which signifies something quite other than the shadowy inwardness of the mere subject himself.

Corresponding to such gradations of autonomous life, we find in the most important work the passing out of the spiritual movement beyond the realm of culture. Necessary as culture is, the main standard for the final convictions of life is not in it but above it. If culture were the highest aim of man, he himself would be a mere tool of this achievement; the culture, however, which is not clasped and vivified by a life superior to its own could not contain any meaning and must, without such a completion, sink more and more into a lifeless mechanism. Culture is a contest of the Spiritual Life with an opposite and seeming hostile world and not an accumulation of accomplishments; it comes to its own truth only when it flows into the current of a Spiritual Life of the self.

Laborious enough it is on the ground of human history to wring such a superiority out of mere culture. It is wrung first and foremost in the centuries when antiquity clashed with Christianity—in a time when an old culture sank and a new one had not yet arisen. In such a situation life would have fallen into emptiness had it not found a world of its own as well as a full security in the concern with itself, in the diving into itself. This becomes clearly evident upon the

Græcian side in Plotinus, and upon the Christian side in Augustine. Both are agreed in the need of carrying the work of culture beyond itself, and of placing it on a point where it revolves around the apprehension of eternal truth and the development of the configuration of an all-inclusive superior life within itself alone. In these connections the thought dawns that the nature of reason is not a mere piece of the universe, but encases within itself the whole of the universe—is a microcosmus. "We are each and all a spiritual universe" (Plotinus). Doubtless those times remained too much in a superior world of withdrawal and solitude; they would not return to the work of the world and employ the life that had been won. So that a sudden reaction was bound to come. But the gain of a pure immanent existence of the Spiritual Life as a cosmic life, and its inward superiority to all mere culture remained intact. There struck, too, along with such a gain, an aim and a standard to which all that shall henceforth satisfy the spiritual nature of man shall have to correspond. This appears valid enough to-day and forbids the finality of the conclusions of culture.

This adjusted standard and this comprehensive coming-to-itself of life are the armour for us in the quest after aims more than possessions, problems more than achievements; but this conclusion is at the same time the carrier and the indispensable presupposition of the earlier standards. We saw effort itself loosened from the natural self, and through such a liberation developing new energies and tracing out new aims. Whence should these energies come, how should the new aims justify themselves if a

characteristic existence did not arise in the Spiritual Life, if a new self did not come into birth which develops and asserts itself in the movements of life? The upward march of life to a true and real level overcame the cleavage between subject and object. Is such a conquest conceivable unless the life returns from the province of work to itself, and unless it transforms its achievements into a raising of the self? That we in spiritual work develop our own inmost nature and struggle for our true self is testified at a glance. Why do we, for example, allow the current of experience to mount into our presentations? Why not allow these presentations to pass over us calmly? Why do we practise self-defence and seek to overpower these external impressions and transform them into our own conceptions? Why suffices it us not to float on the perpetual flux of things? And why are we driven by an inward necessity to follow the infinitude of the All into its uttermost concealment? Such transformation and expansion must belong, indeed, to the culmination of our own particular nature, and its furtherance must carry a movement of this very nature within itself. Also, Art could never have become the mighty power of life it is, and its form could not have been transformed into an elevated power, had it not driven man to his work—not merely to his subjectivity but to the foundation of his being. That scientific and artistic labours won such a height in the struggle for the spiritual self only on certain points of the summits does not alter the facts. What is reached wholly in the long-run would not have been reached at all without the conquest of points on the summits,

and had it not been that the great personalities had taken the facts in that great sense, and had found the salvation of their life in scaling the heights of truth. Such an installation of the whole life alone has founded the conquest of such heights and has tilled the soil of daily work and the results of its accomplishments for the reception of this seed. The work sinks rapidly into a lifeless mechanism when it severs its connection with such creativeness and barters its originality for bare diligence on the surface of things.

All these movements, viewed from the ordinary surface-existence of man, may appear as mere possibilities. But they are possibilities not in the sense of vague imaginations but of urgent tasks and driving energies. They could not work so powerfully in us and make that existence which satisfied us previously now insufficient for us, were they not realities; were they not realities out of the deep we should not have struggled with them for the winning of a spiritual self, and at the same time, for the meaning and content of our life.

2. *Epitome and Survey*

(a) *The Meaning of the Spiritual Life.*—We have already viewed the Spiritual Life developing its characteristics in three grades. It grew out of its isolation and dissipation, and simultaneously disentangled itself from mere-human mechanism; in the overcoming of the cleft between subject and object it forged for itself a self-reliant and sovereign character; in the comprehension of infinity for its

own self, it gained in itself a fixed foundation, and at the same time a superiority to the world around it, and it became an autonomous life. All these aspects work towards one another, side by side they support and clarify one another, and bind themselves into a connected totality. This picture is, however, far removed from the ordinary conception of the Spiritual Life. According to the ordinary conception the Spiritual Life is conceived from its very beginning as strewn piecemeal on solitary and separable points, and it is only much later that any kind of connection is brought about; it appears, too, as an attribute and activity of an existence lying entirely beyond itself, and consequently finds itself hemmed within a given, ready-made world, and busies itself in various ways with such a world. Our consideration of the matter has presented the subject in quite other light. Before all else it appeared clear that the Spiritual Life is only possible as an inward connection, and as a life out of the Whole; it is a participation in this Whole which invests the isolated points with a spiritual character; never can its own world, to which the Spiritual Life extends itself, originate through mere external combinations. However, this total-life did not originate from any dark existence, but it engendered by itself centre-points and concentration-points; for all the conceptions of the existence of its material arose within the life, and through it received a full illumination. The Life-process has not, therefore, to execute an achievement from the outside: it found its problem in itself, in the bringing forth of the culmination of its own nature. This signifies an overcoming and an assimi-

lation of all that lay outside, and that seemed at first alien and seemingly hostile. In such a movement this or that thing within the province of a given reality is not merely altered and bettered, but it is obligatory to bring to clearness a Whole of reality. This reality does not feel itself as one thing by the side of another, but—with its direction towards the self as the carrier of life—as the compact and comprehensive reality, as that which deserves the name of reality in the truest sense, and which cannot tolerate anything outside itself.

This Spiritual Life with its reality surrounds man not as a mere environment of his; it attains in him as a Whole an immediate present moment, and becomes with its infinity his own life and nature. Only such an inward abiding of the spiritual world makes it conceivable that the spiritual tasks work directly on man, not through the ravaging agents of his particular interests, but through the fact that individuals, in spite of all their differences, are able to find an inner co-operation of activity, and to raise themselves out of bare subjectivity to an independent inner life and to a kingdom of inwardness. Through the presence of such an immanence of the Whole the rigid cleft which hitherto separated man from the world is overcome; now in the individual points the energy of the Whole can work and can build for itself experiences of the Whole. Thus man gains in himself different gradations of life. The Spiritual Life is thus seen to be no mere contrivance of a purely human kind, but the taking up of a difficult struggle against such a human mode—an emancipation from such a mode as an intolerable narrowness. This new

world, however, should not rest satisfied with a merely human raiment wrapped around itself, but should contain its own truth, and through its transportation into the Spiritual Life reach its own characteristic nature. The Whole would have been a great falsification had not infinity with its translation into spirituality obtained its original depth. It appears similarly in the direction of spiritual activism. A truth which shrinks and is valid only for the individual is no definite truth at all, but a hybrid of many colours. If all the investigation does not draw the main motives along with it, how can the narrowness of the circle of mere-human notions be broken through, and a new world of thought valid for all be opened out? For the value and the grandeur of the Good, it is essential that all human interests should be repelled, and man enabled by himself to rise above himself.

It is urgent to come to this characteristic depth through the Spiritual Life. In such a province the individual's own nature is not isolated, but is interweaved inseparably with the whole of the All, and turns to this source for its own life-content. Thus there is no depth in the individual portions if they do not exist in the Whole, if they are not able here to unfold themselves; in each point a struggle for the Whole takes place, and this brings the Whole into activity.

Finally, it is to be borne in mind that the Spiritual Life in man could never arise against the power of nature if it were no more than a purely human thing. Nature surrounds us as a boundless kingdom of energies and laws; it surrounds us not merely from

without, but strikes deep into our own soul with a thousand-fold incessant effects. How could the Spiritual Life, which finds itself first in our aspiration, in any manner enforce its way against all this did we not stand upon inward connections, and had there not worked in us over against that which is given in the surrounding world the energy of a new kind of world? Transformations in the Whole could only arise out of a Whole.

It is now evident that the movement to spirituality cannot be considered as a work of any separate individual faculties of the mere man, but that it is a movement of the All, which certainly in our position needs our co-operation, but which, at the same time, takes us into itself and makes of us something quite other than we were on the first view of things. The universe itself now finds its own depth through such a movement to spirituality; from being a kingdom of relations it becomes the kingdom of a definite reality. The inward life, which is otherwise a mere appearance of things, now gains a self-reliance, and develops its own particular kingdom—an inner world. The nearer qualities of this inner world do not allow themselves to be known through general conceptions such as existence-for-self, self-activity, etc.: these give only the frame within which alone the mounting experience of life is able to set forth its qualities. For example, the Good and the Beautiful are characteristic developments and revelations of life, which possess an incomparable individuality and actuality which are later discovered in them. So in connection with the Spiritual Life, it constructs a new ground upon which boundless avenues open out

and a whole kingdom of new actualities becomes accessible. Through this we become discoverers and conquerors, but it is not into a strange but into our own world that we climb more and more.

Leibniz was of opinion that no nature could arise in man without some kind of existence-for-self, and consequently he sought to base all reality upon living monads. Whether his theory, through such a turn to the bare individual nature, is in itself correct, may be doubted; but it cannot be doubted that there is no definite reality unless the united total-life forces its way through, and holds together, all the manifold. Without a foundation-stone all the universe becomes a mere occurrence, and thus receives the character of a mere addendum, a subsidiary and shadowy thing, and one which must finally pass away in a senseless flight that cannot be stopped. Only a total-life can hold fast and bind, can construct a self-activity over against bare mechanical activity, can along with this reach an existence which does not belong to an inaccessible "beyond" constructed through analogy from the scientific picture of the natural world; but such a total-life finds its own more and more in the furtherance of itself, and through this gains an ever-richer content. Only this depth of existence of the Life-process itself may be termed "substance"; such a substance lies not behind us but in front of us; and it is towards it as an all-inclusive goal that the movement now reaches.

This movement of such a substance produces in the particular province of man's nature a separation of activity into that which is empty and that which is substantial, as well as a separation between the de-

velopment of physical energy and of self-activity. Evidently there arises much activity which is not gripped by the whole of the self—an activity which sets mere energies in movement; such an activity governs the initial acts and impulses of man. But there is also an activity which lies within the whole of life, and through which life is able to grow. It is only such an activity as the latter that gives life a support and a meaning in itself, and only out of such an activity are conceptions such as character, conviction, etc., possible—conceptions which sprout in spite of the presence of subjectivity and passivity, and which, as proofs of the Whole, carry along with them an elevation of the level of life. In the strict injunction of such a self-preservation, all other kinds of activity must appear empty and untenable. Through such a self-preservation in the things a new conception of truth originates far above the ordinary intellectual notion, for now that alone becomes true to life which includes, expresses, and furthers the Whole as a present moment in consciousness, whilst the separate isolated activities which have loosened themselves from this and which believe themselves all-efficient, sink into untruth. The main movement of life—encompassing all the separate points and shaping itself characteristically in each, and especially overcoming the opposition between theoretical and practical reason—becomes a striving which longs to pass from this region of the untruth, which at the start surrounds us, to the region of truth; the longing after truth and real existence becomes now the main motive-energy of the Spiritual Life; as in the province of nature, so it now becomes

here a longing after the self-preservation which rules all movement; but the longing is after a self-preservation quite other than that found in nature.

In all these transformations our initial problem has stepped into a new and richer position. The movement which aimed at a level above the natural and which wrecked itself when conceived as a mere-human fact, has now succeeded in showing itself more than human, and yet has fastened man to itself. It works now with characteristic greatness and energy, but all depends upon man being a participator in that elevated life. In all this there are dangers enough, but such dangers can be faced, and must not frighten the man at the outset. Let us see somewhat closer how, through this transformation, the view of the world and the problems of life are altered; and in the meantime we shall not view directly the religious problem, and yet shall not lose sight of it.

(β) *The View of the Universe.*—Our main thought of a "becoming" independence, of a coming to itself of all reality in the Spiritual Life, clashes most strongly with the prevailing view of the universe, and must demand against such a view a powerful transformation. With the prevailing view, the visible universe is held as the main world, and what rises up in the inner life is thought of as a subsidiary phenomenon, which is hardly able to bring forth anything that is original. According to our course of thought, however, there is imbedded in this inner world a kernel of reality, and all else becomes a mere environment or preparation, and thus we obtain *an inverted order* of the consideration and valuation of things. Will such a view be able to hold its own

over against the overwhelming impressions of the external world? It can do so only through a standard of thought, and if the inner life has become conscious of its autonomy, and if from this source it undertakes its work. If this happens, the demand will certainly not be denied; but the fact is to be seen and explained not from without within but from within without. Thus there culminates for the whole expansion of thought an inversion from a Ptolemaic to a Copernican standard.

An independent life is to be found thus within, but it is highly improbable that it is not to be found anywhere else in all the wide universe but in man. But even if this could not be proved, yet the Spiritual Life remains a cosmic fact, for it encloses a depth of reality over against the surface-appearance of nature.

Viewed in this manner, nature cannot possibly signify by itself a complete and finished kingdom. Its whole incessant mechanism of movements and relations reveal nowhere a self-life; in the last resort these are viewed as empty and meaningless, but yet, however, the world-process itself reveals in the Spiritual Life an imperative longing after a meaning. There originates in nature in its wending towards the animal level numerous and clear evidences of psychic life, but this animal psychic life heightens rather than lessens the conflict of opinions regarding nature. This psychic life, which also belongs in the greatest part to human existence, remains throughout bound in the mechanism of nature, and develops over against it no kind of independent thought. So far as we are able to see, all psychic performance on this

stage of life means simply the self-preservation of the individual, and with it of the species, in the struggle for existence. So that here a physical equivalent is well able to take the place of a psychical performance: what a higher intelligence or a closer banding together furnishes to one creature is furnished to others by strength of bodily organisation, swiftness of movement, etc. Nowhere here does the inner life reach an independence, and nowhere is it able to found a kingdom of its own; nowhere is it able to pass beyond the environment in order to view and handle that environment as a Whole. But the inner life remains scattered and bound, a mere piece of an alien world, empty in the midst of all the passion of the animal impulse. If now—not in man himself, but yet within the range of humanity—a clarification and a liberation arise, if here the inner life becomes independent and a depth of existence opens—that such a fact has happened from simple beginnings and by a very slow ascent does not alter the main fact in the least,—then nature cannot any more signify the whole of reality, but can only signify a special stage of it—a stage beyond which the world-process proceeds to an existence-for-self.

This new fact is far too original and signifies far too much an inverted order of things to be understood as a mere furtherance of the mechanical movement of nature itself; rather must it be a cosmic life superior to nature which breaks forth thus—a cosmic life which works also in nature but which proceeds beyond it to a stage of self-completion. In such a connection the Spiritual Life cannot

at all be viewed as only a result; it must also be valid as a principle; it can be the aim and the culmination of the world-process only if it also forms its foundation and presupposition, and if that which at first appears as a result works in and through the whole movement. An energy of the Whole must be active from the outset if the manifold is to be united into a Whole, and through such a union is to rise to a higher plane. How could an All bring forth an independent inner life if it were soulless in itself? Nature and the unfolded spirit become herewith stages of the world-process which, beyond the juxtaposition of nature with its bare relations, progress to a total-life which overcomes the cleft between obscure substance and unsubstantial happening, by making the Life-process independent and developing all substance from it. At the same time, the All-life can no more be a stream flowing nobody knows whither and which nobody experiences. But, in a union of beginning and of end, a superiority is won above all mere movement, and an Eternal appears as a foundation of all the march of Time. This alone gives a standpoint whence truth, and, indeed, any striving after truth, first become possible; at the same time we attain to the conception of a cosmic inner life, as a presupposition of all striving after an interior world. But he who contracts the kingdom of thought of humanity to presentations of the external world renounces at the same time knowledge and truth.

The recognition of such a cosmic inner life signifies in no way an introduction of interior energies and

movements into the province of the science of nature, for this science of nature must reject such a procedure as a disagreeable and dangerous disturbance of its work. But that recognition announces that this science, with all its means, does not create the whole deep of reality. The higher stages can now throw backwards light upon the lower stages; they do that, for example, in the Theory of Knowledge, where the fundamental construction of nature is turned into a problem, and the contact between this and the mental organism is set forth; for thus we obtain universal truths which are distinguished from the merely human forms of life and its presentations. Also, the higher stages accomplish this through artistic reflection; here the inner life of things seems to be experienced. Fundamental facts of the life of nature, which otherwise had been considered as self-evident, become now a problem, and carry us to a deepening of the total-view of things, as, for example, in the thorough-going subjection of all to law, effects of change, constitution of forms, the ascent of the world-movement. We must never contract the exact and speculative consideration of things, but we must not misconstrue the conclusions which issue from such a consideration.

In such a connection there exists between Nature and Spirit a characteristic relation—a relation of opposites as well as of union. First of all, let us consider the opposites. Where Nature and Spirit stand in opposition to one another, as has already been shown in the present work, where a hemmed-in life and an independent life rise sharply one from the other, there the greatness of the spirit cannot possibly

mean the same as the simple ascent of nature; for thus the ascent of spirit can signify no more than what the classical epoch of literature in Germany stated concerning it, viz., that upon the higher stages the development and the formation had arrived at only a greater consciousness and freedom than were visible on the lower unconscious and hemmed-in levels. To such a view the phenomena seem different only here and there through the heightening of the functions of the intellect. In our view, on the contrary, the difference reaches back beyond the intellect into the Whole; the kingdoms of relations and of the total- and self-life widen themselves further and further. Therefore the two sides which ordinary notion and also language allow to flow together, must before all else be clearly separated, and the boundaries between them fixed; a constant struggle is needed against their admixture with all its accompanying sleepiness. Herewith the passage from the one to the other will not appear as a peaceful and secure growth, as we are led to suppose through the doctrine of evolution, but the higher must first of all loosen itself in a new direction and find a fastening in itself; and then this higher can turn back to the lower and discover its kinship in it. For a fact can certainly not remain in a state of full and pointed opposition if the All is not to fall asunder. Also, nature must somehow serve the aims which come forth in the Spiritual Life; the powerful stirring of energies which culminate in nature must somehow assist in the development of a self-life, and the ascent to this life brings forth a further development and intimacy. Therefore points of contact and

points of exit originate where the lower suddenly seems to pass into the higher. But with the recognition of such a chain of life the independence of the higher must always be guarded, for the lower stage may bring forth something to the contrary of what the higher brings forth.

The total-view shows us in the relationship of both provinces more opposition and more insecurity than the pantheistic view which runs through modern culture presents, but it shows as well more expansion and more progressive acts. And also along with the movement depth is gained.

(γ) *The Situation of Man.*—The attitude of man is essentially changed when the greatness and the success of life depend on a participation in a superhuman Spiritual Life. In the first place, he appears placed most strongly against the customary notions of things. We are accustomed to view man as the meeting-point of divergence of worlds, and to attribute to him on account of his characteristic nature an incomparable worth: this cannot any longer be asserted of him. For the New and the Higher lie in the Spiritual Life as openings of an independent inner world, and not in man as mere man. For a long, long time he hardly left the bounds of nature, and when at last the Spiritual Life dawned within him, that life was not so much his own work as the communication of a superior standard. When the Spiritual Life developed further in the human province, that province was in no way won. Far more does the lower mode of life remain, shows the most stubborn resistance, and draws the Spiritual Life down to the lower level;

thus the ordinary situation becomes one of a semi-spirituality in which the greatness and originality of the Spiritual Life is lost. Such a sharp divergence of man from the Spiritual Life places the problems in a new light and heightens everywhere the extension of the activity. Thus, for example, morality may never be held as a natural quality or product of man; what even the ordinary life produces does not raise itself far above the animal instincts and impulses; definite morality with its shifting of the centre of gravity of life is fundamentally different from such instincts and impulses, but such morality becomes possible first of all from the Spiritual Life, and the ascent to this life remains a continuous problem, and, as well, succeeds but in the smallest measure. Thus the decisive turning-point appears first of all in the life of a man; it does not appear with his entrance into this world as mere man.

All this doubtless involves a strong humiliation of man as mere man. But there corresponds to the degradation an elevation, as to man there opens the possibility of a participation in a new grade of reality which lies beyond the entanglements of the human province. All that characterises the Spiritual Life—its universality, its sovereignty, its autonomy —can become the possession of the man who mounts; now the spiritual contents can rise above the purely human forms of life; now the anthropomorphism which had turned the whole of reality into a mere reflex of human thoughts, feelings, and strivings, can be partially if not entirely cast off, and can be gripped by a superior standard; now the

struggle of man against the mere-human becomes possible, and world-experiences enter into his narrow province, and through such effects his whole attitude is changed. Out of the Spiritual Life and not out of the mere-human are all the problems to be seized and all the provinces to be formed. Right and morality, art and science, are spiritual in the sense that they are not developments of the bare man, but developments of the Spiritual Life in man. Also, the religious problem must transform itself in an essential manner, in which it will deal not concerning the preservation of the petty-human but concerning the Spiritual Life in man.

Further, life as a whole receives throughout a special character in the fact that its main connection, its fundamental relationship, becomes evermore the Spiritual Life. This characteristic becomes clear through comparison with the historical and traditional types of life. The religious type of life which men have most welcomed gave to the life the main connection with God, and allowed all the tributaries of life to flow into the current of religion; there came a time, however, when such a conception proved too narrow, and when the fundamental connection passed into a region of grave uncertainty. And as the life through this effect turned from the "beyond" to a "here and now," it split into two main portions—the cosmic and the social. In the cosmic portion, the strength of the intellect mainly opens the door of the universe, and through the winning of such an insight the whole of existence was raised; here now issues the construction of relations to the human environment, definite con-

clusions are arrived at, and strong co-operations of humanity take place. All this ought to bring greater warmth of feeling as well as stronger reason into human relationships. This tendency has produced great and energetic results, but none of these results individually has satisfied the whole nature of man, and even collectively they have failed to do so. The cosmic guidance of life threatens, in spite of all its expansion, to become cold and empty; and the social guidance, with all its nearness and warmth, threatens to become narrow and confined. These guides of life, however, have the common disadvantage in that the fundamental relationship does not lie within the individual life, but appears as something without. It is only in the drift of the Spiritual Life that the Life-process becomes itself, for here it deals with nothing other than the inmost nature of man. Thus it is here alone that the life proves itself, and it is here, too, that an encompassing foundation is won, upon which the relationships to God, the world, and human society have to be grounded and constructed, and a counter-effect to all one-sided forms of life has to be brought forth.

If that in which we recognise the inmost nature of man is to be found here, then the man's view passes from his immediate existence to a far-off goal. In man there are different degrees of reality, different meeting-points of worlds, and thus the man's own decision must not fail. But such a decision lies not in individual resolutions and acts, but it goes through the whole of life. And it is not to be understood that the individual portions of his nature would offer him for selection different worlds merely from the

outside, and that he could have merely an option which to accept or reject. Man is always carried by the total-life of the All; this total-life must be effective in the particular portions if it is ever to win the new stages of life. But however mysterious this may appear, the Whole issues not into a Whole without the vivification and characteristic decision of the individual portions; here the movement of the All culminates through our own appropriation alone; the movement issues only through a joyous affirmation of that which belongs to us, and which, without recognition, cannot become ours. Through this we become co-workers, and, indeed, are called to become co-carriers of the All; thus our life gains an ethical character from its very foundation—an ethical which shows the meaning of our adoption of the Spiritual Life as our true nature, as the ascent to our own heights and to infinity. This work is no longer that of a special province, but it penetrates the whole circumference of life, and places activity at all times before an *Either—Or.* At the same time, rigid determinism is broken, without our having to admit that decision depends on the chance of the moment. For it is the fundamental presupposition of determinism that it fits man well with a particular world-order, and allows him to be bound entirely by such an order. Thus all man's acts from their very beginning are fixed, and life divests itself of all expectation. But, on the other hand, the meeting-point of two unique worlds places the fact in a totally different light; the life now is enabled to transform its main tendency into a free act, and through this to gain a genuine present-moment of consciousness.

According to our method of treatment the Spiritual Life transforms itself from being an alleged possession to being a difficult problem, and this places the main tendency of life not in any one particular act, but makes the Spiritual Life a fact of unutterable toil which grants humanity as well as the individual a real history. The Spiritual Life was not on our view a mere form of life which could be assimilated in a hurried resolution; but through an inverted order of the first impression of things, a new and definite kind of reality is wrung from it which draws the whole periphery of life into itself. The life has now to discover an all-encompassing unity from which each particular province is shaped in a characteristic manner. This, however, is an enormous problem, and forms the soul of all historical work. We do not find ourselves from the beginning in spiritual connections, and do not find our way securely, but the main direction can be found and before all else it must be sought—sought through toilsome experiences and on perilous paths. But primarily some kind of life-connection, some kind of governing aim, must rise out of the initial chaos, for such connections and aims are the salient parts—the hypotheses—of life, full of risks and dangers, but yet indispensable, because thus alone can life as a Whole become a current, thus alone can questions concerning the Whole become possible, thus alone can experiences of the Whole originate which in their turn become a standard in the total-existence of life. Now opposition grows, hinders the movement, and drives it out of its course. But new points of concentration may grow and undertake the erection of reality. In this connection the

growth does not take place—be it through a peaceful movement or through a spiral of opposites—through mere associations furthered by a kind of surface-necessity; things do not fit into one another as in the growth of a pyramid, but ever anew, doubt and violent emotion strike down to the foundation of life; ever anew one has to struggle for the Whole. What issues, however, as connections—so far as it is of a spiritual kind—issues not in a ready-made manner from any part in our nature, but has to be brought forth through our own exertions. In this manner, history cannot become a struggle for the content of the Spiritual Life unless the main standard of life is laid beyond the bare results of the times in a timeless order. The furtherance of the *sub specie æternitatis* holds not only and mainly for knowledge, but in the first place for the Whole of life. The Spiritual Life could not seek in history itself the unfolding of its own nature unless history possessed in its kernel an *over-historical* nature. Time is something of a phantom, and all life in it something of an appearance and a shadow if the foundation of an eternity fails in it, and if, out of its changes and transformations, nothing rises up to save man for an eternal existence. And if all depends on the slender thread of the fleeting moment of the present which illumines and endures merely for a twinkling of an eye but to sink into the abyss of nothingness, then all life would mean a mere exit into death. Thus without eternity there is no spirituality, and without connection there is no content of life. But what is enthroned in itself above time becomes for the man who wins such a spirituality, first of all, an immense problem which

allows itself to be grasped on the field of time alone; and, also, the Eternal which works within us and which hovers before us on the horizon of eternity can become our full possession only through the movement of time. To wish to check this movement and to arrest the course of time, this means not to serve eternity but to ascribe to time what belongs to eternity.

We see accordingly how our conception of the Spiritual Life heightened powerfully the significance and the span of history, but always only under the hypothesis of an Eternal Order of things out of which history is experienced. A full abandonment to history, which is often witnessed on the ordinary level of life, becomes an inward subversion; with all its significance, history can only be the arena of the struggle for the Spiritual Life; it is always only a second and never a first. But even as a second, history grows powerfully, so that it signifies not the mere extension of a given thread but an ascent of a new life, and through this life it handles not the web of a bare outline but the growth of a full reality. What, however, holds valid for humanity holds valid also for the individual: the individual's life contains a great problem and an original decision; values such as personality and spiritual individuality do not fall on him as a shower, but have to be wrung manfully in the inward ascent of life. Also, the individual will give all these movements a spiritual character, and will be able to verify them only if he wins a character above the flux of time; and from this standard, through all the multi-coloured manifold of the external tasks, seeks before all else his own self—his own essence.

(δ) *Conclusions for the Method and the Task of Life.* —Spiritual Life can unfold itself in man only when significant transformations take place in the inward web of his being, and new paths of reflection become necessary. We shall follow these changes here only in so far as they bear on the religious problems to which this work is dedicated.

What precedes the Spiritual Life in man cannot be grasped by science until science constructs a new method and marks out such a method from all others. There is, however, a double aspect of the original manner in which spirituality develops within the human province. It develops itself, for example, under the conditions of empirical psychic life, and, indeed, with energies which have to wrestle with such a life. But spirituality is never a mere product of the empirical psychic life. This psychic life is bound up with the bodily organism, is scattered in the individual, is conceived as an incessant flux ; therefore it never longs, through its own potency, to reach a connected world or a durable truth ; and without such there is neither Spiritual Life nor Spiritual content. To turn the Spiritual Life into a mere procedure of psychic existence is to destroy it in its very foundation. The Spiritual Life must possess from the beginning not only an independence and self-value, but it must also maintain these ; when it develops under the conditions of empirical psychic life, it must, with an unswerving nature, shine through all the strangeness and transientness of human psychic life. At the same time, spirituality, first of all, works as an indefinite and weak potency. It has to find its own nature which, on the one side,

builds a foundation, but which, on the other side, has to come to an understanding with the psychical existence and gain its own energies for higher ends. To leave such a psychic existence calmly on one side is to set back the energy of the Life-process and to rest satisfied with a pallid and rigid spirituality. Both sides are to be distinguished clearly, and at the same time brought into a living connection.

To this double-sidedness of life there corresponds a twofold method. These methods are *the Noological and the Psychological Methods.* To explain noologically means to arrange the whole of the Spiritual Life as a special spiritual activity, to ascertain its position and problem, and through such an adaptation to illumine the whole and raise its potencies. To explain psychologically, on the contrary, means to investigate *how* man arrives at the comprehension and appropriation of a spiritual content and especially of a Spiritual Life, with what psychic aids is the spiritual content worked out, how the interest of man for all this is to be raised, and how his energy for the enterprise is to be won. Here one has to proceed from an initial point hardly discernible, and, step by step, discover the way of ascent; thus the psychological method becomes at the same time a psychogenetic method. The main condition of the successful handling of this question is that both methods are to be held sufficiently apart in order that the conclusions of both may not flow together and yet may form a fruitful completion.

Such separation and union of both methods and their corresponding realities make it possible to understand how to overcome inwardly the old antithesis

between Idealism and Realism. The fundamental truth of Idealism is that the spiritual contents establish an independence and a self-value over against the individual, that they train him with superior energy, and that they are not material for his purely human welfare. In the noological method this truth obtains a full recognition. Realism, however, has its rights in the forward sweep of the particular human side of life with all its diversions, its constraints, and its predominant natural character. Viewed from this standpoint, the main fact is, that life is raised out of the idle calm of the rigid indifference of its initial stages, and is brought into a current; in order to bring this about, much is urgently needful by man, which cannot originate, prior to the appearance of the spiritual estimation of values, but these needful things become his when he is set in a strong current; then, on the one hand, anxiety for external existence, division into parties, ambition, etc., and on the other hand, the mechanism of the psychic life with its association, reproduction, etc., are all seen in a new light. These motive-powers would certainly never produce a spiritual content out of man's own ability; such a content is only reachable if the movement of life raises man out of and above the initial performances and the initial motives. No mechanism, either of soul or of society, is able to accomplish this; it can be accomplished alone by an inward spirituality in man. Through such a conception, Realism and Idealism are no further irreconcilable opponents, but two sides of one encompassing life; one may grow alongside the other but not at the expense of the other. In-

deed, the more the content of the Spiritual Life grows, the more becomes necessary on the side of psychic existence; the more we submerge ourselves in this psychic experience, the greater appears the superiority of the Spiritual Life.

The noological method is new in name only, and in the following connection: it actually extends everywhere where logical, ethical, and æsthetic conceptions are differentiated from the empirico-psychological conceptions. In Kant, and since his time, such a differentiation has been made with great clearness. This differentiation is, however, indispensable, because there is no possibility of an independence of the particular provinces without an independence of the Spiritual Life as a Whole. Such a conclusion comes to expression in the noological method. It is different throughout from the old method of an ontological metaphysic. This latter sought especially to make phenomena intelligible through world-conceptions which had been gained through strong subjective theories — theories, in the main, which were shadows of the living content and concreteness of reality. On the contrary, the noological method understands the particular out of an encompassing and basal Whole of life. The principle of explanation is not brought in from without, but is inwardly present, or at least allows itself to be brought to a present moment in consciousness: it is in the last resort, with all its arrangements through freedom, a fact and an experience. Herewith is not only a higher degree of security won, but the linking of each element with the Whole must lead to an inward renewal and deepening as well as to a clearer impress

of the characteristic features. Therefore, the foundation of religion must be of a noological and not of a speculative kind: the psychological method accordingly stands in a secondary place.

It is, however, necessary to raise up the Spiritual Life not only from the empirical psychic life, but even within itself it needs a further separation. In the Spiritual Life we recognised a total-life—a world; but our ordinary immediate life flows in homogeneous individual acts as a succession of events and activities, and this seems to exclude all definite spirituality. This contradiction is to be overcome through an inner gradation of life alone: in individual acts a Whole must be able to be present, but the life acquires an entirely different character as to whether it discovers such a Whole present or not. Were the life to shift back beyond the surface of the individual events, then what appears tangible to the individual must in some kind of way become conscious, workable, and accessible. That possibility is really discovered and appears in clear results. It is only the presence of a Whole that enables the individual thoughts to become an expression of a *Weltanschauung*, and enables the individual acts to become the expression of a moral character; for it is only a continuous construction of an elevated thought that can mould the material and weld a systematic order of the whole particular provinces. This presence of the Whole in the particular can have very different grades. For example, great are those thinkers alone whose total method reaches into each particular, even into the smallest achievement; great is that moral character alone which sets its stamp on each par-

ticular act: thus *Substance* and *Existence* differentiate themselves in life. Substance is to be conceived not as an inaccessible entity, but as the kernel of the Life-process itself; not as a species fixed for all times, but as something conceivable only through the process of its construction, and as something gifted with power through the process of its transformation. The development in which the Spiritual Life unfolds itself in man strikes itself into the substance as well, and it is in this that the main extension of life lies, because in the movement a struggle for the substance itself is taking place. The first achievements are mere attempts which have to stand the test of experience, and which, through such a test, can be driven forward to a further development and even transformation. Such tests and experiences need a development towards particular activities; this is the substance itself now assigned to the existence-side of life. But in order to make some contribution to the solution of the problem, the existence-side must found a certain independence over against the substance, for if the substance meant nothing more than its immediate momentary expression, the life would remain tied to a situation reached once for all. And thus life could never become a problem and never desire a movement; and without both there is not possible for man, in the midst of all his unreadiness, any further development.

Thus, once more, we find a double-sided aspect of life, which carries an incessant problem in itself, and at the same time carries a germ of entanglements of opposing kinds. What is imbedded in life from the substance has continually to be transformed into a

free activity, and is to be explained through such an activity. The free activity, however, needs a return-movement to the substance in order not to fall into vague indecision. The individual as well as the community show an opposite tendency. Men and times can transform their lives simply into a movement—into a play of free-energies—without grasping the radical foundation, or without even striving after such a foundation. Then shallow men arise who, in all their agility and industry, possess no souls, but merely exist—bare creatures of the environment, and barren times, though full of excitement and business which possess no spiritual base; men and times that seek to fill the needs of life through endless variations and combinations of a free and disconnected activity.

But the contrary is also possible: a substance ready-made does not enter into the region of explanation, and consequently never becomes the full possession of man. It is so with individuals and so with times. Not seldom do we find a spiritual foundation ready and at hand, but it is not worked out; although in one's own possession, it remains as something alien and inaccessible. These are the dull and helpless men and times who cannot find their own depth, but follow in the direction of the shallows of life and not in the direction of what the deep contains. Also, in spiritual provinces and especially in religion, the explanation of the substance fails often to correspond with, and, indeed, often contradicts, its validity; what is willed and estimated at the base can often lie beneath a growing crust of thought. Throughout the whole history of Christianity this

cleft between substance and its explanation appears; ever arises the need to prove the latter, and to seek the former.

Where the analysis into substance and existence is recognised, the kernel of life is then never sought in the so-called faculties of thought, feeling, and will—neither in either nor in their sum. These different phases of the one consciousness belong to the substance just referred to, and never out of their own power can they produce a spiritual content; far more do they develop in a connection with some kind of Life-substance. Such a deepening of reality alone is able to free us from the intellectualism which we discover to-day as so insufficient, but into which, notwithstanding all our troubles and toils, we tend to sink back ever anew. We remain without overcoming so long as the existing activities signify to us the whole of life. In the provinces of such existent activities the intelligence stands in the foreground; that which struggles to reach up to the level of a spiritual content has to explain itself at the bar of intelligence and work from that judgment into the remaining provinces. When the fact is recognised that thought itself, in so far as it is of a productive and not merely of a reflective kind, possesses behind itself a basal and directive activity of the Whole and brings forth its creativeness from this basal region, a secure conquest over intellectualism is gained. Then it becomes clear that in the movement of life the handling is not dealing with an assimilation of a "given" reality, but with an ascent to a definite reality; the struggle is not concerning interpretations but concerning contents.

Thus the problem of life is raised above the antithesis of intellectualism and voluntarism — for voluntarism is a mere reversal of intellectualism, and remains bound on the mere level of bare experience. The powers of intellect and will thus cannot form the kernel of man's nature, far less can they be carried into the universe and be raised to the substance of the All. It is not from the forms of phenomena but from the substance of life that any hope arises of illumining the deep night which wraps our life and our fundamental relation to reality. All pictorial conceptions of these forms of phenomena are mere human projections, intellectual plays of a flying imagination.

When, however, the recognition of that depth heightens powerfully the task of life, it heightens at the same time the inward movement of life, and the attention extends over the whole expanse of life. For now the truth of the Whole becomes anew in each individual position a problem; each point has to prove, to strengthen, and to adjust its truth. This yields also a characteristic organisation of the work of culture. Here the total-view of life is not now included in one particular province, as, for example, in religion or metaphysics, which is supposed to be able to include and to further all the other provinces; the main problem lies on the other side of all the branches and runs through them all; each particular province can take the whole question into itself, prove it in its own experience, and answer it in its own way. All great achievements of the particular provinces possess a grasp of the Whole and at the same time a furthering of the Whole. This signifies

an equality of rights of the different branches; it forbids all hierarchic gradation and subordination of the middle-ages type. The differentiation of substance and existence works in that it renders life more eventful, freer, richer.

Accordingly, we see life all along taking a characteristic shape, and we find this characteristic extend from an external outline into the innermost web. What always yielded itself to the individual drew its strength and found its connection in a particular governing and thorough-going thought—the thought of an opening of a new grade of reality, of a kingdom of independent inwardness within the province of man. And this thought will lead us further into the province of religion. Our discussion hitherto has been necessary in order to obtain a fixed foundation; now we are to handle the matter direct.

PART II.—THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS OF UNIVERSAL RELIGION

(CONTINUED)

CHAPTER VIII

c. THE FACT OF UNIVERSAL RELIGION

(1) *The Turn to Religion*

(a) *The Problem of Religion in General.*—In connection with the turn towards religion, it is necessary before all else to establish what is essential and indispensable to religion—to religion in each and every sense. Before all else the main point is this: religion holds up before us, over against the surrounding world, a new kind of existence, a new order of things, and divides reality into different provinces and worlds. That religion may be obtained without a belief in God is proved by ancient and definite Buddhism; but without a dualism of worlds, without an outlook on a new existence, religion becomes a mere empty sound. The mere acknowledgment of a higher order, however, gives us in no way a religion. That higher order must not merely exist in itself: it must also be effective for us, it must place our existence on a new foundation, and must be conceived by us as a main fact; otherwise it remains, in spite of an external acknowledgment, inwardly strange and indifferent. The mere existence of deities was conceived readily

enough by the Epicureans. How barren for religion were all the diggings for the final "grounds" of things and all the so-called proofs for the existence of God! There is not, therefore, any definite religion without the living presence of a higher world within our own domain, without the clash of two worlds with all their entanglement and irrationality. But even in this irrational there appears especially clear the original character, the transforming and renewing energy of religion.

Such a projection of a new world into our life is a question of an actual kind; and thus appearing as a fundamental fact, the question is not to be placed on one side but to be proved. But with all its actuality, the question does not deal with something that is individual and obvious. ECKHART ridicules such an attempt as this: "Many people hope to see God as one sees an ox." The question deals with something that is a Whole and an invisible. Such an object cannot come to man from the outside and overwhelm him with sensuous impressions; it is only an inward movement that can bring man to the point where truths, otherwise concealed, reveal themselves; and data, otherwise loose, can bind themselves into a Whole of Reality. True, such movements desire as well the work of thought, but such a help remains in the service of the main actual question.

(β) *Nearer View of the Problem.* — The whole course of our investigation has shown the characteristics and greatness of man to consist in the working within him of a total reality; along with this the Spiritual Life became the centre of all the investigation. This must verify itself also in connection with

the turn to religion. It is not the entanglements of the mere-human but those of the Spiritual Life which urge us to religion; it is not the deliverance of man to human happiness but the self-reliance of the Spiritual Life which stands now in question. All this announces such mighty transformations against the customary mode of life—transformations which aim to present before man the fact that something more is indispensable than a smug arrangement of things.

Such a method does not only place religion on securer foundations, but, in the formation of its content, meets with evil entanglements. So long as man as an isolated existence stands over against the All, he is never able to go forth out of his own movements and needs to a certainty of a new world. What he possesses and develops on his subjective plane can never mean anything more than that which holds valid for his own circle of presentations; if things were only so, the danger becomes evident that all things will soon be explained as a mere brain-spinning of the subject himself. If, before all else, the presence of *a world within man* is not recognised as well as the fact that he can be raised to a world-life, he can never win a secure conviction of a Whole of Reality, and never be certain of the opening of a new world.

This first question of truth requires a noo-centric and not an anthropomorphic standard; the thought-world of religion will remain under the ban of anthropomorphism so long as Spiritual Life and the human form of existence are not differentiated. The old thinker was correct in stating that men constructed the gods in their own image; but when such con-

ceptions were refined, they were more and more transformed into objects of thought. But the refining of the conceptions easily makes the error even more dangerous, and entangles the objects of thought still deeper in the anthropomorphic process. This anthropomorphism, however, meets with a strong opposition the more the progress of knowledge explains to man his position in the All of things. Indeed, the more his dependence on nature and, at the same time, the speciality of his species are illumined, the more appears the failure to raise man to the All-Life and to fill up the ground of reality with products from the quarry of human analogy.

More weighty still are the dangers into which such an anthropomorphic conception of religion brings its inner motive-powers. A religion of the merely human kind makes inevitably the quest of man's happiness the centre of all activity; it rivets him to the inactivity to which he seems to subordinate and even to sacrifice himself. Of what avail are all obedience and all sacrifice if man only renounces in order to gain more of the very stuff which binds him? In the customary order of religion the hope of a great reward threatens to adjust the character in a prevailing manner to the results of action, and to link that character with the particular external worth of things and thus to injure greatly the pure joy in the good and true, and to endanger the inner independence. It appears then as if the whole world-order is here in order to satisfy our "dear self" with all its pettiness and meanness, and to bring it to full indulgence; it appears as if "God had forgotten all His creatures with the exception of us alone" (ECKHART). True,

the deeper atmosphere of all religions withstands all such shrinkage upon the small self, and leads against such a notion an ardent battle for the purification and refinement of the soul. But in this struggle the full energy does not enter so long as a fundamental liberation of life from the mere-human and the anxiety for its small happiness have not taken place. And in order to obtain this liberation, radical transformations are necessary, as we have already seen in the acknowledgment of the Spiritual Life and the changes it brought along with itself; there is no ejection of the small human assertions out of our inner world without a new view of ourself, and there is no unselfishness of character without a nature superior to that of the bare self. Man does not remain a mere man—a kind of well-equipped animal — a kind of special and vanishing point in infinity; he is called to acknowledge the inner presence of a *world*, and to reach such a world in spite of his mere singularity. Only the effort for a deliverance can free him from the anxiety for his bare happiness, and only the laying of the centre of gravity in this makes it possible to place the mere inactivity in the background and to create actions and energy; otherwise his particular nature brings forth no fruit and, indeed, his further existence is endangered.

The content and aim of the world of religion are universally not ascertained by the natural man, but by the Spiritual Life in him. Difficult as all this may seem, and sure as it may appear that the natural ways of man accompany all his work and strive to enter into this, yet through the energetic separation of the mere-human and the more-than-human from one

another a struggle for the maintenance and purity of the spiritual substance is taken up, so that we do not fall defenceless to the lower plane. As in culture on the whole, so, too, in religion, the progress of the developing thought appears not anywhere as a mere disentanglement of an initial childish kind — as a destruction of an anthropomorphism—but as a rebuilding proceeded with through the discovery of a new life and nature in man. Were there no road from the denial to the affirmation, the work of thought would more and more destroy the living content of reality; indeed, the more energetic that work of thought would proceed, the more certain it would reach a complete agnosticism with all its hollowness.

But when, however, a religion of the Spiritual Life leaves behind itself the mere-human, it must be by itself of a universal nature. For here it is not the aim of religion to further, through the introduction of a new world, this or that side of the Spiritual Life, but, before all else, it is the energetic longing to maintain the Spiritual Life as a Whole, and to carry it through in the midst of seemingly insuperable obstacles. A religion which performs this must not consider itself as a special province of the remaining life, but must encompass and permeate the whole life. That the *Universal* mode of religion does not form its culmination, for, indeed, it never leads to an independent religion, but that it far more leads to a *Characteristic* religion—all this will be shown later; but it will be shown, too, that this characteristic mode presupposes the universal mode, proceeds out of its experiences, and has to unite itself with it.

Spiritual Life was not in our view a quality of another existence; it proved itself as a life existing by itself, which had to develop all its existence within the life. The problem of the truth of religion receives, therefore, its existence from out of the fact that an absolute life, superior to the world, is recognised as effective in our sphere. Through such a recognition the conception of the Godhead receives the meaning of an Absolute Spiritual Life; out of this all the remainder of life is to be moulded. This yields a decisive break with the old methods of proof—methods that sought before all else to prove an existence on the other side of the human circle, and to set oneself in relationship with such an existence. Through this the intellect gained inevitably a leading position, for by what other means could we perceive an external existing reality? On the contrary, the revelation and the appropriation of a turn towards the Life-process call upon the whole man, and desire a forward act of the whole soul; all this certainly enters into ideas and has to be set in doctrine, but even these have to relate themselves and be adjusted to the Life-process, for they cannot proceed as rigid dogmas which would govern the very powers themselves. From this point of view there results for religion a characteristic relationship of the eternal and the temporal, of substance and its forms; now only such are valid as fundamental truths as are necessary in the vindication of the representative Life-process. The nature of that which presents itself in the existing situation as an incontestable truth, and which is measured as indispensable by a standard of the act, has to be proved ever anew over

against the changes of time, and ever anew does it become a problem. This is so because the historical course of the religious life of the Church has the tendency to extend further and further the importance of doctrines, and, along with this, to relax the connection with the living foundation, or to construct a particular side of the nature at the expense of the whole. Therefore, the return to the ground-process and the elimination of all the superfluous as a burden and a hindrance become an ever necessary problem; the great renewals of religion thus appear as a simplification of life, as a return out of the darkness and distraction of time to an old and eternal truth.

Finally, the position of our question contains also a raising of religion above the ramifications of the psychic life—above the so-called faculties of the soul; the question concerns itself with a particular development of a Spiritual Reality which certainly unfolds itself in thought, feeling, and will, but which proceeds not from one or from a combination of them. All the strict fulfilment of religion in the provinces of the so-called faculties of the soul yield a formation of the periphery, behind which remains unexperienced and undeveloped a centre of life—the workshop of original moulding and creativeness. Let us consider the religion of the Church system of the Middle Ages, which even to-day presents itself with such an obtrusive air as the one true religion. A system of doctrines is transmitted to the individual, a complex of deeds is laid upon him; also the entire resignation of the subjective feeling—a mysticism with its feeling organ—can be brought about through doctrines and precepts presented in such a manner as

not to appear as a burden and a constraint. Thus the whole man seems to have been won, and religion seems to have become the possession of his soul. But is it so in reality? Or remains there not unconceived behind all the expansion that which is really the fundamental fact — man as a superior Whole, as a participator in infinity, as a warrior for a spiritual self? This depth of his nature has now come to a full consciousness, and, along with this, it has become clear that such a fact alone grants him secure stability against unutterable dangers, tribulations, and doubts; so that he will found his religion upon this rock, weary throughout of the strife whether intellect, or will, or feeling, plays the main part in the concern. Here as everywhere in such a fact we do not find anything new, for wherever religion was the moving energy of life, there stood behind it man with the whole of his soul. But this ancient truth was woefully darkened, and prevented from coming to full effect in the common life of humanity through human conceptions and especially through the Christian Church. So that it is still something new when it is recognised fully in principle, and when it is able to defend itself more energetically against its own disfigurement.

(γ) *The Reality above the World.*—What brings about the problem of religion out of the Spiritual Life? The Spiritual Life in itself does not produce religion in an immediate manner. It is certain that it signifies a higher degree of reality than nature; this degree can develop itself fully and live out its potencies in our world, and can prepare all it needs for its aims; as things stand thus, we have in the

Spiritual Life a new stage *within* the world, but we have not as yet a *new world*—we have won no over-world as yet; in all this we have reached an idealism —the employment of this worn-out expression is used here for the purpose of brevity—but we have not as yet acknowledged religion. The question concerning an over-world leads us first to ask whether the New which carries such a fundamental transformation with itself knocks itself in pieces upon the hard obstacles of our world, and thus is not able to win any secure position against such obstacles. If things are really so, either the whole has to be dropped as a treacherous illusion and all activity to reach and to maintain it has to be suspended, or we are to seek a deeper ground in what occurs within our circle and to protect the gain throughout. But when such a matter of fact allows itself to be proved, and when it leads to the recognition of an over-world absolute life, even yet religion is not won. That comes about when the life comes in contact not only with its own results, but when we seize life and appropriate it as a Whole, when we pass from the effects and set ourselves upon the causes, and participate, in a form of immediacy, in the absoluteness of the Divine Life. But in order to reach such a decisive point we must first of all run through the earlier stages of life and seek to show that the Spiritual Life has no secure ground in the ordinary near-at-hand world, but meets the hardest contradictions in such a world, and yet in spite of these contradictions it maintains itself and exercises energy in order to take up first of all the decisive question.

(*aa*) *The Peril to the Spiritual Life from its Sur-*

rounding World.—How little the Spiritual Life governs ordinary immediate existence has been seen from the beginning of our investigation; it was this fact that made us raise it so fundamentally above that existence. But the inner energy presents yet in no way a triumphant advance over against the world. The clash has become sharper rather than milder, and the contradiction reaches deeper into the foundations. In the meantime the Spiritual Life brings forth from within a new kind of existence, and desires for it new forms; it remains throughout committed to a fundamental construction of the same reality and yet it longs to advance and possess more of this reality, and is thus affected with a contradiction right through its course; its energy and its truth are endangered by the greatest difficulties. It signifies from within a total-life, and yet this total-life is strewn over the conformable individual nature; it signifies a timeless truth and underlies wholly the power of time, and yet it is carried along powerless by the ever-restless current of history; it must hold itself as the main fact —as the kernel of reality and a full self-aim—and yet it is handled throughout as a subsidiary fact, as a means to other aims. At the same time, a characteristic nervousness restrains the man from confessing openly his inner apathy towards the Spiritual Life; rather he will and can allow this appearance of a "better" to have its place, so that there originates a general unveracity with all the powerlessness which is inherent in such unveracity, with all the hollow pomp which makes the man himself vexatious. This hard conflict between the nature and the existence-form of the Spiritual Life is the deepest ground of

that hypocrisy which runs through and poisons human life not only in the union of the life of culture, but also in the deepest recesses of the soul. Such a mere semblance of character—such unveracity—is bound to strike its roots into all the individual activities and situations: knowledge, love, happiness—all receive a multi-coloured hybrid form; all these might be and could be *more* than this; everything through such a disunion has not the courage either of a decisive Yea or of a decisive Nay. With such halfness how could a new world arise or be built up over against nature? We have already convinced ourselves that the examination of the historico-social life offers not the least hope for such a new world or the possibility of altering essentially our position in respect to the Spiritual Life. Therefore, the whole movement towards the Spiritual Life is either a great and an inexplicable error, or there is more behind it than appears clear at a glance.

(*bb*) *The Assertion of the Spiritual Life over against the World.*—That in reality *more* is imbedded behind the appearances is shown by the fact of the conflict itself; for this fact is of a twofold kind: it shows the hindrance, but it also shows that *something is hindered* which asserts itself in spite of all hindrance. If the surrounding world with its unspiritual nature were the Whole, how could the Spiritual Life arise universally? How could it, if it is no more than a mere appearance, exercise so much more power now it has recognised the fact than it exercised previously? Whence even the striving after appearance, after hypocrisy, if all resolves itself into a phantom? There must be thus something superior in the very truth

which works in our potency and in the whole of its province. That this is so is illumined yet clearer by the fact that the Spiritual Life, with all its hindrances and restraints in the environing world, does not simply conform to this world, but asserts itself over against it and holds fast its own aims. It does this in the directions we shall now point out.

1. In the midst of all distractions, one thing issues out of the kingdom of distractions—an inconceivable movement towards unity. Individuals, peoples, and epochs believe in the possibility of mutual understanding in the midst of all disintegrations; all assertion of a spiritual kind is valid not only for the individual or for a special circle, but for all; also the particular branches of the work of reason can well diverge for a while but not for any length of time, and finally all the manifold of effort must flow into an encompassing truth, for all particularity becomes rigid and lifeless when severed from such a unity. The striving towards unity in the midst of all distractions is that which particularly rouses human life, which sets it in motion, which entangles it in unutterable strife, but which proves itself a mighty power in the midst of all. Whence else comes the struggle than from thence—that each shall become the Whole, the governing, the universally valid, and that each tends to lose its value if it tolerates another to lie untouched by its side? Such strenuous and even passionate striving is an irrefragable testimony of a power superior to the dispersion of the parts and also to the whole environing order of things.

2. However the content and the value of the Spiritual Life may be made by man to fit in with his

aims, yet they withstand a complete adjustment into the mere-human situation, and exercise from their side a counter-effect to that situation. No less an authority than Kant explained it as "highly objectionable that the laws concerning what I ought to do can be drawn from or confined to what is merely done." How does such a superiority of the norm of all action justify itself above the position of man if there dwells not in his whole nature such a superior arrangement? This arrangement in man's nature appears in the total-movement of history, first of all, as a power of a directive and unravelling kind. Men and times draw the Spiritual Life into themselves and lower it as a means for their aims; they give it a moulding which corresponds to their fleeting wishes. Thus they may carve and bend it, and appear themselves as seeming lords of things. But such a method has always a measuring rod brought to bear on it; sooner or later a counter-effect makes its presence felt and then the merely human fashion lives itself out, its emptiness and meanness come to light, and the final decomposition is not far away. Thus we find an incessant return to the Spiritual Life from the human perversion of it—a return to man's own nature; and consequently an energetic return to the demands and dependence of man.

This is an effect of a more negative kind, but the Spiritual Life declares its ability also positively within the human province through an incessant exertion to move outside the "given" situation, through a tracing out and a holding forth of ideals, through a longing after a more complete happiness and a more complete truth. Why is not man satisfied

with the relativity which clings so fast to his existence? Why has he a longing for the Absolute in opposition to such relativity, and through this plunges himself into the most difficult sorrows and restlessness? This has happened not only in special situations of individuals, but in the total ascent of culture; indeed, the upward march of culture would have been impossible without a striving of man from a level above his "given" position and even above himself. Was not subjective satisfaction more easily reached by him in the semi-animal stages of his existence than in culture with all its toils and tangles, and does the progress of culture with all its tools make him happier in the mere human sense? What else can compel him to step into this perilous track of culture but the necessity of his own nature which, at the same time, reveals to him the presence of a new order of things?

3. Then Spiritual Life asserts itself not only within the human circle, but it exhibits in the midst of all obstacles a capacity to draw the lower to itself, it exhibits the energy to overcome the lower and the power to ennoble it through a higher. There proceeds through our life a movement from the outward to the inward, from the natural to the spiritual. Any spiritual stimulation which comes to us may seem in the first instance to proceed and to work on us from without, and may thus appear as a mere constraint which can only be uncoupled by counter-effects. But what first of all seems to work *on* man more than *in* him begins soon to strike its roots within him, allows itself to be gripped as one's own fact and to be transformed into free activity.

Without such a growth of one's own life, without such an inverted order of the direction of the movement, all education of humanity remains a dead training, and all moral instruction remains a mere appearance; the spark of the inner life would never be awakened were such a life not imbedded in man's very nature, and did it not enable him to carry further his very life in the direction of his goal. So that it is not through the mere working of psychical mechanism, which could never awaken man and which could never originate an inner unity and an active disposition, that the progress from custom to morality, from external relationship to inner harmony, from a collection of self-interests to a union of character, explains itself and reveals itself as a phenomenon of the inwardness of human life and existence. Through this the effort is raised beyond its original motive, and the man is led out to a region beyond himself. What appeared to him previously as mere means for his egotistic aims, begins now, through his own character, to draw him and set him in motion; this is more and more taken into his own life and raises his life. The necessities of existence aim at carrying man to his work; and how many inward movements and how many blessings proceed from such aims! But all this is to be understood only under an hypothesis of an active presence of an elevated Spiritual Life within the human circle.

What we have already considered in connection with these three points and directions is a development of the one and same ground-fact which testifies in a corporate manner that a Spiritual Life works

in us, and which does not explain itself out of the relations, but which points to a higher order of existence than the world-order which surrounds us. With all this is won only an hypothesis of religion, and not religion itself. Though the consciousness of the effect of a higher order of things in the midst of our circle of experience is able to give a true assurance, and to strengthen the faith in some kind of conquest of the good, still the power remains a dark secret, and an inner relationship to it is not yet given. It is only with this latter inward relationship that religion originates. Let us therefore see if the experience of life shows an entrance hither.

(*cc*) *The Revelation of an Absolute Spiritual Life in our World.*—We need not open any laborious and lengthy investigation in order to prove that a Spiritual Life superior to the world not only touches us with its effects, but that it is also present in us as cause with all the fulness of its energy. It is revealed to us as a great fact that a Spiritual Life can rise up as our *own* life: and this actually happens. The significance of this fact can be judged fully after we have recognised that a total-life presents itself in the Spiritual Life, and that in this total-life a new degree of reality arises, and an inverted order of the world-process takes place; such a turn could not proceed out of the potency of the individual elements of life, but has to proceed out of the energy of the Whole. Therefore, this Whole must be, in a form of immediacy, present in us, and, also, the great change shall ensue as a gain of our own life. Now, the life of the spirit does not develop itself in us merely in isolated achievements or from the external; we have

already seen how it returned to itself from each performance and constructed for itself a nucleus which became the carrier of all activity, for thus alone could the autonomous life develop itself. Whatever the personality and the spiritual individuality may receive on the mere-human and natural planes could not arise and bring forth any kind of movement unless there worked on such planes some kind of autonomous and original life.

The great change of life from a web of relations to the founding of a total-life in itself, and the turn of reality to its own depth—all this is a fact which does not march forward in front of us, and it could not arise in us at all had it not gone forth out of us and had we not become along with it active co-carriers of reality. The dawning of a new world in the midst of our province, our entering into an inward revolution of human existence—this is the great miracle in which the presence of a new world manifests itself with great clearness. He who does not find the miracle here is not likely to find it anywhere else, and will seek in vain for it in the "far, far away," for the words of PARACELSUS hold valid in this respect: "You are long-sighted, you see in the distance, but you do not see close at hand."

That the fact of an autonomous life in our own circle holds valid as the decisive proof of the presence of a Divine existence is contradicted only by the external clothing of the idea. "Autonomous," one may say, and so says one with the Middle Ages mode of thought, is the denial of all dependence, of all tying to another will; religion, however, desires unconditional dependence, obedience, submission;

thus the two are complete opposites. But they remain opposites only so long as God and man, in a childish anthropomorphic manner, are set against one another as two isolated natures that are set in relation from the outside, and thus the one side seems to take what is given by the other side. We could think but little of man if we allowed everything to come in to him from the outside, if we denied him all inner movement towards the summits of religion. And, too, the new world would be cut off entirely from our world and, through the inaccessibleness, the "beyond" would vanish.

But it is quite otherwise when the autonomy, now possessing more inward and less anthropomorphic modes of thought, appears not as something contradictory to the Whole but as an independent "becoming" out of the energy and presence of the Whole, and, at the same time, as an essentially new grade of life; then this independent life must separate itself most pointedly from all self-willed selfishness and from all stubborn self-assertion. It is certainly a mystery how the highest self-activity signifies the immediate extinction of all mere egoism and signifies, too, a life out of Infinity. But he who places this mystery on one side must either cast away all religion or shape it in a purely external form of the understanding.

Through the inward presentation of the total problem the thought of an over-world signifies much more than a flight to a bare "beyond." True, there results a separation—a division of reality—for without this religion is not possible. But this does not imply that a "beyond" is to be thought of as a kind

of fixed and inviolable foundation of our existence entirely over against the present world—a "beyond" that has to be adjusted through special helps; but it does imply a "beyond" in the sense that the existing Spiritual Life relegates the present world to a secondary place. Such a Spiritual Life becomes the fixed norm for all life, and in its renewal it becomes not some kind of a More of an already existing life, but in it, first and foremost, a really existing and truthful life is won.

Thus, religion was everywhere found where it possessed this thorough originality, and its own truth was the most certain of all things—a truth in which all else found its fixed duration. Thus an Augustine took flight out of the hardest shocks of human life to the immanent Divine presence in his own soul—to that which first of all disengaged itself from the threatening overthrow of life, to that which won him for himself. So that the Middle Ages conceived this Divine Order as the Fatherland (*patria*), and ventured to say that we know God better than the creature (*Deus notior creatura*).

After all this there can be no doubt as to the nature of religion. Religion rests on the presence of a Divine Life in man; it unfolds itself through the seizure of this Life as one's own nature. Religion, too, subsists in the fact that man in the inmost foundation of his own being is raised into the Divine Life, and participates in the Divine Nature. Christianity was right when it found the kernel of religion in the union of the natures of the human and the Divine, and even the unfortunate dogmatic representation of the two natures in Christ could

not destroy the transforming and elevating energy of this truth.

But the full vivification of the Divine in man and the gaining of a new plane of life can never happen without a recognition and an assimilation on the side of man. Religion can never originate unless the Divine enters into the conviction of man, unless the whole of his soul turns towards the new world. In this sphere there is no place for any mechanical instillation, and there is no growth possible without our own accommodating spirit. Hence religions constantly long so ardently for the consent and repentance of man; the nobility of the soul and its membership with God must be acknowledged in order to be able to experience His Divine Energy. For "what would it avail a man if he were king and knew it not" (ECKHART). It will appear later in our treatment in a fuller manner that religions could not consider human capacity as the measurement of the activity of the Divine, but that to all religions, in their best conclusions, human achievement was considered as the highest proof of grace.

It is not possible that so much should lie imbedded in such a recognition did it not signify more than a passive approval or a setting of act and work. If things did not mean more for our life, there is not much more won than a beautiful sonorous etiquette. In order to bring forth a genuine renewal, the recognition of the Divine must transpose itself into an energetic selection and rejection of the elements which present themselves in this world. The greatness of this turn of man consists in that the Spiritual Life is led through its freedom from the entanglement

and anxiety of the world-situation to a pure distinctness of its own nature and to a full self-reliance. Thus, an energetic distinction between essential and non-essential becomes possible, and through such an analysis the life is powerfully roused and set in motion. Religion throughout is not mere contemplation with its corresponding characteristics, but, after the nature of its nucleus, is the highest activity, the separation of the existing chaos, the concentration of the Spiritual Life by itself, and the setting forth of such a Spiritual Life against all the alien elements which threaten to overwhelm it.

2. *The Content of Religion*

(*a*) *The Idea of God.*—The discussion of the idea of God belongs to the summit of our investigation. But the discussion of the subject is to be considered not as if the idea of God had already been discovered in advance at a certain stage in the evolution of religion, and had driven forward all further development out of itself; but on the contrary, our investigation considers the idea of God as that which brings to expression above all else the characteristic properties of religion, and which makes the main direction of the striving of religion palpable. Therefore, one fought in reality for the content of religion when one fought for the conception of God, and it is in the recognition of this fact that every conception of religion has to prove itself.

The pathway which leads to the conception of God leads us at the same time to the content which the conception can have for us. It signifies to us nothing other than an Absolute Spiritual Life in its grandeur

above all the limitations of man and the world of experience—a Spiritual Life that has attained to a complete subsistence in itself, and, at the same time, to an encompassing of all reality.

Before we view what such a foundation and development of the idea of God, in and by the Spiritual Life, yields as to content, we must discuss how this way of taking the idea contrasts with other ways, and especially how it is qualified to overcome an antithesis, which, beyond mere conceptions, disunites and endangers the religious life itself. This antithesis is that of anthropomorphism and of ontological speculation. The former has endeavoured to keep the idea of God as near as possible to man; the latter has endeavoured to lift the idea as high and far above man as possible. Anthropomorphism controls the ordinary conception of religion from remote antiquity. Or can we deny that man is here wont to project into the universe a somewhat magnified and ennobled replica of himself, and to deal with the Deity as with a man-like being? The insufficiency of this was not only brought up against, but it was also fully felt within, religion's own circle. Hence the effort to drive out such a human notion, and this elimination seemed to be most thoroughly effected by ontological speculation which excluded each and all closer determination of the Godhead as illegitimate, and retained as valid for the nature of the Godhead only Being without any qualities and above all concepts. This worked with special attractive energy on philosophic minds, who then evolved a mode of esoteric religion which seemed to lie

heaven-wide from all the smallness and selfishness of man. But with such a loosening of its bonds with man, religion threatened to forfeit not only all clear qualities of the Godhead but also all animated energy; it passed more and more into a passive contemplation, and, by this, into a direct counterpart of the anthropomorphic religion which accomplishes too little in the inward transformation of man, and which serves too directly his desire for mere happiness.

With such a divergence the two ways cannot possibly be directly united and conjoined, as the esoteric and exoteric forms of religion, as has happened in the main in the historical religions and especially in Christianity. In reality the Christianity of the Church has not one but two conceptions of God—one anthropomorphic and the other ontologic-speculative; they contain different forms of religion, so that any juxtaposition of the two forms cannot possibly be a solution of the problem, but can only represent a tolerable compromise which insistently proclaims the two requirements of every concept of God and of all religion. Anthropomorphism contends rightly that religion, in order to be a power of life and not a mere view of the universe, must remain close to man and must strengthen him in himself. How little ontology is able out of its own power to do this, and how little in its speculations it leads to religion—all this would be quite evident if it were not wont, unnoticed, to complete itself from a more positive kind of religion, and to substitute mere empty conceptions

for true forms, as mysticism evidently shows. On the other hand, ontology possesses a right in the undertaking because it lifts religion out of the circle of presentations, and especially out of the circle of the interests of the mere individual; for through this, ontology really forms something new out of man, and not merely strengthens him further in his smallness and narrowness.

Now, the two claims — the psychic nearness of religion and its liberation from the mere-human — become united with the promulgation of the Spiritual Life. For this deals not only with the preservation of the merely human but with its spiritual substance, and it prohibits all anchorage in any merely human province and all binding of the conception of God in merely human conceptions. But when, at the same time, the truth stands firm that the Spiritual Life has to win our true self—the depth of our own nature—then religion, with all its elevation beyond the merely human, preserves a nearness of soul; and, too, the conception of God can gain a positive content without falling into anthropomorphism. All this will happen through the fundamental conception that man himself signifies no bare isolated existence, but is moored upon Infinity, and only in the realisation of this fact is he able to discover his own definite nature. Also, the highest human conception of designating the Absolute Nature will not suffice, for a human colouring always clings to the conception of spiritual greatness. But these conceptions, through the annulment of the sharp opposites, can well serve as pathways and symbols, and, in spite of all their insufficiency, can present us with true contents of life.

From such a reflection on these things the effort concerning the personality of God is to be judged—a fact which reaches back to antiquity. Much is here a strife over words. In the expression "personality" differences with the most striking resemblances lie imbedded: one side thinks, in connection with the expression, of the individual human nature with its opposition to other natures and with its natural limits; another thinks of the "becoming" independence and self-comprehension of the Spiritual Life in man. But the whole of the difference is not a strife over words. The direct denial of a personality of God aims at the denial of a superiority against the world-process, aims at bringing about a pantheistic melting of the Absolute Life in the world. An unconditional affirmation, on the other hand, works in the direction of humanising and pulling down. It becomes necessary, then, for a further development of the Spiritual Life to secure sufficiently its ground against the flow of all into merely human qualities and relations; and it is not easy to overcome this danger on account of the rooted usage of terms. Therefore, it may be recommended as a scientific expression of the fact, not to transplant the expression "personality" to the Absolute Life, or, at the most, not to employ it as more than a symbol. Indeed, one may ask, in order to avoid the dangers of the conception of personality, whether religion of a universal kind has not to turn from the expression "God" to that of "Godhead." Whether the passage from the *Universal* mode of religion to the *Characteristic* mode constitutes such a turning, and at the same time gives a better right to the conception of

personality, can be shown only by further developments and experiences.

These investigations include also the decision concerning the position of mysticism. If the Spiritual Life is, first of all, a total-life, then no true departure to the religious province can take place without a liberation from narrow accuracy, without a counter-effect to the merely human, and without the setting of the life in a total-life. That mysticism sets this forth, is its great service; indeed, all the moulding of religion fails unless it takes an element of mysticism —the living soul—into itself. But mysticism fails because it turns this necessary portion of religion into the sole content. To it religion is nothing other than an absorption into the infinite and eternal Being—an extinguishing of all particularity, and the gaining of a complete calm through the suspension of all the wear and tear of life. Thus even here the Nay and not the Yea remains in the ascendant; and this will far more lower the natural difficulties of life than wring from them a new power superior to them; and consequently the life fails to find an exit out of the sphere of irritation and of its ordinary pitch to a region of active work and to a fundamental transformation of reality. Mysticism, however, holds valid as a weighty and indispensable motive of religion, but it does not constitute the whole of religion. We cannot dispense with it, but dare not terminate with it.

If we now turn towards the demarcations and securities, it is clear that such can never result out of vague reflection but out of the experiences of the Spiritual Life. All speculative gnosticism fades

where the Life-process constitutes the point of departure and also the boundary of all reflection. The idea of God signifies to us nothing other than an Absolute Spiritual Life—a Life freed from the limits and entanglements of our experience, a Life in possession of a complete existence for itself, and constituting the substance of reality. It is thus alone that the idea of God can possess a content, that the characteristics of the Spiritual Life can long for a purer formation, and that these characteristics, uniting among one another what appeared previously as merely external qualities, can now set these very qualities in the nature itself. Through such a turn from effects to causes, from surface to foundation, the unity of the total-life raises itself to a more complete clearness; the timelessness of all spiritual content leads to the idea of a Divine Order; the truthful and the worthful now desire a full union, and the good becomes the governing power of all life. Thus the Spiritual Life, through such an elevation to the Absolute, reaches a full development of its own nature, and obtains, at the same time, an incomparably greater power and superiority over against the merely human powers.

(β) *Godhead and the World.*—In connection with the problem of the Godhead and the world, two directions have struggled for prominence, each of which is able to show a good reason for itself. On the one side, it appears necessary before all else to distinguish clearly the Godhead from the world, and to raise such far above the world; for it is only thus we are able to preserve the purity of the conception, and only thus does an elevating effect seem to pro-

ceed from such a conception. On the other side, the Godhead is drawn as far as possible deep into the world, and as far as possible the particular nature of the Divine is bound with the particular nature of things, for it is only thus we seem able to reach a living present consciousness and lasting influences from the world.

"What kind of nature would God have, had He no other call
Than from outside to move the world and merely circling all!
Far more is He the inner life of all that seems and is,
In Him is Nature born and bred, and He in Nature lives."

Thus we obtain the opposition of transcendence and immanence, of dualism and monism, of supernaturalism and pantheism. The terms announce but little, and the mutual charges of heresy are wearisome. That the matter is not so simple as the partisans imagine on the one side or the other, appears clear from the fact that whole epochs have stood under the influence, now of one, now of the other: waning antiquity could not, on account of a feeling of weariness, separate wide enough the Divine and the world; the rising modern times, with its fresh strain of life, could not sufficiently unite both. Indeed, soon the impression of limits and entanglements predominated; later the impression of energy and beauty won the upper hand. Alternate aspects of inability and ability drew the character hither and thither. We have to see if the development of religion through the Spiritual Life is able to raise man above the vacillations of times and of dispositions.

The starting-point of the Spiritual Life evidently

prohibits such a crass dualism as governs the ordinary mind. For the Spiritual Life was no separate domain which forced open an entrance to alien things, but it proved itself to us as the characteristic depth of reality, and as the turn of life to its own nature. Therefore, if the conception of the Godhead develops out of the conception of the Spiritual Life, the Godhead must be most intimately connected with the nature of things; and this nature of things must be grounded and founded in the Godhead, and, finally, the Godhead must be all in all. The positive religions could not withhold such a conviction, and religion dare not deprive itself of the experience of the great apostle who felt that "in Him we live, and move, and have our being," and that "we are also His offspring."

When dualism misconstrues this, it isolates the Godhead to the uttermost, and thus loses all power to give the Godhead a content; inevitably a partially transfigured mirror-image of the reality nearest at hand is set up for a new world. The projection of this "here and now" to a "beyond"—this reduplication of the world—must, however, create a contradiction especially in the province of religion, for with such a method there results too little inward transformation; the natural impulses are not sufficiently broken; the bitter Nay fails in religion, and without such a Nay the Yea gains no energy and depth. The same thing happens in connection with the customary hopes of immortality, which conceive of man as being immortal even in his body and all its natural limitations, and which are carried with all their worldly qualities into infinity. Indeed, is there

not a religious disposition conceivable which has as its motive some kind of conservation of the "dear self," and which finds the hindrances against such a conservation unbearable?

Thus, not only all philosophic thought, but also definite religion itself, withstand such a dualism; but, again, a renunciation of it glides easily into pantheism. But an exclusive and complete pantheism, however, is securely obviated through a development of religion out of the Life-process. To such a pantheism our world in the whole of its existence becomes a phenomenon, a development, an emanation, or, as the usual wording has it, an absolute essence. All differentiation of things appears to such a line of thought as a weakness and an error of the human mode of thinking; there is, to such a view, only one particular reality, only one particular life. The government of God according to this theory falls fully in unison with the characteristic effects of the things, and the unity spreads itself over the whole multiplicity. Such a course of thought has the tendency to win man to its side, especially when the consciousness of his energy stirs within him, and when his eyes are opened to the fulness of life and the beauty of the world. It is the self-consciousness of the work of culture—a consciousness of a truth beyond the individuals themselves—which, through a strengthening of itself, raises pantheism to a religion. Its atmosphere of greatness, its effort to reach beyond the antithesis of life, and its giving reality a depth, are the chief recommendations of pantheism.

Such things are no small merits. But, in spite of

all its lustre, pantheism discovers no contradiction in the inmost nature of man, and such a failure makes it untenable, and transmutes its development into a subversion of the self. It remains an indisputable fact that all turn to religion originates out of an opposition to the surrounding world; the thought of an over-world arises and gains a power only because the near-at-hand world does not penetrate into a problem whose solution dare not be abandoned. Herewith, it is characteristic of and essential to religion that it develops its power from within without in opposition to the surrounding world; and where the opposition fades or fails, its energy immediately relaxes. The idea of God becomes unstable where no inner contradiction carries man beyond the world and furthers a life above the world. All movements within the world and all the deepening of the things existing in it can, of course, further their own particular conceptions, but they cannot justify a breach with external things, and it is through such a breach that the idea of God results. Such an idea of God holds within itself a great turn of life and a transformation of reality; it issues also a call of the whole of reason to the struggle against unreason and for the renewal of life. All this lies far away from pantheism.

The contradiction referred to checks the development of pantheism and drives it out to great divergences. If the ideas draw God and the world in opposite directions, both could not possibly flow together side by side; the one tends to overcome the other, and seeks to absorb the other into itself. Where the movement to the Godhead stands in the

foreground, the world takes its flight more and more to the realm of night as is shown in mysticism; where the movement proceeds mainly in the direction of the world, the idea of God evidently fades away until finally it becomes an empty word which transforms itself from pantheism to atheism. The development of modern life down to the brand-new monism of the present day points out this fact. Pantheism often dresses things with an indefinite glamour of the Divine, and deceives us as to the sharpness of the opposites of things. Often pantheism is no more than an echo of a real and energetic religion which has been transformed into a sickly sentimentalism—into the process of the dissolution of real religion.

But in human existence the hardest inner contradiction hinders in no way a true realisation and development of power, so that this remains an historical fact in spite of the poverty of pantheism. But pantheism has rendered the service of working against the humanising of the religious conceptions, and has cast its glance on the particular connections of things and on the presence of reason within the world, and especially it has opposed the egoism not only of the individual but of mankind, and also has held that reality is to be possessed not through words and doctrines but through the opening of a new life out of the Whole and Infinity. But its mistake consists in that it recognises the highest aim as already attained, and declares all divergence from such an aim as a mere appearance. This ready-made kind of reality has precarious results in varied directions. If there is to be recognised as valid only such a ready-made reality, and if it is not

shown that the reason of things can only be attained through labour and struggle, then life transforms itself into a mere contemplation, and the reconciliation with reality lies then merely in a bare contemplation of an artistic or scientific kind. This point is, however, reached at the cost of freedom and ethical handling, for both of which there is no place in such a position. At the same time, there arises an inclination which was made partially clear even at the start, that evil is to be considered trivial and to be glossed over; hence the danger of a quietistic optimism arises. Here, the whole of the Spiritual Life receives too much of a merely natural character; it may be conceived as a restful substance and as a continuous process, but it does not appear so much as the freedom and the destiny of man. Thus such a course falls in its flight to the level of the mere-human, and becomes under the ban of purely natural conceptions—a position extremely difficult for the Spiritual Life to express its definiteness and depth. In reality, all this gliding of the Divine into the world tends in the direction of concealing the opposites and of weakening the energy of movement. True, religion must also seek for the Divine in the world, but it can find it only when it has developed and stamped its impress over against the world; for such is the only possible way to distinguish between reason and unreason, to drive out the enemy and to uplift the kinsman. It is characteristic of religion that the Divine world has another world by its side which somehow strikes its roots into the Divine, and which also presents the aim of its worship as an impetus out of its own energy, but which impetus,

attains to this aim not by its own energy, but only through being lifted up to it by the Divine world.

In the primal phenomenon of religion a two-fold aspect is imbedded: the Absolute Life must be effective *above* and *within* the world; the movement must proceed beyond the world and return to the world. It is this fact especially which gives religion its driving force, its incessant life from ever fresh sources. The two things are not separated one from the other, but are present the one thing with the other. Religion thus needs a continuous overcoming of the opposition of dualism and pantheism, each of which pursues only one of these opposites, and thus soon reaches a disastrous point of rigid repose.

(γ) *Godhead and Man.*—In connection with the problem of the relationship between the Godhead and man, there exists especially the danger of making them to move, within the realm of religion, outside of each other and to labour against each other. For if Divine and human action are brought into such an opposition to each other that the gain of the one signifies the loss of the other, all the freedom of man and all human activity become prejudicial to the all-power of the Divine, as well as to an unconditioned surrender of man; and both of these are absolutely necessary for all religion. If such a one-sided course is adopted, religion will restrict freedom as much as possible up to complete annihilation; indeed, this line of thought made all explicitly religious characters determinists in their consciousness. If consideration for the practice of life enforced a mitigation in these matters, and imposed the admission of a co-operation

on the part of man also, such behaviour was evidence rather of a practical cleverness than of a religious depth and logical conclusions. If, however, the consequences are thought out without any consideration for human opinion and individual feelings, determinism produces an apathy of each and all of our activities, it brings about a blight on all moral endeavour and introduces the most deadly enmity between morality and religion. Then, all redemption is supposed to lie in a fixed miracle; a materialism threatens the substance of the religious life, since good is simply infused into us without being transformed into our own act. All this leads easily to an overstrain and an untruth; when this track of thought is followed, it depicts man as impotent, depraved, and bad, in order to allow the Divine grace to shine all the clearer against such a dark background of human existence. We have thus obtained the unfortunate doctrine of original sin which drew Christianity into Manichæism; and thus we find that opinion of Luther that man does not so much acquire righteousness as that righteousness is imputed to him by faith. Such an opinion, if thought out, resolves the great struggle of the world into an appearance and a play.

Such consequences—unavoidable and unbearable at the same time—reveal clearly a mistake in the fundamental direction of this line of thought. In the last resort, it is a mistaken, anthropomorphic, and inadequate course of thought for religion also, to attempt to heighten the conceptions of the greatness of the Godhead and of the Divine action through the debasement of man and his capacities.

This is in the end nothing other than the measurement of the Divine by the standard of man at his worst. In reality there is only one solution to the problem: the opposition of the Divine and the human has, in the main, to be abandoned, and the development of the one and the strengthening of the other at the same time has to take its place. The freedom and the self-activity of man are not a withdrawal of the Divine power and the lessening of Divine grace, but they are the verification of these—the highest verification of all. Morality and religion do not strive for some other province, but, rightly understood, morality itself is the main proof of the fundamental fact of religion—of the presence of an Absolute Life. The fact that man is raised to a level of a definite Spiritual Life over against his own weaknesses and the contradictions of a boundless world, is the greatest of all miracles, for it carries within itself the power of a world above the world.

How all this is possible, how freedom arises out of grace, and self-activity arises out of dependence—this primal phenomenon overflows all explanation. It has, as the fundamental condition of all Spiritual Life, a universal axiomatic character. This shows itself as no isolated problem, but is a higher stage of a more general problem, viz., how out of the connections of the world an individual nature of a psychic kind—a feeling and willing nature—has arisen, and has led its own life in opposition to all the environment? If we were fortunate enough to solve this problem, we could then be ready to handle every other.

But what remains a great riddle to speculation has been transformed into a religion by life through its

achievements. Also, even with the great determinists who possessed great natures, this truth has been verified. They were not inactive natures dependent merely on hope and tarrying, but even in the proclamation of their highest conceptions and in the shaping of their own inmost nature they were carried as if by a superior power, and became tools for the fulfilment of their most characteristic aims. The highest achievement of freedom carries within itself the strongest consciousness of dependence. Paul more than anyone has brought a determinism into Christianity, but at the same time he worked more than all his contemporaries. One needs only follow Augustine in his life-work in order to acknowledge him as one of the most active of personalities; and Luther's energy needs no proclamation on the house-top. Further, in wider circles of activity, freedom and dependence can run together as is proved by that Calvinism, to which the entire conviction was present that all has been determined solely and directly by God; and yet such a conviction became the strongest motive for the assertion of independence, and for the sprouting forth of the most fervent work. Thus a problem insoluble by the mind was solved by religion.

The solution, however, must not remain confined to those personalities and epochs to whom the original welling-up life was strong enough to drive back and to render harmless all the errors of the psychical impulses and of conscious contentment. The solution must be recognised clearly, and must govern the universal configuration of religion. In all this the activity does not revolve around a struggle of bare

opinions, but around the content of life. Wherever antagonism between the Godhead and mankind remains in power, the life enters into a dilemma—into a vacillation to and fro between irreconcilable opposites. Either the dependence alone fills the conviction, and then all our activity appears as useless, and, indeed, as a blasphemy; thus religion becomes almost entirely passive and receives a gloomy, doleful, and unmanly character; it becomes a danger to the freedom and the energy of life; it easily engenders, in its turn towards pietism, a dejected and cowed character—a character of painful unveracity wherein the man imagines that he is great in his nothingness, and so superior to another who seems to be conscious of his own powers. All this happens the more the man builds and confesses his feeling of detestableness of all he has. When, however, in the reaction against such a disposition of mind a fresh and frank courage of life arises—when the man holds fast the opposites, the previous danger is escaped, and the man feels, unfolds, and enjoys his own energy; such a feeling heightens to a defiant self-consciousness and to the placing on one side of the Divine. The consequence is that culture thus takes a turn against religion, and treats it as a mere expression of weakness and as a refuge for sick souls. But all this leads rapidly to a reaction. The more such a development of culture wipes out from the contents of life everything absolute and all the problems of the Absolute, the more it extinguishes the gleam of the over-world which surrounds our existence. Then life, in spite of all its activities, becomes inwardly shallower and emptier, until at last it turns again home—turns in

search of a content, in search of a spiritual self-preservation within the domain of religion.

If such a change for the worse in the realm of culture is to be viewed in our day, the more necessary it behoves us to raise religion by means of the nature of its *substance* above this situation, in order that it may construct its superiority above the mere mentality of the day, and in order that eternal truth may be rightly held up against all the fluctuations and errors of human existence.

(δ) *The Psychic Connections of Religion.*—It is a main point in our method of investigation to differentiate clearly between the foundation of the spiritual contents in the characteristic connections of the spiritual world, and their stimulations in psychic existence; or, in other words, to hold separate a noological and a psychological treatment. Thus the previous investigation of the religious problem needs a completion through the presence of the psychic motives which prepare and incline man for religion.

The discovery of a pointed contradiction in our life—the strong contradiction between need and reality — constitutes the starting-point of all the turn towards religion; for how could we in any other way come to strive so eagerly to reach beyond the province of that experience which threatens to break the connection of the world and the unity of our own existence? This contrast is in the first place a fact of feeling. Feeling constructs the psychic starting-point of religion, but it remains certainly fundamentally different from the spiritual root of religion. But the observation of a contrast—the painful discovery of a contradiction—has an indis-

pensable hypothesis in spiritual things. Such a contradiction could not have entered into the life had not some kind of movement been already awakened in us—some kind of impetus after a higher kind of happiness been kindled; for purely external misfortunes produce no shock in the deepest recesses of the soul and engender no feeling of the real nature of the hindrance. We see often, however, on the political and social sides, the most stubborn evils and grievances enduring for a great length of time without engendering a feeling of pain, and without calling forth a strong indignation. The callousness is even so great that the external events pass over the soul without any reaction on its part; and the immediate impressions do not link themselves together to form a Whole. But there is imbedded in the discovery of the contradiction some kind of longing after happiness: a positive need of life is the first thing found in the foundation, which drives life upon the track of religion.

If such a need of life met with no hindrance, no kind of entanglement would arise; if the opposition could be conquered, though not at once yet in the course of time through external circumstances, life and striving would be held fast by such external circumstances more than they would be raised above them. A breach can only take place when the opposition appears as insurmountable—insurmountable for present and future, for achievement and for hope. Through such a situation the striving is either to discontinue as being quite hopeless, or it must open out new avenues of a complete transforming view of the world and of life. A closer investigation of that wherein the hindrance and the problem are

discovered shows how deep this inward revolution goes, and in what directions it carries the man. We see in the course of history itself more and more elements moving from the outward into the inward and thus deepening the inward itself. Although in the beginning all this might have been the external entanglement which our own energy could not remove and which called for supernatural aid, yet soon the *inward* condition steps into the foreground and insists on a spiritual redemption. Also, it makes an important difference whether the entanglement is discovered in what a man thinks or in what he does; whether the contradiction roots itself in an existence laid upon the man by a destiny which does not correspond with and even contradicts his inmost nature, or whether the hindrances belong to the soul itself and whether man can sanction his own striving and being in the attempts to remove them. In all this the pain becomes violent, and the awakened soul is hurried along if the impressions and feelings remain unscattered but unite into a Whole of experience and judgment and work with the energy of a Whole; and through this revelation of the nature of our life the whole level of our ordinary existence becomes insufficient and even intolerable.

This judgment in its turn will reach its greatest resoluteness, and the situation of the soul will reach its greatest tension when the main ground of our malady is seen to consist not in that we can never reach worthy aims, and must always remain in a state of imperfection, but in that the very aims themselves are now in doubt, in that they promise no definite happiness, and in that incessant courage and

work appear worthless. If, then, such aims do not suffice, what shall we hope for, and where shall we turn?

The crisis now comes to a full outburst; the previous situation is seen through as untenable, and it now becomes necessary to go backward or forward. Either every striving after happiness and after the noblest things has to be viewed as a tragic error, and has to surrender itself to a total dissolution, or a great turn results, a new point of departure is won for the life, and a new world is discovered. All attempts to weaken this *Either-Or* lead to sickly compromises, to the deadness of the feelings, and to the one-sidedness of life itself.

But through such a turn to his inmost nature, there originates in man a decisive struggle concerning Being and non-being. Often enough has the negation conquered with innumerable individuals, with whole times and epochs, and has gained the overhand in the particular province of religion as is shown so evidently in Buddhism. But it has not always conquered, for the affirmation, too, has become a world-power, and it is this affirmation which preserves rightly human life and effort. The point where such a decision falls on the individual—and it is this fact which occupies us here—lies largely on the other side of the province of "grounds" and aims, and there appears in its existence something axiomatic, original, and elevated. The decision occupies itself with the question as to whether an impetus of life is to awaken—an impetus that no upheaval can destroy, and which shows that, with all the surrender of the natural self and all the overthrow of prior happiness,

something remains in man—something he cannot destroy. It cannot be destroyed because man acknowledges it not as a special possession of his own but as the inward presence of a new world which makes itself felt and efficacious in the greatest catastrophes of life, and indeed, is able to grow on account of these. Through such a turn the presence and mystery of the suffering itself become the beginning of an elevation beyond it.

Thus we discover the co-operation of two factors in what leads man to religion, and in what exercises a power over his soul, viz., a deeper discovery of the hindrances of the world, and an iron energy over against the hindrances right up to the achievement of a new world. We saw how the discovery of the actual situation could not have been made without some kind of a stirring existence of the inward energy. And it is this stirring existence which drives the energy beyond its natural initial stage, stimulates it to a progressive depth, and furthers the physical tension of life into a metaphysical tension. The whole of this is a movement of life all along the line through difficult hindrances; it is the assertion, and, at the same time, the transformation of a Yea in the midst of the strongest negation. Indeed, it is the holding fast of a Yea in the Nay; it is an ascent of the nature whose freshness and truth can only be asserted when both sides are held forth and ever anew are experienced. Thus there is set forth a dialectic not of ideas but of life—a focusing of deep experience and manly energy and a purification of one through the other, an ever-freer elevation above the antithesis of bare natural energy

and effeminate weakness, and finally the dawning of a heroism of the most inward kind. All this sets a world against a world, and out of the catastrophe itself a new life is born.

(ε) *The Characteristic Features of the Religion of the Spiritual Life.*—Religion does not deal with the conservation of man as mere man, but with the conservation of the Spiritual Life in man; for in connection with religion there stands in question the winning of a definite Spiritual Life; and religion must set forth in a characteristic manner the particular features of such a life as well as its total-view. In connection with these particular features we must present at least some of them.

1. Where religion is directed upon the winning of a new and elevated life superior to all human impulses, its sublimity must contend with special energy for a province beyond all human interests and parties. Religion is never mixed in a Yea or a Nay with political or social problems. Religion has nothing whatever to do as to whether monarchy or republic, individualistic or socialistic presentation of economic relation, is the better condition of things; and he who draws religion into these spheres, even if he is of the opinion that one of them is useful for humanity, will find an opponent who thinks quite as strongly in a contrary direction. No less injurious it is to handle religion in the interests of a political or social radicalism, or to defame it in the interests of the privileged classes. How deplorably would one think of the nature of man if religion meant no more than this, and how little would man think of himself if the abandonment of spirituality and, along with

this, the abandonment of the content and meaning of his own life come about so easily!

2. We have already shown how the Spiritual Life with its construction of a discovered reality within itself goes behind the psychic form of life with all its ramifications, and how it has transformed the whole province, in so far as such a province had connections with such a life, into a mere appearance. Wherever the eclipse of this truth happens, there is called forth difficult entanglements and passionate discords which affect deeply the configuration of religion.

Thus, the old-rooted intellectualism turns the greatness of religion into a hybrid of many colours. Religion should be a fact of the whole man and of his own decision, but may, however, fail to possess more than a purely intellectual character. Through this, the main fact of religion is stunted in its growth, and conscience and conviction are oppressed. This appears most of all in the conception of belief. The welfare of the soul can never link itself to belief unless that belief means more than an authoritatively transmitted doctrine, and unless the man in the inmost substance of his soul stretches forth towards the belief. The ecclesiastical form of religion has succeeded but little in working out this connection of belief, and is unable to succeed on account of its admixture of the *substance* and the *existence-form* of the Spiritual Life. The Divine Life in its possession by man transforms itself unfortunately into a doctrine—a doctrine of the redemption of the soul and of "last things," but still *a doctrine*; the more such a doctrine surmounts reason and even contradicts reason, the greater seems the sacrifice of the power of affirma-

tion and of the heroism of the character. Now, heroism certainly belongs to religion—more heroism, indeed, than belongs to any other fact in the world—but this heroism must set itself in the right position, for otherwise the valour becomes a caprice and the consolidation becomes a torpor. The heroism is not brought about through any kind of doctrine which constructs the object of life, but through the presence of an Absolute Life in our own nature; then, belief is no mere agreement with any doctrine, but there is imbedded in it an ascent of the whole existence of our nature, a longing for the heights, and a progressive certainty of such heights out of the energy of the Divine Life. Thus, belief in its foundation rests upon one thing alone, but that one thing is the kernel of a new world. At the same time, belief is naturally a source of new convictions, but these convictions will not be developed without arranging themselves with the general position of the Spiritual Life and without utilising the experiences of life.

Such a character of belief alone makes it clear how its counterpart—doubt—can play such a great part in religion as in reality it does. So long as belief rests upon bare doctrine, it remains undiscoverable how doubt agitates so strongly the soul, and how it can shatter so deeply the life. We have seen, however, how in ancient times that, when the religious problem stood in the background of the Spiritual Life, doubt and scepticism were recommended by clever men as the best remedies for the comfort of the soul. On that account Christianity has become something quite other, because, through the relationship to God, the gain of a new nature—the salvation

of the threatened soul—became the great quest. But if the matter deals with the question concerning spiritual existence or its non-existence, the strength of doubt leads quickly to despair. The shrinkage becomes so painful and the coercion so intolerable when orthodoxy places doctrine between us and life, and decides as to the place of church dogmas in connection with the welfare and salvation of man.

A fundamental driving out of intellectualism in this and in other religious conceptions, as, for example, in the ordinary conception of revelation, is necessary in the urgent need of religion. But such a conquest will only take place through the recognition of the truth-elements of intellectualism, especially in its desire after a world of thought; it will not take place through placing ourselves in an entirely contrary position to the world of thought, or through attempting to found religion upon bare feeling or will. For if the conquest has the conjecture, that it is only reachable simply through the setting-up of a contrary valid doctrine, it is easy to see, on the other hand, that bare feeling or will yields a spiritual substance quite as little as bare knowledge. Strong subjective feelings and strong subjective acts of will may contain but very little spiritual substance. The appearance of a success only is reached in such a manner, for, often unobserved, something becomes a spurious image of something deeper, more essential, and more substantial, and which makes its appearance as feeling or will, but which does not reach the higher stage of a feeling or willing entity. What brings the opposition of intellectualism and voluntarism to ruins are the problems within the Spiritual Life; these

problems handle the different sides and tasks of life which on the surface are at variance with one another and play against one another, whilst in reality they depend on one another and belong to an encompassing Whole. If something did lie beneath and proceed out of all the "isms," we could say that *Noeticism*[1] alone is able to found securely religion, and it is out of this noetic synthesis that the struggle against the discord begins.

3. We have seen that religion has to do with the whole of life, and that it pledges to uplift this whole; therefore it does more than construct a special province over against the remaining portions of life; it must strike its effects in all directions, and it works less directly upon the particular provinces than upon the transformation of the total-life. All the direct effects of religion, as, for example, upon science, art, the state, have grave dangers and lead easily to coercion and contraction, and are rightly rejected. But it is a fundamental mistake, when such direct actions are rejected, to reject the indirect actions as well. Since religion transforms the whole man, it will also change, through its ramifications into the whole nature, problems into energies, and aims into points of attack. But such changes do not occur through any arbitrary command from the outside, but through a tranquil—and, certainly, a mighty—effect from within without. Conceived of in its univer-

[1] The Substantive "Noeticism" is not found in English Philosophy. The terms "noetic synthesis" and "noetic consciousness" are found, but in a somewhat different sense. *Cf.* Stout's *Analytic Psychology*, vol. ii. ch. v.; Martineau's *Types of Ethical Theory*, vol. ii. pp. 443–445, where he deals with Cudworth's "intelligible ideas" (*νοήματα*).—TRANSLATOR.

sality (although this universality does not form the final conclusions of religion) religion needs no special organisation, but is able through an invisible sway to penetrate through the whole work of life. Indeed, the deeper it works, the less it steps into publicity, and the more it signifies nothing other than the tranquil and yet powerful soul of the whole. Thus in the great souls whose convictions were filled with such a universal nature of religion, the incomprehensiveness and the inscrutableness of the Highest Essence do not discourage and lower the pressure of such souls, but work in a gravitating and elevating direction. Thus, we find the deep-religious Plato stating that it is difficult to know God, and impossible to communicate in an entire manner with Him; and also Goethe states that a man hardly confesses his belief in a Divine Nature without at the same time confessing the inscrutableness of the Divine Nature.

But still in conformity with this, all the conceptions of religion must carry the character of universality; they must extend themselves over the whole life and, through this, fasten together and strengthen what does not proceed to a full development in the isolation of the various elements of life. Human life, right down to the abyss of pain and sin, is full of testimonies of a superhuman Divine life which in manifold ways appears as an elevation above all smallness, as an illumination of the darkness, and as a dawning of love and mercy in the midst of all egotistic instincts and impulses. Religion must gather together, through the energy of its universal nature, such external and scattered effects, and understand and revere them as parts of a more general

life. Such *universal* religion does not exclude a turning to *characteristic* religion; but if religion is to extend its power over the whole of life, its values must possess an all-comprehensiveness and an omnipresence.

This is shown, for example, in the idea of sacrifice. Sacrifice is a supremely important conception in religion, since only by its acceptance does religion attain to full seriousness. For without a fundamental renunciation, and indeed, without a seeming collapse, there is no secure ascent to a new summit—no attainment of a real life. But let not sacrifice be limited by religion to specific religious performances, but let religion reveal it as present throughout life, and let it weld together and inwardly raise all this sacrifice. As the energy of love is measured in human circles by the greatness of the sacrifice it is capable of bringing forth, so there is no genuine movement towards truth without denial and renunciation—without an indwelling sacrifice. But in the survey of the whole it becomes clear that sacrifice does not restrict itself to the surrender of this or that good, but demands nothing less than the whole natural impulses of life. When religion works in such a manner that we are made to see and to experience the Whole in the parts, the great in the small, it works therewith for the purification and sanctification of life right down to its most insignificant details.

It is similar with the conception of faith. Faith which the customary mode of religion confines far too much within an isolated province, and which it conceives in far too intellectualistic a manner,

extends, in reality, its strengthening and elevating energy to the whole range of life. Faith, according to the customary teaching of religion, has for its object something invisible and seemingly impossible. Where, however, was there a progressive striving in spiritual things which did not, at the first glance, appear impossible, and which did not trust in the inner ability of being lifted up and in the possibility of creating a new man? How, without this, would any kind of scientific or æsthetic creativeness of an elevated kind be conceivable? How any confiding love? How any joyous action for man's purification in spite of all the appearances and all the meanness of shallow experience? And, again, all faith has the characteristic that we cannot become its possessors through the might and main of our own labours, but that it rather devolves upon us as a favour, and must be offered to us as a free gift. This is so, not only with faith in another, but also with faith in ourselves, in our tasks, and in our life-work. Nowhere do we enter into genuine work and creativeness without a conviction of an axiomatic character, which refuses to be analysed into reasons and which, indeed, precedes all such reasons. What, however, is desired at the single points, and is there affirmed, though often unconsciously and unwillingly, gains a clear light only in its integration into a Whole, and through the recognition of the inner presence of an infinite energy from which an indestructible trust and an unbounded ability of ascent can proceed. Again, it is religion which has to raise to the power and clearness of a principle what indeed

now penetrates the whole of life, but which there, in the breadth of life, remains manifoldly scattered and obscured. Thus, while religion integrates and brings into activity as a whole whatever of noble and elevating force lies hidden in our lives, it effects a transfiguration of life without denying its dark side; it shows the Divine in the things nearest at hand without idealising falsely the ordinary situation of life.

4. This integrating energy would prepare many a danger for religion did there not stand by its side an energy of discrimination; and such a discriminating energy is developed by religion even of the general kind which occupies us here. For as certainly as religion aims at the whole of the Spiritual Life, does it desire such a life in its full purity, but it is able to do this only through an energetic discrimination in the human situation between genuine spirituality and its mere semblance. Because religion dives into a substantial Spiritual Life and constructs its nature from the Life-process, it will exclude much as being adulterated, but will find more depth in what it approves as genuine; and it will raise the genuine out of its isolation to a union, out of its chaos to a cosmos, and out of its merely parasitical quality to a characteristic act and full possession of the spirit. But a hard struggle has to take place in order to carry through a true Spiritual Life against that semi-spirituality which satisfies the ordinary situation of human life, and which treacherously makes man feel comfortable. This is nothing less than a struggle for reality against appearance, a struggle for a true

spiritual culture over against a merely human culture. True, the amount of life, now restricted to its genuine constituents, is thus greatly reduced; but in what remains incomparably more is seen. There arises now a hard conflict with the customary mode of thought, especially because this mode of thought attributes spirituality, and with it greatness and dignity, to its forms of life, as though they were the latter's natural properties, whereas religion already clearly shows that only a certain kernel of spirituality, or a movement towards spirituality, is present from the first, and that these have to attain to more by a hard struggle. But, at the same time, a new order of things and the presence of a new world appear in the Spiritual Life. Man, indeed, is not, with the whole of his existence, straight-away a personality; there only lies implanted in him a power to become a personality—a power over against a nature of a very different kind, and which has to win its way through such a nature. But this becoming a personality is now recognised as an emancipation from all existential tiedness to an external point and an elevation to a self-life of a universal kind. Morality signifies now not a quality pertaining to man as a natural being, since what the ordinary life manifests in the way of social instincts and of occasional sympathy forms, at the most, no more than a step preliminary to morality and can be ranked without hesitation as a mere continuation of the animal level. Genuine morality arises not earlier than at the stage of the Spiritual Life, and it is a matter of dispute how much or how little of this we meet in human life by itself; but, much or little, morality appears in our

domain, and along with it there appears a kingdom of a superior kind. So that the man in the transformation may lose some of the experiences of the natural level, but certainly man's nature has gained in depth and breadth through such a transformation.

Man has been well termed an "historical nature," but most of what is termed his history differentiates itself too little from what is found in the changes and deposits of nature. History, in the distinctive human and mental sense it is taken, never originates through the bare succession of time, but throughout in the sense that something is held fast, experienced, and its nature brought into an inner connection. However, such a feat can happen only through the presence of a standard superior to time, which creates the effect of an order of things above time. But with such elevation history transforms itself from being a mere fact to being a difficult task. And the matter does not stand otherwise in connection with the problem of society. Society, too, in the distinctive human and mental sense, is not any ready-made thing, but has to be evolved, and to it belongs an inner unity of life—a total-life. Little enough of this finds its way to our experience, but the little that does find its way refers back to an order of things superior to nature and its scattered elements.

There is thus imbedded universally in human life something deeper, although it may appear first of all only in the faintest manner, and it is religion which raises up, binds, and energises this deeper quality. Thus, religion performs universally a dissection of human life, sets the life, through the working out of its deep, in an enormous movement, and calls it

to an immense struggle. Religion, in all this, is very far from explaining life as being on its natural plane something superior or even tolerable; far more through its elevation religion casts a gloom over the provinces of life with all their hindrance and shallowness; but in all this natural opposition to religion, religion cannot be destroyed, for the presence of an Absolute Life verifies a fixed nucleus and the certainty of a conquest.

Thus religion stands beyond the opposites of optimism and pessimism, for it is able to acknowledge the total fulness of wrong without forfeiting the joy of belief or even without diminishing it. Indeed, religion has, especially in tattered and dejected times, won the hearts of men. The clear call of an Absolute Life must bring the wide differences of our existence to consciousness and, along with this, work for the heightening of the suffering. The contradictions of our existence appear, when the situation is seen as it really is, far too pointed, and the unreason far too powerful to be veiled by an optimistic mood. But the strongest discovery of the contradictions and their agony cannot create a hopeless pessimism, but it is first and foremost the appearance of a new world —the presence of an Infinite Life—which makes our ordinary existence inadequate.

This twofold aspect gives the total effect of religion a twofold character. On the one side, it means a loosening, a freeing, a redemption from the old world; and on the other side, an elevation into a new one. A uniform development and an incessant reciprocal action of both sides do not take place if the life is coerced and is morose, or if it considers the main fact in a superficial manner.

Also, inasmuch as religion appears as a kingdom of continuous development—as that which constructs the fundamental facts on their Divine side, and as that which is present in the inmost depth of the human soul—it has to be won ever anew in human life, and ever anew it has to be sought, struggled for, and perfected. Thus the fact becomes a task; the possession becomes a problem; and with the varied differences of the points of departure, the one and same life can include certainty and doubt, calm and tempest, bliss and sorrow.

Thus, through and through, religion proves itself a kingdom of opposites. When it steps out of such opposites, it destroys without a doubt the turbid evanescence of ordinary commonplace life, and separates clearly the lights and shadows from one another. It sets our life between the sharpest contrasts, and engenders the most powerful feelings and the most mighty movements; it shows the dark abyss in our nature, but also shows illumined peaks; it opens out infinite tasks, and brings to an awakening ever a new life in its movement against the ordinary self. It does not render our existence lighter, but it makes it richer, more eventful, and greater; it enables man to experience cosmic problems within his own soul in order to struggle for a new world, and, indeed, in order to gain such a genuine world as his own existence.

3. *The Proof and Confirmation of Religion*

(α) *Religion and Science.*—We have hitherto followed the main lines of our investigation without viewing the side-paths, and without discovering the

relationship of our material to the remaining world of thought as that world is represented by science. It is impossible for us to withdraw entirely from this task and to pass silently by the facts which, at all times, have come to the surface in connection with religion, and which have discovered a concealed contradiction. And this they have done often in no spirit of light-hearted jest, but in deep seriousness; for the facts of science have struggled against religion because science considered that religion was a falsification of reality and a disfigurement of life. Science and religion often appear as sworn enemies; each develops a truth out of its own province, and each can present only its own truth; each traces out an image of reality, and these images seem to exclude one another. The one seizes special experiences of humanity, and indicates from this point as its ruling centre all the spaciousness of the All. The other holds itself fast to a Whole, and interprets out of this all the content of human life. Religion is inclined to reduce science to a soulless sphere; whilst science easily interprets religion as anthropomorphism—as an illegitimate inner mirroring of the reality through human presentations and interests. The attained objectivity of science appears to religion as cold and unfeeling; whilst the particular inwardness of life appears to science as subjective exaggeration and fancy. Religion does not believe itself able to guard its independence without the creation of a knowing-organ in belief, and even with this it meets with the hardest contradiction, and falls often within its own province to the boundary between knowledge and belief where all kinds of entanglements prevail.

The adherents of religion are at variance themselves; some draw the ideal word of religion quite close to knowledge, whilst others separate most pointedly knowledge and belief. Thus the struggle surges hither and thither through the centuries and the millenniums, but each situation is not well understood without the historical connections. The defence of religion to-day stands under the power of the rebound from the intellectualism which had checked the ideal world of religion for a long time. From the beginning, the doctrine of the Christian Church was interweaved strongly with intellectualism; in the Middle Ages the intellect served less as a foundation than as a check, and, in the period of the *Aufklärung*, science disengaged itself from all external authority and believed itself able to develop the Spiritual Life as well as religion out of itself, and speculation heightened and ennobled such an undertaking. Now, at least in the opinion of our day, speculation has collapsed, and the insufficiency of intellectualism has appeared with piercing clearness; we not only mistrust the ability of the applied intellect, but it seems to us to rob us as well of a religion of true immediacy and inspiration. Therefore we posit ourselves entirely on the other side, and in the founding of religion put the intellect in a secondary place, and even partially disconnect it. Thus we obtain the turn to feeling—to the explanation of religion as merely an affair of "personal" life, and to the attempt to derive the religious content from judgments of values, etc. Such a course appears natural enough, and has some amount of truth in its favour; but it is afflicted with a strong one-sidedness, and aims to accommodate itself to such a retrogression.

Religion in reality dare not isolate itself from the universal world of ideas. It dare not do this for its own sake. Its vocation throughout is essentially and indispensably to bring forth the final and all-encompassing truth; and it cannot possibly be one thing by the side of other things, for it must be the soul of the Whole. But how could religion verify itself as such without occupying itself in a fundamental manner with the total-world of ideas? Unless it does this, not only does its truth remain set in painful doubt, but through such an isolation the danger menaces its content; and thus the content is unable to free itself sufficiently from the petty-human mode and from selfishness; for in the midst of all the waves and bubblings of feeling, and in the midst of all the agitation of the individual, the content wins too little of a spiritual substance, and, consequently, exercises too little transforming energy on the whole human situation. Such a substance is attainable only in the wrestling from a Whole to a Whole. Religion, however, undertakes this feat, and, consequently, comes to some kind of agreement with science concerning the Yea and the Nay of things.

Whether such an agreement is possible depends before all on a more correct wording of the meaning of science and religion. Such a meaning alone can decide whether what appeared at the first glance an irreconcilable conflict can be brought to a happy settlement. Let us see first of all what the religion of the Spiritual Life for which we contend signifies concerning the whole of reality, in order that we may try to discover the method of proof. Here, an

independent Spiritual Life superior to the world is asserted as the ground and kernel of all reality. The Spiritual Life can be autonomous only as a total-life—as an inner connection; but the superiority to the world reaches the level of self-reliance *not after* the event of becoming superior to the world, but, according to the whole of our investigation, this self-reliance carries such a superiority in itself, and proves it through its own development over against a very different kind of world. This Absolute Spiritual Life signifies not an isolated province, but wills to be the foundation and the apex of all reality. But this cannot be asserted without relegating nature, and, most of all, the near ordinary existence, to a subsidiary world—to a lower level. There is no religion without an analysis of the reality and without stepping beyond bare nature, for an immanent religion can announce and command only a painful weakness and a halfness of thought. But through such a turn as we have already seen the whole reality gains an inner connection and a depth. Even the movement of our world appears, at least in its decisive phases, not as a simple development of the higher out of the lower, but as a further driving-power out of the Whole of the All. Through such a turn to the world, religion unavoidably meets science, and the meeting of the two becomes quite early a collision. Religion not only holds certain assertions over against those of science, but works for their promulgation, furthers the treatment of the world-problem, and thus gets itself saturated with the efforts and objections of science. Religion is an irreconcilable enemy of the naturalism which sets up nature as the whole of

reality, and which treats the spiritual world as a bare epiphenomenon; it is, too, an enemy of the history which is unable to overcome the mere flux of time, and consequently unable to climb above the relativity of the scientific view to an eternal and absolute truth; and it is finally an enemy of the psychology which resolves the life of the soul into elements of the lowest common denominator, and which thus is not able to bring forth an independent Spiritual Life. In its connection with all these, religion develops a thorough-going affirmation, and, indeed, an aggressive character; it prescribes, with a strong decision, a definite track for thought and life; and he who seeks with special zeal to weaken the fact that religion itself is able to sustain a joyous and friendly disposition towards the most varied expressions of thought, shows a dimness of his own mind and a weakness of his own character. No energetic Yea without a decisive Nay must hold valid, especially for religion with its assertion of the final kernel and meaning of reality. Religion is intolerant, and must be intolerant, not against men—for every man is an infinity, and thus far supersedes all forms and confessions—but against a shallow course of thought and the hollowness of its egotistical nature.

Upon what, then, does religion—meeting with so many high demands—"ground" its own rights, and by what means does it verify its own truth? It deals with a unique fundamental truth, viz. with the reality of an Absolute Spiritual Life within our own circle. Evidently such a Life does not allow itself to be born out of individual data, whether of nature or of history; it does not allow itself to be evolved out

of the natural world. It is only within the Life-process itself, as its own foundation and further development, that it may be brought forth. Consequently, it deals not so much with the seeking for new things as with the discovering of the new in the things we already know; it deals not so much with ready-made results, but with the plunging into the existing movement of a current; it aims not at discovering a world already existing merely by the side of our present world, but at securing for itself the depth of the reality which will compel our present world to sink to a secondary level.

The decisive thing in connection with all this is the advance of life itself. The act must precede the proof; the reality of the representative act transmits the main proof of religion. Individual propositions or performances are not alone here in question, but the possession of the Spiritual Life as a Whole, as independent, as superior to the world, and as our adopted situation in such a life. What is it now that drives the man hither? Nothing other than an acknowledgment of the Spiritual Life as his own nature, and the placing of the centre of gravity of his life and existence in this. As soon as this happens, and as soon as we possess an inward relationship to the world and to ourselves, the man can do no other than bind together the Spiritual Life as a Whole and as a self-reliant life; and thus he is bound to reach an inwardness which will make clear the contrasts of life as well as his own superiority over against the environing world. The decisive main proof is and remains in the fact that an autonomous Spiritual Life arises in man and humanity, and that we are

able to discover our deepest being and construct our new world through a process of selection and rejection as participators in such a Life. This proof, however, needs no minute adjustment, for it enters into every soul in the form of immediacy whenever such a soul struggles to step out of the bondage of the world, struggles to create its own laws of ascent, and to enter into its true personal life. Through this the life gains an absolute certainty. Next to this in importance stands the fact that the corroboration results through the demonstration that the Spiritual Life is barren in its ramifications unless it roots itself as a Whole in an Absolute Life; for there is neither art nor science, neither right nor morality, possible without the fundamental truth which comes to expression in religion. The Spiritual Life is not a Whole in its ordinary existence, but is a Whole only as an elevated arrangement of the things which present themselves within and without. But when it is not a Whole, it inevitably breaks in pieces in the isolated positions of life. Such a state of affairs concerning the Spiritual Life is a testimony to the truth of religion. We are able to give up religion, but we must give up at the same time our Spiritual Life, the spiritual character of our existence, and our spiritual individuality. But is anybody able to abandon religion so completely as all this?

Such a condition of things makes it impossible to win anyone through the mere intellect to religion, for the problem lies deeper, and the mode of intellectual activity—right down to the heart of the problem—depends on the total Life-process. He who places himself in the position of a mere spectator

of the great world and accepts his life as an assigned kind of fate, he who undertakes no struggle concerning a "becoming" independence and concerning an inward relationship to things, cannot take into himself the Whole with all its problems, cannot possess a participation in a cosmic life, and is not able to carry forward the energetic movement of religion. But he who has discovered an inner relationship with the world and with his own self, he who is held fast by the inner movement of life and is led to an inner union with reality, obtains a new insight of reality and becomes fully certain of the truth of this reality —far more certain than of the axioms of the sciences. For with such axioms the matter deals with detached portions of life and of the work of thought; but in religion the dealing is concerning the vindication of life as a Whole. Nowhere more than here does the movement itself prove the reality of the hypothesis from which it issues.

Through such a consolidation in the deepest "ground" of life, religion can confidently look forward to an understanding with science. This is certainly not so simple as it seems, for we witness often to-day a pointed dualistic mode of thought. This mode of thought believes itself able to solve the problem after a fashion, but rather far more shuns it, and it presents us with a notion that science concerns itself solely with the world of experience, and, along with this, that it has to contract itself into a mere relative knowledge. From this point of view religion is supposed to deal with final "grounds" and "ends" alone; thus both spheres of science and religion fall entirely outside one another, and only an entangle-

ment can issue in any attempt to bring both nearer to one another. Either science transforms its empirical constructions into metaphysical constructions, as has actually happened with our speculative scientific investigations, or, on the other hand, religion touches the province of science. All this contains much that is true, but it does not exhaust the facts. Science is not a summation of rules, but it develops a characteristic course of thought, and this course of thought can very well come into conflict with religion, or rather, with religion of a special historical kind. Religion, however, cannot explain the standard which it accepts and to which it brings its proofs without coming to a settlement with the whole of science.

This problem receives a driving-power especially through history. The traditional kind of religion and also of Christianity has grown in intimate connection with a view of the world which has been destroyed by modern investigation. Indeed, as was shown in the introductory part of this book, it is not only destroyed in individual places but in its whole mode of thought. The older mode of thought appears to modern investigation as a thorough anthropomorphism—as a transmission of human greatness into the environing world. Modern science, through its discovery of inflexible laws and through the causal restriction of all phenomena, has rendered the old view impossible; it has driven the soul out of such a view of the world and threatens to do the same in the province of religion. Thus positivism especially, with its three stages of religious, metaphysical, and positive thought, formulates such a plan, and attempts

to place religion on one side as a childish stage of human development which has no right whatever in our day. Can we deny that such a view reaches, too, far beyond the special circle of positivism, and that a great deal of the mental atmosphere of our day views religion as a stage on the road to be passed over by the general movement of humanity and its new view of the world? Now, the protest has to be made that religion, in its inmost nature, is not a view of the world but the evolution of a new life—an ascent to a new stage of reality. But such a new life carries convictions in itself of the whole of reality, and these convictions, together with the whole of the standard, must somehow be scientifically vindicated against such a positivistic course of thought. Such a vindication is really to be found, and it is a vindication which makes clear that it itself marches in front against the pettiness in human nature; it is a vindication that the development of the physical and mental sciences, viewed from within, signifies the conclusions of mental constructions; and, finally, it vindicates that if something is lost on the one side, something of incomparably greater value is won on the other side.

Philosophy shows us that reality does not exist merely at hand for us; it exists only in so far as it becomes our own experience. Philosophy also shows that a scientific and mental configuration is not reached unless a new outline of reality is traced out in the Whole; and shows that a new foundation is won only when there has resulted a new conclusion of the manifold in accordance with the laws of the mind. Thus nature becomes a mental occurrence

and a subject of scientific work only in so far as it touches us with individual impressions not merely from the outside, and only when these impressions are fastened together into a total-view ; and such can happen only from within through our mental organisation. History in the human and mental sense, as has so often been shown, originates in no way through a mere succession of events and an accumulation of effects, but only when a superior standard experiences, comprehends, and values the phenomena through a separation of the essential from the non-essential. Our own life of the soul could not be surveyed and brought to a unity did we not in the kernel of our nature stand above the bare co-existence of acts, and had not this co-existence a background for itself. In all this an inwardness of a mental and spiritual kind develops itself, which is all along the line different from the merely subjective nature. The subjective nature remains under the power of the opposites of subject and object, but the mental and spiritual nature seeks to overcome this opposition through a supreme formation of reality. The former adapts itself to the mere-human; the latter adapts itself to the Spiritual Life, and through it alone can man possess an elevated self-life. Evidently such a turn from the naïve situation of life is no mere natural growth but an inverted order of things, and this naïve situation of life appears now a kind of Ptolemaic conduct of life ; for, instead of viewing life from without within, it is now viewed from within without.

In all this there is a vindication of a standard of an independent Spiritual Life, as is represented and

made a main fact by religion; and again, religious history appears in a new light. True, the early anthropomorphic forms get more and more dissolved, but in their place a spiritual form is gained and the movement to the spiritualising of religion is not imposed from without, but arises mainly from religion's own inward longing after truth. Thus, religion proceeds from external observances to inner religiousness, from the self-conservation of the natural man to a salvation of spiritual values and a redemption of the soul, from a duty towards isolated aspects of the Spiritual Life to the raising of such a Life as a Whole. The positivistic mode of thought sees in this the loss and not the gain; it fails to see the rise of a spiritual inwardness over against a subjective one, because such a mode of thought directs its attention to external results and not to inward experiences, and because, over its dealings with the results of the Spiritual Life, it forgets the Spiritual Life itself. The logical conclusion of such a mode of thought is to resolve man into a mere machine—a complicated reckoning-machine—and such machines can be constructed. Only the mystery would remain, how such a machine could produce the great revolution from a naïve to a scientific, and from a natural to a spiritual, condition of life.

So far, however, as science works out the central phenomenon of the Spiritual Life, and illumines the world from such a standpoint, it becomes speculation. Thus, religion cannot lack such speculation for its own scientific development. But speculation needs religion still more substantially. For the aim of specu-

lation is futile from its very foundation, and becomes a vain assumption, unless there exists a hope of finding, in contrast with merely human presentations, a universally-valid thought. But how could such a thought be possible without the immanence of an Absolute Life in our circle? So that from of old religion and speculation have been in close contact; in all speculation a religious element is easily to be discovered; and religion lost in breadth and depth whenever it placed all speculation on one side. True, with the divergence in their starting-points, quarrels were not wanting, but they were quarrels between friends who, in all their differences, strove for a final mutual understanding, and who could not do without each other. Speculation and religion presuppose an inner movement of life; this movement cannot be forced upon anyone, but it can be shown that, without it, no Spiritual Life in the Whole and no genuine spirituality are possible. The words of Plotinus are valid in connection with all this: "The hoctrine reaches as far as the road and its course; but the intuition is the possession of him alone who chooses to see."

(β) *General Considerations.*—If religion first and foremost deals with the inward ascent of life to a Whole —with our apprehension of the Spiritual Life as our real self—then the inward inertness of man constitutes the strongest resistance and the most stubborn hindrance experienced by religion. Such inertness is satisfied with scattered fragments of life; it remains in a mere external relationship to reality, and undertakes no struggle for its appropriation. Accordingly, in a time of predominant expansion as is the present, it

is easy to understand how religion may often appear as a tissue of illusions; with the absence of a movement to a Whole, the opposite opinion would be surprising. But this inner inertness of life would never have stepped forth with such self-complacency and made a virtue out of the calamity unless there went hand in hand with it a great confusion of thought, which believed in the possibility of solving the essential spiritual problems without a movement to the Whole, and hence without religion. It is remarkable how often men here turn against religion that which, without the independence and superiority of the Spiritual Life, as championed by religion, becomes simply untenable. Thus, morality is often supposed to serve as a substitute for religion, although a morality without a new world would be more inconceivable than religion itself; thus, one flutters to and fro towards an "enthusiasm for humanity" without giving the term "humanity" any kind of spiritual content; thus, one appeals to the immediacy of personality and of personal life as if personality could have a meaning and value without the awakening of a new world at this particular spot. Personality is either an empty and misleading term or a confession of a world of independent spirituality.

The *Either-Or* truly present here—independent spirituality or no spirituality—may veil itself from us for a long time, because we live in a spiritual atmosphere which has developed under the mighty influence of religion. For by means of this atmosphere the contention hostile to religion gets unperceivedly supplemented, and thus those formations existing in our

midst are credited as such with what only the original energy of the Whole is able to accomplish. There arises thus the appearance as though it were possible to retain in the subject and the consequence what has been given up in the substance and the foundation, and as though the mere man were able to accomplish what man can achieve only within spiritual connections. Such a mode of life may even appear, in the beginning, as a gain in freedom, freshness, and immediacy. But this can proceed only for a time, for life itself will engender a reaction. For the more those survivals from the older formations of life are driven out, the more all inward connections slip away, until the man finally stands on nothing broader than his own subjectivity; thus the movement breaks up more and more, and the life becomes emptier inwardly and as a whole, and more and more individuals set themselves at variance with each other, and the scene becomes a Babylonian confusion of tongues. Evidences of all this are sufficiently at hand, but in the meantime the struggle against religion and substantial spirituality may appear still as a pleasant occupation and, indeed, as a struggle for freedom. After this comes the reaction, and brings new dispositions and strivings into the life of humanity—perhaps it happens through painful upheavals—and then our problem enters into a new phase of universal history. For the history of the world is mostly wont to prove things in such an indirect manner as this.

In the meantime, however, the direct proof which religion transmits through its effective stirring and elevation of life is not to be misjudged. Religion

does not so much add something particular to life as that it effects an integration, a clear discrimination, and a liberation of what already lies in the total-life, but which, without such concentration, is unable to find its own self. It is through this concentration that the Spiritual Life first gains a durable kernel, and emancipates itself from the admixture of the existential state in order to construct a characteristic world, and to become a new starting-point of life.

This integration into a Whole, and this elevation to action of the whole man, may appear less important and urgent so long as human existence is conceived to be free from acute conflicts and in process of secure advance. However, as soon as difficult entanglements set in, the ascent of the Spiritual Life has to overcome enormous obstacles, and is, through these, threatened with paralysis, a return to the Whole and an actuation of the energy of the Whole become indispensable. Such obstacles appear clearly enough, so that there can be no apology and no doubt for the necessity of religion.

Religion finds a main proof of its truth in the fact that it forms the indispensable culmination of the total Spiritual Life; and although man can be spiritually active here and there, he can never take up the Spiritual Life as a Whole, and transform it into his own act, without religion. We have shown sufficiently the general outlines of this fact, and it remains for us now to show how all the main separate movements which endow our life with a spiritual character attain to no completion and

indeed, lose their anchor and foundation if the turn to religion does not lead them to a Whole, to Principles, and to the Absolute; so that finally the truth and the right of our Spiritual Life hang on such a turning-point. Since, on the one hand, the specifically religious conceptions permeate the whole of life, and, on the other hand, the movements which issue from that whole ever-increasingly demand an elevation to a principle, and hence a turn to religion, a firm interweaving of religion with the whole of the spiritual effort is accomplished. Thus, the whole of this effort speaks and works for religion; the more energetically the Spiritual Life develops itself, the more it becomes conscious of the opposition of its substantiality to a world of appearance; and the mightier the impetus to religion becomes, the more certain becomes the truth of religion itself.

(γ) *Special Pathways.*—If we now pursue the problem through the ramifications of life, and seek to demonstrate that the main movements of life point toward a religion of a *universal* kind, and that without religion all movements must collapse, religion is taken by us throughout not merely as the end of a movement existing prior to itself, but also as this movement's fundamental presupposition; since that spiritual effort could not originate without the presence of the Absolute Life which manifests itself in religion. But since religion clearly reveals that presupposition and the interconnection of life, and bids us incorporate them more energetically in our activities, it will work for the illumination, consolidation, and elevation of all the

remaining life. This fact will appear clearer in connection with the following special points.

(*aa*) *The Aspiration after Infinity.*—The man of experience finds himself enclosed firmly on all sides; he is, as a mere portion of a causal order, conditioned and bounded in his aims and energies; the duration of his life has but a brief span to run, and he must acknowledge himself usually as a finite existence. And yet as a tremendous resistance to all this, his Spiritual Life is filled with a longing for Infinity. The idea of Infinity signifies not merely that an immeasurable expanse ever lies by the side of the circle which we traverse. For such an "outside" need trouble us but little, because it does not explain the stirring and forward-driving energy which lives within the thoughts of Infinity. Such thoughts evidently bear witness on the whole that Infinity does not emerge beyond the bounds of life, but that it belongs to man from the beginning; it is the clash within us between the finite and the Infinite which brings forth such effects, and it is only out of this point that the idea and the feeling of the sublime explain themselves, for they do not originate from without, but are an original testimony of the soul.

The movement towards the Infinite proceeds not only into the quantitative, but far more into the qualitative. It is not the surface of reality which suffices us, but far more do we appropriate its whole depth. All the effort after final ends and all-inclusive aims, all investigation concerning the Why of Whys, all the longing for perfection and the highest blessedness over against the mere satisfaction

of the given situation—what is all this but an evidence of the depth of reality. Everywhere in connection with the idea of the Infinite we find ourselves in danger of losing ourselves in the pathless expanse and the danger of an over-strain of human ability, but we also find a mighty ascent of our nature, a tracing of tracks and a progress upon them, and a challenge to battle against all the narrow and petty-human modes of life which have now become an intolerable barrier. Such a longing—partly revealed and partly concealed—was somehow present in the works which resulted in the great transformations of life and in the inner progressive development of man, so that the impossible itself appeared possible if what ought to be reached is now in reality reached; for out of self-sufficiency and timidity nothing great has ever been born.

What then is the basis of such a movement? If it is a work of a merely human kind, it can mean no more than a mere bolstering up of the self in one's own fancy, a futile presumption of the self, a deceitful illusion. At the same time, all the inner fruits of culture and all that appears always as the spiritual uplifting of man prove themselves as a tawdry polish on old goods and chattels. Or, on the other hand, the movement has a deeper foundation in the inner presence of an Absolute Life. If things are so, then it is religion which embraces and expresses the whole of life. Through such exertions religion at the same time attaches and rouses itself to a striving after Infinity, and, in order to accomplish this, it calls the whole soul to its aid, and wins a strong conviction and character. Thus, in connection with this special

point, it is religion which brings life to its full depth; and what is imbedded in the aspiration after Infinity becomes the evidence of religion.

This is corroborated, too, by the experience of history. The antique method of viewing the Spiritual Life—a method which allowed largely the meaning of religion in our sense to remain in the background—gave full sovereignty to the ideas of extremes and limits; the All is here limited, and the life of man moves between fixed aims and given energies; there is now no need to cross the frontier into the Infinite, but far more there is present a timidity to cross beyond the natural defined boundary. When did the idea of Infinity gain acknowledgment and power, and when did it step into the very centre of life itself? It accomplished this through the turn to religion, a turn which culminated especially in the philosophic sense through Plotinus. Since his time the idea has often enough been obscured, but it has never been extinguished. And what appears to us new and great in modern life is indissolubly bound with the reception of Infinity into our own character and nature. For whence otherwise the fixed superiority over the world—the fast rooting of the personality—after which we at least strive for? Shall we retreat once more into the old limits in order to avoid entering the pathway of religion?

(*bb*) *The Aspiration after Freedom and Equality.*—The experience of life shows man bound on all sides and in constant relationships of dependence, shows him bound to other men, bound to the environment, bound to his own nature. This subordination

often veils the consciousness and continues to exist. But, at the same time, there runs through humanity a glowing aspiration after freedom. This is to be found, first of all, in the relation of man to man as the demand of independence of each individual over against the human environment, or of the independence of a class over against another class. Through such a freedom man seemed to gain an otherwise unknown dignity and an incomparably greater energy; his life seemed to experience an essential elevation, and for the first time to possess an original worth. Thus, the struggle for freedom was able to kindle the strongest affections and to make light of the most difficult sacrifices.

How does all this explain itself, and how can something essentially higher issue forth from life if there is not more present than a mere rearrangement of energies within an enclosed system? It explains itself only through the fact that a new order of things has created a new breach of life, and that life through such a turn has gained an originality of an inward kind as well as a new content. But how can life gain all this if it possesses no depth, and if there is not an existence of a reality for itself? If the Spiritual Life fails in this, what is there besides contained in the representation of religion? History shows, without a doubt, the longing for freedom usually coupled with eschatological convictions; ancient Christianity with its advocacy of the freedom of the religious conviction (*libertas religionis*) took up a great universal struggle for freedom; out of the age of the Reformation has the freedom of our modern times gone forth; indeed, it seemed as if no effort

for freedom could stir the whole soul unless it became a kind of religion to man and raised him above mere ordinary experience. This contention is valid, too, concerning the radical movements of the present day; they could not have taken such a strong turn against religion had it not been that they had moulded themselves into some kind of religion. Whenever the struggle for freedom is not carried by new ideals of the whole life, it tends quickly to relax and to enter under the dominion of egoism, be it egoism of individuals or of classes.

But the aspiration after freedom extends deeper than the relationship to other men; it reaches the fundamental relationship to the world and to reality. Man seeks in spiritual activity another standpoint to things, and, indeed, to himself, than is verified by the nearest-at-hand experience. In such a surface-experience all is given and tied, all is opaque and alien; and, further, the nature of all this appears to man as something external so long as it does not allow itself to be set in his own act and there transfigured. And, therefore, however zealous in work man may be, so long as he remains a mere link of a natural chain, so long will his decision fail to handle the material which he takes up, and his will fail to decide concerning the nature of such material; but all the particular is determined through the connection of the Whole, and what on the surface may appear as no more than a link of a chain, on a deeper view is perceived to reach forth into immensity.

Why does man himself struggle against the acceptance of such a state of things which surround him with irresistible intrusiveness, and which incessantly

explains determinism with its old and new grounds as the only possibility? Why, indeed, but because through the tying of man to such a situation unutterably more is lost than willingly allows itself to be destroyed. There is lost all inner relation to reality through resignation to the dark night of fate; there is lost all inner obligation and, indeed, all ethical character of action through the shifting of action to an imposed necessity, and, consequently, when we reflect on it, what determinism leaves over is nothing more than an empty word; there is lost all present living consciousness, and the present is viewed only as a mere result issuing out of given premises and which contain nothing in the least original; there is lost all hope of sunnier and nobler days; and all the possibility of inward renewal for peoples and times, as well as for the whole of humanity, fails, and thus life in its march becomes more and more numb and senile; and finally, there is lost the striving to construct our existence, through our own original activity, out of the deep and out of a permanent foundation, and all is simply turned into a piling of a mechanism upon a surface-foundation. Accordingly, life, through its complete resignation to an external necessity, loses all inner movement, all soul, all value; it is now a mere appearance and not an original life to us.

It is no wonder that man strives against all this, that he strains every nerve to resist such a destiny. But it is impossible for him to resist it without a transformation of the whole view of reality and of his own nature. For all attempts to escape to some refuge within the given world of necessity must fail, and such attempts issue from turbid thoughts as de-

terminism itself has shown with convincing power. It is the elevation into a new world alone that can help us; and such a world is not a mere system, but is ever a new and inner governing Whole proceeding out of activity, and which can become our own characteristic life of all activity. The Spiritual Life becomes such a world in so far as it gains a full independence and engenders out of itself a characteristic reality. The cosmic "becoming" of the Spiritual Life, however, surmounts all the capacity of the mere-human, and appears to man as the dawning of an Absolute Life. This has been a leading thought of the whole of our investigation. How freedom and necessity in man clash and yet stand apart is a question which does not concern us at this point. Here the main point is that without the presence of a new world, all possibility of freedom—all the transformation of existence into one's own life—breaks in pieces, and, at the same time, all genuine living present vanishes. The origin of the longing itself remains a mystery. And yet such a longing moves in mighty waves over humanity and has brought forth such greatness and nobleness. Thus, once more, all this is religion, and in it a general movement of life fastens itself together, and with it something remains which in the final resort nobody can destroy. If, however, that deepest origin of the effort of freedom is taken up into our own conviction and direction of life, then all activity in this direction can be purified and ennobled, then the individual movements unite themselves more compactly together so that in each individual position the whole man is now able to step into activity. A long period of time loved to conceive of religion and freedom as set up pointedly

against one another and as irreconcilable opponents. A deeper meaning, however, shows here, as often elsewhere, the truth to be quite contrary to the opinion of particular epochs. Without religion—religion in the *universal* sense—freedom is a hollow term; no definite freedom can originate without religion, and certainly no religion can originate without freedom.

The movement towards freedom annexes itself to the movement towards equality, and often they walk hand in hand. Experience shows universally an inequality of man; even nature endows individuals unequally; culture brings forth difference after difference the more it develops itself; and this is true, too, of the newer culture with its heightened differentiation of individuals and its technical shaping of activity. The course of history itself drops many differences as having become spurious, but it brings forth newer and greater differences, and, on the whole, the inequality is in a state of constant growth.

But over against the whole of this current of what actually happens, there arises and asserts itself in a notable manner a longing after equality. Is there imbedded in all this merely the ordinary disposition on a small scale, does nothing commanding endure, and is all drawn down to the ordinary surface-level? This cannot be admitted, for an inequality without the presence of counter-effects to it would endanger most seriously the inner convictions of man, and, indeed, destroy them; it would become an intolerable hardship for that which commands the vicissitudes of life to a lower plane; and it would lead astray to a wayward vanity the very things which ought to have

stood on the summit of life. But how are we to meet such dangers, and how powerless are all abstract conceptions over against them! The equality of all "who carry a human face" will not allow itself to be established through a mere decree. It can only come to a reality and power over against the painful differences of the standpoint of experience if, on the one hand, all the differences of men finally vanish and strictly turn into an infinite greatness; and, on the other hand, if a common problem ignites itself and overflows all else which otherwise compromises effort and achievement. Nothing other than religion can verify this. For the conscious hold upon an Absolute Life prevents the man from reaching final conclusions in the differences of the standpoint of experience; and the opening out of a new task concerning the whole inner man together with the demands of this turn of man press down all remaining activity, press the whole province of achievement to a lower level. This fact appears in that emancipating parable of Jesus, of the Talents, and from this source flows through the whole broad current of humanity; it has often run underground, but ever anew runs out into the light. Also, out of the consciousness of the equality of all before God has, upon the ground of human history, dawned a longing for equality over against the different situations of men, a longing for an acknowledgment of the rights of man. In the army of Cromwell there originated first of all a longing after universal and equal political rights; and it was out of a religious foundation that the proclamation of the rights of man went forth in America. Thus religion has called forth great movements—

movements which often, through the fault of their representatives, have turned against their own origin, but not without having to pay the penalty by falling into shallowness and sinking into a subjective passion of their inner unveracity. Wherever religion has stood with the fresh energy of youth, it has always brought men nearer together, it has always been the protector of the weak, and always a help to the aspiring soul; it is only where it has become withered and senile that religion is used for the maintenance of private interests and privileges.

(*cc*) *The Aspiration after Eternity.*— At a first glance, man appears throughout as a creation of time; he lives and works in time; the actual affairs of time seem to determine his whole life and being. But in spite of all this, it is false to assert that man belongs entirely to time; the situation, if it were so, would become intolerable to him and would mean an inner devastation. And, on account of this, he undertakes an energetic struggle against the seeming situation, and this struggle forms not a mere episode of his life, but penetrates all culture and spiritual work, for without a trust upon eternal truth, and, indeed, without some kind of eternal life, there is no energy in the effort, no greatness in the character, and no depth in the love. "Love—sincere love and not a merely passing desire—never clings to the perishable, and awakens and kindles itself in the Eternal alone. Never is man able to love himself except when he conceives of himself as an eternal being, and outside this he is unable either to respect or to sanction himself. Still less is he able to love something outside himself unless he raises that something into the

eternity of his belief and of his soul, and links it to these" (Fichte).

Thus, there proceeds through the life of humanity an energetic struggle against the dissemination of things on the mere flux of time. We have seen repeatedly that all that is termed "history" in a special human sense carries in itself such a struggle, and that man, in such a struggle, holds or might hold with his utmost exertion something inward which otherwise would be lost on the river of time. The historical configuration of life and conduct signifies the building in the midst of time of an order of things superior to time; this is purely the aspiration after eternal truth and an all-comprehensive present, which confers on history an inner movement as well as an inner connection. And does not the individual strive in a similar manner in connection with his own self? Is there a true life without a stepping beyond the mere flight of the moment, without a crystallisation in one's own self as happens in the formation of character and of spiritual individuality?

Such a superiority to time, and such a power over against time, can never be brought forth by the Spiritual Life through merely human means; what is found in us must stand in connection with an independent world of spirit. Without such a world and its conscious presence all attempts to rescue ourselves from the river of time are hopeless, and the man becomes a mere creature of the day. The inauguration of an Absolute Life in our domain is, as we have seen, the kernel of religion; and such a Life in this respect forms the conclusion of a great movement, whose reality may be judged as a corroboration of its own

truth. Religion not only forms a foundation, but also heightens the aspiration after eternity, and finds this goal more and more through its turn to man's own nature, and in this, too, discovers an altitude above mere time. All the great thinkers were united in proclaiming that all spiritual work of the deeper kind participates in an eternal world; but when a formation of man's nature appears beyond the province of all mere activities, and when an independent starting-point of a true Spiritual Life is recognised in man, then this characteristic spiritual existence must be raised above the transient. The current opinion and, generally, also religion give an insufficient and even incongruous expression to this necessary truth, because they consider as the main fact the duration in time of the natural individuality with all its egoism and limitations. This mode of conceiving things must call forth a progressive contradiction in the particular interest of a religion which has been laid in the forms of the finite and of human nature. But it is one thing to doubt an anthropomorphic immortality; it is quite another thing to deny the spiritual nature of man as a participator in eternity. For such a customary notion means not so much the projecting out of earthly views of the future, as of surrendering all Spiritual Life to bare Time, and along with this to press it down, fritter it away, and inwardly destroy it. Also, the life of man in Time thus becomes a mere appearance and shadow unless there dwells within him a striving towards eternity; and consequently, through a complete binding to Time, all human experience and all human reality which endeavoured to illumine the mere moment sink back into the abyss of nothingness.

Whilst, however, religion clearly encloses an eternal order and allows not merely the acts of men but also their existence to participate in such an order, the thought of eternity gains a great power for life and character. Now, all active progress in Time finds its counterpart in a life resting in itself; the movement of life is not an entrance into Time but a stepping out of Time. And thus we are able to understand the proclamation of a thinker of the Middle Ages, that man shall become younger every day.

(*dd*) *The Aspiration after Fellowship and after a Soul.*—The world of experience shows a co-existence of elements in nature and in human society, which move amongst each other in the most varied ways, which link themselves ever faster, interlace themselves ever more definitely, and construct an ever-completer web. But all relation and intricacy remain linked to the external performances and effects; what precedes what is in the elements themselves, or if anything on the whole precedes them—this is not the question. Viewed from this point, then, human connections as well as the whole of the world become more and more a well-regulated mechanism into which the individual life must enter in order to accomplish its own work, and in order to uncouple any special movement of the world-machine. An inner fellowship, an over-individual experience of men and things from within, must now appear as an absurd and illicit thought. And yet such a thought gains a power over man and engenders an endless movement. All friendship and love might now participate in the inner life of another; and that these possess a soul behind all external activity is undoubted; our own experience of things

unlocks the door of art and leads to the realm of science. Everywhere we find demands and movements beyond the external contiguity, everywhere one's own life with its entrance into the life of another seems to experience an immeasurable elevation, and to gain first and foremost a content and a value. Does not the whole of culture place itself under the view that over against the world of effects and counter-effects a province of existence-for-self arises and opens out into an ever-greater kingdom?

Thus, the fact of a movement towards inwardness cannot be doubted, but a mighty problem arises along with it, and, too, intertwining transformations of the view of the world become necessary. The whole movement is an error and a falsehood if it possesses no depth of the things, and it exhausts its own life in this system of relations. But what is to be understood by "depth," and how is it reachable? Reachable it is in no way through the mere agitation of subjectivity, as the main current of the present day would make us believe. When this main current of the present states that depth of soul is reachable through an emancipation from the environment as well as through the transformation of life into a free and somewhat artistic character, all unbiassed opinion easily recognises this as an error. Man, in the mere disposition of his nature as well as in his mere achievements, is still sufficiently empty and shallow; he has only changed one superficiality for another, but in no way has he gained in depth. Have then, to-day, all the broad developments of external harmony, all luxury and self-importance, strengthened the substance of life, and have they in any kind

of way made man fuller of content and deeper of experience? In reality subjectivity is not yet by any means inwardness, and disposition is not by any means a soul. There is no inwardness of life possible for us without an inward life of reality; there is in the individual positions of life no inner life without the presence of an inner world. Man could never strive after an inwardness had he not been able to disengage himself in some kind of way from niceties of forms, and to gain a portion in Eternal Life. And the facts are such that a genuine inwardness only develops where great tasks and a great strain originate, where a struggle for a new being burns within, and along with it a spiritual self ascends, an essential formation of the nature results, and in the throe a personality and spiritual individuality is born. He who carries not such problems in his own soul and who seeks not, in all the expansion of work, before all else to find his own self, can never gain a depth and soul for himself. But is all this possible unless our life stands within a total-life, and unless we are carried by such? It is religion, however, which pleads for the presence of this total-life, and which brings us to an appropriation of it. When religion conceives of the facts as a Whole, the movement towards inwardness will considerably heighten, and the insufficiency of the ordinary situation enters for the first time into consciousness. Now it is clearly discovered how alien man usually appears in the midst of all external relationships, how coercive the narrowness of natural existence holds him fast, and how shallow and soulless the life shapes itself through all this. Clear, too, it will ever more be how

the movement of culture itself heightens the danger in that it differentiates men from each other more than ever, increases more and more the distance between them, and casts away more and more the individuality. Through all this there arises an inner alienation of man, and a loneliness of soul in the midst of all the fellowship of work. How otherwise can the walls of separation be broken down, and how can the inner experience of one individual draw nearer to that of another save through the opening out of a life on the other side of all natural individuality, through a participation in a world which includes even our own natural world, and, indeed, can include all worlds? It is only when a fellowship of life and a mutual understanding have been gained that the various individualities can further one another in a positive manner, and, out of the contact, a mutual restoration can take place.

Thus, in the relationship of man with man, all lies in the gaining of a corporate life which encompasses and binds all. The problem, however, reaches beyond this to the relationship of man with his own soul. In this natural state his deeper being is no less strange to man than is the deeper being of another; his own soul is to him closed and inaccessible, and, before all discovery of spiritual qualities outside himself becomes possible, he must first of all discover and assimilate his own deeper being. And he can do this only through the vivification of a spiritual world which he makes objective for himself, which gains for him his own special nature, and which raises him beyond his natural state. The customary opinion can only darken such a limitation of the characteristic life

through the environing and changeable world, because such an opinion has no eye for problems of such a nature, and looks upon the most difficult as self-evident, and conceives of the fruit brought forth through the universal toil of the ages as being nothing more than a result of the mere moment. Wherever the problem is discovered, history is seen to furnish an incontestable proof for the definite connection of religion and inwardness. Let us confine ourselves to the beginnings of Christianity. What changes have these sources brought forth in this respect compared with rich and beautiful antiquity! How much nearer they have brought man to man through the opening of a corporate world out of belief and hope as well as a corporate activity of life; how they have created the basis for a spiritual art and a spiritual intercourse with nature; and how they have unlocked man's nature and brought him nearer to his own soul! Could Jesus have seen so much in the little child, could he have explained nature as a symbol of the Divine without the presence of a kingdom of inwardness within himself? And such holds valid for the whole course of the ages: wherever religion—religion understood in the widest sense, and as a religion of the spirit—has stepped into the background, there the inner life has become stunted, if not at once, yet after a while. Also, it holds valid for the present day that wherever religion has been awakened out of the social custom into our own life, it has in the simplest relationships of life aimed at developing more depth than is often to be found imbedded in the highest achievements of culture. Thus, all gain of a true inwardness becomes a testimony for religion,

and thus we see the struggle for religion forming a portion of the struggle for the soul of life. To-day, when the external world forces itself so mightily upon us, and draws us to itself so overwhelmingly, there is needful, indeed, more than a subjective fortification in ourselves—there is needful the development of an energetic inner life. Shall we give up lightly the indispensable associate in the struggle—religion—as happens too often to-day?

(*ee*) *The Aspiration after Greatness.*—The view of human things shows the individual so small by the side of the whole of humanity, and the view of the world shows humanity so small by the side of a boundless universe. What has been held valid from time immemorial in connection with this matter has been brought fully to consciousness only in modern times. Viewing things from the ancient childish level, humanity considered itself as the centre of all; and even with the toning down of such a claim there appeared still a greatness of a human kind, which man saw within the All, and with which he believed himself to have definite intercourse. We have already observed how nature gained a complete independence over against man, how it has drawn him more and more to itself, and how step by step it has honoured him. Through all this his condition and actions seem to lose all significance for the All, so finally man had to seek his happiness and greatness within his own circle. But if he depends on the light which shines from such a corner and not on the light which shines from the inward connections, if he is posited wholly upon his nearest-at-hand existence and develops all out of this, there originates a picture that

has no place for inward greatness and original worth. Far too intrusive stands before our eyes the struggle for existence, the stormy hurry of this life, the unkempt wild growth of greed and passion, the organised and coercive power of general effects, for us to remain with and delineate. In a word, we witness an immeasurable expenditure of life and a vast amount of work, and yet through it all no corresponding gain and no meaning of human life either for the individual or for the Whole. Such contradiction and senselessness, and, indeed, the nothingness of the whole, cannot be avoided by man so long as he remains simply within the clamour of this mechanism, and so long as he attempts to develop his life merely from point to point, and allows his whole efforts to be concentrated upon isolated aspects. But as soon as thought and reflection are freed from such a tie and are set upon a Whole, then there can be no doubt as to the intolerable hollowness and nothingness of such an existence, for such an emancipation and reflection of the Whole cannot possibly be hindered.

Thus, man will reflect on ways and means of escape from this abasement; and to-day an effort in this direction is visible enough. But as the effort reveals itself in the realm of a superficial situation, it is consequently of a kind too little inclined to set the highest goal in front of itself. One hopes to push aside the small and commonplace and to obtain once more greatness and joy for the nature of man—a state in which man raises himself into a free sentiment above the whole mechanism; and thus the differences of individual and individual are brought forth, and the differences of the individual over against other

individuals and over against the whole of the environment are strengthened. In such a course of thought the uncontracted sovereignty of the individual is often proclaimed, and greatness is sought in the discarding of all external restraints. In this manner the man seems to enjoy what is ordinarily termed personality, but what in reality is only a kind of natural individuality. Such a course of thought has its own right—or, rather, its own semblance of right—only through a strong and hardly conceivable optimism in the midst of all the experiences and entanglements of modern life. It has to presuppose man endowed with highly-gifted spiritual potencies and set upon high aims, otherwise it becomes a confirmation of an egotistic greed of life and of all the raw impulses of life; indeed, it will work more towards the sinking than towards the elevation of life. The fundamental mistake consists in this: to affirm in the parts what is denied in the Whole; to wish to retain within the human province of the relationship of man to man a greatness which had been lost in the deeper life and nature of man as a Whole. Such a greatness has been lost wherever man has become a mere piece of an impervious world, and wherever he has forfeited all inner relations to the whole of reality. Man can retain such a greatness only when there dawns within him a new stage of reality, only when he participates in the Whole of this new world, when he does not contract himself upon isolated activities, when there breaks forth from the new life a new being and new self. Then the world and its enterprises can become man's own experience, and then he is able to carry the Whole along with him and to participate in

the struggle of worlds, then he has to represent the Whole in the individual parts, and thus becomes through what he does a necessary portion of the cosmic movement; and it is all this which constitutes in reality his aspiration after greatness of life. Indeed, the more certain the life possesses such greatness, the less man aims to speak of it. Understood thus, the aspiration after greatness is not conceived mainly as one difference against another, not as a superior pomp against the environment, but brings along with it the deepening of the soul itself and the infinite evolution of one's own soul.

All this is not possible, as we have already seen, without the opening of an independent Spiritual Life in the particular domain of man; and with the truth of this stands or falls all greatness of life. It is religion which connects together life as a Whole, and which as a Whole opens out to man; and thus religion is simply indispensable to the foundation and evolution of the greatness of life. Religion raises out of the otherwise destructive and scattered elements a simple outline; it gives life the comprehensiveness of a powerful drama, opens out a great antithesis in the main direction of life, and at the same time calls man to a characteristic decision of his own; it makes the problem of the All become the personal experience of man and gives him, through the inward presence of the Absolute Life, a superiority to the world. The life is here securely raised above the anxieties of natural and social existence through the inner task of moving from a Whole to a Whole. This certainly happens only through the formation of a religion of the Spiritual Life and under the summons for a

complete self-sovereignty. A religion of obedient subjection and blind devotion must certainly coerce man—coerce him deeper than any human power of command, and such a state of things brings about a stagnation of life in its inmost source. But why should we as free men bind our conceptions of religion to the presentations of another, and why should human disfigurements darken the picture of religion for us—a picture that arises out of the necessity of the Spiritual Life, and which has verified itself sufficiently in universal effects?

Conclusion.—In all individual points a definite connection of religion with the total-development of the Spiritual Life was observed. This fact need only be conceived more clearly in its main lines in order to become a testimony of religion. Step by step, movements appeared which burst through the world of experience and which, indeed, could not proceed without coming into sharp contrast with ordinary experience. But we cannot draw fully such a conclusion as this without acknowledging that an inversion has taken place in our conception of reality, and that a new world has been gained; and this actually happens in religion.

Religion appears as something that is not a mere epiphenomenon of life, but as a necessity that grows out of man's deeper nature, and which at the start may not appear more than a clarification of a matter of fact without whose rule no aspiration after spirituality could arise. The wonder originates not only in any one special situation of life, but penetrates far more into all Spiritual Life. To him who does not perceive the wonder in this, to him who does not see a secret verified and acknowledged in what moves us

daily and hourly, religion appears simply as a superfluous and noxious weed of life. But to him to whom the secret has unveiled itself, that all movements of a spiritual kind work towards us, religion is no more an alien thing, and he sees in it the conclusion of what the Spiritual Life all along carried within itself. Further, to him will the conclusion and the emergence out of the deep be worthful because what otherwise would remain veiled has come to great clearness, and what otherwise would remain scattered has led to unity. However, through such an elevation to the level of a principle an inverted order of life has resulted, which works for the elevation of all the earlier existence. In this, religion before all else guarantees the possibility of a spiritual existence, and becomes the most certain thing within our whole domain of life ; and also, it becomes the hypothesis of all scientific knowledge. And as religion, through such a source of the Spiritual Life, results in a constant elevation above the interests and even above the whole existence of the mere-human kind, and undertakes such an incessant struggle against the small human modes of life, it is completely protected from the reproach of the anthropomorphism which a shallow mode of thought has saddled upon the nature of religion simply because such a mode of thought has grown for a great length of time. In a far more fundamental manner than all negative criticism will the delineation of the religion of the Spiritual Life drive out anthropomorphism. Indeed, understood in the right way, religion is the only possible way to encounter the anthropomorphism which otherwise clings inexorably to us.

Part III.—The Opposition to Religion

INTRODUCTION

Our investigation has already reached a certain result. It has been shown that we are more than the mere being of nature; it has been shown that an original kingdom of spirit unfolds in culture; we have seen how religion is able to stand on the side of the individual, and how it has been subjectively appropriated by him. The truth of the other provinces of life does not depend upon how far the individual takes possession of them; science remains science although the individual may discover but little intellectual movement in himself; art remains art although many relate themselves to it in a crude kind of way. But in spite of the superiority of religion to the condition and even the caprice of the individual, we cannot possibly consider the previous conclusions we have reached as final. On the contrary, it must have already surprised us that what we as yet have discovered as religion has nowhere out of its own energy brought forth an historical religion, and has never become the conviction of a great community. Religion must always be able to become something *more* than produce such results as we have investigated, for unless it becomes this,

it is evidently unable to arrive at an entire reality. The object of our particular investigation is to search for this More. We have gained from the conception of the Spiritual Life a certainty of the fundamental fact of religion, but here the object in view was directed upon the positive achievements, upon the triumphant advance of religion. The opposition which religion had to overcome was left largely in the background. But this opposition cannot always remain there; it must come to more than a partial articulation; it will have to be considered and estimated as a Whole. And in this investigation difficult oppositions and hindrances may appear which will perhaps carry our whole consideration of the subject into a new track and therewith lead to a more original formation of religion than has hitherto met us. Let us, therefore, see how matters stand.

That something sub-spiritual and non-divine exists does not become a stumbling-block and a shock to religion, for all this is unavoidable on account of the imperfect stage of the reality we find in the existing world. Religion cannot explain evil—all attempts at explanation within the province of religion are lamentable sophisms—but religion can overcome evil, overcome it through the elevation and triumphant achievement by it of a representative Divine world. But religion must adhere unconditionally to such a progress. Indeed, the less religion presupposes a reason in the nearest-at-hand world, the more vigorous must it further a "becoming" of reason—a progressive spiritualisation of existence through the energy of the efficacious Divine within itself. Such a meaning can be extracted in varied ways according

to the different stages of the reality with which we are dealing, but always the higher stages must raise up the lower to themselves; the Spiritual Life must raise nature, the substance of the spirit must raise the human form of existence; all that represents within the Spiritual Life the unity and the Whole must raise the ramifications and particularity of life.

The picture, however, that we subsequently expect and must expect is not corroborated by experience. In our domain especially, the new life meets not only individual hindrances, but it thrusts itself in the whole of its effects upon an opposition which seems insurmountable. It attains no independent existence, but remains directed by the energies of the lower level of things; the Divine here is not able to raise to itself the non-divine, but is drawn down to it, and is degraded to a mere means for the aims of the non-divine. Such defencelessness over against a world man has entered into to rule, and such a perversion of his activities shake of necessity the belief in the truth of things. How are such weaknesses compatible with the conception of the Divine, and how can a hemmed-in and powerless life be of a Divine kind? But, also, when the reality of the Divine remains unapproachable as a power superior to the world, its communication to us becomes a matter of ever greater doubt. Of what use is a definite Spiritual Life to us if it is only a knowledge out of the distance, if it is unable to permeate through the hindrances of our existence, but is far more drawn into the very same discord from which it ought to free us?

Thus, the turn of life undertaken through religion seems to be drawn right into the entanglement

instead of being drawn out of it. There results in connection with religion undeniably a removal from the prior situation, a new starting-point is gained, some kind of movement is brought into a current. But when this movement is unable to rise after it has opened out vistas and raised desires without being able to fulfil them, it has made the situation rather worse than better. The idea of an independent Spiritual Life has brought forth a new standard which makes much inadequate and intolerable which previously had raised no kind of obstacle; especially the shallow relationships and the ordinary everyday life which otherwise might have remained neutral now step upon the opposite side and strengthen the opposition; the hindrance turns from the external to the internal: out of the weakness of the Spiritual Life there issues an inner entanglement, and within our own domain there issues a discord. Such a confused situation turns reflection and conviction into the most painful dilemma. Too much exists in the mind to pronounce a simple Nay because an actual turn of life has already resulted, and the conflict itself with its bitter pang is engendering the existence of a movement. Too much exists to pronounce a Yea. Thus, neither the one nor the other is able to win us. And yet the necessity of life drives constrainedly to a decision. Will this knot allow itself in any kind of way to be disentangled? Will it at least notify the direction in which we have to search and to work? Only further actual conclusions and not imaginative suppositions can definitely decide concerning this; and the attention must be directed especially upon this.

First of all, however, the province of the hindrances has to be traversed, and its impressions have to be brought to an open judgment; all disguise and extenuation against the truth would be a wrong as well as a danger to all further progress. Evidently our investigation has entered upon a new stadium. In the first place, the sun of a Divine Life rose out of the thick cloud of the initial stages, and enabled us to witness a kingdom of reason in the midst of all hindrances; reflection can follow joyously the extension of this kingdom, and see all the fulness of life and effort drawn to itself. Now, however, thick clouds arise anew and veil that light so much that it becomes dark and dull—more inclined to allow us to discover the cessation of truth than to lead us nearer to it.

Further, our life may be compared to a drama whose handling has come to movement in a toilsome kind of way. But a reason had unfolded, and the world seemed to have opened to its victorious advance. Now, however, the counter-play begins and grips so mightily that all the gain is endangered, and, indeed, it threatens to transform everything into a loss. Whether the matter remains ultimately in such an entanglement, whether reason is not able to carry forth further energies, and through this to remain master of the field—all this must remain open as a possibility, and may present itself as a hope. In the meantime, however, the *advocatus diaboli* has the solution, and it may express it bluntly. For all enfeeblement and excuse come from evil. In connection with the particulars of explanation one alone has to be remembered, viz. that in connection with

the whole question the matter deals not concerning human happiness but concerning the reality of a definite Spiritual Life, concerning the presence of a higher world within our domain. All this gives the fact a more earnest outlook and the question an incomparably greater vigour than the mere problem of happiness is able to bring forth.

PART III.—THE OPPOSITION TO RELIGION
(CONTINUED)

CHAPTER IX

a. THE EXPLANATION OF THE OPPOSITION

1. *The Opposition of Nature*

THE Spiritual Life is unable to desire an independence without placing characteristic demands upon nature. The entire binding of the life of the soul to the natural process shown by experience raised no obstacle prior to the turn towards spirituality. For hitherto the life was a mere means and tool to the self-preservation of the individual; it would not and could not be a kingdom of its own; it developed no original content, and opened out no new world. The spiritual stage, however, has brought forth all this. Therefore the turn to spirituality produces necessarily the longing that there should correspond to this independence in the nature of man an independence of existence over against nature; the new aims and the immediate participation in the whole of an infinite and eternal world, existing by itself, demand appropriate forms of life. Indeed, a superiority and sovereignty over nature become here an urgent demand. For if the turn to spirituality signifies truly a penetration of reality to its own

essence, the independent progressive Spiritual Life must out of itself illumine the whole domain and draw all to itself; it must handle this domain as means to its own ends, and as stepping-stones to its own height; and it will at least desire in all connections to take the lead. Such a demand proceeds not only externally but far more internally. As nature itself with its succession and mechanism enters into the very soul of man, the awakened Spiritual Life must verify its independence and superiority over against this; it must rule our actions more and more, and must link all effort to its own career. How could it otherwise execute a revolution of the total reality?

Do the facts of experience show such a "becoming" superiority of the Spiritual Life? They show quite the reverse. The spiritual development of man as well as the natural life of the soul remain tied to the body, and, at the same time, they remain attached to the order of nature; they become and grow with the body. The Spiritual Life, too, thrives and wanes within us. That the body is more to man than a mere tool is proved evidently by so-called mental pathology—which is really brain pathology—which contracts most powerfully the psychic activity and drives man to perverted paths. Death, again, with its extinguishing of the whole existence, appears as a great evil proceeding from the province of nature. For the Spiritual Life sets aims within the individual being which far surpass the short span of existence; activities are initiated and relationships of man to man are framed which contain a longing after a permanent duration; the man works with incessant

toil for his own cultivation, and achieves by his labours a personal existence and a spiritual individuality in order to witness all his results destroyed so cruelly. Over against this, there awakens a glowing longing to burst such limits asunder, and to participate in some kind of way in eternity; thus religion became in the main especially the promise of individual immortality. But not only does experience fail to give the least clue to this, it also refuses to affirm that what appears on one side as indispensable appears on the other side as superfluous. How often does all spiritual emotion fade in the soul; the spirituality becomes numb and dull, and it gradually dies almost entirely in the life-time of man. What has immortality to do with such a spent-out life? If, however, death forms the natural conclusion, can things stand otherwise in connection with that which persists as a spiritual fire for the whole of life, and, indeed, that which in its course burns with love ever more energetic and ever clearer? Question after question, and riddle after riddle! This, however, is certain, that in our view of the matter the natural process, unconcerned with spiritual values, follows simply its own course; the most glorious spiritual greatness offers no protection against an early death or against collapse brought about by ill-health; but, on the other side, we often witness spiritual nobodies unhappy and dragging idly along an arrested existence.

The experiences of peoples and of humanity correspond to the experiences of individuals. The aims and values of the Spiritual Life do not seem to exist for the blind mechanism of the natural process; these

natural powers know of no difference between good and evil, righteousness and unrighteousness, inward greatness and smallness. Earthquakes and floods as in a play destroy the blossoming Spiritual Life; pestilence and hunger hold forth their harvest without any grief concerning human welfare and spiritual values. Nowhere does nature rise to a higher order as the symbolism of the Middle Ages imagined to have been the case with plants and animals; it merely constructs an enclosed kingdom concerned with itself alone. A mysterious sphinx stands in front of us, incessantly bringing to birth and bringing to death, patiently preparing and rashly destroying, benevolent and pitiless at the same time, its objects quickly befriending one another and quite as rapidly pursuing one another in a relentless struggle; all this verifies the saying that nature is less of a mother than of a wicked mother to her children. We find then in nature an incessant impetus towards life, but in all the agitation and movement we find no existence-for-itself, no life-for-self, and thus no genuine fruits, no meaning, no reason of the whole, but all seems a passionate play without reason and for nothing. But, however, it is not without any reason at all, for all the works of nature result in simple, unswerving fundamental forms and in a fast chain of occurrences; they result in law and causality. All this is certainly reason, but as yet only a *formal* reason which is throughout indifferent to the content of the occurrences. Also, the most painful destruction of life, the origin of awful malformations, the inheritance of painful diseases, follow throughout in accordance with these laws and with the causal order. Of what help,

however, to reason is that which places so much power in the hands of unreason?

Such indifference of nature to all spiritual aims becomes intolerable in religion, and religion sought, as out of a constrained necessity, a help in the miraculous which appeared as an evident proof of the sovereignty of spiritual and divine energies above nature. But, in spite of all toil, a secure foundation for such an assertion cannot be found. The scientific conception of nature as well as historical criticism have undermined the belief in miracle, until that belief has become, right down to its main prop, a burden for true belief. How can we now hold up a consolidated inner life over against the insecurity of the external situation! And, further, the mechanism of nature seizes the soul and places all action in an iron band. This mechanism cannot hold us entirely, for how could a Spiritual Life rise up on the whole within us? And also, after such a turn towards the Spiritual Life the immediate consciousness places the mechanism underneath itself; the spiritual activity must thus have won some kind of place for itself; it is soon pushed out of it, but quickly and strongly it returns to its abode. The Spiritual Life has to be formed out of the Whole, and has to convince us of infinity as well as of eternity. But in the nature of man it disperses itself into the sheer, incessant, changing and counter-stirring flux of consciousness. True, the Spiritual Life struggles against such a hindrance but does not forge its way through it; it remains banished in the background and sees itself shut out of the obvious reality as an alien.

Also, the emancipation of spirituality from nature

cannot be brought about through the motive-powers of life. However much the sensuous impulses may be relegated to a lower level, they reassert themselves with such strength that spiritual activity does not seem able to dispense with their help. How dull would such an activity remain, how uninteresting would all work become, how insipid would all love be, if they were not linked to a natural impulse, and if they did not draw the potency of such an impulse to themselves! Further, the characteristic configuration of the Spiritual Life in different civilisations seems determined before all else by the standard and custom of the natural energy of life. But does not the fact concerning the differences of the historical religions resolve itself to this: whether a people holds tenaciously to an affirmation of life and sets forth this affirmation in spite of all hindrances as the Semites have done, or whether a people tends to deny and to destroy such an affirmation as the Indians have done?

The natural life stands on a lower level than the impulse of self-preservation; and, on the other hand, in the domain of the spirit this impulse is censured and repudiated as selfishness. But shall we become free of it, and can we, in the main, be deprived of it? While we have to wrest incessantly our existence out of an alien and indifferent world, can we and dare we put in place of such a world the anxiety for self-preservation? This anxiety grows and refines itself over whole nations and over the whole of human society. How much depends on material welfare and how much it signifies even for the Spiritual Life, is shown with special clearness by the economic

movements of the present. But when material things become so much to us, and hold us in so obligatory a manner, what becomes of the elevation to the new world which the Spiritual Life and also religion with all its might long for ?

The total impression on this level can be no other than this: that the Spiritual Life, too, with its awakening to a clear consciousness remains a mere accompanying phenomenon of the natural process. In all its lofty flight the effort cannot disengage itself from a dependence from without; it remains tied to the energies of nature; it is drawn down to the service of nature. This barrier becomes an intolerable contradiction when the presence of the Divine is experienced within the Spiritual Life. If the Divine is really in the transaction, the Spiritual Life must be able to bring its efforts to fruition. If it is not able to do this, how could we revere such a Life as Divine ?

2. *The Opposition of Culture*

Certain as the weakness of the spirit over against nature remains a mystery, it would have been intolerable if the man were not able within his own province to construct a kingdom of reason and to fortify himself against all attacks and doubts. In reality a unique human province originates over against nature: this province is culture, through which man prepares a new kind of world. This new world is culture as it develops itself, through the conclusions of individuals, into an historical life and, through history, into a stratum of activity. We have previously shown that this human culture is not

able to bring forth spirituality out of itself, but far more presupposes it. But in spite of such a limitation, it must be in the position to construct its basal development out of deep connections, and to co-operate in the construction of a kingdom of reason. This is to be expected and desired of culture. Culture is called to break the contradiction and untruth of the ordinary commonplace life, and to seek for a new order of things. Now, as such a new order is known and acknowledged, culture must victoriously out of its own energy make headway against the old situation; it must free and weld the inner-abiding reason of our existence, and triumphantly drive out all unreason. In the midst of all the unreadiness of our situation the dawning of a Divine Power ought to seal fast the superiority of reason and transform the movement of history into a progressive conquest of the spirit.

It is thus we ought to find things, but in reality we find them otherwise; instead of human culture placing itself in the service of definite spirituality, it raises itself as an independent master, treats its own existence and development as the highest of all ends, and consequently cannot very well but reduce the Spiritual Life to a mere means, and set it fast on a level where its services seem advantageous to culture. A strong inversion is evident in this procedure. It belongs to the very nature of the Spiritual Life to be independent and self-valued, and this claim it can in no way renounce. Culture, however, need only be viewed a little closer in its qualifications, in order that its inability to discover the Spiritual Life may become evident. In culture there result conclusions

of the human mind, a reciprocal contraction of certain individual elements becomes clear, a visible union takes place, which at the same time undertakes spiritual tasks. In this union the individuals step forth with their given opinions, *i.e.* with their prevailing natural impulses and with but little spiritual qualities, with much delight in themselves and with but little love for others. Thus, there results in the union of individuals some kind of binding of spiritual elements, a certain summation of potencies. But such a binding results only in external achievements and without a just differentiation of the definite and the indefinite. Consequently there easily arises a manifold and complicated web of relations, but not, however, an inner Whole; the current of life thus flows not from the internal to the external but from the external to the internal; and whatever awakens in the form of spirituality remains tightly tied to the purely human formation.

All this may be relatively valuable, and throughout indispensable for man, but inner barriers are perceptible enough; and if, in spite of the acknowledgment of these barriers, social culture makes of itself an all-governing end, and directs itself against the independence of an awakened spirituality, difficult entanglements and, indeed, perversions are unavoidable. That social culture in reality is not more than it is, is no detriment or reproach to it; while, however, it can be more than is possible for it to be through the actual natural state of affairs. It cannot become more so long as it presents its mixture of reason and unreason as *pure* reason, so long as it attributes the rights of absolute spirituality to its

conditioned human spirituality. When it acts from such a disposition it seeks to mould all spiritual greatness out of itself, it seeks to command all effort out of its own achievement, and to satisfy all demands out of its own means; and finally to tie the movement to the point where it can reach its own ends. Hence, an opposition necessarily originates, and, indeed, a struggle between a mere-human and a genuine spirituality arises—a struggle which must work with all tenacity because the struggle on the mere-human side is also led in the name of the spirit. Such a dissension lies evidently before our eyes if the all-powerful State or the Church with its monopoly of all means of grace drags with its utmost all Spiritual Life to itself. But the struggle spreads itself, however, beyond all this to the whole domain of human connections. Everywhere the mere inclination tends not to raise, free, and transform human existence out of its level, but to leave it tied to itself and satisfied with itself, and thus, in spite of all the seeming expansion, to narrow it inwardly. Utilitarianism and relativism—two diminutives of the Spiritual Life—become unavoidable if spiritual greatness and connections as well as religion itself are considered first and foremost as social organisations. Then, that alone is termed "good" which is useful to society; that is termed "true" which finds its acknowledgment in society; and both are an inner subversion of the definite meaning of the two concepts without the discovery of such a subversion. The subversion is so varied and disfigures life so much that it will prove of little avail in the main tendencies of life.

Human alliances always develop the Spiritual Life

in a particular kind of way, but on this path the Spiritual Life is not able to stamp itself energetically without a strong one-sidedness. But this particular kind of way tends towards the greatest stubbornness in its attempt to become a Whole, and it coerces with passionate intolerance all remaining activity. Such contradiction engenders necessarily in course of time a reaction; other ideals arise, progress, and discover their rights, but only to fall quickly into the same narrowness. Thus we witness an incessant change of ideals, a zigzag movement, without the superior unity of the whole, without the necessary demand of definite spirituality to step forth from the background to take the lead. We observe such a change of ideals clearly enough; the experience of history shows it openly with impressive clearness, and, in spite of this, social culture treats ever anew the occasional drift of activity as the only right, the only possible, and the conclusive truth. In the abstract, we have the clearest consciousness of the relativity of all human and historical achievements; in the concrete, any suitable time adapts us to become carriers of absolute truth. And must not this happen, and is not the error avoidable in order to gain character and energy for the problems of time?

Social culture can do no other than present the achievements in front of us and partially conform to such achievements. That would be no detriment if such a limitation were acknowledged, and if the inwardness and rights of the life of the soul were preserved. But such does not happen, because the achievements together with all their residuum as well as the character itself are enclosed within the circle of

social culture. Thus, all life and action are driven from the character to the performances, and this works towards a stunted growth of all independent inwardness. The direction of all striving upon achievements —the acknowledgment of external results alone in the life of others—becomes a great danger to the independence of character; man now finds his centre of gravity not in himself, but in the social environment, and thus the life loses the energy and veracity of original creativeness. He who in the first place works not for himself but for others, not for the facts but for the social environment, must, in spite of all his activity, exclude himself from the depth of things. The greatest defect here, however, is the inevitable rapid growth of pretence. Where all the value lies in the effect an action has on another and on the mere acknowledgment of another, then the semblance of truth does the same and often better service than truth itself. And this semblance will entangle the whole of life, and poison the real soul of man. This semblance-character of social culture becomes an intolerable peril when the inmost soul of the Spiritual Life is in question, as *e.g.* in religion and morality, so that all penetrating creativeness within these provinces was a burning protest against the pretence not only of the special social situation but also of the social mode of handling such problems. But all protests have transformed the social situation but little.

As the inwardness in this manner is stunted in its growth, therefore the individuality is pressed back and suppressed. Since society values and nurtures in man especially what enters into its ordinary ar-

rangement, characteristic features, discernment, and eminence are thought lightly of, curtailed, and ejected. Indeed, the more exclusively the social leadership of life takes the field, the individual situation suffers more hindrance; the more monotonous and mechanical existence becomes, the more must activity itself grow inwardly coarser. Also, society will give an ordinary shallow character to its organisations—a character which often harmonises but little with the inexhaustibleness of the individual cases which originate, and which collides sharply with the individual nature of the particular cases. Thus, for example, we find in law an incessant conflict between the general norms and some feature of the individual fact. But shall we throw such norms away on account of this? Or, are we called to abandon life to a complete subversion and an insecure arbitrary choice?

To base life on the level of ordinary everyday experience is extremely precarious, because the level of human relationships has no altitude, because such ordinary existence must depend on exhausted movement and waning energy, and these will consequently organise the life. When the ordinary existence presents itself as a totality and standard of all spirituality, it enters into a great conflict with the development of true spirituality. The elevated outlook, greatness, and originality appear to the ordinary existence as useless, excessive, and indolent. Thus all independent spirituality becomes a disturbance of social equilibrium, becomes a reproof against social conclusions. This opposition of ordinary existence engenders severe conflicts with tragic issues not only

in particular cases, but permeates the whole of historical life, and persists even in the external acknowledgment of greatness, since existence drags such greatness down to its own level. And in the central questions, the acknowledgment was wont to follow only when the greatness was removed far back enough not to disturb the circles thus acknowledging it, indeed far enough to be able, as 'classical,' to become a weapon against the Spiritual Life struggling upwards in their own time.

Again, in the field of culture there appears the same defect of which already nature makes us painfully aware, the cleavage between *formal* and *intrinsic reason.* Society places all life and action under conjoint forms, and insists, before all else, upon the observation of these forms; and social culture has a decidedly formal character. As against the natural level the entanglement gets even increased here, since the formal reason steps forth and is acknowledged by society as the carrier of intrinsic truth; the decisions of this formal reason claim absolute validity. Now, the most correct observation of all forms of existence offers no guarantee of an intrinsic truth, since fallible and easily moved men have to apply those forms. Socrates and Jesus were sentenced in accordance with all the forms of law, and the Inquisition and the trials for witchcraft were most correct. All social modes of life stand in danger of injuring intrinsic truth whilst holding fast to the formal truth. Hence all true friends of morality praise so little the virtue and righteousness of civic life; and deep religious natures are so often found in

sharp opposition to the basing of religion on forms, dogmas, and rites, towards which the social formation of religion moves.

The more clearly the effort in the Spiritual Life after a genuine being—an aspiration towards the essential development of life—is acknowledged, the greater must that disfigurement and damage appear. But does a knowledge of this fact make formal reason superfluous, and is not the life without it abandoned to an entire dissolution?

Thus, there appear a multitude of abuses, and common to them all an inner unveracity, a desire to appear more than one can be, the raising of a highly problematic half-reason to absolute reason, an idolatry of the social circle! Such a situation of life must anew cause a counter-movement, and this must rise in opposition not only to individual sides and regulations but to the whole of this social mode of life. If great spiritual renewals work in such a counter-movement, they can set an elevation of life going. If such counter-movements, on the other hand, be, as is usually the case, mere reactions, all their passionate protestations can be of but little use essentially. What shapes itself here against a binding of things within the domain of freedom remains so many formless waves of feeling; the individual can indeed appeal to the immediacy of his life and can revel in ever new moods, but the substance of life profits thus but little. If, in kindred directions, the present seeks to cast off all the burden of history, and seeks to defray the cost of life by its own means alone, no complete freedom is attained. For the aspiration of the movement is, viewed empirically, a testi-

mony of history even when it places itself pointedly over against the immediate past. Such an opposition may well show the defects of social culture, but it is not able to overcome such defects from their foundation. Such opposition with its exaggeration of the individual and his contingencies passes easily into one-sidedness and error, so that the scales of right must turn again to the level of social culture. Thus the pendulum of the movement swings incessantly from one side to the other; ever anew one side succeeds through exaggeration against the other side, and in the passions of the struggle the best energies devour themselves without having gained anything essential for the main fact. But it is always the conclusion of absolute truth that makes the struggle passionate and overthrows all error.

Thus, social culture is far removed from being the realisation of a kingdom of reason or even from becoming so by degrees. The greater will be the subversion—not only in expressed words but in acts—when social culture stands for such a kingdom of reason. There lies in such a worship of humanity a delusion which must issue, in the particular as well as in the general, into clamorous hindrance and misrepresentation. But even such a mode of life received its characteristic feature from the Spiritual Life, and can never wholly deny its origin. But how does this Spiritual Life explain itself now that the lower mode of life draws it into its own web and offers the most tenacious opposition to all progressive effort? And even when the Spiritual Life is conceived as a world-power and returns to the Divine, even this conception is drawn into the sphere of

doubt. Is not the Spiritual Life able to complete the work begun? But why then was the work begun? Out of what do these hindrances explain themselves — hindrances which, however, do not originate out of the mere individual, but which carry a necessity in themselves? Here again we find riddle after riddle! All the obscurity, however, concerning these questions is stimulated on the path of denial.

3. *The Opposition within the particular Province of the Spiritual Life*

Difficult as the previous entanglements were, they do not reach to the deepest root of the Spiritual Life. However much such a life may be confined within the human circle, it signifies even here, through inner movements and necessities, a real kind of existence and a real efficacy. For how otherwise does the struggle against bare nature as well as against bare society explain itself, and how could the injunctions of both be discovered as insufficient? Also, such an elevated Spiritual Life encompasses and permeates our existence not merely as an invisible total atmosphere, but it unites itself as a great Whole in art, science, morality, etc., and develops a propelling force within its own province, and works beyond the individual province in the whole realm of life. Thus there originates here without a doubt an original sphere of life. Has this sphere overcome the entanglements, and has it resulted in an emancipation from the hindrance and error which otherwise saddle human existence?

Such were in fact the opinions and hopes of ancient and modern times. All disorder was pressed into the

relationship with the environment; the particular circle of the Spiritual Life was imagined through this to avoid any deformity; spirituality and reason seemed to have an equally valid greatness. According to this, man need only set himself in spiritual activity in order to place his life in pure reason. It is in this direction that the convictions of all the enthusiasm of culture and all the confessions of enlightenment considered that the development of mental energies carry directly within themselves the security of a right habit and usage of things, and that when errors arise they will unloose themselves easily and smoothly.

In connection with the whole course of our investigation quite a contrary picture presented itself. The entanglements vanish in no manner within the province of the Spiritual Life, but reach within it their highest power; the most difficult hindrances and disturbances are not of an unspiritual but of a spiritual kind. That an Absolute Spiritual Life was visible in the domain of man brings, instead of a smooth solution, far more a sharpening of the opposites, a heightening of the conflict. Indeed, when the disturbance threatens to grip the fundamental existence itself, when the Spiritual Life is confined within itself, doubt penetrates now into the final depths. How does it stand now in connection with the Divine that suffers such an inner disorder to prevail? Or shall we flee to the course of thought which comes to expression in the noteworthy words: *Nemo contra Deum nisi Deus ipse?*

(α) *The Disruption of the Spiritual Life.*—The Spiritual Life begins in us at individual points and

first of all constructs further Wholes; it shows the nearest-at-hand view of things as scattered into a great number of isolated elements. The presence of the Spiritual Life promises an entire revolution of all this. For in it the unity longs for sovereignty; little as the fragmentary elements may be abolished with *one* stroke, yet the Spiritual Life will undertake an energetic struggle against them, and out of a Divine power within the soul it will penetrate into them victoriously; more and more the Spiritual Life must connect all into a Whole and permeate each special province with the spirit of the Whole. We must expect and aspire after all this. But again, the expectation is deceived, again a still greater entanglement grows out of the alleged solution.

True, in all this the idea of a total-life arises, works, and extends itself into the individual provinces. But the elements do not bend before this idea, but seek with all their existing rights to draw it down to themselves, and with the help of such an idea of a total-life to raise themselves to the level of all sovereignty. Now it is science, now art, now morality, now historical religion, now practical activity, which make themselves in turn a centre of life, and seek to link all effort to their own special arena. Consequently there originates varied types of life with their antagonistic movements and their disagreement and division of fragmentary portions of spirituality amongst themselves. And, indeed, such a procedure seems to issue out of an inner necessity. Thus the Spiritual Life within us seems to belong to no special and clear province beyond the social circle, and does not seem able to gain the necessary energy

for high aims without concentrating itself on one aspect of life alone, and expecting all safety through reaching that aspect. Therefore, there is with us no prominent achievement without a strong one-sidedness and also unfairness; all greatness thus works tyrannically and coercively; all effort, in the glow and passion of its activities, after a just balancing and a reciprocal reservation, appears as an intolerable dulness. But as all this conflict experiences through the idea of an Absolute Life the most important enhancement, the entanglements are still found beyond the existing situation.

The next result is a sharp division of the various movements, a hard conflict on the whole, the transformation of our Spiritual Life into a relentless struggle. And all hope of an atoning conclusion fails. As each party represents a right which must never be lost, none of the elements of the movement must be destroyed, and thus the conquest of each element carries in its over-exertion a turn to a lower level, and further, the prospect opens itself upon an ebb and flow, upon a fluctuation hither and thither. When, however, the one displaces the other ever anew, ever anew the ideals and the convictions change suddenly into full opposites. Does not the whole thing then become a mere play and caprice? True, the thought of an all-encompassing and all-governing truth is there, but it does not seem able to mould itself without being under the power of the merely individual formations, without serving the ambition of these isolated formations for an absolute monarchy, and without working for the sharpening of the disruption whose overcoming was set forth as a goal.

This presumption, however, to be a Whole in the particular is believed to be atoned for by the individual movements; they will make some amends through the shaping of the meaning of the true and the false, the spiritual and the human, freedom and necessity, which in their natural state are entangled in one another, and which nowhere long to reach pure reason. Therefore, it is only out of the Whole that the necessary division of things results; it is only in the connections of life framed in an inner unity that there results a transposition into full freedom and original activism—into an illumination and spiritualisation of the total existence; it is only out of this that each province receives definite boundaries within which it has, in its own way, to represent the Whole and work for its further development. If, on the other hand, the individual formations in their exclusiveness allow the good and the indispensable to flow alongside of the perverse and the problematic, life degenerates into the most painful dilemma. What life dare not miss as a truth cannot possibly be extracted out of the region of the affixed error; but, however, if life ignores the error, the truth quickly fades and vanishes. Therefore life must at the same time affirm and deny, accept and reject; everywhere truth disperses into error because the particular rules the Whole, and forces its own nature on the Whole.

The total-life needs Art for its emancipation and thorough cultivation, for Art makes Truth significant and joyous at the same time; Art baptizes Truth in the element of Beauty, but as soon as truth rules the Whole through the development of an æsthetic view of life, it submits to a

pleasurable, playful, and hyper-sensitive direction of life. Science brings forth an energetic clarification and consolidation, an ascent of man to a world-consciousness and to a life which proceeds from the expansion and truth of things; but science is not able to become the sole mistress without engendering through its merely intellectual culture an excessive self-consciousness of the work of thought, and turning the tasks of life into problems of knowledge, and finally injuring the development of an independent inwardness as well as of the fresh apprehension of the immediate movement. A manly strength and a consolidation of character which the whole being needs originate out of morality, but a specific moral conduct of life is wont to become hard, stubborn, and self-conscious. Over against this, religion develops more gentleness and fervour, but to fill the life exclusively with these leads easily into the danger of turning aside from the work of the world and of revolving simply in one's own inactivity, and, finally, of transferring to the Divine the claims which humanity makes upon us—the very qualities by which we are able to know the Divine at all. A counter-effect is brought about by the practico-social life with its development of the contact with the environment and with its participation in the energies of the ordinary everyday experience; and this works in the direction of greater security and skill, of fresh courage to face life, and of a joyous self-existence. But as soon as such a mode of life conquers the whole man, it drives him into a shallow activity and into a soulless alienation. Thus each isolated method leads into error as soon as it becomes a Whole to

itself, and yet each individual method will not give up its claim to become a Whole, and puts every nerve forth to become such a Whole.

Through such a dispersal the conduct of life engenders a characteristic obscurity which arrogantly tends to despise all the provinces except its own, whilst it rejects such a treatment from any other side as an unbearable monstrosity. The æsthetic mode of thought feels itself superior in the fineness of its sensations and the distinction of its taste; the scientific mode feels its superiority in the expansiveness of its view and the clearness of its insight; the moral mode feels its superiority in the strength of its virtues; the religious mode feels its superiority in the inwardness of its soul-life and its being well-pleasing unto God; the practico-social mode feels its superiority in the secure rule of immediate existence. Each misses the ideals of the rest, and no wonder that each easily defeats the others. Thus, through a variegated colouring we obtain usually a pharisaic self-consciousness, and, along with it, a disfiguration of the Spiritual Life into a factious life which is as unavoidable as it is intolerable.

But how shall the substance of the Spiritual Life conquer if each element strives against the others, and all contend against all, and in the strife destroy their best energy? On account of this, such strife, in the course of history, will increase rather than decrease. For in spite of all the vacillations of individuals, divergences increase on the whole, and the characteristic development of each particular province takes place as well. Modern times especially constitutes a significant period through its

dissolution of the Middle Ages mode of culture, but the danger became ever greater through the development of one-sided formations, through a disintegration of the Spiritual Life and the transformation of our existence into an irreconcilable struggle. Also, it becomes ever clearer that the entanglement lies far above all will and capacity of mere individuals; the individual appears here all along as a child of his age; the waves of his age play with him and carry him far out until he becomes without a will of his own, and merely floats on the current of the external circumstances.

The idea of a Spiritual Life is not able to prevail against such a discord, but is considered a specially evil defect, and it is driven into stubborn doubt at the moment a Divine power is recognised in the idea of such a spiritual total-life. Then the Divine seems too weak to become the ruler of the human formation of the Spiritual Life; indeed, what is present as a stimulation of the Spiritual Life seems to fall under the power of a lower order, and to heighten the fancy and confusion of that order. How can a Divine work thus against His own aims?

(β) *The Disintegration within the Spiritual Life.*—The opposition to the unity of the Spiritual Life reaches even deeper: disintegrations unite themselves together in the very foundation, and produce a dispersal of elements and conflicting formations. Three such disintegrations have already been noticed in our investigation. First of all, our investigation considered the cleft between subject and object—between the individual consciousness and its external world. From the beginning this cleft checks progress

towards truth, but it seemed to draw a conclusion concerning the opening of a definite spiritual and essential life within the particular domain of man. For along with the cleft there appears within the domain of activity the dawning of a reality; there originates a world which is contiguous with the self from within and not from without, but such a world becomes our true self through the binding of its elements into a unity. That this new world, first of all, found itself in opposition to the old world, and only gradually subjects it, cannot astonish and terrify us. This is certainly to be expected in connection with a movement which arises towards a new direction, and which slowly yet securely advances over against the cleft. But when this expectation of overcoming the cleft is unfulfilled, even the presence of a higher order of things far more heightens than lessens the problem. Not only is the idea of unity unable to draw the being to itself, and mould it out of itself, but it works in the direction of giving an edge to the situation, as each of the two sides—subject and object—is driven, through its indifference to the unity, to an attempt to tear the total-life into pieces and to bring the opposite side entirely under itself. In the one direction, the particular works of man emancipate themselves, they step forward as independent powers, they transform the life of the soul into mere means for their own necessities, they coerce ever stronger all inwardness and mechanise more and more all existence. But the progressive absorption of the subject contributes finally towards the overthrow of man's powers. For the more the activities loosen themselves from a soul-foundation, the less can they

signify a connection by themselves, and the more must their own energy and greatness sink until their inability to inspire the whole of life appears quite clearly. Then comes the rotation to the other side: there results now an inversion of the prior course of work. The subject now raises itself in a gigantic manner and disconnects itself to the utmost from the object in order to construct all reality by itself. Its own individual situation becomes its world; the enjoyment of its sensations and the refinement of its dispositions become its life. But if the subject follows exclusively on this path, the reality more and more internally and externally flies away. For the subject is not able to preserve its own unity on account of its growing resignation to a mere sentiment; it degenerates into purely isolated and incessantly changing positions, and its existence falls more and more into the transient and the shadowy. On the other hand, a great longing will again awaken for the object as an indispensable support for our life, and thus once more the power reaches the other side. This dialectic, in which each side through its isolation and overstrain destroys itself and returns to the other side, shows clearly the necessity of *both sides* to instruct one another. But with the acknowledgment of a homogeneousness we do not gain a living unity; all merely individual effort for a Whole does not free us from the power of a lifeless disunion, as our own times with their vacillation to and fro between a soulless technics and a fanciful sentiment show with painful clearness. The presence of an Absolute Life which shall be above the opposites has as yet only heightened the longing

for unity without conferring the energy to satisfy the longing.

Another evil cleft from which the Absolute Life should be freed is that between energy and character. Experience from of old has shown how the energy has often mangled the character and the character the energy, and how life has entered into a blind natural impulse on the one hand and into a powerless spirituality on the other hand. Such a situation ought to alter itself through the presence of an essential and cultivated spirituality. For within the province of such a spirituality there is no definite energy which does not carry within itself an independent appropriation of that spiritual world, and, along with this, acquires a moral character; at the same time, the character raises itself from a merely passive condition to an energetic act—an act in which the whole soul connects itself together. Thus, through the ennoblement of energy and the strengthening of character an inner unity is reached, and a new type of life is gained in which the strong is good and the good is strong. It is a matter of regret that such a type of life signifies for us more of a distant ideal than of a present reality. For not only does the antithesis contain undiminished energy in the direction mentioned over the whole breadth of existence, but the attempt at emancipation seems to it to lie back still deeper in the spiritual. Also, from an earlier simple-mindedness the idea has more and more heightened, so that one of the sides raises itself above the other as alone of value, and handles its opposite side as superfluous and even evil. Thus, on one side, we find the exclusiveness of spiritual energy—great diabolical formations which

are completely absorbed in the victorious progress of their own doings and creations, and treat all else with supreme indifference; which are served by the events of life, and to which fate itself appears to pay homage, although their course lies on the other side of good and evil; thus all moral judgment appears as a subsidiary consideration and even as an unbecoming intrusion. In all this there lies a wantonness which not only leads sooner or later to external ruin, but which also from the outset damages the spiritual character of the achievement. And, over against this cult of mere energy, we find a cult of mere disposition, the self-conceit and self-righteousness of a disposition separated from action, and resting exclusively in itself. Now, what happens within pure inwardness may, in its ultimate valuation, surpass in lustre the most brilliant performance in the moulding of the world. But when a frame of mind has no contact with the entanglements and temptations of the world, when the disposition is not turned into action, when there is no struggle with external things, when man revolves, from the outset, within an alleged superiority of his own mind, then life threatens to sink into inactivity, the weakness of the soul is reckoned as a merit, and in such a numbness and smallness of nature a pharisaic self-complacency arises. And the self-complacency of weakness is even more painful than that of strength. But how will the disposition become the soul of a great life, and how will the cleft between wishing and achieving be spanned? Once again, we have not amongst men found those things together, which, in themselves, require each other.

In corporate life that conflict appears in the discord between culture and morality (especially as represented in religion). Culture, with its development of energy, is wont to treat morality as a subsidiary thing, and to sacrifice it to its own ends; morality develops, over against this, a consciousness of inner superiority without being able, however, to develop a corresponding power. Morality, nevertheless, shows itself energetic enough to reveal the limits of culture, and to check men from finding full satisfaction in it. Thus each tendency is able to break the exclusiveness of the other, but neither is able to reach an exclusive rule. What, however, does the whole of the Spiritual Life gain through such a mutual hindrance?

The third antithesis is that of spiritual substance and psychic existence—an antithesis expressed by the noological and the psychological methods. This antithesis is, first of all, brought to the surface through the idea of the *essential* development of our nature, and only therewith does it become clear that, without the attainment by the Spiritual Life of an independence over against the purely psychic procedure, there is no content of life and no connected spiritual world. But at the same time, there becomes apparent the fact that such an elevated Life realises itself only in the form of psychic existence, and that its development proceeds only through the movements and experiences of such a form. Thus, as necessary as a clear separation of both series becomes the constant reciprocity of both. Here, also, the experience of life shows, in the main, a pointed and severe enmity. On the one side, we find misjudg-

ing of the incomplete state and limitation of human Spiritual Life, a rash seizure of the substance and the fixing of one's self on it, and through this, however, a cutting off any further movement, thus causing a coercion of all initiative and a premature conclusion of the meaning of life. On the other side, we find the attempt to gather up fragments of a content and of a spiritual world out of the movements of the immediate psychic life; and thus we obtain a good deal of freshness, movement, and variation, but on account of the inward contradiction of the facts we find a constant wish for more than can ever possibly be, we find a fraudulent acquisition of the unprovable and a great danger of shallowness. Thus the opposition between substance and existence-form shapes itself into a disorder of the depth and freedom of the nature; the depth threatens to become rigid, and the freedom superficial. This strife permeates the whole ramifications of life: no other opposition drives men into such contending camps, and none engenders so many parties. It is thus to-day in the particular province of Philosophy. For what other are the deepest ground and the strongest energy of the divisions of thinkers but that one section takes its stand on the necessity of the Spiritual Life, and that the other takes its stand on the circumstances and experiences of man? The struggle between idealism and realism, the *a priori* and empiricism, metaphysics and psychology—they all originate in the last resort out of the same root. How can the presence of an Absolute Life be sustained when the movement towards truth itself is retarded by the strife of parties, and remains fettered by such a situation?

(γ) *The Impotence of Morality.*—After all the upheaval we have already observed, there remains the very last means of escape, *i.e.* morality in its existence-for-self as a kingdom of pure character, as the decision concerning the total-direction of effort. However few results such a decision may possess from an external point of view, however many hindrances and limits it meets within the soul itself, there originates with it an original province of life, a full existence-for-itself of the inwardness of life which all the power of the enemy cannot possess. Here the soul longs for a secure superiority to the world, and gains also the indestructible certainty of a new order of things. Thus, many epochs became the possessors of all this, and later antiquity especially made morality a fast bulwark against all the doubts and toils of life.

All this heightens itself powerfully when the turn to religion posits the decision upon the whole of the universe, and when the decision allows itself to be carried by an Absolute Life. True, the problem becomes far greater, but also the certainty of man becomes far more joyous. Indeed, that turn originates from difficult entanglements of a moral kind, and an immediate conquest is not to be expected, but an inward strengthening and a victorious ascent are certainly longed for by us.

Do things stand thus in the reality of our experience? First of all, this is certain: religion shows far more the inadequacy than the sufficiency of our actions; concerning the judgment of the moral situation of man the Standard, for example, decides before all else the nature of what we construct, and shows

what we ought to construct. Now, religion with its relationship to the Divine reveals such an Absolute Standard; the Divine valuation displaces all merely human convictions of things. While the latter state of things coerces the man within the man, its judgment with all its relativity loses its edge. The ordinary situation of human actions constructs its standard, but what remains behind such a situation condemns the situation; what steps perceptibly beyond the ordinary situation is praised as being somehow great, and is honoured as a service which is not unconditionally required from man. Over against all this, the Divine valuation of things raises itself and transforms the ordinary valuation, because its claims rest upon absolute perfection. Measured out of the infinite, all the differences of the finite vanish, and there remains only the common boundless expanse of space; and it is through the recognition of something of this kind that all moral greatness and all moral service of man develop. Thus it has happened everywhere where the religious idea dawned with full originality, as in the beginnings of Christianity and in the rise of Protestantism. It is only in the weakening of that idea that human valuations gain so much ground as they have gained in Catholicism.

The problem intensifies itself, however, in the degree the spiritual and essential mode of religion longs for a recognition, and in the degree the conviction is found that there stands in question not merely some kind of development in certain directions, but the essential development of the whole of our nature. After this, the revealed inadequacy meets the whole of our existence; then all which is

termed customary morality appears as a thing which belongs far too much to the mere shallowness and far too little to the substance of the soul. And when the inadequacy presents itself as the all-sufficient and the all-encompassing, an inexorable struggle of definite morality as against a mere semblance of it is inevitable.

Thus, all development of morality under the influence of religion gave a continuous lower valuation to customary moral values. That which in worthy achievements fastens itself to bare natural energy must finally crystallise into a non-moral; that which works within the particular circle of human society towards the curtailment of selfishness and towards mutual advancement is much too external and is afflicted with far too much pretence to enter into the balance as an absolute valuation. But placed in a "beyond" to the social formation of things, all human morality appears insipid, vacillating, and hollow. It is a virtue out of a defect caused by temptations or by the equilibrium of errors; a legality which was never placed on trial; a love which remained true out of mere custom and because it knew no other; a belief and trust which never had doubts, and which had no need to prove anything; a sacrifice which at the same time brought forth much profit. Over against such weaknesses we find the evil power of the passions, and man torn through them from his better insight, and, indeed, against his better will, and all the remaining fully-recognised excellences blown out of his consciousness as a dream and a shadow. And over all the particular passions we find, however, the egoism with its loosening of

the individual from world-connections, and from its relationship to the infinity of the universe, brought to a state of poverty. This egoism, through its inversion of the world and so fundamentally different from natural self-preservation, seems to grow not weaker but stronger with the advance of culture; the historical movement may vary its form but such a movement leaves the substance untouched. Such a banishment of effort into the small self becomes intolerable when the turn to his essential nature and its cultivation holds definitely before man a new self in the Spiritual Life; now the hold upon the small and shallow produces a self-alienation of man and a destruction of his own nature. And yet it persists and draws ever the new movement back to itself.

Thus the inadequacy of all human morality lies clearly on the surface. But what harm can this inadequacy produce if over against it a Divine energy dawns and a superhuman life kindles itself? Such a turn to a "better" would then stand more visibly and more convincingly before our eyes! But in the meantime such obviousness and energy of conviction fail to appear. Not only does religion seem to alter but little the total situation of life, but the entrance of the "higher" works in the first place principally in driving out the contradictions and in the awakening of otherwise slumbering oppositions; thus the inversion reaches its most external height, whilst the "good," with the acknowledgment of its highest worth, is dismissed, injured, and destroyed. When many thinkers of a rationalistic turn of mind declare it as impossible that such an activity, which works against one's own conclusions and which disapproves

of a Divine, can be itself Divine, they misconstrue the abyss of human nature and contradict the experiences of humanity. For in the "great" and the "small" there is an evil beyond mere egoism—there is envy and malicious joy over the calamities of others, hate and jealousy; and where one's own welfare is not touched at all, there is an antipathy towards the Great and the Divine, and a pleasure in the defacement and destruction of the Good. Through this the bad things mount to positive evil—to the diabolical. The burlesque figure of a devil has vanished from our figurative ideas, but it has not vanished out of human nature. Further, the mysterious fact of evil as a positive opposition to the "Good" has not ceased to occupy the minds of the deepest thinkers, and in spite of all attempted reconciliation the problem has ever anew broken out; it stands clearly before us at the present day not only through the teachings of Kant and Schopenhauer, but far more through the particular experience of modern life itself.

Evil is thus in the highest degree to be understood as a testimony of freedom, and the conception of moral wrong will never allow itself to be expelled in spite of all attempts. But although moral wrong endows evil with its edge, it does not engender all evil. But what makes the situation of man so especially painful is the fact that the total arrangement of life—which at least leads man if it does not force him—becomes a failure even with man's own activities. Out of the hand of nature man receives the obligation of an incessant self-preservation which often drives men against one another, and allows

them to welcome the injury of one another on account of their own advantage. Civilised life heightens these entanglements through its multiplication and refinement of wants and needs, through its manifold complications and the narrow concentration of men, through its strong blaze of ambition and impulse for gain—all these are deemed necessary for our self-preservation. Thus the release of energy and the restless extension of effort appear self-evident and unassailable; the common atmosphere, the social organisations, etc., shape themselves in accordance with such a notion. And if we proceed only a step further we find the admission of merely instinctive attitudes into entire self-activity; we find that which occurs in daily life elevated into a principle; and thus the real thing which matters appears as a painful inversion and degenerates into adverse criticism. But this criticism grows out of relationships which carry our whole life, and, along with it, our spiritual development!

How shall we disengage ourselves from such an entanglement? And what becomes of the presence of the Divine through such an upheaval of morality? In so far as the actual situation has been acknowledged, it has to all appearance strengthened less the reason of our existence than brought the unreason to a clear consciousness.

4. *The Darkness of the Human Situation*

Our attention hitherto was specially directed towards the entanglements in the actions of man, but we have also to estimate his condition and the formation of his abilities. In connection with these latter

the matter does not deal merely with man's subjective happiness but with the Spiritual Life; it deals with the question—whether such a Life through its foundation in an Absolute Being gains the energy to enforce its way to the external world and to subject the universe to its own ends? What brings about the formation of the value of values should certainly be able to reign and rule also in our circle.

Before all else the desire of man appears in his effort to reach spirituality through the aid of a power superior to the world, to reach it especially in a hard struggle against an alien, dark, and powerful world. Indeed, the more the threads of the phenomena of the universe run tangled through one another, the more indispensable it is to link all human aims to a power superior to the world; the harder the oppositions of the world-environment are, the more urgent is the hope placed upon an over-world help. Such a power is to raise our own potency out of its insufficiency; it is to prepare a secure path for our activity through a deep darkness; and it is to transform the hindrance and opposition into a conclusive advancement. It must raise man immeasurably in the inmost of his being and strengthen him in his courage to face life, so that he may be able to consider himself an object of the care of an over-world power and wisdom, and also of eternal love. Upon the lower levels much may mix together as self-love and even vanity, but on the higher level all this vanishes before the unique end of the spiritual maintenance and elevation of man.

In reality this idea is so indispensable to religion that an entire renunciation of it has been conceived

as the destruction of religion itself. In any case, every conception of religion must feel anxious for the realisation of such an idea. If and how such a realisation can happen does not concern us at this point of the inquiry; here the question is not how the gain of such a realisation reaches the idea of a Providence, but whether the idea seems sufficiently clear over against the condition of the world so as to win the seeker for itself. It is a bad mistake to mix together the matter-of-fact of experience and the claims of religious belief; for he who carries carelessly into his nearest view of things what seemed to him from such a view to be self-evident, but what in reality becomes possible only after a great conquest, diminishes not only the expansion of life but also endangers the truth of life.

We must ask, therefore, without any prejudice, whether the surrounding objects allow us to infer of a movement of the universe in the direction of spirituality, and whether a superior furtherance of a spiritual striving of man clearly appears. Doubtless there are numerous examples and modes of life which create the impression of a well-marked directivity; numberless threads are discovered which bind themselves together and produce a favourable final result; dangers are averted, and aids, beyond all expectation, are gained. But, too, the impression of the systematic arrangement of things can occasionally produce a result of the blindest gamble of things; and in order to estimate with any certainty whether any evidence of a higher guidance and love is to be found in the accommodating behaviour of things, more is under consideration than a purely solitary event; we

must be able to know the relationship of actual instances to possible ones; we must estimate the ratio of the gains to the blanks; and all this we are not able to do.

The impression of many opposite kinds of experiences associates itself with such a darkness as we find in things around us. For we observe that there remains in man himself not only much goodwill and many busy activities without the needed aids from above, but which break in pieces before they reach their highest ends; there remains not only much spiritual energy and warm love unrealised—and in other cases much of all this is painfully lacking—but we also discover enchainments of phenomena which seem to aim at the creation of great misery, and which drive man with unmerciful callousness over the brink of an abyss. The faintest hint would have sufficed to hold him back from such a catastrophe, but this does not appear, and consequently destruction takes its course. Petty accidents destroy life and happiness; a moment annihilates the most toilsome work. Often, also, we discover a chaotic medley, a sudden overthrow of all potency, a seeming indifference towards all human weal and woe, a blind groping in the dark; we discover deep-veiled possibilities constantly sweeping as dark clouds over man and occasionally descending as a crashing lightning. But, also, man's own destiny, as it were, plays with him, raising hopes soon to destroy them and preparing energies soon to annihilate them. And in all this we are to view an order of reason and a kingdom of love!

The method in which the customary development

of religion arranges itself in connection with these problems is lamentable, and is unworthy of the seriousness of the whole question. The matter is handled as a law trial in a thoroughly attorney-like fashion. The cases which seem to present an affirmative answer are recognised gladly as "the finger of God," especially where He seems to strengthen one's own party; but what shows life as suffering and unreason, as stubborn opposition and fruitless toil, is ignored or placed out of the way in a manner we should be ashamed of in connection with human things. Soon one flees to mere possibilities, and holds to the comfortable thought that things will soon outweigh in an opposite direction, and that what began in pain and sorrow will end in pleasure and bliss. Soon the thought grants the consolation that, in spite of all the misery, it might have been worse; that a tormented suffering leads, after the exhaustion of all the energies, finally into death, and that a devastating calamity has not reached the depth it might have reached—all this is praised as a grace of God. These assumed claims easily satisfy, but does the world constitute a kingdom of reason because it is not the worst of all possible worlds?

If, however, the unreason is far too evident to accept the above conclusion, there remains to the official defenders of the Godhead one other exit: suffering is not only apologised for but welcomed as an indispensable means for inner purification and moral cultivation. Now, one must be very undiscerning not to be aware that an order of things whose highest end is reachable only through severe suffering can never be a kingdom of reason. How does it stand

with the real fact of the assertion? Can we say with certainty that suffering reforms man—reforms him in a decisive manner? Or does it not perhaps give another direction to his errors? As the experience of life lifts itself up to an unbiased reflection, suffering is a shield against evil and pride; man is able through great tribulation to rouse himself out of the numbness of daily routine, and is able, too, to pitch his courage to a gentle key, as well as to render sincere services to his fellow-men. But, on the other side, suffering often works in the direction of deadening and discouraging the powers, especially when it does not come to us in the form of a volcanic catastrophe, but accompanies the whole course of life as a continuous grief and as a cramped pressure. The mean and common found in the chain of relations, from which the man is not able to withdraw, although he longs to do so with the whole of his soul, confine all aspiration and lower the level of life; and close to such a level lies a turn to a petty and narrow-minded disposition, to bitterness of heart and jealousy; indeed, through the most external conditions, suffering and sorrow can suffocate all spiritual effort. Thus testifies the immediate impression of experience for the Greeks, to whom happiness and success were held as aids of advancement for the moral education of man. And the fact that Christianity took up suffering into the inmost soul of man, and made it a point of departure to an entirely new direction of life—a fact which will occupy our attention later—can only indicate a mistaken shallowness and a dangerous inversion, as though suffering, without further ado, through a kind of necessary effect, engendered a

spiritual advance and a moral purification. Then, indeed, the fact would be most simple, so simple that religion itself would become superfluous. Certainly to all religious conviction the thought is indispensable that somehow at least a reason shall issue out of unreason is to be hoped for. As it is presented in the book of Job: "And now men see not the light which is bright in the skies, but the wind passeth and cleanseth them"; but it makes a great difference whether, first of all, doubt is fully tasted, and whether an inner turn of life, through the deepest conviction, is prepared, or whether, through those supposed reasonable counsels of the Godhead, all shall soon be turned into the pure and the clear, and, along with this, the head of all sting shall be plucked out. As this beautiful colouring tends towards the blunting of the problem, it enters into a constant conflict with the plain meaning of truth. For the meaning of truth can only acknowledge the impression that certainly much in our potencies seems to point beyond ourselves, but which, however, allows itself to be understood on the whole as a strong enchainment and chaotic disarrangement of occurrences, as an indifferent treading upon weal and woe, as no order of reason for the hopes and fears of man, and as no kingdom of love. And with what other eyes are we able to see things but with our own?

Much certainly remains mysterious, and especially mysterious is the fact that the life of man is not able to follow a directed course. It seems occasionally as if his life and actions were driven by an unexplainable power into a course unwilled by the individual himself; in many instances a strong wave seems to

raise the potencies of man and to carry him far past his own capacities; in other instances such a power, with equal energy, seems to work against him, and to allow his choicest undertakings to be cruelly wrecked. Thus, there has originated from of old the belief in destiny which, with brazen will, prescribes his course for man, doles out his luck, and to resist which is to will wantonly. Spiritual control is withheld all the more from such a belief because human self-love plays strongly in the idea: if the belief once flatters the vanity that destiny, through a supernatural power, raises the individual beyond others, pettiness and weakness find their most comfortable trust in their attempts to impute their own defects to an irresistible destiny. It constantly remains a noteworthy experience that especially renowned men of action, whose actions operated so efficaciously in a dark world and who brought forth incalculable results, often lived in the conviction that they were tools in the hand of an all-powerful destiny. This belief, invulnerable against all dangers and certain to lead to the appointed goal, was indispensable to them in order to possess a joyous courage for creativeness and for the entire certainty of their enterprises. But all the power of such a subjective conviction furnishes no objective proof. Could it not be that the self-feeling alone was expressed in such a belief? Were, however, the reality of a higher power acknowledged here, the mystery of the whole world would increase rather than lessen. For why does that solicitude contract itself upon individual cases, and how does it agree with an infinite good when it handles man as a mere tool, and

throws him indifferently out of the way just as he is about to reach his longed-for goal? Also, in the lives of great men, their energy seems to weaken after the culmination of their work. And does there not remain here an unexplainable incongruity between the seeming power of reason on its summits and its weakness on the whole? Heroes appear, work, and create; they overcome, as in a play, all opposition; they link their results to their further pursuits; thus their achievement enters into the whole and seems to control the destiny of humanity. But has much of reason, on the whole, issued out of all toil and work, and does history exhibit itself as a victorious ascent and a secure advance of definite spirituality? And if this is not the case, what avails all help of the Divine in individual situations? Once more, a half-reason seems to lie in front of us, and the riddlesome appears as an entire unreason. Thus, it happens with us in our search for a guiding thread as with those who search for a track in a deep thicket. We seem to have found such a track; it seems to show a way through the labyrinth; it becomes clearer and seems to lead securely to a goal. But soon the track grows narrower, fainter, and vanishes, to reappear; again the imprints become fainter and fainter, until finally the whole disappears, and all toil has yielded only a delusive hope.

Perhaps, however, the blame of the previous discontent lies on the observer; perhaps we have sought in an inverted direction. If a benevolent providence which links all for the best is not recognisable, yet there appears perhaps with clearer eyes a moral order, an equilibrium of all action and condition, a kingdom

of strong righteousness. The longing after a requited righteousness is in no way an outflow from a petty disposition which desires a reward for the good and a punishment for the evil, or of an envied calculation which grows anxious lest too little should come to us and too much should go to another. But the thought allows itself to be lifted up beyond the small human mode, and places before itself for its advancement the fact that the spiritual governs and rules the world as a moral order. A Plato and a Kant longed for this.

Thinkers thus shaped into the Whole and the Spiritual only what inspires peoples and epochs, and the former were rather called to transform the entire concept of reality beyond all experience than to bequeath anything for the intensifying of the demand. In the first place, one hoped to find the entire adjustment ready in the life-course of each individual; as experience contradicted this, the vicissitudes of life were drawn into a concept, and consequently righteousness was hoped for in the future results of the race as a whole. But such vicissitudes of life engendered new problems without having solved the old ones; and now the thought soars beyond the realm of fear and hope, and passes beyond the limits of this life to seek the atoning righteousness in a future existence. Most peoples satisfy themselves with such a solitary consummation of things, and find in the thought of a judgment day a satisfying conclusion. Others, however, who did not merely think forward but also backward, and who, with an unbounded imagination, flew beyond the world, went much further and made of the present life an

individual link of an immeasurable chain—as, for example, the Indian doctrine has done in its teaching of the transmigration of souls. The teaching of an unescapable destiny of the actions constitutes nowhere more the centre of religious conviction than with the Indians; what is truly man's own seems here to him to be nothing more than his deeds; through life and death, through rebirth and transformation, the consequences of his deeds return to man from the good and the evil; nowhere is there an evasion or an aversion, nowhere a forgetfulness or a loss. The imagination has never worked more powerfully than in the keen tracings of such views of the universe; and the sway of such a teaching has not failed to exercise a strong effect upon the soul of man. But such delineations have convincing power only for believers, to whom the doctrines make possible what is necessary for their souls. But he who does not feel himself in the position of a believer, but of a seeker, can have no choice but to look within his own experience for the essential facts.

Such essential facts do not fail us. A certain moral order, as it is termed, appears already in the natural concatenation of things as well as in the external results of action and in the judgment of the mind on such action. In reality, certain kinds of action exhibit characteristic connections which produce agreeable results, but there are other kinds which produce disagreeable ones; dissipation is less conducive to well-being than a well-regulated life; and an action corresponding to the legal and social ordinances is more favourable to decent living than a contrary kind of action. But how little, after all,

is gained from such trivial truths! They are valid only for isolated fragments of life, and this kind of adjustment touches merely the visible action, whilst the character remains untouched. Indeed, the more the life intensifies itself, and the more the moral tasks extend over the whole circumference of life, the more inadequate will all such adjustments become by means of natural results.

But perhaps there grows with such a development of life as the action engenders in the inwardness of the soul a power of self-judgment, of conscience. Whenever life took a turn from external effects to an inwardness of soul, it believed itself able to find here an uncorrupted judge of good and evil; the approval of this judge seemed to produce joy and power against which all the suffering of life vanishes; its condemnation, on the contrary, produces a torment which reduces the value of the most brilliant external achievements.

Without a doubt we obtain here a primal spiritual phenomenon which only a shallow external course of thought can lay on one side. But the question arises, as to how far this primal phenomenon reaches, and whether it helps to the production of a righteous order of things for the whole of our existence. But the most manifold reflections arise against such a view. First of all, the fact loses its supposed inviolable sublimity because the nearer kind of self-judgment is seen to be under the influence of a strong social environment: many actions were valued by different peoples and epochs in quite contrary ways; a conscience which, however, as a kind of soft wax, shapes and alters itself with the customs, opinions,

and tendencies of men, cannot very well be a true standard for good and evil or an entire righteousness for human existence.

Further, conscience is dependent in a high degree on the individual nature of the soul. The reflex which the action throws on the consciousness is of varied strength and accuracy: with one man the reflex may be highly dull, and may work as an impulsive decision; in another, on the contrary, the reflex fastens the man with great energy and will not let him free. Thus, the first man does not trouble over the most grievous wrongs, whilst the second excites and grieves himself over mistakes hardly perceptible. Physical differences of a coarser or of a finer sensibility play strongly in connection with all this, but it is the height of the moral development, however, which decides concerning the energy of such a self-judgment. Thus most comes to him who needs it least. In the words of Pascal, "the righteous are accustomed to consider themselves sinners and the sinners righteous."

Finally, who can deny that conscience forms the foundation for the influence of great perverters of moral values and of the aims of life. The words of Goethe, "the end invests things with a renown," holds valid also in the particular domain of character. For the evil which we choose arouses us but little when its injury is not perceptible, or when it is trimmed into a supposed good through the enchainment of circumstances; and thus the most upright effort towards ourselves, and more still towards others, seems to remain trifling and worthless if all success is denied it. Where, however, success in good or evil

was of importance, the disposition seems to grow greater and more energetic on the one side or the other. A judge so dependent and corruptible can never bring forth righteousness for the whole of life. All in all, the matter here stands in a similar state to what it stood in connection with previous points we have considered. It may well be, that a phenomenon appears within the human province whose deepest root reaches back into the super-human. But in all the nearer development, the facts come under the influence of human means and imperfection; we thus seem to sink back into the same uncertainty out of which we strove to escape.

If, however, human existence through its own means is not able to satisfy the longing after righteousness, the moral order cannot be other than of an over-natural kind: an over-world Will must re-establish the equilibrium of action and condition which our life fails to do. The fact of such an adjustment must become clearly discernible towards our human view of things, and, indeed, it must become clearly evident even over against such an adjustment in order to be able to protect our conviction and to govern our life. Does it in reality do this? Who could confidently answer in the affirmative? For the nearest-at-hand impression confirms in no way within our experience the doctrine of a righteous course of the achievements of life; but it shows far more a great disproportion of things. Soon the action has the most serious consequences, and all these consequences return to the man himself; causality holds him unmercifully in its grip, and a long-buried past may rise out of its grave and terrify

him as a ghost. But, inversely, painful wrong courses remain for a long time without any consequences; these courses degenerate the man not only externally but also internally; they fall upon him as something alien, and disperse and destroy all just as a storm ravages. Thus particular kinds of foundations come to such a lawless medley when they oppose the righteous allotments of destiny. The individual is not an island, but stands in manifold and often entangled relations; he is conditioned by the nature of the environment, by his commissions and omissions in wide and narrow circles, by family, nation, times, etc. Such a solid complication rules here that the action has its consequences often less on the doer than on others; one individual has often to atone for the wrongs of others, and one generation for the foolishness of another; the offence of one drags others into unhappiness and misery; "the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge."

Herewith the threads run into the individual scenes of life, entangled in one another without binding themselves into a connected web and without exhibiting a common character. He who seeks to draw a conclusion concerning the destinies of life can hardly avoid the conclusion of a blind confusion, and this confusion becomes a strong injustice when so many differences of an inward kind and character originate, as they in reality do originate. Such an impression might call forth passionate complaints and accusations from one direction; from another direction they may acquire a form of a disquieting doubt; but in both cases the indifference of the world transposes itself against the moral relationships

and being of man, and in direct antagonism to the strongest activity of most earnest minds. That evil often not only hinders and rejects, but also advances and rewards, and that the good seems continuously to abandon the hoped-for energy for the suppression and overthrow of wrong—all this has become in the particular province of religion a matter of incessant searching of heart and of sorrow. "Behold, I cry out of wrong, but I am not heard: I cry for help, but there is no judgment" (Job). "The righteous perisheth, and no man layeth it to heart; and godly men are taken away, none considering that the righteous is taken away through wickedness" (Isaiah).

The general custodians of belief and the official representatives of religion have, of course, here as well as elsewhere a comfortable answer at hand. Man, they say, dare not reckon with God, whose decrees far overreach all human knowledge; also, according to the Divine Standard, no one is free from blame, and, therefore, suffering met even him not unjustly who was righteous among men. How clear all this mystery seems to self-righteous men, who yet make a confession of their impotence! What do they know of the decrees of God? And how could they expect from man a suspension of his judgment and a denial of the imperative and urgent impressions which he forms? Certainly, all the moral differences of men vanish in the light of the conception of absolute perfection, but man is not able to consider his actions in relationship to the Divine as solely his own, but also through the connections of these actions with his fellow-men; he is not able to adjust the vicissitudes and values of life;

and when therefore he can find no righteousness anywhere, religion with its basing of the good in the Divine must heighten the pain and the unrest. And is not the history of religion itself full of the most painful persecution and oppression of the Noble and the Divine? Religion is never able to think lightly of such problems.

Also, injustice limits itself in no way to the relationship of inner and outer, of blame and conditions, but it strikes its roots into the inward nature itself, it turns into blame what is in no way so in its whole extent, and what is often hardly a blame at all. The causation of things and the growing relationship of the individual with the environment through which much unmerited wrong has fallen on the individual, as we have seen, enters into his particular actions; what he designates as his own act is discovered inwardly to be only an inevitable final link of a long chain which reaches far back; indeed, reaches into immensity. All this may not lie entirely outside the fault of the individual himself, but such an external fault is nothing compared with what appears in the individual consciousness as the individual's own fault. The seeming inevitableness of that which, however, works as our own act—the growth of faults through the impervious web of destiny—has from of old occupied the attention of the deeper minds. The problem permeates ancient tragedy, and has ever since accompanied artistic creativeness to its heights; and that thinkers have not shut out the problem is shown by the words of Schelling: "The highest conceivable misfortune is to become blameable through destiny without being conscious of any blame of our own."

It is of great importance to bear in mind that things are not sharply marked off from one another in the web of life, and that good and evil do not stand here pure and clear over against one another, as has been pointed out in books on morality and in edifying discourses. But in the confused state of the human situation, one element flows almost imperceptibly into another; our actions seem often entirely indifferent to morality, and no danger whatever is perceived as being present in the sphere of history. And yet the road can lead, if we follow it farther, to the brink of an abyss; a catastrophe breaks forth suddenly; the past illumines itself clearly and piercingly, and shows a blame in what previously seemed to require no consideration. The blame here often seems to lie more in the omissions than in the commissions of life. The unholy thing is avoided through the calling up of opportune energy and through the skilful installation of our activity. We have not called up the consciousness of the wrong, but it comes upon us. But did we know what stood in question, and could we measure the consequences of a hesitation to decide? Thus it was upon our ignorance and inability that the fact returns. But did not our action in some kind of way participate in such an ignorance, and does not the fact, along with this, again become our own blame? Therefore, blame rests not so much upon the individual act as upon the whole of our being. But have we ourselves brought forth this being of ours? Has it not devolved upon us through the destiny of nature, of the situation of life, of education, of our times, of our environment, etc.? Is not the fact of our aspiration

after the heights of spiritual development, in order that we may feel ourselves free, in order that we may strive after self-activity—is not all this more than the result of that dowry of a particular existence and destiny? But if we are a mere piece of the world and its causality even when we feel ourselves free, whence comes the feeling of obligation and the consciousness of wrong which burden us often so unbearably? Is there not here imbedded the greatest injustice, that man should have to carry in his breast the pains and sorrows of freedom without being able to possess freedom? If things are otherwise, freedom is, in spite of all hindrance, able to maintain itself, and the whole world is rather to be dashed in pieces than to abandon freedom! But who confers on us the indispensable energy—the energy for the construction of a new kind of world? In the meantime, we remain in the custody of the old world, and experience here perpetually shows the most painful disagreement between the "ought" and the "is." We must act: the necessity of physical and social self-preservation compels us with unrelenting constraint to this. But we act in the region of darkness with a chance of success even there; without being able to fathom the connections and to measure the results, our actions alter the course of things and create a new situation. And yet in this we have fallen under the power of destiny. For the linkage of things may bring forth effects which we had not dreamed of, which contradict directly our own plans, and for which we are not responsible. Through such an inversion of plan and result we may injure where we ought to help, and destroy where we ought to build.

When the winds and waves of destiny drive us to entirely other bearings than were present in our minds, what in all of this is man's own work, what of his own being is in it? Does he steer his own course, or is he a mere tool in the hands of dark powers? Thus could the old poet call out:

> "What then is man, and what not, too, is he?
> The dream of a spirit that ceases to be" (PINDAR),

and with a turn towards the moral problem, a more recent great poet thus conceives of doubt:

> "Thou leadest man to life's domain,
> Thou countest to him many a blame,
> And then thou leavest him in pain" (GOETHE).

All doubt and sorrow, however, which call forth such a view of the world and such a situation of man, must fall with their whole energy on the soul of the individual after the inauguration of an Absolute Life within man's domain has immeasurably raised him. For now he is no longer able to cast off from himself the problems of the world; now he has immediate participation in Infinity; now he must discover as his very own the destiny which the Spiritual Life experiences within the human province. Indeed, he sees all his work and being placed under a pointed contradiction which limits his actions, which renders his feelings uncertain, and which makes his whole existence problematic.

So far as the Spiritual Life develops itself, the individual gains the unique place where an originality is able to break forth and to give an incomparable worth and a secure superiority against all the remainder of his existence. Here alone—if anywhere

in human things—can there be a self-aim and self-worth. That which pertains to the development of man's soul—to the working out of his spiritual nature—must act on the individual and must precede all remaining tasks; it must all the more set the individual's main energy in the direction of this goal because the path to such a goal is full of toil and obstacles; and the individual dare not consider anything which belongs to such a tendency as small and insignificant. For in all this the individual struggles for something which brings forth with itself a *world*—an essential world, behind which all the "goods" of natural things take a secondary place; here the matter deals concerning the salvation of his own soul, the loss of which is incapable of being counterbalanced by the gain of the whole world. Thus, his inmost consciousness enables man to discover such a fact as a holy duty, and the human environment does not fail to support him in this. Religion and morality strengthen him powerfully in this task, and all deeper cultivation concerns itself with the effort of reaching such a goal.

That such an upward movement proceeding from such an inward obligation clashes with the most pointed contradictions of the world-mechanism, has already been shown in our investigation; such a mechanism treats all actions, and, indeed, all the being of the individual with indifference, so that from the mechanical standpoint they appear as futile and unreal. According to the meaning of the external world, all the inwardness of man appears as an insignificant point of an immensity whose original elements become ever more inaccessible the more

science binds its effects into laws, and which shows ever clearer its extreme callousness towards our strivings. Human connections give the individual a higher value, but here, again, the more the complexities grow, the more exclusively do the achievements of man turn towards merely external aims and, therefore, these achievements become more and more one-sided; what is inwardly going on in man, what issues out of this inwardness, and what has become the standpoint of his soul, become largely subsidiary facts. Also, where all value depends on the achievements, no one is indispensable and no one but can be substituted by someone else, for all this mode of thought there is provision elsewhere for anything and everything; thus the stream of social life flows quickly over the individual with all his sorrows, hopes, and burning aspiration after a self of value. Consequently, on such a level, there remains but the relationship of individual to individual; if there is anything here which man may hope for, it is to be found as a self-aim and self-value in reciprocal love in the whole of his being, in his drawing nearer to the spirituality of his nature, and in his directing himself towards sympathy, comprehension, and love. But through such a relationship of individual and individual, we meet not only in the province of the accidental but also within the inner situation of the soul, difficulties and infirmities which cling with great energy. What is usually praised as love rests so little upon the whole, the inward, and the essential; it is so entangled with bare natural impulses, and so dependent on external things, and especially so fugitive and transient, that it mirrors the deeper aspiration of the soul as an

illusion far more than it helps that aspiration to obtain its fulfilment. Thus the individual sees his impulses appropriated—impulses worthy in themselves: they become acknowledged, valued, furthered, but are of no help to him in his hard struggle; he cannot, with all his aims, prevent himself from being dealt with by the whole of experience, because he himself must deal with all things from an inward necessity.

What consequences, however, shall man draw from the fact that the world-mechanism is so indifferent towards him, and also seems so superfluous? From of old—with special energy in Stoicism—the method has sought to loosen itself wholly from the world, and to withdraw solely to one's own inwardness, and here to construct an independence against all the environment. In reality, the power to accomplish this lies in the ability of man to place himself upon his own thoughts alone, and to reject all connections with the world; he can then create a characteristic happiness and a stolid feeling of superiority out of the liberation from all oppression and out of an elevation above the things of the world. But does such a self-affirmation of the individual suffice, and is it able to inspire the whole of life? Is there not, first of all, in all true effort towards spirituality a reciprocal communication, an exchange of life, indispensable? Does not the separation of man from things turn quickly into an inner impoverishment? And when man casts a glance at himself, does he not meet difficult entanglements within his own nature, and does he not need for their solution the Other—the Whole? The fundamental mistake of such an abstraction is to see the problem only in the relation

of man to the environment; and if the soul discovers itself as full of entanglements, the insufficiency of such a view is clear.

But what shall man do when the world treats him indifferently, and when he finds no refuge in himself? Shall he, on his own side, acknowledge the negation which the world exercises on him? Shall he simply renounce himself to that which coerces all effort, which suspends the Life-process, and which expects all safety through death and annihilation? He could do this if the movement of life were his own concern —his own private fact. But he could not do this if within him a Life-process superior to all mere exactness—the opening out of a higher order of things—is acknowledged. Thus, there is something implanted in him which he dare not rob himself of; he now deals with a problem which he himself has not set, but which, as from a sublime energy, rises within him and refuses to be abandoned. However much of all this concerns itself with the renunciation of his own happiness, man is not able to disown his spiritual nature and its tasks. In his nature and its tasks a fact seems committed to him which is of value not only for himself but for the whole; for the vindication of a higher order of things does not seem possible without his activity. Therefore, beyond all the physical oppression of life something metaphysical seems to govern, and which forbids a simple abandonment. If the fact stands thus, why does not that superior power help man? And why is man placed in a situation where neither success can be expected nor abandonment be allowed? Must not such a contradiction destroy all courage for effort and creativeness?

PART III.—THE OPPOSITION TO RELIGION
(CONTINUED)

CHAPTER X

b. THE OPPOSITION CONSIDERED

1. *The Inadequacy of Proposed Remedies*

WE have followed the main directions in which the development of an independent spirituality met with oppositions; evidently the hindrances do not flow separately side by side, but they mutually strengthen one another and raise one another into united action, so that they become an invincible power. The world outside seems indifferent and rigid; human society is considered inadequate, and resting less upon truth than upon semblance; the spiritual movement within our own province is weak and full of contradictions; and in destiny there is to be recognised no government either of love or of righteousness; all, with the whole of its energy, extends into the life of the individual. Thus, how can man adhere to his effort after independent spirituality and to a belief in the presence of the Divine?

All attempts which human need has devised for its justification have been shattered on the rocks of these hindrances. First of all, all systems of optimism have been shattered. These may point out the

evident unreason of our situation and seek another standard of consideration, as an insertion of things into wider connections. Why could not the contradictions of the world disentangle themselves through such a standard into a pure harmony, or why could not what seems as a stubborn hindrance prove itself a means to the awakening and elevation of life? A beautiful prospect, but only a prospect! As we are not able to place ourselves upon that higher standard, such a solution at the best remains no more than a mere possibility; and compared with the very real reality of unreason, this possibility is hardly more than a shadow compared with a living body. The main error of this attempt consists in that the fact is conceived as a problem of mere observation. If we were related to the world merely as observers, and if all suffering were nothing other than a displeasure of the observer from what occurs externally, a variation of the standard might effect in all cases a complete change of judgment. But we stand in no manner as mere observers of the world, but through actions and sufferings are drawn into the depth of the world; what we herewith experience is itself a piece of actuality, and this actuality will never allow itself to be placed on one side, or, through any dexterity, allow itself to vanish.

Also, the delusion of hope of being able to bring forth more pure reason from the movement of culture has been demonstrated in the whole course of our investigation. Indeed, the main point of the entanglement consisted in the fact that difficulties of an essential spirituality in connection with the highest questions made all progress insecure and all results

double-edged; the alleged gain transformed itself lightly into a loss, and what has long seemed certain fell ever anew into doubt and struggle. He who hopes for an essential betterment of the position of facts from the historical movement has to weave together independent and mere-human, central and peripheric spirituality into one.

Thus the proposed remedies leave the fact unfurthered and the problem unsolved; in the last resort we see ourselves ever thrown back upon the point from which we set out, and the attempt to switch off the entanglement makes it reappear all the greater.

2. *The Impossibility of a Negation*

If the facts stand thus, the oppositions grow from stage to stage and frustrate all attempts for the welfare of the soul. What then remains but an entire negation? If the intolerable entanglements do not untie themselves in some kind of way, the whole movement towards an independent spirituality is withdrawn, and the conviction of the presence of a Divine within the human province is relinquished. In whatever manner the conviction originated, it seems to prove itself an error in the impotence of its achievement. If the facts really stand thus, nothing must prevent us from drawing courageously and pronouncing honestly the legitimate conclusions. Thus, all that belongs to the turn towards spirituality or which results from it would be rejected as a mere illusion, and would be removed wholly from our life. Although this could not happen at one stroke, the duty of veracity at least would command an energetic striving towards such an end if after

such a breach there would be any place for veracity and duty.

The consequences, difficult as they are, should not, therefore, hold us back from such a task. But we are not quite so sure whether absolute negation really brings the situation to a correct expression. We have already seen that a painful contradiction permeates the whole of our existence, that neither the world nor our own capacity corresponds to the tasks laid on us and which gain our conviction. Could the contradiction long for the violent and stirring energy which we have already discussed, if such tasks hang on us only externally, and if such an energy deceived us as a merely transient play of fancy? If there grows within the whole of life an earnest, penetrating conflict, therefore a two-sidedness of life has taken place; there originates now not only something that hinders, but also *something that is being hindered*—something whose development fails to succeed, something that is everywhere denied its request, but that never allows itself to be explained as pure nothingness, or to be blotted out of life as mere fancy. Pascal was right when he stated: "*Qui se trouve malheureux de n'être pas roi, si non un roi dépossédé*"; and were there not imbedded in human nature an elevated movement superior to all arbitrary action, the state of our world could never engender so much agitation, indignation, and pain. Through what other means do the strangeness and indifference of soulless nature become objects of complaint, but through the fact that we are able to reflect on a Whole and relate ourselves to higher aims? How could the evanescence of our existence,

for example, create a pain unless something Eternal worked in us and withstood the dissolution of things into a mere flux of time? Why do the inadequacy and the perversion of the social configuration of Spiritual Life grieve us unless another configuration of life aspires over against the social form, and which now relegates all actions and impulses to a lower level? Could such difficult entanglements be discovered in the inwardness of the Spiritual Life unless in some kind of way a superior kind of energy brought about the opposition, and unless we were, in some kind of way, inwardly raised beyond the sphere of conflict? Why do the flaws in love and righteousness within our circle agitate us so powerfully unless some precious good suffers injury? Finally, how could the individual experience the entanglements of the whole as his own particular life unless he had somehow raised up a new order of things to the level of cosmic significance?

All this has run as a leading thought through the whole of our explanation; the hindrances have appeared so great because new and greater demands have been made; so that here we only gather together what, as a matter of fact, manifested itself step by step in the actual condition of things, viz. that the strength of the suffering and the hardness of the contradictions prove themselves to be the best testimony for the depth of our existence, and for the efficacy of a higher energy. A Nay which calls forth so much stir and movement is impossible without a Yea, although such a Yea may be imbedded far in the background of life.

The inward contradiction of absolute pessimism lies in that it sees but one side of the facts, in that it

ends with what falls within the realm of perception, and in that it does not concede that the impressions, the stirring, and the suffering, however deep and ardent they may be, could occur unless somehow a positive life and striving were being hindered. If all is futile, there originates no kind of disparity; pain is an illusion which easily allows itself to be shaken off. It is an absurdity to bewail the privation or the loss of that the possession of which granted no happiness. Such a contradiction permeates the Indian conviction and feeling of life. Here pain originates primarily out of the experience and perception of the instability, transitoriness, and incessant flux of things. But how can the transient be an evil if we, root and branch, belong to the kingdom of flux, and, therefore, lead but the life of a day? If in reality the evanescent can be felt as pain only by a nature intended for the Eternal and thirsting after Eternity, then the strength of pain bears immediate witness to that longing for Eternity. This is the truth-element in the Hellenic thoughts concerning the privative nature of evil—in the conception of evil as a mere hindrance and a robbing of the good—so that, in fact, without some kind of pre-existing good, suffering would have no energy and pain no depth. But such an optimistic conception made a mistake in conceiving that through the presence of a ready-made kind of good it was able to substantiate the predominant power and authority of the good. But a mistake quite as great is to be found in pessimism, in that, in the main, it wipes out all the good because its development in human existence clashes with difficult entanglements.

Also, the experience of life speaks clearly enough

in the same strain. In no manner is the sense of hard suffering wont to drive man to an entire negation. But even when the calamities hurl themselves against him, when he is threatened not only from without in all that he loves, but also when he is convulsed to the very depth of his existence, such a situation is able to awaken a certain axiomatic consciousness of his relationship to an order of things on the other side of all the conflict, and to the certainty of the indestructibility of his inner nature, as well as to a strength which will enable him to reach his goal. Such a province of hindrance appears then as a stage of reality, as a stage which cannot possibly signify the whole of man's existence. Nothing protects life so powerfully from abandoning the whole of existence and from a docile resignation to the thought of annihilation than deep suffering, especially suffering and pain in spiritual things—in such things as are here in question. It is not epochs of troubled experiences and difficult entanglements which make humanity err in connection with its higher tasks, but far more epochs of idle pleasures and seeming plenty. Further, over against religion, a strong experience of the unreason of our existence has worked not so much in the weakening as in the strengthening of belief, and such an experience, beyond all capacity of a direct demonstration of the truth, heralds the necessity, the certainty, and the presence of a new world. In the midst of the most conclusive doubt—a doubt that cannot from its very root be refuted—the impossibility of an entire negation has dawned with victorious clearness.

Through such a train of thought, all the difficult

hindrances which human existence reveals cannot lead towards an entire renunciation; that which always stamps human existence as something petty and inadequate—that which brings to the mind our long distance from the goals of life—transforms itself into a testimony for the reality and the altitude of these goals; thus the greatness of the Spiritual and Divine appears clearly in the pettiness of the human.

Thus, a depth of things is unmistakable in all hindrance, and such a depth makes clear the impossibility of a simple negation. Also, all the darkness leaves no doubt that the Divine emerges, first of all, not from the outermost boundary of our life, but through a creativeness and activity in the inmost life itself. In the form in which this work of the Divine appears first of all, it certainly negates more than it affirms: there does not result the construction of a kingdom of pure reason, but there is prevented all satisfaction for man in merely human things; all attempts of a self-revolving and of an anchorage in the merely human province are opposed, and an inflexible tribunal is exercised towards all self-sufficiency and towards all self-adulation of human nature.

This appears clearly in a twofold direction. On the one hand, it is seen in the power of logical thought, in which something superior to all human opinion and inclination appears which shows fearlessly the weal and woe of mere man. The movement of thought marches forward, is driven and linked solely through its own necessities; all the attempts of man to draw such necessities into his own track and to adjust them to his aims are lamentably stranded. Certain ideas have appeared, they have won us,

they were welcomed by us so far as they performed for us some service and did not lay too great a sacrifice upon us. In such a situation we might, as individuals and classes, have retained such ideas and placed on one side certain uncongenial circumstances; we might have shaped them so that they might fit comfortably into our plans. But however much we might labour and trouble, however much we might attempt to turn the current with all zeal and perseverance, it helps us nothing, because logical ideas will not allow themselves to be bent and turned; a secure superiority over all the contents of time is presented to weakness and awkwardness when they possess the conclusions of thought and bring these to a clear expression. Thus, we find a secure superiority of thought over all the undertakings of mere man.

A similar conclusion presents itself in the appearance of contradictions in human life. Pointed contradictions may lie within the bounds of an epoch, and may cause no unrest or disturbance so long as they do not pass into consciousness. But a moment arrives when this happens, and when it happens, all the possibilities of repression, enfeeblement, and cheerful accommodation disappear; then the higher assertions develop their full strength, and the opposition to them is unceremoniously ended; happiness, rest, and the earthly welfare of man become secondary things. It has happened thus in political and social movements.

The encounter between such a progressiveness of logical conclusions and such an irreconcilability of the opposites creates a universal dialectic, which does not

move in the precise forms presented by Hegel, but whose mighty power is unmistakable in human life. The Spiritual Life always steps on a special path within the human ground, and the following of this path leads necessarily to a strong one-sidedness, where the success itself engenders more and more error. Now, a rejection of this error does not result through a toning down of the assertions that are made, or through the breaking off of points and angles, but through a sudden change into an entirely real—not logical—opposite; after such a change, a new power is conferred on man, and yet he follows his track with the same exclusiveness until it threatens to predominate over the truth, and one sudden change after another enables the man probably to enter into a new direction. Such movements fill the history of the world with their smaller and greater waves; whether a positive progress towards reason is to be found in them, can in no manner be discovered. Viewed externally, the waves seem to run in an aimless ebb and flow. However, it is certain that all ascent and descent, all "becoming" and passing away, lie on the other side of the interests of the individual, and are confused in no way through his wishes and strivings. Such movements never allow man any kind of rest; they never reach a secure foundation; they hold their existence always in jeopardy; they destroy ever anew all self-satisfaction through the effects and creations which they produce. Thus spiritual forces rule in man—forces which humiliate him profoundly, and which adjudicate him a worth only in so far as he decides to become the tool of such forces, which, in spite of all his brilliant

characteristics, destroy him whenever he attempts to stem their course.

In addition to this superhuman sovereignty of a formal kind, there associates itself a sovereignty of an intrinsic kind. It results in its characteristic features in morality, in its superiority and, indeed, in its opposition to all purely human aims. So morality must consider the natural mode of man as something distant, alien, and even hostile; it has a kind of natural instinct against itself; it is quickly repressed through the ordinary everyday experience of the human situation, and is easily transformed into a mere semblance. It gains no strong positive power in such a situation. On the other hand, however, an influential negative authority is unmistakable. But such an authority renders man uneasy and brings clearly before his mind the inadequacy of all his undertakings; it exercises, in the form of conscience, a judgment concerning his actions from which he is not able to withdraw himself permanently; it destroys also satisfaction in the most brilliant achievements of a culture which believes itself able to dispense with such a sovereignty; it avenges itself all along for all neglect in considering that without such a sovereignty all the gains of life, with their tendency towards selfishness and pride, threaten to capsize into peril and loss.

Matters do not stand otherwise with religion. Religion, also, in so far as it outgrew superstition, had the natural inclination of mere man more against than in favour of it; nature does not transmit a veneration for a "higher" than itself; and even where religion has stood in high external honour, there have

been many complaints of the unbelief of mankind. In the average of human conditions, religion has always been more of a semblance than of a reality, and what religion has performed on such a plane has been full of contradiction. But in spite of all this, religion remains a mighty power of human life and of the universal movements of mankind. For it has brought forth a new standard which makes inadequate all that previously sufficed; it has shown the evil doings of man and the limits of his valuation of things, and, along with this, it is called to create a cleft in the inmost soul itself. That great turn of religion is the raising up of new demands to the level of the Spiritual Life and a blotting out of what had hitherto satisfied man. Thus we find it most of all in the personality and life-work of Jesus. Here we find a human existence of the most homely and simple kind, passing in a remote corner of the world, little heeded by his contemporaries, and, after a short-blossoming life, cruelly put to death. And yet, this life had an energy of spirit which filled it to the brim; it had a standard which has transformed human existence to its very root; it has made inadequate what hitherto seemed to bring entire happiness; it has set limits to all petty natural culture; it has stamped as frivolity not only all resignation into the mere pleasures of life, but has also reduced the whole prior circle of man to the mere world of sense. Such a valuation holds us fast and refuses to be weakened by us even when all the dogmas and usages of the Church are seen through as human organisations. That life of Jesus exercises evermore a tribunal over the world; and the majesty of such an effective bar

of judgment supersedes all the development of external power.

Hence, in spite of all the confused state of human things, an elevated Spiritual Life is not merely an object of aspiration and hope, but also works in us in the form of immediacy; first of all, certainly, as a law and a bar of judgment—as a power which forbids in an obligatory manner the conclusion that human effort is no more than the work of mere man, and which sets forth with unmerciful clearness the impotence of all merely human undertakings. Not only in certain directions but in all Spiritual Life such meek and energetic effects appear with mighty power.

Man is incessantly endeavouring to attribute to himself what comes only from the Spiritual Life; he interprets himself as a standard, as public opinion, etc.; he makes himself judge over good and evil, the true and the false. But when he presents the semblance of truth, he does not present with this judgment the energy of truth; sooner or later the definite standards of the Spiritual Life make their appearance and demolish the semblance. The Spiritual Life allows itself provisionally to be drawn into the service of human aims, but soon it disengages itself from the obscurity and humanisation, and demonstrates its independence and superiority.

All this remains full of problems and mysteries, but in spite of the darkness so much as this is certain, that a superhuman Spiritual Life signifies no illusion. If it rules over us as a power of sublimity, as law and tribunal, it is and it remains a reality founded on a rock—safe against all the waves of negation.

3. *The Necessity of Further Manifestations*

Impossible, however, as an entire abandonment of religion is, the entanglement receives through religion more of another configuration than of a satisfactory solution. For a greater depth of life may be recognised on the other side of the province of the hindrances, and a directive power of a spiritual kind may work within our existence. We are not able, however, to know whence such a power comes, but it is a positive participation in the Spiritual Life and a full vivification of imbedded depths planned within us. It is this alone which invests our action with value, and which is able to free our conviction from doubt. Without such a turn we remain permanently in a vacillating, intermediate position: a higher world is perceptible, but in our province it does not seem able so far to overcome the immense oppositions so as to reach a positive development; it has certainly driven out all hope of deriving satisfaction from merely human things, but it has not granted us the compensation of a new life. Thus, we do not see what the goal of our action is, or the Why and the Wherefore of the action. Has the Divine only opened our eyes in order that we may discover the immeasurable distance from us and our own vanishing smallness at the same time? But is then all that we may undertake of no avail, and must not, under such impressions, all human effort break in pieces?

Thus, even with the recognition of that depth of things, and of that sovereignty of the Divine, all still remains in question; and the most painful dilemma ever surrounds us, viz. that there is too much reason to

pronounce a negation and too little to pronounce an affirmation. *Si deus, unde malum; si non deus, unde bonum?* How can we hope to escape from this dilemma? All the previous facts and reflections do not help us to answer the question; the one hope lies in the fact that the Divine, through some kind of positive effects, appears in our circle. It is only a further reality that can lead the Yea to a final conquest, and, along with this, rescue our life from a menacing destruction. Therefore, it behoves us to look for this. That man, in the upheaval of his life, cried for outward signs and wonders, we can understand without having to do it ourselves; but we, too, remain dependent on a wonder, on an ampler and more pervading Divine, since this alone is able to raise us out of our hitherto-prevailing contradictions, and to guide our life to a secure path.

Part IV.—Characteristic Religion

INTRODUCTION

Our previous discussion has resulted in a strong aspiration after new realities—after a further manifestation of the Godhead. The counterpart of this had developed so powerfully within the domain of man that the life had entered into an entire deadlock; there could be no doubt as to the inadequacy of mere man; the Divine, however, revealed itself as law and tribunal, and brought new aims and standards to our life, but it granted not the energy to coincide with such aims and standards; it allowed the unreason of existence to be unveiled to its very depth, but it did not lead reason to a victory against unreason. Thus, the entanglement seems heightened within us; what grows thence into doubt may not extend to the Divine itself, but man is saturated with it, and, indeed, it robs life of all its significance. Of what avail are all toil and activity if they are not able to raise themselves against such powerful opposition, and if we divine a new world but find the path to such a world closed?

We have already seen that there is only one hope of escaping from such an intolerable situation: the Divine Life and Being must reveal itself still further

in the midst of the needs and struggles of our existence; such a new reality alone can prevent an inner collapse of life, and turn doubt and depression into fixity of purpose and joyousness. Does there indeed result such a turn?

A belief in this runs through humanity; it speaks out of all religions, and has attained an independence over against culture, and has brought forth from the so-called historical and positive religions a characteristic world of thought. For to all religions belonged the desire not so much to assist in obtaining the whole of the Spiritual Life through man's own achievement, as to bring forth something *new*, and to gain the whole soul for this. Over against the chaotic darkness of human existence they created their own kingdom and rescued in this, as in a sheltering ark, the ideals of humanity; this kingdom, however, seemed especially strong through what it possessed in discernment and uniqueness. The historical religions, through such a configuration, appear as an answer to the question which presented itself in our prior investigation—an answer not through ideas and doctrines but through life and act, an answer not of the mere individual but of the corporate experience of humanity. A pity only, that where we long for an unerring certainty soon a strife breaks out, and that where we desire *one* answer the historical religions offer many and conflicting answers. How is this? Do the various claims destroy one another, and does hope of help disappear at the same time? Or does all the ramification allow a universal truth to break forth — a truth which promises to guard us and to lead us farther?

PART IV.—CHARACTERISTIC RELIGION
(CONTINUED)

CHAPTER XI

a. THE HISTORICAL RELIGIONS

1. *The Fact of Religions*

OUR introduction dealt briefly with the historical religions, but it is our aim now in a more precise manner to conceive of their significance and greatness, and to consider what is problematic in them. That such religions present a unique mode of life over against the ordinary world and reason, is shown by the mode of their origin. For they do not grow in a calm kind of way from the ordinary work of thought, but appear as an entirely new beginning in great personalities, who, as mediators between the Godhead and the world, announce the will of God to humanity, and establish a closer communion between the Godhead and humanity. The precise content of the message and the mode of communion decide the characteristic nature of the particular religions; for religion may be understood as a conjoint struggle for goodness, light, and purity as means of protection from evil spirits as in Parseeism; it may be a bond formed between God and his chosen people, which leads to a stricter fulfilment of the law

and to a corresponding retribution as in Judaism; it may finally be a Kingdom of God which binds all men to their Heavenly Father in mutual love, and which, indeed, leads to a union of the Divine and the human natures as in Christianity. Religion ever founds a unique communion of life with God; it ever allows such a communion to engender a new reality which will signify not a mere addendum to the remaining life, but the kernel of the whole. The conceptions of God, the tasks of life, spiritual greatness and values, shape themselves characteristically and incomparably in accordance with the quality of the new life. Thus, each religion has its own view of the universe and its own morality. And it is from this individual and underivable characteristic that religion feels itself mighty and hopes for redemption.

Such an independence and individuality were attained by religions especially through the greatness and energy of their founders. To these founders the new kingdom was no vague outline and no feeble hope, but all stood clear in front of them; the kingdom was so real to their souls and filled them so exclusively that the whole sensuous world was reduced by them to a semblance and a shadow if they could not otherwise gain a new value from a superior power. The new world could attain to such immediacy and impressiveness only because a regal imagination wrestled for a unique picture in the tangled heap of life, and held it up over against all the confusion, and because it invested this picture with the clearest outlines and the most vivid colours. Thus, the new world dawns on humanity with fascinating power, rousing it out of the sluggishness

of daily routine, binding it through a corporate aim, raising inspiring ardour through radiant promises and terrible threats, and creating achievements otherwise impossible. This prepared road into the kingdom of the invisible, this creation of a new reality which is no merely serene kind of play but a deep seriousness, this inversion of worlds which pushes sensuous existence down into a distance and which prepares a home for man within the kingdom of faith—all this is the greatest achievement that has ever been undertaken and that has ever worked upon human soil. In order to accomplish all this, the founders must be great thinkers, and far more than being thinkers they must be great artists, and far more than being artists they must be heroes of action. And, at the same time, they must be raised above all action to a secure repose in an Eternal Order, and be possessed of homely simplicity and a deeply child-like nature in the midst of all the complications and excitement of world-transforming power. Consequently it becomes easily conceivable how the estimation of their adherents raised the founders beyond all human measurements to a likeness to God, and, indeed, to an equality with God. Their works seemed to carry within them Divine energies; wonders surrounded their paths; their life and being bridged securely the gulf between heaven and earth.

Thus, it became of the greatest importance to acknowledge these personalities in order to bring life into a secure track. But the reality founded in God became at the same time an enormous task for man. The new life had to be assimilated, to be developed, and to enforce its way against a hostile world; thus man

became a co-worker with God, and his life through this gained immeasurably in value. Out of such a blending-work a corporate circle grew up; high aims and great hopes united men together and drove their energies to the utmost tension; in united convictions and their fundamental experiences men found the help of God entirely certain, and were fully armed against all doubts and temptations.

The rights of what had been discovered as truth in such a new world could not be set aside by general reason. For it was precisely in that which brought *something new* over against such reason that the energy and strength were to be found; therefore, the *New* must stand upon its own particular kind of proof, and thus it comes to possess an actuality against all reason, and demands for such an actuality a willing acknowledgment of the confiding faith of man. The conception of faith received through this a more definite meaning than is presented in the *universal* delineation of religion. It is not mainly a revelation of God that stands here in question but this special revelation existing in the midst of history; the Yea bound itself more definitely with a Nay, and the acknowledgment bound itself with an exclusion. Here, the thought of the underivableness of the truth easily became excessive, so that the contradiction of reason was welcomed as an evidence of the incomparable and superhuman character of the new truth, and a *credo quia absurdum* inspired joy. In any case, one felt certain and joyful in the possession of a truth on the other side of all the complications and unnecessary formalities of brooding reason; this truth

alone seemed accessible to man independently of the position of intellectual development; deep-penetrating spirits, however, could point to the justification of what they held in the fact that all mediate knowledge in the last resort rests upon something that is evident only in the form of immediacy, and that the final root of reality is to be conceived as an act of freedom which is simply non-derivable.

To such a positiveness of the foundation there corresponds in historical religions a positiveness of content. We have already seen religion, in general, dividing life into a For or Against, and creating an enormous movement, and all this in the historical religions experiences a general enhancement. As the affirmation here is more precise and is traced out in an enclosed circle of life, much is pushed out to the opposite side—even much that belongs to the Spiritual Life itself—and thus the tension and struggle must become incomparably harder. But this may signify from the standpoint of historical religion simply a gain, because it will more than anything else lift life out of the idle indifference which forms the worst enemy of all spiritual movement; it will, too, exercise an energetic counter-effect to all that is small and mean, which otherwise chokes human life; it will, through such a concentration, consolidate life securely in itself and place it on a foundation which seems simply indestructible.

We have noticed the opposition to religion turning into a doubt whether man, in spite of all his efforts, penetrated in any kind of way to truth; whether the union of the Divine and the human, which constitutes the kernel of religion, reaches any measure

of success. Historical religion overcomes this doubt from its very root and in the whole of its extent. For historical religion causes the Divine to enter into the province of man, and makes the effective communion the soul of all life. Through such a definite union of the Divine and the human, the image and the conception of the Godhead transform themselves at the same time. How could the Godhead be moved by human need, and, on the other side, how accept the help of man? How could the Godhead bind itself to an inner communion with us unless it left its superhuman abode and dwelt among men? If, thus, the human appears as essentially related to the Divine, or if the human is raised beyond all narrowness and particularity through the descent of the Divine into its nature, the human may assign the highest conceptions of its own circle to the Divine, and thus it penetrates beyond the colourless conception of the Godhead to the conception of a living and personal God who is present in the form of immediacy, and with whom the soul can converse as an I with a Thou. If man owes his greatness to the fact of a communion with the Divine alone, then it is not an anthropomorphism which the man holds; but a return from the image to a prototype takes place when man, from the best in his own nature, traces out an image of the Godhead.

Through such an approximation of God to man, the union between both could develop far more inwardness—an inwardness which is able to dispense with all relationship to the world, and which is even able to exercise its entire energy in opposition to the world. It is here therefore that the individual

acquires a value, because it is here that the Highest Nature concerns itself with him; here man may have intercourse with the Divine as with his best friend; here originates a religious emotional life—a piety in conscious opposition to all external forms and productions. In such a religious emotional life there develops a pure life within itself of the Spirit; here a sanctuary unassailable from all strife and alarm is found; here a pure stream flows from which life is able to refresh itself ever anew with energy. Through their achievements within their own province the historical religions have worked mightily upon the whole of life and have implanted into it an energetic motive for the deepening of the self; wide circles of the human race have gained an energetic emotional life through such religions. As soon as religion relaxes, the inwardness turns into insecurity and succumbs to the power of the intrusive external world.

A union so intimate and so fervent with God would have repelled all relationship with the world, and would have made all work for the world so indifferent if the historical religions had not created by the side of the formation of such inwardness a visible sphere of life, and had not united men most intimately with each other. And how could these religions abstain from such a creation, since they were concerned fully to develop the fellowship of life manifested by them and to maintain such in the midst of a hostile world? Thus, there arose communities and churches governed by religion which presented themselves as the soul and kernel of the whole of life. In these religion gained a visible presence; here

the Divine seemed to flow intimately into the human. On account of this, such institutions became in the course of their development the main evidences for the power and truth of religion as well as a solid bulwark against doubt. Life was here brought into a secure path; here a pointed distinction between friend and foe was accomplished; here individuals united themselves in a co-operation not only of character but also of work. Man, in the inmost depth of his being, was here united with the fellowship, because nothing other than this fellowship could grant and guarantee a Divine revelation superior to all subjective reflection. Thus, a withdrawal from the fellowship appeared as a falling from truth.

True, difficult entanglements are imbedded in all this, and perhaps, also, contradictions; and these will shortly occupy our attention. But, without a doubt, a great fact and a mighty enrichment of human life are to be recognised in the historical religions. Through the concentration which they accomplish and represent, they have bestowed upon history incomparably greater intrinsic value, contrast, and movement what otherwise threatens to dissolve into sheer unintelligibleness; they have incarnated in flesh and blood; they have gained wide spheres of the human race for spiritual things; and they have raised, in the midst of our world, an over-world of the most mighty power. If, then, every unbiassed view is compelled to acknowledge here a great and, indeed, a unique phenomenon, it means that a decisive and final turn has resulted for men through their entrance into historical religion. Life can no more come to a deadlock, and doubt can no more harm where God, over against

the world, has revealed Himself to man and never ceases to reveal Himself.

2. *The Opposition to Religions*

History bears testimony to the mighty effect of religions, but none the less does it show an incessant counter-effect; in spite of their development of power, religions are always objects which are spoken against. Such an opposition formed an undercurrent wherever religion stood externally in an entirely secure sovereignty. The constant complaints as to the indifference and the unbelief of its adherents show this. Whenever the relaxation of the social pressure permitted a free articulation, doubt grew quickly into a dangerous power, and threatened religion in the whole of its existence. If Augustine was right in stating that religion, as an historico-social institution, cannot subsist without a strong authority (*sine quodam gravi autoritatis imperio*), he indicated, at the same time, how slightly religion roots itself in the inwardness of man. But it is not mere individuals or even mankind at large, who, from an insipid disposition, raise ever new doubts; there are also entanglements of an actual kind—hesitations and doubts within the Spiritual Life itself, and which work for a painful upheaval of the whole.

First of all, it is the plurality of historical religions which produces alienation and uncertainty. Religions themselves aimed at placing the facts on one side; indeed, they engendered a flame of passion against the facts. Through such an opposition to other modes of thought and religion—modes which appeared to the advocates of the "chosen" religion as

a web of human folly, and, indeed, as a deception of the devil—the greatest energy was awakened and the most frantic passions were not only tolerated but commended. Religions, in their struggle against one another, have fettered the soul of man to themselves; also, within the individual religions such a schism has heightened work and zeal, and when peace was brought about, it brought inevitably along with itself an enervation. Struggle is the life-element of historical religions, for it alone seems able to set the truth in full light, and to carry the energy to its greatest tension.

But the problems are not solved by the mere declaration of their solution by religion. Questions and doubts do not allow themselves to be banished out of the world by interdicts and threats. So long as man remains within an enclosed social sphere and brands all that exists outside that sphere as a monstrous folly, so long is he able unhesitatingly to consider his own religion as the only true one. Modern man, however, has outgrown such narrowness; he surveys the different provinces of culture and also of the various religions; an historical mode of observation compels him to estimate religions in their connections, to enter deeply into these connections, and to seek their validity. The more he does this, the more uncertain becomes the exclusive validity of his own religion. The sincerity of conviction and the passion of belief of the remaining religions are not less strong and genuine than those of our own religion; they, too, rest upon great personalities; they have their signs and wonders, and, what signifies more, they have their heroes and martyrs; and they

have moved individuals from the depth of their souls as well as surged through the history of the world with mighty power. What right have we to interpret these phenomena outside our own sphere as fancy and deception whilst our own phenomena are of the same nature, and these are considered by us as solid facts and as safe citadels of truth? Could the ideal world and the life-constructions of many millions and whole millenniums originate through bare illusion? What secures us, against all this, that it is not similar with us and that our belief, too, has not been revealed from on high but has issued from purely human ruminating? Or shall we value ourselves and others by different weights and measures as the fanaticism of all times has done but which has by no means been sanctioned by justice?

But perhaps religions will deal with a proof obtained through a comparison of their most important achievements, and thus seek to demonstrate the characteristic superiority of such achievements over all else. But does that demonstrate their truth, their absolute truth, their Divine truth? The achievements lead into the province of relativities; one achievement may largely overtop all the others, but it remains still an open question whether such an achievement is the final, the highest, and the all-inclusive. Further, the human and historical situation is not a product of religion alone, but varied movements run crossways through the situation, so that it is hardly possible to decide whether that which happened within the life-circle of religion happened from religion's own energy, or whether it has not proceeded, in a far greater measure, from the more

or less gifted nature of peoples, from the characteristic greatness of special personalities, from the favour of external circumstances, etc.

For example, is Christianity indebted to its most important origins and its religious contents alone? Is it not also indebted to its union with highly-gifted peoples, to its coalescence with the rich and beautiful culture of antiquity, and to modern culture for the revival and restoration of its youth?

The questions, however, which most religions set us, lead back to the fundamental problem, as to how far, in the main, an historical religion can manifest absolute truth; and, also, as to the doubt whether such a religion's concentration of life does not inevitably involve a contraction whose detriment counterbalances all gain, and which may transform all gain into a loss. The proof offered by a positive religion is in its nature an historical kind: certain events are exhibited; a certain spiritual content is announced as a revelation. Even if we admit that there is not the least doubt concerning the events, yet an historical existence can never prove of itself that a certain fact is of Divine origin and its content is an ultimate truth, for such a claim can be proved only through the ideas and convictions into which it is brought; and such a conclusion never comes to man from without, but is founded in his own inwardness by the whole of his life. In the historical data it is impossible to recognise the Divine as Divine without antecedent conceptions as to the nature of the Divine, and without the standard imbedded in such conceptions; for otherwise, religion and magic, faith and superstition, could not be separated from one another.

This train of thought leads necessarily to the point that all the argument of history must rest upon the immediate life itself, and that the intrinsic nature of the truth of all historical facts can be measured by the Spiritual Life alone. Here Lessing's well-known words meet us: "Accidental truths of history can never become the proof of the necessary truths of reason." Though this may carry in its form the past mark of the *Aufklärung*, its kernel contains a truth which it is not so easy to get over as was supposed by the historical positivism of the nineteenth century. True, history at the present day has come to mean incomparably more to us than it used to, and it may deem such a course of thought as antiquated, and for which it has no place; but he who is not to fall into a destructive relativism must conceive of history as being encompassed and borne along by an intimate and timeless Spiritual Life which relegates history with all its accumulation to a secondary place. But, also, historical religion is through this withdrawn to a secondary place, and it can by no means become the final basis of our religious conviction, and by no means can its greatest achievements in the realm of time prove its eternal truth. And if religion is to secure a basis at all, it must secure it in eternal truth.

Doubt, however, does not merely remain in the mode of the foundation, it also attacks the content of historical religion, and even combats that wherein it seeks its strength—the distinctive, the unique, the super-rational; and, further, the definite union of the Divine and the human—the kernel of all religion—turns into doubt, and fashions itself into an inner prejudice towards the Divine. The historical religions

cannot claim for themselves a definite relationship to the Godhead without having to leave out of account portions of human nature. And yet we hear occasionally to-day people speak of a "God of the Christian," and who seek therein a special strength of belief. Does not this lead to the path of a particularism which lies not very far from the belief of a primitive stage of culture in special national gods? And as to each historical religion every other religion seems false, so here, all religious mode of thought of a more universal kind will appear to such a particularism as unreal and worthless. At the height of Hellenism, in men such as Æschylus, Pindar, and Plato, particularism can recognise no genuine religion; and it will exclude the leaders of modern culture—men such as Leibniz and Kant, Schiller and Goethe. How close lies such a narrowness of belief to a pharisaic self-righteousness of small souls who have never laboured and grieved for the truth! But how is this danger to be avoided if the affirmation of historical religion is considered as the sole source of truth? And who can find fault with anyone who would rather side with the men in all of whom there was something great—for there is no greatness without independence—with the unbelievers, than be included in the army of believers?

Further, it is not easy to accept the statement, viz. that historical religion draws inevitably the Godhead into the arena of time and thus into variableness. Such could happen if the Godhead did not pervade the whole of time with eternal truth, but had opened, only at a special moment, its inmost essence, and had in this manner communicated that essence to human nature. To place a variableness in God means

nothing less than to surrender the absoluteness of truth; it means no less than to leave the field to a blind positiveness and a destructive relativism. Augustine, a man wont to think out any thought he had laid hold of, has in the main tendency of his conviction—in another direction he is more rational—maintained that prior to the advent of Christianity, not only were beliefs concerning morality different, but morality itself was something different from what it subsequently became; prior to Christianity things were allowed which were forbidden after its advent. This is consistent thinking from the standpoint of a merely positive religion. But it shows, at the same time, that such a mode of thinking even transforms morality into a fluctuating precept, and, at the same time, inwardly destroys it.

Also, the closer union of man with the Godhead and the clearer representation of this union which the historical religions have striven to present are of a double-sided kind, and produce a colossal complexity. Indeed, if in that intimacy the human arises too easily and perpetually to the Deity, not seldom has the Divine been drawn down into the narrowness and passions of the human situation! But in the very conception of God there are difficulties which are very perceptible. The idea of personality is to render comprehensible the incomprehensible, and to bring the representation of the Godhead nearer to a man; but how powerfully does an anthropomorphism pervade such an idea and render it extremely dangerous, as it so easily resolves itself into a mere replica of man's own nature! And does the religious relationship

which develops on this ground bring with itself, always and with certainty, a spiritual elevation—an inner transformation of man? How often do we experience immeasurable waves of subjective feeling! How often do an egotistic desire after success and a passionate excitation believe themselves justified and even consecrated by religion itself! Or, again, positive religion is, through its aspiration after a reality superior to all brooding reflection—after a tangible and incontestable reality—tempted to establish a sensuous and even a materialistic mode of pictorial ideas, and, indeed, to announce with special zeal what has been left behind by the movement of the Spiritual Life. Thus, definite religion is measured by the doctrine of the sacraments which easily degenerate into mere magical charm; thus, many even to-day believe that Christianity is threatened at its root if the belief in a reconciliation through the blood of Christ does not form the core of its nature. Wherever men insist primarily upon positiveness in religion, the danger of a relapse into an under-spiritual stage lies perilously near. Plotinus had good reason for giving the warning that man should not sink back below reason whilst striving to rise above it. The historical religions certainly represent a justifiable and even a necessary aspiration when they reconsolidate the tattered life through the inauguration of a new kingdom which is able to save the harassed soul. But in that which they offer there seems a higher and a lower, a right and a wrong interweaved, and they do succeed in finding the line of demarcation.

It fares similarly with the effect of religions upon

the life and actions of man; these bring him clearer aims and more energetic motives, but they also readily bring contractions and coarseness. Life, under the influence of positive religion, gains a strong consolidation; a province of truths is traced out and dismisses all doubt; men, through this, are brought into greater concord and are called to mutual assistance; the direct relation to the Godhead gives a powerful vigour to all demands and an increasing earnestness to life. But the consolidation turns readily into a rigid fixation, and the reflection turns into a narrow exclusiveness. How often have religions imagined something great in such elements as these, and how often have they rejected everything that lay beyond their own province as something inferior, indifferent, and even dangerous! This attitude does not limit itself to particular points, but enters into the whole. The direct relationship of man to man aims at placing in the foreground, as factors in the formation of life, the rendering of help and love in mutual intercourse and the well-being of the human province. But the relationship to the universe and to the inward expansion of one's own nature which science, art, and culture strive to set forth, is but little thought of. Thus, the governing life easily becomes subjective and merely human, and this soon turns the man to revolve around himself.

But, also, within man's own province, that which seems first of all a pure gain may readily turn into a loss. Historical religion binds men closer together on the Godward side; it creates more inward fellowship, more mutual understanding, more uniformity of the soul. But such can hardly happen otherwise

than at the cost of free movement and of individuality. Each religion has its own type of life, and forces this upon its adherents from youth upwards with mild or strong constraint. Does not the life through this become bound and mechanised? Does it not become to many individuals, who bring no inner movement against it, a mere clinging to the external, and does it not threaten to become a gross untruthfulness—a mere conventional participation in an imposed order? There is an hypocrisy which reaches beyond the conscious idea into the recesses of the soul, and which unites itself with the subjective notion of veracity; there is an hypocrisy of the nature to which nothing more easily enters than religion. This is the pharisaism which true religious natures have to fight against with the whole ardour of their conviction; and the sadness is that such hypocrisy is no transient appearance of certain times, but seems to connect itself indissolubly with religion.

Historical religion is the strongest mainstay of morality, but, at the same time, nowhere else do such dangers grow. Historical religion consolidates morality through a linkage of it to a Divine Will, and it strengthens the energy of morality through the awakening of an indestructible belief in the moral order of the universe. But, at the same time, the founding of morality upon an historical religion draws morality into great insecurity, and it clings to this insecurity; the moral motives are threatened with defacement, for the winning of Divine favour becomes now the main motive-power of action. Thus, a religious morality, through its orientation of thought towards a "beyond," readily injures a joyous labour and

creativeness in the "here and now"—since with its pictorial ideas of future expectations and confidence in these, it may support a passive conduct; it may repress a courageous entrance into reality and exchange it for a mere logical and judicious kind of reality; it disunites and estranges human nature; it produces unutterable bitterness, to which it binds all the qualities of the moral disposition as an aid to its own propaganda, and explains everything existing outside its own circle as unreal and worthless. Do all these questions allow themselves to be placed on one side as an outflow of mere "unbelief," or as a shallow mode of thinking?

All these problems, however, culminate in the turn of religion to the Church. The Church presented itself as indispensable to historical religion, for only through the incorporation of religion with the Church did religion gain a full actuality for man; only in connection with the Church did religion attain a distinct stamp of its characteristic features; only in connection with the Church did religion work for the whole of humanity, and not merely for specially selected minds. But, at the same time, the danger of humanising the Divine increases most powerfully through the conception of its entrance into the province of man. The Church is not able to exist without a human and temporal element; indeed, the more it develops to a full independence, the more will it bring forth the claims of the human and temporal elements and transfer them to the Divine and Eternal; it will then busy itself mechanically with the Divine, and probably consider quite worldly men as being religious and in communion with

the Divine. An inversion of the most deadly kind threatens the Church; it becomes liable, instead of labouring for the presence of the Divine, to clothe a certain kind of the human with a semblance of the Divine, and to confer upon this humanity the qualities of Divine truth and glory; indeed, the Church is able, when it carries such a procedure to its uttermost, to elevate the priesthood above the Divine, and to attribute to it alleged power beyond that of the Godhead. Then the Church occupies itself with a veneration of itself and not of the Divine, and this becomes a mere means to the heightening of its own glory. However, through such a turn, through such a wanton exaggeration of the human to the level of the Divine, the Church becomes the greatest danger to, as well as the greatest enemy of, religion; for, in fact, nothing has injured religion so much as the Church. But, at the same time, religion did not seem able to obtain for itself a secure foundation and its legitimate effect upon men without a development into a Church. How, then, can we disengage ourselves from the contradiction, and how can we find the line of demarcation between good and evil, between a genuine elevation of man through the Divine and through the lowering of the Divine to the human? If such a line of demarcation cannot be found, then a grave doubt is bound to arise in the whole of historical religions, and that doubt appears strongest in that religion which bears most clearly the marks of historicity, *i.e.* in Christianity. Does not historical religion appear as something which of necessity must destroy itself through its own development and excess, and thus reveals itself as an untenable contradiction?

3. *Impossibility of a simple Denial of Historical Religion*

What we have already discussed makes it conceivable that historical religions became a target for the hardest assaults, and, indeed, this did not happen only from the pettiness of a subjective mode of thought, but also from the numerous interests of the whole provinces of life. No struggle has kindled more passions and anger than this, and none so strongly has so pointedly divided men from one another. In earlier times, the attack was wont promptly to issue in a complete denial of religion; religion, to such times, was explained as a mere web of illusions or even as a product of conscious fraud. To-day, the hazardous character of such a sweeping condemnation is clearly perceived. In any case, the capacities, achievements, and sense of truth of mankind fall into entire mistrust if the most powerful energy of the historical development and the most secure anchorage of peoples and times were to sink into an empty illusion. There is not a more deplorable contradiction to be witnessed than, at one time, to praise in the highest terms the greatness of human reason, and, at the same time, to surrender as entire error all that is inmost and holiest in human nature. Only to an absolute pessimism can such a turn give no shock.

Therefore, one seeks to avoid this conclusion, and, in order to do this, devises a mid-path between truth and error. It is now declared that the historical religions were not merely pictorial illusions, but products of the momentary situations of peoples and epochs; such peoples and epochs have, in their re-

ligions, freed themselves from such situations, and raised themselves beyond them through the aims and ideals which were imbedded in their efforts. Thus, religions, in the form of union of ideals, have a certain kind of reality, and have undeniably contributed towards a progressive development of humanity. But all this has happened, it is said, only within the human circle and for human ideas; life itself won nothing which it had not previously carried within itself and from which it was able to develop. Thus, the great problem seems smoothly and simply settled: religion receives a right to be approved of, and, at the same time, shows that what are exhibited as differences and even as opposites are but an expression of the characteristics of peoples and times. The consequence will be that we shall have to do with purely relative truths which do not exclude one another but subsist friendly side by side.

But, in spite of such alleged superiority, this solution is no more than one of those multi-coloured compromises through whose presence the edge of the opposites is blunted and the energy of life is depreciated. The deeper conviction of religions has been all along to introduce man to something superhuman and to shield him from inner destruction. If such a superhuman did not at all originate, man intoxicated himself with his own creations, and climbed to the height of his own subjective notions; thus the whole of religion appeared to him as a self-deception of human nature, and although the representatives of religion were not considered to be conscious deceivers, yet they were considered to be "deceived deceivers." In fact, such a view alters the situation but little,

so that the same answer which withstood the old sweeping denial must meet the new one. Without a doubt, the historical religions have strongly affected the life of the spirit of man; they have carried it into original paths and have brought to it an inward elevation. They have, on the whole, done this less directly than indirectly through a transformation of the entire life. We need only trace back a little the threads of creativeness in art and in the mental constructions regarding the universe, in morality and the formation of communities, in order to recognise everywhere the connection of all this with the effects and sway of religion. Therefore, the alleged illusory character of religion extends itself over the whole of the Spiritual Life; and if we follow this path, it will lead us to the same conclusion as previously—to an entire bankruptcy of human capacity and to the extinction of any hope of help from truth. Out of the attempted obscuring of the problem the unmerciful *Either-Or* steps ever forward. *Either* man is nothing more than mere man—a ready-made kind of nature by the side of innumerable other similar natures; and then certainly religion falls to the ground, but at the same time there falls each and every truth—even scientific truth, for to truth belongs necessarily a validity beyond human opinion and vacillation, *Or* there is implanted in man more than an isolated, completed nature, and he is able to take up a struggle against the petty-human self; and then religion refuses from the very outset to be considered as a mere phantom, and it compels us to seek in it the element of truth.

If an unequivocal condemnation of the historical religions is thus prohibited, and if, at the same time, we

can neither recognise different truths existing side by side nor consider any one of the historical religions as absolute truth and all the others as entire error, one possibility remains open: there must result in all historical religions a common further inference of the Spiritual Life; a common fundamental fact must precede all the ramifications and strife. This fundamental fact has to be set forth with the utmost clearness, and from it alone we must undertake a critical valuation of the particular religions, and seek to differentiate the more-than-human from the mere-human. That much of the petty-human flows into religion and filters into a seeming inseparableness with the Divine is only too evident; indeed, it is this that constitutes the kernel of the problem and the main knot of the matter, that historical religions contain too much that is merely human to be valued as a pure work of God, and yet too much that is Spiritual and Divine to be considered as a mere product of man.

Thus, in connection with the historical religions, we come back to the same question with which we opened this section of our investigation—the question whether, within our life-province, some kind of a further development of Spiritual Reality culminates beyond the hitherto-explained situation, and whether the manifestation of a further cosmic depth results. The course of our investigation does not allow such a possibility to be rejected as a matter of course. For we have already seen a spirituality superior to the world dawning within our existence, but such a spirituality developed itself entirely through our work in the world, and remained united with the

advancement of this work. And on account of this we have witnessed the growth of inexpressible entanglements. Now, could not a spirituality superior to the world make its appearance in relation to man without the intervention of the world? If this were possible, we might expect a new kind of life, new spiritual contents and values, an entire turn of our position, and, through all this, some kind of conquest over hitherto all-powerful oppositions.

In the meantime, this is no more than a possibility; whether a reality corresponds to such a possibility, only further experiences can decide, and to these we now turn. But it is important to know that the investigation even at our present stage is not meaningless, and is in some degree able to show the drift of the path we have to pursue.

PART IV.—CHARACTERISTIC RELIGION
(CONTINUED)

CHAPTER XII

b. SIGNS OF A NEW DEPTH OF LIFE

WE cannot, according to the whole course of our investigation, offer or expect a further depth of reality from any external existence; we can search for such a depth nowhere else than in the Life-process itself; we have to work out this depth, and from this point to secure a connection with a new order of things. It is nowhere more necessary than at this point to avoid the mistake of a deep-rooted intellectualism which first of all constructs a world beyond man and from thence supplies his life with a content, instead of taking possession of such a world and grasping it into a Whole in order then to hazard convictions of the All.

However, the new sought-for depth of life will not probably appear in front of us immediately as a Whole, but, in the first place, it appears in particular manifestations. But these manifestations are able, however, to lead further if they reveal themselves on closer inspection as portions of a larger connection, and if, in such an investigation, further avenues open out until at last a *new world* dawns in front of us.

Therefore, we seek before all else to win some kind of tangible point of departure whose original nature announces a new order of things; we seek then to gain, through a gradual ascent, more and more comprehensive values and at last a total-life.

1. *The Idea of Love of Enemy*

As a point of departure, we are helped by the fact that upon a certain height of historical life, the thought and demand of love of enemy appear not only in Christianity but also in other religions, and, beyond all religions, the fact has appeared as a general atmosphere of life. Love of enemy seems here as the summit of ethical conduct and as the most certain sign of its completion. Whilst, however, love of enemy was ardently praised, and the infinite aim seemed to raise man beyond himself, the question usually remained unasked whether the exalted virtue was possible within the given situation of man, whether the effort for the virtue aspired after intertwining transformations in the whole of our life and being. This question may be lightly put aside if the two dispositions of the soul which we meet in love of enemy is taken up in a faint and slurring kind of way so that no earnest conflict originates. At the point, however, where the claims of love of enemy break forth, things relate themselves otherwise: here an entire turn—a transformation of the prior situation—is discovered. Enmity is no fleeting ill-humour, but an antagonism of the deepest character and of the whole mode of thinking; it is an encounter from an objective necessity, since our highly valued goods are seized, reviled, and injured by another.

And love, however, is not that faint-hearted disposition which begrudges to another his existence and which allows all blessings to fall on itself, but is an active and positive demeanour, a strong joy in the being of another, a furthering and a raising of its own life through the communion established with the other. If things are so, is there not an irreconcilable opposition between love and enmity, and is it not an absurdity to will at the same time to hate truly and to love truly?

Indeed, the question lies here so near—whether an enfeeblement and slackening of the strife is desirable for man. It behoves us, first of all, to bring forth and to carry forward a Spiritual Reality over against a hostile or indifferent world. In order to accomplish this, the greatest tension of energy and an untiring struggle are needful; as this struggle labours for the possession of the highest good, it demands the whole soul of man—the entire strength of his affections, the full glow of his feelings. Plato had good reason for desiring a "noble passion" for the success of the work of life. Now, does not the command to love our enemies threaten to weaken the earnestness of the matter, to handle good and evil as equally valid, and to concede willingly the right of the field of conflict to unreason? Thus, unmanly cowardly compliance and a sentimental weakness are elevated as highest virtues, or the character remains a mere semblance and under the mantle of love such a passion and hate grow luxuriantly, as witnessed so often in religious strife. A depression of the energy indispensable in the struggle against evil has, from the beginning, been made a matter of reproach against

Christianity. Thus, we find Plotinus with this reflection concerning the matter: "If we do not struggle, evil men will triumph." Should such weakening of man, so often witnessed in the history of Christianity, be the final word of Christianity? In any case, it was not the final word of Jesus when He delivered the mighty discourse against the Pharisees, and when He drove the money-changers out of the Temple.

But how does it stand, then, with love for enemy? Is it really no more than a deceitful semblance—a phantom of an overstrained disposition—and must we conclude in connection with it that a friend is a friend and an enemy is an enemy, and that we are indebted to justice for telling us the latter, and that we should preserve our love for friends alone? It was thought thus at the zenith of Hellenic thought, and so, too, Confucius taught consciously and emphatically. "Someone asked, what shall one think of him who repays injury with kindness? The philosopher replied: If one so acts, with what can kindness be repaid? One must repay hate and injury through justice, and kindness through kindness." That is a clear and honest mode of thinking which corresponds to the natural feelings of man. But it imposes limits on human life which the revolutionary experiences of the inmost soul have to burst asunder. Such a conclusion suffices only if, and upon the whole, a ready-made world surrounds us, if we develop ourselves in its railed-in province, and if there is nothing essential to be transformed or renewed. But such a conculsion becomes an intolerable narrowness when the prior situation contains difficult entanglements,

and when only a fundamental renewal can give a value to our life and action. If such a new order of things makes its appearance, everything which divides and estranges us is able to pass away; and out of a new foundation a new fellowship of life can be built which now binds the minds that otherwise strove against one another, so that we are raised above all strife, although many opposite points of view cannot be relinquished. That which otherwise is impossible now becomes possible through a fundamental renewal of life—through the appearance of a depth which relegates the whole prior life, with all its struggles, to a mere superficiality. If, herewith, the demands of love for enemy emerge from and rest upon genuine love and not upon mere pity, the hope of a new order of things lies close to this foundation, and a yearning of human nature for an emancipation from the bounds and barriers of the "given" world takes place. Does not then the joy itself build such a hope, and does not the strength of the yearning itself constitute a testimony that here the matter does not deal with a mere phantom but with a new life within the domain of man?

2. *The Deepening of Love*

The problem of love for enemy is only a section of a more general problem—of the problem whether the direction of our life, in the last resort, belongs to justice or to love. There was good reason for the old Greek thinkers for siding with justice—with justice in the broad sense of an arrangement of all relationships according to merit. Each receives what falls to his share, no less, but also no more; even love has thus to be

measured according to the degree of presented love, and all unmerit and all non-limits are excluded. Such an ideal calls for the utmost exertion, for the transposition of all capacity into efficient activity, and for the construction of an organised kingdom of reason. Such a system of justice had also place for mercy in so far as the hardness of a literal measurement was toned down, and in so far as the over-tension of right was held to become an injury (*summum jus summa injuria*). The idea of justice has, first and foremost, brought forth and developed a connected spiritual order, and it is and remains indispensable for the vindication of such an order.

How does it happen, then, that in spite of such a great achievement justice has not satisfied man? How is it that the movement of universal history has left that ideal of justice behind itself? The answer is: that such an ideal of justice has been left behind through the painful experience and feeling of the inadequacy of man as mere man, and through a knowledge of a deep disorder in his own nature. Such experience and knowledge, however, became an urgent need as soon as man did not continue within a "given" world, but raised himself beyond all earthly connections to infinity; and as soon as he measured himself not with his equals but with the ideal of an absolute perfection. The growing depth of life, with its discovery of infinity in man's own nature, demands him to measure himself in this manner. His life does not exhaust itself with the solution of this or that problem, and does not content itself with the attainment of some kind of elevation, but it drives him from within towards the domain of the Whole; he is now

after absolute perfection, and, before all else, after a perfection of a comprehensive life and conduct in the Whole. The presence of such a goal brings to clearness the entire inadequacy and even the hopelessness of his actual performances and situation. Along with this, the standard of justice becomes an intolerable hardness, and the valuation of the ordinary performances threatens the man with entire rejection and ruin. On account of this, man defends himself through energies which have in no way originated out of his egotistic desires of life, but rather he feels himself convinced of a greater depth and, along with this, of a priceless value; but he cannot call into life such depth and value from his own energy, and, therefore, he depends on redemption and love for the realisation of his own nature. Thus, there grows a burning desire after Infinite Love on the other side of all questions of merit, and after a new order of things beyond all calculation and measurement.

Is such a longing a superfluous fancy, and could it arise and gain such power if some kind of reality did not stand behind it? Also, the relationship of man to man would become cold and soulless if all unmerited and unmeasured love were removed from his soul. But how mysterious is such love! How could it ever have originated out of the selfishness and impurity of the ordinary impulses of man? Man has to be raised out of such a situation and set, from within, in other connections; an energy out of the Whole must become his—an energy which lifts him beyond the initial stage and, indeed, beyond his natural capacity, and which, issuing out of a new life, brings the seemingly impossible to fruition. This is

especially clear in connection with the great personalities whom human life has to thank for an inner elevation, and especially in connection with the heroes of religion. The external situation of life left them forsaken, and the circumstances of life carried them but little love, yet these men were too clear of vision to disguise the true position of things through mere phrases about the greatness and progressive development of mankind. Thus, they have often within human circles felt themselves so lonely, as the yearning and fervour with which they fled to the Godhead reveals. Mahomet did not belong to the deepest spirits, but even he brought that feeling to a tender expression. "In the glare of noonday and in the stillness of the night the Lord casts him not away, and the future will be better than the past. Did He not find him an orphan and has given him a place in His home? Did He not find him astray and has led him to the right road? Did He not find him so poor and has made him so rich?" But has such a loneliness of these leading spirits amongst men destroyed their love to man? Has not a mighty power of love kindled itself in the midst of all opposition—a fire that enveloped also drowsy souls and became the illuminating energy for the welfare of mankind? Thus, these men were able to see more in man than lies on the surface; they were able to penetrate through all meanness and failure to a depth of the nature which unites the seemingly severed and which invests the seemingly worthless with a value. But could such a depth be possible without a new order of things—without the presence of an All-Life in the human

soul? As these men were obliged to view humanity in the light of the new order of things in order to work as they did, it would have been difficult for them to find, without the energy of that All-Life and without an ascent beyond themselves, the stability, the joy, and the inexhaustibleness which their work aspired after and to which their success testified.

It has happened thus on the summits of historical life, but it did not remain confined to these summits. Our life would lose its deepest soul were it a mere system of effects and counter-effects; we should have to measure all actions according to what should issue in the form of a result which corresponds to the thought of justice. Our life, as Goethe has often expressed it in a wonderful manner, would soon slacken and stagnate unless it contained much activity which expected no gratitude and much love which claimed no reciprocal love. Such a love—selfless and strong at the same time—may show itself in unpretentious achievements and may raise the inner worth of life beyond all the exploits of universal history. In such daily occurrences—seemingly trivial—a mystery is imbedded and a marvel happens; what happens contradicts not only the order of nature but also the order of the natural life: in so far as what happens follows justice, it hangs in the air and cannot find a foundation until a new order of things—a kingdom of creative love—carries and animates it. To acknowledge such a superiority of love does not mean that justice is to be attacked and banished out of the world, for justice is ever needed in human relationships for the growth of reason over the whole

expanse of life, and for the consolidation of mental and moral things over against bare nature. But a mere acknowledgment of a kingdom of love does not establish its order in the whole of our inner world; for it is not only through hope but also through its own effective presence that love is able to strike its roots into our life and alter the whole mode of life, and, at the same time, further the acknowledgment of a new depth of reality.

3. *Self-Maintenance in the Midst of Hindrance and Suffering*

Our earlier consideration of this subject has shown us that in the acknowledgment of an independent spirituality, life presents itself not as a calm ascent but as a hard struggle. With the appearance of spirituality there appeared *something essentially new*, which has to forge its way over against an existing world; collisions are bound to take place, and hindrances and deadlocks are to be expected. But at first hope and conviction in all this endured and believed that the Spiritual Life, carried as it is by an Absolute Life, would emerge victoriously from the struggle, and that the hindrance, through the stimulated energy of such hope and conviction, would finally work towards an advancement. Now, we have witnessed the opposition gaining such strength and extension within our circle that the whole life is endangered, and the hope of a conquest within our domain breaks in pieces. Our effort everywhere clashes with stubborn barriers which it dare not conform to without becoming aimless and meaningless. What does the experience of mankind point

out here? It shows us that, amidst such painful hindrances and amidst an eclipse of hope of any success, the Spiritual Life can be maintained and has been maintained by individuals as well as by mankind at large. Our scientific investigations collide with insurmountable obstacles; we discover with pain our inability to wrestle with the dark mysteries of existence. In the wrestling for a genuine Art we find ourselves far too weak to give adequate form to what occurs in the deepest recesses of our soul, to what thirsts after an embodiment, and we fail to aid it towards its longed-for reality. Thus, we remain incomplete, and, indeed, remain tattered and torn in our existence—insufficient for, and locked-out from, ourselves. Must we not become convinced of the impossibility of an essential betterment of the human situation, when we view the effects of experience of millenniums, and do we not see the goal recede ever in front of us? And must not the individual, the more he stands upon an inner connection of his life, recognise life as a mere torso? It is easily conceivable that human nature, under such a hard and harsh Nay, should lose all the courage of life and should relinquish all activity. In reality human nature has *not* done this. True, certain views of the universe and of religion seek an entire negation, but this negation, even if it did not carry within itself a prior affirmation, soon again turns to affirmation. Buddhism has toned down the entire negation of its initial stages, and has transformed itself into some kind of affirmation. Was this due to a mere stubbornness of the natural impulse, to an ineradicable quality of the common greed of life? Hardly, for the affirmation itself has,

in the form of spiritual self-preservation, brought forth so much labour and sorrow upon humanity that it would recommend, rather than a satisfaction in the bare natural desire for happiness, a calm submersion and dissolution of its own existence. Further, the affirmation has brought forth far too much spiritual movement and newness of life to allow itself to be swept on one side as a mere illusion. Therefore, there must be present in such a need of the life of man something deeper; for man, through some kind of energy, will hold fast to his life and fill it with a confident hope and trust, although these cannot be justified by any nearest-at-hand view of things.

No great thinker has more truly experienced these problems and brought them more powerfully to expression than Augustine. Before his eyes the old world sank before a new one had yet emerged; he found himself haunted by the phantom of an entire void, and felt all the havoc and barriers of human existence with the most painful intensity. And yet he held fast to life and withstood the total destruction of his soul. But why? Because the hindrance itself brought him to the consciousness that something greater than it is imbedded in it; because all menace and intimidation made him absolutely certain of something in his nature which can never be lost. This something is something axiomatic—something, first of all, mysterious, but out of the mystery a powerful energy originates and gives birth to a new and higher need of life which, over against the energy of nature, may be termed *metaphysical*. Whence all this if life had exhausted itself with the hitherto-prevailing

situation, and was not able to bring forth a further depth for the strengthening and renewal of man? The experience of Augustine is not singular, but is an experience of mankind, an experience of all individuals to whom these problems come to signify their own destiny. It was not the most troubled times and experiences that allowed doubt to penetrate into the whole of life, but such a catastrophe has happened far more in times of idle super-abundant plenty and of an absence of great tasks. The former hard times have rather worked in the direction of strengthening and energising human nature. But how could they do this without the hope and even the certainty of a new order of things—an order in direct contradiction to all that life had hitherto brought to them?

4. *The Progressive Development of Inwardness*

According to our explanation, it was essentially necessary for the Spiritual Life to raise the inner life to an independence, to extend it to *a world* which does not merely stand by the side of other things, but which takes the things, in the whole of their existence, up to itself, and which reveals to things their own nature. The development of the Spiritual Life becomes through this a progressive inwardness of existence. But we have already observed how this inwardness in all its toil clashes with most painful oppositions, so that a danger is here evident, viz. that what we attain as inwardness may be looked upon as an enclosed circle by the side of the great world, and that it may finally resolve itself into bare subjectivity. But mankind has in no manner surrendered itself to such a disintegration; it has ever sought to

shape the inwardness anew; it has sought to lay such inwardness deeper in the nature and to give it a new foundation and a new content. And to it such effort seemed to be more than a mere aberration of judgment. At least, we often witness new movements issuing forth from the hindrances themselves. We get roughly thrown back by the objects around us upon ourselves, and we discover with pain stubborn obstacles. But what we witness and experience in all this becomes the point of departure of a new kind of life; the hindrance engenders not only a sentimental echo and a timid reflection, but it gets taken up into a wider, deeper, and more basal life; it serves towards a further development of the soul in regard to all the work of the world. Thus, an inwardness seems to constitute itself here, which rests purely within itself—an inwardness which transforms into a gain what was previously a sheer detriment for work.

The acknowledgment of such unalloyed inwardness must change in an essential manner the aspect of life: what seemed hitherto to be the whole of our world becomes now a mere segment of it and appears in comparison with the inwardness as something external; what hitherto appeared as the total range of our soul now acknowledges a depth beyond itself. Man will be the readier to acknowledge this depth because he sees through the prior hemmed-in life as inadequate, and because he feels his own previous mode of viewing things as a stubborn destiny from which he wants somehow to free himself. But how is such pure inwardness, which brings such great changes and awakens such great hopes, itself to

be explained? How can such inwardness be possible unless our life had won further connections than before, and through this had drawn a new content? All this can hardly happen without a further manifestation of the Whole of Reality.

5. *The Further Development of Morality*

The further inner development of life which occupies here our attention is nowhere more visible than in the problem of morality. Wherever we have had to deal with the problem in the course of our investigation, morality, in our view, had not separated itself from the whole of life and had not condensed itself into a province of its own. Morality has not merely a special task of its own, but it extends over all Spiritual Life, since all along it does not surround man as a natural inheritance but governs him through his own decision and appropriation. We must unconditionally cling to such a universality of morality; in particular the practical social domain—the domain of human intercourse—has no right to claim the moral disposition for itself alone, and to exclude from it, say, art and science. The antithesis extends over the whole of life, whether the action is governed by the necessities of the Spiritual Life itself, or by the interests of the individual; whether the disposition is that of the individual who follows after truth and is affected by no kind of motive such as pleasure, gain, and renown, or is that of the artist who reflects in his soul how to bring an unborn form to expression—a form as morally valuable as the practical conduct which stands in the service of humanity. Understood thus, morality develops itself

all the happier the less it becomes an isolated province separated from all other tasks.

But morality experiences oppositions and entanglements similar to those found in religion. That full devotion to the Spiritual Life is not entirely wanting in morality, yet it acquires but little strength, and the entanglements often cripple spiritual work as well as the character; and, also, the most brilliant results of work do not guarantee a corresponding disposition, for natural impulses penetrate deeply into the very province which intended to lead man beyond nature, and the petty-human holds the soul in its powerful grip. Thus, in the ordinary surface-life, morality has but little power, and it is considered as a quite subsidiary matter. Indeed, it is often considered an irksome and obtrusive disorder—an attempt at an unwarranted limitation. But human nature as a whole has not rested on such a denial; it has ever returned to an appreciation of morality, and well it might, because in its abandonment of morality it had followed a track which led to an unbearable loss in depth and energy of life. In such upheavals of life, morality has carried itself above the initial formation of things, and has even attained a special province over against the former life. Morality, through the cultivation of pure inwardness over against the work of the world, gains a new task—the task of preserving unconditionally such inwardness and, along with it, the kernel of the life of the soul, and heroically and faithfully to preserve, a "soul of the soul" over against immense opposition. Life, through this, seems for the first time to reach its deepest root, and what occurs here is immeasur-

ably superior to all other work. Christianity especially upheld such a conviction; we find this in such appropriate words as that "the gain of the whole world can not counterbalance the loss of the soul, and that with the price of the whole world not one soul can be purchased" (Luther). So that in the case of collision with other aims there cannot be the slightest doubt that the autonomous moral task precedes unconditionally all other tasks; "the eye is to be plucked out and the hand is to be cut off" if they endanger the salvation of the soul. Hand in hand with such a high estimation goes a greater rigour of the demands of life. The preservation of that depth of the nature applies not to practice alone, but it grips the whole province of the Spiritual Life and there starts a struggle with "the life at ease." Thus, that which had a right in the particular situation must now rest in the Whole, and it is on account of this that a counter-effect is bound to arise. It is in this connection that conceptions such as responsibility, guilt, conscience, arise—conceptions of a most mysterious character—but in spite of all their darkness they are powers which defy disparagement and rejection and ever resurrect themselves; they are powers, once they dawn with their full energy, which bring the whole of life under their sway; they obviously withstand being driven out of the world of man because the maintenance of a spiritual self-reliance and the possibility of a spiritual self-preservation are indissolubly linked with them. It is easily possible to show that human life, despite its most brilliant achievements—as, for instance, in the period of the Renaissance—rapidly fell into inner

decay. Thus, that mysterious, uncomfortable, stirring force, is ever indispensable; indeed, life seems to obtain through it alone an enduring consolidation, and, indeed, an incomparable worth. How does all this explain itself save that more must be present in the whole of our life, and that further energies must rule in us if morality is to attain the content and the position claimed for it here.

When we view the several points which have hitherto occupied our attention, we discover in all the multiplicity one fact running through all—a further movement of life beyond the point of hindrance. And this fact is a pure inwardness from whose growth a further consolidation and a turn of life were expected. But, in the meantime, this inwardness floats entirely in the air, and we have not yet seen how it can gain a characteristic content, and how it can grow into a self-reliant kingdom. And yet there lies here far too much actuality for us to consider the whole as a mere play of fancy. What appears as not easily comprehensible in the life of the individual is found in the history of mankind as a great characteristic trait. Here the new mode of life appears especially in the raising of life beyond all mere culture. At all times there is present in life more than civilisation and culture, but in special epochs this More comes into bold relief and to full self-consciousness. There are times when special circumstances bring civilisation and culture to a standstill and even to a retrogression, and yet, in spite of this, such circumstances do not invest the times with mental and moral emptiness but develop a noble and worthy life in another direction.

The epoch of the dissolution of antiquity was,

measured by its achievements in culture, highly barren and, indeed, unedifying; but it was this epoch which brought for the first time the life of the soul to a full self-reliance within the human province, and which penetrated beyond all purely subjective inwardness to an inner world—to one of the greatest turnings in the whole history of human life. Thus, we are ever able to draw much from such men as Plotinus and Augustine, and they are valued by us as heroes of the spirit although they damaged more than they aided culture. The fact that they made accessible to man a new world of pure inwardness signifies more than the most brilliant performances in the mere work of culture.

Hitherto we have had more questions than answers, more puzzles than solutions, so that a conclusion at this stage of our inquiry is impossible. But within the province of the inner life *an earnest effort is itself a fact*, and it must, especially when an essential renewal stands in question, be present in that which hovers as a far-away gleam but which also was the possession of the soul from the very start of its enterprise. If it were not present, how could such a far-away aim move us? Pascal's words are valid not only for religion: "Thou wouldest not seek me had it not been that thou hadst already found me." But it behoves us to work out the hidden possession in order to press on from mere ideas and suggestions to a full and joyous life.

PART IV.—CHARACTERISTIC RELIGION
(CONTINUED)

CHAPTER XIII

c. THE UNFOLDING OF A RELIGION OF A DISTINCTIVE KIND

1. *Introductory*

VARIOUS indications of a new depth have already become visible; they all point to the fact that a further inner life, lying far beneath the surface, reveals itself, and that a reality previously hindered by the entanglements has now been gained. Such a movement could never originate from mere man, but must have originated from the All; it can only originate, according to the whole course of our investigation, because the All-Life is present not only in its unfolding to become a world, but also within us as a Whole in the form of immediacy. That this actually happens is the vindication of religion as it shapes itself into the *Characteristic* mode; but such a religion allows itself to be proved only by the discovery of a new life—only by an original connection of life in which an actuality manifests itself, and reveals to us our own being as well as the whole of reality.

This *New* cannot be of a sudden and unprepared

kind, but must somehow be imbedded in us, or how otherwise could it become our inmost being? But on the first view of it, it appears as something scattered, subsidiary, a mere addendum. But religion accomplishes a transformation of this; it gathers, binds, and brings the scattered elements into a Whole; it turns this Whole into man's own act; it places for the first time the significance of the *New* in a clear light and recognises in it the presence of a *new kind of world.*

Thus, religion is not able to obtain the final depth and the inmost unity for the life without differentiating itself from the remaining spiritual life, and constructing for itself a province of its own. Through such a turn to the *Characteristic* mode religion comes into definite contact with the contention of the historical religions, and gains a nearer relationship to these than was possible through the *Universal* mode of religion. Along with the historical religions, religion of a *Characteristic* kind participates in the conviction that man, through a further manifestation of the Divine, has been raised beyond the province of entanglements into a new life; and, further, Characteristic Religion recognises a gradation of reality through the further development of the Spiritual Life within one's own province; it invests, at the same time, the inner experiences as well as the historical movement with more significance. But in spite of such a nearness between these two modes of religion there remains an essential difference. The new life, according to the Characteristic mode, appears, in so far as we understand it, not as the exclusive possession of a particular historical religion, but as the common aim and the common fundamental energy of all religion. These

historical religions are considered by us not as irreconcilable opponents, but as co-workers in the great enterprise of the spiritual redemption of humanity. This does not mean the placing of all religions on the same level and effacing their differences; indeed, the measuring of them all by one common aim may bring out such differences still more. But the differences now lie within something deeper and common to them all—they lie within a common striving, and thus cannot lead to a stubborn enmity. That which any one particular religion develops at all times into a spiritual content does not signify a subtraction from the truth of all other religions, but is seen, when it is brought to the light of the *substance* common to all religions, as that which is able to protect and strengthen reciprocally all the others. In dealing with the several religions, the attention must direct itself especially upon what each religion contributes towards the formation of a religion of the *Characteristic* kind; we have to see how *the one truth* works in spite of the inadequacy of, and often in opposition to, the scaffolding of doctrines and organisations. Thus there has to be raised up in all religions what in reality is *religious* in them —what is *substance* and not a merely intellectual expression.

On account of this, religion as well as its treatment are able thus to gain a broader basis only through the energetic concentration upon the inner life. The truth of religion rests upon facts, or, rather, upon a connected actuality of an inward kind. These facts are to be discovered nowhere outside the human soul, and, indeed, the facts are beyond all particular achievements

and formations of life which have hitherto occupied our attention. In a far greater degree than we as yet have observed does man become the starting-point of a new world. Through this turn the motives of mere subjectivism and humanism will strengthen —motives which are only too liable to make their presence felt in Characteristic Religion from the outset, and which were able to be guarded against more easily in the Universal mode. Further, he who recognises in the total-development of the Spiritual Life an inner unity and an invisible depth may oppose the turn to Characteristic Religion because it seems to be a relapse into a mere humanism which places itself over against the meaning of the remaining world, and which seems to exchange the driving energy of movements outside the individual for a foundation of life upon mere self-preservation. Does the alleged new kind of world construct no more than a mere web of human ideas and interests, and does it not merely spin around itself at a loss of all connection with definite reality? Is not the vigorous and assertive freedom of Universal Religion from mere humanisation lost again through the turn to Characteristic Religion? Doubtless, much subjectivism and much that is merely human are imbedded in the historical religions, and threaten also the Characteristic Religion. Yet, however luxuriously such a subjectivism may grow on the soil of ordinary life, it does not exhaust the matter—indeed, it does not touch the kernel of the matter. In the turn to a Characteristic kind of religion, as in religion in general, the moving-energy is not the self-preservation of man as mere man, but the maintenance of a Spiritual Life superior to his

interests and notions—the impossibility of a renunciation of spiritual contents and values. Thus, there works here a metaphysical and not a physical impetus of life. And what is hoped for as *new* is not a fostering and furthering of the mere-human—not a purely epicurean well-being of a more refined nature—but a new stage of spirituality which creates something other than hitherto out of man, which reduces the value of what had hitherto sufficed as happiness, and which leads to a goodness which was hitherto alien to his life. The historical religions show this quite clearly. They are not mere mirror-images of human doings and dealings, but through them man has scaled spiritual heights; he has learned to see and to understand himself; he has gained courage and energy in the struggle against a petty-human mode of conduct and a petty-human world. It has happened thus, too, within the intellectual province. Nothing has more clearly set forth the limitation of the range of human conceptions than the idea of an Absolute Reality and Life. The demands imbedded within the intellectual province have reduced in value, from their very foundation, the forms of space and time, and have relegated them to a particular—not equally valid—mode of existence. And not less have religions taught us to think of the moral capacities of man, for, in the standards which they have brought forth, the most splendid human achievements fell far short of the needs of the human soul. It is impossible to state that religions, through their representations to man of the problems of life, have made existence lighter and more agreeable, or that they have flattered his natural impulse for happiness. Although there has been much taught in

religions concerning the next world—far too much which belonged to the merely pictorial ideas of man—yet there has worked herein a demand for an entire transformation of life—a demand which gave an immeasurable earnestness to the actions of man.

This detaching of a spiritual world—a world of independent inwardness—from human doings and dealings operates in all religions, and is able to express itself in so far as religion is conceived by the entire consciousness to be a fact of the Spiritual Life and not of mere man, and in so far as the Spiritual Life itself is conceived as an encompassing and an overcoming of the antithesis between subject and object, and as a development and not a mere copy of reality. On such a ground as this, the movement to Characteristic Religion is secure against the danger of solipsism; and so far as a further development of the Spiritual Life virtually appears, a new kind of an entirely active reality is gained. Everything depends then upon whether such a turn of life happens; the turn can happen, as life shows, through its own development and through the construction of a new reality.

Nevertheless, the danger of a humanising of religion is considerably increased at this new stage. And further, the more life is pushed back into an invisible region, the less are we able to bring the spiritual content to an adjusted expression; and if man fails here, he becomes satisfied with mere symbols which incessantly have to be referred back to their basal truth in order not to relapse into purely illusory images. In order to be armed against such a danger, it is necessary never to allow Characteristic Religion to fall outside the *whole* of religion, but to consider it

constantly as one side of that whole. The Universal mode of religion must remain at hand if the Characteristic mode is fully to preserve its spiritual character, and is to be protected also from dangers of all kinds. Thus, we come to the relation between these two modes of religion. How precisely this relationship is to be conceived, and what rights it has, are matters for further investigation, for misunderstanding is only too apt to enter here—misunderstanding which our prior consideration has not sufficiently dealt with.

Certainly, there are not two religions but simply one religion, but this one could well have different stages, and such might be indispensable to an entire vivification of the whole. Indeed, if we take our stand decisively upon a religion of the Spiritual Life in opposition to a religion of the mere-human kind, the more necessary it is to relate our religion to the whole of the Spiritual Life, or, rather, to bind this Spiritual Life into a Whole, and to acknowledge it in its independence. But now we discover the hindrances upon which the development of the Spiritual Life clashed. These hindrances made us seek for a new stage of life and, through this, religion receives a definite meaning, and must now approve itself through definite achievements as a Characteristic Religion. All this connects itself again with the Universal mode, and obtains a secure footing against all embarrassments. Upon the ground of history there has never been presented a Universal religion of a self-reliant kind, but a Universal religious mode of thought has rapidly fallen into decay as soon as it gave up all connection with the Characteristic

mode of religion. But, at the same time, the Universal mode maintains an independent importance in so far as in it the elevation of man to spirituality attains to great energy and clearness, an elevation which also underlies the Characteristic mode. The Universal mode has to bring movements and experiences into a current out of which the turn to the Characteristic mode takes place; for without the undertaking of a struggle against the whole of the world, the longing after a new order of things acquires no personal truth. How unsympathetic, for instance, is the officious confession of the inability of human reason presented by people who have never undertaken any struggle in order to possess genuine knowledge, and who are unaware of the pain and renunciation involved in such a struggle. How unsympathetic are those who depict the nature of man as totally depraved, and declare him as corrupt from the beginning because he is by no means equal to his spiritual tasks, and, indeed, has often stood in direct opposition to such tasks.

But the Characteristic mode requires an incessant relation to Universal Religion also as a counter-weight against a threatening narrowness. Through every turn into the particular, Characteristic Religion must maintain an influence upon the whole of life, and the total-task must remain present in each particular point, and must be furthered by it. Otherwise Characteristic Religion becomes in itself a mere refuge from the exigencies of existence, and for the remainder of life it becomes a numb and gloomy narrowness. Indeed, such apartness may endanger the spiritual character of religion, since by it religion may lose

evermore all definite content, and may sink finally to a mere agitation of empty emotion.

Our affirmation of the growth of Characteristic Religion from the Universal pretends in no way to be an account of the historical course of religion with peoples and individuals. In connection with such a development, positive religion aims at constructing the starting-point, and it is only later that a general mode of thinking develops itself and exercises a criticism on the traditional material—a criticism which appears first of all as mainly negative but which finally leads back to a positive valuation of things Then only we reach the ground of philosophic discussion, and now the double-sidedness of religion becomes recognisable within its one totality.

Understood thus, both modes must remain permanently side by side, and refer reciprocally to one another. Through this, the whole of religion gains an incessant movement, and this movement is of great advantage as a weapon of defence against the finality of dogmatism. At the same time, however, such a movement gives free room for the characteristics of individuals and times. In the whole of religion, indeed, the Universal and the Characteristic modes work together, but their relationship can shape itself in varied ways, and here the one, and there the other, stands in the foreground; thus, either the greatness and energy of the Spiritual Life absorb the conviction, or, first and foremost, the hindrances are felt, and a further manifestation of the Divine is desired as the only possible means of salvation. The leading religious personalities present us with very different combinations. How great, for instance, is the distance

between Luther and Zwingli in spite of all the affinity of their ideas! Probably none of these personalities developed both sides of religion more energetically than Augustine, and even he was able to adjust both sides only in an imperfect degree.

Thus, a view opens out upon much movement and a rich manifold, and also upon oppositions and struggles; but nowhere more than in religion does the struggle itself demonstrate, through its stirring of all the energies, the power of the Whole and the necessity of striving.

We have now attempted to find a secure place for Characteristic Religion, and our next object is to reach nearer to its content.

2. *The New Life-Process*

(*a*) *The Main Thesis.*—The assertion of Characteristic religion consists in the fact that a pure self-subsistence of the Spiritual Life within the human soul, as a communication of an Absolute Inner Life, includes a claim which man acknowledges as his true nature and shapes his life accordingly, and includes the hope that he gains an entire superiority to all conflicts and hindrances. As a self-subsistence of the Spiritual Life, the inwardness here in question cannot signify a special province by the side of reality: it must signify the most essential nature—the inmost depth—of reality. And, at the same time, this inwardness may not be mere subjectivity, but has to unlock a new content; and in such an achievement it can in no way be the work of any individual point of the nature, but must originate from the whole of the Spiritual Life. This precisely is the

conviction of Characteristic religion that such an inwardness becomes a pure self-existence not merely through its development by means of the world but also in opposition to the world, and that it brings help to man in his troubles—troubles which otherwise threaten to make him succumb under his burden; through the creation not merely of individual processes of life but of a new unity of life in man, life is freed from its imposed deadlock and is brought again into a fresh current. How all this happens with man is now to be considered more closely.

The point of departure is to be found in the fact that the problem originates beyond all particular achievements of man, and also beyond the whole explanation of achievements; it is a problem concerning what man is in the whole of his soul—in the whole of his character. In all this, Life appears solely concerned with itself—with its own situation—and in no way appears to reach beyond itself, and yet in what life does or leaves undone in such a seclusion seems to lie the decision concerning its work, concerning its success or failure. Expressions to represent such a fact do not fail us here altogether: we speak of moral character, moral personality, etc., but we do so in danger of narrowing and coarsening what stands here in question from the very outset. What happens here is mysterious enough. Life forges its way here, beyond the work of the world, to a persistency and duration in itself, to a new kind of being, but in all this it is at the outset split up into so many isolated appearances, and it falls easily into mere subjectivity. But some kind of unity seems present in the foundation, but it is not

able to overcome the hindrance, and succeeds in bringing forth no more than poor results. The whole is as though nebulous or veiled, and how it is possible from such vague motives to gain a foothold over against the entire world-order or even to set up a new world over against the old is absolutely incomprehensible. And here Characteristic religion steps in with its fundamental assertion that a "becoming" independence of pure inwardness and the unfolding of a new unity of life result, but this is shown to happen not through the energy of these qualities themselves but through the communication of the inmost nature of things—from the pure self-subsistence of reality. Certainly that communication is no mechanical instillation, but must awaken the energy of the soul itself; but such an energy does not appear as a natural possession but as a gift and grace. What is always fundamental in religion seems in this special position to be certainly so: that the vivification of the Whole at this particular position is not able to succeed without man's own decision and appropriation, and this in its turn includes in itself an act of the Whole.

That a new life of pure inwardness is not found in advance and does not rest upon particular effects, but still that man himself brings it forth and, in the inmost of his life, makes it the bearer and the cause of all, and that through this he gains a new kind of reality—all this is conceived by Characteristic religion as a fact and a wonder for the defence of which it is ready to take up with confidence a struggle against the whole of the remaining world. For this new centre alone is able to invest the

remaining fluctuating life with a stability, for nowhere is life more entirely itself than at this centre, and nothing is able to destroy what appears to it here as a certainty. But this holds valid only in so far as the movement belongs to the Spiritual Life itself, and does not fall from this into subjectivity; and the main business of religion is to see its being the former. When man is convinced of all this, the cosmic character of the Spiritual Life reaches a new stage, so that the new unity of life has to be viewed as the achievement of the one essential development which decides the decisive character of the Spiritual Life.

Such a turn invests religion with a sovereignty over the whole of life. Henceforth man gains out of the relationship to God not only some kind of ascent of his life, but he gains also a self-reliant life and nature over against the world and in the midst of the most serious upheavals and a threatening destruction. In this new life the self-subsistence of infinity becomes his own, and opens out to him the final depth of reality. Thus the relationship to the Absolute Life as the exclusive ground of spiritual self-preservation must far precede all remaining tasks, and these tasks may not withhold man, for the relationship now demands recognition unconditionally and exclusively as self-sufficient. And thus we find on the summits of religion the claim raised that all things are to be loved not for their own sake, but for the sake of God from whose energy they proceed, and consequently they are always relegated to a secondary place through such a mediation; all things thus had value only in so far as they were founded in God and were filled with

His Life. All devotion to anything but God appeared as a robbing of God; all belief in one's own capacity to perform anything appeared as culpable pride (*superbia*). If thus God effects all in all and yet remains in Himself, no aim can lie outside Himself, and consequently the conviction develops that all happens for the glory of God (*propter majorem dei gloriam*). It was by no means a gloomy fanaticism that thought thus, as is often imagined by shallow opinion, for even a Kant in the expression of his moral mode of thinking did not think so. "They who place the aim of creation in the glory of God (setting it forth in no anthropomorphic way) have probably hit upon the best expression." It was in fact the anthropomorphic expression which made such a thought appear hard and crass; and such a thought becomes indispensable with the recognition of that pure subsistence-in-itself of reality and of the redemption of life solely through the communication of such a reality.

This demand, however, is not able to develop its entire potencies unless it perceives with scrupulous clearness the wide difference between, and even the entire opposition of, the ordinary human situation and the deeper task in hand, and unless the problem of life is immeasurably heightened. The new standard causes all which proceeds from natural impulse and from a satisfaction in one's own powers to appear as insufficient, and, indeed, all now appears as a contradiction in the light of the higher order of things. It is not only this or that particular act or tendency, but the whole clinging to natural existence—the existence of a mere creature—which stamps this

mode of thought as an insurrection against God and as an apostasy from God. Amongst thinkers on this subject Augustine appears prominent. Through him the elevation and emancipation of the ethical task resulted from this raising of the problem into the Whole, and a new being from the very foundation upwards was longed for, but none the less he also recognised great dangers that lie on this path. Herewith the demand heightens not only its content but also its urgency. For the contradiction extends not against something that is apart from us but against the nearest thinkable thing—against the Absolute Life that is the basis of our inmost being, and consequently against our own being itself. The contradiction runs against not only an impersonal law, but against the world-power immediately present as a whole. Thus evil appears as a personal outrage—a grieving wrong and a contempt of the highest good; it shapes itself into sin and guilt, and it weighs upon the soul of man with incomparably greater heaviness; it sets the soul in agitation and fills it with alarm. Religions have often expressed all this in too anthropomorphic a manner and have distorted it almost to morbidness, but despite the imperfection of the formulation the fundamental fact of an inner rift in life and of an imperative responsibility glimmer through it all clearly enough. This fact may slumber for a long time in the consciousness of the individual and of humanity; it may be placed out of sight by a mode of thinking shallow and devoid of much toil, but it breaks forth ever anew against the opinions and inclinations of men, and as soon as this happens it becomes quickly the ruling energy of the entire life.

It is evident that man's own energy is not able to save him from such a disunion. If a rescue is possible, Divine power and grace must do the work. That such power and grace really accomplish this, is the fundamental conviction of religion. Religion doubtless cannot appeal, in proof, to any completed work, for usually just those personalities who felt themselves entirely certain of a new life have felt with painful intensity an opposition to such a new life within their own nature. But the experience of the conflict was at the same time an elevation above the conflict, and in this elevation they grasped the immediate presence of a Higher Power. The new life was further strengthened within them through this convulsion; its origin in God had now become more clearly visible; suffering and guilt not only demonstrated their deepest root in our being but they led to the point where a lofty "becoming" —indeed a new "becoming"—through a Higher Power shone forth in the seeming collapse of man. In all the unreadiness and darkness of the human circle the firm belief and the certain confidence asserted that what was begun by such a Power can never get lost; so that it was a trust in God which gave man once more a belief in himself.

The effort to connect these movements and experiences of the soul, with all their clash and their dialectic, in the inmost nature—this resurrection of the nature out of its destruction, this progressive certainty of conviction in the midst of the most stubborn doubt—succeeds but imperfectly; the facts tend to become more obscure and, indeed, the more complicated becomes the apparatus of thought which

was called up for the elucidation of the facts. It is sufficient for religion that in man an independent point of departure, though in direct contradiction to the whole of his psychic life, has taken place and is maintained. Herewith there results not only a rearrangement but also an *inversion* of life, and it is this which becomes the fundamental fact which soon transforms itself into an immeasurable task. Fact and task together testify to the presence of a new order of things in the soul, and there originates, too, a new centre of life. But the man must not, as is often the case, mistake particular aspects and proceedings for the *whole* of life, and especially must he not extol agitated feelings which disappear as rapidly as they originate. Whenever religion is developed out of the Spiritual Life, a new stage of the Spiritual Life on the other side of the branching of psychic activities is required; the reflex of such a new stage may be observed in the immediate psychic life, but never allows itself to be founded on the psychic life. Severely, but not without justice, Kant termed "the will to feel such an immediate influence of the Divine a self-contradictory presumption." There grows easily a luxury in alleged religious feelings which falls entirely outside the realm of truth, and which contains a good deal which helps to reduce religion to the level of a merely subjective fancy.

Religion is best able to lay aside such a reproach when it brings with itself a new kind of being, and along with this a secure consolidation of the whole life. The spiritual concentration found in religion with its development of a pure self-subsistence of

the Spiritual Life and not of the mere subject—this gaining of a new stage of life—is lost to him who holds fast to the naïve, one might say, Ptolemaic mode of thought—a mode of thought which believes that certainty can proceed from the external alone, and which seeks to prove the inward by the outward. The historical development of humanity, and especially the inner movement of modern times, have resulted in an inversion of the old conviction in solid material existence, and have shown more and more that all reality is known only to our inner experience, and that there is no kind of stability possible for us unless there is a more stable unassailable point in our own life. If this is not true, then absolute Phenomenalism is right in resolving the inner and outer world into a mere stream of appearances. Now, the main concern and the main achievement of religion are to offer a foothold above the vacillation of things, and to lead life to its most original sources. This conviction is the most certain thing of all to the Standard of the Spiritual Life, and it is that alone which gives certainty to everything else. That much strife occurs concerning this does not alter the fact itself but our relationship to the fact. Such a central life is not perceptible right in front of us, but we have to climb through our own movements and experience to the point where it becomes accessible and convincing. And in connection with this fact there are various stages visible. To him who busies himself entirely with the external world and who does not reach some kind of unfolding of an inner life, the whole question of religion appears as useless, and consequently he will only possess an anthropomorphic

interpretation of the external world, and will endeavour to lay even that on one side. But he who recognises a complex of the inner life and yet sees in it only a succession of individual activities outweighing all else or a background of life, and takes his stand towards life from such a level, religion may be held valid as one province by the side of other provinces, but such a conception of religion will not attain an imperative energy and will not become the governing principle of his life. It is only to him who fastens the inward aspects into a Whole, and, along with this, measures the whole of his potencies by the whole of the demand, that a penetrating change of life will carry him to the point where the presence of an Infinite Life breaks forth and where the appropriation of such an Infinite Life for the first time affords an indestructible foundation which all the contradictions of the remaining world can only strengthen. Thus there lies in the relationship of religion to man a more than subjective—a more than personal—element. Religion can produce this element only by recognising it as something that enters into the life and not by conceiving of it as something in the distance alone. But if life relates itself in a fundamentally different manner to morality, art, and even science in so far as these unite into a Whole, is it not then characteristic of religion that it fastens the personal judgment into a Whole?

In any case, the questions of the acknowledgment of religion by the individual and of its truth within the Spiritual Life should not be confused with one another. The judgment concerning the latter question, which constitutes the main fact, depends

upon the fact whether Characteristic religion truly brings a further development of the life of the spirit, whether it leads to contents and values which lie far above all the subjective reflections and arbitrary actions of men. This question will be dealt with more fully, and its ramifications will be followed. But before we turn to it, we have to notice the idea of God which issues from Characteristic religion, and to determine its essential characteristic formation.

(β) *The Idea of God and the Relationship to God.*—Characteristic religion draws its idea of God from the Life-process; it cannot expect the idea to come from an external revelation as the older and more child-like mode of thought imagined; it cannot gain the idea from free speculative conceptions whose shadowy creations are not able to move or take a warm interest in anything. But in the Life-process itself such a penetrating culmination is not able to take place unless the idea of God discloses further characteristics for man. But there appears here the paradoxical character which belongs to religion everywhere, and more particularly to Characteristic religion. In the apprehension of mankind the intimacy which the idea of God gains through its further inclusion in life is the most prominent thing. The Highest Power has not only harboured human needs, but such a Power has had communication with man, is present within his soul, has become his own life and nature, as well as his self-subsistence over against the order of the world. Here love is raised up into an image of the Godhead—love as a self-communication and as essential elevation of the nature, and as an expression of inmost fellowship. Since the whole of the Divine Life is here most intimately

present, the relationship of Whole to Whole creates a new unity of life and, through the constant relationship, preserves and develops itself; there originates a mutual intercourse of the soul and God as between an I and a Thou; and the thought concerning the Godhead is not able to attain genuine power unless it endeavours to be a living and operative unity. Consequently, there culminates here a turn from the colourless conception of the Godhead to that of a living and personal God. The idea of a personality of God, whose inadequacy shows itself as soon as it severs itself from the Life-process of religion and appears in a doctrinal form, is, when found *within* the Life-process, entirely obvious and indispensable. Man can be clearly conscious of the symbolism of the idea, and yet, at the same time, grasp in it an incontestable intrinsic truth which he knows to be far above all mere anthropomorphism. For it is not a merely human greatness that has been transferred to the Divine, but it is a return to the source of a Divine Life and its mutual communication with man; all this is not an argument of man concerning God, because the Divine must be apprehended through the Divine within us. All attacks on the personal character of God root themselves finally in the fact that an energetic religious Life-process is wanting—a Life-process which considers the question not so much from without as from within. Whenever such a Life-process is found, there is simultaneously found, often in direct opposition to the conscious wording, an element of such a personal character of God.

But this intimacy is only one aspect of the idea of God; and the danger of falling into a mere-human

mode of conception is avoided if the further removal of God from immediate existence is simultaneously acknowledged. Characteristic religion brings forth a new content only in so far as it penetrates beyond the Divine effects in the universe to a self-subsistence, and recognises in this a new depth of reality superior to all other formative action. This can only happen through a loosening from the bonds of the world and an elevation above all the conceptions of the world; thus there appears here something simply not found in the world—an elevated summit, a mysterious sublimity. If this sublimity superior to the world acquires an abode in the soul, and, indeed, becomes the inmost and most intimate of our being, and enables us to participate in the self-subsistence of infinity, it implants within us a fathomless depth which pushes away the external nearest-at-hand existence, and it makes us a problem to ourselves—a problem which transforms the whole of life—whilst it learns to understand and to handle that which at the outset appeared to be its whole life as a mere phase and appearance. Thus it is the same religion which opens out from God to man and simultaneously opens itself out in man himself and becomes a great mystery to him. Therefore, in the idea of God the intimate and the ultimate must be present if religion is to reach its full development and to avoid the dangers which everywhere threaten it. Thus the Godhead appears, on the one side, at an infinite height and distance above man, so that man discovers his pettiness with great bitterness; and, on the other side, the Divine appears as most intimate and as the dearest possession, so that man is raised through this to immeasurable

greatness. The fact that both interlace in one Life-process, that they do not follow one another but work together, that the unity is present in the manifold and the ultimate present in the intimate, implants an inexhaustible movement within the life, and enables it ever to renew its youth; life is thus carried beyond all final formations and forbids all self-sufficient conclusions. The contrast of the finite and the infinite, of the unreal and the perfect, which was already developed by religion of a Universal kind, and which was recognised as the source of all sublimity, becomes for the first time an immediate personal experience of the whole man.

A closer relationship to the vicissitudes of life corresponds to the richer content of the idea of God. The fact that the new life discloses itself to man not as something at hand but as a counter-action to, and as the overcoming of, an unreason otherwise insuperable within its own domain, shows the idea of God in a quite different relationship to suffering and unreason than had hitherto been the case. The manifestation of the Divine in Universal religion also occurred within an incessant struggle with a resisting environment. But there the opposition seemed to lie mainly in the external situation, and a decisive ascent beyond it was confidently expected. But later the view of reality appeared still more gloomy, and our Spiritual Life shows itself involved in the entanglement to its very root, so that help was expected only through the communication of an entirely new life by means of an over-world Power. Now that Power has turned towards us and has had a care of our misery by raising us to itself. Can this happen

unless such a Power is itself affected by that suffering, and unless it enters into the very sphere of suffering? Is there a genuine help obtained where an inward participation—a conjoint experience—is wanting? The doctrine of a suffering God arose from such a train of thought—a God who took our misery upon Himself in order to free us entirely from it. This doctrine is an irrefragable testimony of a deep feeling, but, through its turn to a doctrinal form, it strikes a decisively wrong note. It is true that religion must insist on the intimacy—the closest intimacy—of the Divine presence precisely in suffering, but to place the very suffering in God Himself, and especially to press such a great mystery into formulated ideas, leads to anthropomorphic and even mythological ideas of an intolerable kind. Since such a train of thought does not set suffering in the final cause, it devises gradations in God; it develops the idea of a reconciliation and substitution, and it feels itself justified in striving to express the impotence of man and his entire dependence on love and grace. This is a fundamental subversion of and a direct injury to religion in so far as it does not carry the efficacy to its final root—to God Himself, and in so far as it will not allow that any success can be brought forth through man's efforts. Further, in the religious province a reciprocal action of the Divine and the human takes place; the intimate relationship to God suffers injury when redemption is expected through mediation; indeed, the notion that God does not help us through His own will and power, but requires first of all His own feeling of pity to be roused, is an outrage on God and a darkening of the foundation of religion

—of the intimate presence of infinite love and grace. Also, in spite of his guilt and in the midst of his guilt God must be near to man. Dare we for this reason ascribe guilt to God? All dogmatic formulation of such fundamental truths of religion becomes inevitably a rationalism and a treatment of the problem by means of human relationships and according to human standards. Such a rationalism would have injured religion far more than it has already done were not life itself raised beyond all the disputation of ideas through the inner abiding energy of the Divine. It is sufficient for the religious conviction to experience the nearness of God in human suffering and His help in the raising of life out of suffering into a new life beyond all the insufficiency of reason. Indeed, the more intuitively this necessary truth is grasped, the less does it combine into a dogmatic speculation, and the purer and more energetically is it able to work.

The facts are similar in connection with the relation of the Absolute Life to history as they are in connection with suffering. History also gains a far greater significance in the Life-process of Characteristic religion. For it is only through experiences, shocks, and transformations of the soul that the over-world life unlocks itself to us; such a life appears as a higher stage which postulates a higher still beyond itself, and gains its energy from such a source. In reality there originates a "history of the soul" only in connection with Characteristic religion, and a place in the literature of the world was first gained for such a history by the Confessions of Augustine. But because the movement presents

itself to man as a succession, and because grades of revelation contrast with each other, yet, to place an historical process or even an inward change in God is again to judge from human analogy, and to measure God by human standards. But this happens if we conceive love in God as having only begun at a certain point of time, if under an appeasement of an alleged wrath, or if that love reached its consummation only through the efficacy of certain conditions. It is a mistake to attempt to reach a greater intimacy of God through projecting forth human notions of His image.

Even in its simple final root religion, as a union of the new nature of man with God and as a participation of his being in an Absolute Life, places the whole of life under a new aspect, and causes an entire revolution of the being. Also, the union with the Divine brings an entire calm under the vicissitudes of life; nowhere else than in the relationship with God can this be gained. The Infinite Power and Love that has grounded a new spontaneous nature in man over against a dark and hostile world, will conserve such a new nature and its spiritual nucleus, and shelter it against all perils and assaults, so that life as the bearer of Life Eternal can never be wholly lost in the stream of time. Thus we obtain in this connection an essential portion of religion with its belief in immortality—the conviction of the indestructibility of that spiritual unity of life in man, which is the work of God. And it is from such a conception that the conviction of the eternity of the Divine Life proceeds—a conviction which gives man a trust in the preservation in some kind of way of the spiritual nucleus of his nature and not of his natural indivi-

duality; and upon which the certainty is grounded in him "that what can not pass away for God can not pass away for itself either. But God is Lord of the living and the dead" (Augustine). The train of thought of religion here is: that where the greater is certain there can be no doubt about the less. Religion holds as certain and conclusive that this new inner foundation is the greatest thing of all and the wonder of wonders, because it carries within itself the power and certainty of the overcoming of the old world and the creation of a new one; it is on account of this that religion longs for the conviction of the whole man, and brands the denial of this as pettiness and unbelief. The world may therefore remain to the external glance as it appeared before—a kingdom of opposition and darkness; its hindrances within and without may drive everything before themselves; they may contract and even seemingly destroy man and his spiritual potencies; all his acts may seem fruitless and lost, and his whole existence may seem to sink into nothingness and worthlessness. Yet through the entrance of the new life and a new world everything is transformed from within, and the clearness of the light appears all the more by the side of all the depth of the darkness. Indeed, in the midst of all the mysteries of existence, hope and conviction and certainty will consolidate our experience, so that ultimately evil itself must serve the development of the good. "This is the spiritual power which reigns and rules in the midst of enemies, and is powerful in the midst of all oppression. And this is nothing other than that strength is perfected in weakness, and that in all things I can gain life eternal, so that cross and

death are compelled to serve and to contribute towards my salvation" (Luther).

(γ) *The Verification of Religion through the Progressive Development of Life.*—Religion, as all things original and axiomatic, can establish its truth not through a reduction to general conceptions, but only through its development and effects. And in order to do this, its effects take place in the conditions and content of life and not merely in the reflection and frame of mind of the subject; it brings forth not merely isolated stimulations but a thoroughgoing further development. That such is the case in Characteristic religion, we shall seek to show; but we have to show first of all how the indications of a new depth—a matter which has previously occupied us—now grow clear and integrate themselves; secondly, how the movements of life, begun in Universal religion, are now carried further; and thirdly, how from such a further development new characteristic traits enter into the entire life.

(*aa*) *Elucidation and Integration of Life.*—A yearning aspiration after a self-reliant inwardness grows over against all the work of the world and all culture and in the midst of all the confusion of life. But such an inwardness needs a new fundamental relation of life—it needs an inner world superior to all subjective reflection. Religion, and religion alone, is able to grant this through the manifestation of an absolute self-subsistence, and it is here alone that the reality integrates itself into a Whole and works as a Whole towards each individual; here man is delivered from the psychic isolation into which he must otherwise fall, in proportion as the movement of culture

dissolves the sensuous connections of life and separates individuals ever farther from each other. Religion, in the experience of universal history, proved itself indispensable for the gaining of an inner connection of life, for the deepening life in itself, for overcoming all the alienation in one's own nature, for drawing to one's self and vivifying what hitherto had appeared as a mere environment. It has unlocked man to himself, and has revealed to him, through the presence of an absolute self-subsistence, a kingdom of pure inwardness, and it is in religion that man found first of all his own inwardness and an inward relationship to the world. This comes to expression in innumerable examples. How, for instance, did the religious movement, prior to and after the Christian era, turn the ideal world of classical culture into a thing of soul and inwardness! How definitely connected in the writings of Plotinus is the foundation of character with the turn to religion, and how much did Augustine enhance the soul's moods and the musical strains of the Latin tongue! Also, an intimate relationship to environing nature and an emotional mutual intercourse with it desire a development only through the conviction of an inner presence of an Absolute Life. German people pride themselves since Fichte on the possession of a *Gemüt*, as a faculty specially developed amongst them, and who else has given the expression such a characteristic sense except the mystics who created such a "turn" from the intimate relationship to the Eternal Being? The inwardness of the soul, which is the inheritance of our language, was gained and has unfolded itself in close connection with religion. And it is not only at its advent alone that the

inwardness needs religion; if there exists no cosmic inwardness and if we acquire no participation in it, the inner life visibly loses its root, its energy, and its truth. Thus we often find to-day an empty subjectivity usurping the rights of inwardness; men clutch eagerly at the letter and semblance of things whilst the reality is threatening to vanish entirely.

Hand in hand with the progressive autonomy of inwardness goes a dominant position of morality, and the one is inseparable from the other. True inwardness grows only where life connects itself into a Whole, and in order to do this, it needs the subject's own elevating deed. Such a deed is not ready-made; it has to be wrestled for and formed, and here is the point where an energetic, manly and healthy inwardness differentiates itself from the weak, effeminate and morbid disposition of romanticism. Contrariwise, there is no genuine morality which does not aim at a whole of the inwardness and does not strive for a new being. But religion alone ensures such a mode because it opens out a new life from cosmic connections, and makes the question of the redemption of the soul the kernel of all effort. True, morality has often attributed to itself an absolute value outside religion and often in opposition to religion: the Stoic mode of thought has proceeded through the centuries as a permanent type of this mind. But such a morality loosened from religion is deficient, as in connections, so also in a living content and a secure foundation; man here will easily overestimate his own capacity, isolate himself, and thus fall into hollowness. The single point is not able of itself to lead any

life from the Whole, if such a life is not communicated to it from the All. As soon as the moral problem has set itself upon the whole of life, and as soon as herewith not only the greatness but also the pettiness of man become evident, the union with religion becomes inevitable; it is in such a union alone that the moral life integrates itself into a Whole and is able to justify its claims to the leading position, which otherwise would appear as dictatorial and arbitrary; it is in this way alone that the pride and hardness of moralism can be held at bay—qualities which have invited many assaults on morality. True, an act —an encompassing act of the whole nature—has to carry our Spiritual Life, but this act is itself more than a subjective flight: it is the appropriation of a new life, and appears, in the midst of all its activity, as being carried and even engendered by the Spiritual Life.

Life persists in the midst of painful hindrances and ever finds new courage for its ascent. In all this we have already recognised a difficult problem—even a mystery. For a merely instinctive clinging to life would not discover the energy for a new development, and all subjective agitation would quickly grow weary in face of the hardness of the opposition. That positive impetus of life is able to obtain an illumination and a justification from religion—an illumination, because here a new life superior to the entanglements of human existence is really mediated; a justification, because this new life is freed from all that, in the self-preservation, was lower instinct or narrow selfishness. For it is not mere man but the preservation of the Divine Life which now governs

all the effort; and the struggle is not for a finite being but for the presence of an Infinite Life. We hear over and again religion reproached of lessening the energy of life and even of breaking the courage of life. But such a statement holds valid only for special times of degeneration of religion, or for an external view of the matter, to which the inner life remains a sealed book. Nothing in reality so much as religion has sustained man in painful tribulations from within and without, and filled him with a joyous courage of life. For man was now transplanted from the effect to the cause, from the periphery to the centre, and here Infinite Life with its perfection became his own life. No doubt, as we have long realised, the entire energy of affirmation deepened here upon the thoroughness of the negation. But how can men with any kind of alertness overlook the Yea which stands behind the Nay?

We saw the claims of love and a shaping of life from out of love persisting in the midst of all the hardness of human relations; but love itself found no secure "ground," and the movement towards it, restricted to itself, threatened to end in empty sentimentality or mere pompous talk; and often enough such talk has to hide a want of substance and truth. New contents of life are absolutely necessary in which man shall acquire a value and shall grow beyond his former self; if such is to happen over against the whole condition of the world, there is need for new beginnings, a new world, an infinite power and love, which communicate of their fulness to man, which free him from oppression, and which

make him capable of genuine love. In this connection the exercise of such a love is able to become a testimony of its Divine origin: "that we forgive our neighbour makes us certain that God has forgiven us" (Luther). Only that a real transformation of life has to take place herewith, and not simply a higher estimation of what has remained unchanged, else we sink back into the subjective and anthropomorphic which will prevent us, until we overcome them, from taking a single step forward in religion. The expression "Infinite Love" contains something pictorial and human which can easily lead into error. But the mere approximateness, indeed, the inadequacy of the expression does not matter so long as the fact is held fast energetically that, beyond all nature and culture, a new being is bestowed on man from the relationship and in the relationship to the Absolute Life—a being whose most adequate expression is that genuine love.

Such a founding of love in the Absolute Life will shield it from the effeminacy and lightness which it so easily assumes amongst human relations; it will sever humanity from the external appearances to which it tends to cling, and will unite it with the kernel of man's being and, at the same time, will avoid all the false idealisations which inevitably lead to grave disappointments. Thus, secure against defacement and certain of a new spiritual content, love will work as a powerful motive towards the shaping of human relationships from the foundation according to the valuation which is the due of man as a member of that new life. Love will undertake a manly struggle not only against

what oppresses and defaces it from the outside, but still more against what threatens to destroy it inwardly. Thus, love of enemy can now mean more than a mere demand or a mere phase, because the new life is able to found an inner fellowship which certainly does not simply abolish the opposition and struggle, indeed, it may not abolish them, but which, however, raises man beyond them and enables him to work against them.

Thus religion binds together into a Whole movements otherwise isolated; it gives a firm foothold to things otherwise insecure; it illumines the darkness which otherwise enwraps such movements. Now for the first time what previously appeared more *beside* us than *in* us becomes our own act—our own being; an inversion results and along with it an immense elevation of life, because we step out of the effect into the cause, and along with this, gain as our own an infinite life and creativeness of pure inwardness, and, indeed, find our true self in it. But all this comes about only in so far as religion in reality opens out a new content—a new stage of the Spiritual Life—not from a mere tendency of life based upon some indeterminate over-world and "beyond." It is essential to the religion of the Spiritual Life that it forges its way ever and ever into a content which raises man beyond his initial situation and not merely stirs him to bare movements within his unaltered condition. True, even the religion of the Spiritual Life cannot loosen itself from the human form of life, but it makes an immense difference whether it accepts such a form as valid without any more ado, or whether it deals with

such a form as a mere receptacle—an entirely insufficient receptacle—of a dawning Spiritual Life within us.

(*bb*) *The Further Development of the Movements of Life.* — We have seen religion, even in its Universal mode, initiating the most fertile movements of life. But these movements experience the most varied hindrances within the human domain; they threatened to come to an entire deadlock if the potency of religion does not strengthen itself, if it is not able, at least, to carry through that which aspires after a Whole. But how this becomes really possible through the manifestation of an absolute inner life will now be briefly explained.

An effort after Infinity belongs to the very root of religion, but the world of man withstood such an effort in a harsh and hard manner. Striving man finds himself not only hemmed in from without; but from within also he is tied by the particularity of his own nature, and its own psychic potency is doled out to it generally parsimoniously enough by destiny. How can he escape from such a barrier, and how can he make the whole of life his own real life? He is able to accomplish this only at a new level where the pure self-subsistence of reality communicates itself to him, and awakens within him a new life. In this life of pure inwardness, he grasps the whole of Infinity as his own possession, and his life is raised above all the hitherto-prevailing barriers. This is done first in an inwardness of the soul, but yet it does not arise out of a purely subjective imagination, but out of the energy of a new cosmic order—out of an All-life subsisting in itself. If, thus, our life anchors

itself in the inmost point of Infinity, it will be able to hold fast to such an Infinity in the midst of all hindrances.

The problem of freedom is closely connected with the problem of infinity. Life had to insist upon some kind of freedom, for without freedom, as already noticed, there is no originality, no personal life, and no genuine present moment. Religion, however, became the best advocate of freedom because it manifested an original life out of the Whole over against the concatenations of nature and destiny. But such a life of the whole of our existence does not forge its way right through the hindrances, but it falls right in its inner woof under the power of the concatenations; and, thus, without a new start, freedom must succumb to destiny. Life gains such a new start from the new stage of life which Characteristic religion inaugurates. For here new beginnings are gained over against one's own psychic potency; and in this domain of pure inwardness even that is not lost which does not succeed in transposing itself into visible work and achievement. This does not mean that a faint disposition, in the form of a merely subjective emotion, suffices—little enough is gained through that—but the presence of an Absolute Life establishes an activity springing from pure inwardness, and creates herewith a new province of life removed from the hindrances of the world. Through the consolidation of this province of life the domain of natural causality does not simply cease, but still exercises a power over the very soul of man. But it has lost its old monopoly; man is now able to withstand its exhausted binding and

hemming in; he is able to set his life in its inmost depth upon his own act and upon an original creativeness, and, along with this, to drive out the old strange elements, and thus to bridge the chasm which otherwise lies between himself and his own soul.

All Spiritual Life is here a struggle against the flux of time—an ascent to eternal and immortal truth. Because religion uplifts things into a Whole and a Principle, it executes an inversion of man's first view of things. But we have already seen how man's effort after truth fell under the power of time and change, and how this called forth the most difficult entanglements and a painful anxiety, so that ever anew the transient presents itself in the garb and with the claims of eternal truth. There is no secure overcoming of time and no consolidating of the eternal through the ordinary every-day existence, or even through the surface-aspect of spiritual things. This achievement is possible only through a new order which reduces our whole world to a particular kind or aspect of reality. In this new order life may gain a timeless character, and may transform itself in its inmost depth into a pure self-subsistence and into a persistence within its own essence. Characteristic religion inaugurates from the side of an absolute self-subsistence an emancipation from time; it brings calm and consolidation into life; hence it works beyond one's own circle for the maintenance and strengthening of the whole effort after timeless truth. Wherever religion acquired full energy and independence, it has scorned being driven away on the current of time or being curbed by the fluctuating situations of mankind; rather has it held up a standard against the

movements of time, and such movements had to justify themselves before such a standard; it has worked for the differentiation of the transient from the permanent, and of pretentious culture from spirituality. But if religion itself falls into the entanglement, it finds no help in the wavering products of time, but in an energetic consciousness of the eternal within its own being—in a revivification of its indestructible foundation; and it is this power alone, which supports religion in the midst of the movements of time, that can be considered by it as possessing value. Thus, religion has held up the idea of eternity present in human life; it has established an abode for life in itself in the midst of all the hurry of work, and has founded a secure rest in the midst of all movement; along with this it has given existence a depth, and has upheld a constancy of life against the vacillations of time.

The aspiration after greatness is, as we have already seen, no mere outflow of vain, overweening pride and self-mirroring. Man has to think greatly of himself and of his potency when he pursues his own task over against his apparent lostness in an endless world, and is to forge his way through enormous oppositions. Religion gave such an aspiration a solid ground and a secure support, and since it revealed the presence of an Absolute Life in man it calls him to pursue this life and to transform its entire infinity into his own possession. But man could not succeed in drawing his whole domain into this infinite life; the oppositions threaten to overpower him, and crippling doubt presses him down into littleness. In order to get beyond this, religion must establish a

new depth of life, and it accomplishes this through the turn to Absolute self-subsistence, and, further, through the ensuing union of human and Divine life. Man is here removed into the centre of reality; here he has to reach decisions concerning the Whole; here the success of the Whole is tied to his decision in so far as the vivification cannot occur at this particular spot without his own deed, and this deed has to carry farther the movement of the world. Thus the deed has gained a cosmic character and cannot possibly be deemed trivial. Rather does, as against the inner forming and building of reality proceeding here, all that the external view of things exhibits, all that the history of the world shows in sensuous results, in catastrophes and colossal effects, become merely secondary. Everything has now a true value only in so far as it furthers that development; and for the best minds the more or less equally valid environment is a coming and going, a rising and falling, a collecting and scattering, of human things. Thus, we have here also the inversion of life and of values which is characteristic of religion.

Characteristic religion, in all this, brings the stagnant life into a current. It does this not so much in that it breaks down the opposition, as in that it raises the life throughout above the domain of the opposition; it does it through the production of a new characteristic domain; but, as the longing for this ideal proceeded from out the Whole of life, so also will its satisfaction re-act upon the Whole and strengthen the Whole.

(*cc*) *Peculiar Effects of Characteristic Religion.*— Our previous exposition noticed the fact that

Characteristic religion not merely carries on, but also brings forth something *new*, and we have now to lay hold of some of the peculiar developments of this New. And here again there is nothing astonishing to be expected—nothing that was hitherto alien to us; but it is to be expected that phenomena which hitherto were dispersed, and through the dispersion remained without any effect within the Whole, now connect themselves together, and, along with this, gain a new significance and reveal a further development of the Whole. Religion thus appears as the power which teaches man, through a discovery of the connections and a transposition into the creative "grounds," to see the facts as a Whole and to grasp them as his own. Its action, viewed externally, may seem to emerge only on the horizon of life and to evade all precise description. Viewed inwardly, it accomplishes an inversion of life which pushes all that surrounds man with manifold abundance and limited form to a secondary place, and causes the ascent of a new kind of life, which appears over against the prior life as the fundamental depth, and which transforms the entire aspect of reality.

Religion generally comprehends reality as a development or expression of a total-life; but it makes a great difference whether such a total-life appears as effective in the concatenation of the Whole and as mediated through this to the individual parts, or whether it appears as immediately present in the part, and as directly related to the part. The former view predominates in Universal religion, and the latter predominates in Characteristic religion. The

development of the immediate presence of the Whole places the individual in possession of a new light, by teaching us to understand such light as an expression of infinity—as the point where an original and self-subsisting life bursts forth. Through this a mode of reflection arises which is the direct opposite of the exact scientific mode with its all-pervading connection and its deduction of each element from out of the series to which it belongs; the new mode cannot hope to eject or replace this scientific mode, but it is able to maintain over against it its independence and its own rights. For there results through this a more intuitive and æsthetic insight which cannot possibly be abandoned in our consideration of the whole meaning of the universe. The individual receives here an immense enhancement because the fact is grasped as an intimate verification of an inner life of the All—as an expression of Divine glory; man in his individuality gains along with this a self-subsistence, a self value, an inner infinity, and all this becomes an object of pure insight and of a disinterested devotedness. Here Art has its pre-eminent task and develops, through its solution, a new and more inward relationship to the world; "it does not raise nature and it does not make it more majestic than it really is, but it raises human nature to see its own glory and the glory of the world—it helps to see right through the confusion of the external" (Runeberg). Art will thus see and honour the Divine not merely in what is charming and harmonious, but also in what is mighty and awful. Would not such an inner vivification of nature—such an inner reflected light of the spiritual from out of nature—be an unreality,

and could it therewith unlock such an immeasurable fulness of individuality, if the reality had no self-subsistence and no inner depth? All art becomes a testimony to such a depth. But such an insight into the infinite—such an intimate apprehension of the infinite in the particular point—reaches beyond all art into the whole of life; for without this, life could never become a pure self-life and never attain to a full present.

Just as with that turn, reflection is raised above mere causality, so also is action raised above merely serviceable activity and above the whole mechanism of ordinary life. It is only through the gain of an inner infinity that action has no need to be ever on the look-out for new tasks beyond the position attained at the moment, but it can rest in itself, return from all movements to itself without falling into an idle inaction. Herewith there opens out a sphere of inner peace—the calm of a Sabbath rest in the midst of all the tumult and struggle of the ordinary surface-world. Such an experience is either an empty delusion and, if so, we are the entire slaves of a restless and senseless world-work, or there is such a thing as a self-subsistence of reality which becomes man's own possession.

The manifestation of such self-subsistence as is represented by religion works in another direction: it invests life with a greater simplicity and child-likeness than is possible through social relations. For where infinity is placed over against the individual, the individual's dependence upon infinity, his relationship to infinity, and his security therein are now perceived. And there can be no more suitable symbol to express

this than the life of a little child with the simplicity of its feelings, its full dependence on others, its unconditioned trust, its certain expectation of help as a matter of course. Life appears here as a return from a painful entanglement, and yet there results something more than a mere return—there results an inner renewal, the dawning of an otherwise locked-up depth. Religions first and foremost have brought forth such a spirit to development, and no one more than Jesus has done this. The reformers of education, too, were convinced that nowhere is man more himself and nearer to the source of life than during the tender age of childhood, and hence that from such a source a rejuvenation of the whole life can proceed. Such a conviction penetrates the life-work of Froebel; and Pestalozzi chose the dispositions that permeate child-life as the most secure point of departure for the cultivation of religion. We quote once more his words: "The amazement of the sage in viewing the depth of creation and his search in the abyss for the Creator are not the education of humanity for the production of this belief. In the abyss of creation the investigator loses himself, and in its waters he can only drift about aimlessly far away from the source of a fathomless sea." "Innocence and purity, an unalloyed human feeling of gratitude and love, are the source of faith. In the pure child-like disposition of mankind, the hope of eternal life wells up, and the pure faith of mankind in God is not experienced in its energy without such a hope."

These various traits are evidently developments of one single life. Such a life resists being

fastened to adjusted conceptions, and can reach some representation only through metaphors and parables. Yet notwithstanding this, it does not lose its power and reality, and in it alone is man able to gain a secure foothold and a pure self-subsistence without which his whole life must break in pieces. Thus, there culminates here something indispensable and urgent, but, at the same time, human life seems most unready—posited between different orders of the world, and moved within itself by sharp opposites. But the movement itself is the most valid testimony that the whole is no mere fancy, and religion will increase this assurance because it turns the matter entirely into an individual concern, and lets the world-problems be experienced directly by man. But religion must reflect with the greatest possible energy as to how to differentiate clearly between the new life-content and all the mere subjectivity which seems to accompany the new life as a shadow, but is utterly unable to produce it out of its own capacity.

(*dd*) *Retrospect.*—To derive the proof of religion from the experience of the Life-process is a doctrine in no way new. For from of old the raising up of a new life was the main achievement of religion and the most convincing proof of its truth. The new life won the soul and inclined it towards the imparted instruction and not *vice versa.* But, however, the more religion turned into Church organisations, the more have they developed their doctrines into an enclosed system, and the more have they considered an acknowledgment of this system as the main end, and have readily treated life as a secondary, and doctrine

as the primary, thing. It is difficult to avoid such a course amongst human conditions, but it contains so many dangers and engenders so many abuses that a counter-action is ever necessary and ever important—a counter-effect that will raise life out of any and every opportune manifestation to the level of a principle. Such a turning of religion into doctrinal conceptions brings it easily into a condition of inertness and cripples man's own activity, because religion is thus conceived as something ready-made which stands with unconditional authority in front of man; whereas if religion is referred to life, it appears far more as a progressive co-operative work, and set as a task from without. But life has to struggle gradually for its content, and work out such a content with increasing clearness; it must ever ascend, ever draw reality more and more into itself and grow along with it. And, further, the setting of religion in doctrinal ideas can result only in definite connection with the momentary situation of culture; thus there is found in religion a temporal and problematic element which easily treats itself as the main fact; and the violence which the main fact experiences through the advancement of culture turns easily into an assault upon religion, and causes it to appear far more insecure than it really is; religion steps thus into immense entanglements because it is not able to carry on the struggle from the point where it is truly strong.

Such and other abuses have for centuries pressed men to put life, which in reality has ever decided, first also in the consciousness and activity of mankind, and to work out its implications

with all possible clearness. The Reformation and Pietism acted thus; Pascal and Schleiermacher did the same; and the present day demands such an achievement with special insistence. But at the same time, history shows the great danger and entanglement connected with such an effort. The turn to life which shall energise the whole sinks easily into mere subjectivity, and this is certainly unable to give religion either a secure foundation or an original content, and consequently an evaporation and a dissolution of religion become unavoidable. It is, then, necessary to raise life beyond its usual vagueness, to discover within it inner connections, and indeed, the source of a reality; and, further, to loosen life from merely isolated aspects and to invest it with a self-reliance as well as with a cosmic character. We have already sought to show this through the turn to the Spiritual Life and its clear differentiation from the empirical psychic life with its "given" existence; and our whole investigation stands or falls with the acknowledgment of the Spiritual Life. We in modern times have long given up the attempt to found religion upon an investigation of the world, because the world itself has become far too much of a problem for us, and consequently we flee to man as our starting-point in the development of life. But man in his empirical existence is far too petty and confined to be able through his own potencies to set up against the boundless world a new and elevated world; and thus religion threatens to become a mere radiation of subjective human craving and fancy, and its entire world threatens to sink down to a dream-world. No amount of shrewdness or acumen can prevent this

issue if man is no more than the first impressions show him to be, if there is not present within him a really-subsisting All-Life which enables him more and more to bring about an inversion of his natural existence. But this, however, is a question of fact and not of argument; therefore our main investigation directed itself to the tracing of such facts. Because we convinced ourselves that things were so, we gained the standpoint of spiritual experience over against a merely psychological standpoint. For the latter standpoint occupies itself with purely psychic processes, and in the province of religion especially it occupies itself with the conditions of the stimulations of will and feeling, which are not able to prove anything beyond themselves. The spiritual experience, on the contrary, has to do with life's contents and with the construction of reality; it need not trouble itself concerning the connections of the world only in a subsidiary manner, because it stands in the midst of such connections, and without these it cannot possibly exist. Man never succeeds in reaching the Divine unless the Divine works and is acknowledged in his own life; what is omitted here in the first step is never again covered, and becomes more and more impossible as life proceeds on its merely natural course. If, however, the standpoint of spiritual experience is gained, then religion succeeds in attaining entire certainty and immediacy; then the struggles in which it was involved turn into a similar result, and its own inner movements become a testimony for the reality of the new world which it represents.

3. *Religion in its Relation to Society and History*

Religion hitherto has been noticed as governing in the domain of the invisible—it was a life of pure inwardness. But it is not able to affect energetically the immediate existence of man and humanity unless it succeeds in coming into visibleness and in adopting a solid organisation, and these in their turn will appeal to, and will support themselves by means of special historical events. But immense entanglements result through religion entering into definite relationship with society and history, and also on account of the fact that religion had to substantiate its truth and reality within the domain of the visible.

The invisible and eternal, upon which all the claims of religion in its foundation rest, steps into strange conditions within the domain of the visible; and easily enough in these human conditions, those things which should serve as mere representation and orientation compete eagerly amongst themselves for independence; they raise themselves up as main facts, and through such a subversion they work directly against the final aims of religion. As everywhere, the main danger here does not come from enemies but from friends—from erring friends. Simultaneously, the configuration within the visible world leads easily through such a turn into a contraction of, and a menace to, the other provinces of life, and the contradiction which these call forth easily impels to a rejection of religion itself; and thus religion has to suffer for the presumption and usurpation of the Church. Nothing has carried into religion so much confusion from within and so much contradiction from without as its

own visible incorporation—as that which intended to serve it, and which religion seems unable to abandon.

(α) *The Problem of the Church.*

(*aa*) *The Necessity of a Religious Organisation.*—Religion in its Universal mode works for an inner fellowship of mankind, but it does not press for a hard and fast organisation. The desire for organisation arises only when the opposition of our world to the Spiritual Life has been deeply felt, and when, over against this opposition, a new stage of life has succeeded in obtaining recognition. For not only is the new stage of the religion of a pure self-subsistence much more difficult to apprehend and to retain, but in its presence the inability of man becomes far more evident. How can individuals be roused out of the indifference of the mechanism of daily life, and how can they be brought, out of the chaos of opinions, into common convictions unless some solid organisation raises and stimulates and unites them? He who denies the need for such a turning must either think very little of religion or very highly of man. If religion is no more than an artistic and delicate worldly disposition—a mere embrace of infinity in the exulting feeling of happiness and success—or, on the other hand, if man is held as from the outset filled with spiritual interests and in his intimate consciousness securely turned to high aims, then religion needs no kind of strengthening through fellowship. But where the greatness of the task and the littleness of man are present to the mind, some kind of incorporation of religion is not so easily rejected.

The fact that Characteristic religion first awakens such an aspiration for fellowship does not signify that it alone is able to satisfy it. Religion is not well able to develop an independent circle of life without falling back upon its Universal mode and calling up also the whole energy of this. Such a circle of life dare not contract into a mere refuge from the exigencies of life, but it has to consolidate the whole of life, and to shield it from dangers of an inner dissolution. Characteristic religion is able, as we have already noticed, to develop genuinely its spiritual nature and defend itself against the intrusion of mere-human elements, only if it occupies that broader foundation. Since religion is to open out to man's nature the entire depth of reality over against empirical existence, the Church seems indispensable in order to introduce and to hold at hand the new world and the new life to man in the midst of his ordinary existence; it is indispensable in order to fortify the conviction and to strengthen the energy in the midst of all the opposite collisions; it is indispensable in order to uphold an eternal truth and a universal problem in the midst of the changes of time and the fleetingness of the moment. In fact, the development of independent religious societies causes in human relationships divergences which undoubtedly have many dangers and abuses, but there has gone forth from such societies a great enrichment and emancipation of life whose withdrawal would mean a loss hardly bearable.

(*bb*) *The Dangers of a Religious Organisation.*— Our consideration of the historical religions has already placed before us clearly the dangers of a religious organisation. It is now only necessary to raise to

the level of a principle that which was visible in those religions, and to set it in a closer relation to the religion of the Spiritual Life.

The religion of the Spiritual Life maintains with special energy that religion is in no way that which simply adorns mere-human existence, but that within it an elevated life is opened out—that it not merely annexes some kind of embroidery to a "given" world. Now the attempt to make such a new world to attain representation within the old one contains a fundamental contradiction which can never be smoothly solved. The temporal and the human, beyond which religion will rise, unavoidably aspire after power; even these exercise a counter-effect to the work of the ordinary and commonplace; the Church must speak not only to spiritually distinguished souls, but must speak to all; and it must speak every day and not merely in moments of elevated feeling; it must reckon throughout with human nature and human weakness. Thus, the Church, measured by the standard of religion, will appear very inadequate. But what is discovered within the Church as limits and defects has been long fought against, and at present causes no real danger because the organisation is incessantly drawn back upon an inspiring life, and because the Church feels and conducts itself as a mere servant of religion. But in human and historical conditions there is a constant temptation to make the Church the main fact, and to degrade religion to a mere means for its power and glory; through this the human, the temporal, and the finite gain power within religion, and, indeed, above religion; immense abuses originate, and then a struggle against the Church may become

an imminent concern of religion—it may become a struggle for the self-preservation of religion. What perversion this positing of the human into the place of the Divine brings along with itself shall here be shown in at least some points.

Religion is unable to attain to a visible form without the work of special personalities in its service, and consequently the sublimity of religion will confer upon these personalities a certain splendour. But, however, this fact easily takes a turn: the man who busies himself with the Divine claims for himself the honour due to the Divine alone; the servant becomes a priest, and places himself as mediator between man and God, and therewith injures the kernel of all religion—injures the intimate participation in the Divine Life. In the extreme development of this, the priesthood can claim power above that of the Godhead: thus the Brahmanic priest, through his sacrifices and incantations, seemed to subdue the very gods themselves; and in perilous nearness to this lies the mass in the Roman doctrine. It is but natural that the power of the priest should be considered as having been conferred upon him by the Godhead, but the usage of the Church places the priest in the very foreground; it is the priest who possesses the truth and has the safety of man in his hands, and who finally aspires after Divine honour and imagines himself able to rule over the grace of God.

Religion is able to create an organisation only with the consolidation of a world of ideas, and this results unavoidably in a narrowing of religion. The structure of the Church was achieved at a particular

juncture; this juncture had particular spiritual needs whose satisfaction preceded and drove back all other claims. Therefore particular central truths stand out from such a world of ideas and group themselves together and all others around themselves; they succeed in the course of centuries in enforcing themselves with tenacious energy, and more and more aim at governing the total intellectual world of the Church. This has happened for instance in connection with the ancient Christian doctrine of the Godhead of Christ and with that of the Sacraments in the Middle Ages. Such a tapering and a locking-up of the world of ideas is less serious so long as an invisible world of religion counteracts it, and puts the assertion of the Church within a more encompassing truth. But such a counteraction fails within the Church especially in times of greater lassitude and narrowness, for then the narrow thought-world of the Church becomes the thought-world of religion, and then the perils and injuries of such a narrowing come to full effect. On the one side, we find an iron logic which develops the governing main truths into such conclusions as the adherents hold easily to be a testimony of the Holy Spirit. On the other side, we find much non-logic, because the conclusions of the iron-logic tend to break down when they are face to face with unquestionable religious needs; and, further, such a logic proceeds only in a special direction and not slant-wise—and hence it tolerates all kinds of contradictions in the juxtaposition of ideas and tasks—contradictions which, once they are discovered, become intolerable. But the Churches offer this circle of ideas with all their one-sidedness as the absolute and final truth, and aim at

imposing it upon individuals with coercive authority. Can we wonder that an opposition arises against all this? Can we wonder if the various ideas of the Church, with all their peculiarities, clash severely with each other, and cannot possibly come to terms? For each of these ideas views the world from its own individual standpoint, and declares such a view as the only possible one; each at the outset places itself in such a position that it sees clearly only in certain directions, whilst in other directions even the clearest things become dark to it.

Now, as the main proof of religion lies in its own actuality—in the creation of a new reality of independent Spiritual Life—so also the Church proves the right of its existence through the greatness of its achievement in the midst of an alien and hostile world. The Church is no mere system of doctrines which has been produced by scientific reasons, and which can be convulsed and dissolved; but as an organisation of life the Church has brought the supersensuous world to some kind of concrete expression; it has, through its training of souls and the formation of relationships, gained an actuality, and acts, from out of this actuality, with a power above all argument. But this actuality claims, as religious, to be not merely some sort of actuality; it must represent the final depth of reality; it must contain absolute truth. And here again a danger threatens all this: that what has its rights only in reference back to the Invisible presents itself as sovereign, and believes its truth to be established by the bare weight of

its existence and the empirical actuality of its achievements. True, the Church appeals in this to the leading of the Holy Spirit, but it makes bold to determine where and how the Holy Spirit governs, and, along with this, it takes upon itself to judge concerning truth and error, and again raises the human above the Divine. Thus it is the authority of the Church which is to assure man of the truth; where the Church unites in a common conviction, there an absolute truth is supposed to have been won; where the Church constructs a tradition, an eternal duration seems secured. Now, in the long run, it cannot be denied that much that is human has worked in all this, and that with the fixation of alleged divine truths this became so earthly that the serene halo vanishes with the insight that the sanction of such truths was far more of human than of Divine origin. Thus, the doubt concerning the Church passes easily into a doubt concerning religion itself, and the domain of religion will easily appear as a mere web of human illusions. A thousandfold experience shows that where the religious conviction of man rested mainly upon the authority of the Church and did not proceed from his own life, any injury to this basis led easily to a renunciation of the whole—to an entire negation and indifference. If once the Church had taken over entirely the solicitude for truth, and if man's entire convictions and conscience depended on a union with the Church, the relaxation of such a union could not but take away from him all fixed principles, and could not but surrender his soul to entire emptiness.

The champions of ecclesiastic authority are accustomed to insist that human nature will fall into

an entangled chaos without a strong authoritative binding, and that it needs for its own welfare a strong control. Against this view let us take the following course. The Spiritual Life itself causes a union of mankind *from within*, and holds men also in visible connections in the general situation of culture, in art and science, in society and the state. Without such a union from within all the external union would become a mere constraint; and, further, if all agreement were a work of authority, every deviation would mean the upheaval of the whole, and that could in no manner be tolerated, but would have to be repressed with the severest disciplinary punishment; so that courts of inquisition and persecution of heretics were not only just but an unavoidable duty. However, that mode of thinking which took upon itself to decide that man had an alleged need beyond what religion itself testifies, fell finally into a crass and unworthy utilitarianism. Utilitarian considerations may possess a right in other situations, but in connection with the question of absolute truth, they signify a lowering of the matter and an entire subversion. The atheist in his denial of religion thinks more religiously than the utilitarian who turns the Divine into a mere means of human welfare.

Finally, the prominence of the Church causes inevitably an externalising of the religious life. The organisation has to stand upon visible proofs of life and to come to expression through such proofs; it will develop and hold forth certain doctrines; it will value and desire certain activities; and through all this connection it will develop a characteristic web of

life. So long as the organisation is drawn back energetically upon the fundamental life of religion and is vivified and held together through religion, all dangers to it can be fought against and overcome; but if the Church drives back religion, and ensnares the whole life in the web of its system of ordinances, the life is in danger of being transformed entirely into a comparative number of deeds, and transferred into the shallows of a most industrious mechanism. Then the fatal conception of "religious obligations" arises, which places the religious task on a level with social, political and other obligations, without discovering at all how deeply such a turn degrades religion, and how soulless it moulds the life. There is here no possibility of a compromise of this kind —that a subordination of religion to ecclesiastical authority and the possession of an inwardness of disposition can be simultaneously preserved—but the fact stands here upon an inexorable *Either—Or*. Where the truth is presented from the external, the inner life is unable to gain entire self-reliance; where the inner life has gained such self-reliance, it will survey the external by its own necessities and shape it to its own demands; and it must reject any constraining leadership as an inadmissible bondage. Freedom and inwardness are ever inseparable; and he who will not accept the perils of freedom, must for good or evil renounce an independent inwardness and a genuine personality. Life can possess but one centre of gravity, and this lies either within the invisible inner world, and, if so, within the soul; or within the visible and, thus, outside the soul; and it is only a confused mode of

thinking that attempts to find a mid-path between this *Either—Or*. It may be that a certain inwardness develops from the external binding, but it remains a dejected, weak and sentimental inwardness, and does not become the sanctuary of a new life and the carrier of a new world.

The dangers of such an alleged superiority of the Church over religion vary in different times; they adjust themselves essentially according to the position which religion itself occupies in the whole of Spiritual Life. If religion stands in close connection with Spiritual Life, and, if new energy and animation flow constantly into it, then it is able to hold a counterbalance to the expansion of the power of the Church; but if such a connection has been loosened and the whole situation has become insecure, religion has to seek support in the Church, and thus the prominence of the Church and the rank growth of the merely human are hardly to be avoided. But the Church will then fail in greatness of creativeness, and it need not wonder if the age sees in it more of the human than of the Divine.

(*cc*) *The Reconstruction of a Religious Organisation.*—In connection with the Church, the dangers and defects have hitherto largely occupied our attention. But the fact should by no means be overlooked, how much greatness the Church has brought forth in the midst of all its mistakes, how it has strengthened the soul, and how it has given some kind of drift towards supersensuous values. What the historical view within this domain shows in the way of tangible events is usually unedifying enough, and seems fully to justify the severe judgment

of Goethe concerning Church history. But it does not show what entered into the souls of men, what led them to noble incentives, what brought them peace and happiness, and what upheld them in temptation and tribulation. He who takes this into consideration will be secure against a sweeping condemnation of the Church, and he will not, with its mistakes, combat the real achievements of the Church itself.

Such a course will not be taken especially because the character of the religious organisation is not allotted to us as a rigid destiny, but was changed in the past and can be further changed. So that we should not simply abandon the Church because the present character of the Church displeases us, but strive according to the best of our ability to bring about a transformation. The following points would seem to be necessary in such a transformation.

1. In the first place, all coercion with regard to men's attitude towards the Church should disappear, and entire freedom should obtain of joining this or that Church or no Church at all. Earlier times felt the unworthiness of a compulsion in this respect less than it is felt to-day; at the present time the consciousness of this has awakened to full clearness; hence, in such a situation, it must directly injure religion, and turn the Church from being a fellowship of "holy people" to being an apathetic community if men are held fast to it through a stronger or softer pressure. At this point again we see how religion is threatened with greater injury from unwise friends than from open enemies.

2. Further, more freedom, more movement and individuality are necessary within the Church. We

refer herewith especially to the difference between a more universal and a more characteristic disposition in religion. The latter first drove men to a Church organisation and, in such an organisation, naturally maintains the foreground. But what it discerns and defends as the final result of the experience of life should not be imposed uniformly upon all individuals, and should not be expected from them as *their* confession. And especially should it not dominate the teaching of the young save to beckon them to it as to a Holy of Holies in the distance, and to assist them by way of suggestion to become conscious of a veiled mystery, but on no account should aspiring minds in their joyous fulness of life be distressed and grieved. How can every man and every child feel what such a mightily contrasted nature as Luther's with all its convulsive experiences felt? Such an obtrusion injures religion because it incites a strong ill-will against religion; it injures life because life becomes thus accustomed to an unreality of feeling, as though to something self-evident.

3. In order to obtain a true reconstruction of the religious organisation, it is, before all else, needful to discern rightly the characteristic content of religion. Religion brings to man not some kind of trimmings of life but the depth of life itself—the positing of man within the nucleus of things, within a self-subsisting reality. Religion in the first place is life, but life not in the customary sense of a mere relationship of things to a sentient subject; but it is a Spiritual Life in the fullest sense of the term—life of an entirely active kind which develops a reality out of itself, and which is present as a Whole in each situa-

tion. But such a life is entirely of an invisible kind and lies beyond all the differences of psychic activity. The religious organisation is not able to place itself in the service of such a life unless it is constantly referred back to religion as the source of this life. The Church has therefore the task, not so much to propagate this or that doctrine, and not to set forth this or that particular mode of activity, but, in the midst of all the ramifications of activities, to point to the Spiritual Life, to set forth the conditions of its development, and to represent it amidst another kind of world to the best of its ability. It has through its convictions to penetrate into an acknowledgment of this Spiritual Life and its new and all-essential reality, and regard it as conclusive. True, there lie in all this assertions concerning the whole of the world—indeed, a *Weltanschauung*—but it makes a great difference whether such a view is developed from what has been assimilated by a genuine life and is carried continuously by one's own act, or whether the view is offered us independently of our own act and spiritual experiences, and whether life is to develop from out of itself. It is not doctrines in the main, but mere dogmas severed from life and through the severance spinning further doctrines —it is this that constitutes an evil in religion. How much of all this is included in the traditional organisation of Christianity! What significance, for instance, has the doctrine of the Trinity to the religious life—a doctrine which only a philosophically educated fraction of believers can somewhat understand and estimate its motives? And if Christian dogmas on one side bring far too much, on another side they

bring far too little. For instance, they have not a single word of appreciation for the developing and original Spiritual Life with its new configuration and fundamental relationship to God, found in the life and being of Jesus. So that often the subsidiary facts become the main facts, and the main facts the subsidiary ones. The age of the Reformation discovered this fact very clearly, but it did not bring things to a victorious issue; but religion will never succeed in engendering a new life until such a change and issue have come about.

Such a presentation of the Spiritual Life will by no means efface all differences; it will rather enhance than contract the fundamental differences of minds. Also, according to our investigation, religion is in no manner a collection of all kinds of facts; it cannot present its new world without culminating in a differentiation in regard to the qualities within the mind and spirit of man; it is able to serve the characteristic power and genuineness of the entire Spiritual Life only when such a differentiation within the soul results, and it attempts to do this in the midst of the spiritual torpor and inertia of our day. The differentiation touches a point where minds part company, where essential truths stand in question; the inmost nature of man and the main direction of his effort express themselves in the decision of appropriating or rejecting; and it is through such a decision that the energy and depth of religion become evident. All this, however, has no relationship to the elaborate confessions of past generations; such confessions can be accepted with great readiness, and be united with a great shallowness of religious life; and the opposi-

tion to all this may arise out of a genuine zeal for religion.

How the recognition of the religion of the Spiritual Life with its inner gradations carries in itself definite decisions which have met us at each point of our inquiry, it is not necessary here to do more than to refer briefly to the fact. The main point to be borne in mind is, that the world of nearest-at-hand experience —outer and inner—does not signify the whole of reality, that such a world rests upon a *deeper* world, and it is only through this depth that it becomes intelligible; in this depth the reality integrates itself into a Whole and is able to be present as a Whole in each individual place. But such a Whole is not able to develop without a pointed collision with the ordinary life and without demanding an energetic division of the prior elements of life. As the Spiritual Life becomes the true standard of all work, a spiritual culture stands out in bold relief to all mere-human culture, and produces a superiority over all the agitations of mere time. Religion places human life and all its efforts under the vista of eternity. True, the movement of history is not without value to religion; but the immediate results of history are not of themselves standards and norms, but have to justify themselves first of all before a higher tribunal. Hence religion is well able to acknowledge and to utilize for itself a position attained to by spiritual evolution and belonging to universal history, but it will discriminate such a position clearly from the surface of time and the shifting opinions of men. Religion will demand in a most decisive manner that time with all its change and caprice shall not pass judg-

ment on the Spiritual Life, but that the latter shall judge concerning the valuable and the valueless of the things of time. If religion holds forth in all this a spiritual substance to life and calls all to battle for this substance, will it not also drive the minds which it has won for such a struggle to some kind of conjoint work and of visible coherence? And will not religion do this all the more, the more clearly the wide distance becomes visible between its own claims and the ordinary situation of life?

The growth of the task makes the opposition appear all the greater, and a further experience shows that the opposition does not succumb with the acceptation of the Spiritual Life. Religion itself steps into evil entanglement and hindrance, and the darkness and unreason of our world heighten. This full acknowledgment is an essential portion of the religious conviction; and it is in this that religion parts company with all abstract idealism which is satisfied with the mere fact of the Spiritual Life, but which pays no heed to the more intimate experiences of religion. Religious conviction further differentiates itself from all the enthusiasm of the culture and progress which believe themselves able to tone down irreconcilable contradictions; it differentiates itself, too, from all purely æsthetic culture which shows only the light side of things in the foreground, and which threatens to transform the whole of life into a graceful but merely empty play. But the religious conviction proclaims with all emphasis that life is no mere play, but that from its foundation it carries within itself a mighty strenuousness, and it is through this conviction that religion can bind together its adherents

But the dismissal of a weak optimism in all its forms does not drive religious conviction into the path of a melancholy pessimism. For the religious conviction ascends through all the complications and hindrances to a new stage which lies beyond the entanglements of human existence; here it is able to found securely a reality, and here discover energy and courage to combat all opposition. That life finally reaches joyousness after painful toil, and that at last out of the Nay a Yea dawns—this is again a confession that can only proceed out of an original movement of life—a movement in which an energy for the union of souls dwells.

When the religious fellowship realises this fact as well as other similar facts, it discovers for itself a mighty task within and without. True, the fact must ever be present that religion intends to raise man to a cosmic life which claims to be the deepest ground of all reality; and therefore the religious fellowship dare not ever sever itself from the whole of life, but it will maintain its place in this whole, and take up the struggle against all perversion with joyous courage and certain trust. Hegel was justified in his warning against the petty retail-traders of belief. Nothing is more essential for religion—and nothing ought to be more essential for the religious community—than to raise life into Greatness, the finite into the Infinite, and the temporal into the Eternal. Here it is necessary to struggle against all that is sub-spiritual as well as against all admixture of the spiritual with the merely human, to struggle against defacements and malformations of the Spiritual Life, to struggle against a torpor on

one side and against shallowness on the other side. The spiritual is to be raised to its own heights, whilst its ethical basal character, its superiority to all merely natural process, its roots in freedom and action, its formation of a relationship from a Whole to a Whole with great clearness, are worked out and are vindicated in the face of all contradiction. The decision for all this results not so much in particular propositions and doctrines as in convictions and modes of thinking; it produces not so much finished results as solid tendencies and broad lines of battle; it furnishes a touch-stone for the separation of the genuine and the spurious in time, and enables our effort to gain an over-individual standpoint. The deepest minds of men can and must meet together in such a standpoint; then a concentration opposes a destruction; a substance of life is maintained over against all mere manifestation of energies; and human existence, amidst the full estimation of conflicting experiences, signifies a meaning which never can fall upon us from without but which has to be struggled for ever anew. Such are the demands of all times; such are especially the urgent demands of the present.

(β) *The Relationship to History.*—The inquiry into religion has led us often into the problem of history. We have already observed that there is no such thing as history—history as an inner experience—without a return-movement to an eternal order of things. We have also observed how religion, through its discovery of various stages in life, increased in a most important manner the significance of history and the historical character of our existence. In this place we

are not so much concerned with a question of principle as with the question how far is religion a matter of history, what promises does history make, and what dangers does it prepare.

Religion of the Characteristic kind will urge history to assist in the development of life. For this religion is founded upon great experiences of life, and is unable to deny that these experiences do not clearly meet everyone at every moment, but that those deeper experiences of religion can become strongly obscured through the passing experiences of the moment. And since, at the same time, the conviction, within the province of religion, obtains that the course of time is not able to bring forth new truths but only an unfolding of a timeless truth, it is in no way impossible to gain stimulations and indications from past times, such as our own time does not offer. Should not the past thus bring the present to a completion, and does it not contain conspicuous epochs when the religious movement—the religious creativeness—scaled a height otherwise unattainable? Such summits might be found—summits where pressing problems of the general situation and great personalities came into contact with each other, and through the contact the otherwise stagnant existence was brought into a current. Through this the historical religions originated, which incorporate a type of spiritual life—a type which exhibits its power through the centuries and millenniums, and brings and offers to man what has been gained in the form of achievements and experiences. Should we not set our own life in union with this?

Certainly we must do this, but we must not pass over the limits and dangers of such a union with history precisely in the domain of religion. Religion lays hold of an Absolute Life which in its very nature is timeless. If a particular epoch advances particularly far, yet it apprehends the Eternal far better as the source of its achievements; and its genuine effect lies in the fact that it illumines the path to the Eternal, and not that it holds mankind fast in itself. In a word, it is only in so far as the epoch places itself in the service of an immediate and intimate life, only in so far as it leads out beyond itself, and only in so far as it frees man from the accidental nature of the moment and raises him into a genuine present, that history can further religion. Hence, that alone can be religiously valuable which transforms itself into an immediacy of life, and it is always necessary to test how far the historical quality of anything corresponds to such a demand. The soul's own life thus stands always above all mere communication of the past; thus it adjusts the past from the standpoint of the height of its own experience; thus religion develops itself not so much from out of history as *within* history; and thus all genuine use of history becomes at the same time an annulment of bare history.

This treatment of history differs from the traditional and still prevalent church organisation of the present day more than is usually discovered; and friends of the newer mode of thought often underrate the greatness of such a turn. The old mode of thought conceived of the Divine as being enclosed in a particular point of time, and that the work of later generations was simply to appropriate and to

hold fast to what had there and then appeared; they must copy truly the model presented there. Thus we obtain that ideal of the imitation of Christ—an ideal which has governed the life of Christendom from a height far above all other individual summits. This conception of religion possesses as its broad foundation a conviction of truth and of life's content which in its scientific aspect reaches back to Plato. Truth appears here as harmony with a pre-existing immutable Essence, and Spiritual Life appears as a copy, an imitation, and an explanation of this perfect Essence. According to this, there is nothing new to be reached; there is no essential progress and no universal process; all that is necessary is to guide reason and effort ever back to the summit which, according to Plato, did *not* lie *within* but *above* time, and which for the first time is planted by the Christian conviction *within* time. The new mode of thought has broken away from this ideal of truth not so much through theoretical reflection as through the heightening of the needs of life, and through a deeper longing for independence and originality. Truth appears now no more as a copy of an absolute essence but as an elevation to an Absolute Life, and as an intimate participation in such a Life. It does not belong to this particular part of our discussion to examine here how all this transforms the tasks and conditions of the individual provinces as well as especially the problem of knowledge; but evidently there grows through all this a characteristic relationship of history to life, because now we have not to seek within life a ready-made truth which we have to hold fast and to imitate, but all that was great in history is to be

transformed back into the immediate timeless life from which it arose, in order that from out of the community of this life it may be able to profit us. The contact is able to become far more intimate than all merely historical communication is able to engender; but at the same time the relationship becomes free, because life has ever to wrestle with greatness in order to win greatness.

What is demanded by such a turn is not already fulfilled through any stronger relationship of history with the subject—not through an inner subjective appropriation. For as certainly as personal life, that forms worlds and elevates being, is something other than a subjective life, quite as certainly life contains the demand of a superiority to history, and quite as certainly must that life relate itself not so much in a passive as in an active way to history; certainly, too, must that life incessantly free the eternal content from the transient of the mere form of time, and thus see another meaning in it and make something other out of it than the older mode of viewing it had done.

Let us consider further, in the light of such a discussion, in what special manner history can aid religion. If it is necessary to obtain a new reality superior to the world, history becomes of use through its great personalities as well as its great organisations. Both are indispensable for the furtherance of the higher life. In personality alone does life reach the height of original creativeness, but without organisation the new creation gained could not unfold itself into a thoroughly complete reality, and could not encompass the individual with its spiritual atmosphere.

Indeed, the stronger religion develops its characteristic mode, the more will it seek a close relationship to great personalities, for these alone present the life superior to the world in an intuitive form and as secure actuality; and without such personalities such an elevated life would appear only in indefinite outlines. The Divine within the depths of human nature is now awakened to a vivid life, and is brought to full effect for other lives also. That the new life is not in the main a product of mere man but is a communication of God, is the fundamental conviction of all religion. But the average of mankind fails to work out and to place in clear bold relief the Divine; the Divine here loses itself in the merely human path, and does not disengage life from pettiness and doubt. To those rare ones only has power been given to sever the Divine from the merely human and to hold it forth in a clear form as a characteristic, immense, and elevated world to man, and to allow such Divine effects with all their energy to work upon the soul. When such happened, it produced a raising of the life into greatness and certainty; it freed man from merely subjective particularity, and brought him a progressive certainty of the presence of a Divine within his own nature. Thus the customary and conventional life with all its petty aims sank to a lower level, and all its power faded away before the glory of a new world. But all this happens not through any new doctrines, but pre-eminently through the raising up of a new life, through the development of a characteristic spiritual type, which grips the man with irresistible power, and which brings him to a realisation of that which has been prepared in the

depth of his own nature, but which is not able to ascend from the realm of shadows to that of a clear reality without such a help. The main and essential effect of such great personalities is the fact that they, through the powerful energy with which they present before us a type of life incarnated within themselves, constrain us to a decision and lift us out of the stagnation of the trivial occurrences of daily routine.

In order to obtain such a power, it is essential that the content should succeed in reaching an intuitive form—that the sublime thought should gain flesh and blood. We have already recognised in this the work of an imagination which holds sway over entire worlds, and which makes the inconceivable easy and, indeed, self-evident, whilst it places the best that appears in this present world into the service of the new world. The representation of this sublime reality retains here also its aspiring and symbolical character. Is it not a symbol, for instance, when in the teaching of Jesus, the relationships of parents and children typify the union of God and humanity? But notwithstanding the symbol, no cleft is felt here because what actually belongs to our world is seen in the light of the new world, and is through it ennobled, raised, and transfigured. Because thus the higher draws to itself the lower, and because the higher can even shine out of the lower, the full presence of the Divine appears reached. Such a union of the Divine and the human is not confined to individual summits in the history of the world, but extends itself over the whole of humanity; it results in an inner elevation and in a spiritualisation of the whole of existence; it constructs, through the dawning of its content, an essentially

original life with its secure superiority to the confusion and unreliableness of the social sphere, and also with its energetic conviction of a life of the spirit founded upon the incontestable fact of the living presence of a new world within the human circle. Nowhere is it more true than here that it is not history that makes man, but that it is man who makes history.

Thus, our estimation of the great personalities of the Church is able to follow a good portion of the path which they travelled over. But a point of divergence certainly occurs. Where the realisation of a new and intimate life founded in God appears as the main fact, and where, as greatest of all achievements, the experience of this Divine Life is recognised, the Highest dare not sever itself from human nature, but must remain with it in genuine communion of life, for otherwise the elevation would mean no elevation of the whole nature of man. It is only when such great ones belong wholly to us, only when they participate in our struggles and sorrows, our temptations and doubts, that their experience is able to become *our* experience, their overcoming *our* overcoming, and that the miracle which occurred in them can ever renew itself. Further, the passive character of religion here falls away. The man moved greatness as far as possible into the distance in order to gaze upon it with a blind devotion instead of binding it most definitely with his own life and effort. But such a binding is impossible through mere imitation and blind submission. That which can work best towards greatness is the training for an ever fuller freedom. The free person, however, must set and even prove all—even the Highest and

especially the Highest—upon the foundation of his own life, and see what all this can mean for life. All this prevents in no way a deep and sincere veneration of greatness; but this greatness must never in itself become an object of religious faith, and all worship of man should be kept at a distance as an injury to God.

In a way other than that of great religious personalities, history works through the religious community. All pre-eminent greatness of such personalities does no injury to the significance of the religious community. For mankind is in need not only of creativeness, but also of the preservation of this creativeness; it is in need not only of a fundamental foundation for action, but also of continuous progressive actions. He who bears in mind the fact that in religion it is not so much the question of the salvation of the mere individual that stands in the foreground, but the formation of a spiritual nature and of a cosmic life in the soul of man, will in no way wish to see the cosmic character of religion stunted; he will perceive that his own consolidation and realisation are obtained through the community, which is indispensable on account of its spiritual atmosphere and its historical continuity. But this continuity does not lie in external things but in a unity of spirit, and this spirit cannot flow in, upon the later generations, from without, but must ever originate anew, in order that it may seek a strengthening in what is transmitted and in order to differentiate the eternal from the temporal.

Consequently the position of man to the historical religions can never be that which the ecclesiastical

forms aim strongly to make it. These religions are receptacles of truth or pathways to truth, but are never the truth itself. They offer in our human situation and exigencies the eternal not in its pure form but mixed with the temporal and the fluctuating. In such a connection adherence to an historical religion does not mean the recognition of simply everything in its total condition as so much pure truth, but the welcoming and reverencing in it the formation most readily capable of developing within itself the absolute religion, which can never exist without an historical religion.

How much, however, history can mean in this respect is not decided in the last resort by general reflection, but by the witness of human experience. But it is decided before all else by this: whether, among the historical religions, one religion is extant that has seized with full consciousness, and has developed through the whole of its being that which has presented itself to us as the kernel of religion—especially of Characteristic religion. If this is the case, then it is not necessary to find the pathway of truth beforehand, but only to proceed farther on the path already found. This point, however, is a later conclusion of our investigation.

In the event of an affirmation, however, religion is no ready-made possession of man; it remains a matter for incessant seeking and wrestling, and must ever issue anew from man's own work and experience. But what man loses in rest and alleged security, he gains in the greatness and truth of the *new* facts. For is there not far too large a picture of religion presented when we view it as

ever anew arising from the foundation of a timeless order of things and proceeding as a continuous work, and when the growth of the new reality encompasses all ages and civilisations? Would it not be better to present a smaller picture which shows religion as having been essentially completed at a special point of time, and that all succeeding ages have but to hold fast to what had been fixed there? It is not in the fixation of its content to any one particular point of time that religion verifies its genuine eternity, but in a living and elevating present in the midst of all the fluctuations of time and over against the changes of time.

But do not such a presentation of the inner life and such a critical relationship to history and society bring us perilously near to the rationalism which we do not fear so much as does the historicism of the nineteenth century, but whose limits, however, have been laid bare by the experience of the times in a way that cannot be contradicted? We answer, No. For the bearer of life is not for us the individual with his supposed ready-made intelligence, but *the personality only in its process of becoming*, through its encompassing of the world and its upbuilding of a new reality. The intimate and timeless life which such a cosmic nature desires cannot be acquired by it either in a day or in isolation, for in order to climb to its own heights the life must draw the traditional religious world into itself and remain in constant intercourse with such a world. The content of this religious world can mean so much more to us than to rationalism, because religion does not merely signify to us a view of the universe or theoretical notions for the

definition and explanation of phenomena. Religion means to us a mighty concentration of the Spiritual Life; in it we observe and revere great spiritual energies in which hidden experiences of our nature are revealed, and which have made life itself quite other than it was—made it richer and deeper. Thus Christianity has not so much brought forth new conceptions of God and the universe as that it has transformed the fundamental process of life, and along with this our fundamental relationship to reality; since it became strong enough, through the most intimate union of God and man, to take up the whole depth of suffering into the Life-process, and at the same time to raise the Life-process beyond suffering. Through this, Christianity changed not merely the view of reality but reality itself, and thus introduced man to a more essential life. This further development of life does not depend on the mere environment or on mere time; for unless such a development is laid in the very foundation of man's nature, unless it is constantly able to verify and to renew itself, it can never become our own truth, faith, and hope. But the penetration into this foundation of our being is made immeasurably easier through its linkage with history, and especially through the positing of the nature upon the formative process of the great religions where mighty convulsions and renewals have raised them out of all the insecurity of reflection, and out of all the pettiness of daily routine. It remains always a main fact that history is not able to deliver us from the decisive experiences and further developments of life, but it is able to make them easier.

The fact that the historical religions thus render the abiding truth far more intuitive and even personified, through its close relations to special personalities, epochs, and environment, signifies a great gain so long as this embodiment does not enter into conflict with the spiritual substance. For it is only through this turn to intuition, to the entire individuality of an historical formation, that the religious life is able to free itself from the other-worldliness and shadowy character which otherwise cling to it. The individual instances in the historical religions are thus no mere examples, but a living factual proof—an incontestable realisation. History is able through such a contact with intimate life to place on one side all alienation, and to become more confiding to us than all the visible things of the present moment, and than all sensuous nearness. Thus the distant land where the Saviour lived and worked and suffered has become to Christendom a spiritual home, and the personalities who surrounded him have become types that have permanently accompanied the work of life, and that have raised the centuries ever anew to either love or enmity.

But such an interweaving of history and life depends on fixed conditions. It can succeed only in so far as life finds the pathway to history easy, only in so far as life furthers its own efforts through the aid of history, and only in so far as the interval between past and present is not perceived. But when this interval is perceived, most important transformations create a barrier between the intimate contact of the Now and the Then. Thus we are not able, in connection with the affairs of history, to

affirm anything without also denying something; we are not able to acknowledge anything without also limiting it. Thus the naïve fusion of past and present fails, and the historical tie can readily become a hindrance. History then recedes into the distance, and remains inwardly alien to us even in the midst of all the incessant scholarly disquisitions concerning it.

Such days are critical days, and even painful days for man. But they are necessary phases of a universal movement; they are indispensable for the purifying and deepening, for the purer working out of eternal truth, and for a fundamental preparation of a new configuration of the things of religion. What gets shaken in such days is in reality not the fundamental fact of religion itself—not the manifestation of an intimate reality founded in God—but the human conception of this reality. Indeed, the upheaval itself is in the last resort a testimony of the presence of Superior Powers. Mere movements and transformations within its own province alone have always proved dangerous to traditional religion; all changes in the conceptions of the universe, all adoption of new aims of activity do not, in spite of the strong agitation of souls, remain long outside the substance of religion, but enter into the ground and plant themselves in the soil of religion, and thus act as a real portion of religion itself. It is only then that a conflict of the new with the other views becomes irreconcilable. So that finally nothing other than religion itself produced the upheaval and the renewal; or rather, the Divine in religion has anew proved its sublimity above all human configurations, whilst it

proved, rejected, and transformed such configurations. Viewed thus, the most painful crisis, with all the anxieties and unrest which it prepares for man, is an expression of the sway of a Superior Power which does not create without destroying and which does not destroy without creating.

PART IV.—CHARACTERISTIC RELIGION
(CONTINUED)

CHAPTER XIV

(*d*) THE GENERAL ASPECT OF RELIGION AND LIFE

IT is now necessary to examine in conclusion how, after the appearance of Characteristic religion, the general aspect of life presents itself, how far a solution of the problems which led to religion has been achieved, and whether the solution has resulted in the sense we strove to see at the commencement of our investigation. For it could very well be that the development of religion had made out of man something quite other than he seemed to be prior to this development, and that he in his aspiration after happiness found more than happiness in the sense of human well-being. Perhaps the experience of Saul, that Goethe was so fond of citing, applies to us all—of Saul who went out to seek his father's asses and found a kingdom.

1. *The Persistence of Evil*

What drove man mainly to religion was the longing for a deliverance from evil—evil without and within—a longing after a fuller and purer happiness. Has religion, as it manifested itself to us, satisfied

this longing, and has it driven evil out of life? We do not find this to be the case. Even after the manifestation of the Divine Life things proceed externally on their old course; the rigid indifference of the course of the world remained unaltered towards the whole Spiritual Life of man. This Spiritual Life continues suddenly to disappear under the forms and aims of human frailty; it remains an inner impotence, tattered and torn, and perverted; the inscrutableness of destiny remains, which exhibits neither an order of righteousness nor a reign of love. Indeed, the pressure of evil and the gravity of unreason seem to be but further increased within man. It is, first of all, increased in itself. For now it is in direct contradiction to the new manifestation of Divine Life; it sets itself against the domain of love, and love is hemmed in by it; now evil integrates itself more into a totality and seems to set forth an energy of its own against the Divine. Nowhere is this heightening more to be witnessed than in the problem of morality, because first of all Characteristic religion stamps any deviation from its path as a rebellion against a Holy Will and consequently as a guilt. Further, the elevation of the standard through the new life renders much problematic which was otherwise without any doubt. The standard now shows clearly the two-edged character of all human efforts and of mere culture and civilisation with all their ramifications. On the one hand, science and art appear now as the highest aims for obtaining a reality superior to the world, and for bringing about the redemption of the soul. On the other hand, practical and technical work appears not as Divine but as a potentially diabolical

power which can also turn into evil and demoralises man. Thus, it becomes clear that the most serious hindrance to the spiritual lies within the spiritual itself.

But along with the thing, the consciousness of it also grows. Religion, in its progress towards a Characteristic mode, has filled man with a new need of life, and without such aid man's energy and courage grow weary amidst insurmountable obstacles of a hostile world. Religion further has ennobled this need from its very root, so that man in the inmost depth of his being succeeds in coming to a union with the Divine; he cannot, and dare not if he could, consider himself and his actions as indifferent, and he dare not wholly despair. After his hopes have been strengthened, and a greater inwardness and a greater longing after love are awakened, he must experience, with all its poignancy, the insufficiency of all that human existence offers in the way of soul and of love. The lack of affection within the visible order of things, the fleetingness and the semblance of all human love, the inner forlorn condition of the Spiritual Life in a dark world, meet man now in a far more painful manner than hitherto. And the leading spirits of religion were unanimous in proclaiming that religion, with its heightening of the standard and the deepening of feeling, rendered suffering not easier but more difficult: "the more of a Christian a man is, the more is he subject to evil, suffering, and death" (Luther).

In addition to this, religion not only appears powerless against the remaining world, but the very enemy whom it is supposed to overcome penetrates into its own province. The superhuman is not able to

communicate itself effectively to man without some kind of incarnation within man's own domain; the inner fellowship must adopt external forms in order to become a power within the historical domain. But simultaneously with this, human frailty begins to draw to itself the Divine; it begins to weld that which was to raise man beyond himself; but man welds this power far too much in accordance with his own frailty, and moulds it so disastrously by means of so much arrogance and pretence and of so much craving for power and intolerance that the whole may well seem to be rather a loss than a gain. Indeed, the more highly religion thinks of its own task, and the more seriously it undertakes such a task, the less is it able to conceive of the possibility of toning down and of glossing over the actual situation, or of leaving human nature in the condition it is in. If there is no toning down of the Nay, it can only be in the strengthening of the Yea that religion comes to the aid of man.

2. *The Overcoming of Evil*

Such a strengthening of the Yea in reality establishes itself. The manifestation of a new life—of a new reality—raises man with entire certainty above the spheres of wrong and unreason. It is a fundamental conviction of religion that the new life in its inmost nucleus withstands all hindrance, and that all defacement of the Divine within the human circle is not able to destroy it or to annul its effects. Also, the human point of departure of life is set by God, and the whole of life is maintained simply through His energy, and is simultaneously withdrawn from all

human insecurity. In this inmost original depth, no failure or guilt of man is able to destroy entirely his spiritual substance; he cannot, in the words of a religious mode of expression, again fall from grace if once he has been gripped by grace. Even in the midst of the most painful suffering, and in the overthrow of all that was termed happiness, the blessedness of a refuge in Infinite Love and of a peace superior to the world in the union with the Final Ground of things permanently remain. The fact that God Himself preserves the Divine alive within us and protects man also from himself has been the stand upon which all hope of an ultimate conquest of the Yea over the Nay within the soul of man rests.

The new life appears first of all in opposition to the world, and only through loosening itself from the world is it able to succeed in gaining full self-reliance. But life does not on account of this become a merely isolated province which is enclosed within itself, and which allows the situation of the world to remain unaltered. For such a course could mean no more than a painful flight of individuals from the iniquity of the world, and could help in bringing forth no more than a devout disposition. But in all this the substance of life would gain but little. The true meaning of religion is rather the fact that such a higher life signifies a higher stage of the total-life of man himself, that it develops further the very substance of reality, and that it must strike its effects everywhere, and must come to a fundamental understanding with the environing world. The total aim of the Spiritual Life, its turn from the world to its own depth, the construction of an activity of the sustained and

transformed nature—all this is reached through an intimate inclusion of the final unity; it is only through this that the movement of life entered once more into a current, whilst otherwise life would have become weary and worn on account of the oppositions. Through such a turn, it is not only this or that isolated good that is gained, but the whole of the Spiritual Life is redeemed; through the positing of man from the fringe of things to their centre an inner relationship to the whole of reality is gained; through the comprehension of a continuous Divine act in the formation and preservation of life, an indestructible consolidation is acquired. The union from a Whole to a Whole gave a depth of life to the Spiritual Life of humanity as well as to the souls of individuals, and it is from such a union that there originated what is known as our experience of an intimate relationship with things, of an inner expansion of human nature and of a creativeness; and from such a union, too, all spirit to labour and all soul to act have issued.

It is true that this life which originates in the deepest ground is not conveyed immediately into the domain of work and configuration. But it works upon the whole of one's being, and through this works indirectly upon all else it comes in contact with. But certainly this life is perverted and contains a germ of the most intricate confusion when, for instance, a Christian doctrine or a Christian State is desired through the carrying over bodily the mere formulas of religion, instead of realising that religion consists in the possession of developing convictions and doctrines. It is only a shallow mode of thinking that can ignore the fact that Christianity is able

to work and has worked by transforming the whole man, and that it culminates in bringing about an alteration in his fundamental relationship to reality, through the power which issued out of itself. He who denies this connection with the fundamental questions of our spiritual existence thinks of Science and of the State not highly but meanly.

The conquest of the Yea is determined all along the line by the turn to religion; we gain a portion in an Absolute Life and, at the same time, an untold activity; and we become fellow-citizens of a new world. But in this final conquest of the Yea there are two different kinds of things which must not be forgotten: the negation and self-denial which the Yea desires, and also the whereabouts of the oppositions in the environing world and in the soul itself. Man is not emancipated while he lives and thinks in his natural state; he is set free only through an entire inversion of his first impressions of the world—through the germ of an Infinite and Eternal Life. What is usually deemed happiness—the full satisfaction of natural impulse—lies below this sphere of the higher life, and will also be overcome by the new emancipation; it is only in opposition to the small self that there originates a spiritual self in man. So that religion on its summits does not speak of prosperity or of supreme happiness, but of blessedness; and when the popular idea falsely conceived of this as something lying on the other side of the grave, even the mistake points to the truth that something must pass away if ever a genuine life and being are to be won. Religion rightly understood, is, in its direct affirmation of life, very far removed from all eudæmon-

ism, and, indeed, frees itself fundamentally from the narrowness of such an easy-going affirmation. Inseparable from religion is the idea of sacrifice—the idea not of a sacrifice happening but once, but of a continuous sacrifice. Consequently there remains permanently a loud lament even in the conquest of the Yea, which is very different from the pleasurable Lubberland of which common theological eudæmonism dreams.

Further, over against the turn to religion, the hostile world of darkness and unreason permanently remains; these draw man to themselves; they clutch him with the energy of sense impressions and with the eloquence of the mere expansion of things, and they gain power over his soul. This opposition is not overcome once for all, but is to be overcome ever anew; pain does not entirely vanish, but remains and echoes within the blessedness of the new life, and never allows the conquest to enter into an inactive rest or to become an indulgent enjoyment. If, however, the energy is now a match to the oppositions, or rather if man now becomes superior to them through the presence of the Divine Life, this constant struggle becomes an incessant conquest; the whole life shapes itself into a heroic deed; suffering with its persistence can indeed disturb and destroy, but cannot check a final affirmation. In the great works of music we often observe the fundamental theme develop and maintain itself through a seeming chaos of tones and conflicting discords, and also, in the very conquest the conflict does not altogether vanish, but sounds on and on, yet now as something overcome, until at last the harmony finally triumphs.

3. *The Religious Interpretation of Life and the World*

The religious solution of the problem of life, with its strengthening of the good and its raising above evil, contains in no manner an explanation and justification of evil. In order to do this it would be necessary to demonstrate that evil passes entirely into the good, and that in spite of all hostile appearances it finally shows itself as a means of the good—as a means by which we reach the depth of the good. A proof of this is not, however, found. Also within Christianity men have often troubled themselves over this problem. Suffering and guilt were supposed to be the only means of moving the Highest to unlock His love and grace; and upon the human side, only grave guilt seemed to invest the feeling of need with an inwardness and a longing after deliverance through overpowering energy, as is explained in the parable of the prodigal son. Thus guilt itself could be extolled as fruit-bearing (*felix*) because it had brought forth such a redeemer. A more philosophical and far-reaching mode of thought, however, could wish for a contrast of evil over against the full development of the good, just as a dark background is contrasted with a clear light. "Who can speak of joy who has felt no pain, or of peace who has not seen or experienced strife?" (Jacob Boehme).

Certainly such a mode of thinking is able to call upon many experiences within the human circle in favour of its claim. An ascent of life may often result more easily from a precipitous fall with its scars than from the stagnation of daily routine. Evil may

exercise a stirring power, and along with this, point out the path of goodness; suffering and guilt may occasionally be conducive to the inner advance of life and to the formation of a new nature. But that they are always this, or that they are pre-eminently this, is demonstrated in no manner. How often evil with its acute growth increases its grip upon man and fetters him for ever! And how dangerous would such a teaching concerning evil as a necessary gate to the domain of the good become if it were raised to a doctrine and precept! Also, in the totality of the world's order, we dare not consider evil as an indispensable means for the furtherance of the good. An Almighty Love, according to the conviction of religion, governs the world. And this Almighty Love could not unlock its depth otherwise than through the admission of guilt and suffering, in order then to oppose them utterly. Would not the Divine, through this, bend under the power of a destiny which had prescribed its path? Do we not step here into a web of anthropomorphic ideas? And would not such an explanation place in the very constitution of the universe the deadly proposition that the good "end" justified the evil means? Such an explanation sets a greater puzzle than it attempts to solve.

In reality, such an explanation of evil corresponds far more to the desire of speculation than to that of religion. The inner elevation above evil suffices religion; religion must refuse everything that weakens the edge of the opposites and the tension of the struggle. And the reduction of evil to a means for realising the good is such

a weakening—a weakening which threatens to transform the mighty world-struggle into an artistic arrangement of things and into an effeminate play, and which takes away that bitterness from evil without which there is no strenuousness in the struggle and no virility in the life. Thus it remains permanently true that religion does not so much explain as presuppose evil. As religion sees the acme of suffering in guilt, therefore it is inclined to seek the deepest root of evil in guilt. But this is only a mere pushing back of the problem, and is no explanation; indeed, every attempt at a didactic fashioning of the problem leads to impossibilities. If man, by his fall, is considered to have brought the whole world to deterioration, religion is in danger of sinking into a mythology.

If religion heightens rather than lessens the view of the unreason of our existence, yet it brings a certain relief through the enlargement of the conception of reality—through the opening out of a new world-perspective. To those epochs whose thoughts and tendencies were turned tenaciously towards another world, hope and conviction could hold that all suffering in the present world will find overflowing compensation in a future glory. Why of course this suffering exists, remains dark. Help was sought in the thought that through all suffering, and even all guilt, our training is more and more completed, that what appears at the outset as hardness may finally serve the aims of love, that much which astonishes us as being a Divine command proves itself finally as a means for the elevation of our life. But this is no more than a possibility. And why

should this supposed education need such a circuitous route if an absolute reason directs our life? Thus we roam in the midst of explanatory attempts in the region of mere possibilities; and these possibilities lead towards dangerous reefs the more we follow them. The matter ever comes to this, that religion places evil in quite another light, but that it explains and interprets it in no way.

Further, religion does not solve the riddle of the universe. The unfinished state of the whole—the gradual and toilsome "becoming"—turns into a difficult problem. And the "becoming" itself is full of entanglements: stage raises itself above stage, but the lower becomes no pure ascent to the higher but maintains an independence over against it and holds the movement rigid in itself, and, indeed, threatens to draw back to itself all further effort. The kingdom of nature constructs the foundation of an immeasurable extension and strikes its roots into the psychic life, and in this the sway of mechanism is found; what points to the lawfulness of phenomena, to the universal causal connection, and to the construction of durable forms from a greater depth, remains permanently in an inaccessible background. With the appearance of the Spiritual Life a great turn results, but this Life remains tied to the inadequate human form and succeeds but in a toilsome way towards a mediocre self-reliance. And it is able to maintain this self-reliance only in so far as man within his own domain progresses from a universal mode to a concentrated mode of viewing things, and only in so far as he withdraws from contact with the world of semblance to a pure

self-subsistence. This, however, seems to be not so much to take possession of the world as to be carried out of it.

In this gradation the more developed stages, on account of their richer content, will deem themselves more highly valued, and will claim to govern the lower stages. Thus especially the Spiritual Life would like to handle nature as a mere means for its own aims. But nature maintains its independence over against the Spiritual Life and follows, as we have already observed, its own course heedless of all spiritual values. Similarly, within the Spiritual Life, the universal kind of spirituality maintains itself over against the concentrated or characteristic mode, and such a general mode refuses to become a means and a preparatory stage for the concentrated mode. Whence, save on account of this, is the pointed opposition to religion found even within the Spiritual Life? Thus the world-process itself seems to become narrowed and entangled in itself: what strives upwards within the world-process is not able to carry the whole domain of reality along with itself, and it consequently steps into a situation of the most insecure nature.

Such an entanglement strikes also into the method of investigation, and places it under conflicting motives. At one time, the higher is explained out of the lower; at another time, the lower is explained out of the higher. The former view has the immediate impression of experience on its side; the latter view calls to its own superiority for its better right as an explanation, but as soon as it carries its conceptions within the domain of the lower, it disturbs the particular mode of operation of the lower

and seems to drag human qualities into the domain of the lower. Thus the various views of the universe enter into an irreconcilable contradiction; each view can injure the other views, but no single view is able to conquer completely.

Within our human reality the entanglement grows further, because here the higher stage remains dependent on the lower for its own preservation, and is not able within our world with all its superiority to create an existence from out of its own energies. The spiritual nature must ever anew achieve the means for the maintenance of its life, and is thus drawn back and pinned down to that which it feels inwardly it has passed long ago. Even concentrated spirituality whose stable support is constructed by religion needs universal spirituality, beyond which, nevertheless, it intends to lead us; for without this basis and the indispensable help which it offers, concentrated spirituality is in danger of fading and, indeed, of forfeiting its spiritual character.

The entanglement reaches its climax, however, when the lower penetrates into the heart of the higher and gains strength for itself—when the Spiritual Life sets unspiritual aims before itself. Then the natural is refined, and self-preservation heightens into selfishness; and then evil is no mere departure from the good, but grows into an entire perversion.

If all this were only a matter of æsthetic reflection, the sublimity of the spectacle could be willingly acknowledged. The scene would then appear as the broad ground of nature developing unerringly into simple iron laws, drawing all effort back to itself,

and appearing entirely indifferent towards all which man calls good or evil. But on the contrary, a Spiritual Life grows beyond the world-process, engenders an inwardness out of itself and turns towards it, shapes a new reality but in the shaping narrows and even destroys much of it, withdraws from its ascent, denies it affirmations, resigns its toilsome work, and allows itself to be overthrown. All this appears as an ebb and flow—a colossal picture in life and death. But is it all a mere picture—a mere play? It is an awful self-contradiction, a tragic deception, an empty phantasmagoria, if it claims to be taken seriously and if it encloses in itself the whole of our life and being, and if it signifies the ultimate and the whole of all things. We are not able, however, to view it other than with seriousness.

If all this, with all its darkness, is not able to browbeat religion, religion must be considered in its inward nature superior to that whole province, and it must prove its superiority through the construction of a new reality. We need only touch here on the point which our investigation attempted to show, viz., that religion not merely gathers together certain elements at hand, but that, through the inauguration of an independent spirituality, it brings forth something *essentially new*; life and the world are transformed from their very foundations. As the whole of the Spiritual Life gathers itself together in religion and brings itself to expression, a new standard and a new content are gained by life. What was imbedded in existence prior to the advent of the Spiritual Life but was isolated and scattered, narrowed and disfigured, insecure and dependent, is through its union

with the Divine raised to a fuller self-reliance, to a purer formation, and to a more consolidated position, so that it is now able to work as an energy for consolidating and elevating, for selecting and rejecting. The dawning of new possibilities which result here is itself a fundamental fact, and renders insufficient what hitherto satisfied; it reduces in value what hitherto stood in secure estimation. The ascending aspiration found in religion after an appropriation of the whole of infinity—after a life from out of the soul of reality—breaks away step by step from what hitherto captivated man. The working rights of civic life sink to the level of a merely preparatory stage or to a caricature of the genuine culmination of life with its essential and world-encompassing love; the truth in which the ordinary routine of science finds satisfaction becomes a mere semblance and shadow when face to face with the genuine truth which opens out the inner nature of things, and which transforms these things into the soul. And also, genuine Art becomes an inner community of life with things—it becomes a new "becoming" which lies on the other side of all mere gratification and ease. There results thus a thorough and new fundamental relationship to reality—an essentially new life. This New, however, draws to itself from the situation of experience all that it can appropriate; it drives asunder the opposites and it places the confusion of things before an *Either-Or*; and it manifests its energy in stimulation and movement. Simultaneously we discover a raising of characteristic features out of the depth, an insight into values and essentials, a simplification of reality, and a penetrating concentration of life. All this is an

actual current which can never issue from the mere reflection or mood of man but is a fact which gives man, in the midst of all his unreadiness, the conscious certainty of his relationship to a higher order. How the view of the world and the task of life, through such a turn, alter their content in accordance with the main tendency revealed is to be further explained.

Religion as the inauguration of an over-world life is no *Weltanschauung*. As it is unable to prove fully its own higher Divine order from the condition of the universe, it presents no explanation of this condition. But it is not able to make the over-world life the kernel of reality (not the kernel of an isolated province) unless it transforms its total view of reality, unless it brings the whole into a new light, and rearranges the relationships of the various sides of life to each other. Religion places a Whole in front of all the manifold, and understands this manifold as an expression of such a Whole; it will emphasise and bring to effect all that reveals itself in the relationships and connections of the elements of the world. The laws of phenomena and their causal nexus become now testimonies to a unity of the Whole; and so may be said of the possibility of a reciprocal understanding within the domain of the spirit, and the possibility of an inner conjoint work: they point towards a unity which carries and brings together all the manifold. But before all else, as we have already seen, each individual appears now not merely as a link in a chain but also as being in intimate relationship to the Whole, and, consequently, as being in himself of intrinsic value and precious; along with this, the individual is

able to form his own ends, and an æsthetic insight of things with its apprehension of infinity is founded in the individual situation. Finally, this Whole within the Spiritual Life is able to become, in the form of immediacy, a characteristic personal experience and a self-reliant deed; it is able to work against placing all the inferences of life within the narrowness of any particular or isolated circle. Without the presence of the Infinite there would be no striving after truth, no energy for the good or for love over against egotistic utility.

Similar transformations occur in the relationship of rest and movement. The world appears to modern reflection as a process existing in incessant change. Religion, on the contrary, proclaims an eternal order, and understands movement as an expression of this eternal order. Again, there comes here prominently forward for the first time into a persistent form what the world-configuration contains as substance and law, so that the movement itself cannot become a personal experience without a standpoint superior to it. And there is no genuine experience of history, and consequently no history of a spiritual kind, without an order of things which learns to survey, connect, and deepen the conditions of things. Along with this, the total view of occurrences transforms itself. The higher, which appears to an empirical consideration of the world as a mere evidence of a process, gains through religion an independence and superiority. Because religion develops a self-subsistence of reality and stands out in bold relief from all mere nature and from all that is unspiritual, it acknowledges in movement qualitative transformations—

essential enhancements—and it brings men, at the same time, to the discernment that what happened within the spiritual domain happens also in connection with the whole of reality, viz., that the result is somehow a principle—a principle that must be the presupposition and driving energy of the movement whenever anything shall issue out of the movement, as in reality something does issue out of it. Because such a conviction, arising out of religion, wends its way towards the world, it will everywhere carry forth the Characteristic and the New which the progress of the process brings with itself; it will understand the development not as a result of the lower but as an ascent to a higher stage—as a breaking forth of such a stage; it will not bind the situation of experience to the mere level on which experience *now* stands, but will guide it beyond its present situation. Culture appears as such a course of thought: it is not a mere bettering of a mere-human existence but an ascending tendency towards a new world; the spiritual greatness which occurs in history appears now not as a mere More of the commonplaces of the environment but as the inauguration of a self-reliant spiritual world over against such commonplaces. Thus, all that life contains for its inner ascent clarifies and connects itself together through religion. And as religion, through such a mode of thinking within its own domain, transforms the movement, from a drifting along towards vagueness, from a meaningless hurry to a return to itself, and along with this brings life to an inner rest, so will religion work against the abandonment of things to the mere movement, and it will become the focussing point of all that gives stability

to life, and invests all effort after a consolidation with more meaning and reason.

Religion has opened out an intimate relationship with an Infinite and Absolute Life, and has given our life an originality over against all the attempts to classify it within the causal nexus. As religion thus places man between two worlds, it calls him to a self-decision and makes freedom for the first time possible, for freedom remains an empty delusion so long as we are only pieces of a merely "given" world. And, for the first time, religion furnishes the possibility of an inner renewal and of a new beginning through a contact with an inexhaustible depth. As thus worlds come to a focus within the deepest inwardness of the soul, and as freedom becomes a portion of our spiritual self-preservation, then this ennobles every effort after freedom and strengthens the confidence in the possibility of an inner renewal throughout the whole breadth of life. How much we are in need of such a confidence, since even the most brilliant civilisation finally outlives itself, and since mankind even amidst the greatest richness of results becomes inwardly sterile! And, further, the whole of life gains immensely in stimulation and tension, in meaning and value; it passes out of merely external occurrences to a genuine life of its own where it transforms itself in the struggle between an old and a new world, between originality and imposed conditions, between its own deed and the process of nature. For "without the contradiction of necessity and freedom, not only philosophy but every higher will of the spirit would sink into death" (Schelling).

Religion founds the whole of reality upon a cosmic inner life. The fact that religion preserves such a depth within us must be discovered through the presence also of more inwardness in the rest of life, and everything must be strengthened which aspires after such a depth. Certainly, religion does not carry every outer into an inner, every visible thing into the invisible; but in the midst of the visible an invisible kingdom can be present, which sees more and more in the visible, and which enables the visible to produce new effects. We have already observed how Art especially wrested a soul from the external, and simultaneously opened out a new kingdom of life. And in this connection, too, does the progressive deepening which is visible in life everywhere find its true interpretation and its full acknowledgment. Thus the facts themselves illumine themselves and gain an energy for our efforts, so that in the advance of the movement the Inner ceases more and more to be a mere addendum of the sensuous world, and becomes the main standard of life, and through this culminates in an effective re-valuation of all value and excellences.

Such a progress would not have been possible without the differentiation of a substantial and intrinsic inwardness from a subjective and empty inwardness. The foundation of such a genuine inwardness is secured only through the acknowledgment of an independent inner world as is represented by religion. In order to bring this truth to clearness, it has to be borne in mind that the inwardness not only engenders new contents and values, but in the main it makes in the first place these contents and

values possible. These values could never happen from without, and could never originate out of man's mere contact with external things, but they require an inwardness grounded in the soul itself. But this truth is not able to find a secure basis in religion unless its effects and sway illumine clearly the remainder of life, and connect themselves energetically together. Thus, to all striving belongs an actual necessity over against a merely subjective opinion and inclination as presented in science and art, law and morality. Where otherwise lies and works that actual necessity save in the characteristic inwardness of the spirit of man? It is out of this source alone that conceptions such as personality and spiritual individuality gain an independence and a characteristic content over against mere nature, and are able to obtain a value in what takes place within themselves. And it is from the same source that the standpoint and the inner scope of life, which all genuine spiritual work presupposes, are explained. For these dare not make either the external result or the merely subjective welfare their own final end without becoming inwardly degraded and, indeed, inwardly destroyed. If they are ever to maintain a self-reliance against carnal appetites without and within, and if they are to preserve the results of their labour from falling into emptiness, they must stand within an inner world, and find their entire satisfaction in the further development of such a world and in the incorporation of it within the human circle. Thus, the whole of life exhibits a struggle between a subjective and a substantial inwardness. The latter, however, appears the greater, and gains in energy

when it finds through religion a firm centre and, at the same time, a closer bond of union.

The movement against the mere humanising of our existence—a movement which penetrates all spiritual effort—stands in close relationship with what we have just discussed. For we could not speak at all of truth over against mere opinion, or of good over against mere utility, unless there is some point of departure from the limits of mere humanity, and unless there is an acknowledgment of a truth beyond man himself. But what is maintained in this statement is impossible of realisation without raising the Spiritual Life from the narrowness and subjection of its human mode; and this religion does through the acknowledgment of a superhuman origin of the Spiritual Life. As, then, the wonderful seems now possible to religion, religion must now strengthen the power as well as the positive assurance of all effort to reach it. Now for the first time it can be fully realised that all genuine spiritual culture undertakes a struggle against the petty-human, and that the progress into the spiritual presents itself as an ever-further repression of the petty-human, and that especially modern times form at this point a sharp dividing-line. Its great thinkers—a Spinoza, a Kant, and a Hegel—set their best energy upon the attempt to bring life to such a point where all the isolation and limitation of man fall away, and where a spiritual content of a universal kind and of an absolute validity opens itself out.

Thus religion, all along the line, throws a new light upon life; new aspects of life become prominent in this light, and bind together elements otherwise isolated; more aspiring reason comes into existence,

and more simplicity and greatness are discovered. The concentration which grows through religion works beyond itself into the whole of life, and binds all the manifold more energetically into a total activity. Life as a whole thus gains a new total view, and appears now more than a mere movement within a given circle—more than a maintenance, an enjoyment, or an ornamentation of natural existence; it appears as an apprehension of a new and essentially different world, and, indeed, as an entire inversion of all prior existence. This does not mean that all existing things enter into such an ascent, as an optimistic evolutionary doctrine asserts, but it does mean that a connected movement to a new height arises, and carries with itself an immense current of actuality—a current which could never be produced by the reflection of mere man.

The fact that religion thus appears as the height and the animating soul of a wider life and that it illumines, collects, and strengthens so much, may be greeted as a corroboration of its own truth. But it dare not base its truth upon that wider life, as has often been attempted and has called forth inevitable opposition. For in our view the world receives its interpretation only *after* the development and consolidation of the absolute life by religion; unless this fact is observed, the proof is searched for in the empirical situation, which may suggest the greater depth represented by religion; but, prior to the appearance of religion, this More of religion remains an obscure background, and it is thus a leap of thought alone that can give it an intimate relationship to religion. Such a leap

takes place, for instance, when, through the observation of the interaction of the elements in nature, it is sought to prove the existence of God as the connecting medium; or when, within the organic world, the existence of teleological tendencies and formations are made to prove the guidance and activity of God. But we must not forget that no province can prove anything outside its own reach, and that an attempt to do this leads into anthropomorphism. It is similar with human and historical life. To him who sees life in the light of religion, life itself becomes a verification, and he will find everywhere indications of the presence of an Infinite Life, but he dare not reverse this method and attempt to make of an external derivative a foundation of religion. To allow the religious interpretation and the scientific explanation of the universe to blend into one injures not only science but also religion.

We have already witnessed the religious interpretation work in the direction of consolidating and gathering together, and through this raising the courage of life. But an explanation or even a diminution of evil is not brought forth. But rather the increase of the action on the good side makes the opposite side appear all the greater, and stronger than ever the power of destruction and of unreason comes prominently forward. But all this is a gain—and it is no small gain—because the matter is now abstracted from man's subjectivity, and a cosmic movement and a cosmic struggle have become evident. Mysterious as the whole may appear, there cannot be a doubt concerning one's own situation and task. Different grades of reality meet within our domain, and an

advance does not result through a restful further development, but painful entanglements and perversions retard the advance, and any kind of success is hoped for only through a retreat to the Final Cause. But we have already noticed how such a dependence of man did not take away his own self-activity, and how in the particular situation the vindication and progress of the whole was set upon man's own act. Thus man's action gains a mighty expansion; he works in the works of the All; indeed, he becomes through the Divine Life a co-carrier of Infinity.

The movement seems hardly to make head-way under such powerful hindrances, and it need not frighten or dishearten us that it does not compass the whole of our existence and that it carries only a portion of it along with itself. We are still able to hope, because religion carries within itself a secure eminence beyond the whole line of battle, and because its characteristic truth is not linked in the last resort even upon success in this battle. And further, our human world signifies to religion no more than a particular kind of existence, but the unfinished condition of this world signifies in no way an utter absurdity, but is able to gain some kind of meaning through the presence of a higher standpoint, and is thus turned to something other than a tangled chaos. Certainly, our world is no simple evolution of reason, but a certain moving tendency in that direction is not to be denied it. More and more connections and more and more inwardness appear in bold relief. The Spiritual Life does not, indeed, gain the whole breadth of things, but it unlocks an ever richer content, and affords a

glimpse into ever greater depths. But simultaneously the oppositions grow too; the problems become more and more difficult; and what previously seemed so near and easily within our reach recedes more and more on the horizon. Is there a greater difference than this between antiquity and modern times: that the weightiest questions seemed near solution to the former, whilst with us the goals recede ever farther? Thus, the main gain of the movement is a heightening of the problem; and more incomplete our life appears. But who has given us the certainty that our world constitutes a completed Whole, and that it carries its complete interpretation in itself? How is it, if our world is such, that the problems are to be vigorously worked out, that the energies prepare themselves and set themselves against one another, and that the opposites gain so much in clearness? Then, indeed, the whole of this world would be but a beginning, and might be compared to the development of the plot of a drama: the further development is lost for us in darkness, but religion has no doubt as to the final consummation. Thus we do not deal of course with the consummation; it is sufficient for us to know that what we do is not lost. The words of Luther are valid for the whole of life: "We are not it yet, but we shall be it; it is not yet done and has not yet happened, but it is, however, on the move and in full swing; it is not the goal but the road; all is not aglow and sparkling, but all is being cleansed."

Religion may discover with pain the fact that we are not able to fathom the whole; yet on account of its basal conviction of the intimate presence of an Absolute Life, religion will not allow itself to be

overthrown, but rather it will derive the confidence from such a conviction; an elevated reason enforces its way through all the unreason and will manifest itself in the vicissitudes of single souls. The darkness may even be of value, in view of the actual condition of man, in so far as it pushes back the idea of reward and directs the effort upon the content of life itself. Thus a Kant, in a surveyed reflection, could greet this lack of insight into the wider connections of things as a gain for the purification of character, and could give expression to the conviction "that the inscrutable wisdom through which we exist is not less venerable in what it denies us than in what it allows us."

The religious interpretation of life, through such a course, will not work towards the lessening but towards the heightening of its energy, its self-reliance, and its virility. Where our life carries within itself so many oppositions and decisions, where so much within it has to be awakened and strengthened, where cosmic movements penetrate into our existence, and where a higher mode of existence has to gain a place over against the ordinary shallow routine, the task cannot consist in prudent evasion of the entanglements, in bringing things to the same centre of gravity, or in hunting after a smug happiness. But it is necessary to enter courageously into the great struggle, and to work without ceasing for the possession and the progression of the new world of an essential life; and in the midst of confusion and obstruction, in unreadiness and darkness, in suffering and death, to be fully certain of the presence of an Eternal Life.

4. *Faith and Doubt: The Denial of Religion*

Religion has to prove its rights not only against certain propositions but against a deep-rooted mode of thinking. By this we mean, first of all, that naïve fixed mode of thinking with its intellectual outlook on the world—a mode of thinking which conceives that the truth can be determined independently of life, and that life can afterwards be led to it. Such happens only in connection with the relationship to a world existing outside ourselves; but, if it is necessary to conceive of the whole of reality only as something external to ourselves, then religion stands condemned. But it is not only religion but also the whole of the ascending Spiritual Life which insists upon an inner relationship to things; and herewith the whole of life comes to the foreground, and determines also the particular mode of thinking—its direction and formation—in accordance with its own qualities. If religion thus leads into a characteristic conception of faith, such a life in the first place rests upon a characteristic life—upon a life in the special spiritual sense—which carries within itself a reality, and which develops it out of itself. Religion is not a communication of over-world secrets, but the inauguration of an over-world life; and it is with the acknowledgment and assimilation of such a life that faith has to do; it has to do with an appropriation which carries a synthesis and an ascent of man's own nature as well as an advancement and a lofty elevation within itself. The new life brings forth with itself a new conception of reality, but faith all along proceeds to such a reality through life alone; and it

is only in the obscuring of this connection and finally in its dissolution that faith becomes a mere assertion concerning things on the other side of this world, and consequently succumbs inevitably to the criticism of knowledge, whilst faith as a power of life precedes knowledge, and it is only out of faith that knowledge becomes possible. Such a faith is not only of a stirring and progressive, but also of a welding and defensive, nature. Then an unbroken decision for a new life and its appropriation in a Whole becomes a matter of significance, and life maintains itself against a hostile or indifferent world; it holds itself fast to invisible facts against the hard opposition of visible existence, and to general ideas over against all the failures of the nearest-at-hand achievements.

If faith carries within itself so much movement and struggle, it is not surprising if the matter does not run smoothly, if hindrances and deadlocks obtrude, if faith and doubt set themselves against one another, and if the soul is set in a painful dilemma. Doubt, in these connections, does not appear as something monstrous and atrocious, though it would appear so if a perfect circle of ideas presented itself to man and demanded his assent as a bounden duty. For where it is necessary to lay hold on a new life and to bring to consummation an inward transformation, then a personal experience and testing are needed. But no proof is definite which clings from the beginning to the final result, and places on one side all possibility of an antithesis. The opposite possibility must be thought out and lived through if the Yea is to possess full energy and genuineness. Thus doubt becomes a necessary, if also an un-

comfortable, companion of religion; it is indispensable for the conservation of the full freshness and originality of religion—for the freeing of religion from conventional forms and phrases which would lead the mighty current into well-ordered channels but which easily cause it to be lost in the sands.

The history of religion presents us with a corroboration of this estimate. For it shows only a mediocre kind of the religious life as being unassailable by any doubt—a life inclined to a pharisaic superiority; and to such a life the stern suppression of all doubt or even of any problem seemed necessary for the consolidation of its own belief. But on the contrary, many creative spirits—for instance, Augustine and Luther—had much trouble with doubt. This was so, not because their impetus towards religion was less strong, but because, by means of the greater strength of such an impetus, they saw through the inadequacy of all the props which give the feeling of certainty to the average man, and because they longed for something essentially secure, intimately present, and free from every human error, in order to posit their life upon it and in order to defy even death itself. It was only through the possession of such a goal that these leaders could become other than they were; but the realisation of such a goal claimed the greatest toil and a fearless analysis of doubt. And even with all this, no complete rest was gained. What was as steadfast as the rock in the depth of the soul, experienced temptations ever anew from a surrounding world which never allowed the soul a rest. So that the certainty constitutes no inert possession, but has ever anew to be struggled

for and ever anew has to wrestle with doubt. "I believe, Lord; help Thou mine unbelief": this is the best expression of the situation of the soul which finds itself in such struggles.

To bring forth tangible signs and wonders to the aid of threatened belief was a very natural and congenial thought to a naïve frame of mind. But with closer reflection, the observation renders this situation precarious because now external wonders have withdrawn entirely from the heights of spiritual creativeness—from the inner wonder of the Spiritual Life and from the intimate presence of a Divine World. The founders of religion have themselves protested against a craving after such sensuous signs. "Go thither and hush up about your good works, and make a clean breast before the people of the sins you have committed, for that is the true wonder." These were the words of the Buddha; and Mahomet would perform no wonders, but looked upon the great works of God in nature and in the human soul as the true signs and wonders which man is called to believe in. How did Jesus blame those who craved for wonders and who had mixed up his life's work with signs and wonders? "An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign; and there shall no sign be given to it but the sign of Jonah the prophet." This is no other than the sign of spiritual power and of a Divine message and greatness.

Again, there is a mid-level of religion to which miracle seems indispensable in order to give faith the certainty from without which it is not able to obtain from within; thus one will see and feel with Thomas before one believes. Great crises and

upheavals, however, have ever returned to the inner wonder of the spirit of man. The Reformation was attested by no external signs and wonders, and yet it found the energy to forge its way against an old and great existing world and its possessions, to renew life, and to fortify religious certainty. And so it was in connection with Savonarola in the dark days prior to his violent end—days which chronicle a touching insight into certainty and joyousness. Where did he finally find these? He found them not in external signs and wonders which lay near to him in the environment or through tradition; he found them in the inward presence of a life-elevating Divine Spirit that makes something better out of man, and whose communication can thus be no mere illusion.

Doubt is far more an uncomfortable companion than an enemy of religion. Doubt always bears witness to a strong interest, anxiety, and labour in the cause; it acknowledges the problem, it discovers the difficulty and even the impossibility of an easy solution. It is quite otherwise with the entire denial of religion—with the attempt to drive religion entirely out of life. But even this can appear monstrous to no one to whom the entanglements of the question have become evident and who fully measures the wide distance between our world and the picture which religion demands. But the question arises, whether these entanglements can be overcome, and whether new realities—original facts—stand over against them. We sought to show that this is the case through the discovery of an autonomous depth of life—through the tracing of an intimate relationship of man to a cosmic and absolute life; we ventured to assert the need of a

struggle with all things which, after the inauguration of the new life, become externals and a mere environment, and also to assert the need of carrying forth such a struggle to a victorious issue. Herewith we are fully conscious of the fact that the new life carries within itself assertions which are in no way self-evident, and concerning which much uncertainty and discord can arise. But then the struggle is pushed back farther into life; it does not concern an interpretation of a "given" world but the production and content of reality itself; it is not a concern of the mere intellect but of the whole man; it is a struggle of life against life. Let us inquire what possibilities are here in question, and what aspects of life oppose religion.

There are three assertions, or rather, the conjoint action of three, which the characteristic life of religion carries within itself. The first is, that a self-reliant and inter-connected Spiritual Life develops over against bare nature as well as over against the particular individual with all his distractions. The second is, that this Spiritual Life collides in our world with the hardest oppositions within and without—oppositions not only in individual points but in the whole of our being, so that our existence presents itself as an inner contradiction. The third is, that the manifestation of a new life raises man above these oppositions and re-instates life in the position of positive action and creativeness. Thus, there bind themselves together the *basis*, the *struggle*, and the *conquest* of spirituality. Life is through this posited upon a new summit; it undergoes here sore trials under which it threatens to fade away, but finally reaches, through a strengthening from within, the

victory of a Yea. When these three grades bind themselves through an adjustment of their conflicting experiences, and through a reciprocal relationship into a corporate life, then religion has secured a pre-eminent place in life.

At the same time there becomes evident whence the rejection of religion arises—from what directions of life it is considered an error and an absurdity. Rejected must religion be by all who make war upon its foundation and indispensable presupposition—upon the existence of an independent spirituality. Naturalism does this through its conceiving of all Spiritual Life as a mere product or a secondary accompanying phenomenon of the sensuous world. Phenomenalism or subjectivism acts similarly through the dissemination and dissolution of the Spiritual Life into isolated and disconnected phenomena. Both do not bring forth either the need for, or the understanding of, religion. And even quite as little will a mode of thinking help life which does not perceive the difficulties and the manifold contradictions down to their very root, and which resolves all the discords of the first view of things into an encompassing world-harmony: these are the optimists of all kinds. Optimism is able to assume many different forms; it is able to perceive reason in the very structure of the universe or in the evolution of life; it is able to determine the progress of human civilisation from a practico-social point of view; it is able, on the romantic-speculative side, to take the greatness and beauty of nature as its basis. The enthusiasm of culture and the romanticism of nature find the solution of things within the given world, and do

not feel the need of religion, and they often conceive of the turn to religion as an expression of weakness. But, however, the full acknowledgment of the hindrance leads in no way to religion. It can include far more a paralysing and a deadlock of life which turn either into a weak resignation or into a passionate pessimism. As soon, however, as pessimism becomes rigid and absolute it withstands religion, since it holds life fast to doubt—life which otherwise through the possession of a new stage would have turned to religion.

From these assaults, the greater outer diffusion happens in the beginning of the series, and the greater inner dangers happen in the conclusion. Naturalism corresponds to the character of the great external accumulations found in all situations, and has but a slight contact with spiritual tasks. Pessimism fetters more the elevated things which carry within themselves the movements and experiences of life. Special modes of thought and conceptions of the universe originate from these standpoints—modes of thought with which religion has to come to an understanding. But what arises into ideas and doctrines draws its energy from the formation of life out of which it proceeds and which brings it to expression. Religion, however, asserts its right and superiority in that it alone is able to estimate the different sides of things justly and to connect them together into a Whole; and in that it is able to give its rights to each individual main experience without doing a wrong to any experience. Religion alone institutes a thoroughgoing movement and maintains this movement even at the end; it alone is able simultaneously to

recognise fully the hindrances and inwardly to overcome them.

If thus the source of the power of religion lies in such a universal and elevated character of its life, the defence of its truth depends especially in holding life fully to its summits, in developing the particular sides equably, and in gathering them together strongly into a Whole, thus avoiding a resignation into lower levels and courageously steering clear of dangerous courses.

It is necessary before all else for the truth of religion that the elevation to the stage of the Spiritual Life should be consummated and conserved with all energy. Such a truth enters always into insecurity when religion is based upon mere feeling; and, along with this, all spiritual contents disappear when religion rests in the main upon isolated activities and does not lead into a new mode of being, and develops no new reality out of itself. If there results no elevation beyond the ordinary surface-tendency of life, if religion works only within a "given" world instead of manifesting a new world, it abandons its truth from the very beginning and becomes powerless against doubt. The second point is the need of the full acknowledgment of the opposition, and the rejection of all superficial optimism. Certainly it is necessary to conquer finally the enemy somehow, but the conquest itself loses its energy when the problem is blunted from the very beginning. The opposition, however, will be estimated in a fuller measure only when the fact is laid hold of as a Whole and is made to depend upon one's own act, *i.e.* when the encounter takes on an ethical character. It

is thus alone that the problem steps into the centre of life, and thus alone does the matter shape itself into a struggle for a spiritual existence. This does not mean, in spite of great failures and the breaking off at the outset of many convictions, that all evil is an effect of guilt. That would present a far too narrow and rigid formation of life—a formation largely devoid of the ethical. Yet the whole of life must interpret every tendency; for it is only when man himself participates in the great world-struggle, experiences and grasps the tasks as his own, that the opposition gains such a violent and stirring energy as to render a reconciliation with the given situation now simply impossible, and to have the choice only between an overthrow or a renewal of life.

The third and final point we wish to emphasise is, that this renewal is actually realised, and is not a mere delusion; it means that life is essentially raised from within—indeed, raised in its totality—and that it depends in no manner on purely particular excitations or mere injunctions from a "beyond," for such would keep life tied to a mere hope and tarrying, and would easily give it an oppressed and doleful character. The aspiring New must reach a living present, and dare not reconcile itself to a mere More of the prior situation; it must not trace out in imagination a similar (but painless) world to ours, but it must bring forth an entire transformation and along with this consummate an essential elevation; otherwise there is no genuine conquest and no convincing meaning of the whole. For why all this toil and sorrow if nothing *new* issues forth?

First of all, it is necessary to raise life to a height

of an essential self-subsisting spirituality, and to gain a new domain—a new place for spiritual experience; it is here necessary to experience the Nay and the Yea and to bring them to a right relationship, and finally raise all to an undivided and encompassing life. The main proof of religion lies always in the Whole of the life developed out of religion. This Whole must draw to itself the whole circumference of existence; it must sift and winnow, connect and raise; it must conduct things to their own truth; it must kindle a powerful movement which, through its own content and its progressive victorious superiority, demonstrates its own truth. Here it is not a doctrine which man has merely to accept and follow that leads him to religion, but a life held in front of him and brought near to him; it is for this he is called, for it is this alone which grants him the right relationship to reality, and enables him to dive into the depth of his own nature. Through this the idea of reality is transformed, extended, and deepened. The elevation of the level of reality, the inner ascent of life in a manner superior to all capacity of the mere individual, the growth and creativeness—all these are the main proof which religion is able to bring forth. The fact that religion, with its willing and creating, stands in no isolation but finds itself in the centre of life, that it furthers the whole and not merely isolated sides, and that it leads it to its own truth—all this belongs essentially to this main proof. As with all things original and axiomatic, this new life is positively demonstrated through its own development and not through a deduction from

some other points: it carries its most effective energy of conviction in the strength and clearness of its own development; it never allows itself to be forced from without, but only to be stimulated from within, and it cannot possibly convince and gain us where such a stimulation finds no kind of accommodating spirit.

An indirect proof, however, can be found in the fact that without the connection and elevation of life represented by religion, all that life possesses as any kind of content becomes insecure and unstable. We need only follow backwards the stages of ascent in order to become aware that with the surrender of religion a decay of life sets in, eats more and more into its essentials, and finally destroys its deepest foundation. When religion thus decays, a conquest of unreason takes its place, and pessimism becomes the uncontested lord of the field. As a final conclusion, however, such a pessimism must become rigid, embittered, and barren; the whole life sees itself threatened by it with stagnation—indeed, with destruction. An urgent natural impulse withstands this pessimism, and a tenacious clinging to existence softens it to some extent. One wishes in some kind of way to retain life, but is not able to do this without emphasising the brighter sides of existence and placing the darker sides in the background; thus we find an approach to optimism without a crossing over to optimism. Thus we witness in our own day an affirmation of life gaining ground over against an intolerable growing pessimism; the ground is gained not so much through an inner elevation of life as through men's resistance to an entire denial.

But a solid support is granted in no way through such a resistance. Such a resistance either contains but little basal affirmation of life in face of the conflicting impressions of experience, and consequently sinks into superficiality and unveracity, or these contradictory impressions gain the overhand and destroy then all synthesis of life and annihilate all self-reliant spirituality. Thus, life loses all spiritual character, and renounces all ideality when it turns aside the inner advance of the movement and its conclusion from the realm of religion. It appears clear in connection with all this, that the matter does not deal with a special province, but with the preservation of the whole of life, and that the denial of religion leads inevitably to an inner dissolution of the whole of life.

One may seek to evade such a conclusion of life as this through the belief that a certain kind of Spiritual Life is possible and actual without penetrating to final questions—that it surrounds us with its multicoloured fulness through the expansion of the work of culture. Why should we not accept the Spiritual Life as it offers itself to us in culture, dismiss all further questions, and cling to the actual whilst refusing to be involved in any problems of a subtle inward nature? We are able to do this, and had it not been that we were able to do it, life would offer quite a different aspect, and its opposites would stand far more pointedly and clearly against each other. But such an explanation of the whole matter is obtained at a high price! It is possible only where the Spiritual Life is conceived as something "given" and presented from the outside and not as something inward and

originally engendered. Thus it appears more as an alien than as our own concern—more as an appended trimming than as our inmost nature—and also it resolves itself into so many isolated appearances and does not connect itself together into a Whole. Whosoever tolerates such a degradation, alienation, and disintegration, and through this can renounce all inward independence, and place aside the question of truth even at the source of life itself, may find such a compromise sufficient for him. But he who takes up the struggle for truth and is determined to live his life as his very own, must lay on one side such compromise, for he is not able to escape from the fact that the problem proceeds from a Whole to a Whole, and that the nature of the movement is decided in the final conclusion of religion; and further that what has been given up in the Whole and in the Substance cannot be retained in any one isolated point or in the subject, and that no individual stage can offer us a foothold if the Whole ends in unreason. If one believes therefore that a denial of religion is a legitimate procedure, one must at the same time throw away as semblance and delusion what life has developed in the form of ideal greatness and goodness, and such a procedure leads inevitably to the conception of the spiritual evolution of humanity as an unparalleled great aberration. When this happens, man becomes from out of a cosmic nature a mere piece of a soulless and meaningless mechanism of culture, and all greatness and all emancipation from the mere-human to an inner independence disappear with the loss of the struggle from a Whole to a Whole. And with the resignation of all inner connections of reality, all unity of personality is given up. Now that

there is no intimate relationship to the whole of reality, all originality, all freedom, and all genuine present moment of the soul fall away; and now where a mere point holds life fast and rigid to itself, all love which has risen above a mere, natural impulse becomes an empty phrase.

The so-called immanent idealism with its deceptive, intermediate formations has become a special danger to man and to religion. Such a system dazzles man because it contends that the reason of reality and the meaning of life descend upon him without much labour, in a form of immediacy. Such an intermediate product springs from a flaw in the energy of life, and is bound to increase such a flaw; but notwithstanding its clanging phrases it is never able to discover this flaw, and it injures the truth of life. It is not only in the realm of science but also in religion that the words of Bacon hold valid, that truth proceeds out of mistakes rather than out of chaos. The atheist is not the most dangerous enemy of religion.

The Spiritual Life which attains full clearness in religion constantly remains in difficult opposition to the environing world, and an overcoming of this opposition is not to be found in the ordinary capacity of man. This opposition must and will move and stir ever anew head and heart, and will ever drive forth new doubts. The decision lies finally in the question whether for man the external world or a spring of life within himself is *the main fact*, whether the centre of gravity of reality is found without or within. *It is a struggle for the governing centre of life.* If the inner life attains to no independence and is not led as a Whole, the contradictions of the envir-

oning world appear insurmountable, and man must decline religion as an impossibility. But if the inner life reaches such an independence, and if man finds within the Spiritual Life simultaneously a new world and his own genuine self, the gravest misgivings will not be able to overthrow the certainty of this fundamental fact. Thus, this fundamental fact remains as the first and foremost, and uplifts itself far from the contradictions of the whole external world, so that the aspect of world has to accommodate itself to this fact and not this fact to that aspect. Certainly, even after such a decision the contradiction does not simply vanish, but as holiness retains the background of suffering, so certainty will preserve its "one thing needful" as the background of doubt. But the contradiction is now removed from the centre to the periphery of life; it can therefore only touch us from without, and is not able to overthrow what is within; it will now not so much weaken as strengthen the certainty, because it calls life to a perpetual renewal and brings to fruition the greatness of the conquest.

Part V.—Christianity and the Present

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS CONCERNING HISTORICAL AND ABSOLUTE RELIGION

If we now open the question concerning the relation of Christianity to our present day, the question gives another kind of character to our investigation, and presents new difficulties. Hitherto we have striven to come to an understanding with all who acknowledge fully the significance of the religious problem, but now we enter into a domain where divergent opinions are hardly to be avoided. For scientific reflections alone are not able to decide concerning the material within this domain, because characteristics of the work of life, individual impressions and experiences, fall into the balance. Thus, much which appeared to us as a main tendency is separated from us through this further problem. But in spite of this we dare not place our further investigation on one side. Closely connected with the investigation concerning the intrinsic truth of religion lies an open pronouncement concerning the situation of our day, for it is such a pronouncement which is able to set forth the essential character of our general conviction. That which rejects being immersed in mere Time has yet to verify itself in Time. May we as friends, in

the midst of all the differences, hold fast to what binds us together in the totality of our convictions.

How we understand the relation of the historical religions, and amongst them of Christianity, to absolute religion, has been shown in the whole course of our investigation. As certainly as there is only one sole truth, there can only be one absolute religion, and this religion coincides entirely in no way with any one of the historical religions. For they all conceive of the Divine under the conditions of the human situation; originating and growing in particular epochs, they have all to pay their tribute to the characteristics and culture of such epochs. But what is problematic and transient in such particularity need not prevent the action of a truth superior to time. If we acknowledge as the one essential of religions that they manifest and represent a Divine Life, such a Life in its inmost foundation is superior to its external configuration and activity, and thus it is able to withstand all the changes of time, and to maintain in the midst of all its curtailment through the human situation an eternal truth. It is then necessary to differentiate such a *Substance* of religion from its *Existential-form*; it is necessary to examine how far religion harbours and represents such a fundamental life which runs through all ages and nations, and which raises them beyond the merely human situation. That a religion confesses itself to be an historical religion does not mean that it is to be considered as the final and completed truth, but that it is accepted as a standpoint where there exists the closest possible contact with truth, and where we are able to take possession of it.

The historical religions are not the truth itself, but appearances of the truth and pathways to the truth; and it is only where the Divine and the human get mixed up that men can fail to perceive this limit of the historical religions.

If from the standpoint of religion a critical investigation of historical religions becomes needful, critical investigation is nowhere more difficult than within this domain. Conflicting considerations work here especially against each other. Now the historical religions may partially desire and deserve a great veneration because of their actual achievements. They are not mere systems of doctrine, but a concentration and development of life; they have traced out ideals not through some bold flight of thought, but have rooted such ideals even in the stony ground of the life of humanity; they have worked not merely for a period and upon select minds, but have operated along the whole vista of the ages for the welfare of humanity; they carry within themselves, through their close contact with human reality, great experiences, and have gained an actuality which maintains itself through its own centre of gravity, because religion from the outset deals not so much with theoretical considerations of the world, but with a content of life which will secure for us a spiritual existence. Thus Hegel's words concerning a preponderatingly critical relationship to the State hold even more valid in the domain of religion. "The State is no work of art; it stands within the world, and thus within the spheres of arbitrary action, of accidents, and of errors; and evil conduct is able to disfigure it on many sides. But even the ugliest person, the criminal, the invalid, and the cripple, are

yet living beings: and this affirmation—Life—exists in spite of all the flaws, and it is with this affirmation that we have to do." Where the treatment of religion does not succeed in reaching this affirmative character, where religion is simply cavilled at, and no attempt is made to enter into its totality and its inwardness, such a carping criticism may attain a cheap popularity, but it has absolutely no value for the subject-matter.

This is one side of the matter. But there remains another side, and it, too, has its rights. The historical religions may not be satisfied with their actual facts alone; they raise the claim of being the truth—the final truth, which is superior to all else. Now, nothing—not even the most colossal achievement of an historical kind—is able to furnish the proof of such a truth, for such a proof is only to be found from a standpoint *above* Time and from the very nature of the Spiritual Life and its fundamental relationship to reality. Thus an intimate and immediate life has to stand over against every historical achievement, measure it, and test it. In fact there exists in all times, and especially in such times when historical religion was in a state of indisputable sovereignty, an interior tension between tradition and immediate life, and the assimilation of the presented material is ever a remodelling and an adjustment. But as long as this adjustment was not too difficult to accomplish, no cleft was felt, and consequently the historical religion could appear to be in entire possession of the truth. When, however, important transformations of universal life heighten the tension, a point is finally reached where men feel especially its distance from their own

ideas and efforts, and where, consequently, the relationship to such an historical religion becomes predominantly critical and negative. The differences which thus originate may be twofold. Either life outgrows the content of the historical religion, and therefore great revolutions of an inward character become inevitable; or all the transformations in the existential-form leave so much of the Substance untouched, so that still the changes in the external form can be connected with the inward nucleus, and thus in the midst of all the disarrangement the continuity of the historical religion can be preserved. Indeed, the transformation in the existential-form may even help towards a purer and more energetic effect of the Substance, and thus the seeming upheaval and destruction may prove itself finally to be a development and deepening of the Substance.

All this has now to be applied in connection with Christianity. It is necessary to ask the question, how deeply Christianity is affected by the undeniable transformations of culture and human life, whether it is able to assert and maintain itself victoriously over against such culture and life, and what such an assertion demands in the way of new activities.

PART V.—CHRISTIANITY AND THE PRESENT
(CONTINUED)

CHAPTER XV

a. THE ETERNAL IN CHRISTIANITY

1. *The Nucleus beyond all Loss.*

THE whole of our investigation leaves no doubt as to our position in regard to Christianity. A double aspect has been already fully noticed. On the one hand, Christianity in the nature of its Substance appears as the highest embodiment of absolute religion; and, on the other hand, a fundamental revision of its traditional existential-form has become absolutely necessary. It has already appeared to us that we are not able to develop what proves itself as absolute religion without a constant reference to Christianity. Christianity has already appeared to us from its inmost foundation as the religion of religions, and, simultaneously, as being certain of a permanent duration. But the Eternal in Christianity finds itself not only railed in and interlaced, but also welded with seemingly inseparable elements which bear the imprint of a special age, and which we dare not bind to ourselves—an age which is so distant from us and which in so many ways has been outrun. It is now necessary to present a connected view of the twofold

aspects, to mark clearly the boundaries between them, and to show the necessity of not allowing the religious problem to remain in a state of stagnation. If we bring together the results of our main discussion and the historical conditions of Christianity, we shall see how they illumine one another reciprocally, how they strengthen one another, and, also, how they diverge from one another. This will enable us to understand where the boundary between the temporal and the Eternal lies, and this in its turn will carry to clearer expression the manner in which Christianity has to be shaped in the future.

Christianity is a religion of redemption and not a religion of law. Herein lies the acknowledgment of a pointed contrast between an actual and an urgent situation; herein lies the assertion of the inability, out of one's own energy, to reach the longed-for summit through a general kind of improvement of the prior situation; and herein lies the demand of a transformation and elevation through an intimate entrance of the Divine. Does the general experience of the Spiritual Life corroborate this assertion? It does. For we have already seen how the Spiritual Life is unable to find its necessary self-reliance in the world of ordinary experience; we have seen a breach between genuine spirituality and the world taking place; and we have seen how the effects of all this carry a new world within themselves. In spiritual things every pathway of man leads to a Yea through a Nay, and all toil is in vain without an inner elevation through the energy of an Absolute Life. This happens in connection with the whole of the Spiritual Life as soon as it aspires to climb from merely decora-

tive culture to genuine truth, and this Spiritual Life strengthens itself even through the very effort itself; it is only the inauguration of a new stage of reality that is able here to prevent a shipwreck of all toilsome work. This new stage places the threatened overthrow of human life, the impotence of mere man, and the presence of an elevated world, far more intuitively and urgently before man's eyes. Thus, the religion of redemption only brings to a fuller expression and more tangible configuration what is present as a demand and a fact throughout the whole of life.

The religions of redemption which are found alongside of Christianity are esoteric Brahmanism and Buddhism. But the difference between the latter and Christianity occupied our attention at the commencement of our investigation, and has appeared all the greater in the course of the investigation. Now it becomes quite clear how wide an interval lies between a predominantly intellectual religion of redemption and a predominantly ethical one, and how differently life shapes itself in each. In the former mode an emancipation from semblance becomes necessary; in the latter mode an overcoming of evil is the one thing needful. In the former, the very basis of the world seems evil; in the latter, it is the perversion of this basis which seems evil. In the former, the impulses of life are to be entirely eradicated; in the latter, on the contrary, they are to be ennobled or rather to be transformed. In the former, no higher world of a positive kind dawns on man, so that life finally reaches a seemingly valid point of rest, whilst upon Christian ground life ever anew ascends beyond itself.

In Christianity suffering has its bitterness chiefly as a perversion of an original good, so that a Yea is able to work in the midst of all unreason, and a hope of a final conquest is able to become the possession of the soul in the midst of the seeming collapse of the world. But an elevation into a new world is even here not an entire casting off of the old world. For that elevation does not succeed at the outset in reaching the inmost depth—the centre of life. The old world with its darkness and suffering, its alarm and its error, persists in the whole breadth of existence. There arises thus a noteworthy dialectic of life. What man possesses in this existence has to be won and even abandoned. Thus, an overflowing joy and a deep pain, a serene security of the inner being and a drifting of existence before all the storms of life; a steadfast conviction and a brooding doubt, a participation in the perfection of Absolute Life and a persistence of human pettiness meet as opposites in the one and same life. If life is ever to rise, it has to take upon itself, in a genuine manner, its own acts, and not be satisfied with a merely sentimental disposition; it has to enter into an incessant tension and movement; it has to be driven to ever further self-deepening; and it has to take up its experiences in all their extent, to live through them, and to taste all their sweets and bitterness. Thus there arises energy without defiance, gentleness without weakness; indeed, the deepest feeling and the most joyous activity sustain and interlace one another. Such an inner tension and movement, as we have already observed, are indispensable for the ascent of the Spiritual Life under human con-

ditions, and Christianity only develops here in a special direction what is struggling upwards from the whole of life and which is pressing towards a configuration.

All religions proclaim and require morality. But this of itself signifies in no manner that freedom and deed constitute the source of their ideal world, or that the nucleus of the Spiritual Life is of an ethical nature. What constitutes the decisive characteristic of Christianity is the fact that it roots the whole world in freedom, and that it refuses altogether the reducing of the Spiritual Life to a natural or mental process. But, at the same time, Christianity steps into painful entanglements without and within. Without, a rigid kingdom of mechanism which enters into the soul and overpowers spiritual activity withstands the attempts of a transformation into freedom, into a soul, and into love. The impression of a blind indifferent actuality is here so powerful against all inner greatness and goodness that an external glance of things deems it hopeless to overcome the opposition. At the same time, entanglements of an inward kind threaten to bring the movement towards freedom and personality under the ban of the petty-human, and to rob these qualities of their cosmic character; and the threat goes so far as to coerce all inward aspiration under an all-powerful destiny. Therefore, there arises a painful hazardous enterprise when the struggle is taken up against such oppositions within and without; but Christianity has found the courage and the faith for this colossal struggle, for it has become convinced that this is the only means for the spiritual preservation of human life and for the gaining of a meaning and value. At the same time, the inmost

nucleus of life must withdraw itself from all rationalistic deductions, and yet it has to remain in the midst of opposites. Christianity is the most ultra-rational of all religions, because it is the richest and deepest of them all.

It was a main point in our investigation to show that the Spiritual Life is not a manifestation of mere man but of an independent reality, and that it, through a communication of this reality, gains a new and cosmic nature for man. What religion more fully meets such demands as that which makes the Kingdom of God its central idea, and which promises to help the individual not only in a "given" world, but to guide him to a new world? And this new world is contiguous with man not only from the external; it also becomes one's own world from within and as a Whole; and as each particular point in life has now to be decided by reference to the Whole, and, indeed, has to carry the Whole within itself, life gains a task which cannot be measured and a greatness superior to that of the world.

The union of the human and the Divine constitutes the nucleus of all genuine religion, and it is the manner in which this union is conceived that constitutes the main characteristics of the particular religions. Christianity has pursued this problem to its final depths, since it not only effects particular relations of the Divine and the human, but presents a full union of the two natures, and has courageously maintained the indestructibility of the Divine in the midst of all the perversions of the human situation. Not all the crippling of this idea through unhappy dogmatic formulations can hide

the fact that the religious form presents here a truth which is the indispensable presupposition of every effort after truth, and without which our life loses all possibility of a durable support.

A warm love towards all humanity runs through Christianity; it longs to redeem every individual; it gives man a value beyond all special achievements and on the other side of all mental and moral deeds; it has been the first to bring the pure inwardness of the soul to a clearer expression. But it has also, through the linking of the human to a Divine and Eternal Order, raised life beyond all the petty-human with its civic ordinances and social interests. He who, with the best intention, views Christianity as a mere means for the betterment of the social situation, draws it from the heights of its nature, and deprives it of the main constituent of its greatness—the emancipation from the petty-human within the depths of the human itself. It is essentially the nature of Christianity that it transplants man into a new world over against the nearest-at-hand world; it has planted the fundamental conviction of Platonism of the existence of an Eternal Order over against the world of time amongst a great portion of the human race, and has given a mighty impetus to all effort. But it has, though it separated the Eternal from Time, brought it back again into Time, and through this presence of the Eternal it has, for the first time, proposed to mankind and to each individual a fundamental inner renewal, and through this has inaugurated a genuine history.

In order to render the Life-process of Christianity characteristic and significant two different elements have to be taken into account—a conception of the

Spiritual Life and a valuation of the actual world-situation. A hard contradiction and an immense movement issue from the contact of the two elements: that which from within is real and necessary, is set back and rejected by the surface-reality nearest-at-hand. Thus, life finds itself within a powerful coil, and a great decision becomes urgent. Shall the new world which arises from within and which, viewed inwardly, appears the most certain thing of all, gain our energy and disposition in spite of the contradiction of the whole remaining world? Or shall we merely accept the fulness of the external world and allow the overthrow of our inwardness to take place? There is here no middle course. Christianity has decided for the first alternative; but it is important to bear in mind that Christianity presents no ready-made conclusion, but that it brings forth an inexhaustible movement. Christianity before all else is great in that it takes up the experiences and the opposites of life in their widest extent, and fastens them together into a Whole; it is great in stirrings, struggles, and transformations; it appears before all else as a powerful current of life which indeed does not flow into vagueness; but over against all attempts to make it deviate from its course it adheres to its main tendency. The whole of the Spiritual Life and the total trend of human things point in the same direction. Thus, Christianity is not a special phenomenon by the side of other similar phenomena, but is the main struggle for the soul of man. It has within the domain of religion, and, along with this, in the deepest configuration of life, brought forth to an historical realisation what genuine spirituality

according to its total nature must demand as indispensable.

Thus, there is no need of a breach with Christianity; it can be to us what an historical religion pre-eminently is meant to be—a sure pathway to truth, an awakener of immediate and intimate life, a vivid representation and realisation of an Eternal Order which all the changes of Time cannot possess or destroy.

2. *The Maintenance of this Nucleus against the Changes of Time*

Let us now consider somewhat more closely how this Christian cardinal type of life retains its truth over against civilisation and culture. We limit ourselves to the consideration of the chief changes effected in the world of ideas. Our assertion proceeds from the fact that these changes undoubtedly enter into a sharp conflict with the traditional existential-form of Christianity, but the Substance of Christianity is not able to free itself from antiquated forms and gain a purer and more energetic development without much trouble and toil. The mighty expansion which the whole of modern times has brought forth need not become hostile to Christianity. Such an expansion can be assimilated by Christianity, and through the contact Christianity can even be strengthened, provided it turns to the depth of its own nature, fortifies itself with this Substance of Christianity, and simultaneously finds the courage for new creativeness.

(*a*) *The Further Development over against Nature.*—The most tangible result of modern investigation has been the immense extension of the natural world

and the shrinkage of the earthly circle to a minute littleness. The sharp point of modern investigation has undoubtedly turned against the Church-form of Christianity in so far as the latter considers the earth as the centre of the universe, and in so far as it makes our actions decide the destiny of the All. To give the earth such a significance, in spite of all the transformations of modern thought, has been attempted by an apologetic at any price; but all manipulations of possibilities and subterfuges are of no avail against the natural impression of the altered position of our earthly circle. All such manipulations belong to a geocentric and anthropocentric mode of thought of the past. But when the new mode of thought enters deeply into the realm of traditional ideas and feelings, does it destroy the spiritual substance of Christianity, and does it refute the conviction of the superiority of the soul of man? It does this in no manner. For why should the expansion of things limit itself to nature? Why should not the spiritual as well penetrate and encompass the world? Indeed, the spiritual must do this if the web of relations of particular energies observed in nature does not constitute the final depth of reality, but that this depth is to be sought in subsistence-by-themselves of things, as the Spiritual Life alone offers. It may be that we, upon this earth, are able to apprehend but a small segment of this life, but in such a segment the cosmic character of the Spiritual Life is unmistakable. The fact is not to be overlooked that, in any comparison with the outward extension of nature, the inward transformations more than hold the balance. For a progressive intensify-

ing of the Life-process has made ever more clear the fact that nature is not the final reality it was conceived to be by an older mode of scientific thought, but that it signifies only a human vista of reality. The Theory of Knowledge which has brought to a clear consciousness the limitations of this vista on account of our bodily organisation is only an expression of the inner growth of the Life-process beyond mere nature. Nature, which at the outset entirely surrounded and captivated man, has become more and more a mere environment to him. If man in such an inwardness of the Life-process has gained an Archimedean point, all the palpableness of sensuous impressions is not able to endanger the priority of spirit. The earthly circle, however, notwithstanding all its contraction, does not lose its significance when it appears as an abode where cosmic problems are struggled for, and where a segment of reality is raised to a higher stage. Over against Infinity man appears petty, but he becomes great through the cosmic life and its turn to spirit, which develops also within him.

Nature has not only extended externally; it has also altered inwardly. It has revealed itself as a connected causal web under simple laws; it has thus obtained an independence through which it dismisses every alien influence as an unjust intruder. Along with this, all dependence of nature upon the Spiritual Life seems for the moment to cease, and especially all sensuous miracle is placed on one side as a break in the order of nature.

Such a rejection of miracle is directed against all religions, for in all religions miracle is "the dearest child of faith." But nowhere is the rejection of

miracle more pointedly directed than towards Christianity which, with its doctrine of the bodily resurrection of Jesus, has planted miracle in the very nucleus of religious belief. This doctrine constituted not only the basis of the convictions of the apostles, but it has remained a main portion of the teaching of the Church up to the present day. To touch this subject may appear serious even to men who otherwise willingly follow the newer mode of thinking. For must it not alienate and even wound our feelings to resolve into a mere semblance an event which was at the foundation of the belief of millenniums, and which has been of help to an innumerable number of souls? Also, all the insufficiency and contradictions of the historical records leave the fact untouched that the apostles were entirely convinced of that bodily resurrection, and that this conviction alone explains the sudden change from entire despair to the joyous certainty which culminated within their souls in those dark and critical days.

On the other side, the opposite reasons retain a mighty force, once the exact conception of nature has been adopted and once an historical criticism has developed. To place a miracle in that one situation would now not merely mean an occasional exception; it would mean an overthrow of the total order of nature, as this has been set forth through the fundamental work of modern investigation and through an incalculable fulness of experiences. What would justify such a breach with the total mode of reality must appear to us with overwhelming, indisputable clearness. Has the traditional fact this degree of certainty, and cannot it be explained in any other way? Who is able

to assert this with entire certainty? If the superiority of the Divine was, on this particular occasion, to be proclaimed in a tangible manner, why did all this happen for the small circle of believers alone, and why did it not happen to others? There seems, however, to have been necessary a certain state of the souls of the disciples to make them see what they thought they saw; but in all this there is found a psychic and subjective factor in operation—a factor whose potency is very difficult to define and to mark its boundaries. It would have been a fact of a wonderful nature if the souls of the disciples, from within, became suddenly and without intermediary convinced of the continuation of the life and the presence of the Master: all this would have been no sensuous miracle —no break in the course of nature. But we have to bear in mind how times of strong religious agitation and convulsion are so little qualified to judge concerning external phenomena, and how easily a psychic state solidifies into a supposed percept! Within and without Christianity there are numerous examples of the sensuous appearance of a dead person being considered to be fully authenticated by the narrower circle of friends. Savonarola appeared more than a hundred times after his death, but always to those whose hearts clung to him; and to fifteen nuns of the convent of St Lucia he gave the consecrated wafer through the opening in their *grille*. (*Cf.* Hase, *Savonarola*, 2nd ed., pp. 99 and foll.)

We can, indeed, lay on one side such analogies, and still assert the uniqueness and inexplicableness of the events at the death of Jesus. In the midst of all the obscurity of the facts, no interpretation is pressed by

us as being universally valid. But on one point perfect clearness ought to reign—as to what such supposed events can and may be for our own life and faith. The bodily resurrection is an historical, or asserted as an historical fact. Such a fact is either capable of proof or incapable of it. If it is capable, it can be proved to everyone—even to the greatest unbeliever, and its acknowledgment needs no personal disposition. If it is not capable of proof or at least of sufficient proof, religion can never make it a duty. Even in connection with any point less critical and less difficult than is here in question, religion does not compel us to accept as proved what in reality has not been proved. Otherwise expressed: the acknowledgment of an historical fact is a matter of knowledge and not of faith. Faith has as its object what is of a timeless nature—what is able to be immediately present to each individual and able to manifest its own elevating energy; faith, in fact, carries within itself an inner movement and a courageous ascent of the spirit of man. If an historical fact is put in the place of this object of faith, faith is externalised, and reduces religion to a level which has been passed by the most important movements of the world; and thus religion becomes entangled in an insoluble contradiction with the whole of the rest of life. If, then, the belief in the bodily resurrection of Jesus threatens to break up the whole of Christianity, wherein does faith in the truth of Christianity obtain its final root? Are the new contents of life, which affirm an emancipation from all petty-human capacities, and which proclaim a new world of love and grace, to be explained as mere illusions if they are not guaranteed to you

by a tangible proof of a bodily resurrection? If, in the manner of the Middle Ages, we make the reality of the spiritual dependent upon a sensuous embodiment, we shall obtain the pertinacity of what is termed historical belief, but through this, we confess our unbelief in the all-presence of the Spiritual and Divine Life; and consequently we have parted from the religion of the spirit and of personality and have sunk back into a religion of signs and wonders. Men certainly do not intend to do this, and yet they allow the confusion which originates through the mixing up of history and faith to remain, and which has brought so many entanglements upon humanity. We have already quoted the words of Fichte where he pointed out that the emphasis on the historical has resulted in considering subsidiary facts as of equal validity with the main facts, and even at the expense of the main facts, thus coercing the main facts and tormenting the conscience.

Religion, which has already shown so much energy, will finally find the energy to subsist without sensuous signs and wonders. It discovers the true wonder in the Spiritual Life itself, which, with its cosmic creativeness and its deepening of itself, demands as well as manifests the presence of the Absolute Life. Nature, through its abandonment of sensuous miracle, is in no way surrendered to mere mechanism, and the denial of a break in its order does not mean a breaking off of all relationship with spirit. Mechanism itself has presuppositions which it is not able to explain and which point beyond it, as for instance, the laws of nature, reciprocal effects, the ascent of types and of animate life out of a

seemingly scattered and soulless agitation. And without giving straight-away a religious significance to all this, yet a depth of reality is here unmistakable; and that the whole of nature finally serves the whole of spirit is held fast by religion in spite of the impossibility of a detailed application. But the main fact for religion remains in the wonder of the Spirit and the wonder in the Spirit; and in the most decisive manner religion must reject whatsoever threatens to weaken the significance of this wonder and its consolidating and elevating energy.

Not less severely does modern natural science collide with traditional Christianity in the theory of evolution. The fact that the world has at the present day entered into the current of scientific investigation, that its elements participate in this movement, that out of the supposed co-existence of types a succession of types has been shown, and that especially the organic kingdom has climbed from simple beginnings, through a long ascent to its present height — all this certainly contradicts not less irreconcilably the traditional doctrine of creation and the whole notion of the bringing of things into existence through a will "beyond," as the newer astronomy contradicts the old geocentric mode of thinking. It is only certain forms of the evolutionary theory, and in no way all its forms, which signify a danger to the substance of religion. If the interpretation of the universe from the evolutionary point of view signifies that the whole content of the universe has proceeded without the operation of any effective law from within, but solely through chance collisions of elements, so that all the higher is simply a product of the lower,

and so that all independence loses its value, then certainly a victory of mechanism and materialism has captured each and every religion. If evolution, however, signifies rather this—if it signifies that the attainment of the higher stages became possible only after having passed through the lower stages; that in each stage the Whole brings forth a new beginning, and consequently all movement has the foundation of a timeless order, and its advancement happens within Time but not from Time, then evolution can in no manner injure the substance of religion. If things are thus, there is a growth in the depth of reality as well as in the living presence of a higher order.

Indeed, we observe in natural science itself an inner law of a timeless kind restraining more and more the mere mechanism of a "becoming" brought forth through external adaptation to environment, restraining the lawless flux of forms and the predominance of a blind chaos of natural selection. But religion is not able, however, to base its convictions upon the currents of natural investigation, and there is no need for it to do so because the dawning of the Spiritual Life itself is a proof to it of a new stage over against all nature, and of the growth of a further new stage within the Spiritual Life itself. Thus the Higher is not a mere More and a mechanical result of the lower, but within this Higher an immediate proof of Absolute Life is imbedded. Evolution is then a testimony not against but for religion.

No unbiassed mind is able to deny a "becoming" within nature and spirit. Reason is for us no ready-made thing; within our own circle it has to be wrestled for, and the wrestling needs both

the movement of external things and an activity on our own part. But the question which separates minds is: whether reason is a mere effect of a "becoming," or whether it can be an effect without at the same time being a principle—whether the universe must not be grounded upon reason in order to engender reason at all. He who occupies the former standpoint draws reality down to its lowest stages and is able to see no more in all the rest than a construction of that lower. But wherever characteristic features and independence are accorded to the Higher, wherever it stands clearly before us in all its fulness and depth, there reason is recognised as a principle in the midst of all its "becoming," and there the evolutionary theory and religion can and must walk together hand in hand.

(β) *The Further Development over against History and Culture.*—Changes in human life and actions threaten Christianity still more directly than the changes in our view of nature. Here, again, our investigation leads to the result that an irreconcilable collision originates not so much in connection with the real facts of the movements of life and actions as in connection with certain problematic tendencies which cling to these facts, and which grow in seeming inseparableness along with them. All that is true and genuine in these movements of life and actions can be accepted by Christianity, but Christianity can accept anything only in so far as it differentiates clearly between the Eternal Substance and the temporal existential-form, and only so far as it strives after a *new* existential-form which corresponds to the demands of the situation reached by the labours of the ages.

First of all, an opposition to religion originates on account of the rise of an historical view and treatment of existence. This view and treatment bring all things into a flux and unveil an incessant change. To draw religion—the work of God—into the current of time and to adjust its stability to the changes of the human situation, means to destroy it at its very foundation. A religion based upon mere time—accepted with the possibility of a notice to quit—is no religion. Christianity, however, has welded together with special energy not only a fundamental body of doctrines and organisations, but also a characteristic content of life —a content which is to defy all the changes of time.

This is the first glimpse of the opposition, but we shall see that it does not remain in possession of all this harshness. First of all, human life refuses to surrender itself entirely into this flux. Modern times, in their first fresh impression of the movement of things, saw only the bright side of the change—they saw only the greater freedom, the rich manifold of things, etc. But we are just beginning to discover difficult drawbacks in connection with the facts—the instability of all results, the speedy toppling over of all standards and values, the dissolution of life into mere moments which drive and dislodge each other. More and more we lose an inward connection of life; we become the puppets of an ever-changing kaleidoscopic situation, and are in danger of becoming engulfed into nothingness. In the presence of such a catastrophe we are no longer able to speak of a history, and least of all of a history of a spiritual kind. For some kind of a persisting factor is present in all history; and in history of a spiritual kind there is present an inner representation of the past, a view of the

whole course, a stepping out of the stream of time, and a transference to a timeless contemplation *sub specie æterni*. If life ascends towards such an eternity, it ascends of necessity towards religion, which calls for a return to final depths, calls for the illumination of the fundamental relationship of man to the All, calls for the setting forth of the abiding tasks and experiences of life, calls for the union of our life with the Absolute Life, and above all else to become the custodian of Eternity. If religion is anything at all, it is that which gives man a secure foundation, and which measures his undertakings by means of elevated norms. If thus a longing after Eternity arises through the fresh experience and deep feeling of the vanity of all the mere life of time, the turn to religion will gain full energy and veracity.

But is religion able to satisfy the aspiration after Eternity without having to suppress all movement and without having to prohibit the full flow of the current of life? The aspiration is not satisfied if the traditional existential-form signifies its final essence. The mode of thinking which conceived eternal truth only as it presented itself in time (of course this is an indispensable element of religion), and also which believed in the possibility of man reaching it at one stroke, has become untenable. This mode of thinking corresponded to the old view of truth which has been replaced by another view. According to the old view, the truth appeared so intimately related to man that a courageous tension of energy seemed able immediately to reach it at one stroke, and then an alleged durable truth was set forth and which had only to be guarded

in a true and heroic manner. Thus, it was believed at the height of Greek development that scientific knowledge could accomplish this for once and for all; and men believed themselves able to trace out a political constitution valid for all times. Corresponding to this, it was believed that religion could be brought into an inviolable and durable situation in the same manner. But it is characteristic of modern times, on the contrary, that a wider division between the truth of the Spiritual Life and the immediate situation of man has taken place, so that now, if an Eternal is not to be lost, man has to labour in the depth of his being, and it is only after a toilsome struggle that the Eternal can be gained and can become the true possession of man. The Eternal, in itself certain and firm, is to us an incessant task. Christianity is able to take over this latter view only when it differentiates between an existential-form characteristic of, and appropriate to, a certain age from the timeless Substance which is effective in all ages; only when it works out the characteristic Life-process and its new reality founded in God, and only when it uplifts clearly this Life-process through thought and feeling from all mere-human formations of doctrines and works. Then Christianity will give its full rights to the Eternal as well as to the temporal, and the necessary contact between the two will lead to no injurious narrowness.

The turn towards history and culture brought forth not only more mobility, it also raised man to greater self-activity and to the awakening of slumbering energies within him. Life, through such experiences, is immeasurably raised, and man gains

power not only over nature but also over his own particular relationships and over his own soul: he has now undertaken the construction of a kingdom of reason on a great scale. Such a life, through its possession of reality, has made all things far richer in content than could ever have happened in the times when man stood impotent over against the darkness of the world, and expected, through tarrying and hoping, his entire welfare from a power beyond. Now, does not such a self-consciousness of human potency contain a strong protest against all religions, and especially against a mode of Christianity which proclaims the vanity of mere man with such special emphasis? A clash is here quite evident, and the question is, whether the necessities of life itself tend to level down this distinction, and whether, indeed, religion goes out half way to meet the desire for levelling it down.

It is undoubtedly true that through the development of modern culture far more has resulted from man's capacities than had hitherto been the case, but it is doubtful whether it is the energy of the mere individual which has brought forth all this; it is doubtful whether, in the very process of this development, nothing besides the merely human was at work. We have already noticed that Spiritual Life does not proceed from historico-social connections. In so far as civilisation and culture are no more than products of such connections they are, notwithstanding all their claims at being able to form a higher stage of things, afflicted with the curse of semblance and untruth. Indeed, the further they progress, the more do they get away from

their true basis, and thus become artificial and empty, and fall into the petty and the common.

Whatsoever is genuine in civilisation and culture rests upon the fact that a superhuman Spiritual Life with its cosmic creativeness is operative within them. Through such a connection with the Spiritual Life all that is great in man is not given by nature but originates from a deeper basis, and must rest permanently upon this basis. When it does this, the very sense of power will contain a consciousness of entire dependence on this basis and, at the same time, will contain a denial of all merely natural individuality. Civilisation and culture will not then think lightly of religion, and will not attempt to push it back, but they will invoke it for their own preservation and purification, and for the elevation of man beyond the region of the petty-human. All merely secular culture will now be seen through as a mere farce, since man has realised that genuine culture has not merely to develop extant powers but has to form a new being —helps to develop an ascent from mere time to a timeless order, and from mere man to a world-embracing spirituality.

Religion, however, is able to correspond to such a "call" of culture only if it grasps its own task in a great and free sense. Religion must not consider that the Divine in some external kind of way does the work, and thus reducing life to a merely passive level, but far more it has to posit itself into the centre of the highest activity, and yet must never forget that such a creative activity is fundamentally different from merely natural development of energy. And, over against culture, religion must at all times assert its

rights to prove and to winnow, for it is religion—the power which draws upon the deepest source of life —which takes to itself the whole of man and offers a fixed standard for all his undertakings. Religion, instead of being carried on the face of the changing currents of civilisation and culture, must provide through its timeless truth a secure foothold for the remainder of life. It must cavil less at the transient and particular in the domains of knowledge and life, and rather undertake to test their whole meaning; it has to hold fast to the fact that all civilisation and culture are only phenomena of the Spiritual Life and not the Spiritual Life itself, and that consequently these exhibit only a few of the many possibilities and phases of things which have changed in the past and will continue to change in the future. Religion is thus unable to measure and to pass judgment on things without holding up definite aims before civilisation and culture, but it will accomplish this task less directly than indirectly: it will accomplish it through the working out of the further development of the total-life which connects and encompasses all the provinces of knowledge and life with itself. It is through this reciprocal relationship that civilisation and culture can assert their independence and freedom of movement.

In this reciprocity then religion has not only to give but also to take. For the fundamental condition on which religion finds its secure superiority comes to a full effect in man when it finds an appropriate existential-form; and man is not able to find this form without the aid of civilisation and culture. Thus, we may hope that such change which to-day urges culture to oppose

religion may finally serve the main aims of religion, so that a common spiritual world may span the provinces of both religion and culture.

This homogeneousness of both has to be worked out over against the traditional forms not only of culture but also of religion. Religion must not bring forth simply that which lies by the side of the rest of life—simply handling its one-sided content alongside of other contents which it deems as not belonging to itself and which it treats indifferently. Religion must never consider itself as an isolated province but as the characteristic depth of the totality of life; and it must consider that its full energy and intimate knowledge are to be reached on this pathway alone. Through such an insight, religion will neither be anxious to win the individual to some kind of a mere assent to truth nor to lead individuals to some ready-made spiritual world, but it will far more constantly attempt to build up and hold forth a Whole of the Spiritual Life within the human domain over against the immense hindrances and perversions of an indifferent and hostile world. We need a religion of the total Spiritual Life and not one of the mere individual or a one of the sum-total of any number of individuals; we need as our own that religion which has set forth more expressively than any other religion the central conception of the Kingdom of God. But here, however, it is necessary to purify further the traditional form if that which from of old has worked as an ideal and a demand is to find its energetic achievement and to become the entire possession of man.

(γ) *The Further Development over against the*

Changes of the Spiritual Life in Man.—The most important movements of the day have brought about great changes within the province of the Spiritual Life. But the fact is nowhere more perceptible than in the changes which have taken place in connection with the traditional existential-form of Christianity, but, rightly understood and carried further, these changes promise to develop the inmost essence of Christianity, and to extend it as the religion of universal life. This matter deals especially with the three points of analysis and emancipation of the Spiritual Life: its progressive superiority to sensuous nature, to mere history, and to the petty-human form of life. This emancipation and expansion of the Spiritual Life are no ready-made results which fall upon each individual in his smug situation, but are movements and invitations of a spiritual kind and from which no individual, who is to maintain human power and creativeness on the heights of the most important movements of life, dare withdraw himself; for these movements of the Spiritual Life present a standard beyond all the arbitrary actions of individuals and beyond all the vacillations of the moment.

1. The Spiritual Life has, upon the ground of modern times, succeeded in obtaining an independence over against sensuous existence in all its forms. It has succeeded in obtaining this through a more energetic excitation and exertion of self-activity—an activity which does not tolerate a passive immersion of man into the environment, but which precedes and measures the material that is presented to it from without, and even weaves the meaning of the fundamental construction of

the world from within. On account of this, the sensuous is no longer able to remain an essentially integral part of the mental construction, but signifies now only a valuable helper and even an essential means of representing the meaning of the mental construction. Sensuous nature extends to the domain of religion: we find this first in the senile disposition of waning antiquity as well as in the simple-minded way in which the middle ages made the sensuous an essential part of religion. But to the greater activity of awakened modern times, such a mixing of external signs with the inner life has become something magical and an intolerable hindrance to freedom. This mingling of the sensuous and the spiritual is represented in the main by Roman Catholicism, and it is largely owing to this that the strength of Catholicism was due in former times, but since the advent of the movement towards greater self-activity and purer spirituality of humanity, the situation suitable to former times has given way to an inward and higher stage of life. But Protestantism also, which has protested against the magic of Catholicism, has by no means excluded it; it holds sensuous miracle in high estimation; it preserves a sacramental mode in all its tendencies, and this shows itself in its doctrine of salvation through the "blood" of Christ. The sacraments are a child of an age of deep weariness and spiritual twilight: Divine energies were to proceed towards man, but it was imagined that these energies needed sensuous signs which, however, conceived as necessary pledges of the truth of Divine energies, became more than sensuous. In order to hide the contradiction imbedded in this, a dim twilight time

and a dreamy disposition of life are necessary, and these are needed further in order to obtain a foothold and conviction in the midst of the darkness of the situation. The fresher life of modern times has scattered this twilight and has reduced an alleged piety to magic. The residue of such magic which has remained in Protestantism works all the more vaguely, the more it fails to understand the life of our day.

Many have found and do find to-day a subjective support in such magic, and its removal may appear to such minds a disaster. But it is necessary for modern man to bear in mind—and this truth is of the very essence of Christianity—that when Christianity entered into the arena of time as a religion of pure spirituality, magic served as help to it and was not inseparably connected with it. Certainly such magic ought not to disappear before some equivalent appears. The equivalent is at hand: it is the further development of the Spiritual Life itself; and this development can take place through a turn of life to a level beyond all externals—a turn towards itself and towards a total-activity—and through the winning of an unassailable reality by means of a development of a basal and durable life and being. If the sensuous is not in this manner replaced by the self-consolidation of the Spiritual Life, every kind of spiritualisation tends to wither away, so that the Middle Ages was right in insisting that something besides the sensuous was needful. But the sensuous through its removal from the centre of life becomes in no way superfluous and subordinate for the stimulation of man. Indeed, the more religion deepens itself by means of the whole of the Spiritual

Life, the more it makes the external recede into a distance; the less religion is able to grasp the idea, the more necessary becomes the pictorial, and the more religion needs the help of imagination and art. But this indispensable means does not signify the reality itself and will not coalesce with it.

2. The progressive superiority of the Spiritual Life to bare history has occupied our attention so much that it is not necessary here to do more than remind ourselves of our previous conclusions. The fact that we as children of modern times posit all the offerings of history upon our own day and adjust them from such a situation comes into conflict with the traditional form of Christianity. Catholicism is not, on the whole, troubled with this entanglement because to it past and present join themselves intimately in the manner of the Middle Ages, and also because the differences of the generations are obliterated. To Protestantism, on the contrary, the distinction between past and present was made and an alleged yet conscientious return to the former became essential: it attempted to carry life back to a special epoch—the beginnings of Christianity—and to shape it in accordance with this epoch. But Protestantism discovered that it was still more essential to base religion within one's own life and personal experience; but the attempt to carry both elements—the experience of the personal life and its binding to an historical factor—has miscarried; and this fact is discovered to-day, and it must soon become intolerable. Catholicism has here decidedly the logic on its side when it makes the Church and its past the guarantor

of its truth; whilst Protestantism, through allowing matters of learned investigation and of an historical nature to decide concerning the meaning of life and the salvation of the soul, has entered into grave danger. If Protestantism is to remain true to its main idea, it must subjugate history to personal life, and this means a radical transformation of the traditional material.

The present day often shows an uncertain oscillation of the religious life between history and the present, between authority and personal conviction; one hopes to help the personal conviction through a retreat to the past, and thus the rich content of history is supposed to procure an intuitive content for life as well as for religion. We resign ourselves, through such a turn, to the impressions of unique epochs and personalities; we transpose and submerge ourselves in these so far as to forget ourselves; we seek to understand such epochs and personalities as they really were, and the intuitive presentation of such pictures seems to us a great gain in truth. But this historical and relative truth is not the eternal and absolute truth upon which religion must ever insist. The interweaving of these two things is not far removed from the German mode of conceiving life, and contains the danger of substituting merely imitative feeling for genuine feeling, many truths for the one truth, mere knowledge for life. Let us give the highest honour to history in its right place, but let us energetically oppose an enervating "historism."

We are in entire unison with the spirit of Christianity when we place history and its results in a secondary place. It is true that the assertion of the

entrance of the Divine into Time made by Christianity has heightened mightily the significance of history, and, indeed, has for the first time made history in a spiritual sense possible. But Christianity has never made the temporal life the main fact, and has never turned the nature of man into a predominantly historical nature. For all that happens within time has here a worth only in so far as it develops what is eternal and in what it executes for the eternal. Thus it views and values not eternity by means of time, but time by means of eternity; and thus it finds present within history a greatness: it is a greatness because it is an emancipation from history—a realisation of an eternal order. Herein is imbedded the demand that the contemplation of infinity must ever remain superior to all, so that Christianity forms an irreconcilable opposition to any form of evolution or of "historism." The more energetic working out of its eternal character—the aspiration after a present superior to time—is therefore no defection from Christianity. We have in our previous investigation become convinced of the fact that such a movement is not a relapse into the Enlightenment, and that history as a subsidiary element retains great value. We have already seen that a "here and now" superior to time must somehow through religion become the main standard of life, and that history will further us in our efforts only in so far as we encompass and govern it with an independent life.

3. The third aspect of the emancipation of the Spiritual Life is the one of emancipating it from a merely human existential-form. We have already observed how the modern work of civilisation and

culture with its expansive tendency has broken through the merely human existential-form, and we have noticed how it took up an energetic struggle for the driving out of the mere-human. Throughout the whole development of modern times, the Spiritual Life has severed itself from a merely subjective inactivity and from resting upon a merely human opinion; it has engendered characteristic contents and necessities, laws and methods; it has connected itself into an independent world and has made man a mere tool and means for its development. Modern development finds its most tangible expression in the linking of the Spiritual Life with a unique and seemingly free-moving thought-process. We have observed how this thought-process pointedly opposed not only Religion and Christianity but also how it lowered morality to a merely subjective and subsidiary phenomenon, and how it undertook to disintegrate all personal life, all independent self-subsistence, and all ideals favourable to the creation of spiritual energy.

Now, through such a critical situation composed of an irreconcilable entanglement, the emancipation of the Spiritual Life becomes a great problem. But the reason for this opposition is highly problematic, but we dare say that it is a mistake—a colossal mistake. We have already seen in this book, and the same idea has been more fully developed in other works of the author, that the transformation of the Spiritual Life into an impersonal thought-process destroys it to its very foundation. This method of treating the Spiritual Life becomes its self-distortion, whilst at the same time, its content evaporates more

and more and the whole life is transformed into a kingdom of abstract values which slip through our hands as soon as they are grasped and subjected to a closer examination. If, however, the idea of an emancipation of the Spiritual Life frees itself from such an abstract process, and when it possesses the further insight that the Spiritual Life, in order to become a full reality, must become a self-subsistence and must, through a persistent self-development, encompass all activity, *then* this movement of thought need not go against Christianity, but can quite well serve for the furtherance of Christianity, whilst simultaneously it brings the Spiritual Life and man into a secure relationship. It is true that in Christianity a high estimation of man and a strong love for man are found. But these do not issue out of man as a merely natural being; they do not fortify him in his merely human self-assertion, but they see him in the light of a new world and inaugurate for him a new life founded in God, so that his estimation and love rest, if not upon the reality itself, yet upon the possibility of an essential transformation of the nature of man. Throughout genuine Christianity everywhere there is operative a yearning after a new man and after a new kingdom of peace and love. The detailed elaboration, however, which this aspiration found in earlier ages is not able to satisfy entirely our age. Life in those ages, notwithstanding its ennobled efforts, remained too much within the domain of human frailty and did not sufficiently distinguish the new spiritual contents developed by the relationship to God, from the subjective form of their appropriation by the soul. Such an idea of God to the modern

mode of thinking appears too much as a mere idealisation of man, and the religious life too much as an intercourse of person with person, and consequently as too emotional and anthropomorphic. Pantheism, on the contrary, has insisted upon conceptions of the universe and has opposed energetically the religious tendency of dwelling on the sickness of the soul, and on account of this has gained a good deal of sympathy in modern times, but we can no more go back to it, notwithstanding the warmth of its definite ideas, than to the Ptolemaic conception of the universe.

But we hear it asked, does not a danger arise to religion through such a conception of Pantheism? Is there not a certain affirmation and strengthening of man essential for religion, and does not there belong to religion a certain anthropomorphism? In any case, the view of God as well as of religion has become more shadow-like, the more it has attempted to drive everything human out of religion. We step thus into the dilemma: that the human is too small for us, and that with the renunciation of the human, religion threatens to break in pieces.

Such a dilemma is to be escaped from only through an inner analysis of the human—through a sharp differentiation of the spiritual contents from the subjective inclinations. The whole of our investigation has been directed towards demonstrating that such an analysis is not only possible but even necessary, and that without it there is neither religion nor, speaking generally, truth. Our investigation sought also to show that not only did particular contents develop side by side, but also that they connected themselves together into a Whole of an entity and produced an

essentially new being, which we aspired after by means of our "ever-becoming" personality. Herewith the man gains a cosmic nature within his own province, so that he is now able in religion and everywhere else to take up a struggle against the petty-human; he is now able to bring about, if not with ease, yet with great effort, a fundamental analysis of his own nature. The problem remains no longer for him in the relationship of himself with the external world, but lies within the domain of his own soul.

Difficult tasks arise along with all this. As modern investigation transforms the immediate picture of nature into a mere phenomenon which appeared to an older mode of thought as the reality itself, and as it passes from the phenomenon to the meaning of this phenomenon in consciousness, we, too, have to pass from the surface-possession of human existence and have to work out the spiritual substance which lies beneath this. The supposed facts then transform themselves into tasks,but within the tasks themselves facts are imbedded which promise to bring us nearer to truth. It is from such a source as this that religion can hold man fast to his spiritual nature, and struggle vigorously against anthropomorphism. Thus all objects and qualities have to be changed within consciousness; conceptions such as personality, morality, etc., have to be carried beyond their nearest-at-hand human meaning, and all merely subjective inwardness has to give way to an essential inwardness; in fact, there is now everywhere a remodelling of all into the great, the fully active, and the cosmic. Consequently, much that appeared previously as the reality itself is now reduced to a mere finger-post;

but what we thus lose as a surface-possession is more than compensated for in the gain of a depth in our nature. Indeed, the more we fortify ourselves through such a spiritual substance and feel that the kernel of our life lies beyond the petty-human, the more truly are we able to employ and value such metaphors and symbols of the Divine. For then we know that they are indispensable means for the furtherance of the soul, and at the same time we find in them not the reality itself, but a parable of reality.

If we consider how much is involved in such a change in the position of the Spiritual Life, and if we as well present before ourselves what transformations, culture, history, and natural science carry within themselves, we see clearly the critical situation in which religion is placed, because these surface-changes are not of the essence of religion. Through the mighty expansion and fissures which these changes bring about, the old immediacy and intimacy of the soul have become lost, and religion has now receded into the distance, and is in danger of vanishing more and more. The disarrangement of things which such changes cause occurs not only in connection with their own facts and material and against their old forms, but the effect proceeds into the very character and feelings of man and into his religion. And yet, when we examine the matter closer, we find that such changes cause not so much a breach with Christianity as with its traditional form, and that they aspire to bring about a fundamental renewal of Christianity. For when we penetrate beyond the motives and dispositions of men to their spiritual basis, all the changes cannot contradict what is

essential to Christianity, but they even promise to assist this essential element in its new, freer, and more energetic development. But we have to bear in mind that all this will not descend upon us like a shower of rain, but will have to be brought forth through immense labour and toil. It becomes necessary to replace that which must pass away, and to reconsolidate the essentials which are threatened. All this cannot come about save through an energetic concentration and deepening of the Spiritual Life, save through a struggle against the superficiality of time regardless of all consequences, and save through a vivification and integration of all that points in the right direction. We now turn to the elucidation of this.

PART V.—CHRISTIANITY AND THE PRESENT
(CONTINUED)

CHAPTER XVI

b. THE TRANSIENT IN CHRISTIANITY AND THE NECESSITY OF A RENEWAL OF CHRISTIANITY

1. *The Removal from Past Forms*

WE were not able to plead for the substance of Christianity, without, at the same time, emphasising strongly the temporal character of the traditional existential-form. This existential-form took shape under the influence of a highly characteristic epoch, and since that epoch fundamental transformations have taken place in human life and activity. The fourth and the fifth centuries, in which the conclusions of the existential-form of Christianity were formulated, were in the whole of their nature times of spiritual stagnation; they could further Christianity only through the aid of the very antiquity with which primitive Christianity had had to wrestle. Thus, the doctrines and worship of Christianity during the earlier centuries developed under the strongest influence of Greek thought, and its organisation was largely influenced by the Roman spirit. At a later period came the transmission of Christianity amongst a people imbued for the first time with aspirations;

then followed the mistakes and finally the decay of the ideals of these peoples; and later the rise of a new civilisation and culture brought forth a new standpoint of viewing the world as well as a new kind of life, and all this could not proceed on its course without bringing about changes in the whole situation of man as well as in the whole of Christianity—without revaluing old values and engendering new demands out of new situations. We have already protested sufficiently against subjugating religion to the ordinary changes of history as well as abandoning it to the limits of the elements of time. But where transformations in the world of thought reach back into the whole of life, and where these transformations find the soul something other than it was supposed to be, and where they are called to bring forth a different view of man and the world, then religion is not able to withdraw from such transformations without injury and without even the danger of being supplanted at the very core of life. Such transformations in reality resulted against the conclusions of the fourth and the fifth centuries. Thus, religion had to speak in a new way to a new man, for it dare not ever deal with this New in a concealed manner and offer portions of it as a mere embroidery of life, but it has always to pronounce openly concerning this New and take its stand independently upon it, if the religious life in its totality is not to suffer in energy and veracity.

The greatness of the change, and the necessity of a remodelling become most obvious if we compare the configuration of the religious world of thought at the spiritual height of ancient Christianity—as for

example in Augustine—with the configuration which is demanded after the experiences of the millenniums. By these experiences we do not mean the fleeting fancies of many of our contemporaries, which have little enough to recommend them, but we mean the experiences which have issued through the most important and universal results of the Spiritual Life through the centuries; and this inheritance no one, in the long run, can deny. Augustine in three main points holds out before us a characteristic configuration of religion. The manifestation of the Divine in his writings stands in direct opposition to the development of human energy, and this doctrine conceived of and revered the Divine all the more, the deeper it lowered human nature and the more it divested man of all independence. And further, according to this view, religion seemed to be real and true only in so far as it gained a visible embodiment; thus the kingdom of God had its embodiment in the Church; all activity of a religious nature had its embodiment in tangible achievements which were in no way a mere semblance but were essential parts of the reality. Finally, the whole of culture was placed in the immediate service of religion and its doctrines; all scientific, artistic, and political activities were admissible and of value only in so far as they discharged themselves into religion and corroborated its truth. And thus was obtained a thoroughly religious, but not a universal, system of life.

The relation of the spiritual to the sensuous is investigated from these three points of view, and this relation shows how deeply the claims of the heightened self-activity of the Spiritual Life affects

the configuration of religion. But we have to bear in mind that the sharp conflict between an older and a newer mode of thinking allows no compromise, but imperatively demands a decision. These two tendencies of thought contradict one another; the inseparable blending of the sensuous with the spiritual signifies to the old tendency an unconditional necessity in order to reach the entire reality of the spiritual; but the newer tendency considers this as a drawing of the spiritual down to a lower level. The newer tendency must desire to drive the sensuous out of the centre of life, whilst the older tendency feels itself obliged here to assert and to consolidate the sensuous. What is to one a rock of offence is to the other a necessary demand.

Further, in connection with the relationship of the Divine and the human, we are prohibited from holding fast to the old mode. To Augustine belongs the merit of having formulated with full clearness the fundamental Christian thought of the nothingness of mere man, and also of having severed morality from all mere nature; for with him all greatness in man was a work of Divine grace. But in dealing with one side of the question he allowed the other side, in accordance with the disposition of an enfeebled and despondent time, to become stunted—that is, the side of the restrengthening of man through his union with God and the transformation of his life into self-activity through the new connections. Grace and freedom, corresponding to that conception of the relationship of the Divine and the human, appeared to Augustine as irreconcilable opponents; a welling-up of freedom out of grace remained alien to his

dualistic mode of thinking. That Augustine, on the other hand, does assign an activity of his own to man and that this activity often seems even to contain the main decision of life we are well aware of; but we are also aware that all this is in direct contradiction to his fundamental tendency, and that it is rather a superficial compromise to the claims of practice than a deepened conception of Christianity.

This conception of Augustine was bound to result in giving religion a character of passivity, of drowsy devotion, and of blind obedience; it engendered a pleasure and even a passion to worship its object on account of the security it promises; it threatened to take away all backbone out of life and to transform it into mere sentimentality, weakness, and dejection. Also the senile character of Augustine's time has here penetrated deep into religion itself. At later periods in the history of the western world protests did not fail to arise. Especially do we find in the inauguration of the Reformation a glowing aspiration after a manly, joyous, and world-renewing Christianity. But even these new beginnings did not succeed in coming to a full development, and infinitely much remains to be done in the future if world-denial and world-renewal effects are to find an entire equilibrium within Christianity, and if freedom and grace are to settle the dispute that exists between them, and are to bind themselves together for the construction of a new reality.

Also, the relation of religion to culture needs a remodelling. Because all the provinces of life, in the view of Augustine, had simply to serve religion, all that existed and worked from its own energy lost its

value, and the renunciation of all objective interests to a subjective state of the soul threatened to destroy all culture. And, further, religion through its aspired isolation lost all living content; and when religion degenerated into a highly abstract conception, it had as an alternative only the return to an anthropomorphism. The Middle Ages through their Scholasticism gave a higher value to the work of culture, because it looked upon culture as possessing a certain independence, and assigned to religion only the work of guiding the totality of things. But Scholasticism did not carry things to a true settlement—culture was narrowed and religion was still largely under the influence of an alien mass of thought. The Reformation accomplished a severer severance in favour of the independence of religion, but even here the danger of making religion too much of an isolated province became quite evident; religion thus tended to lose its cosmic character, so that the results of knowledge had but little influence on life and were considered to be of a secular character. Although religion and knowledge have different starting points and took on opposite poles of the total-life, yet their entire severance would mean the rending of life in an intolerable manner.

Thus, we stand face to face with new tasks; we are obliged to do something more than merely carry further the past: we are to seek for new and independent beginnings. A merely pietistic view of life has become too narrow for us; but, on the other hand, the superficiality of a culture devoid of religion becomes more and more evident. Consequently, an understanding within the domain of a wider synthesis

has become necessary. We have already seen how the Spiritual Life, in the sense we conceived it, offers a basis for such an explanation. But this Spiritual Life is not a restful bond of union, which man has merely to accept; it is not the setting forth of an equilibrium of life for once and for all. The point of departure and the drift of the movement of the Spiritual Life are fundamentally different from this old conception, and all attempts to weaken this difference threaten to lower the energy as well as the truth of life. The Spiritual Life, if it would remain healthy and fresh, must, founded though our being is in the Absolute Life and Eternal Truth, remain in constant movement. That the truth is to us simultaneously a fact and a task signifies an essential divergence from the older mode of thinking.

Thus, there appears all along a great opposition between the traditionally old and the sought-for new types of life. And it is of no avail to veil this difference between the old and the new Christianity, or to endeavour to make the old and the new flow together in what can be no more than a seeming coalescence. And further, it is not sufficient merely to allow the New to assert itself, and merely to interpret the Old. He who attempts to give equal rights to both is in danger of doing injustice to both; he is in danger of raising the claims of the Old to become crystallised through the centuries without any change although it has no longer the same meaning for the convictions of an increasing number of minds; he is in danger, through the attempt to amalgamate both, to do injustice to the New, whose development is retarded through placing a millstone around its

neck, whilst it needs all its energy in order to re-set its truth, in order to overcome the present-day situation of painful unreadiness, and in order to help in the bringing forth of a new phase of eternal truth.

How great and irreconcilable the opposites are, appears most clearly in the different positions which the Founder of historical Christianity occupies in the Old and in the New. This question we are discussing is in so far the kernel of the whole matter, since we here decide concerning the manner of the relationship of the human and the Divine, which relationship forms the fundamental truth of the whole of Christianity. For nothing differentiates Christianity so much from other religions as the fact that in Christianity the union of mankind and God is not determined in an external manner through commands and achievements, but that it results from within through the growth of an entirely new and essential life founded in God and through the call of man, in the midst of an antagonistic world, to a participation in the perfection and blessedness, in the infinity and eternity of Absolute Being. The old conception presents this union of the natures of the Divine and the human in a supernatural, ontologic-metaphysical manner. The Founder of Christianity is thus simultaneously truly God and truly man; only at this one life does the miracle of the entrance of the Divine into the human appear accomplished; only through the mediation of the Divine in this one situation and the relationship of man to the situation, that a union with God is inaugurated for the rest of mankind. Thus the whole truth and certainty of this union is

stated to lie in the fact that in the personality of the Founder it was not merely the energy of the Godhead which was efficacious, but that the Founder himself was of a Divine Nature—was himself God in the fullest meaning of the term. In this connection, every attempt to weaken the Godhead of Christ meant a lessening of the substance of religion, and all similarity between Christ and God had to give way to the strict identity of the two. Thus the more metaphysical and also the more identical with God Christ became, the greater seemed his religion to be and the securer seemed the foundation of its Divine truth. But, however, the entire union of the Godhead and humanity in *one* person has become in no way through its dogmatic proclamation a living reality for the religious life, but the history of Christianity shows here a strong dualism. People have not so much revered Christ at the same time as God and as man, but rather they have revered him alternately now as God, now as man, according to the manner in which the dogmatic conception brought forth the one side, and the practico-ethical conception brought forth the other side. And the contradiction is in reality irreconcilable. The dogmatic conception views the Founder as a man who is at the same time God; who as God possesses absolute truth and who from such a height leads a human existence; who lays on one side only for a time his sovereign rank; who participates in the cares and quests, the struggles and doubts which constitute not only the most difficult but also the greatest conceivable sufferings in human life. Even to the suffering that was preordained by a Divine

decree to bring forth the most beneficial results and, indeed, to bring a change in the destiny of the world—in all this the sting which makes suffering genuine is wanting: the seeming senselessness of his death, the doubts, whether all the hard struggles, the bitter pain are not in vain—all these disappear if the dogmatic conception is correct. He who had no need to overcome also such a doubt, had not more but less laid upon him than is laid upon us other men, and such an one's conquest cannot bring consolation to others. And when traditional Christianity fails to discover any contradiction in that, on the one hand, it grieves from the depth of its soul over the human sufferings of this Personality, and, on the other hand, reveres this Personality as a God superior to all human anxieties and needs, we are reminded, although they are separated by an infinite interval, of the words of Xenophanes so specially concerned for the unity and eternity of the Divine Nature. When the Eleatics questioned him whether they should sacrifice to Leucothea and bewail her, he replied, "Bewail her not if you consider her a goddess, sacrifice not to her if you consider her human."

But the new conception dare not renounce the union of the human and the Divine. The renunciation would be an abandonment not only of religion, but of any and every truth. But the new mode dare not fasten the union to any one individual event in history, and place everything else in a state of dependency upon that one event; but it has much more to permeate, connect, and elevate all events of a spiritual kind; it has to bring forth a world-

encompassing and continuous deed which can become the intimate experience of every individual.

This involves also a severe clash of the new view with the traditional idea of mediation, which Christianity connects with the main idea of redemption. According to the traditional view, redemption does not proceed directly from the Absolute Life and Being that lies on the other side of man's own energy, but a mid-link is forged between the Divine and the human, and half of it belongs to each side; both sides are brought into a definite connection which could be found in no other way. The power which this idea has exercised over the soul is shown through its origin and whole history. It was late Greek antiquity that fled towards it and clung to it. The presuppositions of the idea are quite evident. Deeply conscious of the opposites of our existence, especially of spirit and matter, man sought to elevate the Divine above the sordid mechanism of the world, and to conceive of it as much as possible on the other side of this world; and consequently the Divine appears incapable of coming into direct contact with man. But if, at the same time, there energises in man a glowing aspiration after an emancipation from the hard exigencies and unreason of the world as well as after some kind of participation in the Godhead, and if simultaneously the consciousness of his own impotence is developed, what remains except the hope of intermediate powers that finally integrate themselves into one personality? We are able to understand how such a conception offered a means of support to human frailty, how it seemed to

make the access to the Divine easier, and how it gave an intimacy to the idea of redemption. And yet there is imbedded in the doctrine of mediation a crass anthropomorphism which religion cannot possibly endure for ever, and the presuppositions of which must fall to the ground as soon as an energetic feeling of life and a firmer faith have bridged the deep cleft between the Divine and the human which ruled there. Then it is bound to become clear that the doctrine is not able to bring forth a gain on one side without bringing forth a great loss on the other side. For it injures the *direct* relationship with the Divine; as it removes this relationship farther away from man, it lowers the Divine love and grace upon which in the last resort all depends; as it places the entire inclusion of such love and grace in one particular point, it falls into anthropomorphism; as it contracts the union of the human and the Divine to one special situation, it thus inevitably draws down the Divine into the existence-form of man. The main fact, however, is that, like to all other life and being, so also that of religion cannot have more than one centre; either God or Christ stands in the centre, and the one consequently represses the other. Concerning the decision, there cannot be the least doubt: the fact is clear in the soul-struggles of the great religious personalities, that in a decisive act of the soul the doctrinal idea of mediation recedes into the background, and a direct relationship with God becomes a fact of immediacy and intimacy. And the idea of mediation glides easily into a further mediation. Has not the figure of Christ receded

in Catholicism, and does not the figure of Mary constitute the centre of the religious emotional life?

Such a conviction does not exclude the fact that a man is able to be a great help to men in their upward path towards God; and does not exclude the fact that the human personality who first and foremost brought eternal truth to the plane of time and through this inaugurated a new epoch remains permanently present in the picture of the spiritual world, and is able permanently to exercise a mighty power upon the soul. Such a personality as Jesus is not the mere bearer of doctrines or of a special frame of mind, but is a convincing fact and proof of the Divine Life, a proof at which new life can be kindled ever anew. The fact is at the same time the source of a movement which cannot be estimated; it is from this source that a great yearning has been implanted within the human breast—a longing for a new life of love and peace, of purity and simplicity. Such a life with its incomparable nature and its mysterious depths does not exhaust itself through historical effects, but humanity can from hence ever return afresh to its inmost essence, and can strengthen itself ever anew through the certainty of a new, pure and spiritual world over against the meaningless aspects of nature and over against the vulgar mechanism of a culture merely human.

But all this is far removed from any idea of mediation, and far removed from the setting of a human personality in Divine power and worship. And if we have thus to protest against the position accorded to Jesus by the traditional form of Christianity, so

that we have to part company with a Christo-centric configuration on account of the breach with the old mode of thinking, yet we cling to an essential content and a metaphysical depth in the human image of Jesus, and seek in this the sole standard of the religious life. One had good ground for doing this so long as Jesus Christ was considered in his humanity as true God, as the second person in the Trinity. But where this belief has been abandoned, the exclusive linking of life to Jesus becomes an inadmissible contraction and diminution of religion. Also, the pathway to the facts dare not become the facts themselves, and dare not bring the metaphysical and eternal in religion into obscurity. The Christianity which occupies itself solely with Jesus and which to many to-day seems an exit from all entanglements, is not yet a match for the mighty problems, and does not carry within itself the energy to overcome the world.

Thus, we witness the most pointed antagonism between the traditional and a new aspiring Christianity. All along the line, the two conceptions do not appear as a More or a Less between which some kind of a Mean can be found, but they appear as opposites in their main tendencies. The breadth which the one desires is held by the other to be an evaporation; the consolidation upon which the one insists is held by the other to be no more than a semblance and a humanisation; the doctrine of mediation which signifies to the one an indispensable entrance to the Godhead, appears to the other as a diminution of the Divine and as a weakening of the fundamental process of religion.

In the midst of such antagonism and such an actual cleft, what can now signify a clinging to an appearance of unity? The old mode is right when it complains that the traditional values are buried under new and strange phenomena and meanings; the old view fears an injury to the substance of Christianity from such a new interpretation, and calls up and stands upon a tradition from century to century in order to hold fast the pure and true configuration of Christianity gained for once and for all. The new mode desires clear divisions of the material whenever it feels itself the representative of truth, and when it feels it its duty to set forth truth with the whole of its energy. It feels that it is only through an entire independence it can overcome all the prior hesitation of halting in front of a problem; it feels that it is able to progress from a more negative to a more positive construction; it feels that it is able to test the experience of human nature, and that through a struggle with the opposites it is able inwardly to grow. Thus, as things now stand, the opponents consume their best energy in reciprocal disputes; through the one questioning the rights and wrongs of the other, the subject-matter itself is not furthered, and, more than all, the confused state of things hinders veracity, and without such veracity the present crisis in religion cannot be overcome.

This new disunion will not be able for any great length of time to keep religion in the background. Indeed, this fact is even now becoming visible. Religious questions occupy and govern more and more the minds of men; they kindle the passions and call to battle. They do this at present, it is true,

more from without and not always in a desirable manner, but an inward change is visible and wide-awake. Old and seemingly-settled questions arise anew and show that all the transformations of life have not entirely broken their power. Such a light in the direction of religion drives out with mighty power that gloomy twilight which is the abode of halfness and obscurity, and such a light brings the concealed contradiction to a clear consciousness and makes it intolerable. It is out of an honourable adjustment of the Old and the New, however, that the effort after a reconstruction of Christian truth must issue—a reconstruction of the universal validity of the Spiritual Life, which already wells up as a mighty aspiration in the hearts of many who hunger and thirst after truth and eternity, but whose deep craving is no longer satisfied by the old forms. How long shall religion be considered a mere stepchild of that which suppresses conscience and conviction? How long are we to search for eternal truth upon an obsolete road? That things are not easy and comfortable on the *new* road is easily seen, and it is to this fact we now pass.

2. *The Necessity of a New Mode of Christianity*

When we aspire after a new form of Christianity and simultaneously deem necessary a breach with tradition, we are not blind in any way to the danger and difficulty of the problem. The traditional form has for centuries held together a large portion of humanity; it has given life and conviction a fixed direction, as well as a foothold and confidence to an innumerable number of souls, and it has been the

means of interesting the widest circles in spiritual tasks. All this is already evident as something great beyond measure when we compare it with the small spiritual activity brought forth by the ordinary life of men and with the instability of the Spiritual Life within the mere-human circle. In reflecting on all this, the breach with the traditional form of religion may appear as an upheaval of morality as well as of intellectual connections. In a word, this may appear as an endangering of all that lifted man beyond his small self and beyond mere nature. In reality, there exist here grave dangers, and a great risk is unmistakable. Such a breach is justified only if it is aspired after on account of a spiritual necessity of man's nature, superior to all human considerations and reflections. And this will be the case in the province of religion when it is perceived that the old form of religion is unable to solve our own religious problems, and when simultaneously our own interest in religion has turned into an aspiration and effort after an inner renewal. That this is actually the case to-day has been the leading thought of the whole of our investigation, and we need here do no more than bring this thought to its final connection and conclusion.

Religion has its nucleus in eternal truths—in truths which, once they are grasped, cannot be overthrown by any transformation of the work of the world. But such truths want to produce effects upon man, and, in order to do this, they must enter into his sphere, and their existential-form must correspond to the universal situation of spiritual evolution. Within this universal situation, as we have already observed, not only slight re-arrangements but deep and pene-

trating transformations have already occurred against the old mode of Christianity, and these transformations are not merely in contact with the periphery but reach into the very centre of life itself. A mere change of views concerning the external would stir only slightly, but something infinitely more happens when simultaneously the Life-process and the whole mode of thinking transform themselves, when man becomes something other than he was before, when his fundamental relationship to reality is transformed, and when the whole domain of his life is reshaped. For as certainly as religion does not stand merely by the side but *within* life, quite as certain is it that it relates itself to such transformations. The thought-world of the old form has become far too narrow and anthropomorphic; its opposition to reason—an opposition which was formerly considered to be the doing of man alone—has spread by to-day over the whole religious world, and such a conception has increased immeasurably the obscurity of reality and has given rise to an increased difficulty in discovering what religion really means. In its earlier stages, this old thought-world presented a picture of the greatness and goodness of the All, and thus religion appeared as the relationship of man to a nature incomparably higher than himself, but still a nature in analogy with his own nature. But now the world of nature has drawn man to itself; he becomes now a mere drop in the sea unless he recognises the dawning of a new and essential reality within his spiritual nature. Thus, what appeared as his secure possession turns now into a difficult problem; he now undertakes a

task—the task how to penetrate from his ordinary surface-situation to the spiritual depth of life. Consequently a religion of the Spiritual Life must stand in bold relief from that of mere man, for the latter aspect of religion threatens more and more to become a mere mythology. Therewith all conceptions of Divine things become inadequate; much that was held hitherto valid as entire truth has now become a mere symbol from which it is necessary to move further and further. But, at the same time, the spiritual contents gain an independence, and exercise a transforming energy on man; life raises itself now through religion from the subjective to the substantial, and subsists more and more upon a real transformation of its own being. All along we stand here face to face with new tasks, and we can never hope to come nearer their solution unless the altered situation is fully acknowledged and unless a struggle is undertaken from such an altered situation.

The old mode of religion withdraws itself from such an acknowledgment of the altered situation; it allows only some isolated elements to fall upon itself —results which have now become incontestable. It accepts now, for instance, the Copernican view of the universe, but it had to be dragged to accept it; it does not posit itself willingly even now within the whole meaning of the conception, but stands mistrustful and on the defensive over against it, so that it cannot loyally adjust itself on the side of the Yea or the Nay of that and other movements. Consequently it cannot seize the fruit offered by such movements to religion.

The consequence of this leads to a constant and

unbearable frittering away of life. Culture more and more pushes back the old mode of religion, and through this enters into an ever-greater secular and soulless mode. Religion thus becomes more and more of an isolated province, and the channel between it and knowledge widens; thus its distance from men becomes ever greater until the mental efforts and ascents of humanity become indifferent to it. This indifference is the greatest enemy to religion, and is in reality more dangerous than all the assaults of doubt. And yet this indifference cannot be avoided if religion is severed from the whole of life. The indifference, indeed, will strike its roots ever deeper until religion once more gains a fixed connection with the whole of life.

The older mode of religion, in the midst of all these hindrances, exercises still a powerful effect, and in so far as positive achievements are concerned, it is still far ahead of the new mode. But these effects confine themselves to particular provinces: the totality of spiritual work and the main current of life are no longer dominated by the older mode; it is not so much a universal as a particular mode as "all who call themselves Christians" are only too apt to let us know. The fact that great masses of the people cling to the older mode does not at all prove that they have come to any kind of conscious decision concerning the differences of the Old and the New, but only proves that they have not as yet come into contact with the problems and doubts of the age—that these problems have not as yet entered into their consciousness. But these problems and doubts are the very things which render the position of

religion insecure. For sooner or later a contact with them is bound to take place. The question is, will people then be true to the old customs and practices ?

In fact, religion is able to reveal its entitled position when it holds the full heights of the Spiritual Life, and through this proves itself necessary and fruit-bearing ; and also when, in connection with the movements of life, it draws the "kinsman" within these movements and drives out the "old enemy." But as the old form cannot lend itself in any great degree to such a task, it needs a new existential-form ; it needs before all else—in the very interest of religion itself—to free the Eternal within itself from its temporal forms, and the spiritual substance from human notions. We discover in the old mode too much that is languid and alien. Men have become tired of its form and also of its language, and it does not any longer issue forth from a rapturous energy and youthful freshness of the whole of our own life, as it always does when the entire truth and effects of religion are at work. Now, as we have to live our own life and carry our own destiny, shall we reject the aid of our indispensable helper on the road of life—religion ? There are no such things as restorations, in religion as elsewhere, and the Spiritual Life will never return to the old forms. It thus behoves us to take heed of what is ahead of us and to strive to reach it.

But, indispensable as the effort after a new existential-form is, yet there can be no doubt as to the immense difficulty of the task if we do not conceive it in a wrong or petty manner. The first demand is, that in the transformation of the *existential-form* nothing of

the genuine *substance* should be lost, but that the new existential-form should succeed in giving this substance purer, more energetic, and more universal effects. This is, however, possible only if the problem of the adjustment of religion and culture is not understood as in any way desirous of a relaxation of religion with knowledge, and, on the other hand, is not desirous of an absolute adjustment of both. The solution will come when religion enters into the relationship as an independent power and with all its independent content—when it is not only measured by culture, but when it, in its turn, measures, judges, rejects, and selects. All this is necessary for religion when face to face with modern culture, because modern culture is not of a simple and obvious nature. It comprises movements, experiences, and unfoldings of the Spiritual Life from which it cannot for ever withdraw itself; but such a culture also carries within itself temporal and human tendencies of a highly problematic character—tendencies which contradict most pointedly the dominant trend of religion and even of Christianity. Modern culture as it expresses itself in human formulations—with its material joy in, and its ready affirmations of, life, with its repression and even displacement of ethical greatness, with its abandonment of eternity to the doctrine of evolution—is not only at variance with this or that existential-form of religion but with each and all religion. He who makes, therefore, such a culture a standard for measuring religion has there and then decided against religion. But for him to whom religion has become a serious concern a struggle against such tendencies of culture has become inevitable, and he must forge his way

with all the energy at his command to the fundamental differentiation of the elements of spiritual truth and of the human errors found within the whole situation of culture.

Hence all definite movements for a renewal of religion must be differentiated clearly from the movements which are found within the domain of culture. Unless this is done, we may hold fast to a kind of religion which inevitably falls into great shallowness. In an age of religious crisis, as we witness to-day, the superficial is always the nearest-at-hand remedy and the loudest in its claims; it is able to hide its own poverty of life under the colours of freedom; it has on its side the half-educated and, even more, the over-educated to whom negations are so pleasing and smugness is so welcome. This is also true of those movements that attempt to shape religion in harmony with what is termed "the spirit of the age"—shape it in harmony with all that bubbles from the playful fountains of time—and that avoid every genuine Nay and look upon every sharp collision as a disturbance of their "life at ease." Even to-day any movement be it ever so perverted and hostile to genuine religion will find so-called "liberal-minded" people who feel themselves the true messengers of the times when they declare that their message can be made to fit excellently with religion and even with Christianity, and that it is here alone the meaning of both can be found. It is necessary over against such an unworthy adjustment of the times to hold forth the superiority and the trenchancy of the timeless truth; it is necessary to uphold the independence of religion over against a superficiality of knowledge and to

exercise an energetic criticism on the claims of culture from the standpoint of religion. Those who are unable any longer to cling to the Old constitute two main classes. The one class feels the need for no more than a minimum of religion, whilst the other class strives to obtain a maximum. The former places itself under the contents of time, whilst the latter attempts to raise itself above time; the former feels itself already in possession of all essentials, whilst the latter sees itself as only just entering on an infinite quest. The sincerity of life and the progress of the religious movement can only be furthered when the two classes are differentiated more clearly from one another than has hitherto been the case.

He who conceives the religious problem in its varied difficulties is unable to deny that religion has lost unspeakably much through the upheaval of the old form, and, further, he sees the need of making good such a loss. But such an urgent result can come about only through a strengthening of the *substance* of religion—through the energetic working out of its fundamental characteristics, and through the undaunted assertion of all that raises religion above the mere level of time. Religion is thus raised to the metaphysical and transcendental which frighten so much the ordinary man of the present. The contradictions of human life must be fully acknowledged if ever a true effort for overcoming them is to be set in motion. The *Either-Or* which runs through the whole of life must stand clearly in front of us, and we must take a decisive stand within the situation. A thorough-going clarification of the

entangled situation and a severance of spirits according to their fundamental convictions are the first requisites for the turn towards a better state of things. And then comes the need of building up and creating, of collecting and penetrating, of selecting and possessing, a new reality. But all this is not possible without a deepening of the total Life-process—without an energetic self-recollection of the Spiritual Life and a stepping beyond the situation of the times. Our whole investigation rests upon the conviction that the religious problem is not to be handled isolated from, but within, the totality of life; it rests upon the fact of the phenomenon of the Spiritual Life and the characteristic way in which it is to be conceived; it rests upon the fact that this Spiritual Life binds itself into a Whole, and upon the acknowledgment of an essential and independent reality within it which became the fixed standard and great task of religion. The necessary conditions for a renewal of religion are solely the elevation and the energetic development of the Spiritual Life. It is in this alone that a sufficient compensation for the loss of the Old can be found, and it is here alone that the new mode can overcome the opposition directed against it from the side of the old mode.

The old mode often misses a sufficiency of actuality in the New; the New seems to the Old to lack the certainty that man in religion is raised above himself by means of a superior power, and is also led to a new life. This complaint is valid in connection with all attempts to found religion upon mere psychology, for when this happens, it is either the intellectual or the affective side of the nature—either

ideas and concepts, or judgments of value and feelings —which take the lead. Through any of these, man may be able to revolve within his own circle, but he is never able to come out of his subjectivity, and the energy of truth can never invest his psychic state or his partial and one-sided qualities with an absolute value. But it is quite otherwise when the Spiritual Life in its independence is acknowledged, and when it is understood as the presence of a *new kind of world.* Through this the total outlook of life changes itself, so that it is not now necessary that man should be guided to this new world by means of some isolated portion of his nature. The man now possesses energy of a spiritual nature to be a participator in such a new world; his need now is to develop such a cosmic life within his own consciousness and all that it includes. Thus, the fundamental fact and proof of all lies in the *totality of the Spiritual Life itself,* and all remaining facts and proofs have to be connected with this one fundamental fact. The result then is that religion is raised above all mere subjectivity.

Further, the new mode complains of the "abstractness" found in the indeterminate concepts of the old mode, and states that such an "abstractness" does not help towards bringing about an energetic effect of religion. Much is to be said in favour of this complaint of the new mode, but it is not in its favour that it often does not attempt to discover the nature of religion within the characteristic formation of Spiritual Life. It is in doing this that the concreteness of religion lies and not in copious and learned disquisitions concerning doctrines and organisations

—disquisitions which may concede that some kind of needed nucleus lies beneath all this but is imbedded in great obscurity. How is it, if no more than this were needed, that Catholicism with its colossal machinery often fails to manifest with sufficient clearness and energy what is new and world-renovating in Christianity? The characteristic and the concrete in religion can be brought forth, however, by the New through an exclusive concentration upon *the spiritual content*; and once this Yea has become the conviction of the new mode, it can pronounce judgment on any Nay it likes. It is characteristic of religion before all else that it constitutes the ethical formation of the Spiritual Life, its foundation in freedom and deed, its demand for a new kind of existence, and *its creation of a world subsisting within itself.* This signifies incomparably more than a mere fulfilment of moral rules within a given earthly organisation; it contains the most unique and decisive assertions and denials; it withstands the alleged sovereign claims of all intellectual and æsthetic formations of life; it withstands the immersion of our life into an environing world and into a blind destiny. But notwithstanding all such characteristics, ethical idealism is only the presupposition of religion and not religion itself. A turn to religion results only through the problems and conflicts which originate from this foundation through a deep convulsion of the nature of man; and when this has happened, the elevation and transformation become religion. It is obvious that all this, through its reciprocal relations, exhibits an entirely new and characteristic type of life, and it is this type with its

facts and tasks, its developments and conquests—as our whole investigation has attempted to prove—which constitutes the genuine concreteness of the Spiritual Life upon which we take our stand.

It may appear at the first glance as though the new mode does not place the problem of moral wrong so exclusively in the foreground as the old mode places it, and this assertion appears to the old mode as a sign of a laxer mode of thinking. This may be true concerning a number of the forms of the New, but it is not true of all. The New is able to acknowledge in the fullest possible manner that nothing reveals the depth of life so much as the discovery of an ethical conflict within human nature. And it is this fact which gives the religious problem a compelling power. But the acknowledgment of this inner conflict has to pass beneath the level of conscious mental reflection and shallow delineation, because such a procedure blunts the real facts and glides easily into unveracity. Thus, the conceptions of freedom and moral guilt must be viewed in a wider sense than the old mode has yet done. We cannot agree with the old mode that all evil is to be traced back to the deeds of man or that sin brought death for the first time into our world. We must hold fast to freedom, but at the same time we must not deny the fact of the mighty power of a dark destiny. This problem has to be placed in the very front of the old mode, and it has to be shown that the problem has mysterious depths. The problem will thus be handled in a more circumspect, more tender, and less anthropomorphic manner than has been the case with the past Protestantism of the

Church; and notwithstanding the change, the earnestness concerning the facts will preserve everything essential from being lost.

The New then may live convinced that nothing of the energy and depth of religion need be lost upon its path. And it will certainly realise that it is only at the beginning of the road and still far removed from any kind of terminus. How the course of things will shape themselves in the distant future lies for us enwrapped in deep darkness. For manifold factors are operating at the present day which are creating some of the elements of that distant future. These factors are the fortunes and experiences of humanity, of great personalities, and of the characteristic and most important universal elements of the times. But we need not trouble our hearts concerning the contour of that distant future. There is in the present enough and to spare for us to do. The activism of the present, taken in its deepest sense, has work enough under its very eyes to trace the outlines of a new ideal world in the midst of a perverse generation and the midst of immense confusions. The great task to-day is to carve out deeply and clearly the main bearings of life—bearings where all efforts can co-operate and where the deepest spirit of man can find its greatest energy. Even if all this be only of a preparatory kind, preparation itself is part of the total-work, and no one, at bottom, can know where the preliminaries go over into the work itself.

PART V.—CHRISTIANITY AND THE PRESENT
(CONTINUED)

CHAPTER XVII

c. THE SITUATION AND DEMANDS OF THE PRESENT

GREAT as the difficulties of a new configuration of religion are, they must not discourage us from entering upon the task, for behind this task an urgent need of the times calls us to the work—a need which wells up ever to the surface. We live in an age of richness and movement—an age which no one dare brand as paltry, and which, with all its activities, capacity for work, and its over-flowing life, should never be assimilated too closely with the stagnation of waning antiquity. But it is an age afflicted with an immense contradiction. It is wonderfully great in its mastery of, and achievements within, the environing world, but, on the other hand, it is deplorably poor and insecure in regard to the problems of the inner life and the inner world. Such a contradiction cannot be tolerated forever. As certain as it is that it will be overcome, quite as certain is the fact that religion will once more step forth as *the fact* of facts, and prepare for itself an appropriate configuration of the essential and universal elements of life and existence.

There is no need for us here to delineate the power of man over the world: it is evident to all. Most evident are the gains over nature through science and technics; and also the conditions of human relations have become incomparably clearer and more tractable. We understand how to unravel the skein of the past and how to weave a meaning out of its isolated threads, and how to differentiate the subjective clothing of things from their essential aspects. Further, we observe in the corporate life of men the immense growth of the power of administration and organisation, and through all this we are able to obtain our wants and needs in an incomparably securer and easier way than at any other period in the history of our world. In all this, man has become more and more the master of things. But all this potency has a measured and limited boundary. This potency is confined to what the capacities of man are able to extract from the external world, but the potency does not reach to that which exists within his own soul, and does not lead to the growth and the blossoming of an inner world. And consequently life in the midst of all its achievements remains resting upon the external, and man has to consider himself ever as something of an alien in the midst of it all if he is ever to exercise real power and to exhibit his genuine superiority over the world.

Whilst the effort and the energy are so strongly drawn towards the external, the inner life—the heritage of long millenniums—has become afflicted with a grave anxiety and insecurity. But this inner life is too deeply implanted and rooted in human nature through the work of the millenniums to be ever

shaken off as an alien thing or to be considered in any light-hearted manner. It holds us fast and raises its claims; it forbids us to find satisfaction in all the things of sense and time. But in the midst of all the contradictions the inner life is unable to reach by itself a clear and energetic content, and it will never reach it by looking externally. We remain therefore on the inward side as poor in the midst of all the external plenty which surrounds us as if we were not the possessors of it at all.

We discover this poverty "in the inward parts" in a stronger and more painful manner if we do not wrap our inward exigency with historical tradition, if we do not call upon antiquity or upon the beginnings of modern times to come to our immediate assistance, and if we cease to look to the traditional form of religion for the deepening of life and for consolidation. In fact, the situation of mankind has altered so much through the work and experience of modern times that the older mode of thinking cannot possibly satisfy our life in its entirety. We may feel great interest in much that is contained in the old mode and allow ourselves to be carried along with it, but a point arrives where a parting of the ways takes place for ever. In reality, we cannot approach certain aspects of the Old without simultaneously moving away from other aspects; we cannot affirm certain aspects of history without at the same time having to deny other aspects. Therefore, if we take the whole of any historical occurrence as our guide, there cannot be at work more than half of our energy and character; we shall thus turn hither and thither in the most unsteady manner; and

amongst all the chaos of the contradictory impressions we shall fall at last into dulness and weariness.

What remains? The immediate present moment remains. And if this present moment possesses not as yet a connected inner world, still it possesses the free spontaneous feeling and the natural individuality of the individual. But can these become the standard of a new life? It is certain that from this source much can become alive and move, raise and turn itself, affirm and deny, devote itself energetically in divers ways to vista beyond vista and task beyond task. But notwithstanding such a possession life still remains under the ban of the accidental and the superficial; it has not yet possessed the genuine substance and the durable truth. Indeed, the farther life travels on this road without these essentials on its journey, the more it falls amongst strange situations, mistakes, and eccentricities. And thus there arises that shallow situation of which we are all aware, and which we need only briefly refer to here.

The basing of life upon subjectivity and natural individuality causes inner divisions of the human race; it causes a frittering away of the life of the soul of the whole and the soul of each individual. It was the main service of traditional religion that it raised up and presented a total-task and total-aim for humanity; the individual was introduced to the life of the fellowship; he received from this source light and guidance; each individual experienced intimately the fate of the whole, and so could always withdraw from the fleetingness of his own individual conclusions to this; it is in this total-life of the fellowship that the individual finds support and

consolation, motive and enhancement, norm and standard. And, further, men were thus held closely together; the common task and the daily burden of each and all was understood by each and all; they laboured and suffered together, and they loved and hated together. Here was a source of spiritual energy and ethical character which no proclamation of mere doctrine and no appeal of mere emotion could ever replace.

It is a loss which cannot be estimated when such an inner fellowship and, along with it, a life out of the Whole decay. It is a loss when each individual plants himself upon the particularity of his natural individuality, and when an exaggerated individualism is developed without any reservation and counterpoise. If this calamity happens, all the energies which worked together in the fellowship now work against one another. The result is an intellectual and moral disintegration; men understand one another less and less, live less and less for one another, and more and more rarely are they to be found shoulder to shoulder. Can we deny that mankind divides itself more and more into opposites and parties, and that the colossal associations in the domains of material work oppose the independence of the inner life?

It is a strange life which issues out of such an unbounded development of subjectivity and natural individuality. Man in all this is most busy with himself, observes himself, mirrors and reflects his own states; he ruminates and broods more and more over himself, seeks to refine his small artistic soul and to free himself from all the deeper concerns

of life and existence. Thus, life is posited more and more upon mere reflection and is turned towards whims and delusions; it loses all its *naïveté*—all simple innocence and inner necessities. But herewith it enters into a track where mind and soul are neither well nor sick, and where artificiality and eccentricity keep company with prejudice and jealousy.

The elevation of natural individuality to the level of a guide of life has as its result the shaping of life in a puny, piecemeal, irregular, and curious fashion. Paradoxes and commonplaces now present themselves as excellences, but they never lead to even a mediocre independence although the man is in urgent need of greatness and independence in order to compare his life with such trivial things and in order to be raised above them. The individual has here no inner world beyond himself, so that he cannot measure himself and cannot obtain fulfilment for his life. What remains for him but to return towards the external world and seek there a flimsy greatness by means of a "brilliant career" and often of an overstrain?

Through the convergence of these individual currents of life, no life of greatness can ever issue forth. A chaos of conflicting movements, contrary hindrances and weaknesses, sudden rising and abrupt falling, no governing main drift which differentiates between good and evil and between the real and the apparent, no energetic counter-effect to the petty and the common on the highways of human life, and, instead of an energetic spirituality, a refining of the sensuous right up to a senile sensuality—all this

takes place. All culture which possesses no substance, notwithstanding all its aspiration after reality and notwithstanding all the excitement of its subjectivity, possesses no soul, and in the whirl of fleeting appearances obscures the great *Either-Or*. The words of Pestalozzi are even more needful for our day than for his own: "Light and darkness have always been in our world, but most of the light and darkness stood out in greater bold relief in days of yore—in the dark days themselves—and were clearer and more real to the eyes of men. Darkness was then recognised by the seer fully as darkness. But to-day the darkness has become light and the light darkness."

In such a critical time as ours, which meets the life of humanity everywhere, this truth of Pestalozzi becomes particularly plain if we compare the universal weakness of the inner life with the colossal capacity of a scientific, technical, and practical kind. We are occupying ourselves very diligently in a scientific, historical, and reflective way with Philosophy, but we possess no Philosophy of our own—no philosophical creativeness of an independent kind. We occupy ourselves incessantly with history, and have carried the results of technics to a marvellous height, but we lack all along the meaning of history as a totality, and are not able to cross the bridge from the past to the present. Our literature sets in motion individual sides of the soul, but it does not seize and bind together man in the totality of his being—it does not strike its root into the depth of man's nature. Our art works diligently and aspires zealously after truth, but it does not

succeed in bringing the chaos of the times to its own track. We deal more than ever to-day with education, but we possess no united and simple ideal. We trouble incessantly for the betterment of political and social relations, but we come to a painful halt wherever the final aims and the highest happiness of man are at stake. Everywhere we witness the absence of a self-reliant Spiritual Life which would be superior to the wealth of the conflicting impressions, and which would carry the universal situation of the present into a connected and simple expression. Our day is also full of inner problems, and we have not grown strong enough to attack them; we sink back ever anew into the petty-human level and fail to reach a genuine content of life—fail to reach consolidation and greatness.

All this will not be seen so long as man allows himself to remain entirely in such a state of impulse and mechanism and only hurries breathlessly along from one small point to another. But once he steps out of such a situation and strikes out for a new path of the Whole, he will certainly discover the nature of the painful situation. He will discover the situation to be that of incessant toil and work without many pure gains, of fascinating achievements in isolated things but of a trivial value for the totality of life, of a highly complicated apparatus of civilisation and culture but of no living soul in the Whole, of burning impulses of the fleeting moment but of no creativeness, eternal values, or eternal hopes. Why all this labour and toil if the whole thing has no meaning but relapses at last into nothingness?

But one needs but grasp clearly the crisis of

such a culture in order to raise himself above all anxiety for the future. The boundaries of such negations and shallowness have been set: there comes a point where man within his own being and life discovers their destructive energy, and when this happens the counter-effect is not far away. Man now takes up the struggle on behalf of his threatened spiritual existence; he grips the inner connections of his being once again—connections in which his deepest being has its foundation—and new energies will flow from such a source and strengthen him towards producing a culture which signifies once more an independent inner world, and which is able to grant their true valuation to all the relationships of his life. We really stand to-day on the verge of an aspiration after an essential culture—a culture of the whole man—after an inwardness which corresponds to the most important meanings of the Spiritual Life. In the midst of the tangle and the loud lament of the initial stages, the aspiration will become stronger and stronger; it needs but an energetic concentration of effort as well as a definite focussing of energies in order that the movement may proceed on its upward course — beyond the realm of the petty circle and into a realm beyond all earthly bounds. The possibilities of life are not yet exhausted: new avenues and tasks open out whenever we discover the courage of creativeness and the right point of attack, but it is imperative that we should possess the conviction and that the conviction should possess us that reality has a depth beyond the *natural* man, and that we are able to gain admission to such a depth.

But a movement towards a more essential and soul-stirring culture—to a progressive superiority of a total-life beyond all individual activities—cannot arise without bringing the problem of religion once more to the foreground. Our life is not able to find its bearings within this deep or to gather its treasures into a Whole unless it realises how many acute opposites it carries within itself. Life will either be torn in pieces by these opposites or it must somehow be raised above them all. It is the latter alone that can bring about a fundamental transformation of our first and shallow view of the universe as well as the inauguration of a new reality. It is this which religion announces to man and promises to bring to his soul in its dire need. Man has emerged out of the darkness of nature and remains afflicted with the afflictions of nature, yet at the same time, with his appearance upon the earth the darkness begins to illumine, and "nature kindles within him a light" (Schopenhauer); he who is a mere speck on the face of a boundless expanse can yet aspire to a participation in the whole of Infinity; he who stands in the midst of the flux of time yet possesses an aspiration after infinite truth; he who forms but a mere piece of nature constructs at the same time a new world within the Spiritual Life over against it all; he who finds himself confined by contradictions of all kinds, and which immediate existence in no way can solve, yet struggles after a further depth of reality and after the "narrow gate" which opens into religion. Through and beyond all the individual problems of life and the world, it behoves us to raise the Spiritual Life to a level of

full independence, to make it simultaneously superior to man as an individual and to bring it back into his soul. When this happens, there happens at the same time a transformation of his inmost being, and for the first time he becomes capable of genuine greatness.

The aspiration after a new culture carries thus within itself in an immediate and intimate manner the aspiration after a rejuvenation of religion. Religion and culture will thus instruct one another. Without religion the inwardness cannot become a self-reliant province and cannot rise above the external world; without a connection with the whole of life and also with culture, religion loses its characteristic spiritual content and threatens to sink into a merely subjective disposition. Consequently the deficiency or the curtailment of one is also an injury to the other.

These final conclusions strengthen the aspiration after a religion of the Spiritual Life, which has run through the whole of our investigation. Such a religion is in no way new, and Christianity has proclaimed it and clung to it from the very beginning. But it has been so interweaved with traditional forms which are now seen through by so many as pictorial ideas of epochs and times. Earlier times could allow the essence and the form to flow inseparably together without discovering any incongruity in this. But the time for doing this has irrevocably passed away. The human which once seemed to bring the Spiritual and Divine so near to man has now become a burden and a hindrance to him. A keener analysis, a more independent

development of the Spiritual and Divine, and along with this, the truth of religion, do not succeed in reaching their full effects if religion is looked upon as merely something to protect individuals, instead of looking upon it as that which furthers the whole of humanity—as that which is not merely a succour in times of trouble and sorrow but also as that which guarantees an enhancement in work and creativeness. The situation is difficult and full of dangers, and small in the meantime are the number of those who grasp it in a deep and free sense, and who yet are determined to penetrate victoriously into it, so that the inner necessities of the Spiritual Life may dawn within the soul of man. Whatever new tasks and difficulties lie in the lap of the future, to-day it behoves us before all else to proceed a step upward in that direction of the summits and to draw new energies and depths of the Spiritual Life into the domain of man, for this kind of work will prevent the coming of an "old age" upon humanity and will breathe into its soul the gift of Eternal Youth.

INDEX

OF NAMES AND OF SUBJECT MATTERS

Absolute and Historical Religion, 534 ff.
life: its conception, 193, 208.
Activity demanded in religion, 483, 562, 580 ff.
Antithetic character of the Spiritual, especially of the Religious Life, 242 ff., 542 ff.
Art: as an overcoming of an interior opposition and in connection with religion, 133 ff., 450 ff., 505.
Autonomous Life and Autonomies, 152, 153, 204, 205.

Bacon, 532.
Being, and the formation of Being, 161, 162, 422.
Biological conception of life: its peculiarity and its danger, 27, 51, 52.
Bodily resurrection of Jesus: no object of faith, 550, 551.
Böhme, J., 498.
Buddha, 521.

Catholicism (Roman), 565, 567, 602.
Changes and crises in historical movements, 357, 358.
Characteristic Religion: its conception, 410 ff.
its detailed development, 419 ff.
Characteristic Religion: its place in education, 468 ff.
its relation to the historical religions, 411 ff.
its relation to Universal Religion, 411 ff.
Christian religion, the: as over against history and culture, 556 ff.
as over against the changes within the Spiritual Life itself, 563 ff.
effect of its beginnings, 227.
its eternal substance, 539 ff.
its maintenance, as over against the changes in the outlook on to Nature, 547 ff.
its peculiarity, 7, 539 ff., 546, 547.
its temporal form, 576 ff.
its union of the Divine and the human, 206, 544.
of its mediæval form, 41, 42, 194.
peculiarity of its older form, 20 ff., 40, 41, 65, 559, 576 ff.
Christian State, Christian Science: the right and the wrong in these conceptions, 495 ff.
Childlikeness: its connection with religion, 451, 452.
Church, the: demands concerning its formation, 467 ff.

Church, the: its necessity and its dangers, 458 ff.
Cognition: its complications, 100 ff.
its conditions, 148.
Concreteness in religion; how to be understood, 601 ff.
Confucius, 394.
Conscience: its significance and its limits, 336 ff.
Cosmic Interior Life: as presupposition of all striving after interiority, 165 ff.
Creativeness (spiritual): its character and its conditions, 146 ff.
Culture and Civilisation: their character and their relation to religion, 58, 68 ff., 142, 560 ff.
in contrast to morals, 318.
in contrast to religion, 296 ff.

Dead, judgment of the: motive of this conception, 334.
Determinism: its presuppositions and its insufficiency, 172 ff., 223 ff., 265 ff.
Development, doctrine of, and idea of Evolution: their limits, 109, 116 ff.
their relation to religion, 27, 29, 554 ff., 569.
Diabolical, the, in human nature, 324.
Dialectic, the, of religion, 425 ff., 436, 542.
of universal religion, 357.
Disposition and power: their alienation, 316 ff.
Divine, the, and the human: their inter-relation, 222 ff., 579 ff.
complication of this inter-relation within the historical religions, 380 ff.
Doubt: its power, its right and its wrong, 9, 233, 519 ff.
Drama, the, as an image of human life, 288, 516.

Eckhart, Meister, 188, 190, 207.
Emancipation of the Spiritual Life from man, 36, 569 ff.
Enemies, love of our (as indication of a new world-order), 392 ff.
Eternal, the, and the temporal: their mutual relations within religion, 193.
Eternity, the longing for, 270, 446.
as presupposition of history, 176.
Ethical Idealism: its character and its superiority, 173, 602.
Evil: its reality recognised by religion, 14, 499.
its treatment in religion, 502 ff.
Existence, Existential Form (in contradistinction to substance), 182 ff., 514 ff.
Existences (in contradistinction to Natures), 184.
Experience (distinguished from merely empirical knowledge), 137.

Faith and doubt, 518 ff.
its necessary conception, 232, 237 ff., 518 ff.
Fatalism, 324.
Fate and guilt, 324, 340 ff.
of the work, 144.
Feeling: its significance for the psychic starting-point of religion, 226.
its insufficiency as a basis of religion, 67, 78.
Fichte, 34, 271.
Following of Christ, 553.

Formal reason: its quarrel with material reason, 212, 293.
Freedom and depth, 319.
and Equality: their connection with religion, 263 ff., 444 ff.
and grace, 205 ff., 223 ff.

God, the idea of, 181, 208 ff., 371 ff., 429 ff.
its twofold interpretation in ecclesiastical Christianity, 210 ff.
Godhead and God, 429 ff.
Goethe, 54, 133, 140, 151, 215, 337, 344.
Good, the, and the useful, 124 ff.
Greatness, the longing for: its connection with religion, 278, 290 ff., 447.
Greek manner of thinking and view of life, 101, 105, 233, 263, 559.
Guilt, 500, 527, 603.

Habit: limits of its efficiency, 125 ff.
Hegel, 80, 149, 474, 536.
Higher, the, and the lower: opposite direction of the explanation of them, 502 ff., 507, 556.
History: conditions for a history of a spiritual kind, 55 ff.
its relation to religion, 28 ff., 434 ff.
its significance within religion, 475 ff.
limits of its efficacy in the domain of the Spiritual Life, 113 ff., 176.
of the soul: introduced by religion, 434.
Historical criticism: its origin and effect, 32 ff.
religions, 6 ff., 366 ff.
Historism: refusal of, 567 ff.
Historico-social culture and civilisation: its incapacity to produce the Spiritual Life, 50, 68 ff., 142, 560 ff.
is interpretable in two different ways, 318.
its opposition to religion, 296 ff.

Idealism and Realism: they can be conjoined, 178 ff.
Idealist Culture and Realistic Culture and Civilisation in modern times, 43 ff.
Ideals: their peculiar action, 200 ff.
their constant change, 300 ff.
Imagination: its operation within religion, 8, 367, 368, 481, 567.
Immanent Idealism: refusal of, 532.
Immortality, 216, 272, 291 ff., 435.
Impersonal character of the process of civilisation and culture in modern times, 36.
Indian religions, 11 ff., 541.
Indirect proof furnished by universal history, 258.
Individual, the: as interlaced with the environment, 338 ff.
in relation to society, 300 ff.
treated by fate as though indifferent, 347 ff.
Infinite Love, 441 ff.
Infinity: the longing after, 261 ff., 445.
Interiority: discrimination between subjective and substantial interiority, 67 ff., 150 ff., 274, 426, 439, 510, 572.
strengthened by religion, 437 ff.
Intellectualism: conditions for overcoming it, 181 ff.
its insufficiency, 74, 232.
Intolerance, the: of religion, 248.

Jesus: His personality, 16 ff., 360, 521, 588.
His position within the Christian faith, 16 ff., 583 ff.
Judaism, 367.
Justice and love, 395 ff.

Kant, 34, 200, 275, 423, 426, 517.

Leibniz, 161, 275.
Lessing, 378.
Life, types of: their difference and their onesidedness, 171 ff., 307 ff.
Life-work, 138 ff.
Love and justice, 395 ff.
its nature and its presuppositions, 148 ff., 395 ff., 505.
Luther, 151, 222, 407, 437, 442, 492, 516.

Magical, the, in religion combated, 565 ff.
Man: his smallness and his greatness, 169 ff.
Matter of fact, in religion: how to be understood, 600 ff.
Mediation, the idea of: its presuppositions, 583 ff.
its dangers, 585.
Metaphysic indispensable for religion, 68.
Metaphysical life: the thirst after (distinguished from the thirst after physical life), 402.
Miracles (in the false and in the right sense), 25 ff., 205, 223, 282, 521 ff., 549 ff.
Modern culture and civilisation: discrimination between its spiritual substance and its merely human tendency, 593 ff.
Mohammed, 398, 521.
Morality and civic worthiness, 108.
and religion, 223.
is no diminution of energy, 128 ff.
its interior growth and development, 405 ff.
its nature and action, 128 ff.
its power, 130.
its seeming impossibility, 103 ff.
its weakness in human life, 95, 320 ff.
no natural quality of man, 170 ff., 240 ff.
Movement and rest: influence of religion upon the constitution of their interrelations, 507 ff.
Mysticism: its right and its wrong, 74, 213 ff.

Natural Science: its relationship to religion, 24 ff., 547 ff.
Nature and spirit as grades of reality, 86, 164, 167.
opposed to religion, 290 ff.
Negative element of all the work of life, 93, 94.
Noeticism opposed to intellectualism and voluntarism, 235.
Noological method differentiated from the psychological, 178 ff., 455, 456.
differentiated from speculative metaphysic, 180.

Object and objectivity: their true meaning, 90 ff.
Objectivist and subjectivist modes of life: their conflict, 313 ff.
Optimism: its insufficiency, 349 ff.

Optimism: its contrast with religion, 524, 526, 529.
Organisation of the work of culture: demands concerning it, 185 ff.
Original sin, a mistaken conception, 222.

Pantheism: its development in modern times, 43 ff.
its mistaken interpretation of the process of life, 168.
the right and the wrong of, 217 ff.
Paracelsus, 204.
Parseeism, 366.
Pascal, 337, 352, 409.
Passive kind, the, of religion combated, 482, 484, 561, 579.
Paul, 216, 224.
Personal: distinguished from subjective, 151, 152.
Personality, 150 ff.
of God, 212, 429 ff.
of the founders of the religions, 7, 367 ff., 480 ff.
Pessimism: as opponent of religion, 526 ff., 529 ff.
its interior contradiction, 353 ff.
Pestalozzi, 77, 452, 611.
Pietism, refusal of, 225.
Pindar, 344.
Plato, 236, 393, 478.
Plotinus, 154, 256, 277, 393.
Positivism: rejection of its attack upon religion, 255.
Presence, characteristics of spiritual, 256 ff.
Priesthood, its dangers for religion, 461 ff.
Privative conception of Evil; its right and its wrong, 355.
Proof, the kind of, possible for religion considered, 72 ff.
Providence, belief in, 325 ff.

Rationalism: position taken up towards it, 485 ff.
Reformation, the, 23, 581.
Religion: and cosmic contemplation, 448 ff., 506 ff., 513 ff.
and culture and civilisation, 597 ff.
and speculation, 255, 256.
its affirmative character, 249, 250.
its discriminating and integrating action, 235, 236, 471 ff.
its kernel, 187 ff., 249 ff.
its method of proof, 193 ff., 453 ff., 526 ff.
its psychic starting-point, 226 ff.
reasons for men's different attitudes towards it, 228, 243 ff., 426 ff., 523 ff., 530 ff.
Renaissance, the: its ideal of life, 43.
Right, the idea of: its spiritual conditions, 135.
Runeberg, 450.

Sacraments, 553, 565 ff.
Sacrifice: how far necessary, 237, 497.
Savonarola, 522, 551.
Schelling, 341, 509.
Schopenhauer, 614.
Science and Truth, 103.
Self-actuation: distinguished from mere activity, 151, 152.
Self-life of the Spirit, the, explained, 147 ff.
Soul, depth of, 262.
powers of the, 273 ff.
Souls, transmigration of, 335.
Sovereign treatment of life (as against the subjectivist and the objectivist treatments), 133 ff.

Spiritual, the, and the sensible: form taken by their interrelation in modern times, 564 ff., 578.
Spiritual culture: its contradistinction to merely human culture, 239 ff., 472.
Life, the: difference between our conception of it, and that which obtained in the classical period of German literature, 168.
its gradual independence over against man, 35 ff., 563, 569.
its position in the universe, 156 ff.
its scatteredness in human existence, 307 ff.
Stoicism, 347, 439.
Substance: in contradistinction to Existence and Existential form, 182 ff.
Suffering: its effect upon man, 328 ff., 355.
God: objections to this conception, 432 ff.
Thinking (logical): its power in history, 356.
Truth: its apparent self-contradiction, 101 ff.
its new formulation, 161 ff., 478, 505.
Two chief directions in the movement of religious reform, 599.

Universal Religion: its conception, 192.
its relation to Characteristic Religion, 412 ff.
Utilitarianism (in religion) rejected, 64, 465.

Voluntarism (see Willing): a mere reaction against Intellectualism, 80 ff., 185.

Willing, not suitable as a foundation for religion, 81 ff.
Winckelmann, 47.
Work: its greatness, 136 ff.
its limits, 144.
world of, the: its conception, 135 ff.

Xenophanes, 585.

PRINTED BY NEILL AND CO., LTD., EDINBURGH

CROWN THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY

The original of this book is in
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.

http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924029061526

Cornell University Library
B841 .E86 1909a
Life of the spirit; an introduction to p

3 1924 029 061 526
olin

CROWN THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY

VOL. XXVI.

EUCKEN'S THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT

THE
LIFE OF THE SPIRIT

AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY

BY

RUDOLF EUCKEN

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN JENA

TRANSLATED BY

F. L. POGSON, M.A.

SECOND EDITION

WITH INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY THE AUTHOR

NEW YORK: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

LONDON: WILLIAMS AND NORGATE

1909

PREFACE

In the present volume philosophy is not regarded as a known quantity, and no attempt is made to impart it to the individual by a comparative survey of its different departments; but it is treated as a problem—the problem that it in reality continually becomes in the course of the centuries. The book represents a particular view of the nature of philosophy, and undertakes to show that it must be conceived in this way if it is to be equal to the demands which are made upon it by the life of mankind, and particularly by the present situation. By tracing out as simply and clearly as possible a few of the leading lines on which the age-long work of the human spirit has proceeded, it is shown that our spiritual life is not built up in peace and security on a given foundation, but that doubt and

conflict extend right down to the foundation, and that no progress of our inner life is possible without a reversal of our first impressions. If philosophy thus appears intimately bound up with all the striving of humanity and the necessity for spiritual self-preservation, then the re-emergence of a philosophy of life and existence becomes an urgent requirement in the complication and confusion of the present situation, and in the struggle which we have to wage to-day for a spiritual centre for our civilisation and a perception of the meaning and value of life. It is because this struggle concerns not merely the learned, but every man who does not despair of attaining to inner independence and true fulness of life, that it is hoped this book will appeal to a wider circle of readers, especially those who share the author's strong and painful conviction of the inadequacy and indeed the emptiness of modern civilisation, in spite of all its outer ostentation.

RUDOLF EUCKEN.

JENA, *May* 1908.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY THE AUTHOR

It may render the present volume easier to understand if the author endeavours to sketch in a few words what he aims at accomplishing.

My efforts have been inspired by the strong feeling that the present spiritual situation is highly unsatisfactory, and in particular that there is a sharp opposition which divides mankind and depresses the level of life. The greatness of our age lies in work, in the subjection and shaping of the world of objects to human ends: this work has gained more and more brilliant triumphs, and has altered the whole of our existence. But these triumphs have not been accompanied by a corresponding growth in the content of life and the soul of man. Work directs our efforts towards

external ends, and thus brings into play only a part, and indeed a more and more insignificant part, of our faculties. Hence all technical achievements do not preserve us from inner emptiness: work overwhelms our soul and makes us to a continually increasing extent a mere means and instrument of its restless activity. In opposition to this a counter-movement has lately arisen; man tears himself away from work, and opposes to it his own subjective condition; he seeks happiness more especially by treating life as an art, by cultivating refined and pleasurable emotions, by shaking off the burden of matter and the objective world. But the æstheticism which aims at transforming the whole of existence into pleasure and enjoyment provides it with no high aims and no real content: it makes life a mere play on the surface of things, which may be attractive and delightful for a certain time, but which in the end is bound to produce weariness and repulsion. Hence it becomes a matter of importance

to rise above the opposition between soulless work and empty subjectivism; this, however, cannot possibly be accomplished from the outside, but requires the strenuous exertion and deepening of life itself. To help towards this end is the special task of philosophy, which is thus seen to be indispensable to humanity, for it is philosophy which can best co-ordinate life into a whole, investigate the specific character of the whole so formed, press forward from the outer appearance to the inner depths, weigh the significance of each element in the universe, and try to ascertain the meaning of the whole. But any such thorough investigation of life must make it evident that human life—in a large measure, at any rate —falls within a wider concept of Nature, and displays a close kinship with the animal world. It is equally evident, however, that the possibilities of human life are by no means entirely exhausted in the life of Nature, but that with it a new stage of reality arises, which we call spiritual. This stage does not

merely exhibit particular new qualities, but also involves an entirely new kind of existence: psychical life, which, in the stages below the human, forms a mere appendage and serves only to promote physical self-preservation, here first reaches independence, gives rise to entirely new realities and values, and forms a realm which is co-ordinated into a whole by internal connections. This whole cannot possibly be set down as a merely human product; it must spring from the universe and thence be communicated to man. In appropriating it he appears as a being who has a share in a cosmic movement and is called upon to further it. But the spiritual life is no mere possession to be enjoyed by man. His average existence usually forms a turbid medley in which nature is strong and spirituality weak. Hence the object to be aimed at is first to build up in opposition to this average life a realm of genuine spirituality by means of united work, and then to raise humanity up to it. This

transforms the whole of our existence into a problem and a task; at every point life must be raised to an essentially higher level, a reversal of its previous course must be accomplished; our view of the world and the kind of life we lead must be given a specific shape; humanity as a whole has here a common work to carry out. From this starting-point a new idealism is developed, a philosophy which may be termed activism. This activism differs both from the older speculation and from modern Pragmatism. From the former it is distinguished by its repudiation of intellectualism, by its grounding of knowledge on life, and by its constant return to the content of life as the fundamental and controlling fact. From Pragmatism it is differentiated by the fact that it does not make the welfare of the mere man, whether as an individual or in society, its leading aim, but sees in man the emergence of something superhuman, divine, and eternal, and makes this the sure guiding star of its

efforts; by this means it raises them above the contingency of the individual and the vicissitudes of time, and gives to man's life a worthy content.

But where endeavour is thus concentrated chiefly on the content and connections of life, the consideration of the general movement of history will acquire great significance. For the spiritual life does not lie ready to hand in the consciousness of individuals; it reveals to us its depths and its goals only through manifold experiences and hard struggles; these experiences and struggles, with the development of spiritual life which they have brought about, form the heart and core of the movement of history. Hence history, when regarded from the philosophical point of view, leads us to consider the height of spiritual life which has been already attained; not only so, but with regard to the different leading problems of philosophy, the process of tracing out the fate they have met with in the course of the centuries is an excellent

means of taking bearings and of seeing both what in them is permanently necessary, and what in this connection the present requires from the thinker. This attention to history is not meant to alienate us from the present, but, by increasing our philosophical insight, it should reveal to us a wider and richer present than that of the mere moment. This is the justification for the attempt made in this volume to fix our position with regard to the present tasks of philosophy by means of an historical survey.

RUDOLF EUCKEN.

JENA.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

It is my pleasant duty to thank the friends who have helped me in various ways. The translation owes much to my discussions with Mr G. G. Berry, whose keen insight has cleared up many a difficulty. I am also much indebted to Mr W. R. Boyce Gibson for generously allowing me to see in manuscript the concluding portion of his forthcoming translation of Prof. Eucken's *Lebensanschauungen*, and for giving me the benefit in other ways of his intimate knowledge of Prof. Eucken's philosophy. To Prof. L. P. Jacks I owe the correct interpretation of the passage from Hegel quoted on p. 54. The translation in the "English and Foreign Philosophical Library" does not seem to bring out the real meaning, but it was unfortunately too late to

alter it. Finally, I am greatly indebted to Prof. Eucken himself for courteously giving me information on a considerable number of doubtful points. For any errors that there may be, I, of course, am solely responsible.

F. L. POGSON.

OXFORD, *December* 1908.

CONTENTS

PAGES

INTRODUCTION 1–29

Philosophy the queen of sciences, 1; ancient philosophy, 2; religion and philosophy, 2; philosophy and its opponents, 3; internal conflicts of philosophy, 4; the aim of philosophy, 5–7; the influence of philosophy, 8; philosophy as the representative of necessities of thought, 9–11; philosophy and life, 11–14; spiritual life, 15–20; history, philosophy, and the spiritual life, 21–29.

CHAPTER I

UNITY AND MULTIPLICITY 30–103

The systematisation of life, 30; demand for unification, 30; Greek philosophy and unity, 32–34; Plato's doctrine of ideas, 35; Aristotle's scheme of life, 37–40; the creative activity of art, 40; philosophy and universal reason, 42; the function of religion, 43; Plotinus and the search for unity, 44; unity and the spiritual life, 46; mysticism, 47; Christianity and unity, 49; the ethical conception of God, 49; the Christian conception of God, 50; the Greek conception of the Deity, 51; exaltation of the individual, 53; the Church and individual freedom, 55; contradictions of Christianity, 55; the absorption of Christianity by the Church, 57–59; Scholasticism, 61; freedom, 63–68; modern science and its aims, 68–72; new forms and aims of philosophy, 72 *et seq.*; individualism and society, 83; personality and the world, 84; civilisation and the spiritual life, 87; German philosophy, 88; the medieval ecclesiastical system, 92; history and the spiritual life, 94; philosophy and the spiritual life, 100–103.

CHAPTER II

PAGES

CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE—TIME AND ETERNITY 104–181

The endlessness of time and the longing for eternity, 105; religion and its influences, 106; Greek philosophy and its influence, 107–112; the search for the persistent, 112–113; the Greek ideal of life, 115; eternal rest the supreme goal of religion, 117; the Christian scheme of life, 119–123; the Church the guardian of unchangeable truth, 124; classical antiquity and the beginnings of Christianity, 126; Scholasticism, 126; mysticism, 127; persistence and medievalism, 128; the Renaissance and the Reformation, 132; "middle ages": derivation of the term, 133; the doctrine of evolution, 135 *et seq.*; the conception of evolution in *Faust*, 139; time and eternity, 139 *et seq.*; three phases of evolution, 140–141; natural science and Positivism, 141; co ordination needed in spiritual work, 145; modern philosophy, 146; historical modes of thought, 151; natural law, 153; the futility of a restless life, 157; the rejuvenescence of the old Mysticism, 159; rationalism and optimism, 161; historical evolution an absurdity, 163; the medieval system of the Roman Catholic Church, 164–167; the illusory recourse to history, 167–168; independent work, 168; the movement of history, 169; faith in the ultimate rationality of reality the basis of spiritual life, 176; the co-operation of philosophy and the reconciliation of time and eternity, 178–181.

CHAPTER III

THE OUTER WORLD AND THE INNER WORLD . 182–274

The need and use of philosophy, 182–184; the two worlds, 183 *et seq.*; dualism, 185–186; materialism, 187; spiritualism, 188; monism, 188–190; the relation between idealism and naturalism, 193–199; Greek idealism and its complications, 199–208; the later ages of antiquity and the two worlds, 208–210; Christianity and the two worlds, 211–218; Christianity the subject of constant strife, 218; the fundamental conception of Christianity, 219; the Christian conception of the sacrament, 225; the trend of modern life and the relation of the two worlds, 227–232; the scientific conception of the soul, 232; intellectual culture and the question, 234–238; modern

PAGES

natural science, 238–241 ; defects of naturalism, 246–249 ; spiritual life a new life, 256 ; religion and the spiritual life, 262–264 ; the creative activity of art, 264–266 ; science and the question, 266 ; the close connection of the spiritual with the natural, 270–273.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH 275–333

Truth and happiness : opposing conditions, 275 ; Augustine and Spinoza, 277–278 ; the conception of truth, 280–283 ; the classical idea of truth, 284–293 ; Scepticism and truth, 291 ; Christianity and the question, 294–302 ; faith the way to truth, 294–296 ; difficulties regarding faith, 296 ; the Roman Catholic Church and faith, 297–298 ; faith, the remover of doubt, itself an object of doubt, 302 ; the Enlightenment, 307–313 ; critical philosophy, 313–319 ; constructive speculation, 319–321 ; Positivism, 322 ; Pragmatism, 322–326 ; truth and metaphysics, 322–326 ; modern philosophy and truth, 327–333.

CHAPTER V

THE PROBLEM OF HAPPINESS 334–394

Work and happiness, 334 ; the craving after happiness, 335–337 ; a survey of world history in connection with happiness, 337 *et seq.* ; the Greek idea of happiness, 338–339 ; Plato's conception of happiness, 340–342 ; Aristotle and happiness, 343–345 ; an examination of the ideal of happiness of the great classical thinkers, 345–357 ; Plotinus' ideal of happiness, 350–355 ; the Christian pursuit of happiness, 357 ; the Christian conception of pain, 360–363 ; modern idea of happiness, 366–373 ; limitations of knowledge and complications arising therefrom, 373 *et seq.* ; æsthetic culture, 383–384 ; happiness and the question of personality, 384–386 ; philosophy and happiness, 391–394.

CONCLUSION 395–403

THE
LIFE OF THE SPIRIT

INTRODUCTION

THAT philosophy is not only full of problems, but that philosophy itself as a whole is and remains a problem is shown by the varied estimation in which it has been held and the disputed place which it occupies in the life of mankind. On the one hand it is called the queen of the sciences, and a life dedicated to it seems the acme of human existence; minds of the highest rank have laboured to serve it, and it has often intervened with great effect to modify the whole condition of humanity. This modifying influence, moreover, has appeared in a great variety of ramifications.

At one time, as in the case of Plato, philosophy has wrested pure ideals from the dark tangle of everyday life and has held them up as sure guiding stars to action. At another time, as in the case of Aristotle, it has sought to grasp the fulness of reality in a unified whole and to penetrate the whole of life as an organizing influence. At still another time, as in the later ages of antiquity, it has been a support and finally a consolation amid the cares and troubles of life. In modern times again it has acted as an influence in liberating men's minds and as a torch of advancing culture. Moreover, it has in addition carried out a vigorous examination of the traditional condition of life and has sought to enlighten men in the most thoroughgoing way as to the limits of their powers. No great spiritual achievement has seemed possible without the help and co-operation of philosophy; whenever it has been wanting life has lost in spontaneity, in freedom of movement, in depth. Religion especially has often enough experienced this

to its grave injury. When we follow this line of thought philosophy appears as an indispensable and most important part of the spiritual possessions of humanity.

But on the other hand every survey of human experience shows that at all times philosophy has had its zealous opponents, who have declared that it was superfluous and indeed have rejected it as harmful. This is the case with the specialist, who believes that the work of knowledge is completely defined when the world has been divided up among the different scientific disciplines; with the practical man who regards brooding and reflection as a hindrance to keenness of action; and, finally, with the believer in positive religion, who thinks that philosophy undermines the security of faith and fills men with proud self-confidence. But more dangerous than any attack from without is the fact that philosophy is uncertain of itself, that its work is dislocated, that it is divided into different schools, each one of which, in order to maintain itself, thinks

it necessary to refute all the others. This conflict threatens to remain unsettled and without result; it seems in the course of the centuries to grow rather than to diminish. For whether the Sophists were in the right with their subjectivism, or Socrates with his doctrine of concepts, whether happiness in life is to be sought by the way of the Stoa or by that of Epicurus, is still an open question. Of course the individual actors have withdrawn from the stage, but their ideas have remained and passionately continue the fight, like the spirits on the Catalaunian Fields. From this standpoint it remains incomprehensible how philosophy can have gained a deep influence over thought and life; but if this influence must be accepted as an indisputable fact, we are confronted by a riddle which necessarily impels us to take our bearings both as to the task and the position of philosophy.

It is true that an attempt has been made to get rid of the above contradiction by means of a conception of philosophy which would make

it acceptable to all: the only question is whether, in such a case, everything is not lost which lends it independence and value. In earlier times as well as at the present day it has often been held up as the sole aim of philosophy to co-ordinate the work of the different sciences and to blend their results into a unified picture: the more investigation becomes specialized, it is said, the more necessary is a special discipline which should concern itself with any unity that may be left; in surveying and discussing the presuppositions, the methods, and the results of the individual sciences, philosophy has an important task to which no objection can be raised. No doubt there is a task for philosophy here, but every attempt to gain a more exact conception of it gives rise to complications and difference of opinion. How are we to conceive of this surveying and co-ordinating activity? If it is bound to take the sciences as they come, if it has no right of revision, if it can venture on no further

development, then to be sure it has escaped all danger, but at the same time it has lost all significance. For if it is thus limited it becomes merely a registering of the results of the particular sciences, an encyclopædia which is not a genuine science, though a generous use of language might give it the name. In particular it is hard to see how a mere encyclopædia could have exerted upon thought and life those deeply disturbing and fruitfully elevating influences which the examples of Plato and Kant are enough to show have actually proceeded from it. And what if the individual sciences do not harmonize without demur, if bitter conflicts arise, if, for example, one department of science contends for the exclusive operation of mechanical causality, but another craves at least some shred of freedom therefrom? Shall philosophy quietly suffer such a contradiction to remain and be ready to submit to it? According to the above conception it would not have the slightest remedy.

On the other hand one who desiderates for philosophy a separate domain of activity may perhaps be inclined to think that it carries out a synthesis of the manifold in accordance with the particular nature of the contemplating subject; that it is not so much a science governed by strict rules as an unfettered art, and that it therefore remains inseparably bound up with the nature of the individual. According to this conception, philosophy would offer an incalculable variety of pictures of the world, some of which would quickly fade, while to others their inherent spiritual power would give the capacity to subjugate men's minds and to last for thousands of years. This view seems to be favoured by the fact that the history of philosophy shows us a great abundance of figures. There is no doubt that this conception contains a certain amount of truth; the subjective element is particularly important in philosophy, for a man's philosophy can least of all be separated from the whole of his personality. But on the other hand

the influence which philosophy has exercised throughout history remains unexplained. For how could subjective pictures of that kind cause such passionate excitement and stir, or give rise to so much love and hate? Besides this, philosophy does not merely offer an unlimited number of individual pictures, but it also shows persistent types which seem to embody the fundamental tendencies of human existence and effort. Hellenism especially has given rise to an abundance of types to which humanity has remained faithful as it has gone on its way, and which are continually producing new effects. In spite of all the progress of knowledge, Platonism and Aristotelianism, Stoicism and Epicureanism still maintain their position. Besides, it would be incomprehensible how philosophy as a purely individual and subjective reflection of reality could affect the contents of thought and alter the conditions of life, or how it could be for humanity a source of freedom, of security, and of rejuvenation. Philosophy has been often enough a com-

pelling force which has transformed the whole of the work of the spirit. Whence this compulsion if it rests purely on the caprice of the individual?

It is true that an attempt has been made to avoid the danger of such a relapse into pure subjectivity by regarding philosophy as the representative of necessities of thought which have not been sufficiently emphasized in everyday life and in the other sciences. By unfolding and fully developing these necessities philosophy has the right and the duty of transcending its starting-point and reorganizing its representation of reality. It thus acquires compelling force and is bound, in particular, to set itself the task of radically removing all the contradictions which appear in our world of thought. This seems to lift its task above the risk of pure subjectivity and to make it a matter which concerns the whole of humanity. But this conception, too, contains more complications than are apparent at first sight. The experience of history shows

that there is no unanimity as to the exact nature of that which is to count as a necessity of thought. Great thinkers have absolutely contradicted one another on this subject: Hegel, for example, saw in contradictions a power favourable to the production and promotion of spiritual life, while to Herbart, on the contrary, they seemed absolutely intolerable. Does not, then, the search for necessities of thought bring us back to the very subjectivity beyond which it was to carry us? And we may be doubtful of the right of a thinking which rests purely upon itself to impose its demands on the totality of things. Thinking, in its immediateness, is something which goes on in man: if things are to conform to thought, does there not arise a merely human interpretation of reality which may be quite foreign to reality itself? But the strongest motive in the pursuit of truth is the desire to get beyond the small and narrow circle of the merely human and to gain full participation in the life of things themselves, in the breadth and

truth of the universe. It is, above all, this inner expansion and liberation, this carrying of man beyond himself, which makes the work of great thinkers valuable and helpful to us; a merely human truth is a contradiction in terms, is no truth at all. If we cannot thus be sure of some sort of inner connection with the universe in our thinking, if we cannot found our thinking on a wider and deeper life, then philosophy does not exist in the sense in which it was understood at the height of its activity, and in which it has, as a matter of fact, influenced mankind.

We are thus thrown back from thought on to life—life as it co-ordinates itself from within to some sort of unified whole, directs its powers to particular ends, and adjusts itself to the totality of its environment. We need only examine the individual thinkers more exactly as regards the inner texture of their work and the aims which have actuated them, to become aware that, behind what stands before us as fully accomplished, there lies a particular

shaping of life, and that here is the point of division which separates thinkers and drives them to do battle with one another. Only because it was founded in such a life has thought attained a finished form as well as a constraining necessity; only from this starting-point has it gained the power of taking reality up into itself and striving after inner illumination. The products of thinking have varied very largely for the reason that, corresponding to the connection with life which is the foundation of thought, the work of knowledge has been from the first conceived differently. The failure to recognize this connection between thought and life is mostly to blame for the fact that the strife of the philosophers with one another has turned out to be so unedifying and so fruitless. The contest always ran the risk of moving in a circle, because it never got back to the point where in reality the division lies, and because it treated as the main thing what was the effect of deeper causes. This connection of thought with life enables us also

to understand that in the case of philosophy the work of knowledge is so closely connected with the nature of the personality.

But this connection of thought with life does not seem to lead us out of our complications to a secure standpoint. The danger again arises of a wide separation and division of mankind into separate circles. For, after all, different types of life do develop and range themselves side by side and put forth equal claims. Who is to decide to which of them belongs the higher right and leadership, and which, therefore, may produce a general picture of reality that should be reckoned as definitive? Besides, this gives no explanation how a movement which arises in man could go beyond him, bring him into connection with the great world, and put him in possession of its meaning. And without this there is no knowledge of truth in the sense in which philosophy strives to attain it.

All these discussions come in the end to this, that the existence of philosophy is bound

up with definite conditions which are by no means perfectly obvious, and which no mere acuteness or reflection can bring to light, but as to whose existence or non-existence only experience can decide. If thought is to have a root and a basis in life, and if at the same time it is to have a constraining power and a character of universality, there is only one possibility. There must appear within reach of man a life which can rise above divisions and can counteract them, a life, further, which can develop out of its own movement comprehensive connections and, indeed, can show itself active in moulding the world. Finally, it must be a life which not only touches and interprets what it lays hold of from the outside, but shapes it from within and admits it to its own depths. Only if man is able in this way to share in a universal life and thereby outgrow the limits of his particular nature, can his thinking advance from a mere cognition of things to a true knowledge. Thus there results the possibility and, indeed, the neces-

sity of a new way of looking at the world in contrast to that practised by the individual sciences.

The question then is whether we have evidence of a life of this kind, which shapes our world and places us in a different fundamental relationship to reality. We believe that we can confidently answer this question in the affirmative. For we only need to gain a keener apprehension of what is called spiritual life, and to set it in sharper relief against the environment in which human existence involves it, to become aware that it offers the very thing which we desire and seek. Spiritual life is, above all, the formation of a coherent system in life. In it not merely the potentialities of the subject are aroused and heightened, but confronting the subject there arises a field, and indeed a whole kingdom, of an objective nature. Subject and object are comprehended in a self-contained activity and assist each other's further development. Nothing short of such a comprehension of the two sides

can supply life with contents and values which, with all their inwardness, possess an indubitable superiority over all merely human powers and opinions. It is in this way that whole provinces such as science and art, jurisprudence and morality, grow up and develop their own contents, their own motives, their own laws. These provinces, however, strive towards unity and finally coalesce in a unified world. In fact, they belong on the subjective side from the very beginning to such a unified whole, and only in connection with it can they solve their own problem. Thus we find that within man there is something which goes beyond him; he himself must become something different, and his whole life assumes the form of a problem when a unified world thus makes its appearance in his life and distinguishes itself from that which is merely human.

But what is the significance of this new life in relation to the whole of reality? This can only be estimated by comparing it with that

from which it distinguishes itself and which it strives to transcend. In the first place, the realm of nature surrounds us all and penetrates deep into the human soul. Here we see reality dissected into purely individual elements. Life is resolved into the relations of these elements; it passes in purely individual processes, and does not get beyond mere matter-of-fact. For there exists here no life of the whole, which should comprehend the diversity, take it up into itself and thence draw profit. But the amount of psychical life which exists here has not yet reached the stage at which it might be called an individual life. For in the realm of nature psychical life does not attain any independence; it remains a mere concomitant phenomenon. It does not stand out as an end in itself, but forms a mere means and instrument for the preservation of living beings in the hard struggle for existence. But the great change that ensues when spiritual life comes upon the scene is that now the inner life becomes independent and begins to prepare

for itself a world of its own. This change, with its introduction of an essentially new kind of life, and its construction of a world from within, with its own particular contents, values, and order, can never be the work of man by himself. It is only to be understood as a movement of the whole of reality itself, which surrounds man, takes hold of him, and drives him on. Thus the movement towards spiritual life appears as a movement of reality towards an independent conscious existence. A depth of the world is revealed which before was hidden, and this gives rise to a complete transformation which must produce an essentially new view of reality. But this new life, by the mere fact of its having constructed a state of civilization which exists side by side with what is purely natural, has proved its power to make its way in opposition to pre-existing forces. The achievement of civilization, when at its height, in producing essentially new objects and essentially new human characters, can have been made possible

only by the force of an independent spiritual life, seeking to unfold itself.

With the recognition of this movement there is a change in the whole representation of our spiritual work. It is no longer accessory to the main body of reality, and it is not a private concern of man by himself, but in it we recognize a portion of a world-movement, of which mankind is the servant. From this standpoint, that work can claim superiority both over isolated individuals and over all mere subjectivism.

But what is true of spiritual work generally applies also to philosophy. Man does not, out of his own inner consciousness and possibly quite at random, put a particular complexion on the world, but his philosophy can only possess truth and power so far as the life of the world comes to clear consciousness in it and reveals its own depth. The co-ordination of the manifold, which philosophy undertakes, cannot be imposed upon reality from the outside, but must come from within it and conduce

to its unfolding. The task of philosophy now is to enhance and thus to foster that co-ordination in the work of thought. In opposition to the circumstances of humanity it will have to be the champion and enforcer of the necessities of the spiritual life, and bring home clearly to man the connections of that life. From this point of view it is quite comprehensible how, throughout the course of history, philosophy was bound to accompany the life and the struggles of humanity, and how it could lift them to a higher level. It was able to do this because it was not an opinion of man by himself, but because it was a work and a demand of the spiritual life. It is only as a philosophy of spiritual life in this sense that philosophy can attain to independence and maintain the position assigned to it by its friends. And from this point of view its work can be seen to be a connected task which is common to the whole of humanity.

But at the same time, this conception explains why philosophy is exposed to so much

uncertainty and strife. For spiritual life is not something that is ready-made for us, but is a difficult problem—in fact, the problem of problems. Certainly our being must be somehow grounded in it if we are to make an effort after it, but as far as our consciousness and activity are concerned, we must first win it and make it our own: only thus can it gain a clear shape and a definite content. But this further opening up takes place in the individual not so much through reflection or imagination as through the labour of the whole and as the work of history. What first makes history in the distinctively human sense possible, is the fact that here a revelation of spiritual life gets started and gains ground as the development of a new stage of reality. But the testimony of experience shows that the course of this historical movement is by no means sure and simple. In the first place, spiritual life has no domain of its own in the human sphere and no independent starting-point, but it develops out of our life in

nature and society and cannot dispense with it. In doing so it does not appear from the beginning as a whole, but starts from separate points and gradually extends to larger connections, which again may diverge from one another. And its progress through history is not orderly and sure, but resembles rather a groping and seeking. It makes a step forward, but encounters insurmountable obstacles and is often driven back a long way; new starting points are tried, but they lead to a similar result. The life is often split into opposites, and then again the impulse towards reconciliation gains the upper hand: much drops out of sight, only to come up again later and exercise new influence, and so the whole becomes more and more complicated and involved. In particular a permanent complication proceeds from the relation of the spiritual life to man. Spiritual life stands in need of the feelings and faculties of man, and so far as it gains these it raises him above that which is merely human. But at the same time this merely human

element persists and is always ready to drag down the spiritual life to its own level. It does this especially when no great spiritual tension and no powerful spiritual creative effort exercises a counteracting influence. At such times it almost appears as if this merely human element looked upon the spiritual life as an enemy, and would like to take vengeance on it for its troublesome interference. Nothing contributes more to impress a particular character on human history than the fact that spiritual life has to develop in the unsuitable and indeed hostile medium of human existence. But if spiritual life has often been dragged down to the level of the merely human, it has not submitted for any length of time to this degradation. It has always escaped again, and, however much it might be disintegrated, it has always made a fresh effort to regain its unity; in fact, throughout all the mistakes and passions of men it has made substantial progress in self-realization. It has been able to liberate life and thought from the tyranny

of the mere passing moment, and by separating the temporal from the eternal, the human from the spiritual, to gather up the results of thousands of years, so as to be taken in at one view. It has been able to reawaken what to all external appearance had perished, and to hold fast everything that it recognized as valuable in a present which is above time and includes time. Philosophy in particular, just as spiritual life generally, takes its stand on this time-including present. History, however, appears on this view not as a kingdom of pure reason, but as a scene where a certain amount of reason wins through in the teeth of enormous resistance.

From this point of view the movement of history, with its elevation of spiritual life above the position and caprice of mere man, gains a special significance for philosophy, and in fact becomes an introduction to a philosophy of the spiritual life. For, in revealing all that has been unfolded of independent spiritual life, it shows what possibilities our life contains of

being raised to a higher inward level, and also what oppositions arise in this connection and have to be overcome in some way or other. It goes on to exhibit the conditions and the demands of spiritual creative effort, and the presuppositions and environment from which special kinds of spiritual life have sprung. It shows the dominating facts both within and as opposed to the spiritual life, and also the directions in which the movement progresses. It can further operate to free our work from all that is casual and temporary, and to bring it into line with the necessary course of spiritual life so far as it has been revealed in the history of the world. Our efforts will not only acquire thereby more breadth and freedom, but may also gain a stronger and securer position through the recognition of the great guiding lines of the general movement of history. Naturally all this can only take place according to the capacity of the individual life on which the task is laid of gaining an inner mastery over the materials provided by history. For

without such individual exertion history cannot impart or teach anything: the contents of history must first be awakened and revivified by our own work before they can be of any significance or use to our own life. If we thus address ourselves to the spiritual content, the revivifying of the general movement of history takes the form of a comparative survey of the spiritual possessions which we have hitherto acquired, and a summons to develop and secure these possessions against the influences and accidents of the moment. We need not waste any time in proving that the present, with its sharp oppositions, its violent cleavage, and ominous levelling down of life, and its want of any ruling aim, stands in particularly urgent need of being supplemented and developed in the way we have sketched. Historical study must press on with particular insistence to fresh philosophical work, to a creative activity which will transform philosophy by clearly proving the untenability of the present spiritual state and the necessity

of a new type of culture. But in this respect the spiritual requirements which are involved, not so much in the time as in the general position in world history, are bound to set philosophy definite tasks and point it in definite directions.

A treatment of history like this, which combines the tracing out of the rise and growth of spiritual life within the sphere of humanity with the search for a standpoint for philosophical work, can be undertaken in different ways. We desire to undertake it in such a way as to emphasize some of the leading lines of development, to exhibit the problems which there await us, and to show the movements, experiences, and revelations of life which have resulted from them. It may seem that outwardly we are giving ourselves up entirely to history, but our aim is always directed towards philosophy. What history has brought us is not reckoned as merely past, but we try to make it present to us as living, and at the same time to gain from it points of support

both for the guidance of spiritual life and for philosophy. In these leading lines we shall find common features, in fact an inner connection will be evident through all the diversity; but a more exact estimation of this is to be made at the end. We thus arrange our sections so that we progress gradually from general sketches to a more definite content, and so allow the character and the demands of the whole to become continually more apparent. Let us then treat in succession the problems of unity and multiplicity, of rest and movement, of the outer and the inner worlds, and finally the problem of truth and the problem of happiness. As far as material is concerned, let us limit our investigation to tracing out the movement from the rise of Greek civilization to the present day. This is not merely because it lies nearest to us externally, but also because no other historical complex contains so much spiritual movement or has produced such an abundance of life and, amid violent metamorphoses, has passed through so

many experiences. But this is the point, above all, for philosophical contemplation. If we go through history in this way we do not lose ourselves in an incalculable vastness, but, with all the abundance of material, we are all the time at home. It is a kind of introspection, not so much of the individual as of the whole, which we are here striving after, and introspection is to-day, as at all times, the best approach to philosophy.

CHAPTER I

Unity and Multiplicity

Nature, as it lies open to our view, displays a mere juxtaposition of elements, with no inner connection. On the natural level life does not get beyond the stage of mere correlations. But on the other hand, wherever spiritual life makes itself felt we find the desire to surmount the stage of mere juxtaposition, to establish an inner connection, and, in fact, to systematize the whole of life. All the main directions in which our spiritual work finds its outlet involve the effort to overcome an opposition and the demand for some sort of unification. Thus the struggle for truth seeks to overcome the separation between men and things, between subject and object, between

thought and existence. With the good, in the narrower sense of the word, it is a case of getting free from the pettiness of the ego, breaking through the original narrowness, and attaining inner solidarity. Beauty too seeks to overcome an opposition in endeavouring to make the external conform completely to its own internal standards. But just as spiritual life exercises a unifying influence in an external environment, so too, in itself, it strives to assume the form of a coherent whole and gives rise to an inner solidarity of work. It is a matter not for the individual man, but for the whole race; it strives to attain not merely individual truths but a realm of truth, which envelops and holds together the individuals, and which, indeed, lays claim to a validity of its own, independent of mankind. It is very much the same with the good and the beautiful; however much controversy and dissension may prevail in this connection, even the controversy would be incomprehensible without the belief in a

common truth and without the impelling power of this truth.

But though the striving for unity is an incontestable and fundamental impulse of all spiritual life, it yet involves a difficult problem, which cannot be attacked by the individual but only by the age-long toil of humanity. For the question is, how the unification can be attained, and what form the whole must assume in order to take up the diversity into itself and overcome the oppositions. Many different attempts and much unrest will meet the eyes of him who makes a spiritual pilgrimage through the centuries. In accordance with our plan we begin with the life of the Greeks.

From the very beginning the philosophy of the Greeks shows the impulse towards unity. Their first thinkers, the sages of Ionia, turn at once to the search for a single fundamental substance, and the Pythagoreans co-ordinate the wealth of phenomena into a coherent universe, a cosmos. Even the exclusiveness

of a unitary being finds early defenders in the Eleatics, and they do not shrink from reducing multiplicity to mere appearance. But Greek life clings too closely to the rich diversity of reality to be able to give it up completely: hence the problem assumes the form of discovering a definite relation between unity and multiplicity, a firm co-ordination of the diversity of things. Its solution is reached in close connection with movements that take place in the general life of the time, in contact of the work of thought with the state of political and social development. As usually happens, the beginnings of this development show us individuals in strict subjection, in complete dependence on the order and custom of the community, under the yoke of authority and tradition, which is not yet felt as oppressive. But gradually the individual gains in power, in freedom of movement, in independence; he begins to inquire into the right and reason of the systems in which he finds himself; he holds himself continually more

aloof from them, and feels that he is personally responsible for his own life. But then the danger at once arises that the subject may break up all systems, make himself the measure of all things, and, as a logical consequence, recognize the validity of no ends except those that further his own well-being. This gives rise to the most dangerous crisis, and life appears likely to suffer a complete dissolution. The Sophists with their subjectivism make this very evident. In such a convulsion nothing can be of any assistance except man's own spiritual work: it is this alone which can attempt to build up from within the coherent system which the visible world no longer affords, and what it here undertook for the first time is in reality a problem of a lasting nature which our own day too must face. With the Greeks it was pre-eminently philosophy which took upon itself this problem. A solution was sought by affirming the existence of a world of thought raised above all human circumstances

and opinions and firmly established over against them. Plato's doctrine of Ideas brings the power of genius to the execution of this task, and for him the constituents of that world more nearly acquire the character of forms endowed with fulness of life. These forms with all their diversity unite to form a whole; the work of this whole, moreover, is to give movement and elevation to human existence; it supplies it with a deeper foundation and the power of counteracting the distraction from which it previously suffered. On the basis of scientific work there thus arises an artistic ordering of life which brings about a peculiar combination of unity and multiplicity. The thought of the One takes precedence, but the Many are not in the least sacrificed, though each part must seek its place and its task within the whole in order to carry out its special work in this position. But it cannot do this without recognizing limits and overcoming the crude impulses of nature, and thus it is ennobled and, in fact, spiritualized by the whole. Thus life

is organized from top to bottom, marked off into stages, made symmetrical and harmonious, and everything which is merely natural is brought under the dominion of the spirit.

A movement of this kind affects human endeavour in all directions and gives it a peculiar character. On this view thought is not a critical sifting and analysing, a pressing forward to the most minute elements, but it is rather a comprehensive survey of the diversity of things, and a disentangling of the fundamental structure of the universe from the chaos which it presents at first sight. Its main movement is from the whole to the parts, and it is especially the task of philosophical knowledge to put everything that exists and everything that happens in its proper place, and to understand it from what it does for the whole. And the psychic life of man has also a general work to perform, which includes its individual parts and stages. It is of special importance in the human community to counteract the isolation of in-

dividuals, with their caprice and selfishness. The thought arises of a state whose structure is based on knowledge and seeks to enforce its own realization. An essentially elevating effect is expected from the direction of the whole towards spiritual goods and from the division and organization of work by a gradation of classes. Even the severest consequences, such as the extraordinary communism of the higher classes, are not shirked if they seem to be necessary in order to strike at the root of egoism. But all this surrender to the whole does not mean any complete sacrifice of the individuals, for in this arrangement they satisfy their own nature as well, and thereby attain to complete happiness.

Aristotle's scheme of life is closely related to Plato's, but still the modifications which he introduced are significant. Less importance is attached to the part played by art, and the power of co-ordination which results from taking the point of view of art is less emphasized, though it is not entirely neglected.

But, on the other hand, the classifying and organizing power of thought is given the widest scope, and it is especially the conception of the unfolding of life, of existence becoming fully active, that provides the guiding lines for thought. It is here in particular that human activity displays a systematic character: the world, both in general and in detail, is regarded under the governing conception of an articulated whole, an organic unity of life. Aristotle is particularly successful in enforcing the idea that in the case of an organic living being a large number of organs and functions is subordinated to a comprehensive unity of life, and that it is only from this point of view, by help of the idea of an end, that they can be understood. This conception of an organism is finally transferred to the whole universe; this too forms a complete and rounded unity which tolerates nothing "episodic."[1] Still more than in the case of

[1] *Cf.* Aristotle, Met. 1090[b] 19, *οὐκ ἔοικε δ' ἡ φύσις ἐπεισοδιώδης οὖσα ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ὥσπερ μοχθηρὰ τραγωδία.*

Plato we thus find one fundamental conviction extending over all departments. Thinking becomes the logical organization of the whole of reality, and, while prepared to recognize all particularity, it never allows the individual to become separated from the whole. Simple and fundamental thoughts govern all departments, and though they may appear to be disparate they are still kept together by the bond of analogy. Psychic life, too, is required to develop every faculty, but there must be an activity of the whole which includes all particular activities and measures them by its own standards. The superiority of the whole acquires particular force and vividness when we come to the idea of the state. Just as each member can only live and work in connection with the whole organism, man can only be fully man in the community. And thus it can be maintained that the state is prior to the individual. But at the same time the utmost differentiation is desired within the state, and the

heart and soul of every man is called upon to co-operate.

The combined work of both thinkers has held up to life a stable and coherent system, and satisfied in a characteristic way the desire for unity. Unification is attained by the alliance of clear thought with the creative activity of art. The main achievement of this philosophy is its vigorous and thorough organization of the whole range of existence; it leaves nothing outside but takes up everything from the greatest to the least, gives it definite shape, and quickens and ennobles it. Man here displays his capacity of forming a whole in thought, retaining within this whole a rich diversity of elements, and making it a centre from which to bring the whole range of reality into an inwardly coherent system. The endeavour to attain unity in this manner has persisted throughout the whole course of history; it has often entered upon new spheres of activity with rejuvenated powers, and seems to be indispensable for the spiritual appro-

priation of the breadth and fulness of existence. But as a leading synthesis of life, this philosophy had presuppositions which met with a continually increasing opposition. Such a synthesis not only needs pre-eminent spiritual power to carry it out, but it also presupposes as objectively existing a tendency on the part of things towards union, an inner harmony of reality, which the further movement of life made continually more uncertain. In the first place, this synthesis of life did not retain its leading position in the following centuries. When the separation between philosophy and the particular sciences becomes wider, and the former comes to be regarded predominantly as wisdom in the conduct of life, we no longer find simple fundamental thoughts exercising control over the whole range of reality. Individuals are still less inclined to submit to the constraint which is commended by Plato and Aristotle. As the break-up of the old systematizations of life becomes increasingly apparent, men are more and more concerned

to ensure that the individual shall stand firm on his own basis and be independent of all environment. Philosophy is particularly successful in this aim when it occupies man with the thought of the Universe, and promises him victory over every obstacle if he realizes strongly the presence of the Universal Reason. The complete emancipation of the individual finds its classical expression particularly in the doctrine of the Stoics: it is here that there arises the conception of a personality superior to the world, and participation in the universal thought lends dignity and value to human existence. Another result is that all men enter into an invisible connection, they become conscious of an inner relationship, a solidarity embracing all that is human.

But if men are thrown on their own resources to grasp and realize the universal thought, it is only heroic individuals of original force who will succeed. But such men are scarce at all times, and this solution became especially unsatisfactory in propor-

tion as the approaching break-up of the ancient world increased the feeling of insecurity, of weakness, and of need. The perplexities of life finally appear too great for man to meet out of his own resources. This gives rise to a continually increasing craving after religion, and finally to a movement in the direction of religion. Hence the endeavour after unity now takes on a religious rather than an artistic character. Unity is now sought not so much by producing an all-embracing co-ordination of the diversity of things, as by recourse to an existence which is raised above all multiplicity and forms its ground. But although with the Greeks multiplicity was never degraded to mere appearance, as it was with the Indians, and though for this reason the Greeks never embraced an exclusive monotheism, yet they came more and more to attach significance to that which is individual only so far as it gives expression to the unity of the universe. This gives to life a powerful stimulus and

impetus, but it involves the loss of the organizing influence which was exercised by the older creative activity. It was Plotinus in particular who gave a philosophical shape to the new tendency, and in this connection philosophy takes a quite new direction. It was formerly the function of religion to minister to the happiness and especially the tranquillity of man; it was a mere means to his well-being; but now the centre of gravity is transferred from individuals to the universe, and it is only from the universe that the individual receives life and being. We find here a single life which sustains and pervades the whole range of reality and exhibits it as its own development. All the diversity of things is dependent on this unitary life, and everything tends to return to it. Many metaphors are employed in the attempt to show how the One can give rise to the rich diversity of the world without losing itself anywhere or striving to transcend itself. It resembles a light which sends forth its rays

far and wide without diminishing its own brightness; it is like the fountain from which all things proceed but which itself continues to flow inexhaustibly; or it resembles the root of a tree which shoots up above the ground, but which is not merged into its own unfolding. In these modes of connection the core of spiritual life and also of philosophy consists entirely in the search for unity and the apprehension of it. All the different domains of life and philosophy are only particular ways of reaching unity. But since the final unity lies beyond all special forms and all concepts, it follows that thought, even when its powers are strained to the utmost, is no longer equal to the claim which is made upon it. It is only immediate apprehension which can put us in possession of this unity. Thought passes into a formless feeling, a subjective mood which cannot be expressed in words, in which it desires nothing but unity. By this process thought brings about its own destruction as pure thought, but this violent

convulsion results in feeling becoming independent, and there arises a new type of psychical experience which is both self-contained and self-sufficing.

In the detailed carrying out of this tendency life is either shaped on the model of a hierarchy or it receives a mystical turn. The former scheme leaves the diversity of things, but introduces a fixed order into it by recognizing throughout a continuous chain of life. For Spiritual Life proceeds from the original unity as the first stage, and on this there depend the further stages of Soul and of Nature. Each in its place receives life from the order of being immediately above it, and conveys it from itself to that which is below it. Through a connection of this kind, even that which might seem to be imperfect as far as itself is concerned gains a certain value. It is only through a misapprehension of this connection that anyone can imagine that he has discovered evil in the world, since what seems to be evil is in reality only a lesser good. This concep-

tion of gradation and the downward communication of life was destined to attain to great influence in the domain of Christianity.

Mysticism, on the contrary, puts the individual into immediate relationship with the infinite life, and aspires to steep him in this life to such an extent that it becomes his own. By getting rid of everything that makes for separation and distinction, by casting off the chains of what men call happiness, and by freeing himself from all the narrowness and insufficiency of the mere unit, the mystic believes that in extinction itself he gains an incomparably higher life and genuine blessedness. It is here that we first recognize clearly the power which the thought of a total surrender of the ego and of absorption into an infinite life can exercise over the human soul. The fact that man can completely renounce the merely human and can give up the whole wealth of reality without thereby falling into the void, seems to assure him of his capacity for rising superior to the world,

and to bring him into close connection with the ultimate depths of the universe. Hence he seems to himself to be nowhere greater than in such complete surrender of his separateness. But the danger of this movement, as well as its greatness, consists just in this concentration of life on one point. It is, of course, this concentration which has given rise to the thought of a purely internal world, and the recognition of the immediate presence of infinite life in the individual soul has revealed a refuge which is open at all times. But at the same time the stripping off of all particularity forces life to give up all detailed content and all penetration and organization of reality. But even when this loss is recognized, this mode of thought remains an indispensable element in all development of independent spirituality. It not only persists throughout the middle ages, but comes into prominence in modern times in new shapes, and shows that it is still powerful even at the present day. If we give up the immediate presence

of infinite being in the soul, the life of the soul must inevitably and immediately lose in depth and spontaneity.

The relation of Christianity to the problem of unity and multiplicity is by no means simple. Different, and in fact opposite, tendencies are engaged in conflict against one another, and though this may give rise to much confusion and error, it also produces much movement and progress in life. The mere fact that Christianity is distinctively and characteristically an ethical religion, has diverse tendencies. Morality has its end in action, and therefore demands both self-activity and self-sufficiency on the part of the individual; but religion gains power only where man is conscious of his weakness and seeks help from higher powers. The ethical element prevails chiefly in the conception of God, which is essentially different from that of the Greek world. For Greek thought the divine is closely bound up and intimately united with the totality of the

world; and though, later on, it was regarded as raised above all sensible existence, it never detaches itself from the world as an independent power, and does not take up an independent stand over against it. Hence its activity seems to be not so much a free action as a process of nature, which is only raised to the spiritual level. It is represented as a flowing out, a shining forth, a going forth, etc.: in every case as something which happens from necessity.

Christianity, on the contrary, in close connection with later Judaism, regards God as a Spirituality who transcends the world and is self-existing and self-sufficing. He is thought of as free in His action, and His self-manifestation is regarded as spirit coming into touch with spirit. There is no doubt that, especially in popular thought, this may give rise to the danger of degrading God to the level of human ideas and interests, the danger of anthropomorphism. But however far this may have spread, it is not the whole of the

matter. All the mistakes that have been made ought not to prevent us from recognizing that it was in Christianity that the movement towards a self-existent and active Spirituality was first carried out on any large scale, and that it was religion, in the ethical form which it assumes in Christianity, that first led to the recognition of such a Being. To the change in the conception of the divine Being there corresponds a new relation of man to Him. The Greek sought to draw near to the Deity on the heights of philosophy, by pushing knowledge to its utmost limits. He sought complete union with the Divine; but when this is attained, life does not return to its starting-point to make something newer and higher out of it. But this is what takes place in Christianity, because the relation to the Deity opens up new depths of life in the individual, and makes him, even in his particularity, an object of the divine love and care. The individual, who is accustomed to be treated with such indifference by nature and society, gains

an infinite worth from such a relationship, and ventures to regard himself as an end in himself, but at the same time he finds that he has a task which takes precedence of any general extension of his activity. This holds good for all men without distinction: it is not measured and limited by any outward results that have been achieved, but depends on the general nature and bent of the soul, on the active moral force which it shows. This forms a great contrast to Greek thought, which could not make union with the transcendental unity a matter of philosophical knowledge without encountering great differences between one man and another, and finding that only a few were called to the full knowledge of God. The problem of recruiting all men for the spiritual task is one which, in the province of civilization to which we belong, first gained recognition by the agency of Christianity, and, though the task contains enormous complexities, in particular, the danger lest spiritual work should be subordinated to the power of the

merely human, once having been recognized and acknowledged it can never again be put into the background. The fact, too, that in Christian thought, which is determined by ethical considerations, the Greek ideal of justice gives way to the ideal of love, tends also to the exaltation of the individual in general and of each separate individual in particular. If, on the one hand, outward achievements decided the place of the individual in the whole, that which was mean and feeble could never receive any sort of recognition. But on the other hand it does gain a certain value if every man finds that the task he has to face is independent of external conditions, and if infinite love embraces all, the least as well as the greatest, in an equal degree.

This all leads to a considerable increase in the significance of the individual and his decisions. At the same time the coherence of things and the connection of the individual with it is not surrendered, but rather there is a general tendency to increase this also.

Christianity does not exhaust the relationship to the Deity in single points of connection and isolated achievements, but desires that this relationship should lead to an entire change of soul; and it is for this very reason that the individual cannot force himself to take the decisive step, but must await the coming of a new life from a source of power and grace which is above him. A kingdom of God must reveal itself to him, and must even inspire the desire to enter it. Great world events must happen in order that a change may take place at one point, or, as Hegel expresses it in his own language, "the very fact that the opposition is implicitly done away with constitutes the condition, the presupposition, the possibility of the subject's ability to do away with it actually."[1] Withal, it is an important fact that the coherent system with which the individual

[1] Hegel, *Werke*, 2e Aufl. xii. 277. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, translated by E. B. Spiers and J. B. Sanderson, iii. 67.

comes into connection does not remain purely of an invisible kind but strives to embody itself in a visible form, not only in its later stages but from the very beginning; and that there is an early and persistent tendency to form a church. This brought in its train an inevitable dependency not merely on divine truth but also on human conditions. The more firmly the visible order was established, and the closer it linked the invisible order to itself, the greater was the loss which the freedom of the individual was bound to undergo; every diminution of freedom, however, endangered the ethical character of Christianity.

Thus Christianity contained difficult contradictions, just like every other spiritual movement which has had a great part to play on the stage of humanity. These contradictions needed imperatively to be reconciled in some way or other, but the manner of reconciliation was principally determined by the nature of the period within which it had to be accom-

plished. It was the time at which the definitive consolidation of Christianity was established, the last epoch of antiquity, a period when the will to live was greatly weakened, when men were becoming uncertain of themselves, and all the old connections were broken up. The old epoch was at an end, and a new one had not yet dawned. Hence men's first desire was to reach a safe harbour of refuge: they wished to be thoroughly assured of deliverance, and to be relieved as far as possible from all private responsibility. The wish was all the stronger owing to the fact that men's minds had been so overawed by gloomy experiences that the thought of eternal life became for them, above all else, a dread of eternal punishment. This drove them to submit willingly to a superior authority, and also led to truth being put in as popular a form as possible. In this difficult situation Christianity did indeed become a refuge for mankind; but it could not become so without suffering the consequences of this position and

being driven in a very problematical direction. The religious aspect now pushed the ethical into the background, and immediately developed a strong tendency towards the visible and sensuous. Hence it came about that the Church as a visible order absorbed Christianity more and more into itself, that it was thought to have at its disposal the treasure of divine grace, and was raised to a position of incontestable authority over the individual. At the same time the idea of organization—and of an organization which is both stable and palpable—becomes the centre of spiritual life and spiritual work. However much complexity and difficulty this tendency has brought with it, we must not fail to recognize its grandeur. Nowhere else in the whole course of history has the attempt been made to bring the whole of mankind into close connection with one another on the ground of common convictions, and thus to bind them together not by external constraint but by inner communion. Nothing in the human shape is left

outside the spiritual order, or excluded from its influence. But at the same time the spiritual order is drawn down deep into that which is human, and thereby strongly influenced; its special shape is essentially determined by the needs of man, or by the stimulus which seems necessary in order to set him in motion. The final result is that a unique compromise is concluded between the spiritual and the merely human, which leaves to the former its essential superiority, though in detail the spiritual is largely overborne by the human. No one contributed more to establish this compromise than Augustine, a man who united a fervent desire for a world-enveloping spiritual life with the deepest feeling for the needs and weaknesses of men.

The idea of organization was first carried into effect in a complete form in the middle ages. It determined not only the relationship of the individual to society, but also the relations between the different departments of life. The community in its religious aspect appears

as the Church, and by it the individual is provided with a firm support, direction for conduct, gentler or sterner constraint to definite tasks. Thus a certain level of life is attained, a certain amount of spiritual activity is widely distributed, and to some extent the masses are brought under discipline. But at the same time the limits of achievement are unmistakable. Such a system of subordination and solidarity inevitably involves a serious loss of independence, and if independence is lost the inward life is bound to suffer injury. We cannot place the chief end of man in the performance of certain exercises and tasks, in the fulfilment of his religious, *i.e.* his ecclesiastical "duties," without reducing the experiences of his soul to a position of secondary importance, and letting outward acts repress inward disposition. The centre of gravity of life is removed more and more from the soul of the individual, and the latter is treated as a mere appendage of the gigantic ecclesiastical system. It is a natural development of this position

that the Church becomes not only the exclusive custodian of truth, but also the keeper of the moral conscience of humanity. Her ministers decide what each man has to hold for truth, and what is the good he has to strive after. She believes that she has the power of conferring eternal salvation on them, or of condemning them to eternal misery. The more this conviction prevails and becomes a part of life, though the spontaneity of life in its particular manifestations is dried up, the more must the greatness of man consist in willing submission, and the more must his piety acquire the character of a blind devotion. But all the smaller is the place left for independent conviction and disposition, for erect and self-active personalities. Thus the latest papal Syllabus actually required men not only to receive the decisions of the Church obediently, but to hold these decisions as their own beliefs. If the independence of the personality is violated in this way, acts as well as belief will acquire a predominantly passive character. Hence it is

again consistent with these medieval modes of thought when the latest Encyclical reproaches the Modernists for thinking too highly of the active virtues. The result is that the individual is degraded, and obedience and endurance become the highest virtues in his life.

The medieval tendency towards organization affected also the life of culture, and it was Scholasticism in particular which gave philosophical expression to this tendency. The rigour of the older thought, which involves the exclusive concentration of life on religion and allows all diversity to be absorbed in unity, is here moderated. The other departments of life are accorded some rights; they are taken up into a general scheme in a way that resembles the Greek synthesis of life, especially as carried out by Aristotle. The artistic and the religious struggle for unity are to be fused into a comprehensive totality of life within which their differences are reconciled. The idea of gradation seems

to render this possible by handing over the direction of the whole to religion, but guaranteeing a certain independence to the other departments which fall within the sphere of the universal reason and the secular life. This inclusion of all interests certainly sets men a great and imperative problem, but the solution here offered is much too external to be felt as satisfactory beyond the middle ages. This scheme of subordination leaves the other departments of life no real independence and no spontaneity of creative effort. But this is not the only unsatisfactory feature, for it is also found that the spiritual life is wanting in inner unity, since religion, on the one hand, with its elevation above the world, and an essentially earthly culture on the other, with its joyous reconstitution of the world, pull in precisely opposite directions, so that only an extremely external conception of the problem and extreme superficiality in the mode of attacking it could bring them into immediate union.

This attempt to solve the problem of unity is, as a whole, magnificent and in its way unique. But the influence which it exercised on mankind was considerably modified through Mysticism, and it involves a presupposition which is open to dispute. It demands men who are either senile or else spiritually immature: it cannot satisfy men who are grown up and conscious of their powers. But ever since the close of the middle ages humanity has been striving to attain its majority, and it is just this endeavour which ushers in a new epoch and gives it a distinctive character. A growing feeling of power requires a life that is independent and spontaneous, and it cannot have it unless individuals are called upon to exercise their powers in the freest way. This caused authority to be felt as an oppressive burden, and the medieval synthesis was proved to be too narrow for the wealth of life that was struggling upwards. Hence a breach with the old order became inevitable, and life took a course which was directly opposed to

that which it had previously followed. The leading tendency had hitherto been from multiplicity towards unity, from an unorganized to an organized life, but now the movement is directed towards multiplicity, towards the apprehension and elaboration of all that is specific and individual. Freedom from every tie, complete emancipation, now becomes the main aim, and a demand to which everything must give way. At the beginning there was no intention of shaking off all the traditional connections and making the individual rely entirely on his own powers: the intention was rather that, at such and such a particular point, the whole should be more immediately apprehended, made to live more intensely, and wrought out into a distinctive form. But gradually these connections sank in importance, and the individual freed himself more and more from all ties. Hence any co-ordination of life could only come from the individual himself, and must never be inconsistent with his freedom. The complications

which arise from this position we shall have to deal with immediately.

The old philosophy, which was deeply rooted, and occupied a hallowed place in the beliefs of mankind, might regard this striving for freedom as a mere movement of opposition, as a bold revolt and a piece of defiant presumption. Such reproaches have not yet been finally silenced. But that this striving after freedom was in reality something more, that it was the result of a spiritual necessity, is proved by the enormous enrichment and development of life to which it has given rise, and the enormous range of actuality which it has opened up. If the unfolding of the powers of the individual were nothing more than a movement of negation and contradiction, this victory of individuality could never have been the source of the amount of life and creative effort to which, as a matter of fact, it has given rise. That the change extends beyond all merely human ideas into the fundamental texture of life itself, is proved,

among other things, by the transformation of the inner life as compared with the middle ages. The middle ages were by no means wanting in inner life, but it was an inner life of a rather weak and passive kind; man felt himself untrammelled by the world in the silent ebb and flow of immediate personal experience. The modern period, on the contrary, develops an inner life of an active kind which insists on making its power felt, subjecting the world and making it conform to its own demands. Whatever may be the problems involved, it cannot hide the truth which this movement brought into prominence, viz., that complete spontaneity is essential to genuine spiritual life, and that this spontaneity requires both freedom and self-activity. But we cannot have these latter without the recognition of the special character of each particular part, the recognition of individuality. Where such movements arise and make themselves felt, life is bound to be essentially changed.

In justification of the new movement this also may be alleged, viz., that the great civilized nations have imported into it each its own specific character and have accentuated this character by its further progress. Nothing distinguishes one from another more than the special direction in which they seek and demand deliverance for humanity. In art and in the general tone of life, the Italians, the first modern men, occupy the earliest place. The French continue the same tendency and carry it further into the ramifications of existence, and their leading spirits set an example to the individual of defiant independence of the world and also of society. The English build up political and economic life from the individual as the starting-point, and cherish the hope that it will thus be raised to an infinitely higher level. The Germans represent the movement towards freedom in the domain of religion, and they carry it down into the furthest depths of the soul. When their classical literature reaches

its highest point they finally develop the idea of a world-enveloping Personality, which is grounded in itself and controlled by its own laws. This is an idea which must form the rallying point for every attempt to overcome the opposition between unity and multiplicity, between order and freedom.

The new movement shows that it is superior to all individual caprice, and is spiritually productive by its characteristic shaping of all the departments and relations of life, and the essential changes which it makes in the representation of the world and the existence of man. The older science consisted chiefly in a general survey of the multiplicity of things, in which they were regarded as forming parts of a great structure. Modern science, however, breaks up the initial impression which we experience of a totality, and seeks to get down to the ultimate elements and the smallest forces, to ascertain their laws, and by their help to reconstruct the world. This tracing of particular lines of connection gives us not

only a clearer insight into reality, but also an incomparably greater control over things. Without the analytical methods practised by modern science, the modern technical applications of it would never have arisen. But just as modern science introduces more detail and exactitude into its representation of reality, and places the motive power of things in the elements, so, too, its own position is strikingly differentiated from that of medieval science. The Scholastic system, which made metaphysics supreme over the whole range of reality, is shattered. The individual sciences take up their task independently, and furnish us with characteristic views of the world, while at the same time they get closer and closer to things and keep near their real nature. Not only the individual sciences, however, but also whole departments of life diverge further and further from one another, and at the same time break away from the control of religion and the Church. Law and Morality, Art and Science, become independent spheres of life

which encompass man on all sides with particular truths and set him particular problems. This makes life incomparably broader, richer, and more varied, but is likely at the same time to expose it to varying and, indeed, intersecting movements. It takes from life, without hope of return, its old restful and self-contained character.

It has been so often depicted before that we do not feel it incumbent on us to show how human society takes on an entirely different form when work falls predominantly on the shoulders of the individual, how political and economic life is driven into new channels, and how the individualizing of existence penetrates even into social intercourse and everyday customs. That which now gives charm and attractiveness to work is, in general, the fact that its product embodies and illustrates individual character, which is only thereby fully realized.

The position of man within reality is also affected by the movement of modern life, and

a fresh foundation must be sought for his greatness. Aristotle declared that the difference between man and the animals was that the latter cannot go beyond individual impressions and individual stimulations, while man, in virtue of his power of thought, can form universals and let his action be determined by them. Later thought differentiates the lower from the higher stage by the distinction that the former is bound hand and foot to the order of nature, while life at the latter stage rises to independent thought and self-decision. Reason, which raises us above the purely natural order, does not take its direction from any external source, but is able to choose its own path. Thus freedom becomes the distinguishing mark of man; he is "the first freedman of Creation" (Herder). Of course, the conception of freedom is by no means uniform, and often covers both a higher and a lower kind, *e.g.* the freedom of Locke is different from the freedom of Kant. But everywhere that freedom forms the leading

conception of value it is taken as proof of a Reason indwelling in man. Freedom, too, need not reduce the demands on conduct, but may increase them if an invisible world is present in the soul as an awakening and constraining force. Thus the Reformation has greatly increased the task of morality by laying the chief problem of religion immediately on the soul of the individual and demanding its transformation. And Kant, by deepening the idea of duty, has brought the whole of life under an inner subjection, and has thus made it not more easy but more difficult. In connection with men like these, who approached the subject with all the deep earnestness of souls anxiously concerned for the truth of life and spiritual self-preservation, who dare speak of libertinism?

This movement as a whole gave to philosophy a new form and new aims, and, as far as philosophy is in line with the new movement, it exhibits a common character throughout all the differences between individual

philosophers. Descartes is the first in whose philosophy this common character is clearly discerned. A strong craving after truth makes him feel the existing condition of knowledge to be absolutely unsatisfactory, and, in particular, to be involved in unbearable confusion. The first result is a radical doubt, but within this doubt there persists unchanged the endeavour to attain some fixed point, such as the fulcrum which Archimedes desired. Such a point is finally found in the thinking subject, in the conscious ego, and this leads to a complete change of direction in the work of philosophy. Hitherto it had proceeded from the world to man, from the whole to the element, from the macrocosm to the microcosm: after a truth had been apprehended in the macrocosm it was applied to the microcosm. But now the microcosm steps into the first place, the movement advances from man to the world, which becomes a difficult problem instead of a ready-made datum. The truth about the world is ascertained only after it

has first been taken to pieces by scientific analysis and then reconstructed in accordance with the laws of our thinking. Only that can be admitted to be true which presents itself to our thought as clear and distinct. It is owing to this tendency to start with the subject that the English thinkers make psychology the foundation of all knowledge. To follow up the growth of the individual life, and to ascertain the laws and tendencies which govern it, becomes the central task of knowledge and determines all its contents and range. All the spiritual achievements, all the morality and law, the religion and art, which form an integral part of human existence, are to be developed from the soul of the individual, and owe to this source their characteristic forms. What was formerly looked upon as a cosmic process, for example, the causal connection between events, now becomes something experienced by man, and, indeed, produced by him, and thus acquires quite a different significance. About the same time Leibniz draws

up a magnificent scheme of the world in which each individual existence is regarded as a monad, as a metaphysical point. As such, it gains an endless life, and develops this life purely out of its own resources without having any relations, or being bound up, with anything external to itself. While the monad thus assumes the form of a world, reality itself is transformed into a world of worlds. But at the same time Leibniz' hearty recognition of individuality enables him to assign to each of these sub-worlds a unique significance.

Kant, too, continues this movement of modern life, and the whole of his philosophy is pervaded by the attempt to transfer the centre of gravity from the object to the subject. The theoretical reason frees man from the oppression of an alien world, for it shows that the subject itself constitutes its own world in accordance with laws that are indwelling in itself. "The understanding does not derive its laws from nature, but prescribes them to nature." Hence the theory of

knowledge takes precedence of metaphysics, and destroys the latter in the old sense in which metaphysics believed that it could apprehend a transcendental existence. The practical reason frees the acting personality from all external constraint and leaves it to impose its laws on itself, but, at the same time, in the building up of a new moral order enables it to penetrate to the ultimate depths of reality. Personality here becomes the channel through which a higher world is revealed, and nowhere else is it more clearly seen that freedom, while it destroys old ties, introduces new ones in their place, and claims to be essentially the setting free of a more real and spontaneous life. Hence the new philosophy exhibits a large number of results which often contradict one another if taken as they stand. But we need only institute a general comparison with the older method to become aware that the diversity rests on a common foundation, and that it is not a confused divergence, but a struggle to

carry out a common fundamental tendency. We thus discern here with absolute clearness the close connection between the form which philosophy assumes and the general movement of human life.

Anyone who is ready to deny that there is any truth in such a movement as this, with its thorough-going transformation of reality, must have a very low opinion of the forces which have been, and are, at work in the world. The man who undertook to prove that this movement was nothing more than a product of human self-will would find that the logical development of his principles made it very difficult for him to escape absolute scepticism. But to acknowledge some truth in a movement which forms part of the world's history does not mean that we regard it as raised above all dangers and aberrations. In particular, we may expect that here, as usual, the relation of man to the spiritual life may give rise to the most perplexing difficulties. That which, on the high level of the spiritual life, has an in-

contestable right, and is capable of producing the most fruitful results, may be dragged down by man in his natural state to the level of his general mental outlook and interests, and thus be most mischievously distorted. Such a man may claim for himself, just as he is, what belongs to him only as a member of a spiritual order; he may believe that he can accomplish from his own resources what is possible for him only in connection with a visible or invisible system, and this is bound to give rise to a great deal of error and obstruction. For the tragedy of the human situation is just this, its greatest danger is the perversion of its best (*corruptio optimi pessima*). Hence in modern life also doubt may finally become so strong that it reaches right down to the foundations, and drives life and thought into new directions.

The modern scheme of life arose in opposition to the medieval, and is in direct contradiction to the latter both as regards its estimate of

man and the general feeling for life which pervades it. The medieval system, as we saw, presupposes the spiritual minority of man, the modern system his majority. In the former man appears as possessed of no great spiritual enterprise, and as partaking to a certain extent in spiritual life only through superior power; but the modern system presupposes men of spiritual power, bent on high aims, for otherwise individuals could never become pillars of the spiritual life. But now the question arises, whether this picture is verified by experience, whether real life does not lag far behind, and whether all the complications which we have just indicated are not thereby reintroduced. Such complications may be allowed to rest so long as the old coherent systematizations of life, the world of religion, or the world of a universal reason, in the sense of the Enlightenment, are still vividly present to men, and point them in a common direction. But the more these fade into insignificance, and the more man is thrown upon himself, the greater

is the danger that spiritual life may dwindle and finally disappear entirely.

The problem is most easily grasped when we consider the question as to how any systematic coherence can be introduced into life on the new basis. The more we surrender all control of the manifold by a superior Whole, the more are we thrown back upon the capacity of the individual elements to accomplish the same result by means of free association. Experience shows that this is not such an easy matter, that on the one hand we may have mere colourless co-existence, or on the other a condition of mutual hostility. And the surrender of an inner connection may easily lead to a diminution of spiritual achievement. This is seen in all the ramifications of the spiritual life, and first of all in the case of science itself. We saw how the break-up of the medieval structure raised the individual branches of science to a position of independence, made them specific starting-points for investigation, and revealed the treasures of

the universe with incomparably greater fulness and exactitude. At first a reaction towards unity persisted as a relic of earlier religious and philosophical systematizations. After its disappearance the individual sciences had only their own necessities to consider, and went their own ways, which soon diverged. The next step is a specialization which has eyes for nothing except what lies in the direction of its own goal, and which, though it accumulates a wealth of information, never really succeeds in penetrating and mastering its material. Or again, where more general tendencies come into prominence, they easily succumb to the influence of special departments of science, and this brings them into a position of sharp opposition to one another. Hence the various branches of science which deal with nature and spirit develop fundamentally different methods and standards of value, and, even within any one of the great departments, the various movements and tendencies are often widely divergent. Still more dangerous is the

cleavage which takes place in life itself, the attitude of hostility which whole departments of life assume towards one another. We have already become so accustomed to look upon religion and culture as opponents that we hardly feel any longer how abnormal this strained relationship is, and how foreign to other epochs. Further, there exists at the present day among men of average culture an opposition between their beliefs about the world and their beliefs about the moral values of life, which is often concealed, but in reality is very sharp. In the world they recognize an exclusively mechanical causality; in human life they defend moral values and the idea of freedom. The same individuals and parties who, in their view of the world, greet every negation with shouts of joy and put as low an estimate upon man as possible, in the political and social domain glorify the greatness and dignity of man, as if this did not depend upon inner connections and require that reality should have deeper foundations than those

offered by the mere co-existences of experience. Thus we live to-day not only alongside one another in separate worlds, whose wide divergence is concealed only by language, but one and the same man lives in different worlds. In view of such a state of spiritual anarchy, how could common ideals arise and by their superior power win the minds of men?

The problems which arise from the relationship between the individual and society are no less difficult. When the modern movement towards freedom laid the burden of life mainly on the shoulders of individuals, it presupposed that they were thoroughly efficient and willing to do their best. It also relied upon the free association of individuals, and the mutual contact and intermingling between different circles in the life of society, to produce a sufficient degree of solidarity among humanity. Much has certainly been attained which earlier epochs did not possess, but the modern liberation of energies has given rise to strong oppositions and passions, and has conferred enormous

power on the party system. It has often tended to promote the unbridled letting loose of frenzied selfishness, and has placed at the service of the latter all the means which a highly developed civilization has at its disposal.

But this leads us to the decisive point as to how the individual presents himself to us on the new basis when we consider him in his own private nature. In the higher strata of modern culture, wherever conceptions such as personality and individuality have been fully recognized, it has only been by those who have held fast to and reinforced invisible connections, and have resolutely maintained the reality of an inner world. For we are only justified in setting a high value upon personality if we believe that it reveals to us a new kind of process—in fact, a new world. The development of individuality can only be made the chief object of human endeavour if existence as human beings means that men have great tasks to carry out, and contradictions to overcome, as the condition of realizing the highest

capacities of their own nature. Life only acquired greatness and spiritual independence because man had to seek to enter into relations with the whole universe, to come to terms with it, and to maintain his own position in face of it. The main body of mankind has become less and less conscious of these inner connections, and, at the same time, man has become a mere item in a world which comes before him as something given and incapable of development from the spiritual point of view, and which surrounds and hems him in on all sides. Hardly any room is left for the conception of personality, and we do not see how individuality can maintain its value if it is nothing more than a particular fragment of nature. But if the conceptions maintain themselves, claim to be valued as highly as before, and make good their claim, it is impossible to guard against a luxurious upgrowth of hollow talk and a deep-reaching insincerity in life. In the absence of any counteracting influence, there is an increasing danger that our

life may lose its sure foundation and finally find itself adrift in the void, leaving us to affirm conclusions while denying their premises. In fact, when this tendency prevails, the human soul can no longer remain a unity in itself, but is bound to be transformed into a medley of co-existing and interpenetrating psychical processes. If these are not worked over and transformed by a superior unity, they will come to have a merely sensational connection with one another, and man will finally become a mere bundle of sensations, feelings, and impulses. But, all the same, the superior rights of personality and the dignity and greatness of humanity are proclaimed and trumpeted forth.

Thus experience shows that the mere striving after freedom cannot ensure that life shall retain a spiritual character. The break-up of all inner connections has led to superficiality and the dissipation of energy. In addition, the course of the movement in modern life has revealed that the complications

are much greater, and the resistance much more strenuous than was anticipated at the beginning, when men were filled with joyful confidence. And a further fact has become evident, viz., that it is not only at particular points that civilization does not correspond to the demands of the spiritual life, but that civilization as a whole is in many ways in conflict with these demands. We feel with increasing distress the wide interval between the varied and important work to be done at the circumference of life and the complete emptiness at the centre. When we take an inside view of life, we find that a life of mere bustling routine preponderates, that men struggle and boast and strive to outdo one another, that unlimited ambition and vanity are characteristic of individuals, that they are always running to and fro and pressing forward, or feverishly exerting all their powers. But throughout it all we come upon nothing that gives any real value to life, and nothing spiritually elevating. Hence we do not find

any meaning or value in life, but in the end a single huge show in which culture is reduced to a burlesque. Anyone who thinks it all over and reflects upon the difference between the enormous labour that has been expended and the accompanying gain to the essentials of life, must either be driven to complete negation and despair, or must seek new ways of guaranteeing a value to life and liberating man from the sway of the pettily human. But this will force men to resume the quest for inner connections.

But the objection will be raised that the endeavour to attain to such connections is no novelty, for the whole of the nineteenth century was taken up with it. This is certainly the case; but should we find ourselves at the present day in such a state of unrest and insecurity, as actually exists, if the co-ordinations which have been attempted had been satisfactory? In German speculation philosophy itself, with buoyant courage, undertook to understand the whole of reality as the

unfolding of a single all-embracing spiritual process. Hegel, in particular, makes all philosophy to be the search for unity, and at the same time gives a symmetrical form to the whole of existence. But however powerful have been the influences which this attempt has exercised, and still exercises, it has not met with universal recognition, not only because in the meantime there took place the well-known movement of life towards the visible world, but also because man was treated in the Hegelian system too much as a purely intellectual being, and the spiritual life was not given any sufficient content. On a broader basis a counteracting influence to prevent the threatened dissipation of the energies of life was exercised by the thought of social evolution, the carrying out of which was especially distinctive of the nineteenth century. It makes full use of the connection of the individual with the sequence and co-existence of things, and shows what is the value of this connection, how the work of men through

long generations still continues to influence present conditions, and, further, how the existence of men in society produces a spiritual atmosphere, a *milieu*, which leaves every individual enveloped and moulded by superior power. But if, from this point of view, he appears as a mere member of an extensive system, the question arises as to whether he can come into intimate relationship with this system, and take it up as a whole into his character and disposition, or whether he feels himself at the mercy of mere blind fact. In the first case, the problem arises how history and society are to attain to an inner connection which can win the allegiance of the soul of the individual, if no sort of inner world is presupposed. In the second case, where the mere fact of dependence is the final conclusion that is reached, we cannot see why man should welcome as a good this dependence, which is often very burdensome and oppressive; why he should make it part of his character, and sacrifice his

own well-being to that of a world which consists of merely co-existing parts. Hence the matter remains in some obscurity, and only the constant interpenetration of the two conceptions, as, for example, in the case of Comte, the founder of Positivism, can in any degree conceal the fact that, by this path, the goal is unattainable. In reality, what has kept modern men together to the greatest extent is work, work in the modern sense. This has as its characteristic feature, in comparison with earlier periods, a greater detachment from the subjective basis and a greater independence of the individual, the formation of great complexes which develop their own laws and motive forces, and which combine and unite with one another the achievements of individuals. The efforts of the individual can only succeed on condition that he gains an entrance into these systems, and does his work in the particular position which is assigned to him. This exercises an extraordinary power in overcoming the self-will of individuals and

directing their actions towards a common end. But, whatever has been accomplished in this respect by such a co-ordination, it unites men only with regard to their outward actions, and does not produce a spiritual unity. Wherever it is a question of character and convictions, all combination and co-operation in work cannot prevent a wide divergence, a rampant selfishness, an inward isolation of the individual. In fact, if work is raised to a position of exclusive control, it finally brings with it the danger that life may become merely mechanical. The craving after more soul and more love in human existence has to remain unsatisfied. Hence, as a general rule, the modern movement after some sort of connection is too external, and does not go back to the spiritual foundations; we are conscious of a great gap with nothing to fill it.

Such a situation naturally enables us to understand how the older method, and, in particular, the medieval ecclesiastical system,

can again make itself more powerfully felt, how it can make use of the perplexities of modern life to recommend its own system of truth, and how it can win the allegiance of many vacillating souls. As a matter of fact, it acquires a certain power because, in the midst of a progressive disintegration, it presents a stable and coherent system, and offers a support to which one can cling. If that disintegration is not in the end checked from within, then a serious danger of a relapse might arise; the imperative need of some support or other might for a time thrust out of sight all other considerations. But what men are able to win temporarily does not necessarily become a power that is spiritually productive; and even if the old system is taken up again, it could never regain its old power of conviction. For this rested for the most part on the fact that the spiritual life which was offered by this system was on a level with the general world-movement. But, meanwhile, changes of the most far-reaching

character have taken place. Of course, men may make artificial attempts to reverse the course of progress, or to explain it away, but these attempts can never have the immediacy and inner necessity which were characteristic of the medieval systematization in its own age, and which belong to a great achievement in the history of the world. Hence no help can be expected from this quarter.

If men were mere products of history, as this view makes them, if, as such, they were bound to the pre-existing situation, and both their life and their work were essentially controlled by what has previously been accomplished, it is impossible to see how to avoid the perplexities which we have set forth, or how we should overcome the opposition between a unity which crushes out all freedom and a multiplicity which breaks up all coherence. But we are not mere products of history; in virtue of our spiritual nature we are able to transcend our past, and this power we are able to make use of and cultivate.

Fortified by this, we are not left defenceless, and need not accept whatever history offers us as an undifferentiated whole; we possess a spontaneity which we can oppose to everything that is merely given; we can separate in what is offered to us that which is spiritually necessary from that which has been shaped by human agency; we can emphasize the requirements for the maintenance of spiritual life which have been revealed by the experience of history, and we can inquire what direction is pointed out for our own work by these requirements.

In our brief survey of history it was clearly seen that, in the case of the problem of unity and multiplicity, the movement of life has not followed a single line, but that the tendency towards multiplicity, which is characteristic of modern times, is in opposition to the tendency towards unity, which was predominant in antiquity. A critical estimate of the whole shows us that it is not a question of a mere sequence of tendencies, but that two poles are

indicated, between which the spiritual life is necessarily compelled to move. If spiritual life is to be possible, we must have on the one hand an inner connection, a creative activity proceeding from the whole: such life can never be produced by a mere juxtaposition; it must be acquired and maintained by some power above the separate elements. On the other hand, as we saw, the spiritual life must have spontaneity, independence, and pure inwardness, if it is to exist at all; it must be lived for its own sake and cannot be imparted or transferred from without. It does not persist in the condition which it has once reached, but begins to ebb if it is not continually renewed. If, then, it is incontestable that such immediacy and spontaneity can arise only in the soul of the individual, and from this source must animate all the connections which are subsequently formed, then a contradiction arises which at first sight is insoluble. Life arises for us only at an individual point, and yet, as spiritual life, it

must at the same time be a creative activity proceeding from the whole. If this contradiction is to be resolved, we must make an essential change in the view which we took at first sight, and deepen our conception of reality so as to see at the individual point more than an isolated event. We must recognize the presence there of a universal process, and a totality of spiritual life must be the basis of our own existence. To be sure, this world-process is not immediately our own possession: we have first to grasp it and work it out; but it never could have come into our field of vision at all and become an object of our efforts if our nature did not originally participate in it. If our inner existence is not somehow grounded in the infinity of the whole, all co-ordination of life must be impressed upon us from without, and this will inevitably crush all independence. But this again will necessarily cause, sooner or later, a reaction in favour of setting free the individual elements, and will engender a desire

to break up the connection. On this view, mankind would be driven to and fro, without hope of rescue, between blind subjection to authority and a spiritual anarchy of individual elements, and would be worn out by the contest, were it not that there is a point of vantage from which it is possible to make some headway against the antithesis in question, though it does not here simply disappear, and at which we are able to protect ourselves from the unhappy condition just described.

The average man, whose spirituality is sluggish, will always have great difficulty in getting beyond the stage of wavering between these two opposite positions. According as the feeling of weakness and isolation, or the feeling of power and independence, gains the upper hand, he will incline first in the one direction and then in the other. But this makes it all the more an indispensable task for the work of the spirit to develop a life which rises above that opposition and all the spiritual poverty of the average man, and

thereby to bring into as sharp relief as possible a genuine spiritual culture as compared with the superficiality and pretence of a culture which is merely human. This cannot well take place unless we seek also to establish a particular organization, a co-ordination of mankind with this object in view. The medieval Church became too narrow for this purpose, not only because it bound up the spiritual world much too firmly with a visible order, but also because it made religion the sole representative of that independent spiritual life. It thus gave life a character that was too one-sidedly religious, and transformed to too great an extent the spiritual into the ecclesiastical. But when once the fundamental thought of a combination of forces, under the idea of a spiritual life superior to the average, has won a footing in history, it cannot again disappear ; it will stir up and move humanity until it is revived in some form or other. Only then can we attack the problem of bringing into relief from the dull

average of attainment a heart and core of genuine spirituality throughout the whole range of existence, and of working from this starting-point to strengthen and elevate life. The constant presupposition is, that a spiritual life which is a unified whole is at work in the depths of our soul; it is only when it does this that main lines of effort can be developed out of it, that truths of the soul can be elaborated, and that the way can be prepared for an inner solidarity of the soul.

If this is impossible without the constant co-operation of philosophy, then philosophy itself must receive a new form from the new connections, and must develop new methods. Its first task is to provide a new starting-point for its own work. It can no longer take its stand on the external world, as the ancients did, since the general movement of life and thought has tended more and more to make that world itself a problem, and to refer men back to life as the only thing which is immediately present to them. But if this life is

understood as the mere activity of a unit which is cut off from the world, it can never get beyond its limited and separated sphere, and never attain to a truth that is universally valid. It will thus inevitably lapse into a state of complete isolation. Hence it is important to show that there is a world which lies within life itself, and to advance from the psychological treatment of it to the noological. The latter does not deal with the states and experiences of the individual unit, but with the upgrowth of the spiritual life, and looks at it in a way that rises above the separation of individual and society, but at the same time affords us a characteristic view of the whole of reality.

If we thus start from the spiritual life as a unified whole, and strive to reach some systematization of life in work, we need not be afraid that humanity will sink to a condition of rigid uniformity: ample provision has here been made for movement and variety. For, in the first place, spiritual life as a whole will always need to be recognized and appropriated

by men, and in doing so different minds will inevitably take different paths. It will only be with great difficulty that this divergence will ever cease in the course of history, or even diminish. But we have to struggle incessantly, not only to realize the spiritual life as a whole, but also to give form to its details. For, as we shall have to show later with more detail, the spiritual life does not reveal its depths to man all at once, but he can only advance gradually into it by coming to terms with the existing condition of the world and his own soul. Various stages may have to be traversed and important decisions will have to be taken. In this matter one and the same answer cannot be expected from all. For the individual may take up his position here or there according to his nature and experience; in fact whole periods may adopt different positions according to the impressions they have received and the tasks they have to perform. In particular, one epoch may be filled with the consciousness of the inner

greatness of the spiritual life, another may feel deeply how human existence fails to reach this height of attainment; the one may therefore be a period of affirmation, the other a period of negation. Great tension may be the consequence, and much strife among men, but if we once make sure only of the idea of an independent spiritual life, we shall have made it possible to bring counteracting influences to bear against the disintegration, and in fact to understand the different movements as all co-operating in a common work. The only essential is that the matter should never be regarded as settled and done with. Let it never be forgotten that to us men there is not offered any ready-made relationship between unity and multiplicity, but that we have to co-operate with the forces at work in the world, and laboriously strive to reach some sort of reconciliation of the antithesis.

CHAPTER II

Change and Persistence

Time and Eternity

The relation between change and persistence, between time and eternity, is exceedingly complicated and confused in human life. No phase of this relationship is satisfying; we are driven from one to another; a reconciliation seems to be indispensable, but we do not see how to attain it.

In the first place, man stands completely immersed in the stream of time; his whole existence is in a state of constant change, and in the external world he finds everywhere the more change the more closely he scrutinizes things. Meanwhile, the current of his own life flows on without resting; in comparison with

the endlessness of time, the existence of the individual appears as a fleeting moment. But this transience and insignificance of his life is felt by man both as a grief and a grievance, and hence it comes to be one of the leading motives of his work to escape somehow from the destroying power of time. He experiences that longing for eternity which Plato depicted in glowing colours. The individual feels that he must soon retire from the scene, and hence he seeks to leave behind him some signs that he has lived. Great kings set up memorials of their deeds and inscribe their names on walls of rock. But if we go beyond the individual, we find that the building up of a civilization requires, as it were, the accumulation and storing up of achievements. The present must maintain its hold on the past in order to be able to continue the building-up process; our task is to establish a foundation for life in face of all change of circumstances and all caprice of individuals. Institutions and customs, which are declared to be un-

changeable and which are revered as inviolable, are particularly dominant at the beginnings of civilization. Religion especially, by connecting life with a sacred order, exercises an influence in favour of persistence and keeps change at arm's length as an outrage against God.

But if we take our stand within time we cannot well overcome the power of time. The stream of time undermines and destroys the mightiest and most skilfully constructed works; from the largest whole to the smallest parts it brings everything into flux. Not only individuals, but whole nations and civilizations decay; the various religions themselves, the guardians of eternal truth, succumb to time and survive only as memories. The craving for eternity would have to be torn from our soul if our life belonged entirely to the immediate present, if it could not transcend it and press forward to a new reality, which stands in a different relation to the question of time and eternity. But such a reality can reveal itself, if at all, only as the result of

spiritual work, and this work necessarily involves both thought and philosophy. Now it would appear that nothing is more characteristic of thought than the power to look at things out of relation to time under the form of eternity.

Greek philosophy devoted special attention to this problem. It waged vigorous war against the flux of phenomena, and hence produced a characteristic type of life. Change in things is recognized throughout a wide range, but is degraded by the main tendency of thought to a lower level, and kept at a distance from the heart and core of spiritual work. This was not done purely in the interests of philosophical knowledge, which bade men seek beneath all change a persistent fundamental substance or unchangeable elements. Life, too, demanded some sure and certain support, which should be a spiritual rallying-point from which it could go forth to enrich itself. It was thought that life could not gain this support except by turning

from the restless activity of man to the universe, which, in its ultimate nature, was considered to be unchangeable. In grasping and contemplating the order of the universe and its eternal grace, man seemed to find something worth living for and to be raised above the cares and troubles of everyday life. On this view, knowledge seems to be the only path by which man's life can be raised to the level of that which is eternal; the superiority of knowledge over action was thus fully guaranteed. But the next thing was to ascertain more accurately what it was in the universe which could be reckoned as persistent. The answer given by Plato gained the widest acceptance and has exercised the deepest influence on mankind. Plato sees in the conceptions which thought uses a certain amount of fixity in contrast with an opinion which continually varies. On a closer view, this fixed element is determined as the form or shape. The co-ordination of these forms into a great synthetic structure gives rise to

a realm of unchangeable truth and reality. This realm must be raised above the world which envelops us, in order to preserve its independence and purity, but it exercises a formative influence over the world and gives its efforts a fixed goal and an impulse towards higher things. Knowledge is here raised to a position of control over the whole of life, for it is knowledge alone which is able to reveal to us this transcendental world and keep it abidingly present.

Aristotle brings form back into the world of experience, but leaves it its immutability, and by his vigorous development of the antithesis of matter the total picture of the world and life is rounded off with still greater completeness. This reconciliation between change and persistence, between time and eternity, which was reached when Greek thought was at its highest level, has moulded the whole of life in a specific way, and still retains the influence which it has exercised for thousands of years. Form has received the fullest recog-

nition as a phenomenon which pervades the whole world, and it becomes the central point of spiritual work. The world appears on this view as dominated by the opposition of matter and form. The latter is the absolutely unchangeable element, so that to seek something which is persistent simply means to throw the forms into clear relief. Matter, on the other hand, exists in a state of flux, not subject to rule. In the process of life form takes hold of matter and shapes it to its own ends, but matter always tends to escape from these ties and always has to be conquered anew. Hence the world is in a state of constant movement, but in its ultimate nature it remains unaltered: rest retains an unassailable superiority over change. And even where change extends beyond the individual, as with the fates of nations or the motions of the heavenly bodies, Aristotle does not by any means believe that there is no persistence. The conception of fixed rhythms in movement is developed, perhaps, in connection with the Babylonian astronomy.

Just as day and night, summer and winter, follow one another in eternal recurrence, so also there are rhythmical periods in the world as a whole and in the fates of men. Movement does not go on endlessly, but only up to a certain point, whose position is fixed, then it turns back to the beginning and starts a new series. Hence everything is both old and new at the same time; in the incessant ebb and flow of phenomena, in the endless succession of periods, the world as a whole remains the same. The work of knowledge corresponds to this conception of reality. Its task is not so much to follow the changes in the coherent systems which have been formed within life as to construct a general picture out of the confused mass of first impressions, to bring the flux of things to a stand. Its procedure is not genetic, but descriptive and classificatory. The strong point of this philosophy lies in discovering fixed types or forming them, to a certain extent after the manner of plastic art. It is certainly in connection with

this that we are especially indebted to the work of the Greeks for the fixation of sharply outlined types of thought and life, which seem likely to remain a permanent heritage of humanity.

The search for something which is persistent is not confined to the universe generally, but extends to the details of human existence. The kind of political life which prevails seems to be determined above all by the nature of the political constitution. The form of the state seems to be that which preserves the systematic coherence of the whole in opposition to the constantly changing series of individuals, and it is this in particular which has led to the high estimation, and frequent over-estimation, in which constitutional forms are held. Thus a tendency arises to construct an ideal and to hold this up as the permanent standard by which any change in political relations is to be judged.

But the impulse to find something that is persistent is seen with particular clearness in

the way in which the life of the soul is shaped. The ultimate basis of life is here always taken for granted; in the full development of this human activity has an important task assigned it, but at the same time an impassable goal. When this goal is reached, activity ceases to be a mere striving, and is transformed into a state of rest in itself, into an activity fully satisfied by its own exertion and self-expression. The best example of this is artistic contemplation, which is full of exalted pleasure without striving to attain to anything beyond itself. It seems that here the opposition is entirely overcome, since the activity itself acquires a sort of persistence. If, in accordance with this, happiness is sought not in effort but in possession, this possession is no state of slothful rest, but an incessant activity. Hence the chief problem of life is life itself, as the complete unfolding and effective co-ordination of its own nature: as the poet says, the important thing is to become what one is. The conception of form has a far-reaching

power in this connection also, for everywhere that there is any diversity manifest in the domain of life, it is to be brought into a fixed relation either of gradation or of equilibrium. The general result is a life which is self-existent and established on its own foundations, and which is exempt from restlessness and haste only because it is incessantly active.

No one would wish to maintain at the present day that this scheme, which was drawn up by the philosophers, really controlled the life of the average Greek. Very possibly it was by way of contrast to this average that its features were outlined with so much sharpness. But in the spiritual life and in the work of that unique nation philosophy does not occupy a position of isolation. And the creative activity which found expression in art shows more persistence than in modern times; certain types endure for centuries without crushing the individuality of their creators. The technical work of the Greeks, too, has more stability; there is less alteration

in its methods and instruments than has become the rule in the latest period. Hence their life has throughout a more restful character than modern life; it is laden with fewer unsolved problems and sharp contradictions. It is not so much a restless striving after an ever-receding goal, a hoping and waiting for a better future, as a co-ordination and strengthening of its own powers; it draws its satisfaction from the complete mastery of its own existence in the present.

This ideal of life, with its reconciliation of rest and activity, has always possessed an attraction for later periods, but all its nobility and greatness cannot conceal the presuppositions on which it rests, and which became untenable in the following ages. It demands a vigorous nature; it demands a considerable activity which takes pleasure in its own exercise; it demands, in fact, faith in the rationality of the human soul and the whole of reality in their fundamental nature. Form, too, can only maintain its position of leader-

ship where it possesses an inner life—we might say, a soul. And the whole scheme underwent considerable modifications towards the close of antiquity. After the loss of political freedom and the cessation of spiritual creation, activity loses its old value, and what is offered in its stead cannot fully make up for the loss. Difficult problems and contradictions arise within human existence and in the condition of the world; in particular, the old harmony between the spiritual and the sensible threatens to turn into a sharp opposition. Among men the pettiness and meaninglessness of everyday routine is ever more keenly felt. The thought that a similar round of tasks may go on for ever, may easily make it appear that all our trouble and work is fruitless, and may become terribly oppressive. Finally, when creative power is at a low ebb, form no longer preserves the soul and the content which are necessary to the furtherance of life.

Hence old ideals decayed, and yet no new ones arose out of the chaos of the times. Was

it to be wondered at that, in such a situation, wherever all faith in life had not disappeared, there arose a strong desire for some truth or other which should be untouched by the changes of time, and for complete peace in the possession of such a truth? The important point is to find something eternal, which leaves behind it the whole domain of becoming, and reveals to men a new life. Such an eternal element, however, is not to be found in the world, but only above it, and hence the endeavour to attain to it acquires a religious character. The endeavour to reach persistence, as we saw it in art, in which the fixed element is sought within the activity, gives way to a religious endeavour which is inclined to bring the two into opposition. Rest in the eternal, free from all the haste and toil of life, now becomes the supreme goal. When spiritual life is at its highest level, as in the case of Plotinus, this rest is certainly not represented as a cessation of all action, but action here lies entirely within the soul; it comes to be a

constant and persistent contemplation of the one eternal existence. On this view there is no room for any change or any diversity. Finally there remains as the ultimate fact of life, only a single and fundamental emotional tone, a quiet resting and free moving in eternal existence. But this leads to the threshold of a new epoch.

Christianity could not summon mankind to a complete change of heart, and could not preach the necessity of a new condition of things, without making a breach with the finality of the old Greek view. It was just the rise of Christianity which made clear the fundamental presupposition on which the old system rested, and which was now seen to be untenable. The Greek solution of the problem stands and falls with the conviction that this world of ours is everything which it can possibly be, that it is in a normal condition which does not need any alteration and does not demand our interference. Only on such a view could the contemplation of the universe

furnish the chief content of life, and a content which is not only completely satisfactory but also productive of happiness. Christianity, on the contrary, holds the opposite belief, that the world is full of grave disorders, that it has fallen away from a standard which it ought to maintain, and which it really did maintain at the beginning, and that it is important to regain the lost height of attainment by an entirely new departure, for which a fresh bestowal of divine love and power on humanity is necessary. At the same time, the world as a whole acquires an essentially new aspect: great deeds now become the essence of all that happens, they make an ethical drama out of the whole. In this the salvation of mankind and, indeed, of the whole universe, is the question at issue and is the subject of the greatest vicissitudes. The seriousness of this drama forbids all repetition: the thought of a rhythm of events, and of an ebb and flow in the history of the world, can in such a connection be regarded only as a frivolity. At the same

time the most significant modification occurs in the relation between time and eternity. Greek speculation at its highest level admitted, of course, that all that happens in time rests on an eternal order, but the temporal and the eternal remain clearly separated from one another; eternity does not intervene in the changes of time. But this is just what happens according to the beliefs of Christianity; it is this conviction more than anything else that gives this religion its distinctive character. But the entry of the eternal into time must very considerably increase the importance of all that happens in time; temporal happenings thus gain a value for the deepest ground and the ultimate fate of reality. The building-up of a kingdom of God within human life is closely connected with this fact. When the old and the new worlds come into collision, nothing produces a wider separation between the leading thinkers on both sides, such as Plotinus and Augustine, than the fact that the former reduces time to a mere simili-

tude of eternity and does not call for any sort of historical progress in human life, while with Augustine the building-up of a religious community, an ecclesiastical order, is the central point which controls all his thought. It is when the formation and development of this religious order lays a great task upon men and calls for decision on their part that they first acquire a history in any true sense of the word. But the task which is laid upon them is a permanent one. For although, after the victory of Christianity, the movement proceeds on more peaceful lines, there is always the demand for the further expansion and development of the Christian life. In this connection Christianity has from the beginning set up a high goal in its representation of the kingdom of God, when men shall be perfect in love and purity. This goal is far in advance of anything which experience shows to have ever been attained, and it has consequently implanted a deep longing in the human soul, and has continually lifted the thoughts of men

beyond the present and the present order to a future anticipated in faith and hope.

But the soul of the individual takes its full share in the inner movement of life and in the shaping which it receives in the course of history; in fact, it is in the individual soul that the most immediate and deepest changes take place. For, henceforth, the main task of life can no longer be to make completely intelligible and hold fast a nature which after all is already present to us. For the intensifying of the ethical demand, which insists that men must be renewed and purified, makes everything which is achieved by merely natural powers seem inadequate, and requires a radical renewal. It is thus that a history of the soul first arises and becomes the heart and core of all life. The great oppositions of existence here come into immediate collision, and keep the life of man, which oscillates from one to the other, in a state of constant tension.

Hence there is much more movement and change in Christianity than in the world of

ancient thought. But, on the other hand, there are many influences which co-operate to preserve and strengthen the effort after persistence. When God is conceived of as entirely above the world and as a personal Being, and especially after victory has been won in the outer world, the rest in God which is longed for when life is at its highest level has a more fervent and intimate character, and the desire to be completely free from the restless and ignoble routine of the world becomes still more pressing. The appearance of the eternal in time could then be easily understood as allowing men, even in this life, to give an eternal setting to their thoughts and feelings, and to free them from every element of time. This line of thought has established itself and maintains a permanent position in particular in the Greek Church, and, more than anywhere else, in Greek monasticism.

But, as a general rule, what contributed most to the attainment of persistence was the conviction that the truth which decides the

salvation of the soul was not obtained by merely human power, and could not be so obtained in the future, but that it came to us as a communication from God, as a supernatural revelation, and, as such, tolerates no change. The course of history makes the Church the guardian of this unchangeable truth. The more the Church detaches itself from its secular environment, and the greater the separation between divine and human, supernatural and natural, the higher is the inviolable divine truth raised above the changes of human life and above the whole sphere of human work.

A further support was given to the tendency towards persistence by the conditions of the closing period of antiquity, with its disinclination for any independent action and any private responsibility, along with the dangers attaching to both. When it made any effort, it experienced not so much a pleasurable exercise of power as a paralysing uncertainty as to the success of its endeavours. Hence it was bound to seek for happiness not so much in endeavour

as in possession, and it wanted its possession to be absolutely certain and unassailable. A possession of this kind, however, seemed to be nowhere offered except by religion in its ecclesiastical form.

Just as this tendency towards persistence made itself more widely felt in the middle ages in the sphere of religion, so now it conquered all the ramifications of life. In spite of their increasing power, the new nations were not yet in a position to produce a culture of their own, and were compelled to depend on that which was handed down to them. It was not to be wondered at that this culture was thought to be final perfection and met with unconditional veneration. Hence Aristotle came to be regarded as the supreme example of human knowledge, with whom men would not dare to break, and the attainable was everywhere supposed to have been already attained in the past. There was only one task left for men to carry out,

to guard faithfully that which had been won, and to transmit it conscientiously to later generations.

This mode of thought usually looked at the life of its own age and the state of its environment in the light of the past, and this past might be either classical antiquity or the beginnings of Christianity. The past, with its culminations of attainment, was that which lay next to man's soul, and it hung like a veil between the man and his own period. There was something fresh to do only in so far as the various authorities on which men relied had to be reconciled with one another. This was the problem which Scholasticism took up and solved in a very capable manner within the limits of possibility. Thus life here, with all its externally directed industry—and this is by no means lacking—yet possesses in its inmost heart a deep tranquillity and security. It is usually exempt from agitating soul-conflicts and corroding doubts. In the exceptions where these do occur they are usually thought

of as something monstrous and are condemned with the utmost severity.

This restful tone attains its maximum in mysticism. The latter develops a wonderful tenderness and intimacy, in direct contrast with the hardness and roughness of its environment. It strives to free human life more and more from every element of time, to make man younger every day, and to transport him entirely into a "permanent present." The man for whom time becomes as eternity and eternity as time, seems to escape all pain and to be brought into a state of pure bliss. In order to prepare a secure lodging for such peace within the soul, the inner consciousness is here first separated from all external activity, as a pure internality of the soul, and while this immersion of life in itself does not prevent a joyous activity toward the world, this latter has no value except as an expression of character. The close connection between God and the world which mysticism stands for, may reduce both the visible world and time to

an illusion and a dream, a morning-glow which disappears at the rising of the sun. But this may easily lead to the thought that the world and time, as expressions of eternal being, gain a closer connection and a greater significance. These are valuable seed-thoughts which may lead to a more inward comprehension of the world and also to a doctrine of development. We cannot fail to recognize that this is a doctrine which has arisen from religious speculation.

This predominance of the idea of persistence sets definite limits to the action as well as the thought of the middle ages. Where the condition of things, with all its incompleteness and all its misery, was thought to be the dispensation of a higher will, it could not be the task of man to strive to make essential alterations in it, or to transform reality as far as possible into a kingdom of reason. And the misery was the more easily endured because all earthly life was thought to be only a transitory passage to a better state of existence,

to man's true "home." Hence any effort to improve things was limited to mitigating to the best of men's ability the need which existed in individual cases: no attempt was made to trace back the misery to its source and to abolish it totally by a general transformation of existing circumstances. We find no effort and no movement from whole to whole. But just as the condition of mankind was accepted as essentially unchangeable, so the great external world was thought of as being once for all established and fixed by superior creative power. In particular, we never meet with the thought that organic forms may be subject to change; nature is conceived of as the faithful tenant of the form which the Creator has stamped upon things.

Hence the thought of persistence had a secure predominance and determined the kind of life that was lived. To emphasize the persistent element in things, and to connect human action with it, seemed to be in the main the chief aim of spiritual work. The

artistic and the religious solutions agreed together on this point and reinforced each other.

The older kind of life certainly had great advantages. To life it gave an inner equilibrium and to man the consciousness of being encompassed by assured truth. It thus guaranteed a restfulness incomparably greater than was given to later periods. But it rested on a presupposition with the overthrow of which the whole became untenable, the presupposition that in those achievements of the past, on which it relied, the highest conceivable limit had been reached and absolute truth attained. If essentially new tasks arose and essentially new powers were developed, if far-reaching changes took place in the fundamentals of life and in the general view of reality, there was bound to be opposition to the finality of earlier views. This opposition could not be smoothed over by a friendly agreement, but led to a complete breach with the old way of life. For as soon as the con-

viction gained ground that tradition did not exhaust the fulness of life, that it left many problems untouched, the solution of which was possible and, in fact, absolutely necessary, as soon as, in a word, the incompleteness and the inadequacy of the old way was put beyond doubt, its claim to be final and complete was bound to seem an intolerable presumption, which must be contested with the greatest vigour in the interests of truth. It seemed wrong that the achievements of a particular age should be stereotyped and made the standard for all ages. Such an attempt might lead to the reproach that the temporal usurps the rights of the eternal, and the human the rights of the divine, in a way which can no longer be tolerated. But the decision of the resulting conflict depends on the question whether the modern period has, or has not, really given rise to a new life of an independent spiritual character. If it has done so, if it has unfolded new forces in the region that lies beyond all human opinion, and made

something essentially new out of life and reality, if there is a culture which is specifically modern, and if there is a specifically spiritual type of the modern man, then the foundation is overthrown on which the medieval doctrine of persistence rested, and the maintenance of life on medieval lines becomes impossible.

But when the new life first arose, it was not by any means the intention of those who introduced it to bring in something new and different. They believed rather that what they introduced would only free the old life from the disfigurement to which it had been subjected, and would restore it to its original condition. Thus the Renaissance and the Reformation were not consciously, as they were actually, the originators of a new life, but the restorers of an old one. They did not want something new, they wanted the old and nothing but the old. It was in the seventeenth century, with the advance of the Enlightenment, that the new became fully con-

scious of its own nature: old and new became clearly separated, and it was inevitable that a middle period (*medium ævum*) should be interpolated between the two, and hence the name "middle ages." Thus was invented the usual division of history, subject to all the defects which are inseparable from divisions of this kind, but nevertheless an unavoidable necessity. But at the same time it was recognized that human existence is in motion. The modern period could not enforce its own right to exist without breaking with the traditional doctrine of persistence.

It is not for us to consider now how the idea of movement has made its way more and more into the different departments of life, and how everything which stood in opposition to it, and finally even organic forms, have been brought under its category. At present we are concerned only with the general nature of life and work. And here the most significant feature is the change in the fundamental presupposition, as compared with earlier schemes of life,

a change which becomes continually more evident. To the Greeks the world presented itself, in spite of all the movement that goes on, as a ready-made and rounded-off whole, and on their view there was no necessity for any essential alteration. Christianity, on the other hand, which estimated things from the moral point of view, found the world full of error and guilt, and indeed burdened with a pervading contradiction, a contradiction so grave that its solution could not be expected from any movement on the part of the world itself, but only from some supra-mundane power. The main stream of modern thought does not acknowledge any such dualism: it is inclined to connect the divine with the world and to merge the one completely in the other in a monistic system of thought. But if in this it approached the ancient view, there is the essential difference that now the world is not thought of as a finished product but as in a state of becoming, and that it calls upon man to act on his own

account to a far greater extent than did the earlier schemes of life. Philosophical thought thus understands the world as the whole of being, which strives to attain its highest level by its own movement. The double conviction that the world, as we have it, is extremely imperfect, and that it is making sure and certain progress towards perfection, changes the whole tone of life and the nature of work in important particulars, as compared with earlier periods. If it was formerly the task of science to distinguish and emphasize permanent forms in the transitory series of sensible phenomena, and to show that the perfect form is the directing power and final goal of movement, we now find that the significance of time for the production of reality meets with full recognition. The important point is to make the existing state of things completely intelligible by following its evolution from the very beginning, and thus win for man more power over things. For the man who begins by understanding the evolution of things is able to

intervene in their formation, and can direct them to human ends. When knowledge therefore ceases to be a contemplation of reality, and becomes a re-creation, it comes into closer connection with life and increases its activity. Science is the leader in the movement towards subjecting the world to the human spirit.

The new life does not accept any part of the existing condition of things as absolutely unchangeable. Even in the case of the most difficult problems it holds out the hope of a better future. One task is no sooner finished than another comes into sight; everywhere we see the capacity for increase, unlimited possibilities are disclosed. In the first place, man in his own nature appears capable of progress, and not bound down to a fixed endowment of nature. For nothing appears more characteristic of a reasonable being than an indwelling of infinite life and effort. Hence no definite limit is set to its powers, but they seem to be able to grow and to keep on growing. And

further, both political and economic life seem to be capable of progress to an unlimited extent. This progress seems to take two directions: firstly, the getting rid of all irrationality from human affairs, as far as possible, and the progressive transformation of our existence into a kingdom of reason, and, secondly, the effort to ensure as far as possible to all individual members of the community a share in material as well as in spiritual goods. And since spiritual work in all its ramifications is in a state of movement, the idea of progress determines to a continually increasing extent the general character of life. Since movement continually breaks down more and more all the goals which lie ahead of it, and fashions them afresh according to its changing needs, movement itself, gathering force as it goes, comes more and more to be the chief content of life. Finally it will have nothing beyond itself; the increase of power becomes the supreme ideal, which is bound to come into violent collision with the old ideal of giving

form to things. As Hegel says, "becoming is the truth of being."

Movement cannot win control over life in this way, or even claim to control it, without overcoming the irregularity which had hitherto clung to it and subjected it to severe reproach. It must show that it possesses in itself stability and coherence, and is moving in a fixed direction. Movement fulfils these conditions when it becomes evolution. For the conception of evolution makes all the different phases into steps in one progressive movement, in which one part is connected with another, and all contribute to one general result. But this conception of evolution can extend over the whole of reality and shape it in a single mould. It is precisely the thinkers generally regarded as the leading representatives of modern thought who have given a particularly impressive exposition of the idea of evolution conceived cosmically. It is thus with Leibniz and his innumerable monads, all of them moving with slowly but surely increasing

rapidity, the summation of whose progress amounts to an unceasing advance of reason. It is so with Hegel, according to whom the movement of the universe progresses by means of a constant succession of contradictions, which arise and are overcome. Every individual thing, according to its particular nature, must plunge into the stream of becoming, but it is permanently preserved in that stream as an element in the universal. But the whole conception of movement in the modern sense has been most powerfully expressed by the poet:

"In the currents of Life, in Action's storm,
I wander and I wave,
Everywhere I be!
Birth and the grave,
An infinite sea,
A web ever growing,
A life ever glowing,
Thus at Time's whizzing loom I spin,
And weave the living vesture that God is mantled in."[1]

Such changes give rise to a new relation between time and eternity, and at the same

[1] *Faust*, Sc. I. Sir T. Martin's translation.

time alter the value assigned to the present. But a closer view soon shows that the modern period does not speak with one voice on the subject, that the idea of evolution is itself evolved, and has passed through three chief phases. The first phase owes its origin to religion, and especially to religious speculation, as it begins with Augustine and is continued by philosophical mysticism. Just as the world in its diversity is conceived of as a representation, an unfolding of the divine unity, so the course of time is an unfolding of eternal being. Time cannot thus become an expression of eternity without itself gaining in significance, and being co-ordinated to a greater degree into a continuous whole. Here everything that happens in time gains its content and value from eternity, and hence remains directed beyond its immediate existence towards eternity. In mysticism, too, the soul of man, though it participates in the work of the world, retains a profound peace untouched by the confusion of the world. The next phase

has both an artistic and a speculative aspect. It brings the eternal more and more into the world as we know it, and there finally merges it completely. The movement of reality is conceived of as the unfolding of an all-embracing being, which thereby first attains to complete realization. Goethe has given the most impressive exposition of the artistic aspect, and Hegel of the philosophical. On this view life is not referred beyond itself to a transcendental being, but every individual manifestation stands within the life of a whole and is controlled by it. In this way life can gain depth in itself, and in the stream of time can grasp that which is above time. As Goethe said, the moment can become a representative of eternity. The final phase of the doctrine of evolution is when it reaches the level of natural science and Positivism. In this phase everything which makes any claim to eternity is placed entirely behind the process of life, and this vital process is regarded as consisting almost entirely of the movement and displacement of the elements.

Then everything that takes place happens in a single plane, and is entirely exhausted in being what it is; it has in no way to represent or to serve anything that exists behind itself. Hence there can be no question as to its having any sort of meaning. In this view life falls asunder completely into a mere juxtaposition of individual processes and a succession of moments, which may to a certain extent be summed up but do not form an inwardly connected system.

These phases do not merely follow one another. The second in particular maintains its position alongside the third, but the main tendency of the movement is to concentrate itself more and more upon the sphere of immediate existence and to reject all persistence with ever greater vigour. At the same time there is outlined with increasing sharpness a particular type of life which fully develops the opposition between the old and the new way of life. On the earlier view, the highest aim was to live one's life from the side of eternity,

and to retain in life the presence of something eternal. But now the aim is to bind up life as closely as possible with the stream of time and the changing moment. Formerly, unchangeable ideals were held up for the guidance of action. Every enterprise had to be measured by these ideals and to conform to them, but now they are felt as intolerably narrow and oppressive; equal rights and the fullest freedom are demanded for everything which aspires and struggles upwards. Thus life is subject to incessant change; but the more it changes and the less it marks time and stagnates, the higher it seems to stand. Such mobility gives it immeasurably more freedom and fulness, freshness, and intimacy. And the individual departments of life are subject to similar changes. Education undergoes an essential change in that man is not now required to be educated for an ideal which transcends time, but for the needs of his own period. Legislation has no longer to enforce uniform demands, but must correspond to the existing situation

and unreservedly follow its changes. In such a connection the conception of modernity gains a peculiar significance and power of attraction. If life is to be a success, the chief requisite seems to be, not to cling tenaciously to the old but to seize the fleeting and transitory moment, to make the most out of it, and to adapt one's life continually to it. It is only if we do so that it seems to become entirely our own life and to attain to what in this connection can be called truth. Thus we get rid of all rigidity; values become fluid, and the stream of things carries off everything in its course.

But what we thus desire for ourselves we must also grant to other periods; we cannot understand them from our point of view, we must try to understand them from their own; we cannot measure them by an absolute standard, but by that which they set themselves to attain. Hence our historical judgments are only relative, and man develops the faculty of placing himself completely at

the point of view of all past systems, of reconstructing them and re-living them. Life thus gains an immeasurable breadth and unlimited elasticity; whatsoever moves mankind seems also to belong to us.

But all the advantages which result from such mobility of life, such flexibility and adaptability on the part of the human spirit, have a reverse side, which may not necessarily affect the individual but spiritual work as a whole. All spiritual work needs co-ordination of the diversity of things, and control of our first impressions. It is impossible if the stream of phenomena carries man hither and thither like a plaything; it needs a fixed standpoint, and can only find it in opposition to the disintegration which we have described. Hence, in spite of the mobility of life, the creative efforts of the modern period have been eagerly directed from the beginning towards finding some sort of fixed point, from which the realm of movement might be understood and controlled. The only question is whether the

modern period has found such a fixed point and turned it to account, whether it could find it at all in the circle of life which it marked off.

There are two ways in particular in which the modern period has sought to meet the advance of movement by something that is fixed: firstly, from the standpoint of philosophy, and, secondly, from the standpoint of natural science. Thought in the one case and natural law in the other, both of which are themselves exempt from all change, seemed to promise a sure support for the whole of life.

Modern philosophy begins when Descartes turns from the overthrow of all tradition and the uncertainty of the existence of the external world, to the thinking ego as the Archimedean point, the existence of which no one can doubt. But when Descartes carries out his method in detail, it appears that it is not so much the individual point as thought itself which is to lead the investigator to certainty. What is clear and distinct for thought may be regarded

by us as truth. But thought could not recognize anything as clear and distinct if it were merely an empty vessel or a mass that yielded to every stimulus. For this purpose it must possess a fixed original endowment, and this endowment was thought to consist of indwelling truths, the so-called innate ideas (*ideæ innatæ*). Only with such an endowment could it oppose the stream of phenomena, and undertake to reshape the previous condition of things according to its own requirements. It was not only thinkers like Spinoza and Leibniz who defended such eternal truths with complete confidence. Kant was really defending them in another form when he maintained that all experience and all change necessarily presuppose a persistent intellectual structure of the mind. The whole of the Enlightenment also presupposes them when it endeavours to test everything that is handed down to it as to its reasonableness, and, if it cannot stand this test, to reject it or transform it. Through such a challenge to prove its

rights before a timeless reason, the whole of life is vigorously shaken up, sifted, and renewed; a culture which rests on a basis of reason advances in cheerful confidence to oppose the culture resting on history which had till then held the field. Thought thus becomes the measure of all things and the fixed point in the transitory series of phenomena. The conception of the nature and function of thought has undergone many changes in the course of the centuries, but it is a characteristic of the whole of modern culture that it assigns to thought that stablishing and regulating function for which it looked first to the universe and later on to the Deity. The struggle of thought to appropriate the whole range of reality and to bring it under its own laws is the chief movement of modern times.

But although much has been accomplished in the struggle, the result has not been an absolute victory. The carrying out of the undertaking was met by difficulties both from within and from without: from within, because

the foundation of thought itself gave rise to grave doubts and difference of opinion; from without, because the immeasurable extent of the field of history offered an obstinate resistance to being enveloped and controlled by thought, and rejected more and more decisively all such attempts. Who is the vehicle of thought, where does it arise, and where is its centre of activity? Descartes and the Enlightenment had no scruples in making the individual the vehicle of thought, thus presupposing an essential equality of reason in all individuals. If this presupposition is contested, and it soon was, then the universal validity of truth, and truth itself, is overthrown. Kant met such doubts by the assumption of an intellectual structure of the human mind anterior to all difference of individuals, which comes to light in great products—above all, in the construction of scientific experience and the development of the moral law. But doubts may easily arise as to whether these products are to be relied on, and are capable

of only one interpretation, and these doubts will then extend to the common structure of the mind. When Hegel finally raised thought to the position of an all-embracing and all-moving cosmic power, he thereby surrendered all connection with the immediate life of the soul, and attributed to the mind of man a complete absoluteness which was bound to meet with the strongest opposition, especially in the nineteenth century, with its growing knowledge of the strict and narrow limits within which man is confined. Hence we are met by the dilemma that thought is either closely bound up with man and is involved in all the uncertainty and fragmentariness which cling to human existence, or else that it casts loose from the connection with man, overstrains its own powers, and, emulating the bold flight of Icarus, finally plunges into the void.

Still more comprehensible than this inner perplexity is the resistance offered by historical life to the claim to control it made by a thought that transcends time. This opposi-

tion is met with at an early period, and the advance of historical modes of thought strengthens it. The experience of history shows with continually increasing clearness that the differences and changes of the periods not only extend to the inner depths of the soul but also affect the shaping of thought, that, at the most, certain elementary forms are of universal occurrence, which however are of no importance for the content of life. Hegel made a magnificent attempt to construct a world out of the forms themselves, and to bring into this structure the whole of historical reality. But not only do the living contents and the individuality of the historical structures fade away in Hegel's philosophy of history, but there also arises the strongest contradiction between history and the necessary demands of thought. Thought cannot take a general view of history without detaching itself from it and treating it as already closed. But this does away with the possibility of all further movement, and history is inwardly destroyed. But

if history preserves the right of unlimited progress, then thought, from the point of view of history, will be seen to be merely the expression of a particular time, "time grasped in thought." But then one period has the same right as another, and this does away with the possibility of thought being able to co-ordinate and illuminate history. If the first alternative leads to an intolerable fixity, the second leads to a no less intolerable relativity. For the great majority of mankind the movement of history has broken through the scheme imposed upon it, has gained a victory over timeless thought, and has vindicated the rights of relativity. Thought has thus been unable to make good its claim to raise life of itself to the level of that which is fixed and eternal.

But still less successful is the attempt to do so from the side of nature, with the help of the conception of law. Modern investigation has transferred the persistent quality of nature from composite structures to the

elements and their modes of action—natural laws are nothing else. This transference is no doubt a fact of the highest importance, but it does not mean that persistence is surrendered, only that it is carried further back. But even if these laws of nature could be simply transferred to the spiritual life, they would not solve our problem. For although the course of events may follow simple fundamental forms, this does not give life any inner coherence, and does not direct the diversity of things to common ends. The reign of law would still leave us defenceless against the changing currents of life. We may all think in accordance with the same logic, and yet, under the influence of different interests and apperception - masses, reach fundamentally different results. Using the same forms of thought we may reach more and more widely divergent conclusions.

Hence we are convinced that the element of fixity, which the modern period on its own ground opposes to movement, is either itself

involved in conflict and movement, or else, so far as it is incontestable, does not satisfy the demands of the spiritual life and does not guarantee us the necessary support for our struggles and aspirations. The general result then is that the movement which emerges in the modern period does not find in it any sufficient counterpoise, that it is therefore bound to advance further and further with elemental force, and to destroy everything that still offers resistance. The same result is further promoted by the rapid acceleration of life on its external side—an acceleration which the latest period has carried out, and will carry out to a continually increasing extent, by quickening the means of intercourse, facilitating the communication of ideas, massing men in large aggregates, etc. Hence it is quite conceivable that within the movement itself the more uncompromising forms are more and more displacing the milder; that all the persistent elements offered by the older conceptions tend to be slurred over and lost,

and, in particular, that persistent basis which the genuine theory of evolution supplied by its conception of a universal life gradually unfolding itself. Life becomes more and more an incessant change, a constant letting go and beginning again, a following of every fresh attraction, a floating away with the stream of things. If it is thus transferred entirely into the immediate present, as we saw, if it is freed from all the pressure of the past, and gains an agility and capacity for change which were formerly unknown, then it flatters itself that, with this movement towards modernity, it has attained the summit of the ages.

But here, too, the rule is verified that the external victory, the complete permeation of the world by life-forces, is usually the beginning of a counter-movement, that the very exclusiveness of success sets limits, and that what is outwardly still advancing in triumph, may thus be felt inwardly as inadequate and even intolerable. The turn of the tide first becomes noticeable in a sudden revulsion of

vital feeling, which completely alters the value ascribed to change. At first it seemed that the setting of life in motion, the stimulus to the powers, the continual production of fresh images, the opening up of ever fresh aims, the unbounded possibilities, were all pure gain; life seemed to be made individual in a higher degree, and man to be brought incomparably nearer to himself. The individual may still retain this estimate so far as, concerned only with his own welfare, he throws himself into the stream of life and seeks to advance on his way. But, as a thinking being, he cannot help reflecting on the whole, and asking the question, in all this excitement and strain, in all this toil and work, what is gained for the whole? And if he does not covertly bring in other bodies of thought to make up the deficiency, he cannot fail to recognize the inner emptiness and meaninglessness of this life, the break-up of all connections. Hitherto men had seen only one side of movement, the inexhaustible wealth of novelties to which

it gave rise: they had not seen the other side, their equally rapid disappearance, and the unsubstantiality of the inner life that results from such coming and going. A life of nothing but change cannot look forward to the future with any joy or certainty, for where there are no persistent aims, the future, as regards its spiritual character, is hid in deep obscurity, and we cannot tell whether to-morrow may not bring a complete revolution. Such a life has no fixed past, and therefore no history, for the constant change places things perpetually in a different light; it is bound to make our past character and actions seem as if they did not belong to us, our own selves dissolve into a kaleidoscopic succession of pictures. And least of all has such a life any genuine present; a present which is spiritual in its nature. For mere time is not sufficient for such a present; the time must also be filled with a content such as only persistent and co-ordinating aims can give it. But the absolute movement which we have

described resolves life into smaller and smaller pieces, indeed into separate moments; every attempt to grasp the present results in nothing better than mere opinion, the shadow of a present. Hence, as a general rule, if this life does not experience any sort of counteracting influence, it threatens in spite of all its activity to become a mere hankering after life, a half-life or phantom-life. We may add a fact which has been too often described to detain us now, viz., that the breaking-up of all connections inevitably hinders the inner elaboration of impressions and experiences, drives life and effort more and more to the surface, and makes them to a continually increasing extent defenceless and dependent on externals. There is the further fact that the different movements in the different departments easily come into conflict and find themselves at cross purposes, not only as between different men but also within the individual himself. If this is really the case, it can be easily understood how men grow tired and weary of all the rush and

bustle, which is so confused and yet in the end so empty, how this feeling of weariness spreads and produces a longing for more persistence, more peace and repose in life. It is a remarkable feature of the present day that the old mysticism is regaining its power of attraction, and that the Indian religions, which release men from the cares and troubles of time, are gaining many adherents also in the West. Is not this to be connected with the change in vital feeling which we have described?

Now, such a change does not prove much in itself; it may, after all, be merely a part of the irregular ebb and flow to which mere movement reduces life. It can only be of use in so far as it enables us to take a more unprejudiced view of the whole problem, and free ourselves from the one-sidedness of our previous estimate. And this is in fact what usually happens in human life. Movements emerge, seize upon men's minds, and carry them irresistibly away. Men perceive only

the results of these movements, their progress, their general direction; they do not see their limitations, their presuppositions, the problems and, may be, the contradictions which emerge on a closer view. Hence they are proof against all attack, and no demonstration of their deficiencies and faults can affect them. No amount of sober reflection is of avail against the condition of intoxication with which they fill mankind. But in the end some limitation is felt, and then the movement's power of attraction quickly disappears. All the problems which it involved now stand out clearly, and the next step is to underestimate, and in fact to treat unfairly, what was so long overestimated. We are experiencing to-day just such a reversal of opinion with regard to the attempt to reduce life to mere movement. It is a change which is first felt in the higher strata of the intellectual atmosphere, and not among the great majority of people who lag behind any movement and believe that something has come

into existence when it has at last attracted their notice. We are becoming more and more clearly aware of the presupposition on which alone this belief in movement could take upon itself the guidance of the whole of life. The presupposition is that movement is a sure and constant ascent, that it can, out of its own resources, overcome all the obstacles which it meets with or produces out of itself: on this view it can never give rise to complications against which it is defenceless. In so far as this widens out to a general view of the world and history, it involves the demand not only that our reality shall be rational in its ultimate nature, but also that man shall be able to make himself absolutely certain of it. Rationalism and optimism are here indispensable. But optimism has not only aroused many misgivings when looked at from without: from within, also, it very easily appears superficial and untrue. We see clearly before our eyes the hard and pitiless struggle for existence both in nature and among men,

the constraint and insecurity of spiritual life in the world in which we live, but, above all, the insufficiency of man for the spiritual tasks on which the value of his existence depends, the wide interval between genuine spiritual culture and what men like to call culture. If we take a general view, human existence seems to be a grave contradiction. And, when we come to the more detailed shaping of existence, we begin to doubt the presupposition which underlies the interpretation of history as an evolution that becomes more and more rational, viz., the presupposition that movement starts from a fixed point and makes sure progress towards its goal, that any doubt which may arise only concerns details and cannot call in question movement as a whole. For the present state of opinion, with its complete uncertainty as to the final aims of man and the meaning of his existence, is sufficient proof that doubt does extend to the whole, and that the whole, if it is to have any influence upon us, requires on our part a continuous act of

recognition and appropriation. But if this is the case, then evolution cannot be the last word: action and decision must come before evolution. And at the same time we clearly see what difficulties lie in the relation between action and evolution, and how easily evolution can come into collision with the fundamental conception of history. Where evolution prevails, the order of the whole prescribes what is to be done at each point, and the direction to be followed: there is no choice and no freedom of decision. But without these there can be no history in the specifically human sense. To talk of historical evolution is, properly speaking, an absurdity. Where there is evolution there is no real history, and where there is history there is no evolution. For if we are to have history, the individual must have freedom of decision, but this is excluded by evolution.

But, above all, the very attempt to deny it only demonstrates with greater clearness and cogency the old truth that there can be no

real spiritual life unless it is raised above time, that otherwise the true is subordinated and sacrificed to mere opinion, the good to mere utility, and, generally, all independent spirituality to the trivial round of merely human activities. Man, too, in the end cannot tolerate such distortion of the spiritual life, for it deprives everything which distinguishes him from nature of its end and meaning, and condemns his life to absolute emptiness. Emptiness, however, is more difficult to bear than pain. Hence the craving after happiness drives us continually to renew our demand for a truth which transcends time, and forces spiritual work, and philosophy in particular, to seek ways of securing it.

When faith in the power of modern movement thus disappears, and a craving after some fixed content of life is re-awakened, the medieval system of the Roman Catholic Church may seem likely to solve our difficulties and may summon mankind to return to its fold. We found that this was the case when

we were considering the problem of finding connections in life. But such a return could only satisfy a few tired and faltering souls, for whom the visible and tangible is at the same time the spiritually certain: it is not capable of satisfying the demands of the spiritual life. Medieval thought rested on the presupposition and conviction that the height of human achievement in every sphere had been already reached, that there could be nothing essentially new. But this presupposition has been obviously refuted by the whole course of the modern period, with its fundamental transformation of human existence. The man who, to avoid flatly contradicting the evidence of his senses, would perhaps be willing to recognize movement outside of religion, and only wished to deny its existence inside, would by this means divide human life into two contrary species, and would assign our efforts to fundamentally different motives and feelings. He would produce an inner discord in the soul, which is

fatal to the vigorous conduct of life, and absolutely foreign to the middle ages, which extended the tendency to persistence over the whole of life. Thus at that time religion could be regarded as in its whole extent exempt from all change only because men unhesitatingly accepted it, just as it was, as an undivided whole, because they had no insight into its gradual growth and the conditions of this growth. Only thus could it be entirely separated from the human sphere and regarded as a pure revelation of God. But now the scientific study of history has brought this department also under its sway, and proved how it was shaped in detail, very gradually at first, and under the strong influences of human needs, interests, and ideas. It is to confuse the human and the divine, and to do the divine a grave injustice, if for that system, which has in great part been recognized as human and temporal, a veneration is demanded which is the due of the divine and the eternal alone. Hence we

cannot solve our present perplexities by a return to the middle ages.

But what is true of the middle ages applies to all the epochs and achievements of the past. They may help us on our way if we have an independence of our own to oppose to them, and if we can thus transmute them into our own life, but they are quite incapable of compensating us for the loss of independence. We are very fond to-day of evading the urgent problems of the present by seizing upon some culminating point of the past, by according to it unconditional veneration and absolute devotion, and then using it as a basis from which to supplement and consolidate the present. In doing so we usually emphasize the points of contact and minimize the differences, but we forget that the present situation sets us problems which are far too specific and far too pressing to admit of being solved or even essentially advanced by such indirect means. This recourse to history, which is evident to-day in

all departments of spiritual work, yields at the best only a substitute for a real life of our own. A substitute is certainly better than nothing, but it produces the illusion that we possess the real thing when we are inwardly poor, and it threatens to limit our life to half truths, and indeed untruths.

There is only one way left to overcome our present perplexities: humanity must go on with its independent work, it must use its own powers to bring about a new situation. The demand for a new type of life and a new type of culture becomes more and more insistent; as the present crisis owes its origin to the whole of life, so it can be overcome only by a further development of the whole. The work of philosophy can only be helpful in this connection in so far as it takes its place in such a general movement, receives a stimulus from it, and exercises a return influence over it. But within the whole, its first task is to get rid of the illusion of finality, to open up the way for wider possibilities,

and to restart the movement which intrinsic causes have brought to a standstill. But this task lent a particular value to a survey of universal history, as in general, so also in particular in connection with the problem of persistence and change: it has given us a wider view, it has revealed the most diverse relations and demands which our existence involves, it can use the experience gained in the general movement of history to point out to our own work more definite lines of attack.

The general movement of history has not steadily followed one line with regard to our problem, but has swung completely round. The striving after persistence was predominant at first, and established its position more and more firmly in the course of time, until its own activity came to a complete standstill. When the modern period began, movement gained the ascendancy and transformed all standards and values. But the experience of mankind left no doubt that the exclusive, or even the partial predominance of movement

gravely endangers the spiritual character of life: thus a reconciliation of the two tendencies becomes an urgent requirement. But this reconciliation is impossible, as is sufficiently shown by the study of history, if both meet on the same plane and are brought into immediate contact. For then rest relegates movement to an entirely secondary position, and condemns life to stagnation, or else movement makes itself master of the whole sphere and tends towards the break-up of all fixity. It is impossible to escape this dilemma unless a division and inner expansion of reality takes place, which brings rest and movement not into an oppositional but into a complementary relationship. This is, however, hardly attainable otherwise than by a sharper separation between spiritual life and human existence. Spiritual life needs to be clearly thrown into relief against human conditions in order to preserve its independence and transcendence of time, which are indispensable to its substance. In such a separation, to be sure, this substance

must not entirely disappear from the ken of man : it must somehow be a part of his own nature, and it must gradually work itself out from the indeterminateness of its beginning and allow us to take full possession of it, if this separation is to give rise to a particular kind of life. It would not be of much help to us if we could only open up the depths of our being with difficulty, and get a glimpse of them as in a dream ; we must be able to place ourselves immediately in them and share in their contents if our life is to undergo differentiation, gain thereby an inner breadth, and at the same time overcome the opposition between persistence and movement. But here movement is also indispensable, for the appropriation of these depths needs much hard work and toil, which is subject to the conditions of time, and can only advance very gradually. But a movement of this kind has a fixed goal and a history. It is directed towards a spiritual substance and serves to promote the unfolding of a persistent truth : it cannot be a

mere succession of periods of time; it becomes a gradual movement away from time, and a progressive construction of a present which transcends time. When history is of this kind, our study of it need not helplessly follow the succession of periods, but can distinguish in the contents of history what belongs to the mere temporal situation from that which is eternal in its nature and can exercise a permanent influence. Such a study of history may lead to a deliverance from mere history, and to the revelation of a present which transcends time.

But such a treatment of history cannot arise and make its way unless we grant that the world and human existence contain greater depths than are evident at first sight. The contradiction, that a truth which transcends time appears and plays a part in this world, which is in a state of becoming, can only be resolved if this world has an eternal order behind it, and, along with everything in it which is spiritual in its nature, serves to pro-

mote the unfolding of this order. If such depths are present in our world, in human creative efforts also we can distinguish a spiritual substance from everything which is merely temporal, and the apprehension of this substance enables us to overcome mere time. Then, particularly in the case of all that is great, we can recognize through the veil of time a life and work which transcends the world and is valuable for all ages. Hardly anyone at the present day will profess his adherence to the doctrines which such a personality as Plato formulated, or the practical proposals which he made. But if, in spite of this, we hold Plato in the highest honour, and treat him as a living and powerful influence among us at present, we only do so because we recognize a creative power and a particular shaping of life, which may be called Platonic, and which was embodied in time in Plato's doctrines and proposals, but was by no means exhausted in them. The same is true also of general movements of historical life. In many

ways we are out of sympathy not only with the ideas and dogmas of early Christianity, but also with the contemporary feelings and tone, but this does not in the least degree exclude the possibility that the revelation of spiritual life accomplished by it should preserve an indestructible freshness of youth and remain an ever-changing problem to the ages. Only, our life must not be lived on one plane in which temporal and eternal, merely human and spiritual, meet indiscriminately, but rather there must be an inner gradation in it, which takes place in virtue of the independence of the spiritual life—a gradation which distinguishes as well as re-unites spiritual substance and the human appropriation of it. As, in order to be fully possessed by man, this substance must first be acquired, a movement will arise here which, however, will not appear as an aimless journey to an infinite distance, but as a striving of life to return to itself, to raise and consummate its existence.

This new way of treating history, this

esoteric way, as it might be called, produces a radical change of view, which is also seen in connection with the problem of persistence and movement. Here, too, the earlier periods must not be regarded as a dead past, but as something which remains bound to us by a community of work, and co-operates with us towards the up-building of a present which transcends time. Ancient thought could make such a point of the persistent only because it regarded the condition of the world as normal and needing no essential change, and because it believed that life was to be satisfied solely and entirely by its own efforts in raising itself to the status of a perfect work of art. Later experience has shown that this conclusion was premature, and that, in particular, human life contains far too many complications and contradictions to form at once a harmonious whole. But, however much these facts compel us to go beyond anything which the ancients attained or attempted, they do not invalidate the main motive of these en-

deavours. Faith in the ultimate rationality of reality is the permanent basis of all spiritual life and effort: otherwise it immediately loses its support and is bound to collapse. Equally indestructible is the thought that life has to seek satisfaction not in the attainment of any external good but in its own unfolding and activity. Although the exact nature of the activity may have to be differently conceived, and the goal may recede to a far greater distance, the fundamental thought is indispensable if life is to be completely independent and really self-sufficient.

Christianity destroyed this restful optimism, and threw mankind into a state of great agitation, by revealing grave disorders in the state of the world and life. The deepest root of these disorders was found in the ethical situation, and the struggle against such perversions was made the cardinal point of life. It has often laid these disorders too directly to the charge of the individual; it has applied ethical considerations too directly to the whole

breadth of the universe; it has not developed its own power of affirmation to its utmost capacity, and, under the influence of periods of exhaustion, it has been too ready to dictate its own permanent form. But whatever changes may be necessary in the traditional order, the great revolution remains irreversible which delivered life from the sway of all merely natural processes, made a real history possible, and, by the opposition of affirmation and negation, stirred life to its foundations. The peaceful and even course of human existence is thus destroyed for ever: the new problems which are raised can never again disappear.

We saw how the modern period began by giving complete recognition to movement, but we also saw this exaggerated to such an extent that movement was to produce all the contents of life. This attempt was bound to miscarry, but such a failure must not make us forget for a moment that it was this feature in life which first brought into prominence not only the

incompleteness of human existence but also its capacity for progress, and thus gave an immense impulse to our efforts. This has brought about a new situation: we may perhaps struggle and rise above it, but we cannot simply treat it as if it had never existed.

All these different facts call for recognition at the present day, and prevent all immediate recurrence to one particular period. If they are to be reconciled with one another, not by a superficial compromise, but by coming to an understanding with one another, we must considerably extend the frame-work of our life and re-shape the vital process. It is obvious that this is impossible without the vigorous co-operation of philosophy, without the help which it can give by opening up the way and sketching the country to be traversed. The perplexities of life necessarily drive us back to philosophy and set it new problems.

But philosophy will hardly be able to help in this work if, in dealing with these questions,

it does not make use of the experiences of the general movement of history and gain therefrom definiteness of direction. Above all, it must seek for itself some fixed standpoint, and the experience of history has shown that it can hope to find this standpoint not in a being beyond the process of life but only in that process itself. This process again it cannot understand as the evolution of a unit confronting the world: it must lay hold of the life of the world in the very process itself. Such a world-life, however, cannot be reached by a freely ranging thought, but only by a self-centred spirituality, which partakes of the essence of things and moulds reality. Such a spirituality rises above the activities of the individual faculties, and also shows in great detail the task which thought has to accomplish and the direction it has to take. Hence philosophy cannot turn immediately to the universe; it must first strive to deepen life by introspection, and then try to discover connections in life, and root itself firmly in them. It

is only after such a strengthening process that it is equal to dealing with the world around us. Since, however, these connections in life are not immediately apparent to us, but are only revealed by means of work and struggle with resisting influences, it follows that we are involved in movement of all kinds, and need have no fear of relapsing into a permanent state of dull inactivity. But if in our search we are encompassed by spiritual connections and guided by spiritual necessities, if the spiritual life itself affords a firm foundation which is at the same time the highest goal of human endeavour, and if in this way what is a certain fact becomes at the same time a difficult task, then life, with all its movement, will not lose itself in uncertainty; however much it may appear to be struggling towards an uncertain and distant goal, it remains in the end occupied with itself and anchored in its own being. But if philosophy sets itself the task of giving a scientific form to its fundamental vision, and deducing a corresponding line of

conduct, it is then equal to dealing with the opposition between rest and movement; it can then reconcile the eternal and the temporal, and can use them both to raise life to a higher level.

CHAPTER III.

The Outer World and the Inner World.

Nothing drives man to philosophy with more urgency than a contradiction which arises within himself and makes him uncertain as to his own life and nature. We first find that we are sentient beings and form part of a visible world, from which we receive a constant series of impressions and which makes continual demands on us. But, at the same time, introspection teaches us that we have no direct experience of external things, but only of our own subjective states, and that therefore what confronts us as an external reality must be evolved from within. Hence two realms arise which cannot be directly co-

ordinated, and each strives to subordinate the other to itself, and indeed, as far as possible, to absorb it. The sensible world treats the life of the soul as a by-product, a mere reflection and shadow; the psychical world, on the other hand, is inclined to degrade the sensible to a mere appearance which is purely subjective. According as we decide in favour of one or the other, our whole view of life will be completely altered: different goods will attract us, different aims will control us, and this may easily be exaggerated to the antinomy that what from the one point of view seems valuable and indispensable is from the other perverse and reprehensible. The one regards the increase of material happiness as the supreme good, the other looks upon it as hindering our efforts to attain the right goal: to the one, absorption in the inner world is the acme of life; to the other, it is a lapse into the vague and the vacuous. Where are we now to find out what we are and what we are not? This is a problem which can never be postponed

and handed over to the future. The urgency with which it calls for our decision is no less than our certainty that we are alive to-day, and wish to-day to attain satisfaction. Now our immediate impressions bring us to an irreconcilable opposition: we must therefore get beyond them, and what can be of any assistance to us except philosophy?

In reality philosophy has taken up the problem from the beginning, and all the more because the form which philosophy assumes depends very largely on the solution of this problem. But it is in the modern period that philosophy has devoted special attention to the subject. For the Enlightenment, with its violent separation between inner and outer, between what is conscious and what is extended, cleared the situation and sharpened the contrast. This made a definite solution a matter of urgency, and men sought to find it by making the problem the main subject of investigation and comparing the different solutions that were possible. It was easy to

take in these possibilities at a glance, and their number has not increased. The two worlds seem to be fundamentally different as regards their contents, and yet in real life inseparably bound up with one another. Which, then, is to take precedence, the maintenance of the specific character of each or their connection with one another? Where the first alternative is chosen the result is dualism. If, on the other hand, we emphasize the connection of the two, we must press on to a unity which transcends the opposition. There are thus three different ways of reaching a solution. The first regards the material world as the only reality, and attempts to derive all psychical life from it. On the second view, the psychical is the only world that exists, and contains the material world in it. The third strives to attain a unity embracing both sides, which are regarded as the unfolding, the expression, the manifestation of the unity. Hence, beside dualism we find materialism, spiritualism, and monism in the narrower sense

of the word. By removing the core of reality from one centre to another, each of these attempts places many things in a clearer light and co-ordinates much that is otherwise left incoherent. But each also meets with peculiar obstacles and must, in some way or other, try to overcome them. An enormous amount of effort is expended in doing so, but the struggle still goes on with varying success, and the adherents of each view show a continually recurrent capacity for believing that they can finally refute their opponents.

Dualism, with its separation between the material and the psychical worlds, is particularly calculated to display the specific character of each. It may boast of the clearness and definiteness of its conceptions, but it is flatly contradicted by a craving after unity, the existence of which is shown by our immediate perception of the close connection between body and soul; by art, which joins the material and the psychical in intimate union, and uses the one to enhance the other, and by

thought, which insists on the ultimate unity of the universe. In favour of materialism we have our immediate impressions and the stubbornness of the sensible world; its apparent simplicity and avoidance of all metaphysics: and the incontestable dependence of all psychical processes on physical conditions. But what has especially promoted its influence among men is the fact that, in the conflict of opinion, it is thought to furnish the sharpest weapon against the oppression of obsolete systems, against tyranny, illusion, and superstition. Materialism, however, is contradicted by the incommensurability of what proceeds from the soul, of the unity and inwardness of psychical life, with what takes place in the domain of matter and motion, and by the building up of a specifically spiritual life in the sphere of history and society. The fact that the external world recedes into the background and that its existence becomes uncertain as the result of epistemological reflection, is also opposed to materialism. From this point of

view it is impossible to hide from ourselves that nature, as we see it, does not come to us from the outside as a ready-made fact, but that it starts from our own thinking, and, under the influence of our intellectual organization, takes on the shape in which it lies before us. In fact, the failure to recognize that we do not find the world but mould it and build it up from ourselves as centres, threatens to reduce materialism to a pre-scientific opinion. Spiritualism pursues the opposite course. It asserts the primacy of psychical experience and enforces its assertion, and it shows much energy in the logical working out of its fundamental conception. But it cannot succeed in making clear the specific character of the sensational element which contrasts with the purely inward experience of the soul. Even if the division is transferred to the soul itself, it is not thereby overcome, but, rather, is likely to become still more intolerable.

Monism seems to be the theory most consistent with our knowledge that neither series

can be reduced to the other, but that, at the same time, they require some sort of connection; for monism makes them different but parallel sides of a single more essential process. This provides for the unity and also preserves the difference; perfect equilibrium seems to have been reached of valuation and attunement. The only pity is that a keener examination soon shows that the opposition is only hidden and put in the background but not overcome. The parallelism between the two sides, which it is sought to reach, can never be attained. As soon as we pursue the fundamental conception somewhat further, we find that one side comes into prominence and relegates the other to a secondary position. We cannot study the historical forms of monism without becoming aware that they have approached, and finally passed over into, materialism or spiritualism, if indeed the two conceptions have not clashed and crossed in the same thinker. This was the case above all with Spinoza, whose Ethics starts from an

unmistakably materialistic basis and reaches spiritualistic conclusions. Thus monism sinks back into the very confusion which it aimed at avoiding.

We thus see that a twofold opposition pervades the whole problem: we dispute as to whether there is unity or multiplicity, and we dispute as to where the unity is to be found. The one problem involves the other, and the dispute separates men further and further instead of bringing them together. How often has one theory "refuted" the other! But the conquered and apparently annihilated theory has always risen up again with renewed power. Have all the "refutations" of materialism prevented it from being the most widely prevalent view at the present day, and in fact feeling itself master of the situation? Does not the fruitlessness of these learned disputes indicate that the discussions do not carry back the matter to the point of divergence—that this, rather, lies further back? Another indication pointing to the same

conclusion is the fact that each separate school has claimed a triumph over its special obstacles solely because it has had special views on what was of primary and what of secondary importance, because its general view involved a definite system of values. Hence its thought depended on the position it took up towards reality, and this, again, on the work, impressions, and experiences of the different individuals, and, in fact, of whole nations and periods. In the end it is the view which is taken of the whole of life which lays down the lines for thought and determines its direction.

Thus the problem is transferred from thought to life and assumes a new aspect. For if we ask whether life is to take up its position outside or inside and conform itself accordingly, it does not behove us to interpret an existing process, but first to call the process into being. For our life is not given us as a whole without our co-operation, but presents itself at first as a juxtaposition and succession of individual processes: the binding into a

whole is the work of the thinking and active spirit; it is an attempt, a venture, which must always justify itself. But, in the last resort, such justification is possible, not by any outward achievement, but only if the attempted solution co-ordinates all diversity and binds it into a single and unified life. This necessarily raises the whole of life to a higher level, and enables us to make completely our own the life which otherwise only streams past us. It is only such a synthesis, too, which can overcome the indeterminateness of the initial situation and give life a definite character.

There are different ways of carrying out this synthesis which our problem demands. In the first place, the world of the senses, which holds us so firmly in its embrace, which links us imperiously to itself by the obligation of waging a perpetual struggle for existence, may become the real scene of life. If so, all the peculiar powers of the human soul will rank merely as means and instruments to bring ourselves into closer relations with

the sensible world, to appropriate it more fully, to gain more profit from it than is possible at the stage of merely animal existence. But, on the other hand, the life of humanity in history and society has risen above the level of the senses: a non-sensuous life has appeared and continually develops richer and richer ramifications. Where the synthesis of the whole seeks its controlling centre in the new life, the sensible world will have to be subordinated and can only gain any value so far as it promotes the unfolding of this other life. This is the source of the main opposition—the opposition between a naturalistic and an idealistic basis for life and culture. But the relation between idealism and naturalism can assume two forms, and this gives rise to a further division. The new life which idealism stands for while rising superior to the sensible world may do one of two things. It may yet seek to preserve friendly relations and a close connection with the sensible world, or else it may stand out in sharp relief against

it, and venture on absolutely independent paths of its own. The former species of idealism may be called immanent, the latter supernatural. Hence the struggle centres principally round these three types, naturalism, immanent idealism, and supernatural idealism. Dualism, in the sense that there are two developments of life which run alongside without affecting one another, and only come into external contact, is excluded by the craving of life after unity; and this also excludes monism in the sense that there is a total life embracing two series running parallel courses in complete independence. The nearest approach to monism is made by immanent idealism, with its endeavour to reconcile the two worlds; while supernatural idealism, which strives, on the contrary, to hold the two worlds as far as possible apart, is most closely related to dualism. History, to be sure, and in particular the present day, shows a large amount of dualism in so far as men, and indeed whole periods, often distribute their efforts along

different lines, and incline here to a naturalistic and there to an idealistic mode of thought. But this is an error which men commit; it does not yield a new type of life, and need only occupy our attention incidentally.

Hence the spiritual struggle goes on between the leading types which we have described. But the course of the struggle is not what we might expect: it does not start from universal principles and from them go on to details, but there arise concrete syntheses of an absolutely individual nature. These syntheses have, of course, universal questions and answers behind them, in fact they radiate a world-philosophy; but above all they are characteristic facts in the life of the world, and it is from their individuality and actuality of achievement that they derive their power and significance. For it is only because they do not merely pore and brood over the conception of reality but vigorously set themselves to produce something real, that they can raise the level of our existence, open up depths

and powers in the spiritual life which before were hid, and help us to experiences which are of lasting value. It is also to be expected that, so far as there is any systematic connection in historical life, the later forms of this life should take up and make use of the experiences of the earlier, and that thus the experience of the world should be welded into a unified whole and a general level of spiritual evolution attained. Anyone who takes a general view of the whole process can see what particular form the different syntheses have given to the relation between the inner and the outer worlds, and what answer to the main problem has been involved in the construction of the synthesis; he can see what obstacles they met with and how they came to terms with them, what complications they fell into, and what further steps they were thus compelled to take; finally, he can see how the overthrow of one synthesis helped the rise of another, and how the whole process led to a continual enlargement of the circle of life. A

study of this kind is primarily historical in its nature, but it need not consist entirely in the unrolling of a succession of processes. For if the attempt is successful to decide, in what has been accomplished, between that which has grown out of special presuppositions and surroundings and that which reveals a permanent capacity, and perhaps also permanent limitations, of the spiritual life, then co-existence may take the place of succession; a present which transcends time may stand out in relief from the course of the ages, and seek to maintain its hold on all the real life which the different epochs have contributed.

The peculiar position which the modern period takes up towards our problem makes it a matter of urgency to survey the whole of history in the way we have described, and emphasize what is of permanent value. The traditional systematizations of life gave idealism an undoubted ascendency; for them it ranked as an incontestable and indeed self-evident truth. But now, in opposition to this

devotion to an invisible world, naturalism has more and more emphasized the importance of the visible world, and is thus pressing idealism further and further into the background. In addition, the onward movement of culture has shown the existence of much confusion within idealism itself, and it has been weakened by the fact that the new methods of studying history, with their keener criticism, have discovered much variation and inconsistency in the traditional idealistic forms of life which were formerly accepted without hesitation as homogeneous. But, in spite of everything, there are many obstacles in the way of naturalism. For idealism has cut its way too deeply into our convictions, efforts, and conceptions, to be likely to succumb at once to a bold assault. But, all the same, we have fallen into a state of great uncertainty; the existence of the invisible world has become doubtful and the visible world does not satisfy us. Such a state of uncertainty as to the direction which life ought to take must inevitably cripple its

power and joyousness. It is certain that the crisis can only be overcome by an actual further development of life; and it is equally certain that this development cannot come down from heaven to us, but must be set in motion by ourselves. For this purpose we cannot dispense with the active help of philosophy in clearing the way, taking bearings, and acting as pioneer. And if the immediate duty of philosophy in this connection is to free us from the contingency of the moment and to bring before us human experience in its utmost possible range, it will undoubtedly be a valuable contribution to this end if we carry out a critical scrutiny of the great syntheses of historical life, with their revelations and experiences.

We naturally begin our journey through history with the solution which our problem received when Greek life was at its culmination. Let us not forget for a moment that the average life of the time did not attain this height, but was in many ways sharply opposed

to it. This culminating period, however, welded life into an artistic whole, which in a pre-eminent degree embodies for us the system of immanent idealism. Here the artistic element is, above all, plastic in its nature: as regards its spiritual content, life is a transformation of reality into a whole endowed with soul, and therefore well ordered and clearly graded. This process of transformation has two opposite sources—on the one hand, spiritual activity, and, on the other, nature as perceived by the senses; but the two streams converge and unite to form a comprehensive vital process which finds its full satisfaction in itself. Here the spiritual is certainly the controlling element: it is the source of all movement, it revivifies and imposes form on the sensible. The latter, with its formlessness, may seem at first the exact antithesis of the spiritual, but to a deeper study it soon reveals itself as something which expects and struggles towards the ordering and quickening influence of spirit.

In this way both can meet as elements in a harmonious life, and the one can help the development of the other. For even the higher element, which imposes form on the lower, is not perfect and complete without the help of the other: it is only by the subjugation of matter that it attains the full measure of its own power, development, and perfection. This type of life gives both spiritual life and nature, to use these abbreviated expressions, a characteristic form and task, as it thus establishes a friendly co-operation between the two. The spiritual, however much it is raised above the sensible, does not sever itself from the one reality which embraces them both: it does not form for itself an inner life which neglects the world, but it finds its task in uniting and revivifying this world and raising it to a higher level. Hence in its inmost nature it is an incessant working and creating, virile power and joyous activity; its fundamental impulse thus seems to be towards the undeviating pursuit of the true and the

good. At the same time, however, the sensible, because of its close connection with the spiritual, remains indispensable at all its stages. Whatever stimulus to the senses life offers is recognized and retained; only it must fit in and subordinate itself to the whole; it must occupy a definite place and be bound by definite limits; but at the same time it will be purified and ennobled. Hence the characteristic and great achievement of this type of life is, above all, that it has brought together into the closest and most fruitful connection spirit and nature, form and matter, and has thus made the spiritual vividly near to us and raised the sensible to a higher level. Here all oppositions seem to be reconciled, all contradictions overcome; life is co-ordinated into a unified whole without detracting in any way from the diversity of things. Hence it can feel itself firmly established on its own basis and equal to dealing with all the complications of existence.

Such a type of life is seen among the Greeks

in its purest development in the sphere of plastic art. Nowhere else in the whole range of history is a world of spiritual objects and values brought so near to man in an immediate present; nowhere else are the visible and invisible worlds so closely interwoven. But philosophy also takes part in this movement, and does so in the first place, at least where it gives expression to the Greek mode of life in its purest form, by uniting the inner and outer world, under the control of the former, into a life which rests upon itself. It is Aristotle who gives the completest scientific expression to this view. But, apart from the particular contents of Greek philosophy, we find merely in the mode of its operation a unique reconciliation between the inner and the outer. For in it content and form are not separated, and thought is not left painfully struggling with a refractory matter, but the work of philosophy does not cease until it has overcome all contradiction and given a clear and exact representation of thought. Such

efforts on the part of philosophy have produced at all stages of the movement of history well-marked types of thought, which have indelibly impressed themselves on the consciousness of humanity.

A similar creative activity pervades the whole of Greek life. All the inner life that strives to find outward expression succeeds in gaining complete embodiment, and everything that is external has soul and shape put into it. It is this above all that gives rise to a coherent spiritual reality and lends the life which is here unfolded a wonderful power of attraction. Much that is temporal and particular may also come in, but the heart and core of the whole lies beyond all contingency and is capable of exercising a permanent influence. For here the primary phenomenon of the form makes itself clearly and strongly felt; the fact is convincing that, on a spiritual basis, the inner can mould itself on the outer and the outer can become an expression of the inner. This gives clear expression to a general experience of human

life, the experience that, in life, the inner is imperfect in many ways, and that it can pass from indefinite outline to definite shape only if it can find outward expression. In this connection the outer, far as it may fall short of being a factor with equal rights, yet seems indispensable in order to drive the inner to definite decision and complete organization; with its power of stimulation and reaction it is an important element in the process of life. All artistic creation proves the truth of this, and thereby furnishes, as Goethe said, the happiest assurance of the eternal harmony of existence. But the clearest proof of it is the indirect one from the experience of humanity. For wherever form has been despised and neglected, life has soon degenerated and finally sunk into barbarism. Form, with its close union of inner and outer, is indispensable in order to call forth spiritual life, bring it to full power, and make it penetrate the breadth of things. Hence it can be easily understood how it was possible that form should become

the central conception of a cult of immanent idealism.

But just as the creative efforts of the Greeks show us this at its highest, so their experience also proves the existence of many limitations and complications. These are bound to become objections and obstacles if the artistic order described above is taken as the final achievement and the whole of our life. In the first place, this solution contains presuppositions which are by no means self-evident. It can only form the highest achievement of life if the spiritual impulse is strong, and, with its superior powers, can subdue and shape the sensible world; if, in addition, the life of the senses is healthy, if its natural power to strive upwards is unspoilt, and if it willingly fits into the frame that is provided for it; and if, finally, the movements from the one to the other unite in ready and friendly fashion to form a common life. All together demand that life should attain a height which is only reached under special circumstances, and which deter-

mines the general character of existence only in rare periods, and then only for a spiritual aristocracy.

We also find complications in the fundamental nature of this artistic idealism, so far as it claims the direction of the whole of life. The unification of form and matter must not be a mere combination and arrangement of them. Their efforts to come together can only yield a spiritual content if form has a soul and can communicate it to the whole of its product. But whence is form thus endowed with soul? This leads to the further question, how are we to conceive in this connection of the position of spiritual life generally? If it possesses a superiority over the formative process, and if, in order to preserve the purity of the form, this superiority is vigorously emphasized, then there arise two worlds, as Plato clearly shows us. But this gives rise to enormous complications. If form, however, is to operate only within the process, as the tendency is, especially in the case of Aristotle,

then it threatens to lose in spiritual content and has difficulty in preserving its purity. Here we recognize the Achilles' heel of this artistic idealism. On one alternative it presupposes a large amount of inner life, which is self-contained and self-sufficing: in this case human life can hardly find complete satisfaction in mere systematization, mere art becomes too narrow for it. The second alternative is that the moulding and shaping are treated as complete ends in themselves: from this it is not far to the position that they are a mere embellishment of existence as it is given, a mere refinement of life, and thus they easily lose their significance. Thus the artistic solution points beyond itself to a further totality of life.

The later ages of antiquity place this problem before us in broad outline. The sensible and the spiritual, which were so closely united when creative effort was at its height, dissolve the union and diverge further and further. The spiritual tries more and more to acquire

a complete inwardness. The result of this tendency is that, with the vigorous co-operation of philosophy, first of all morality and then religion becomes independent. But, however much depth of soul is thereby won, and to however large an extent sense-existence finally sinks to a mere symbol, the spiritual life is able to give no effective content to the condition of inward isolation and self-sufficiency which it reaches. The main reason for this is that thought desires to produce a reality from itself, while as a matter of fact it only comes to forms and relations which strive to detach themselves from all perception, and float over reality like ill-defined shadows. In this way, to be sure, the spiritual wins a realm of its own, but its emptiness would be immediately perceived if religious feeling did not incessantly revivify and put warmth into the cold products of thought. But as culture becomes increasingly polished and subjective, the sensible element loses more and more the robustness of an earlier period and sinks into

feeble refinement, and indeed inward corruption. It is not to be wondered at that the spiritual life became hostile to the sensible, that men not only strove to repress the latter as far as possible, but that asceticism made this repression the main content of life. In spite of this change, the old ideal of the artistic shaping of life retains its influence in many directions, and form continues to rank as a conception of high value. But it only does so in opposition to the main stream of life, though the opposition passed unnoticed, and it cannot alter the fact that the classical harmony of the two worlds is transformed in the end into a sharp division. The whole course of Greek history presents us with the spectacle of the gradual retreat of the sensible world before the spiritual. In the beginning the sensible world took complete possession of man, but the craving after spiritual self-preservation drives him to the elaboration of a super-sensible world. It was not Christianity, and certainly not the modern period, which

first gave rise to the idea of a purely inward life: the Greeks won it for the general system of culture by painful work and experience, and thereby prepared the ground for new systematizations of life.

Christianity also turns away from the sensible world, but it succeeds in giving this self-centred and self-sufficing inner life a great work to do and a rich content. It accomplishes this when, in unmistakable connection with later Judaism, it transfers the centre of gravity of life from the intellectual and cosmic to what is ethical and personal. The result is a complete transformation, since the fundamental relation of human life is no longer the relation to a visible or invisible universe, but the relation to a perfect Spirit who is above the world. In this way new aims and standards are revealed which bring the whole of life face to face with tasks of great importance. The object to be aimed at is union with this perfect Spirit, a demand for which the existing condition of humanity

is not only inadequate, but with which it even appears to be in direct contradiction. To end this conflict, which involves the whole of the soul, now becomes the supreme necessity. This is impossible if we start from the existing condition of the soul; for this purpose a new and purer nature is needed, and hence the task is raised above all human capacity. Such a necessity for what is impossible must bring about a huge convulsion. But if the conflict grows more acute, Christianity shows a way of overcoming it; it confidently preaches a redeeming and sanctifying love, which frees man from all perplexity, enables him to share in the perfection of divine life, and vouchsafes him full blessedness.

On this scheme the inner life itself contains great contrasts, movements, and experiences. The utmost extremes of absolute despair and certain assurance are at work and intensify one another. The tension of the whole is increased by the conviction that the trans-

formation of human life is not a mere private concern of man, but that the refusal of it signifies a revolt against the divine will, a violation of a sacred world-order, and therefore involves the disintegration of man. Hence this life will necessarily feel that it is the heart and core of the whole of reality; it will regard all other life as a mere setting, and will grant it no independent significance. At the same time it must uphold its complete superiority over all nature. It not only understands nature around us as a work of spirit: it is more important that, within man, it puts on a lower level all activity which proceeds from merely natural powers, and stringently prohibits its entry into the sphere of moral action. Thus a thinker like Augustine, who throws the oppositions into sharp relief, could regard ancient morality not only as insufficient but as a perversion (*virtutes veterum splendida vitia*).

Hence the life which arises on this ethico-religious basis is of a strictly supernatural

character. Here the spiritual life has absolutely no need of being supplemented by nature, but it contains its task as well as its power within itself. But the sensible is not therefore declared to be bad and treated as an enemy. Where this has taken place within Christianity, it is in contradiction to its fundamental tendency. For on this point Christianity is clearly and consciously at variance with the later ages of antiquity: to it the decisive opposition is not that between the sensible and the supersensible, but that between good and evil. The root of evil is not a deficiency in spiritual capacity, but moral guilt. But the sensible remains a subordinate sphere, which has to be completely subservient to the ends of the spirit: it possesses value not in itself but through the part of the higher order to which it gives expression, or through what it accomplishes for the higher order. Hence it can never form the sole domain of human endeavours, but always points beyond itself, and, with all its palpability, as far as the soul

of man is concerned it remains an external world.

We shall see what dangers and complications are produced by the unfolding of this system of life in the sphere of humanity and under special historical conditions. At the same time we shall have to examine whether, from the very beginning, the whole is not burdened with difficult problems. But before we discuss these questions we must fully recognize the primary phenomenon of the spiritual life, which here unfolds itself. The spiritual life here discovers in itself immeasurable depths, sharp contrasts, mighty tasks. If it formerly ranked as of incontestable worth throughout its whole existence, there now arises in it an inner division, a cleavage, the overcoming of which becomes the task of tasks. Man's own nature thus becomes his chief problem, and this means that his life is withdrawn from external activities and principally occupied with itself. The purely inward life thus gains independence and a completely satisfying content. At the

same time a change takes place in the value put upon action in that it does not need any external results to make it complete, but finds that its main business lies in the purely inward life. Then only does the internal disposition cease to be a dead accompaniment and become an active process; thus men are freed from the bondage which may come not only from external relations but from the unalterableness of the nature of the soul. A life which is based upon freedom of action rises above all merely natural processes; a struggle commences between freedom and fate. The independence which is thus won not only seeks to make man master of his own nature, but it prevents him from accepting his sense-existence as an assigned destiny and from yielding to it without a struggle. It calls upon him to master the life of the senses, and insists on shaping it conformably to the ends of the spirit. The importance of this is shown in particular by the beginnings of Christianity. For in taking up with courage and confidence the struggle

against a weak sensuousness pervading all the relations of life, it strengthened and consolidated men against the disintegration which threatened to carry all before it, and, by increasing their self-confidence, prepared the way for a movement of ascent.

In the actual world of history these transformations, these deepening and liberating movements, have always produced only inadequate results: in the consciousness of mankind they are liable to be temporarily obscured and forgotten. But they cannot be simply cancelled; they have produced so much change in life on its inner side that any further movement of humanity must come to terms with them. It is impossible for man to resume without question the earlier naïve relations in which he stood to his environment and his own nature, and to find full satisfaction in their development. Where the working-out in detail of this ethico-religious system of life provokes to contradiction, it often happens that the fundamental thought of the deepen-

ing and ethical awakening of life maintains its position all the more strongly. Where the answers no longer receive assent the questions remain. They, too, are forces which drive life in a definite direction and give it a specific character. Hence the new systematization of life which we owe to Christianity not only cannot be erased from history but remains one of its leading features: in fact, as revealing a depth which controls all the rest of life, it is above all the changes of history. It continues to work openly or in secret throughout the ages, and this proves that it belongs to that timeless present which is the subject of our investigation.

But all the truth and greatness of Christianity have not prevented it from being a subject of constant strife. It is not only from outside that it has continually experienced the severest attacks, unless these have been suppressed with an iron hand, but it has been torn with internal dissensions which have extended beyond the domain of conceptions

to the shaping of life. Everything indicates that the main tendency, when it is worked out in detail, contains a complication; we shall see that it is just the relation between the inner and the outer worlds which is here in question. Christianity stands for a new world, as opposed to that which immediately surrounds men, and it cannot give up either of these worlds; a "monistic" Christianity is an absurdity which can only please a confused thinker. But to maintain the existence of two worlds still leaves it an open question how they are related in detail to each other: the particular point is, how the world, which is on the one hand transcendent and superior to man, can become his own, and come into close touch with his soul. It is certainly part of the fundamental conception of Christianity to make the supramundane order powerfully operative in our world as well, but the relations of one to the other are not completely adjusted. The supramundane order remains in the first place a Beyond, which exists alongside our

world and is bound to lead us away from it by drawing us to itself. But, at the same time, instead of creating a present which transcends time, it remains too much a matter of mere expectation, a hope to be realized in the future. This not only leads to the greatest confusion in particular directions, but it gives the whole of life a character which is bound to arouse doubt and opposition. Since the transcendent Spirituality affects us here chiefly as an order working upon us from the Beyond, our whole life receives a specifically religious character, and is thereby driven into a channel which may satisfy particular periods but which is too narrow to be permanent. Christianity was established in an age which was wanting in vigorous vitality, and was chiefly intent on gaining a safe harbour of refuge. But it seemed that this could be found only in opposition to the confused activity of the world, in a supernatural order. The sharper the division became, the more certain men felt of themselves and the stronger was the

position of the divine revelation, which came to us only by a miracle. It would be irrelevant to treat of the objections raised by later ages, when vitality was at a higher level, but it is of course important to consider how the relation between the inner and the outer worlds had to suffer through this tendency.

Above all, there arises a sharp opposition which runs through the whole history of Christianity, and finds expression particularly in the shaping of creeds: we allude to the opposition between an inwardness which withdraws from the visible world, and an adaptation to this world, with the accompanying danger of an intrusion of the sensible into the spiritual. Where the inner life springs from the relationship to a transcendent Deity, and finds its chief task in the development of this relationship, it is easy for anyone to be indifferent to his earthly environment, to face all injustice in silence, with patience and resignation, to make no attempt either to grapple with the irrationality in the world,

or to raise it to an essentially higher level. Can we deny that the modern period has intervened in the general relations of life much more powerfully and helpfully than Christianity, though the latter dominated for so long the souls of men? Who abolished slavery, who carried through a universal system of popular education, who has attacked the social problem on a grand scale? The inwardness which we have described, with all its delicacy of feeling, was too feeble and too aloof from the world to exercise any power of penetrating and organizing it. Where spiritual emotion does not somehow turn into activity it runs a great risk of becoming an inert brooding over things, a purely subjective feeling, an empty mood. It does so, of course, only where the seriousness of the religious life has faded away, a pre-eminent example of which is the purely intellectual Christianity of modern times. And even where men are willing, they are often very helpless in dealing with the world: nor can we deny the further fact that, in the

life which is ruled by Christianity, the depth of soul and the tenderness of the fundamental experience have often been unsuccessful in preventing great barbarity, and in fact brutality, of outward action. Or were not the Inquisition and trials for witchcraft carried on in the name of Christianity? There is thus a dualism of life, which cannot be permanently endured.

But in Christianity itself there was vigorous opposition to the movement towards an inwardness superior to the world. This movement would probably have made Christianity a religion of mere individuals, if from the beginning its efforts had not been directed towards establishing a kingdom of the new life, and helping the whole of mankind. Even on the ground of history nothing distinguishes it more from other religions than the formation of a church that is definitely marked off, and claims to embrace the whole of humanity. But this enterprise could not be carried out without taking into consideration the general

situation, and also the opinions and interests of men. If now this situation was accepted as essentially unalterable, it was naturally impossible to avoid accommodation to it in many ways, and the consequent intrusion of sensible elements into the world of religion. It is thus emphatically the case not so much that a new world is formed as that the old world and its modes of thought are transferred to the domain of religion. How sensuous are the ideas of a God who is provoked to anger by sin, and must be appeased by some sort of atonement! How sensuous are the ideas of reward and punishment, of purgatory, of heaven and hell, and the whole body of eschatological doctrine! In addition, the spiritual exhaustion at the beginning of Christianity, which has been often alluded to, was bound to strengthen the sensuous element. Men wished to be perfectly sure, at any cost and without any risk to themselves, of the full reality of the spiritual, and so they insisted on a sensuous embodiment in order to be absol-

utely certain of it. Hence they demanded facts which appealed to their senses, overpowering impressions, visible pledges, such as we find in the clearest form in the conception of the sacrament. For the sensible is here much more than a mere means and instrument; it belongs to the essence of the matter, and the communication of divine powers is so closely bound up with it that a man's own disposition in the matter may easily become a secondary consideration (*sacramenta non solum significant, sed causant gratiam*). There is the closest connection between this and the fact that, the more the consciousness of his own weakness makes man look for deliverance solely to supernatural grace, the more religious it may appear to deny him, as far as possible, all activity of his own, and to represent the new life merely as "streaming into" him as into a passive vessel. Hence the inclination spreads to make sure of spiritual processes by binding them to sensible forms, to give to outward and tangible performances

a value which is in direct contradiction to the efforts of Christianity after inwardness. The final result is a materialising of the spiritual life, which leads at the same time to a suppression of all free movement.

A similar problem also appears both in the conception of the Church and in its activity. This activity is in the interests of the kingdom of God; its object is to subordinate all external processes to the ends of the inner world. But it cannot meet with any success without coming to terms with the world as it is, and making use of the means which it provides. The result is that it falls under the influence of this world, and may be overborne by it to such an extent that the main aim is completely obscured.

We thus see the opposition in its fullest development: we have on the one side an inwardness withdrawn from the world, and, on the other, the inner overborne by the outer. Though there are constant endeavours within Christianity to effect some sort of reconcilia-

tion, the confusion lies too far back to permit of anything but a tolerable compromise being attained. Do we not see in Christianity, with particular clearness at the present day, the opposition between a freely ranging subjectivity and a sense-bound organization?

The main trend of modern life puts the problem of the outer and the inner worlds in a very different light. The stream of life is once more directed upon the world, but now the main point is not merely to contemplate it but to lay hold of it vigorously, to get full possession and enjoyment of it. The inwardness that has been won is not by any means given up in principle, but is now expected to communicate itself to the whole of reality, and in this communication to increase its own power and joyousness. We saw how the main task of modern times lies in the enhancement of life, and how this enhancement does not serve an end beyond itself, but itself becomes more and more its own completely satisfying goal. But as the carrying out of this process

makes it necessary that diversity should be reduced to unity and the oppositions should show a tendency towards reconciliation, the inner and the outer worlds cannot remain separate; the life of the whole continually directs them towards one another; the one can develop its power and reach its highest level only in contact with the other. Although they may thus form different starting-points, they approach one another and become more and more closely interwoven, and the advance of the process of life may here be regarded as a progressive overcoming of the opposition. The supersensible strives to unite with the sensible in order to win its full power in the movement of the latter. Thus we see that all the ideas and principles which have emerged in modern times are filled with a fiercer longing to master the sensible world and penetrate to its furthest ramifications. Only by doing so do they seem to step from the realm of shadows into clear and full reality, and at the same time demonstrate their truth. Hence

the time for a timid severance from the sensible is now past, nor can the latter any longer be despised. From the other side, modern life and work enable the sensible to appropriate in an increasing degree the features of the spiritual, and they bring it nearer and nearer to the spiritual. Nature renounces its old palpability; it no longer lies before us as a realm of impenetrable matter, but is transformed into a web of forces and relations, held together by a causal order accessible to thought. In this system of life, whose fundamental principles are the increase of power and constant progress, material goods also appear in a higher light than at earlier periods, when their pursuit was thought to be the outcome of a lower way of thinking. For now they become indispensable means to the development of human power and the overcoming of obstacles: it is not so much sensuous enjoyment as the increase of power, the mastery over things—and thus something supersensuous—which makes them valuable.

If one thus grows by means of the other, it seems that there is only a single world and a single life encompassing man, and the tendency towards union which we have described seems completely to reconcile idealism and naturalism. Thus the division which opened in front of Christianity seems to be happily overcome.

The systematization of activity into work, in which the modern period considerably surpasses earlier epochs, was of great significance for this result. For the modern period has made vigorous attempts to free human action from all subjectivity, and to connect it closely with its objects: it forms great complexes of work, recognizes in them their peculiar laws and motives, and lets these latter control human action. While man thus identifies himself with the special necessities of things, the latter come incomparably nearer to him and grow to be parts of his own nature. In the world of human work the inner and the outer unite, in the same way as force and its object, to form a single whole. Thus the

progress of work is at the same time the establishment of man in an undivided world: it means that the idea of unity has made a further advance.

This consciousness of belonging to a single world dominates the convictions of the modern man, and gives him an assured sense of life. But the greater the pride and joy which are manifested in the striving after unity, the greater must be the resultant confusion, if, in the details of the systematization within modern life itself, different, and indeed contrary, life-currents are formed, which that life cannot bring together with the means at its disposal; if work, though it strains its powers to the utmost, cannot fulfil a requirement which is emotionally of the utmost urgency. This comes about as follows. The chief instrument for carrying out this effort has been found by modern life in science, science of the analytical and exact character which has been developed precisely in modern times. It was of such scientific knowledge that it could first

be truly said, knowledge is power. But science could not clearly and distinctly grasp either psychical life or nature without giving them an independence of one another and recognizing that each possessed a unique nature of its own. This meant a complete breach with the former method, which found no difficulty in a mingling of both realms. Though from the ethical and religious point of view the inner was raised above the outer, the earlier scientific conception of the soul was overladen with many sensuous images. No difficulty was felt in representing sensuous operations, impressions, influences as entering immediately into the soul, nor, on the other hand, in representing volitions as extending into the outer world and altering its condition. In addition, the soul was defined not so much by any positive attribute as by its contrast with the sensible, and hence it easily came to be popularly conceived as something sensible, though of a refined and gaseous nature. On the other hand, nature seemed to be controlled

by psychical forces, guided by ends, moved by impulses and inclinations; it might be regarded as forming a living whole and exercising creative power from within. A confusion like this, which involved the constant interpenetration of the two series, hindered all precise explanation, and hence the desire for such explanation drove men to separate completely one realm from the other, and at the same time to demand a psychological explanation of everything psychical and a physical explanation of everything natural. This separation was ably and vigorously carried out by the leading spirits of the Enlightenment: as they conceived the essential characteristic of the soul to be consciousness and thought, and that of the material world to be extension in space, the two were regarded as irreconcilably disparate. Here a realm of souls with their indivisibility, there a realm of infinitely divisible masses with their motions. As regards their relations, the two realms could no longer be understood as

communicating with one another. According to the new conception, a stimulus comes from one side and releases on the other some sort of activity: in its working, however, each realm kept to itself and was closed against every interference from without.

But these movements did not by any means remain confined to the realm of mere theory: they broke forth and became mighty forces striving to dominate the whole of life, and thus inevitably came into the sharpest collision with one another. In thought the thinking subject begins to feel himself the creator of a world. For when thought, as a productive faculty, develops an inexhaustible diversity out of itself—mathematics affords the clearest example—it does not thereby lose itself in things; it preserves an unassailable superiority; from all its work of production it always returns again to itself, and thereby proves the complete independence of the human spirit. Just as the thinking subject seems to be the Archimedean point which

affords a fixed position in face of the chaos of phenomena, the next task is to include the whole of reality in the process which so arises. Thought now becomes both the motive force and the measure of all things: by vigorous self-concentration it discovers in itself an original endowment of eternal truths, then transforms these into postulates, and applies them to the existing condition of things. What contradicts these truths cannot stand; what corresponds to them will be illuminated and raised to a much higher level. An activity of this kind not only works on things from the outside, but penetrates into them and seeks to make out of them something quite different from what they appear to our immediate impressions. For everything sensible here becomes a mere appearance, an expression and instrument of a content of thought: all reality seems to be reduced to thought-elements, and we seem to promote its ultimate truth when we raise it to the realm of thoughts and ideas. On this view the

sensible can only be regarded as a residue on which the transforming work of thought has not yet been fully successful, but it is not granted an independent existence as opposed to thought.

The essential attributes of the work of thought thus become the ruling characteristics of the whole of civilized life. The universal and timeless truth ascertained by this work possesses an unassailable superiority both over what the sensible world exhibits and over what has been made of man by particular historical experiences. Man's greatness and worth do not lie in what he is as a natural being, nor in what he is as belonging to a particular nation or a particular religion, but in what he is as a reasonable being. The development of his rational nature produces a culture which is rational and universal as contrasted with a culture dependent on history; in particular it rejects all sensationalism and becomes an intellectual culture; and it shows vigour and tenacity in making

its way in all directions. Man now appears as, above all, a being whose essence is pure thought, as a personality and an individuality, and from this point of view he must make further claims on himself and on life. Accordingly an attempt is made, starting from the reason immanent in man, to shape the individual departments of life, such as religion and morality, politics and education, and these thus undergo a complete transformation. Finally, all variety tends towards an all-embracing realm of thought, and an inner life is developed which, with its incessant activity, is much better protected against an irruption of sensible elements than the more passive and emotional inwardness of the middle ages. The guidance of this intellectual culture belongs incontestably to philosophy. For centuries great thinkers have emphatically contested the existence of an independent sensible world, and have sought to transpose the whole of reality into a web of thought. This intellectualistic effort found its culminat-

ing point in the system of Hegel, which not only makes the laws of thought control the whole of reality, but makes the movement of thought, which advances by means of contradictions, its sole content.

But nature, too, exhibits a life of its own, which is no less intense, and which struggles for the possession of the world. Just as psychical life, after the removal of the traditional intermingling of psychical and physical, found in thought a world-forming creative activity, so, after the expulsion of the psychical elements, nature is co-ordinated into a stricter unity, and shows that, when it is understood in this way, it is capable of incomparably greater services. Modern investigation, using the exact methods of mechanics, probes nature to the smallest elements and forces, and thus reveals to us a new depth of reality. By the aid of these elements it illuminates the existing state of things in the most thorough-going manner, and not only discovers much more movement

in nature, and, by following it up, is able to recreate reality, but also finds a way to enlist the forces of nature in the service of man, and thereby enormously enhance his life. Modern natural science is the starting-point of modern technical processes, which have not only led to an enormous advance in details, but have in general put man in a different relation to reality. For his ability henceforth to grapple boldly with all the irrationality of existence, and to treat all limitations as only temporary, must give him a proud self-reliance and instil an inner joyousness into his life. But while the shaping of existence by the technical applications of science shows that the outer is everywhere capable of a strong influence on the inner, and while it is easy for the latter to appear as a mere appendage of the former, the progress of science produces effects tending in the same direction. The latter, especially when it assumes the form of a doctrine of evolution and makes even organic forms subject to change and growth, may look

upon all psychical life as a mere product of the process of nature, and may regard its task as consisting only in what it does for the advancement of this natural process. Psychical life loses more and more the independence which was formerly assigned to it; even in details its activity seems to be determined by physical processes. Another factor which increases the importance of the visible world is the emergence and predominance of economic problems in modern society. Not only much that was formerly in a state of disintegration thus gains coherence for the first time and increases its influence, but also the particular systematization of modern work produces many new problems, and gives them a leading position in human life. From this point of view the management of life on its material side seems to be the main thing in human existence, and the struggle connected with it is the heart of the work that has been done throughout history. The manner in which this problem has been solved seems

to give the different epochs their peculiar character. If intellectualism regarded ideas as the motive forces of social and historical solidarity, the pendulum has now swung to the opposite extreme, and the place of ideas has been taken by material interests.

A realistic culture, such as has never existed before, arises out of the combination of these different movements and their annexation of the whole of life. For although the idealistic schemes of life never failed to meet with contradiction and the counteracting influence of realistic modes of thought, it was always rather a matter confined to individual schemes, and did not extend beyond a critical and defensive attitude to a positive construction dealing with life as a whole. The occurrence of this in the modern period alters the situation in essential particulars. For now for the first time naturalism may hope to satisfy the spiritual as well as the material needs of humanity, and meet idealism on equal terms. The struggle thus enters on a new phase: it

goes more than ever from whole to whole, and, when clearly realized, is bound to throw the whole of life into frightful unrest and confusion. Philosophy has again played the largest part in raising the matter to the level at which it can deal with life as a whole and fundamental principles. Only philosophy will not now appear as untrammelled thought, prescribing to things the course they should pursue, but will mould itself upon the data of experience with the greatest possible fidelity, and will find its chief work in co-ordinating, or, to use Comte's expression, "systematizing" the co-existences of experience. Comte, with his Positivism, may in general be regarded as the realistic counterpart of Hegel: the opposition, and at the same time the close relationship between the two tendencies, comes out with particular clearness in the life-work of these two men.

There is no doubt that the elaboration and the collision of the two movements takes place within the sphere of a common effort.

Both in the one and in the other there is a struggle to conquer the world, a thirst for reality, an increased sense of power, a translation of the vital impulse into objective work, a denial of all separation between the two worlds, a depreciation of the ethical and religious inner life of the soul, which had been developed in Christianity, but which now appears too insipid and feeble. If, now, these demands are satisfied in two opposite ways; if, on the one hand, the inner world does not, and cannot, tolerate anything outward, nor the outer world anything inward, if the craving for unity drives each of the life-currents to insist on its own exclusiveness, then no agreement between them is possible, and the movement of modern times is bound to be transformed into an incessant struggle: this is what has actually occurred.

At first the intellectual culture had the better of the struggle, not only because of the greatness of its cosmic philosophy and the penetrating power of its work, but also

because it seemed more capable of coming to an understanding with the traditional forms of idealism, and of making use of their forces. But while idealism thus found a support in history, naturalism was favoured by the immediate impressions of the real world. These impressions have constantly increased in strength, and have tended more and more to produce the conviction that the shaping of life from within is an audacious and indeed unsuccessful venture. But what has been most in favour of naturalism is the progressive spread of culture: an increasing number of men take an interest in, and in fact help to decide, ultimate questions, who are little affected by history and know hardly anything of the experiences which it records, and who therefore decide the great problems well or ill according to the immediate impressions of the present. And who can deny that our own age shows no powerful and strongly marked movement of an idealistic character? In the older forms of idealism we feel that

much is obsolete, and yet we are unable to draw the boundary line between what is obsolete and what is of permanent validity. Our age is by no means wanting in idealistic movements, but they are not co-ordinated into a whole, and therefore cannot inspire mankind to enthusiasm and sacrifice. On the other side stands naturalism with its rounded-off system, its appeal to the senses, its easily understood aims: is it to be wondered at if the main tendency of the age regards its triumph as already settled? The question is whether the judgment of the age has come to a decision which is finally valid, and whether philosophy can be content to acquiesce in it.

That philosophy cannot be content to do so is sufficiently proved by our survey of history. For however large a part of our spiritual achievements history showed to be problematic and transitory, yet it revealed powers and depths of life which belong to its essence and which may, of course, be denied by human opinion and inclination, but cannot be abol-

ished. The essential nature which life thus revealed gives us something to take hold of, and contains demands which must be satisfied if life is to attain anything more than a superficial and momentary satisfaction. Here, however, lies the rock on which naturalism makes shipwreck, here is the basis for the assertion that it will not be able to retain a permanent hold on humanity. That naturalism is in many respects incomplete, that it sets aside many problems as insoluble, cannot in the least degree be reckoned to its disadvantage or reproach, for this is a defect from which all systematizations of life have to suffer. It is a greater drawback that its development involves it in many contradictions, but such contradictions may be quietly ignored or simply endured. But the fatal thing is that it does not meet the claims which life, in accordance with its nature as unfolded by the movement of history, is bound to make, and in fact puts itself in direct opposition to the main tendency of these claims. However

much fluctuation, and even at times retrogression, the movement of history may exhibit, there can be no doubt that it has elaborated inner life to a continually increasing extent as opposed to the outer world, and has made this inner life continually more independent. A kind of reversal has been continually in progress by the transference to an ever greater extent of the centre of gravity from the outer to the inner. Naturalism itself, as a system of thought and a totality of life, bears witness to this superiority of the inner, for without this superiority the diversity of things could never have been co-ordinated, worked up, and experienced as a whole. But this inwardness, which has become independent, now claims full employment and satisfaction; if this claim is refused, all the rich diversity of inflowing impressions cannot prevent an emptiness, and an emptiness which in the end is bound to be felt. Naturalism, however, with its building up from the outside, offers no shred of substitute for this inwardness, but transforms the

whole of life into a sum of outward achievements. It is thus inevitable that it should be opposed by the desire of man for happiness, a desire which does not proceed from petty selfishness but from the inner necessity of our nature, from the craving after some meaning in our life and efforts.

If this destructive action of naturalism is not fully realized, it is owing to the fact that it usually supplements its deficiencies secretly by means of a stock of thoughts which belong to the world of idealism. Thus it is accustomed to hold fast to an ethical estimate of action; in practical life it usually retains without hesitation its hold on such things as duty and honour, justice and humanity, though in the world built by its own conceptions there is not the smallest place for them, and though from this point of view they must appear no less incredible than the crassest legends and miracles. But the more the consequences of naturalism are developed, the more intolerable must it find this dualism, the more inclined

will it be to reject these supplements as impossible, and the more plainly must its limits be seen and likewise its inability to guide life. Thus its own outer victory must destroy it inwardly: it is wrecked not on its contradiction of any traditions and institutions—no system of thought need fear such contradiction—but on its conflict with the inmost essence of human life, which in the end will ever prevail in spite of all aberrations of individuals and epochs.

But in a question like this the negation of one possibility does not alone involve, as in logic or mathematics, the victory of the other, but life may quite well remain in suspense between the two possibilities. Although we may be ever so certain that to transform life into mere relations and achievements directed towards the outer world is to destroy it spiritually, although the inability of naturalism to give a meaning and value to our existence may be perfectly clear, yet a life in the sense

of idealism, an inner world which should co-ordinate our efforts and direct them along one main line, is not yet won. We feel, rather, that our position is insecure and unsteady as soon as we seek a path from the general idea to the precise systematization. The work of the past, to whose strong influence we are all wittingly or unwittingly subject, presents us with three different ways of shaping life from within: the artistic method of antiquity, the ethico-religious method of Christianity, and the dynamic-intellectual method of modern times. Each of these, in its day, offered itself as the only one, or at any rate the supreme one. Now we find them all pressing upon us at once, while our vision has been made much too acute by historical and critical modes of thought for us to be blind to their great differences and glaring contrasts. But if it is impossible simply to combine them, each one of them displays truths that must not be lost, and thus successfully resists its own absolute negation. Indeed, in the midst of their strife,

they seem incapable of dispensing with each other's help: each contradicts the other and at the same time demands it.

If we abandon the artistic idealism of antiquity, with its power of shaping and ennobling life, it will be easy for our life in the midst of all its zealous activity to sink into a state of formlessness, uncouthness, and barbarism; so we obviously must preserve here a fundamental phenomenon of life. But, at the same time, not only the deep obscurity of the world and the severe conflicts in human life revealed by Christianity, but also the immeasurable capacity for increase which the modern period has proved to belong to human powers, forbids us to recognize as final a scheme of life so circumscribed and so instinct with the harmony of existence as that presented by the highest efforts of Greek creative activity. The depth of soul and the inner movement of life, the pervading influence of a world-embracing love, and the great seriousness attaching to moral decisions, which are characteristic features of

Christianity, cannot be surrendered or even minimized without impoverishing and lowering the level of life. But at the same time the increased psychical activity of the individual, as well as the greater breadth and freedom of life which we owe to the modern period, not only make the historical form of Christianity too narrow and too anthropomorphic for us, but also give rise to the strongest doubts as to the rights of a specifically religious system of life, which directs man's thoughts and efforts predominantly to an existence yet to come, and makes him live more for a better future than for the present. The particular character of the modern period, with its breadth and universality, its rousing work of thought, its increase of human capacity, its liberation of men's minds, may be ever so highly estimated, but we must not overlook the fact that not only were these characteristics bound to necessitate a constant supplementing of the older schemes of life, but also that their own development, with its call upon all our powers

and its awakening of unlimited claims, has conjured up enormous complications. In particular its intellectualism, for all its restless external activity, remains inwardly confined within rigid limits. The faith in reason and progress, with which the modern period began, has more and more faded away under the influence of these experiences: it no longer controls men's deepest convictions even where it still persists as an outward confession.

Hence at first sight everything is here in a confused whirl, conflicting movements intersect, and fill man with opposite emotions. Here he is to think highly, and there lowly, of himself; here with defiant self-assurance he is to subject the world to himself, there he is humbly to subordinate himself to it; here his activities and aspirations are restlessly directed towards externals, there he takes refuge in the still depths of his inner consciousness. How can a life that is full of so many contradictions co-ordinate its activities into one main direction, how can it make its assertion of the

existence of an independent inner world convincing, and bring it home to the mind? As the powers of life wear one another down, the inner world will more and more fade into a realm of shadows, and there will remain only an unstable subjectivity which yields to every stimulus. Such a subjectivity may be strong enough to keep naturalism at a distance; but it is far too weak to unfold a world of its own, to bring man to a condition of inner unity and mankind to a condition of inner solidarity, to combine all the forces of life into one great stream and thus give them security. We all know how at the present day such a lawless and unreal subjectivity comes forward as a true inwardness and usurps its rights.

But how can we escape from this precarious and, in the end, intolerable position? Perhaps we shall be led, if not to the goal, at least some distance along the road we are seeking, by the perception that all the older kinds of idealism rest on a presupposition, for which they do not seek any further foundation, but which

is not so self-evident as it professes to be. Everywhere, that is to say, certain developments and activities of the spiritual life are in question: a moulding activity, or the overcoming of an inner contradiction, or the increase of power without limit. That spiritual life exists is everywhere assumed, and no one troubles any more about it. Must not this presupposition be transformed into a problem by all the confusions and doubts which we feel so strongly at the present day? and, if we start with this problem, should not new light be cast upon life? Science has been often advanced by the fact that what earlier times regarded as settled and self-evident has later become transformed into a difficult problem. Perhaps it is the same in life; perhaps if we start further back we may have a right to hope for a more fertile development in the later stages.

We have dealt at length with the problem of spiritual life in various publications, and especially in the *Grundlinien einer neuen*

Lebensanschauung, and we must refer to these works for all details. But it is clear, without going more closely into the question, that in spiritual life we have to do, not with a mere addition to a life already existent, but with an essentially new life. Psychical life, which otherwise is merely subservient to, or accompanies, the process of nature, gains, when human life is at its highest—not when it only reaches the average—an independence and content of its own. It is something so new and so peculiar that it can be understood only as a new stage of reality, as the emergence of a depth of the world which was formerly hidden. For although this new life may appear only in the human sphere, its claim to form a new domain of existence as opposed to nature, and to introduce new realities and goods and assert them in opposition to those which reign in the natural order, would be absurd and hopeless from the start if it were a life which belonged to mere man and were ultimately bound up with the con-

ditions of his existence. Its cosmic ambition would be an audacious folly were it not that it had a cosmic life behind it by whose power it is driven forward.

That with the upgrowth of spiritual life man is raised into a new world and participates in the totality of its life, is something of which we can gain no assurance by any flight of speculation: conviction can come only from the fact that a life is developed which accomplishes the deliverance of man from the merely human, and, in doing so, by no means falls into the void. But such a development does appear in point of fact; indeed, it exhibits itself as the height of spiritual work both in the macrocosm and in the microcosm. What is genuine and essential in religion is not a petting and pampering of the mere man with his craving for happiness; it is a removal of him into infinity, eternity, perfection; it is the winning of a new, wider, and purer existence from a new world. Real morality does not consist in man's obeying commandments im-

posed upon him and playing the part of the honest citizen, but it demands a new world, a kingdom of justice and love, a new starting-point for life. Real knowledge is not an adjustment and accumulation of impressions, starting from man and directed towards human ends, but it is a penetration into the real nature of things and an inner expansion through participation in a wider life. Nor is that genuine art which ministers to the enjoyment or the interests of mere man, but only that which brings him into an inner relation to his surroundings and at the same time makes something different out of him.

Anyone who takes a general survey of all these points will feel no doubt that in the human sphere a new kind of reality emerges, a movement of the universe is set in motion. However far this new element may in appearance retreat into the background, in it alone lies all the meaning and value of human life, and so far it has succeeded in making its influence sufficiently felt to render impossible

a quiet acquiescence in the existing condition of things. From the standpoint of the new life this condition must appear as a confused medley of nature and spirit; in fact, it will seem to be a difficult and intolerable contradiction in that the spiritual, with all the superiority of its nature, is accustomed in our sphere to play the part of a mere accessory to nature, and, so far as it is developed at all, is drawn into the service of the merely human. In reality, the average culture treats the spiritual as a secondary matter and a mere means towards human well-being, but in words it proclaims that the spiritual is the main thing and a complete end in itself. Hence this culture acquires a character of incompleteness and falsity, and it is impossible for it to carry the spiritual life beyond individual phenomena to a stable and coherent system, and from vague outlines to a strongly marked form. Life is here wanting in real independence, and thus does not get beyond a half-life or phantom life.

But if a desire for real and genuine life now awakens—and the spirituality indwelling in man will always impel him in spite of all contradiction to seek such a life—it becomes clear that a movement in this direction cannot come from the chaos we have described, but demands an elevation above this, the winning of an independent standpoint, the development of a spirituality superior to this average routine. Only after the movement is firmly established can the spirituality which is latent in this average be thrown into relief, purified, and turned to account for the further development of the whole.

Endeavours of this kind may give rise to an idealism which is universal in its nature, because it makes it its task to appropriate not this or that point in the spiritual, but the spiritual itself. But at the same time this idealism, in its insistence on the reality of the spiritual life and on liberation from the merely human, prescribes a specific aim, which is able to co-ordinate all the diversity of these endeavours

and set them in due proportions. From this point of view the whole condition of culture will have to be submitted to an examination to ascertain how much of it is essentially spiritual in its nature and what belongs to the bustle of merely human activities. The individual systems of life of an idealistic nature must be taken up into this movement, into this struggle for independence of life and for the opening-up of a basal depth of reality. This universal idealism has to prove its right above all by showing that it is able to appreciate all these developments of life, to separate their permanent content, with its primary features, from their historical form, to confirm them in their own truth and provide against their lapse into the pettily human.

This system of life, which rests on an independent and essential inwardness, has above all an ethical character. And this is principally because, with this conviction, life does not run its course in quiet development, but contains in itself the necessity of a con-

version from appearance to reality, and therefore of a complete reversal; and this reversal, with its demand for a rise to independence, cannot possibly be a mere process occurring in man but must be his own act and deliberate choice. But at the same time this system leaves no doubt that the act we have described does not depend on the will and pleasure of the mere man, but that the action of each unit reaches back into the totality of the world and thereby involves a great responsibility. It is only a morality on such a basis which will as a general rule introduce life to its own height and truth; it will not make it petty and constrained, but greater, freer, and more stable, for it is incomparably more than a mere regulation of social life, accompanied as this latter is by reciprocal pressure and the danger of a self-complacent Pharisaism.

Religion also belongs essentially to the life which it is here sought to attain. If the independent spiritual life with its essential inwardness stands in sharp contrast to the

average condition of humanity, and cannot possibly spring from this condition, then it must be understood and recognized as the revelation of a new world. Therefore, all work for the inner elevation of man, all genuine spiritual culture, contains, although in a latent form, and even in direct opposition to the consciousness of those concerned, an acknowledgment of such a superior world and of its living presence in the human sphere. But the religious character of life attains a clearly elaborated form whenever the constraint and the disfigurement, to which spiritual life is subject in the human sphere, are clearly realized, but at the same time the maintenance and further deepening of spiritual life is regarded as a fresh manifestation of this superior world. A religion which is thus grounded in the whole of the spiritual life cannot strengthen the merely human element in man, with its vulgar greed for happiness; it cannot drive his life into that which is petty and narrow, but, rather, with the revelation of infinite life

it will free him from all paltry punctiliousness, and by giving him a share in the cosmic battle will lend him dignity and superiority to the world. On this view, too, the divine need not come to man from without, since it manifests itself sufficiently in the very process of life by the opening up of a new depth. At the same time thought and feeling will be directed not so much towards the Beyond and the future as towards a present which transcends time. It is then possible to bring a counteracting influence to bear with good results upon the opposition between, on the one hand, an inwardness that is withdrawn from the world and is indifferent or even hostile to sensible existence, and, on the other, the defeat of a too passively conceived spiritual by a sensible that is surreptitiously introduced.

Further, without the creative activity of art there can be no successful construction of an independent spiritual world in the human sphere, for this construction involves the severance of the subject from the confused

initial situation and a creative effort in contradistinction to it. Would not a movement of this kind fall into the void unless imagination went on in advance, giving form to the invisible and keeping it constantly present with insistent, rousing, and stimulating force? The importance of this is most clearly shown by the historical religions with their impressive pictures of new worlds, their pictures of the Kingdom of God and the last judgment, of the future heaven and earth, or else of the endless succession of worlds—pictures which sometimes inspired men with deep longing and sometimes filled them with horror and dread. But in all the departments of life no essential progress is possible unless imagination thus opens up the way; and the life of the individual needs it as well, for it is only when an ideal picture of itself is constructed and kept in mind that this life can enter upon an inner movement of ascent, and thereby rise superior to the dull routine of every day. An activity of an artistic nature is also in-

dispensable for the organization of what this inner ascent has enabled us to acquire. Such an activity alone can extend what has been seen on the heights to the whole breadth of life, and make what was at the beginning distant and strange in the end near and familiar. An artistic activity of this kind, which is grounded in the connections of spiritual reality, cannot be isolated in spite of all its independence of other departments of life, and cannot lead man on the road towards a feeble and unnerving æstheticism.

Science and the civilization based on it encompass us so obviously with their beneficial influences that no doubts of any kind can be admitted as to their significance. But that science is indispensable can also be fully recognized in connection with the very question of gaining a new coherent system in life, a self-centred reality, in opposition both to the soullessness of a mechanical nature and to the dark confusion of human existence. For what force can be found more suitable than

this, with its objective necessities, to deliver man from the pettily human and to lead the struggle against it; what force more suitable to raise life from the contingency of the temporary situation to that which is universal and above time; or what force more suitable than this, with its constructive use of leading thoughts, to develop inner connections of a systematic character? The liberating, elevating, transforming influence of science, its capacity for building up a world of thought-elements in opposition to that of sense and for enforcing objective necessities in opposition to the caprice of individuals, has been exhibited by the modern period with particular clearness and effectiveness. We cannot dispense with these services where it is a question of rising to self-activity and independence. But at the same time we shall be safe from over-estimating the value of science if we regard it as a member of a wider system within life, if we are convinced in particular that it has to gain its strongest driving force as also its special

differentiations from the whole of life, and that, on the other hand, if it is severed from life, its fundamental nature renders it very liable to be transformed into a tissue of abstract formulæ. The dangers of an intellectualistic ordering of life are plainly visible to us at the present day, and there is no lack of vigorous opposition. But this opposition will hardly attain to complete victory without a return to the roots of science, and the demonstration of its close connection with the whole of life. By this close connection it may appear to lose, but in reality it gains.

The different sides of the life which it is sought to attain, and the different lines of approach to it, are very easily brought into isolation, and indeed into conflict with each other. Owing to the limitations of human nature, individuals and periods, according to their special impressions and experiences, may give the first place to one or other of these aspects, and apply all their powers and faculties to further it: thus the ways divide

and the violent strife which rages throughout history becomes quite comprehensible. This strife will hardly come to an end; the task of men can only be in some way or other to rise superior to it and to counteract the threatened disintegration of life. But this is impossible until the different movements allow themselves to be encompassed by a totality of life and take the form of endeavours after one and the same goal. For this end, however, it is essential that our existing spiritual assets should go through a process of sorting and sifting, of clarifying and heightening: at every point it is necessary to look from the standpoint of the whole and to separate the spiritual content from its human trimmings. But however much toil and labour, strife and uncertainty, this involves, the general result can only serve to convince us of the reality of an inner life and an inner world, of the fact that man does grow beyond the stage of merely sensuous life. Just as the individual becomes certain of an inner task and an

independent psychical life principally through contradictions in his own nature, which he cannot well tolerate, so too for humanity the strength and intensity of the struggles to shape the content of life are the surest witness that it is here in reality a question of seeking and winning something, that some important process is going on in us, that it is not a case of mere vain pretensions and empty fancies. The doubts and struggles themselves make us feel with compelling power that we cannot give up an inner world, and that it is with the shaping of this world that our spiritual contest is principally concerned.

This transference of the inner realities to their true place behind the superficialities of the merely human is, further, the surest and indeed the only means of giving full recognition to the element of truth in naturalism without accepting its guidance. Many men, no doubt, are still extremely reluctant to recognize fully the historical development of man from animal beginnings, the slow emer-

gence of the spiritual in him, the strict subjection of all life to material conditions. Such a close connection of the spiritual with the natural is repugnant to them, because they believe that the spontaneity and independence of the spiritual are thereby endangered. But this danger can threaten only so long as the fate of the whole spiritual life is held to be bound up with human experience. But if it is once clearly realized that, however the spiritual may have arisen in man, in its world-character it cannot possibly have been in the last resort produced by him, but that, rather, we must recognize in the spiritual the appearance of a new stage of the world, then all its insignificance and subjection in the human sphere can in no way imperil its independence. On the contrary, this subjection to conditions, and indeed this weakness of the spiritual in the human sphere, can but strengthen the conviction that its roots strike deeper into the ground of reality.

At the same time our action will not be

able to treat the sensible and natural side of our existence as a secondary matter. Where nature ranks as a stage of reality, which remains even when the spiritual is developed, the power which this stage contains must be enlisted in the service of the life-process, in order that it may not become too weak. Not by withdrawing from nature, but only by overcoming, appropriating, and penetrating it can the spiritual life attain its full height and strength; only thus can life be brought from mere outline to the finished product. That which has done idealism, with its defence of an independent inner world, more harm than any attack from outside is the fact that it has often been intent upon offering a picture of reality which should be as smooth and pleasant as possible, and upon representing reason as in immediate control of reality. In doing so it became untrue, and lost its rousing and deepening force. But if, on the contrary, we are certain of an independent spiritual life, we can fully recognize the large

amount of obstinate matter-of-fact and blind irrationality in our world without necessarily becoming doubtful in any way as to our goals, or relaxing our efforts to reach them. For then our world signifies only a particular kind of being, with which the ultimate decision does not lie.

Anyone who takes all this into consideration will feel no doubt that our age has been set a great task with reference to this cardinal interest of human life. Some inwardness is indispensable; life is in danger of losing its equilibrium unless there is a central reality and a lofty goal to aid us in our resistance to the overwhelming pressure of the external world. Tradition with all its fulness does not supply this want; hence it is important to gain a new standpoint, to look the problems straight in the face, and to venture on ways of our own. If the present crisis has been occasioned less by the increase in importance of the outer world than by the uncertainty in which the inner world has become involved,

we are impelled to go deeper into ourselves and to discover new inner co-ordinations. Only in this way can we become equal to dealing with the complications, and again come to realize the meaning and value of our life. But how can we even strive after such goals without the help of philosophy? It is all the more called upon to exert itself here, because the solution of this problem is decisive as to its own rights and its own development. For to surrender the independence of an inner world is to surrender philosophy as well, while the more specific nature and relations of the inner world dictate to philosophy also the path which it is to pursue.

CHAPTER IV

The Problem of Truth

Under human conditions truth and happiness often seem to be irreconcilably at variance. In his striving after truth man finds his immediate existence too narrow and too petty: he desires to escape from this narrowness, and, passing from the subjective to the objective, to participate in the life of things and the whole of infinity. It seems that here the greatest of all deliverances is beckoning to him, the deliverance from all the troubled passions of self-will and the contingency attaching to the particular. A purer, nobler, infinite life here emerges, a life which even so moderate a thinker as Aristotle could declare to be more divine than human.

When he is inspired by such high endeavours man seems obliged to put his own subjective condition entirely in the background, and indeed to sacrifice it willingly where the service of truth demands such a sacrifice. It is quite otherwise with regard to the desire for happiness. Here everything which concerns and affects man, which moves him and drives him to action, is brought into relation with a central point in which his own life is co-ordinated into a whole. All his experience is measured and valued in reference to this; from this source love and hate, fire and passion, stream out to all infinity. That which can accomplish nothing in these directions is counted as useless ballast and may well be left on one side: whatever, on the contrary, is left, must be strengthened from this source. Hence in the case of happiness the subject takes the first place, in the case of truth the object; there we have a vigorous concentration, here an unlimited expansion, there an expression, here a repression of vital

emotion. From the point of view of the desire for happiness the struggle for truth may easily appear cold and lifeless, while from the point of view of the latter the former may appear narrow and selfish.

It must not be thought that this opposition is entirely external to philosophy, which, however appealed to, decides the question in favour of truth and against happiness, but it extends into philosophy and produces two fundamentally different types of thought. There are two eminent examples which bring this contrast before us in a palpable form, those of Augustine and Spinoza. A fervent desire for happiness impels and animates both the striving and the thought of Augustine: it is only this desire, only an overpowering "I will" that leads him through all doubts and makes him equal to dealing with all obstacles. That which he apprehends he insists on mastering and transmuting into his own life, and even in what is apparently most distant he sees only the relation to the condition of

the subject, and therefore enfolds it with his emotions. Hence for him everything falls under an alternative, good or evil, day or night, salvation or perdition: here all attempt at mediation becomes an intolerable weakness. Spinoza, on the contrary, attacks the importation of human feelings and passions into the universe as a gross misrepresentation, indeed a complete falsification. He regards it as important to free the ordinary representation of the world from them, and to fill our thought and life entirely with the content of things. Contemplation unmixed with volition and desire here becomes the acme of life: it teaches us to look at things "under the form of eternity," to fit every unit into all-embracing connections, not to weep or laugh at events, but to understand them. All true greatness here consists not in wishing to be anything particular for oneself, but in seeking to be entirely absorbed in the infinite: "he who truly loves God cannot desire that God should love him in return."

Who is right, and whose ideal must rank as the higher? For both cannot well be co-ordinated without further trouble, considering that the directions in which they point are so sharply divergent; hence we cannot avoid deciding between them. But at the same time it seems impossible to renounce either of them entirely; rather, each apparently requires to be supplemented to a certain extent by the other side, the sharp divergence must admit somehow or other of being transformed into a convergence. For the truth from which we promise ourselves so much, and which requires so much work and zeal, must surely be somehow linked with our own nature, and must in some way or other be auxiliary to our self-preservation. Otherwise, how could it move and affect us so strongly? On the other hand a happiness which did not go beyond the condition of the mere subject, which did not in any way widen our sphere of life and make more out of us, could hardly satisfy a reasonable being; it would not be

worth the trouble which it cost. Thus it appears that in the struggle for truth a desire for happiness, though diminished in intensity, is at work, but that this desire itself cannot dispense with that inner purification which the struggle for truth promises. Hence we are impelled to inquire how far an approach is possible, and whether the two aims may not be taken as opposite poles of a single life. But for this purpose every movement will have to be examined for itself.

The conception of truth is among those which at first sight seem simple and indeed almost self-evident, but which become complicated in proportion as it is sought to gain a more exact idea of them. When we speak of truth in everyday life it is merely a question of comparing an image, an opinion, an assertion of ours with the facts of the case to which they relate. So far as these facts lie within the realm of experience such a comparison gives hardly any trouble; truth can

here be regarded without hesitation as the agreement of our ideas with objects (*adæquatio intellectus et rei*). But man is driven beyond this conception of truth by his spiritual nature, which implants in him a capacity to stand outside the connected series of phenomena, to reflect on the world and his relation to it. He develops a thought-world of his own, distinguishes it from the world of things, and cannot help asking how the one whole is related to the other, and how far, in what his thought makes out of things, their own being is present. In this connection it seems as if man were set a great task, as if it were a question of piercing through an initial mist and beholding things in their unclouded reality. At the same time life seems to rise superior to the varying opinions of individuals and to attain inner stability. But, however great the rewards which await the performance of this task, is it not in itself an impossible one to fulfil, does it not contain a contradiction? We cannot well keep things

at a distance from us and at the same time draw them back to us, and the conception of truth as a copy of reality, as an agreement of our ideas with a world of things that exists alongside them, needs only to be more exactly thought over to be proved to be untenable. For, assuming that man stands alongside things, and things make themselves known to him, would they not be compelled to adapt themselves to his nature and thereby become something different from what they are in themselves? The gap, and at the same time the impossibility of immediately bridging it over, must be all the more strongly felt the more independent the inner life is made by the progress of culture. But even if things could make themselves known to man in their true nature, how would it be possible to gain any certainty of it, since we cannot transfer ourselves to a third standpoint and from there compare our representation of things with the things themselves? But if, in spite of the obvious impossibility of this solution, a desire

for truth persists, if it impels man with overpowering force to seek a thought and life which proceed from the All, then an essential change in our relation to reality will become necessary; such a change alone can give us any hope that the apparently impossible may yet in some way or other become possible. Hence the work of philosophy has been from the beginning concerned with the discovery and development of a relation which should overcome the contradiction: each of the main epochs has dealt with this question in its own characteristic way, there has been no great thinker who has not attempted ways of his own in treating of the problem; in fact, it has been at this point more than anywhere else that both the possibility of a philosophy and its fundamental character have been decided. But the efforts which are made at the present day are strongly influenced by this past work; hence we shall be compelled to exhibit it in its main features in order to take the bearings of our own position.

In connection with this problem Greek antiquity followed its usual course and did not break away abruptly from the naïve view, but developed it and raised it to the spiritual level. That a universe is present and encompasses man with its sure operations is universally presupposed, and, however much opinion may change in other respects, this presupposition is not called in question. Hence spiritual work finds its main task in developing to full clearness the relation of man to the world: here the goal of the struggle for truth is the philosophical knowledge, the spiritual appropriation of the world. The chief epochs have endeavoured to effect this purpose in different ways, and the course of these attempts displays a typical character, so that it tends to repeat itself in later times. First of all, the predominant thought is that of a community of nature between the universe on the one hand and man and his thinking on the other; then the two fall apart and the subject must concern himself with finding definite

marks of truth in himself; finally, thought is assigned the capacity of shaping itself into the world and comprehending the opposition of subject and object.

In the classical period of Plato and Aristotle the influence is still felt of the personification of the environment which belongs to the naïve way of thinking and which pictures man's relation to the world as an intercourse with his like. For in spite of the decay of that anthropomorphism which treats things as big or little men, they retain an inner life and capacity for effort, and the same forces which move our life seem also to govern the universe. They do not seem to be imported by man into the universe, but rather to be communicated to him from the universe which encompasses him. It is only because of this inner affinity, or rather relatedness, that man can hope to grasp the universe in his thought. The process of knowledge is the bringing into contact of two correlatives which are from the beginning destined for each other, but must come

to terms before they can attain complete union. This union is attained in intuition, which is here closely related to love. It is to this stage above all that the words of the poet apply:—

> "Were not the eye itself a sun,
> No sun for it could ever shine:
> By nothing godlike could the heart be won,
> Were not the heart itself divine." [1]

No doubt on this view truth is still an agreement of the subject with the object, of thought with being; but since philosophical knowledge is nothing but the development of the community of nature between the spirit and the universe, no complication arises from this conception. It is not inconsistent with the most joyous confidence of ability to grasp the complete truth of things, and to participate in the true life of the universe. Men may hope to appropriate the whole depth of things since no cleft has yet opened between the activity and the being of things, but, rather, their

[1] Goethe, *Zahme Xenien*: *cf.* Plotinus, *Enneads*, i. 6.

whole being is present in their activity. On this conception thought is clearly enough separated from all merely sensuous perception, but it takes up into itself a certain objectivity, a plastic form, and thus acquires a certain affinity to such perception. Scientific work is itself a kind of artistic moulding, an appropriation and inner revivifying of things, a co-ordination in thought of the manifold into a unity, a transformation of the chaos of sensuous impressions into a well-ordered cosmos: it is at the same time a joyous raising of the whole of human nature to a higher level.

Just as in the case of Plato all this stands in immediate connection with the whole of the personality, so here the artistic and plastic character of thought is still more strongly marked. When scientific investigation becomes independent in the hands of Aristotle this artistic character tends to fade out of sight, but it by no means entirely disappears. There remains a close connection of human life with the universe, and unwearying

efforts are directed towards transforming the world into a web of inner unities, ends, and forces, and thereby bringing it closer to the spirit of man and making it transparent to his intellect. Innumerable threads are spun between man and his environment, in fact a vigorous articulation, a systematic organization of the whole of reality is attained. But as the system settled down into greater clearness there is no longer any possibility of concealing that anthropomorphism which the whole, with all its greatness of achievement, involved. It was bound to seem especially dangerous just because it was hidden, and men could not permanently fail to notice that a great deal of what was here offered as explanation was nothing more than an image and similitude. At the same time the whole was bound to be rejected because felt as an intolerable mingling of fact and image, as well as a transference to objects of what is merely subjective. This in particular was the case at the beginning of the modern period with

Scholasticism, and all the more because the latter held fast to the forms of Aristotle without being able to retain his spirit and the inner connections of his thought. But already in antiquity the increasing severance of man from the world drove the struggle for truth beyond the classical solution and compelled it to seek new paths.

One of these new paths was attempted by the Stoa. Even the Stoics do not doubt that the world exists and that man belongs to it, but for them the close connection between the two has been loosened. They make the subject their starting-point and thence seek to gain enlightenment as to what may be regarded as real and true. Much zeal is expended in ascertaining definite marks which teach men to distinguish genuine knowledge of things from mere imagination. Investigation does not here so much enter into the life and activity of things as sketch certain fundamental features of the whole and make men believe in them. At the same time the

close alliance between philosophy and the individual sciences, which distinguishes the work of Aristotle, comes to an end, and the different sciences go their own ways. But to make up for this, life in the human sphere is investigated more closely and made deeper; in particular, it is when his ethical task is clearly thrown into relief that man believes he is winning an inner connection with reality and an assured truth. The truth that appears in this ethical sphere is confirmed by importing the whole personality into it: the maintenance of knowledge becomes itself a valiant action. But the attempt to reconcile this knowledge completely with the whole of the universe does not succeed: the world which stands alongside man is predominantly of a physical and logical character; if a doubt should arise the sphere of ethical life may easily be isolated and appear uncertain: but this also shakes man's faith in truth. The problems and contradictions which are involved in the Stoic doctrine have been very clearly emphasized

by Scepticism, whose achievements have been far too little appreciated by the moderns. When the Sceptics saw that there was a rigid division between subject and object, doubt was bound to extend further and further until every avenue to truth seemed barred to man.

But the modern period was not the first to oppose this division; the Greek world had already done so, principally in the cosmic speculation of Plotinus. It is here held as a truth beyond doubt that a knowledge of things existing outside thought is an absolute contradiction; and thus, if all knowledge which deserves the name of knowledge is not to disappear, things must be compelled to take their place within the world of thought. But this cannot be done unless thought makes itself the object of knowledge and thereby overcomes the division, in the sense that knowledge is nothing but a self-cognition of thought. Then investigation had only to bring into emphatic prominence this activity of thought

and to express in terms of it all the data of experience. Plotinus having set about doing this with vigorous boldness and on the grand scale, discovered in thought the essential independence of life and made this into the soul of all reality. There is here unfolded a vision of things from within outwards, from the whole to the part; all reality is set in flux, its different realms become stages in an all-embracing movement. Since it is an essential unity which underlies all diversity, the apprehension of unity is the principal task of knowledge, unity is what it strives to see before all else at every step. In this connection the thought of infinity arises, a thought which embraces all oppositions and indeed reduces them to harmony. Thus the world is coordinated in a magnificent way and filled with inner life; the dependence of one thing on another, the permeating stream of life, the necessity and importance of the thought of unity, are enforced with peculiar power. But this is accomplished by sacrificing all the vivid-

ness of the concrete and the particular, by transforming reality into a realm of logical relations, which would have constituted a tissue of mere forms and formulæ were it not that a strong impulse of an emotional nature had given the whole a deeply religious tone and thus infused life into it. But when this tendency prevails, knowledge, just when it reaches its greatest height, must exchange its character of scientific insight for that of obscure feeling, of a freely ranging emotional mood. Although it may still retain some truth, this species of knowledge has given up the attempt to ascertain the detailed content of the world and has renounced the form of science.

We thus find a wealth of movement even within antiquity, and we recognize that it is a gross error to extend the particular characteristics of the classical period to the whole of antiquity. But still throughout all its phases it did retain one common feature, viz., that belief in the world's existence was not shaken,

and the relation of man to it was regarded as the main problem; it was in close connection with this that thought maintained its position as the guide of life. When Christianity made the heart and core of life to consist in the relationship to God, and indeed to a God who is not so much indwelling in the world as superior to it, this was bound to produce essential changes both in the aim and in the character of the struggle for truth. The main concern of knowledge was now to work out the relations between God and man; but this was a question on which the work of science, and indeed the human faculties at large, were unable to give definite information: for this purpose it needed a communication on the part of the deity, a divine revelation, "about God it is possible to learn only from God" (Athenagoras). From man, however, a docile acceptance of this revelation, an unconditional faith, is demanded: hence faith and not knowledge is regarded as the way to the truth that decides the salvation

of man. Faith is represented as having the advantage over knowledge not only in its greater certainty but also in its greater intelligibility; even the simplest working-man may have his share in faith while those who attain to knowledge are never very many. The truth, however, which is attained by this path has for its content great world-events of a moral nature; in particular, everything centres round the problem of man's revolt and deliverance, everything else becomes a mere setting; according to Augustine it is only of God and the soul that it is necessary to know anything. While the sphere of human thought is thus confined within the narrowest limits, there arises at the same time a far-reaching change in the general outlook on reality, since the totality of the world is now regarded as resting upon a free personal Being, and as being governed by ethical tasks. Hence man with his ethical strivings may know himself to be bound up with the deepest foundations of reality; he stands at the centre

of the world and may be absolutely convinced of the truth of the content of faith. Indeed, for the participators in this ethico-religious movement the whole world is opened up. Things seem to express their deepest being in what they accomplish for the ethico-religious task. Where they cannot work directly in its service, they do so in image and similitude, and thus even the figures and processes of nature become symbols of what is contained in sacred history.

But the conception of faith, which is here the foundation of all certainty, contains difficulties which first give rise to many complications within the sphere of Christian thought, and finally even threaten to convulse it. It cannot well be denied that there is a department of knowledge additional to that of faith; then the question becomes, how are the two related to one another? It is a question which can receive, and has received, different answers. In particular there comes into view a pervading opposition between a

universalistic and a positivistic mode of thought: the one seeks to bring faith and knowledge into friendly alliance, the other to keep them as sharply apart as possible. According to which conception is adopted, each of the two departments will take on a different form. One means of seeking a combination of the two is to maintain that knowledge is a preparation for, and a lower stage in, what comes to its highest perfection in faith. But, in spite of this subordination, owing to its close connection with divine truth knowledge is directed towards essential problems; it acquires a speculative character. But the content of faith, however superior it may be, is seized upon, worked over, and illuminated by thought; faith appears as another and higher kind of knowledge, which is only possible by communication from God, but it still remains a kind of knowledge. It is this mode of thought which finally gained the ascendancy in the Roman Catholic Church, in which at the present day it retains an unas-

sailable supremacy. In the middle ages, however, it had to wage a hard struggle with the other type, which has predominantly gained the adherence of ecclesiastical Protestantism. To the latter type the above-described mode of reconciliation seems to endanger the characteristic nature of faith, the specific character of the facts, and the immediateness of the conviction. For the preservation of these it seems that the sharpest possible separation is necessary, an "either . . . . or" takes the place of the "both . . . . and." Faith thus loses its intermixture with speculation: but the less it is regarded as capable of proof, the more it becomes a matter of free decision; it is regarded as an act of the will and is declared to be a "practical attitude" (*habitus practicus*). The facts on which it is based present themselves as pre-eminently historical in character and insist on being received as such. Knowledge, however, is kept at a distance from these fundamental questions so far as possible, and is

directed towards the world of nature; it becomes thereby much more closely connected and concerned with experience. This opposition between a universalistic and a positivistic, an intellectualistic and a voluntaristic, mode of thought, divides men to the present day, and we do not see how it can be resolved within this range of ideas. Its deepest root lies in the fact that Christianity insists at the same time on being an historical fact and on having a universal validity; and according as one or other of these claims comes into prominence, the mode of thought will assume this or that form.

Still more difficult than this problem of the relation between faith and knowledge is the complication in the conception of faith itself. From the beginning faith strove to be something more than knowledge—a claim which it could justify only if it proved that it sprang from a greater depth of the soul; it carried out, or at any rate attempted to carry out, this justification by putting itself forward as

a manifestation and expression of the whole nature, as a purely inward matter entirely dependent on free decision. But the willingness to receive a divinely revealed truth, and the resolution not to be led astray from allegiance to it by any misgivings of reason, have a necessary presupposition; the divine origin of the doctrine in question must be exempt from all doubt, infallible testimony must assure us of it. But only science can examine whether such testimony is really available, and hence it seems that an act of knowledge must precede faith. The misgiving which results from this would be more easily removed if it were a question of something which arose in the life of the individual and could prove itself immediately by its elevating influence: but it is here a question of facts in the history of the world, which lie beyond the life of the individual and have first to be imparted to him. How can faith in such facts prove that it has an unassailable right? Roman Catholicism has supposed this difficulty overcome by its

assertion that the Church has a teaching office entrusted to it by God ; but this assertion has first to be proved, and the study of history shows that there are very weighty objections to it. In any case the decision of the question lies with science; and this shows that the foundation of faith is dependent on the very thing above which it strove to raise man. At the average level of life faith is thus nothing more than a docile acceptance of what the Church brings forward as truth, which is here guaranteed by tradition and authority. If, in opposition to this, Protestantism represented faith as arising immediately in the individual, the presupposition was that the facts which form its basis are accessible to every individual and must be immediately self-evident to him. We cannot doubt to-day that the matter is by no means so simple. According to the form which the question has recently taken, it is sought to attain certainty of faith principally by a combination of psychical experiences and historical facts; psychology and history are to

work together towards the same goal. But each of these has had its credibility seriously shaken by modern investigation; and the combination of two uncertain quantities can never by any possibility produce a certainty. Thus at the present day faith, which was to relieve man of all doubts, has itself become an object of doubt; its power of conviction is limited to a sphere within which man feels himself encompassed by a clearly defined religious world, certain and self-evident, which makes both the existence and the proximity of the Deity as obvious to him as his own existence. If this world falls into discredit, indeed if it loses in any degree the naïve certainty which it possessed for the men of the middle ages, faith ceases to be a sure foundation for truth and itself becomes a difficult problem.

The more the modern period has developed an independent character the more has the specifically religious conduct of life retreated into the background and had its presuppositions shaken. The first result is a great

uncertainty as regards the problem of truth. Christianity has torn man away from the coherences of the world which encompassed him in antiquity, and the increased independence of the soul forbids a simple return. But he is no longer certain even of the Deity; in any case his relation to the Deity no longer controls the whole of life. In this situation where can he now turn to find truth, and what meaning can this conception still retain? In accordance with the experiences which we have described man can seek truth nowhere else but in himself; his own life must possess a depth which even for himself at first lies in a dim and distant background; with the full appropriation of this depth, however, he may hope to discover a world in himself, or rather he may himself grow into a world. The object then to be aimed at is a transference of life, not into something which exists outside us or above us, but into something which belongs to us, but which can become completely our own life only by a vigorous trans-

formation, and indeed revolution. Reality is not here found already existing, but it has to be built up from within: truth is thus a striving of life towards itself, a seeking for its own being. Hence it cannot be the agreement with a given reality: it becomes an agreement with itself, a self-co-ordination of a life which becomes independent and raises itself to a higher level, instead of remaining disintegrated and constrained. Its verification can only lie in the fact that, by embracing it, the whole of existence is transformed into spontaneous life, raised to an essentially higher level, and at the same time united into a whole of creative effort which moulds reality.

Here the main problem is to find the point where a spontaneous and creative life springs up in man as the deepest thing in his own nature. According to the form which this life takes, different forms will be assumed by reality and truth; but that such a life is attainable in some way or other is the common presupposition of that faith in reason which

pervades the creative efforts of the modern period and is enunciated with particular clearness in the works of its leading thinkers. The reason which is immanent in the human race must now take the place of the universe and the Deity. This, too, is common to all attempts, viz., that the movement does not proceed from a pre-existing world towards man, but from man towards a world which has first to be constructed. This movement draws everything into itself which at the beginning lies outside it; it tolerates nothing which does not conform to the necessities indwelling in it; everything previously existing must fit in with and accommodate itself to these necessities, or it can no longer maintain its position. It is evident how great a change comes over human activity as compared with the older way, how much it gains in independence, how much more active and productive it becomes, but at the same time how much more restless and critical. In moulding the world it will insist on developing things from

their first beginnings and at the same time on gaining control over them: this it is which principally determines the character of modern science, and it is also the impelling force towards a complete renewal of human existence.

The question as to where such a life emerges in man is now closely connected with the attempt, which has been previously discussed, to find in thought the persistent power that is able to hold together existence, which otherwise strives to diverge, and to gain a spiritual mastery over it. The predominant tendency is first of all to declare that thought is that spontaneous creative effort which raises man by himself above the pettily human and leads him to truth by enabling him to participate in the life of the world. It was thought in particular which, throughout the centuries, undertook and carried through the working out of objective necessities and wide complexes in opposition to the narrowness and constraint of the pettily human. In this movement it raised itself more and more

freely above the immediate existence of man, co-ordinated itself more firmly on its own basis, and took up into itself to a continually increasing extent whatever confronted it as an independent world. In this advance of thought three chief stages can be distinguished; the Enlightenment (Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz), the critical philosophy (Kant), and constructive speculation (Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel).

When the Enlightenment took the thinking subject as the starting-point of the struggle for truth, it would have gained very little by doing so if it had not discovered in this subject a definite content and a moving force. It found these in the "innate ideas," the "eternal truths," which seemed to form an absolutely certain original endowment of the human spirit. When these truths unfold themselves, seize upon the surrounding world and shape it conformably to their own demands, a realm of reason arises and vouchsafes man an apparently universally valid and

unassailable truth. But neither the representation of nature nor the sphere of man can reach the state of truth except by toilsome labour of an intellectual nature. The object to be aimed at is a thorough purgation and sifting, which must get rid of everything that refuses to be illuminated by thought, while everything that stands the test is more effectively revivified, and more firmly co-ordinated. This gives rise to natural science, with the exactitude of its mathematical methods, and also to a culture based on reason, which makes a problem out of everything handed down by historical tradition, and lets nothing pass which cannot clearly and distinctly prove its rights at the bar of reason. This attempt, however, derives its self-confidence and its power chiefly from the conviction that reason is not a matter of mere man, but controls the universe; hence what man recognizes as truth can have a limitless validity beyond him; he himself, however, gains a high life-task and a com-

pletely satisfying happiness by participating in this universally valid truth and in the building up of a kingdom of reason. Thus Leibniz is of opinion that the whole earth "cannot serve our true perfection unless it gives us opportunity of finding eternal and universal truths, which must be valid in all worlds, indeed in all periods, and, in a word, with God Himself, from whom they continually proceed." Both with Leibniz and in the Enlightenment generally, faith in the possession of universally valid truth rests on the conviction that the human reason is grounded in a divine world-encompassing reason. It was sought first of all to find a basis for this conviction in close connection with the traditional transcendent conception of God; faith in the veracity of God may then enable us to trust our own reason with complete confidence if it conscientiously observes the rules prescribed to it. Spinoza, however, with his philosophy of immanence, goes so far as to conceive that a cosmic

thought is immediately present in us, that it is not so much we who think as it which thinks in us; the only important point, therefore, is to make sure of such a cosmic thought, and we can do so, according to Spinoza, if we free our intellectual work from the influence of human conditions and aims, and allow it to be determined purely by the inner necessities of thought itself. For what makes the usual representation of the world inadequate and erroneous is that man is treated as the centre and goal of all reality, that in particular the oppositions which belong merely to human modes of feeling, such as the antithesis of good and bad, beautiful and ugly, etc., are imported into the universe, and have grossly distorted its image. The first condition of truth is, therefore, a modest self-repression on the part of man, a willing submission to the necessities of things as thought reveals them; man must remove the centre of gravity of his own being from the confused whirl of the passions into a passion-

less thought, into a contemplation of things which is unmixed with volition and desire. Pure thought of this nature can place man in the stream of a cosmic life, deliver him from everything that is pettily human, and by the opening up of an eternal and infinite life, vouchsafe him complete rest and blessedness.

But, however high may be the position which Spinoza thus assigns to thought, and however strongly he represents it as self-moving and progressing in accordance with its own necessities, he does not deprive it of all relation to objects existing outside itself; he holds fast to the position that, while thought unfolds its own nature and necessities, it corresponds at the same time to a being which exists alongside it; in place of agreement we have here a parallelism of thought and being, and it seems thus to become possible that one and the same fundamental process of the universe should embrace both series and come to expression in them. But, on this solution, not only is the above

presupposition of an all-embracing world-basis open to attack, but also the relation between the two series leads to the gravest complication. It must at once arouse misgivings that Spinoza nowhere puts the two series on the same level but always subordinates one to the other; either thought becomes a mere mirroring of nature, whose laws thus widen till they become laws of the universe, or thought forms the core of reality and nature is nothing more than its manifestation and environment. But doubt cannot be suppressed on the further question as to whether, if the two sides are incommensurable, the idea of a parallelism is not an absolutely unthinkable thought, whether it is not essentially self-contradictory. But whatever doubts of this description may arise, they cannot obscure the greatness and inevitability of Spinoza's endeavour to discover a cosmic nature in man himself, to distinguish in him the merely human from the cosmic; at least we do not see how the modern man could find his way to truth by any other path.

But was Spinoza right in placing this cosmic nature solely and entirely in intellectual activity, and in imagining that every other kind of life ought necessarily to be degraded to a lower stage? In this way he reached only a reality of logical forms and formulæ, whose emptiness and soullessness must have been immediately evident, were it not that a mystic and religious intuition, entirely different in its nature, had infused life and warmth into the whole. In spite of the vigorous energy of his thought in certain directions, there is no other philosopher who, in the fundamental texture of his system, is so compound of contradictions as the thinker who is praised by many as the supreme example of the quest for unity.

The struggle for truth reaches a new stage with Kant. He is the first to recognize clearly that truth, in the sense of the agreement of thought with an existence external to it, is an absolute absurdity. But since at the same time the existence of some truth or other is

insisted upon with the utmost vigour, the conception of truth must undergo essential modifications; in reality a complete revolution is brought about in the relation between thought and being. It is now taught, not that thought has to conform to being but that being has to conform to thought, that is, we are acquainted with reality only so far as things enter into the forms of our intellectual organization; truth thus ceases to be for us the knowledge of things, and becomes the self-knowledge of the human spirit, which prepares for itself a world of its own—acting, it must be admitted, on an impulse independent of itself. This self-knowledge, however, surpasses everything which earlier epochs possessed of a like kind, and gains an incomparably richer content through the coming to light of an inner structure, a comprehensive web of spiritual life, in the course of that construction of a world. In the gaining of this knowledge there arises a new kind of investigation, the transcendental, which is concerned with the

inner possibility of knowledge, as opposed to the empirico-psychological method, which treats of its origin and growth in the individual man. Our view of reality is thereby fundamentally transformed, for henceforth all the coherence which it presents, in particular all the assertions which it includes about ultimate grounds, have to be regarded not as belonging to reality itself but as imported into it by man. Thus man in his struggle for truth does not transcend himself, he does not reach in knowledge a point where a universal life springs up in him, but remains always confined to his own circle of thought, the contents of which cannot be universally valid, since they have arisen under special conditions and have not proceeded from an original creation. For Kant regards it as beyond question that human thought is non-creative.

But if the Kantian movement from the object to the subject thus puts human knowledge on a much lower level and threatens to make truth merely relative, it brings us into

an incomparably happier position in the domain of the practical reason, in morality. For here, according to Kant, the subject can rise to creative activity, eliminate everything specifically human, and thereby press forward to an absolute truth. Hence the thinker has no doubt that the ultimate meaning of the world is moral, and that man, by participation in it, attains a universally valid truth, a superhuman life, and at the same time an incomparable greatness and dignity. He reaches these heights, indeed, only in this special direction, and not so much by scientific knowledge as by an inner appropriation which is of the nature of faith, and which cannot be forced on anyone, but requires a free recognition, an inward up-striving of life. Hence this philosophy does not by any means fail to transform pre-existing reality and to grasp a cosmic nature in man, and thus possesses a metaphysics, but of a kind completely different from all earlier systems.

The Kantian philosophy forms the beginning

of a new epoch in the struggle for truth both in negation and in affirmation. The impossibility of the old conception of truth is clearly and cogently demonstrated, and at the same time the philosophical is finally distinguished from the naïve treatment of the problem. All immediate connection of thought with things disappears, and there is a simultaneous disappearance of the capacity of thought to reveal to man by freely ranging speculation a realm of universally valid truth; at the same time the view of the world is freed from the deeply rooted confusion of subjective and objective which had hitherto prevailed. But if man thus loses the connection with a surrounding world, he gains in exchange a new world in his own being, and the very limitation of knowledge seems to make it possible, this ethical turn having been given to philosophy, to put the struggle for truth on a new basis, which is simpler, surer, and more fruitful than any of its earlier forms. The struggle for truth is here thoroughly purged from all mere intel-

lectualism, and indeed the conception of truth is itself deepened.

But the obstinate strife over the interpretation of Kant soon proved that these changes did not provide any final solution but gave rise to new problems; this is also proved by the fact that the movement of philosophy so quickly went beyond Kant. Can the subject be raised, as is here the case, so as to become a texture of inner life, and yet at the same time be bound in knowledge to an unfathomable world? Is it possible to lift the special domain of morality above the rest of life to a condition of complete independence, creative activity, and absolute truth? Will not this new life either draw the other up to itself or else sink down to the level of the rest, with its subjection and its merely human character? Will the cleavage between the theoretical and the practical reason, with the conflicting emotions to which it exposes man, be permanently endurable? So much is certain; from the standpoint of history it is clear that Kant did

not provide a final solution, which brought peace and union, but that he gave rise to a powerful movement and an enormous amount of contention.

We know that it was in the first place the craving for a more effective unity in the world of thought which drove effort into new channels. Thought, which with Kant was so sharply separated from the world, now becomes the workshop in which the whole of reality is created; it is vigorously thrown into relief against merely human conditions, and thus grows to be a world-process which drives forward all being by its own movement, fashions all that is apparently alien to it into its own possession, and proves its rights not by any sort of external verification but by its inner mastery of the whole. This movement which commences in Fichte with directive force and fervid zeal, reaches its consummation and its ripest development in Hegel. Thought is here raised entirely above the mere subject, it has for its vehicle the work

of society throughout history, which work is itself thereby co-ordinated and spiritualized. The motive power of the process is contained in the fact that thought produces contradictions out of itself and overcomes them, and that it is thereby driven further and further until it has finally assimilated the whole range of existence and at the same time admitted it to its own truth. Since man can identify himself completely with this movement, this self-unfolding of spiritual life, if he vigorously rejects all his narrow opinions and self-willed striving, he seems here to participate in the full and complete truth: nowhere else in the whole course of history do we meet with so joyous and proud a feeling of the possession of truth. Our world of thought, however, undergoes a radical change of condition when it is attempted to carry out this undertaking, in such wise that all the diversity of things is united to form a single structure, everything which is apparently isolated is brought into relation with everything else, everything that

is at rest is set in active motion, all mere matter-of-fact is illuminated by logic and rationalized.

This achievement as a whole has resulted in a vast increase of spiritual capacity, which cannot simply disappear. But as a definitive solution of the problem of truth it was bound before long to meet with opposition. It involved the assumption that the spiritual life of humanity is spiritual life pure and simple, absolute spiritual life, and it thus exaggerated human capacity in a way that became intolerable, especially to the nineteenth century, with its growing recognition of the subjection of man to wider systems. Further, it could not accomplish this transformation of reality into a process of thought without either transforming it into a realm of mere shadows and categories, or else essentially supplementing it from a richer world of thought and so leaving the path upon which it had entered. We know how suddenly the whole structure collapsed, and this precisely because the pro-

cess of thought was unable to maintain its superiority over the subject, because the subject violently appropriated the increased mobility of thought, and consequently gave rise to an unlimited subjectivism, which contains no trace of any higher truth common to all men.

Thus with regard to the problem of truth we now find ourselves in an extremely uncertain and confused position. The movement of history has made an irreparable breach with the naïve conception of truth: it has raised claims to which our capacities do not seem equal, but which we cannot renounce. It is true that the modern period shows no lack of attempts to minimize these claims and to find some sort of truth without metaphysics. Thus Positivism transforms knowledge into a mere determination and description of the relations of things, which in their own nature are absolutely inaccessible to us; thus Pragmatism transforms knowledge into a mere means and instrument of human well-

being. But we are impelled beyond such limitations not merely by the persistence of theory, which seeks to invent some "metaphysics" or other for any given existence, but also by the irresistible power of man's innate spirituality. That we are not a mere constituent in a web of relations of things is sufficiently proved by the very fact that we are able to consider our relationship to our environment, apprehend it as a whole, and recognize the relations as relations. But as soon as we convince ourselves that behind the sphere of our knowledge there still lies an unattainable world, we cannot help feeling that what we have attained is unsatisfying as belonging to the mere surface of things. And what would be fairly tolerable as a limitation of thought becomes absolutely unendurable as an ultimate limitation of life. For here, where it is a question of arousing and co-ordinating all our powers, it is impossible to renounce ultimate goals, and therefore the consciousness that, with all our toil and labour,

we can never penetrate beyond the surface of things to their fundamental nature, is bound to produce an unspeakable emptiness in which no nature of any force can finally acquiesce. Was it by chance that Comte himself in the end set to work with heart and soul to create new ideals? Was it by chance that both Mill and Spencer, at the end of their laborious days, felt painfully the limitations of the solution which they had offered, that thus all the leaders of Positivism were impelled by their own natures to transcend their own philosophy? Man may treat nature as something external, although this too has its limits, but he cannot permanently maintain this attitude towards other men, and especially towards himself. But this does away with Positivism, which knows only external relations.

But as regards Pragmatism, which ought to have more attention paid to it in Germany, let us accord full recognition to its efforts to deliver the problem of truth from its customary isolation and to bring it into closer connection

with the whole of life. It is only such a connection which will give truth a firm foundation and enable it to assume a fruitful form. But the question is, what is understood by this whole of life? If it means nothing more than the complex of actual society, as it displays itself in the wide field of experience, the struggle for truth would be subject to all the dissipation and collision of forces, the selfish striving after happiness of the mere man, the spiritual sluggishness of mere average humanity, and thus truth would be sacrificed to utility, de-spiritualized, and thereby destroyed. But after all the movements and experiences of world-history we cannot help feeling keenly so unfortunate a result: we have grown beyond both mere nature and merely social existence, we cannot help measuring this existence by the necessities of our spiritual life, we cannot turn round and make the latter depend on the former. The average condition must be very highly idealized if it is to be accommodated to the endeavour

after truth without serious harm. Or else we must recognize another life besides that of the social sphere. But where this assumption is made explicitly and worked out consistently, a fundamental transformation of the earlier situation becomes necessary; men resume the quest for a metaphysical system, and once more the struggle for truth, in the old sense of the deliverance of man from the merely human and the winning of a new and more essential life, must come into prominence. Thus we find ourselves in the end agreeing with Hegel that a highly educated people without a metaphysics resembles a temple without a holy of holies. Only let us not understand by metaphysics something gratuitously added by thought to a rounded-off world, but something which, by a vigorous reversal of existence, forms the very first step to a stable and essential reality.

Hence a final renunciation of metaphysics is impossible without producing such a marked degradation of life as to be intolerable; we

shall have to resume the struggle for truth in this higher sense of the word. However certain it is that we cannot do so simply by returning to the achievements of an earlier period, yet the experience of history shows us the direction in which we have to seek our goal. And this experience leaves us in no doubt that, when we take up the struggle, we cannot start from the world nor from a transcendent Deity, but only from the process of human life. And it is just as certain that the struggle cannot start from the immediate condition of psychical life, as empirical psychology determines it, but that it requires a reversal, a transference to a spontaneous, self-active, creative life. It is only thus that man can participate in a cosmic life that forms the essence of things, and so gain possession of truth.

Such a reversal has been undertaken with great energy by the leaders of modern philosophy: the form taken by the attempt was that a special kind of activity was exalted

above all the rest, and a new life of an independent character developed from it. Some demanded for this purpose a knowledge rooted in itself, others a creative moral activity. But we have seen what complications resulted from this limitation to a special faculty. This subordination not only drives life into a channel that is too narrow for it, but such a faculty does not seem to be in a position to produce a new reality from itself, and at the same time to effect a reversal of previous existence. Besides, a shaping process of which the transforming power does not extend over the whole range of life will hardly acquire the stability and certainty which are necessary for this movement; in that case doubts and contradictions will continually arise from other sides of life. Consequently the next requirement will be that this reversal should extend over the whole of life, that in particular it should rise superior to the intolerable cleavage into a theoretical and a practical reason. Life must get behind this cleavage, it must be possible

to reach beyond the individual faculties a total activity, which by its own movement develops into an independent reality and at the same time comprehends the opposition of subject and object, subjectivity and objectivity. But this is much what we have in mind in the conception of spiritual life. It is not that a primary thought or even a creative moral activity operates in us, but that a new totality of life, a self-existent and self-sufficing being, a primary creative power which fashions the world and expresses itself in complete acts, makes its presence felt in us — this is the cardinal principle on the attainment and vivid realization of which all truth of thought and life depends for us. Hence it is not a question of the appropriation and strengthening of particular sides, but of making independent and co-ordinating all the inner life that is active in us, and thus reaching a new starting-point for the whole of life.

This new life has to confirm its truth by an enhancement of the whole range of our exist-

ence. It will be seen that it is only from this standpoint that the contents and values unfolded by our life can be understood, and, further, that the latter is raised to an infinitely higher level when it is summoned to independence and co-ordinated into a self-existing and self-sufficing world. Just as the new life, as the totality of a new being, is raised still further above the mere man and the immediate situation, so also it will make greater demands than the older kinds of reform; in face of the given condition of things it demands at each separate point a disturbance and transformation of old conditions; everywhere the object to be aimed at is to work out an independent spirituality, to oppose it in the first place to the average life, and then to refer it back to this life. The whole of existence is thereby transformed into a general problem which can be solved only very gradually. For this independent spirituality cannot be suddenly transformed into reality by a bold fiat, but the work and experience of

world-history are necessary for this purpose; it is only by convulsions and negations that it is possible to compel life to open up its depths. But since in the end the truth of thought depends on the essential content of life, thought must get rid of the idea that at a given moment it can reach conclusions which are final for all periods. Though it must necessarily insist on a truth which transcends time and possesses absolute stability, the stability of this truth does not lie in man but in the spiritual life, and if man, as grounded in the spiritual life, must in some way or other participate in this truth, to work it out to a self-active possession is a high goal to which we can only slowly approach. If truth, if a life which fashions the world and partakes of the essence of things, are not in the first place incontestable facts for us, then all our trouble about them is wasted; but that they likewise form difficult problems which are continually recurring, is shown with peculiar force by the struggles and confusions of the present. It

is an urgent necessity for our spiritual self-preservation that life should be deepened and renewed; but this cannot be accomplished without a bold advance, a successful search for new connections, a further development of our world of thought. Can we expect to advance in these endeavours without the help of philosophy? Is it not an indispensable ally in the struggle for a richer content of life and more truth of conviction? And does not the idea of an independent spiritual life open up new outlooks and tasks, the possibility of a revolution? Humanity has indeed not yet exhausted the possibilities of life.

If the struggle for truth thus rests on the craving after a life which partakes of the essence of things, it cannot possibly divest itself of all strong emotions and become an affair of quiet contemplation and selfless resignation. For the above conception shows clearly that its motive force lies in the impulse towards spiritual self-preservation: without the elemental force of this impulse it would

never succeed in overcoming the pressure of the actual world and in building up a new world of self-activity in opposition to it. Resignation is justified only so far as this spiritual self-preservation requires much negation and renunciation just because it is fundamentally different from self-preservation on the natural level. This negation, however, must be the reverse side of an affirmation if it is not to remain lifeless and unfruitful. It would be easy to show that even in Spinoza's philosophy there is no lack of positive and joyous vital emotion in the depths of existence. But if this is so, then the irreconcilable hostility between truth and happiness disappears, the struggle for truth will help to purify and ennoble the desire for happiness and will not tend to suppress it; it will be able to aid the latter in overcoming the complications to which it gives rise.

CHAPTER V

The Problem of Happiness

Our age has particularly urgent cause to occupy itself with the problem of happiness, for we are confronted by a remarkable contrast between the greatness of the outward achievements of the age and the insecurity of its sense of happiness. In successful devotion to the work of civilization we surpass all other periods; how far are we in advance of them in the knowledge of nature, in the mastery and utilization of its forces, in the humane ordering of society! But it cannot be denied that all these achievements do not help us to attain a joyous and assured sense of life, that a pessimistic tone has become very widespread and continually extends further. How is it

that with us work and happiness refuse to associate?

When such a dislocation compels us to consider the nature and conditions of happiness, we immediately encounter a grave misgiving. May man as a general rule make happiness the goal of his efforts, is it not a sign of a narrow and petty character that in every effort man should think principally of what gain he is to receive in happiness? Experience, too, seems to show plainly that not only individual men but whole nations and religions have been able to renounce happiness: we know, further, that thinkers of the very first rank have called for something higher than the struggle for happiness. But if we look more closely we find that their opposition has been directed not so much against happiness as against lower conceptions of happiness: even in the substitutes which have been offered in its place a craving after happiness can always finally be recognized. Men have wanted something different from the majority, but they have always opposed to

the existing condition of life another which was higher and better, and have sought to enlist human feelings and faculties in the task of attaining it: but is this not a craving after happiness? Thus even the Indian sage strives for happiness when he tries as far as possible to negate life, to bring it into a condition of absolute repose and indeed indifference. For then absorption in the universe or even complete annihilation appears to him a better state than his previous life with its labours and cares, its excitements and disappointments. And the struggle for happiness need by no means remain bound to the narrowness and poverty of the natural ego, but rather the very aim of the struggle may be to find a new, purer, nobler being, a life which is freed from this ego and yet remains active and vigorous. Thus we see that the conception of happiness is itself by no means simple, and that the opposition does not apply to happiness so much as to lower and inadequate conceptions of happiness. Indeed, it is a thing to be insisted

upon that man should let the thought of happiness control his efforts, for it is only by doing so that he can put all the vigour of his life and the strength of his emotions into his action: he cannot devote all his energy to the struggle after anything in which he does not expect to find satisfaction for his own nature. Fundamentally different conceptions are included in the term happiness, but it is only dulness of thought which can agree to a general renunciation of happiness: all real life is strictly individual life, and to this happiness is indispensable.

But this survey has already shown that happiness is not something simple, that the understanding of it is only to be reached by labour and struggle. This lends value to a survey of world-history in the present connection. Let us then make a hasty journey through the ages keeping this problem in view, not in order to consider the whole array of individual solutions but only to show the leading types which human life

has elaborated, and which cannot cease to occupy us.

We begin once more with the highest achievements of ancient culture. Here the answer to the inquiry after happiness rests on a peculiar attitude towards life and the world which pervades the whole course of Hellenism. Effort is supported by the conviction that the joy of life lies principally in activity, that it is therefore the chief object of endeavour to enter upon a state of activity, to assume an active and not a passive attitude towards things. In the course of Greek development, activity, on the high level of the spiritual life, has continually retreated further and further from contact with the immediate environment, and has taken refuge in the inner nature of man, and indeed finally in the relation to a being superior to the world; but yet faith in activity and joy in activity have always remained. In the struggle which Plotinus finally waged against Christianity it was a leading consideration that this religion makes man hope and wait too

much for help from an outside source, while the good cannot gain the victory unless every individual himself takes up arms and fights. On the Greek view, activity needs no reward in order to gain the allegiance of man; it is its own joy and reward: as Aristotle says, all life possesses a "natural sweetness."

But now the question arises, in what, then, does the activity consist which is able to control and fill life? With regard to this question thinkers were naturally bound to go their own ways. They seek what leads to the highest form of activity in that which distinguishes man from other beings, and exalts him above them: this is reason, which is here defined more exactly as thought. In virtue of his thought man can overcome the distraction of sensible impressions and the transience of external stimulations; he can grasp permanent values and aims; in fact, he can leave behind him the whole domain of civil life with all its petty interests, and in the contemplation of the universe, with its eternal

order and wonderful beauty, he can attain a true and lasting happiness. He can return hence to man and his soul, and here also strive to attain a condition essentially higher than the average.

To this effort Plato was the first to give an individual character and a vigorous elaboration. His conception of happiness involves an energetic negation and rejection of the usual human existence: all the happiness which is there offered and commended seems to him fleeting, external, and illusory. But science reveals to the thinker the possibility of contemplating an eternal order of things which, in accordance with his characteristic tendency towards grandeur and vividness of conception, becomes co-ordinated into a whole, the world of ideas. This ideal world, with all its superiority, is not intrinsically alien to us, but he who strives with all his might to attain it can gain complete possession of it and make it his own life and being. In this appropriation of a real and perfect world

the thinker finds a happiness which is beyond comparison with anything else that life offers. But even the individual life of man takes another course when a higher world is thus revealed to him: it is in particular the combination of scientific thought with the formative activity of art which everywhere reveals great tasks and leads to genuine happiness. The work of science is to destroy all mere appearance and everywhere to throw into relief something essential: it also frees its disciple from all external dependence and places him entirely on his own basis. Art as formative effort, however, finds a high goal set before it by the fact that human life contains a wealth of potentialities and powers which must somehow be reconciled with one another. No one of all these different potentialities ought to be rejected or stunted, but all ought to be associated in carrying out their common task in such a way that higher and lower are clearly separated, the former gaining a secure ascendancy while the latter willingly subordinates

itself. When this is successfully accomplished, when all the diversity of things is clearly marked off and graded, human life in itself is fashioned into a perfect work of art. It is the vigorous realization of this work of art, the self-contemplation of man, from which true happiness proceeds. In the possession of such happiness, which is grounded in his own nature, man may feel himself superior to all fate, for this inner harmony cannot be destroyed or even diminished by anything that comes from outside. Thus Plato sketches that magnificent picture of the suffering just man, who is misjudged and persecuted even unto death, but who through all the attacks upon him actually gains in inward happiness. On this view, further, action needs no external reward, for this contemplation of inner harmony contains complete happiness in itself. The only presupposition is that the inner condition, while differentiating itself into harmony and disharmony, should enter into feeling and life in its pure and undisguised character, that the

reflection in our consciousness should be absolutely faithful. The chief distinction of this doctrine of happiness lies in the fact that it brings the internal disposition and its manifestation, the good and the beautiful, into the closest connection, but represents the whole as finding its joy and motive force immediately in itself. Here all petty calculation of private advantage, all thoughts of reward and punishment, have sunk out of sight.

Aristotle shares this conviction in all essential particulars, but he puts a peculiar complexion on it by another mode of marking it off from the ordinary conceptions of happiness. The usual struggle for happiness is, according to him, only a pursuit of external goods; the devotion of all one's life and efforts to this pursuit involves an inner contradiction, and indeed the deep degradation of man. For these external goods are after all only means to life; an endeavour which is directed towards them never reaches rest and satisfaction; it is driven onwards to infinity and yet always

remains dependent on external things; with its pursuit of outward results it robs man of all inward independence. True satisfaction can come only from an activity which finds its task in itself and does not strive after anything beyond itself. Such an activity is reached when all powers unite and acquire a great depth of purpose under the guidance of reason, when a strong and earnest man consciously expresses himself and his character in his actions. But as the feeling of happiness generally corresponds to the content of life, man will gain all the greater happiness the more successful he is in filling his life with significance: there is no full happiness without greatness of soul. Joy in activity, however, will on its side contribute towards raising activity to a higher level, and thus life itself will be enhanced by happiness. In this connection Aristotle has weighed and measured with circumspection and sureness of touch the relation of human action to Fate. The activity which decides our happiness undoubtedly

postulates the fulfilment of many conditions and the co-operation of many auxiliaries; a maimed and crippled man cannot exercise any full activity, and, generally, we must to a certain extent be favoured by circumstances if we are to unfold what is latent in us. But however strongly Aristotle recognizes this, he does not believe that man becomes on this account a plaything of Fate. For the main thing in all activity is always the inner power and capacity. Though for its consummation it may need to be brought on the stage of life, even without this it is as little lost as the dramatic poet's work of art which is never acted. Spiritual power is equal to dealing with the average amount of suffering and constraint which life presents. Excessive afflictions may of course destroy the happiness of life, but in any case they are of rare occurrence, and even they are unable to make a noble man really miserable: for his beauty of character shines through all unhappiness.

Thus the great classical thinkers have

sketched an ideal of happiness which has always claimed the attention of humanity as the type of a vigorous, joyous, and noble scheme of life. But the further movement of history soon made it evident that the ideal rests upon definite presuppositions and does not overcome certain limitations. It demands a pre-eminent power of spiritual creation; it assumes not only that the soul is directed towards the good but also that the spiritual faculty is a match for every obstacle; it needs, further, the conviction that man can grasp the complete truth with his thought and make it the setting of his life. But the beginning of Hellenism involved a great revolution which modified the relation of man to reality. With the traditional order of life shaken to its foundation, it became the supreme necessity to win for him an inner self-sufficiency, a complete independence of and superiority over everything which lies without him. But this can only be accomplished if his interest is dissociated from externals, if his relation to

all experiences of external happiness or unhappiness ceases to be that of feeling or suffering and becomes one of complete indifference, so that he takes refuge entirely in his thought, in the realization of a cosmic reason and the consciousness of an inner greatness. A man who thus gains by thought a living realization of the totality of the universe cannot be moved or agitated by anything which happens in the world of experience; even if this world were shattered he would not be dismayed. The development of this spiritual superiority has greatly strengthened the inner life and has led man deeper into his own soul: it has supported him in troubled times by rousing the heroic elements in his character, but the many problems which as a whole it contains cannot well remain hidden. The fundamental thought which here forms the basis of life is more of a negative than of an affirmative nature; it exalts character above the world, but it does not lead to the permeation and moulding of the latter; hence, how-

ever powerful may be the stimulus, it is easy for a feeling of emptiness to arise. Further, this ideal of life needs great and powerful souls, it requires heroic energy to maintain the fundamental conviction when the whole environment contradicts it. Hence, as soon as doubts about the spiritual power of man arose and spread, faith in this ideal was bound to wane.

Doubts of this kind, moreover, continually gained ground as the ancient world ran its course: man continually developed a deeper sense of the obscurity of the world, and felt himself continually less equal to dealing with its sharp oppositions. In particular, it was the opposition between spirituality and sensuousness which occupied and agitated men's minds to an ever-increasing extent. The old harmony between the spiritual and the sensible was replaced by its opposite as spiritual power became deadened and the life of the senses more refined; in the end, this was intensified to an antipathy against all sensuousness and

a passionate longing somehow to gain deliverance from it and to participate in a purer life. But man felt himself much too weak to bring about this change from his own resources: thus a longing arose for supernatural help, and the Deity was invoked to raise man to a higher life. These changes destroy the old rest and security; life is tossed hither and thither between conflicting moods; longings, hopes, and dreams take the place of a secure possession; the fixed forms are dissolved and a journey begins towards the distant, the formless, the unlimited. The whole is thrown into enormous agitation by the fact that human existence is thought to be encompassed by influences proceeding not merely from good but also from evil spirits, destroying demons, and that thus a consciousness of responsibility, indeed a torturing fear of eternal punishment, makes itself felt. In such a situation deliverance and happiness can be hoped for only from the assistance of a supramundane Deity; such a Deity must come to the rescue

in a miraculous manner and give man a share in his perfection. In order to reach this it is necessary for man to come out of himself, and a condition of ecstasy becomes the highest level of life. As regards the sensuous, however, the object to be aimed at is the highest possible degree of renunciation, a strict asceticism. In the whole scheme the position of humanity is wrapped in deep gloom, but it is precisely from this sense of darkness that there proceeds the strongest impulse towards liberation from all misery, towards the attainment of full and vigorous happiness. In the wide field of existence this endeavour gives rise to a remarkable situation, in which the most various elements, higher and lower, superstition and the scientific impulse, greed for happiness and willingness for self-sacrifice, meet in a confused medley. It needs a great personality to wrest from this chaos a pure ideal of life and happiness: such a personality appeared in Plotinus.

In the change of direction which was due

to Plotinus the essential point is that here religion is no longer, as it had been to the average man, a mere means to subjective happiness, but that it promises to make something essentially new out of man and to get rid of all the pettiness of a separate existence. What is new is that the whole universe appears as a single life, which always remains self-contained even when it unfolds into multiplicity, and that at the same time it seems possible by means of thought to transport oneself into this unity of the All and thence to regulate the whole of one's life. The winning of such an inner unity with the All promises an incomparably higher life and incomparably higher happiness. For union with the ultimate basis of the All enables man to gain the whole of infinity and eternity for his own possession, and to comprehend all oppositions. At the same time he attains thereby a purely inward life, since here all the value of action lies in its relation to this cosmic unity; all external achievements, on

the other hand, become completely indifferent. A further result is complete independence of fate, since all experiences of joy and suffering fail to reach this height of life. It is true that such a life involves a constant movement in virtue of its relation to eternal being, but in contrast to the rush and bustle of the world it appears as perfect rest, as profound peace. Participation in such an inner life, which rises superior to the world, must further the essential development of psychic life. As this primary unity lies above all special differentiation, man cannot attain to it unless he is able to rise above all diversity of psychical activities and co-ordinate himself into a unity superior to all differentiation. The pursuit of this path leads to the development of a life purely of the soul and feeling, a freely soaring disposition, untrammelled by material ties. Life seems here lightened of all weight and entirely transported into the pure ether of infinity. Hence it may well be conceived that in the development of such a life Plotinus experi-

ences a rapturous bliss, and that this bliss carries him far above every other happiness which life can offer. It is equally intelligible that he does not believe in the possibility of winning and forcing this life by personal toil and labour, but that he regards any beginning on the part of man as necessarily preceded by a revelation of the absolute life, which has to be quietly waited for. "Men must remain in quietude until it appears, and must look for it as the eye awaits the rising of the sun." Thus Plotinus by this appropriation of a universal life carries out a transference both of being and of happiness into the purely inward life: it is here first clearly seen what power the thought of union with the All is able to gain over the human soul. But it cannot be denied that there is no path leading from this inwardness back to the wide field of life; the spiritual rapture cannot transform itself into fruitful work and permeate the whole of life. Hence in the end there remains a cleavage between the height of the inner

life and the rest of existence; there are only particular moments when the thought of the All takes complete possession of man, fills him with ecstatic rapture, and enables him both to participate in a bliss beyond description and to forget everything else.

The further limitations in the work of Plotinus we can best estimate if we keep in mind his connection with the whole ancient world. For although with him philosophy takes a turn towards religion and pure inwardness, he does not forsake the connections of ancient life. This life regards man and all his efforts as an item in a given world which is complete in itself and rounded off: the cardinal task for man is to master this world and find his place in it. Thought, which connects him with the All, thus becomes the guiding force in spiritual life; but just as this thought arises in the soul of every individual, it is likewise the concern of every individual to carve his own way to happiness. Man is not dependent on others, neither does he work for

others ; there is here no inner solidarity between men, no assimilation of another or of the whole into one's own inner being ; the destiny of mankind is not lived out at each individual point, nor is any activity entered upon for the elevation of the general condition, but as the individual here stands entirely on his own basis, so he lives only for himself and even in his happiness is inwardly lonely ; there is here no inner world encompassing men and forming a bond of union between them. Hence it is not to be wondered at if the great differences between individuals, which human life undeniably shows, are accepted as final and completely control the system of values. An aristocracy of the spirit is sharply distinguished from the rest of humanity : it alone, with its spiritual power and greatness of character, has any share in true happiness ; such happiness is refused to the others, and this refusal causes no pain to those on the higher level. The rigidity and hardness of the whole also becomes apparent in its estimate and treatment

of pain. Greek thinkers have by no means treated pain lightly, as seems to have been thought in former times, but they have displayed the greatest reluctance to admit it among the fundamental constituents of life. As thought was here concerned as a general rule to prove that the world, in spite of all the pain obviously existing in it, is a kingdom of reason, so the highest task in life seemed to be to prohibit all approach of pain to oneself, to put on against it armour of proof through which it cannot possibly pierce. Thus immense complication was bound to arise when, after all, the sense of pain grew continually stronger and refused to be treated as a mere appearance, or to be kept at a wide distance from the inmost part of life. That joyous doctrine was then in some risk of being transformed into its exact opposite. The Greek ideal of happiness, with all its seriousness, is not on the whole free from an audacious optimism. To find perfect happiness in activity is something not to be hoped

for apart from the conviction that such activity has been from the first exerted within the sphere of truth, and that, provided all powers be strained to the utmost, it reaches its goal with absolute certainty. Thus, as a matter of fact, the opinion of the ancient world is that a well-directed and vigorous struggle for truth must undoubtedly reach truth, and that all spiritual power is certainly working towards the good. There are as yet no shattering doubts and inner dissensions in the spiritual life itself, or, where they appear, they are thrust into the background and attention is averted from them. The struggle for truth of the old thinkers presupposes the rationality of the universe: they neither appreciate the irrationality of human existence at its full value nor fight against it with all their powers.

It is this irrationality of existence which affords the starting-point for the Christian pursuit of happiness; it is here for the first time that it gains full recognition. For it is not this or that item in the world which here

seems wrong, but the whole condition is full of confusion and disorder; the perversion, however, reaches its highest point in the ethical alienation of man from God, and it is here that the transformation too must begin. But where the mischief goes right down to the root, and where a renewal of the whole of existence is requisite, the new departure cannot proceed from the private resources of man but only from divine love and grace; it is the fundamental conviction of Christianity, however, that such a love has really been made manifest and that it promises deliverance to every individual. As all evil arose out of the separation from God, so the highest good can consist in nothing else but re-union with God: but this affords a bliss incomparably superior to every other form of happiness. For here man obtains a share in the whole wealth of divine life; here he is entirely transported into a kingdom of love, of childlike trust, of saving grace. Moreover his soul acquires a peculiar state of tension, since the

initial situation, above which he is raised, does not simply disappear but persists within the new life, which thus runs its course amid sharp contrasts. An undertone of pain accompanies the bliss, and may even seem to be enhanced by the presence of the higher elements; but, on the other hand, happiness gains by the contrast both in intimacy and stability. Placed amid such contrasts the soul remains in constant inner movement: happiness cannot here be thought of as a possession acquired once for all, and the condition of man as a state of perfection, but it is only an inner superiority to the whole realm of conflict which is offered, and it is in the inmost ground of his being that man is absorbed into divine life. The point of superiority of this new life and the corresponding happiness over everything which could be attained in Hellenism, even by the path of religion, is that here a true inner world arises. What makes this possible is that here the divine is not conceived in the first place as the unchangeable unity, the

essential being, but as the ideal of personality, as moral perfection, as almighty love. The relation to such a Being may rise to the highest power and warmth, the inwardness of thought may be heightened to the intimacy of the full personality: man in general, and each man in particular, may know that he is supported and guarded by eternal love. In this realm all differences of spiritual capacity disappear and everything depends on the force and faithfulness of the character, on the ethical direction of the nature, which everyone is able to display.

The particular character of the whole is especially prominent in the treatment of pain, which is in flat contradiction to the Greek method. Here, where man cannot find his way to the heights until his nature has undergone a mighty convulsion, and where the most difficult problems concern the soul itself, it is impossible to follow the Greek thinkers in expelling pain and keeping it wholly at a distance from the inner life.

On the contrary, pain here becomes indispensable for the deepening of life and as a preparation for the good: indeed, the assertion is actually made that in pain itself there is a blessedness, so that those who suffer pain are praised as blessed. In this connection those who take an external view might think chiefly of the joy of a future life, to which pain forms a mere passage, but the more spiritually minded have sought to show that the transformation of soul which proceeds from suffering contains in itself a deepening and strengthening of life. According to Gregory of Nyssa a good becomes manifest in pain itself; the absence of the good could not move us to such strong and passionate grief if it were not something pertaining to our being; hence it is precisely distress of such a kind which gives us assurance of a depth of our nature. In pursuance of this line of thought a special unhappiness may be ascribed to the man who now feels himself happy, for it is just this which circumscribes his life and

prevents it from reaching further depths. In the same way the strong feeling of the immeasurable pain of existence is for Augustine a sure sign that the present is not the final and complete existence, that, rather, we belong in the ultimate basis of our being to another and higher world. In a similar way from the agitating and shattering power of doubt he infers that truth does subsist and has a close connection with our being; non-possession accompanied by a painful feeling of want everywhere attests for him the impossibility of renunciation, the active operation of a higher life. Thus Christianity in its struggle for happiness has taken up negation into the heart of life, and thereby for the first time made life truly superior to it. If there is a consequent danger that life may tend too much towards softness, mildness, and gentleness, this one-sidedness is counteracted by a strong impulse towards activity proceeding from the innermost being of Christianity: did it not come to renew the world, to put

humanity on its feet again, to build up a kingdom of God even on earth? It promises, therefore, not merely deliverance from pain and guilt but also the revelation of a new and higher life. But it cannot be denied that historical circumstances have permitted this affirmative side of Christianity to develop to a much smaller extent than the negative: once more it was the influence, so often described, of that weary and languid period which gave the one side an unwarrantable predominance. Complete deliverance from suffering and all the confused bustle of the world, rest and peace of mind—these became the highest of aims.

However convinced we may be that this development of Christianity which holds aloof from the world does not extend to its inmost essence, and that it leaves open the possibility of other developments, it at first gained the victory over them and ruled for long ages. The difficulty about this kind of Christianity, which has met us under many different forms,

can be clearly seen also in connection with the problem of happiness. For it seeks happiness too much in separation from the world; it is in danger of sinking into weakness by not grappling with things courageously but only rising superior to them in the mind. Since feeling is not sufficiently transformed into action, it is impossible for happiness to inform and animate the whole of life. Another drawback arises from the fact that the emphasis on suffering easily leads to a lingering over mere suffering, indeed to a sentimental revelling in pain, such as we see especially in religious poetry and often in an unedifying form. A further consideration is that a happiness which is thus divorced from the rest of life must become insecure as soon as the whole of this religious systematization of life begins in any way to be doubted: but we all know that such doubts did arise and have spread. The history of Christianity shows, it is true, much diversity on all these points: the medieval

system of Catholicism appears in very different hues; still there is no mistaking the wide divergence between the predominantly passive character of the middle ages and the greater activity which proceeded from the Reformation and which has reacted even on Catholicism. For the Reformation, in imposing the strong contrasts of the Christian life on the soul of every individual, in rousing in it a greater stir of emotion and summoning it to more vigorous activity, could not but effect an inner transformation of happiness as well. But in spite of everything here also happiness remained a matter of the inner consciousness superior to the world; it rested too much on a hopeful faith in a new order for it to ally itself with any valiant and vigorous attempt to grapple with and transform the surrounding world. Hence it always retained a certain weakness and tenderness; it is easy to understand how a period filled with a more vigorous vitality and pleasure in activity pressed beyond such a conception.

This is what happened to a large extent in the modern period. In this period man seeks happiness not so much by retreating into the sanctuary of the soul as by coming out of himself, unfolding and utilizing his powers: a great deal here depends on the conviction that man is not assigned a limited capacity by nature and fate, but can grow without limit, continually develop new powers, and set himself higher and higher aims. Nothing seems to give a clearer proof of man's greatness, and indeed of his relationship with the Deity, than this capacity for progress to infinity. On the very threshold of the modern period it is absolutely clear that this faith in progress brings with it an essentially different sense of happiness, a more vigorous and joyous condition of soul than was known to the middle ages. Thus we read in Nicolaus of Cusa, the first modern thinker: "To be able to know ever more and more without end, this is our likeness to the eternal wisdom. Man always desires to know better what he knows and to

love more what he loves, and the whole world is not sufficient for him because it does not satisfy his craving for knowledge." With such a growth of endeavour the spirit also must grow in itself: "Like a fire which is kindled from the flint-stone, the spirit can grow without limit through the light which streams from it." This feeling is also expressed in the succeeding centuries with particular clearness in the thinkers who are the principal representatives of the modern movement. Thus Leibniz is filled with a vigorous faith in progress and derives from it a sense of happiness and joy. Thus even Hegel is carried safely over all the oppositions and vexations of existence by the consciousness of the constant progress of the whole.

But this faith in progress gains in weight and content principally because the movement does not merely increase the powers of the individual subject but develops the general situation and makes reality more and more rational. A central position is here obtained

by work. In work an activity is recognized which brings us into the closest connection with things, since it can take up their nature and necessity into itself and conform to them. While man thus binds himself more closely to his cosmic environment by means of work, he has a right to hope that by his efforts the condition of reality may be raised and all the more so because modern work has tended to form extensive complexes, has united the powers of individuals more closely, and by uniting them has made them capable of achieving incomparably higher results. But if man has thus gained in work a means to advance the condition of the world, it has given him at the same time stability in his own nature, it has given his life a broader foundation and a secure position in face of the world. Hence for the modern man happiness is closely bound up with work; here for the first time work, which was put in the background by the earlier systems of life, comes to be fully appreciated, and by combination with

it happiness becomes stronger, calmer, and richer: it is now able to penetrate the whole range of life.

This modification of work and of happiness can be followed out in different directions. We see it, above all, in the building up of civilization, that is, a condition of life peculiar to man as opposed to mere nature. By valiant struggle with the apparently alien world man extends the boundaries of his domain and constructs for himself his own sphere of life. It is science especially which takes the lead in this movement and thus proves its power over things. It is especially clear in connection with science how the individual in the modern period has to fit himself into a whole and to carry out his work in the ranks. But if definite limits are thus assigned to every individual, he may cherish the consciousness that in his place he is indispensable, and by his activity is furthering the construction of the whole: "Many shall run to and fro and knowledge shall be increased" (Bacon, with refer-

ence to a passage in Daniel).[1] In a still bolder flight of thought Leibniz declared that we men, like little gods, in virtue of our reason, are able to imitate the architect of the world and promote the welfare of the whole. Man is "not a part but an image of the Deity, a representation of the universe, a citizen of the divine city." If activity here seems to be principally directed towards serving the progress of the universe, at the same time there shows itself in modern society an eager and active endeavour to raise the condition of humanity, to eliminate as far as possible all irrationality from human relations, and to give more and more strength to reason. For here the conviction no longer prevails that the condition of human affairs has been established once for all by the will of God and must be accepted by us as an unchangeable fate, but here also everything appears to be in flux and capable of enhancement. Thus activity here

[1] Bacon, *De Aug. Scient.*, II., x.: "Plurimi pertransibunt et augebitur scientia." *Cf.* Dan. xii. 4.

finds high tasks to perform, all the more since "everything in human form" becomes an object of sympathy, indeed a growing feeling of solidarity makes every individual seem responsible for all the distress and injustice around him. Much darkness and suffering is now really felt for the first time, but it is unable to overwhelm man because his power to cope with the misery can increase indefinitely. The feeling of power and happiness must grow to an immeasurable extent if man can thus take up the battle with circumstances and bring about a new condition of the world.

In this movement as a whole the first thing which attracts our notice is its larger and broader effects, but the movement is no less significant in its relation to what is small and individual. For it is an essential feature of modern life that every individual is recognized as furnishing a specific problem: at every point his dormant power must be awakened, the different elements whose previous state is a confused medley must be adjusted to one

another and subordinated to a unity which is able to raise everything to a higher level. In the development of this effort the individual finds an exalted happiness in spite of all the toil and labour. For he here becomes a world of his own which possesses a value for the whole just because it is unique. This individualizing process extends to all human relations, a uniform development is everywhere avoided, and by the cultivation of individuality a specific task and joy is revealed.

In the whole there is apparent a powerful vital impulse which is occasionally heightened to fierce passion. To be sure, an objective compulsion and law is also at work and prevents a lapse into merely subjective excitement: resignation, too, is not wanting, since at a given moment every achievement has definite limits, and since, further, the individual cannot accomplish anything by himself but only together with the others and in subordination to a common aim. But all the limitations and restrictions at the individual

point and the particular moment are outweighed by the faith in a better future and in the infinitely increasing power of the human race. This faith is as indispensable to the modern period as that in the harmony of the universe was to antiquity and that in a benevolent Deity to the middle ages. Such faith in progress enables the modern man to bear all his labours cheerfully and to preserve a vigorous sense of happiness in the midst of all his work and care. It seems to give life an absolutely positive content and human happiness a sure foundation.

We know to what a magnificent development of life this movement has led, but we also know what complications have arisen from it and how these complications are placed in the foreground by the consciousness of the present. The faith in progress which we have described has been able to fill the whole of life and make it happy only in virtue of the conviction that human activity could pene-

trate things to their foundations and enable man to appropriate them completely; but whether this really takes place became open to stronger and stronger doubt. Such doubts first affect science, the leading force in modern culture. While the height of the Enlightenment was absolutely convinced of its ability to fathom things to the very bottom, Kant has demonstrated to us with irresistible force the limitations of our knowledge. Far beyond the domain of philosophy, however, the conviction has become established in the nineteenth century that behind the work of our thought there lies a world of things which remains inaccessible, and that the mutual relations of things are all that we can hope to ascertain. We cannot explain and understand but only determine and describe. Hence we are cut off from truth in the sense in which it admits us to the essence of things and frees us from the narrowness of a merely human conceptual world. But what applies to truth applies also to the whole of culture. It has

been brought home to us more and more that, however much we are able to alter and improve in the external relations of things, we do not thereby attain an essentially new life and a higher kind of being: all the progress of civilization has resulted in little genuine culture and little development of the condition of the soul. We cannot avoid asking the question whether such an activity on the mere surface of things is worth the enormous toil and labour which it costs.

Similar misgivings are also aroused by our relation to man. The modern movement rested on a firm belief in man's efficiency and natural goodness: it seemed that, if only ample room were provided for the full development of his powers, everything would shape itself for the best and a kingdom of reason would be established in the sphere of humanity. Now, in fact, deliverance from all kinds of constraint has been secured and human powers have been unfolded as never before; but can we shut our eyes to all the

complications, struggles, and aberrations which have proceeded from this deliverance? At the beginning of the modern period the conception of humanity included an emphatic judgment of value: to develop the human element in man still seemed to be at our classical period to raise life to a proud height, but now we are more conscious of what is petty and mean in man; we perceive sharp conflicts in his being, we find him not merely inadequate for the tasks which his own nature sets him, but we see his liberated spiritual powers to a large extent enlisted in the service of selfishness and, in general, of pettily human interests, and thereby diverted from their true ends. Hence it is not to be wondered at if there is aroused a longing for deliverance from the pettiness of man, a craving for greatness; but it must be confessed that as a rule these ambitions quickly succumb again to the influence of pettiness and vanity. In such a situation how could it fill us with assured confidence and pure happiness to work for the improvement

of the human situation? The contradictions which are here involved fail to be fully realized at the present day simply because estimates of man which belong to older schemes of life still retain their influence although they have no foundation in our period. The religious estimate of man as a "seed-corn of eternity" and the object of infinite love still retains its influence; from the point of view of the faith in reason which was characteristic of the Enlightenment, man appears as belonging to a kingdom of reason, and in virtue of his freedom incomparably superior to all mere nature; but religion has been shaken and faith in reason has waned, and hence in the end this estimate cannot possibly be maintained. But if it is seriously meant to transform man into a mere item in a rounded-off natural world, this does away with all possibility of bringing any counteracting influence to bear on this state of immediate existence, all possibility of inner elevation, and we do not see how the most distant future can produce any change in this respect.

These complications extend also into the sphere of individual existence, the full recognition of which was a leading feature in the modern movement of culture. Certainly much stimulus and pleasure still arise from the activity of individuals, but the foundation has been overthrown which gave these endeavours a significant content and an assured direction. Formerly the individual seemed to be valuable and the work expended on his education profitable because in him infinite life strove to express itself in a unique way, because, therefore, every individual might hope that the development of his own nature advanced the condition of the universe. But since life is now more and more exclusively concentrated in the visible sphere, we have become continually more uncertain of this foundation; but, if the individual is completely tied to the sphere of immediate existence, his unlimited development must lead both to severe collisions with other individuals and mutual hostility, and also to crude sel-

fishness or even complacent vanity. Once thought has embraced all these points in a single survey, the emptiness and unedifying character of the whole cannot possibly escape notice; and then the solution of the problem of happiness can no longer be expected from the fullest possible development and recognition of all individuals.

These misgivings are further increased by the modern development of work and the urgency with which its problems are thrust into the foreground. At the beginning work still stood in close connection with the soul of man: the individual could take a pride and joy in its progress because he saw his own product in it; at the same time it still possessed a restful character, it set life in motion but the motion as yet was not feverish or violent; it still afforded periods of leisure which permitted men to review the whole and to transform it into a joyous possession. And now what a change! By forming gigantic complexes work has severed itself

more and more from the soul of the individual and goes its way unconcerned for his weal or woe; owing to its being at the same time more and more specialized and differentiated, the part which the individual has in his field of vision and under his own control becomes smaller and smaller. Hence his psychical power also is developed only in a certain direction while the rest remains unemployed and undeveloped. To this must be added the speeding-up process by which modern work has been more and more invaded; it forces man to be always on his guard and to hold his powers in constant readiness for fresh efforts; this life must bind man hand and foot to the temporary situation, keep him in a state of breathless tension and transform him more and more into a mere struggler for existence. It cannot be denied that the whole has led to prodigious results, but it becomes clearer and clearer that the man as a whole can find no happiness in such a life. But if this work thus strains him to

the utmost without leading him through all his toil and agitation to any genuine happiness, and if at the same time it becomes clearer and clearer that, in spite of the pre-eminent cultivation of skill in particular directions, man is sinking to a lower level in the whole of his being, is becoming insignificant and in the end empty, the question necessarily arises whether all this work of civilization, which renders man neither happy nor noble nor great, is not a self-deception on the part of humanity; whether it is not a huge contradiction to set all one's power in motion with such passionate earnestness, and, as regards the whole of one's being, to lose rather than to gain. What is then the real object for which man works if he thus becomes a mere means and instrument in a soulless process of civilization? We have just seen that he does not attain happiness for himself in the process. For whom, then, does he work? For a future which is wholly veiled from him and which will perhaps in all its progress only be involved

in increasing confusion? Or for the whole of humanity, which yet from the point of view of immediate existence is a pale and empty abstraction, and which, as such, will never be able to overcome the interests and passions of the individual? Everything contributes to raise doubts as to whether the path pursued by the modern period, especially if it be pursued exclusively, is able to lead man to happiness. It is coming more and more to be believed that, as every individual man is more than his work, so also the whole of humanity must be more than the civilization based on work. It is the craving after independence of life and true happiness which drives us beyond the civilization based on mere work and compels us to seek further widths and depths of life. But where are they to be found?

The craving after a more spiritual civilization as opposed to that based on mere work has become stronger and stronger and brings to the front many counteracting influences.

Perhaps the most significant of these influences is the development of an æsthetic culture which runs through the period in broad waves. We cannot deny that this movement of culture has furnished a valuable stimulus and indeed has led to an advance: it has again laid a stronger emphasis on the independence of individuality, it has given life more immediacy and more free movement, more suppleness and more joyousness, and it may in consequence seem to restore genuine happiness. But in reality, as a closer examination is bound to show, when confined to its own resources it does not afford a happiness which penetrates to the inmost heart of life and gives it warmth and elevation, but only a rich diversity of individual agreeable moments, of pleasant stimulations which are not combined into a whole. What is here offered is only a selfish though refined enjoyment on the part of the educated, and often over-educated individual: there is an absence as well of a high goal as of an

essential content of life. But without these, what has happened in the end to all forms of Epicureanism will also happen here in the midst of all the enjoyments, however refined they may be—a feeling of inner emptiness will break forth irresistibly and reject all the proffered happiness as shallow and artificial. Thus, although the individual, and indeed whole circles of society, may seek in this manner to escape the complications and troubles of the period, the way to overcome them is not revealed by a superficial life of this character.

In another direction it is sought to win true happiness by demanding more personality and a more personal shaping of existence: the ethical task is here given precedence over artistic activity. This view certainly contains an incontestable truth, only we must recognize that a high and distant goal is here in question, the attainment of which should not be anticipated so lightly and easily as it often is. We do not by any means become

personalities by pronouncing the word with affection and emphasis, for subjective emotion is not enough to start our life on a new path. The thought of personality possesses value only so far as the word is backed by action, and indeed action which involves nothing less than the complete transformation of the old, and the building up of a new reality. How much this thought demands is shown with particular clearness by the life-work of Kant. He saw clearly that there is no personality unless life is raised to freedom, independence, and spontaneity, but he saw just as clearly that for such freedom and spontaneity the world of natural existence does not afford the smallest room: hence a complete reversal of the former world-picture became necessary, and Kant employed all his mighty powers in its accomplishment. But to-day it often looks as if life could be raised to an essentially higher level within the world of natural existence without much trouble if only it were brought into more vigorous and direct

relation with the individual units. This, however, is a dangerous error. If we do not bring the living units into connection with a new kind of being and thereby give them an essentially new content, this movement, by awakening their self-consciousness and self-complacency, may easily do more harm than good, and, with all its subjective stimulation, provide little genuine happiness; it is also dangerous in so far as it veils the difficult problem with which we are here concerned. The modern period, like all others, is especially eloquent and enthusiastic about that in which it is most lacking: we are in painful want of vigorous and strongly marked personalities of original force, and we talk incessantly about personality, its value and greatness.

If, then, the conclusion of the matter is that we cannot overcome the complications and gain a share of happiness from the immediate situation, but can do so only by an energetic transformation of the whole, it is our obvious

course to turn our gaze upon the whole of history in order to gain thereby a wider perspective and perhaps a point of support. Thus viewed, however, the problem really seems to be greater rather than smaller. For our own examination showed that wherever the desire for happiness found satisfaction on the high level of the spiritual life it involved definite convictions, but that these convictions in the changing course of the ages came to lose their immediacy and their force. With the Greeks the struggle for happiness rested on faith in the rationality and beauty of the universe, the vigorous realization of which would raise man above all the constraints of existence; in Christianity it was the steadfast faith in the loving care of an almighty Deity which supported man in all the trials of life; the modern period relied on the reason indwelling in the human race and on the unlimited capacity for increase possessed by human faculties; here it was faith in a better future which raised man

above all the limitations of the moment. For us moderns, however, the thought of the beauty of the universe has faded away before the dark actuality and the severe struggle for existence which modern science displays to us; and we all know how religious faith has been most severely shaken in the life of culture. But least of all can a closer examination fail to recognize how seriously faith in man and his spiritual greatness has been impaired; for here the test of experience lay nearest to hand, and experience, wherever it has given a candid verdict, has decided in the negative.

Hence that which afforded earlier periods a firm foundation for happiness and an aid to its development offers us at the present day no sufficient point of support. In face of the influences of the world which press so strongly upon us we lack a rounded-off world of thought to mitigate, transform, and turn to account the doubts and difficulties of life: in particular we lack a single supreme truth,

and hence we stand defenceless in face of an all-powerful Fate. Is it to be wondered at if in these circumstances pessimism boldly raises its head and ever advances further? We now see clearly that the very thing which exalts man above nature involves him in vast problems, with which he seems unable to cope. It cannot fail to be recognized that a new kind of life arises in him and separates him from other beings. This life, however, seems to find no support and help in the great world; it sees itself bound to unintelligible conditions and treated by the process of nature as if it were a thing of no importance. Since at the same time in man himself it is generally languid and burdened with sharp contradictions, it seems unable to prevail against all that alien world upon which it supervenes. But with all its weakness and constraint, this new life yet maintains its standards and forces man to apply them to all his doings and dealings. After this movement the mere comfort of natural existence

can no longer be felt as satisfying: man's awakened power demands a goal and an intrinsic value, but it does not find what it seeks and renunciation is impossible. Man's thought carries in itself the idea of infinity and eternity, and thereby destroys all the satisfaction which can be found in the temporal and the finite. Viewed in relation to infinity man and all his doings must seem unspeakably small; the individual, too, as a thinking being cannot help feeling the cramping limits, the nullity, even, of his particular sphere; the thought of eternity contracts into a fleeting span the whole duration of our life and threatens to take from it all its zest and heart. But the course of history heightens rather than diminishes these complications. For the more man develops his specific characteristics, and the further his thought carries him beyond the sphere of immediate existence, giving him at the same time a feeling of freedom, the greater appears the resistance of an alien world which does not

partake in his advance, and the heavier the pressure of a rigid order of things. Human experience, too, teaches us plainly the moment we consult it that the progress of civilization rather leads man into increasing complications than bestows upon him pure and complete happiness.

Thus the problem of happiness runs through the whole movement of history, and that which is in question is not merely the paths which lead to the goals but the goals themselves. It follows that beyond all doubt philosophy has here a great task to perform, and indeed that it is here indispensable to humanity. For if a natural instinct does not infallibly show us the way, and if at the same time all our efforts after genuine happiness need to be founded on definite convictions about the Whole, humanity cannot dispense with a vigorous effort of introspection. Here, too, we encounter the problem of truth; no amount of subjective wishing and willing can lead us on the path to happiness unless the

possibility of happiness is guaranteed by the reality of things. But to give information on this head is pre-eminently the task of philosophy.

But, as all our previous discussion shows, it will make no progress unless a successful attempt is made to extract from the experiences of human life an all-embracing fact or supreme truth which shall help us to concentrate and strengthen our powers and render them superior to obstacles. The experiences and changes of the ages show that we have to seek a fact of this nature primarily not outside but within ourselves, that is, not in the mere circumstances of the individual but in a vital process superior to him. The peculiarly human attributes have been the source of all complications; these complications, therefore, will in all probability be insoluble unless the specifically human element is further deepened, brought into wider connections, and thereby made a match for the indifferent or hostile world. With this

we return to the problem of an independent spiritual life superior to the mere man. If the spiritual process which takes place in us is a mere product of man, this involves the disappearance of all hope of building up a specific world from it as a centre, and of winning at the same time significance, value, and happiness for human existence: on this conclusion all our labour and toil is lost, and victory rests finally with negation. Hence only one way is left, viz., to understand and treat the spiritual life as an independent world; only thus can we hope to win a content for our life and to save it from the nothingness into which otherwise it irretrievably sinks. With the appropriation of these connections our existence is by no means transformed into vain pleasure and harmony, but rather the contrasts and conflicts of existence may at first appear only greater and more intolerable, and the battle may become fiercer than ever. But if human endeavour is provided with a firm point of support in the

movement of the universe and allowed to draw upon its resources, it can confidently begin the battle; it is then at least certain that our life is not in vain, but that something of moment is accomplished in it, however far we may be from having a clear view of the whole. But if philosophy has in general been found indispensable to the battle for happiness, it must become still more so when we see that what is needed is a radical deepening and a vigorous unification of life. For what is there more qualified than philosophy for the task first of destroying the illusory hopes which the modern world holds out to man, and secondly, of pushing on the work of positive construction and searching out new paths?

Conclusion

A variety of pictures has passed before us, a variety of movements has come within our view in connection with the different fundamental problems. Nowhere, however, have we seen the movement advancing in a straight line, but the historical aspect is complicated by a series of reactions and revulsions. But at the same time it has become clear that the problems of the past reach into the present and that our work is conditioned by the strong influences of history. Now the goal appears as the overcoming of traditional oppositions, now as the more vigorous following up of a course successfully begun, but in almost every case a glance backwards will make our own task clearer: we cannot doubt that our work, to be successful, must meet the demands of a

situation conditioned by its antecedents. But it has become just as apparent that we cannot simply accept a particular stimulus and allow ourselves to be carried on without trouble by the stream of history. For we have seen everywhere that the earlier achievements can no longer satisfy us in their more detailed development, that the movement itself has produced a new situation with peculiar demands. Not only an abundance of problems encompasses us on all sides but our spiritual condition as a whole has become insecure; we feel with particular distinctness at the present day that the life of humanity is not being built up in peace and security on a fixed foundation, but that we have continually to renew the struggle for its continuance and its main principles. Everything tends to show that our period is full of tension and occupied with high tasks; it is obvious that we have come to a point where it is a question of recurring to the fundamental problems, to the elementary conditions of our spiritual existence; we are

urgently called to the search for new paths, to independent creative effort.

But the average attainment of the period by no means corresponds to the demands of the spiritual situation; we feel, perhaps to a greater extent than other epochs, how far human conduct can diverge from the inner necessities of the spiritual life. The spiritual situation of the present urgently calls for a synthesis of life, for an overcoming of oppositions, for a systematization which should deal with the whole, and also for a concentration of men on the search for common paths. In place of this we find a high degree of isolation, a complete separation into different parties and groups, a treatment of problems from the standpoint of mere party. This division into different circles and sharp oppositions hinders all mutual understanding; to each it seems to admit of no doubt that his own way of thinking is the best and constitutes the certain cure for all ills; it is never doubted that the other party is entirely in the wrong. Self-complacency

and dogmatism thus flourish luxuriantly, the constant criticism of others stifles all self-criticism. Thus the different movements are bound to intersect and hinder one another, and in the end a confused chaos must arise, from which it is impossible for successful creative efforts to proceed.

In addition, the spiritual situation demands a vigorous deepening of thought and life, for otherwise how should we be equal to dealing with the difficult problems which the age lays upon our shoulders, or how could we wrest from this confused medley goals and paths of our own? In place of this the average man clings to the surface of things and is content to do so: we surrender ourselves to the first impression and do not perceive into what complexity it may lead us; hence everything seems easy and smooth and all difficulties appear to exist only in the imagination of those who are involved in old prejudices. This mode of thought further leads us into sharp contradictions in our own being by bidding us follow

first one and then another impression; and hence in particular we often seek to retain as an effect and consequence what we have definitely rejected as a cause and ground. In this way alone has it become possible for the thought and the action of the period to employ as a general rule fundamentally different standards of value. Our thought is occupied chiefly with the visible world and shuns as "metaphysics" everything which transcends its limits; but in action there prevails a vague idealism, which treats conceptions such as reason and personality, humanity and human greatness, as incontestable values, without realizing that with them a new world is introduced. But in the end our spiritual creative efforts are oppressed by a desire for negation, an inclination to expect great benefit from the destruction of traditional systems, from the rejection of old solutions. Now the age certainly contains much that is obsolete and rotten, which urgently needs to be removed, but negation cannot produce any true advance

unless behind it there lies the impelling force of an affirmation, which gives effort a fixed direction. But this is usually lacking; it is the negation as negation which satisfies many and is thought to be something great. But since there is usually nothing narrower and more impatient than negation, it produces to-day a dogmatism, and indeed a despotism, which is bound to impair to the most serious extent spiritual creative efforts and the true knowledge of the present situation.

But if the surface of things offers the most obstinate resistance to the necessary renewal of culture and strengthening of inner life, and if no essential progress of life is possible from this starting-point, but only in opposition to it, we may welcome as evidence of an increasing reaction the fact that this obstacle is coming to be more and more felt, and that the necessity of deliverance from isolation, shallowness, and negation is becoming more and more clearly recognized. The more, however, spiritual work strives to gain indepen-

dence of the superficiality of the period, and the more the desire emerges for greater depths and more essential contents of life, the more valuable must the work of philosophy appear, and the less doubt can there be felt that it is indispensable for overcoming the present crisis of spiritual life.

But at the same time it will also be clearly seen that philosophy must have a special nature in order to be able to discharge these tasks. It must not be an affair of mere learning, nor can it remain a mere blending of reflection and subjective acuteness, but it must become an energetic pressing forward and a spiritual creation, it must work out depths of our life, awaken dormant powers, co-ordinate isolated efforts, indeed it must reveal a new reality if it is to help humanity to deal with these leading questions and at the same time to preserve the independence of its own position. For such progressive creation it has to seek a new and peculiar standpoint, and in this sense it must assume the

form of a metaphysics. But it cannot avoid the errors of the old metaphysics unless it starts from the process of life, as we see it not in the isolated individual but in the whole of humanity, and unless it succeeds in the attempt to discover and develop in mankind a general tendency opposed to the initial situation.

This is much what we had in mind when we spoke of a philosophy of spiritual life and desired the elaboration of such a philosophy. It is only such a philosophy which can co-ordinate and make use of all the experience accumulated in the history of the world without surrendering the rights of the living present; only such can place us under the constraint of an inner necessity and at the same time summon us to fresh and joyous activity; it alone can do justice to the diversity of the relations of life and at the same time strive after a straightforward simplicity; it alone can in the end serve to promote the advancement of life without

sinking to a matter of mere utility. A philosophy of this nature is especially congenial to the peculiar characteristics of the German people and the traditions of German life: a nation which has produced men like Eckhardt and Leibniz, Kant and Hegel, and so many other thinkers spiritually akin to these, will never be able to give up the desire for a philosophy which seeks to regard reality from the inside and from the point of view of the whole, and which, in the midst of earnest and laborious investigation, strives to raise the whole of human life to a higher level.

INDEX OF NAMES

Antiquity (Greek), 33 ff., 107 ff., 199 ff., 284 ff., 338 ff., 356 ff.
Archimedes, 73, 146, 234.
Aristotle, 2, 8, 37 ff., 61, 71, 109, 110, 125, 203, 207, 275, 285, 287, 289, 290, 338, 343 ff.
Athenagoras, 294.
Augustine, 58, 120, 121, 140, 213, 277, 295.

Bacon, 369, 370.

Christianity, 49 ff., 118 ff., 134, 174, 176, 211 ff., 251, 252, 294 ff., 299, 303, 357 ff.
Church, 57 ff., 69, 93, 99, 124, 223, 226, 301.
Comte, 91, 242, 324.

Descartes, 73, 146, 149, 307.

Eckhardt, 403.
Eleatics, 33.
Enlightenment, 79, 132, 147, 149, 184, 233, 307 ff., 374, 377.
Epicurus, 4, 8, 384.

Fichte, 307, 319.

Goethe, 139, 141, 205, 286.
Gregory of Nyssa, 361.

Hegel, 10, 54, 89, 138, 139, 141, 150, 151, 242, 307, 319, 326, 367, 403.

Herbart, 10.
Herder, 71.

Kant, 6, 71, 72, 75, 147, 149, 307, 313, 315 ff., 374, 385, 403.

Leibniz, 74, 75, 138, 147, 307, 309, 367, 370, 403.
Locke, 71.

Middle Ages, 58 ff., 66, 125, 128, 133, 167.
Mill, 324.
Modern Period, 66 ff., 131, 134, 145, 146, 169, 177, 222, 227, 252, 302, 305, 366 ff.
Mysticism, 47 ff., 63, 127, 140, 159.

Nicolaus of Cusa, 366.

Plato, 2, 6, 8, 35 ff., 105, 108, 173, 207, 285, 287, 340 ff.
Plotinus, 44 ff., 117, 120, 286, 291 ff., 338, 350 ff.
Positivism, 91, 141, 242, 322, 324.
Pragmatism, 322 ff.
Protestantism, 298, 301.
Pythagoreans, 32.

Reformation, 72, 132, 365.
Renaissance, 132.
Roman Catholicism, 60, 164 ff., 225, 297 ff., 301, 365.

Scepticism, 291.
Schelling, 307.
Scholasticism, 61 ff., 69, 126, 289.
Socrates, 4.
Sophists, 4, 34.
Spencer, 324.
Spinoza, 147, 189, 277, 278, 307, 309 ff., 333.
Stoicism, 4, 8, 42, 289, 290.

PRINTED BY NEILL AND CO., LTD., EDINBURGH.

CROWN THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY



CROWN THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY

VOL. XXXIX

EUCKEN'S KNOWLEDGE AND LIFE

Crown Theological Library

WORKS ALREADY PUBLISHED

Vol. I.—BABEL AND BIBLE. By Dr Friedrich Delitzsch. 4s. 6d. net.
Vol. II.—THE VIRGIN BIRTH OF CHRIST. By Paul Lobstein. 2s. 6d. net.
Vol. III.—MY STRUGGLE FOR LIGHT. By R. Wimmer. 3s. net.
Vol. IV.—LIBERAL CHRISTIANITY. By Jean Réville. 3s. 6d. net.
Vol. V.—WHAT IS CHRISTIANITY? By Adolf Harnack. 4s. 6d. net.
Vol. VI.—FAITH AND MORALS. By W. Herrmann. 4s. 6d. net.
Vol. VII.—EARLY HEBREW STORY. By John P. Peters, D.D. 4s. 6d. net.
Vol. VIII.—BIBLE PROBLEMS. By Prof. T. K. Cheyne, D.D. 4s. 6d. net.
Vol. IX.—THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT AND ITS HISTORICAL EVOLUTION, and RELIGION AND MODERN CULTURE. By the late Auguste Sabatier. 4s. net.
Vol. X.—THE EARLY CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF CHRIST: Its Significance and Value in the History of Religion. By Otto Pfleiderer. 3s. net.
Vol. XI.—THE CHILD AND RELIGION. Essays by Various Writers. 5s. net.
Vol. XII.—THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION. By Dr L. R. Farnell. 4s. 6d. net.
Vol. XIII.—THE BOOKS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. By Baron Hermann von Soden, D.D. 4s. 6d. net.
Vol. XIV.—JESUS. By W. Bousset. 3s. 6d. net.
Vol. XV.—THE COMMUNION OF THE CHRISTIAN WITH GOD. By W. Herrmann. Revised and much enlarged Edition. 4s. 6d. net.
Vol. XVI.—HEBREW RELIGION. By W. E. Addis, M.A. 4s. 6d. net.
Vol. XVII.—NATURALISM AND RELIGION. By Rudolf Otto. 5s. net.
Vol. XVIII.—ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL GOSPEL. By Dr Adolf Harnack and Dr Herrmann. 4s. net.
Vol. XIX.—RELIGION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By Karl Marti. 4s. net.
Vol. XX.—LUKE THE PHYSICIAN. By Dr Adolf Harnack. 5s. net.
Vol. XXI.—THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CHRIST. By Prof. Kirsopp Lake. 4s. 6d. net.
Vol. XXII.—THE APOLOGETIC OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. By E. F. Scott. 4s. 6d. net.
Vol. XXIII.—THE SAYINGS OF JESUS. By Dr Adolf Harnack. 5s. net.
Vol. XXIV.—ANGLICAN LIBERALISM. By Twelve Churchmen. 4s. 6d. net.
Vol. XXV.—THE FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION. By Dr R. Seeberg. 4s. 6d. net.
Vol. XXVI.—THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT. By Dr Rudolf Eucken. 4s. 6d. net.
Vol. XXVII.—THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. By Dr Adolf Harnack. 5s. net.
Vol. XXVIII.—MONASTICISM AND THE CONFESSIONS OF ST AUGUSTINE. By Dr Adolf Harnack. 3s. 6d. net.
Vol. XXIX.—MODERNITY AND THE CHURCHES. By Professor Percy Gardner. 4s. 6d. net.
Vol. XXX.—THE OLD EGYPTIAN FAITH. By Prof. Edouard Naville. 4s. 6d. net.
Vol. XXXI.—THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW OF THE CHURCH IN THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES. By Dr Adolf Harnack. 5s. net.
Vol. XXXII.—THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By Dr Rudolf Kittel. 5s. net.
Vol. XXXIII.—THE DATE OF THE ACTS AND OF THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS. By Dr Adolf Harnack. 5s. net.
Vol. XXXIV.—THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE OF ST PAUL. By Prof. Percy Gardner. 5s. net.
Vol. XXXV.—PHARISAISM: ITS AIMS AND ITS METHODS. By Rev. R. Travers Herford. 5s. net.
Vol. XXXVI.—BIBLE READING IN THE EARLY CHURCH. By Dr Adolf Harnack. 5s. net.
Vol. XXXVII.—PROTESTANTISM AND PROGRESS. By Prof. Ernst Troeltsch. 3s. 6d. net.
Vol. XXXVIII.—PRESENT-DAY ETHICS. By Prof. Rudolf Eucken. 3s. net.
Vol. XXXIX.—KNOWLEDGE AND LIFE. By Prof. Rudolf Eucken. 5s. net.

Descriptive Prospectus on Application.

KNOWLEDGE AND LIFE

BY

RUDOLF EUCKEN

SENIOR PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF JENA; AWARDED NOBEL PRIZE 1908; AUTHOR OF "THE TRUTH OF RELIGION," "THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT," ETC.

TRANSLATED BY

W. TUDOR JONES, D.PHIL. (JENA)

AUTHOR OF "AN INTERPRETATION OF RUDOLF EUCKEN'S PHILOSOPHY," ETC.

LONDON

WILLIAMS & NORGATE

14 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, W.C.

NEW YORK: G. P. PUTMAN'S SONS

1913

OCT 27 1937
10196

RICHARD CLAY & SONS, LIMITED,
BRUNSWICK STREET, STAMFORD STREET, S.E.,
AND BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

This volume, which constitutes an introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, is one of Professor Eucken's latest pronouncements. It forms an excellent epitome of the author's views concerning the need of a Metaphysic of Life. The book supplements certain important aspects of the author's previous writings. Its insistence on the need of a Knowledge based upon Life is an all-important message for our generation. As the author shows, we are at the end of a period of *Expansion*—a period which has brought forth so many things of real assistance to the material welfare of life, but which, at the same time, has failed to touch the depth of man's soul. There has arisen, on account

of this failure of the material side of life, a deep longing for something greater—for something that will give power and depth to life. This longing, according to the author, is a sign of a coming new *Concentration* of life. Men's attention will be turned more and more to the things of the spirit, and the real norms and values of life will once again gain their legitimate place.

The life of the spirit will discover a self-subsistent reality which will result in bringing about an *inverted* order of things as well as a new scale of values. The whole domain of Knowledge will be measured and valued from the standpoint of such a spiritual life. In a series of chapters Professor Eucken shows the insufficiency of natural science and of much of the philosophy that is in vogue to-day to accomplish such a revolution within man's soul. And really the question arises, Is it worth understanding and describing earthly things at the expense of relegating life and its deepest necessities to

a secondary place? Yet it is this that is being done by much of the science of our day. Is it worth weaving systems of Metaphysics concerning the Absolute merely from the conclusions of a Logic which has hardly any affinity with life? Yet this is what is being done by much of the philosophy of our day. The solution of the problem of life is urgent and difficult. A solution of the problem is *urgent* because experience has taught us during the past fifty years that much which is of permanent value is in danger of becoming lost to the vast majority of mankind. It is *difficult* because it deals with a *new world* and a *new life;* and neither of these lies near to our hands. The problem is difficult on account of the further fact that its solution cannot come about without the operation of a *deed of the soul.* Ideas about things will not save us, and neither will ideals viewed merely as objects of contemplation and far removed from human life. But though difficult a solution can be found. It is

BD
43

found in the presence of a spiritual life whose existence is not in space or time but *in itself*. When the world becomes aware of this truth—a truth which cannot be realised without an enormous struggle—it becomes aware at the same time of the only power which will free us from the many entanglements into which increasing knowledge *about* things has led us.

Professor Eucken's plea in this book is, that the only Knowledge which may be termed genuine springs from the demands and aspirations of man's own deepest life. The union of such Knowledge and Life will create a new humanity and a new world.

That the situation to-day is in dire need of such a solution of the problem of life few will deny; and no European thinker has laboured more than the great and genial author of this book to make such a treasure the possession of all "who carry a human face."

I have to thank the Rev. E. E. Coleman for his kindness in reading the proofs and in making several valuable suggestions.

W. TUDOR JONES.

HIGHBURY, LONDON, N.
November 1, 1913.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THE following pages constitute a portion of a greater work already planned. The separate publication of this volume has been occasioned by personal reasons, especially by my approaching visit to the United States of America. But I could not resist this invitation though it necessitated a decision between an introductory volume on the one hand, and my strong desire for the completion of the work on the other. On account of the confusion which governs things to-day, it is of importance, in the first place, to discover the *direction* of the path we have to travel over before we follow it any farther or seek upon it a view of Reality.

When our work sets the problem of Knowledge in definite contact with the problem of Life it corresponds to a strong movement of the times. All the incessant and highly

significant work on the *external* side of things to-day is not able to prevent a stiffening and an ageing of life—a stagnating of it in its inner parts. Consequently, there proceeds right through the civilisation and culture of humanity an ardent desire after a renewal of life—after a connection with the original sources of life; for it is thus alone that man can create the necessary power and greatness to withstand victoriously the hostile powers which threaten him. Such a yearning, however, engenders a turn towards life—a turn to the nearest and most original source which it is possible to reach. Thus the word "Life" is to-day on everybody's tongue. But much of the prevalent sympathy towards such a point of view easily connects itself with much obscurity with regard to the true conception of the problem, and consequently the most varied conceptions frustrate one another: often a higher and a lower grade of life are not sufficiently differentiated, and therefore what should have furthered the

development of the life of the spirit of man tends to fall under the ban of conceptions *merely natural.* In opposition to all this, we shall attempt to show how Life has to be created—a Life that shall make genuine Knowledge possible. Further, we shall open the investigation concerning the meaning of Life and its connection with Reality, as well as show how, out of such a creative Life, the method and task of Knowledge are to be specifically moulded. All this, however, requires the most definite connection with the situation of the present day, and indicates the goal for which we have to strive if our final convictions once again are to receive more stability and content than they possess to-day—if, in a word, the critical situation of the present is to be overcome. What the present work will only sketch, a future volume, soon to appear, will bring to fuller completeness.

RUDOLF EUCKEN.

JENA, *August 1912.*

CONTENTS

CHAP.		PAGE
	TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE	v
	AUTHOR'S PREFACE	xi
I	INTRODUCTION	1
	I. CRITICAL PART	
II	THE LIMITS OF SCIENCE	19
III	THE FAILURE OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY	29
	(*a*) THE TRANSITION TO THE PROBLEM OF LIFE	54
IV	MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF LIFE . . .	63
	(*a*) PRAGMATISM	65
	(*b*) THE BIOLOGICAL VIEW . . .	97
V	RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT	126
	II. EXPLANATORY PART	
VI	THE MAIN THESIS	143

CHAP.		PAGE
VII	The Consequences of the Main Thesis .	200
	(*a*) Consequences of the Main Thesis on the Situation of Philosophy .	200
	(*b*) Consequences of the Main Thesis on the Work of Knowledge . .	217
VIII	Transition to the Present . . .	269
	(*a*) Analysis of Kant's Position . .	269
	(*b*) The Demands of the Present . .	285
	Index	305

KNOWLEDGE AND LIFE

CHAPTER I

Introduction

In relation to the problem of Knowledge, modern man is in an extreme degree beset with insecurity as to his position in the universe and the meaning of his own life. Despite the acknowledgment of values and ends, *old* and *new* modes of conceiving things stand in irreconcilable opposition to each other. The *old* mode sets high aims before man, and allows him to think highly of himself and of his place within Reality; but this mode, in the consciousness of the present day, has been shaken to its deepest foundations, and has consequently lost much of its power. The *new* mode presents us with tasks

and with achievements in abundance, but these do not connect themselves into a *totality* or *whole* such as raises man in the inwardness of his being—giving his acts a self-value, and satisfying the deepest part of his nature. Consequently we vacillate insecurely between the *old* and the *new* modes; and in such unstable equilibrium the inner situation of life is in danger of falling into a serious case.

The *old* conception of his own greatness gave man the conviction of an inner connection with the universe and of the significance of his actions in their relation to the universe. The universe thus appeared as possessing a life of unity, or as being governed by such a life: man not only participated in this unitary condition but also occupied a *special* position within it, and seemed indispensable in order to bring to perfect expression the meaning of the universe. This was the view of life and its meaning as presented by religion; and also here man's relation to God raised him far beyond the sensuous environment, and en-

abled his deeds to be effective in relation to the destiny of the universe itself. The same view was presented in certain ideals of civilisation and culture, with their transformation of Reality into a kingdom of reason either of a logical or of an artistic kind. In such an idealism the whole of the world was transformed into an *inner presence;* and man's deeds, for the first time, seemed to be raised by the All to the level of clear consciousness and, at the same time, perfected. In religion as well as in idealism all greatness seemed thus to proceed out of the independence of an *inner world* and of its superiority to the external world.

This independence of an *inner world* and, at the same time, this inner relation of man to the universe have become, during the past century, more and more insecure. The inner connections of things have become more and more disintegrated; and the natural world has been resolved into a mere co-existence of individual elements, and into

a web of the mutual relations of such elements. This web of relations has also more and more drawn man into itself, and has regarded him as a mere part of itself. Man's life has thus been entirely transformed into a relation with the environment of sense impressions; life is viewed as exhausting its meaning in its effects and counter-effects in connection with the external world. Thus what happens within the *inwardness of the soul* becomes a merely subsidiary phenomenon—it becomes a mere repetition in miniature of what happens in the great world without. Man thus becomes a mere link in an endless chain : he can neither *mean* anything *special* nor grasp, by means of his acts, any totality or whole. And if no kind of totality or whole obtains here, the *idea* of an inner relation to a whole—the idea of a personal experience of a whole and of a value for the whole—sinks into a delusion. To grant any specific position to man in the universe is consequently impossible; and, at the same time, it is supposed

here to be proved that what issues from the inwardness of his being has no longer any kind of value any more either for himself or for anybody else, so that all his actions have no other ends to serve than the betterment of his situation within the sensuous environment, and the extension of his power over this environment. How much has been achieved in this direction from the sides of the pure and applied sciences is evident to all. Thus, for the loss of an invisible world, the heightening of the visible one seems to offer entire compensation; and amidst the continuous development of the power of the environment we are not at all able to discover the loss of such an *inwardness*.

So we are surrounded and carried along not only by the results already achieved in the external world, but also by the problems of life in our own day. These problems rivet man's life to the external world. As, for instance, the social questions of the present in all their confusion show, the life of

man on its purely external side becomes his whole life; more and more are all his wishes and hopes and beliefs drawn into the vortex of such an external life.

And yet there exists and persists a painful contradiction in the fact that the life of man is being wholly transformed into a portion of a mere flux—that it is being darkened and rendered indifferent to its own worth. Such a state of things could content us only if it were able to drive out all unity from life, to place in its stead the relations of our actions to physical phenomena, and to set the standard of life in the external world. Our life would then become a mere co-existence and sequence of external happenings, and the mere *factual* world would fill us so entirely that all questions concerning our own situation and its meaning would appear altogether futile.

Such a development of life, upon the ground of modern times, has undeniably gained a certain kind of reality: even upon

the so-called summits of civilisation there appears much life though without a soul in it, and in the midst of great activity there may be found stunted and languishing souls. But from its very nature the soul will not allow itself to be permanently driven out of life. For we discover once again that we are *thinking natures* and as such must reflect concerning *what we do* and *what offers itself to us.*

For we do not merely live but also *experience* what we live; we construct a specific circle of our own over against the environment, and we cannot possibly refrain from deciding concerning what lies *within* this circle and what is only contiguous with it from *without.* The Subject—Man's Mind—and his inwardness may be placed in the background and neglected, but they cannot possibly be eliminated. If all this *persists,* it cannot possibly be nothing more than what merely flows on the current of external events, but is in reality that which trans-

forms such a current into a mere environment; and thus it becomes an intolerable contradiction to exhaust Life wholly in achievements connected with this environment. Viewed from the side of the Subject —Man—all progress towards the environment and all the development of power within the domain of the universe cannot be viewed as constituting the kernel of life, but only as a help and a furtherance, only as a means, only as a setting of the conditions for what constitutes the *main fact.* To conclude merely with a care for such conditions and means is certainly a kind of initial preparation for Life; but Life in this manner has prospects which it never succeeds in realising, so that such incessant work and care become empty of significance. This emptiness—this poverty—becomes all the more manifest the more the thirst after a richer life has been engendered by the calling up of all the powers of man's nature. As a fact the present day not seldom exhibits

powerful effects from *without* along with the most painful sensation of *inner* emptiness.

Such an experience will immediately awaken a longing after a stronger development of life and after a development of inwardness; but this longing is more easily awakened than fulfilled. For, in the necessary withdrawal from external things, man cannot furnish himself with any ready-made content of a kind different from what he possesses in his natural state: his nature, at the outset, cannot, out of its own capacity, pass beyond the waves and the winds of external circumstances. In a word, his nature ceases to grow any further by means of the world which penetrates so effectually into his life. Thus activity in connection with external things on the one hand, and concern for the state of the soul, on the other, do not unite, and consequently the man's life remains split between a work without soul and a soul empty of content. Life, as a whole, through such a splitting,

does not succeed in reaching full power and reality; and its total result, despite its activity in individual situations and on various sides, is bound to become unreal and to lose all original creativeness as well as all genuine joyousness. At the end of such a path stand pessimism and despair.

We cannot possibly surrender our life to such disaster: we must wage a war against all this, and seek to give our life an inner unity and also a greatness and value. The aspiration for this necessarily leads to the problem of Knowledge. We shall be able to overcome the disruption and diminution of our life only if we succeed in coming out of our isolation and in winning once more a genuine connection of the soul with the world and, as well, in experiencing all this in the form of immediacy. This can come about only if we succeed in reaching Knowledge in the specific and distinctive sense, viz. that such Knowledge, which, at the outset, only shows the contact of things with us on their

external side and as being somehow over against us, incorporates objects into *our own* life, and transforms their content into our own possessions. In order to obtain such an *inner* appropriation of reality other provinces occupy themselves : art and religion succeed in transforming reality into an inward possession of man. But though the undertaking within these provinces possesses an independence over against philosophic work still it is the latter which has to transmit to the various provinces the final justification of the transition which it presents—the justification regarding the meaning and value of the whole. For unless such a justification is found, uncertainty and doubt will never be entirely driven out of life. The possibility of this kind of Knowledge is the indispensable condition for gaining an inner relation to Reality and, also, an inner greatness for man. Thus the question at issue is not one merely for scholars, but one which presents itself to all who might participate

in mental and spiritual development and who might co-operate, in an independent manner, in such a development. Finally, it is the desire after a *spiritual* self-preservation—it is the taking of our stand upon the meaning and value of life *as a whole*—which drives us to-day in an imperative way to the problem of Knowledge. Mankind at the present day, despite all its activity and achievements, stands under the powerful influence of an inner shrinkage and of an increasing hollowness of soul—it stands under the restriction of a pettiness of what ordinarily happens *within* us and *without*. This lies as a heavy pressure upon us—a pressure which deadens all the courage of life, and which is bound to choke all joyous development of the powers of our nature; for of what avail are the brilliant results connected with the fragmentary elements of our nature if nothing at all issues out of life *as a whole?* It becomes thus the question of questions whether it be possible to withstand such a

downward movement of the inner life—such a growing apathy of the human race, and whether it be possible to consolidate once again the faltering faith of life. We stand here face to face with a pointed *Either—Or*—with an alternative which, of all facts, is *our own* fact, and from which no one can withdraw except under pain of being left behind the inner movement of mankind. This *Either—Or* leads of necessity to the problem of Knowledge.

Such a situation is bound to invert in an essential manner the effort of Knowledge as this effort presented itself at the beginning of modern times. At that period the feeling of intolerable bewilderment pressed heavily upon mankind; and the main desire, over against such a depression, was to obtain a thorough clearness of view by a dispersal of the existing chaos and by the development of a homogeneous world of ideas. In our own day, too, such a bewilderment is not absent, while nevertheless we do not see in

it the main problem : this main problem we find to-day in the evaporation of all spiritual stability of life—in the loss of a governing centre and, along with this, in the loss of a substantial nucleus of life. We find the problem in the inner emptiness which threatens to engulf us notwithstanding all our feverish activity and our immense profusion of stimulations and achievements. In the seventeenth century Comenius complained of the lack of genuine light in so illuminating a period (*in tam illuminato seculo, uti quidem appellari gaudet, luminis penuria*); so that as Tantalus deplored the lack of water in the very midst of water, the age missed genuine light though it was surrounded by some kind of light. With regard to our own day, we would say that we, in the midst of all the fulness of life, miss *genuine* life; we would say that life, with all its sensuous plenty, threatens to become inwardly disintegrated and unreal. Such a thirst after genuine reality must also mould the work of

Knowledge in a manner other than that of the period of Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*), and the first question therefore is not concerning clearness of ideas but concerning reality and a substantial content for our life.

I.—CRITICAL PART

CHAPTER II

The Limits of Science

A deep-rooted opinion, which appears to-day as if it were quite self-evident, is that Science has to supply man with knowledge, and that he cannot expect knowledge from any other province of life. There can, indeed, be no doubt that, when Knowledge is taken in the widest sense of the term as meaning a description and explanation of Reality, Science stands pre-eminent; but the matter appears in quite another light when the conception of Reality is taken in the definite sense which occupies our attention in this volume. For it is easy to see that it is only an inexact conception of Science, and especially of Modern Science, that can view the task of Knowledge as Science's entire

monopoly. Modern Science has attained its greatness and its value—indeed, has only become a Science in a definite and exact sense—because it has succeeded in viewing the customary projection of human ideas, feelings, and aims into the universe as an intolerable confusion; it has opposed such a view with the greatest persistency, and has learned to see things in *their own* nature, apart from their supposed human qualities. This has happened most specifically with regard to the *physical* universe; but even in regard to *History and the life of the soul* man has attempted to conceive of things as real facts without any admixture of subjective interpretation and valuation. The subjective factor has generally been conceived and condemned as an illegitimate ingredient —indeed, as a falsification of the facts—and a purely objective consideration of things has been striven for. It is in this way alone that Science can develop its own methods as well as connect its material into a king-

dom of its own. The fact that man is able to place his own subjectivity in the background, and is able to present before himself something outside himself constitutes something of the greatest significance—something that testifies, even in the denial of the activity of the mind as really making anything known, to a distinctive greatness that has to be taken into account in any accurate and complete view of man. But such a fact marks also an insuperable limit to Science. The results and value of Science depend upon the fact that any disparity between Object and Subject—any opposition of external things to the mind that knows them—is obliterated. The *factual*, striven after by Science, dare not suffer any intrusion through attempts at dovetailing it into something mental or interpreting it by means of some human analogy. Thus Science, the more it progresses, divests itself more and more of all anthropomorphic trimmings and removes the facts further and further from

being conceived as having their existence in the human mind. The experience of the present day indicates this with special clearness. Natural Science especially eliminates more and more clearly from its products all its relation to human reflection, and seeks all its conclusions and simplifications entirely within its own external domain. Thus Physics at the present day is not conceived as at an earlier period—in that the differences of our senses do not any longer suffice as a principle of division (Optics, Acoustics). When the effort is most diligently made to resolve the multiplicity of phenomena into the fewest possible elements, and, indeed, finally to one element, it is evident that the *whole* is not thus brought inwardly nearer to us. Such a tendency must on the contrary remove this final simplification further and further from our sensations and perceptions. In so far as such attempts of Science succeed, the results are bound to leave us inwardly alien to them; and consequently the meaning

of the whole remains in darkness. We clarify the *relations* of things, but we do not know what lies *beyond* them.

Further, with regard to the view of History, modern investigation eliminates from all events the nearness of the soul and also the seeming transparency which events seemed to possess in earlier times. In the thought of antiquity, Past and Present flowed inseparably together, so that the Here and Now became a key to what had gone before, and so that anything of value which had arisen anywhere seemed to remain valid for *all* times, and capable of being furthered by all men. But afterwards came exact investigation with its criticism, and broke ruthlessly down the connections of epochs. While the nature of epochs were more clearly depicted, this *specific isolation* of each epoch was shown at the same time; the interval between ourselves and each and every epoch has been indicated, and an easy transition from epoch to epoch has

been made impossible. The subversive effect of this point of view has been experienced especially in religion. For it was essential for religion to interpret unique events as Standards, and to show their necessity for *all* times. This could only happen on condition that religion did not insist entirely on the particular colouring of any special epoch, and on condition that it was equally intimate with *all* times and equally trusted and saw the meaning of them all. Scientific investigation, however, is unable to envisage such a view in any exact manner without discovering in it a coercion of the Past; so that such an investigation, notwithstanding all it gains in insight, removes us from the Past in a manner which cannot be tolerated. We are on this view unable any longer to unite our lives with the Past in an intimate manner; we are unable, as it seemed possible at an earlier period, to understand our own nature as connected with the whole of things. Thus

Science separates us and the objects far from each other, while it teaches us to view the objects in *their own* connections. Different periods thus seem, on fuller investigation, to conflict with each other more than to bind themselves together in a friendly relation. And, further, the domain of historical development has extended beyond our range of comprehension, so that a *total* view of things, an insight into the meaning of the whole, and the connection of the individual with the whole have become impossible. The scientific research concerning History and the History of Philosophy differentiates the two provinces more and more sharply. All attempts at finding the final grounds of things are shattered upon the immeasurable fulness of the bare *factual* which surrounds us.

It is clear, as the particular sciences in their advancement remove ever further from

Knowledge as related to man and his life, that the union of the sciences and the connection of their relations are unable to grant us Knowledge in the definite sense already referred to. Doubtless there originate valuable tasks and combinations of the particular sciences from the proofs of their resemblances and differences, because there is room by the side of the particular sciences for a Theory of Science. But such a Theory of Science is by no means a Philosophy : mere notifications with regard to the provinces of the sciences can never bring to us anything essentially new, or enable us to attain any higher level for viewing things connectedly. The claim so often made to-day of the possibility of developing a theory of the universe from Science can only arise—if a Theory of Science signifies in any manner an insight into reality—from a false mode of thinking which becomes possible only by mixing Philosophy with Science and especially with Natural Science. To-day it is Monism especially

which believes itself able to construct a theory of the universe from Natural Science. The transformation of Natural Science into a theory of the universe is only possible through overlooking the *Subject* (man and his mind) as well as the *mental process* which carries on the work of Science, and also by overlooking what this *mental and spiritual process* has brought forth and ever brings forth in the form of contents and aims in the universal life of mankind outside the realm of Science as well as side by side with it. The theory of the universe obtained by leaving these values out of account is much too narrow in its thought-content; and the picture of the universe here presented is much too poor and shallow. Thus the confusing of Philosophy and Science produces a shallowness and an alienation within our world of ideas. When the representative of a " scientific theory of the universe " does not allow of a *contradictio in adjecto*, and presents his impossible solution as the only possible one, this can mean

nothing other than that the certitude which is reachable within Science, and especially within Natural Science, is unconsciously applied to the meaning of the *whole universe*. Evidently in this case one is not aware that in the recognition of the facts we have mentioned a transition has taken place which sets forth new demands. Thus it is incorrect to think that the problem cannot be solved in *another way* or that the scientific method is the only valid method—a method that leads us into difficulties of an *inner* kind. Hence we conclude that Science is unable to discover Knowledge in the sense in which we conceive of Knowledge, and that it is unable to unite *from within* man and the world. A view of the limits which Science in this respect certainly has shows that the nature of Science, and especially of Modern Science, is not perceived with sufficient clearness. To perceive the specific greatness of Science means at the same time to perceive its limitations.

CHAPTER III

The Failure of Speculative Philosophy

If Science then does not lead us to Knowledge, Philosophy is able to vindicate itself in relation to Knowledge only in so far as it proceeds on its own specific path. Such a path Philosophy believes to have found from of old; and for centuries this path has been the one of *speculation*. This speculation consists in a mode and work of *ideas* which free themselves from the remainder of life, and which exercise complete sovereignty over all. Such governing ideas seemed powerful enough to penetrate to the depth of Reality, and to transform this Reality into a possession of man as a thinking being. In fact, ideas have attributes which invest man with a special position and significance.

From the outset it cannot be questioned that if Knowledge be possible at all its organ must be *Thought.* In the first place, ideas are able to free man from indifference and from the interests and aims of considering himself as an isolated being. They engender the conception of an actual necessity or obligation, and may in their development feel themselves superior to all the disorder and confusion which surrounded them. In the next place, ideas include an effort to pass out of the chaos of the existing situation and to transform all the multiplicity of elements, which present themselves, into an inclusive system. They accomplish this in a *positive* way by means of linking together Propositions otherwise isolated; they do it in a *negative* way by driving contradictions out of life. In the possession of such attributes, ideas are able to transform the world into an *inner presence.*

Speculation, however, passes beyond such a valuation of ideas in that it believes itself

capable through its own inherent power of unlocking the world of Being and of guiding man to a clear knowledge of such a world. But that this matter is not so simple as Speculative Thought assumes becomes evident from a survey of the actual history of the enterprise. Such a survey points to hard trials and struggles, to a perpetual quest after new paths, and to a constant swinging from one experiment to another. It also shows an awakening of doubts ever recurring concerning the possibility of the whole undertaking. Two questions have been raised ever anew: (1) Can Thought, out of its own capacity, discover an inner union with the world of Reality? (2) Does Thought, through such a self-sovereignty, exhaust the whole domain of existence?

In the most important work of the world the connection of Thought and Being has been in the foreground. Three possibilities present themselves here. In the Middle Ages as well as in Modern Times have these

characteristics appeared, but they have been treated at various times in very diverse manners; and the centre of gravity of their various effects has been found in very different positions.

The first step of this Speculative Thought requires belief in the mutual connection of man and the world—of Thought and Being. These signify one and the same Reality, and belong to each other and strive together in a friendly encounter. The power of such relations succeeds in passing easily from one to the other; just as the light of the sun becomes visible to us because our eyes have in them something of the same nature, so here the fundamental nature of Reality is able to include our Thought because it contains within itself elements of Thought. The work of Thought thus only binds together qualities which belonged to one another from the very beginning.

The second step of Speculative Thought brings out a sharper distinction between

human life and its environment. The soul and the world are too far apart to be able to come into immediate contiguity with each other; the union of the two is now sought in the fact that what occurs on the one side has corresponding effects on the other side. Thus the supposed natural connection of Thought and Being here issues in a doctrine of Parallelism.

The third step asserts that Thought cannot reach Being that is *external* to itself, so that Knowledge is possible only in so far as Being is discovered within Thought itself, and in so far as it is produced by Thought. Thus Knowledge becomes a thought of Thought—a knowledge of self, a self-comprehension of a creative thought which embraces Subject and Object.

The theory of an intimate connection of Thought and Being corresponds to a naïve mode of thinking, and it is also held in a more refined way by an æsthetic mode of thinking. The blossoming period of such a

mode of thought was classical antiquity; but the view was also revived in the Middle Ages, and it is not entirely alien to modern times. It continues to be effective as a basis wherever the necessity of Thought and the qualities of Being are regarded as essentially connected.

This mode of thinking connects, in the closest possible manner, the microcosm with the macrocosm; it discovers connections everywhere between man and the universe, and by means of this development raises the life of man into breadth and greatness. The strength of this mode of thinking lies in its ability to see things *together;* its elevation is due to its æsthetic intuition, which does away with the interval between Subject and Object; and, consequently, it gives Life a strong feeling of rest and security, and it seems to grant Life a solid and immovable foundation. This mode of thinking on its æsthetic and general human sides finds its climax in Plato, and, on its scientific

side, in Aristotle. The former held up before mankind great ideas and myths; the latter, by means of his teaching of the union of Thought and the World, developed a logical order of Life and a thorough system of Ideas which have governed the centuries, and which exercise influence down to our own time. But even in antiquity serious doubt was raised concerning such an intimate union of man and the world; and with the Stoics and the Sceptics man and the world were parted far asunder. This cleavage between man and the world became all the deeper the more powerfully the upheavals and renewals which took place later set the meaning of life in a region above its superficial connection with the environment and found the kingdom of pure inwardness in religion alone. This inwardness needed only to gain a fully awakened self-consciousness and a power to control the work of science in order to reveal the ancient connection of inner and outer worlds as an

intolerable defect—as a projection of merely human qualities into the universe, and as an unbearable anthropomorphism. It was now seen that man, in the turn towards the world, had merely extended *his own* circle, but had not passed beyond it. It is evident that the definite contiguity and even the blending of sensuous and spiritual, as these were presented from the heights of ancient thought right through the centuries, as well as the conception of Knowledge (*e.g.* of intuition), have at the present day become untenable. More doubtful still has become the transference of formal logical conceptions into the particular nature of external things, as, for example, the treatment of modal conceptions involving even the possibility and necessity of an energy inherent in the things themselves. Such an admixture of Logic and Metaphysics penetrates into the theory of Principles of Aristotle, and it also finds a prominent place in Scholasticism. But to modern thought such conceptions appear as

presenting the world in an obscure light, and even in the dangerous light of ascribing human qualities to it. The abolition of this confusion of the logical and the real aspects of things in the beginning of modern times has resulted in a clarification highly necessary, and, indeed, in a mental and spiritual emancipation. It thus became evident that the world *without* and the world *within* contain for man a rich fulness of life; the aim was now to bring to a clear expression the abstract, formal, schematic character which the picture of Reality took, and which, since the time of Aristotle, made the inner meaning of the effort of knowledge to consist in what lies behind the particular qualities of things, *i. e.* in the nature of Being itself—in the recognition of Being as Being (τὸ ὄν ᾗ ὄν). The necessary result of this view was that the scaffolding of abstract-ontological conceptions became an essential part of Reality. The rich and variegated fulness of life presented by such conceptions

consisted, however, in a mere development on the logical side of things. The greater experiences and further development of life did not consequently combine sufficiently to form a connected view of Reality. The recognition of this fact constrained the civilised and moralised life of modern times to part with this traditional solution.

Further, the step of differentiation between Thought and Being already referred to is in no way alien to antiquity; but the classical period of antiquity did in no manner run its whole course in this direction. But though Hellenic times were conscious of the antithesis of Subject and the Universe, it is the dualistic mode of thinking in modern times that has brought such an antithesis to a climax. In the modern world, for the first time, does man gain the power and the self-consciousness to place himself, by reason of the unlimited needs of his nature, over against the whole world; more than ever has his life become a struggle with the universe.

This movement of man, however, has penetrated so deeply and ruled his spirit so powerfully because the cleft between himself and the world was thrust out of sight; and a burning desire of his life for a unity between the human spirit and the universe as well as for the transformation of inward and outward into his own possession originated. Without a radical transformation of the first view of man and the world the contradiction between them cannot be overcome. Consequently thinkers of the first rank have devoted their best energies to this task.

Descartes, who separated Thought from the World and placed it upon itself, became fully aware of the difficulty of finding his way back from Thought to the World. He sought to overcome the difficulty from the very outset by linking human reason to a Divine Reason that governed and penetrated the universe; and through such a belief he gained confidence in human capacity to acquire truth. He sought thus to discover

for his future investigations a touchstone for the differentiation of the true and the false, and believed himself to have discovered such a touchstone in concepts of entire clearness and distinctness. Complex, unfinished and strained as his conclusions are his contributions were of undoubted value in the fact that he laid the centre of gravity in *consciousness*, and gave a new beginning to the movement for conceiving things from consciousness to the world and not from the world to consciousness. The problem of Knowledge is carried further back by Spinoza and is brought by him to a height which even Leibniz could hardly overtop. Upon this height Thought and Being [the aspect of Being as Existence] stand independently over against each other, but both belong to the same Universal Life that carries and embraces them; and both exist and continue parallel to each other as the Appearance-forms of the one Reality. Whilst one side develops out of itself and according to its own nature,

still it harmonises with the other side. "The order and the connection of Ideas are the same as the order and the connection of Things." Leibniz holds to the idea of Parallelism, but by it he meant not so much that Thought and Extension should correspond to each other as that the individual and the All, the microcosm and the macrocosm, should do so. Each individual soul, according to him, experiences the whole of Infinity within itself in the form of immediacy and without any kind of mediation of the world; the "pre-established harmony" produces this connection; an Intelligence that embraces the whole universe brings forth all effects.

This theory of Parallelism contains a strong inducement to conceive each of the two sides in a precise manner on its own characteristic side, and to mark clearly the boundary of one from that of the other; and every mingling of the two is most strongly resisted. Through such a method it becomes possible to transform each of the two

into a continuous union and development, and to weld each in an incomparably more definite and consolidated a manner than was previously possible. This investigation possesses its value on account of its penetrating analysis; for the main effort of the modern world to treat Nature and the Life of the Soul as independent provinces, without, at the same time, giving up the *unity* of the universe, finds here a philosophical justification. Thus the work of Thought corresponds to the demands of a universal and all-important situation, and the frequent withdrawal of this work of Thought towards the multiplicity of external things does not by any means render it alien to Reality.

But the *difficulties* concerning the adjustment here sought for between the World of Thought and the World of Sense do not remain long out of sight. Most of all, the main idea of an all-embracing unity fails of proof. This main idea was a keen hypothesis of Speculative Philosophy, but it is an hypo-

thesis which the calm clearness of modern thought has sharply contradicted, and one whose roots lay less in modern ground than in the world of traditional religious ideas. The increasing uncertainty concerning this main idea loosened more and more the connection of man and the universe, and as the weakness of this connection increased, Thought tended to be considered and to become a merely subjective reflection; Nature now sinks to a soulless mechanism, and also all the possibility of genuine Knowledge disappears. And, further, along with this uncertainty an *inward impoverishment* gives rise to doubt and contradiction, which are actual experiences of human life despite all the external expansion and development of things. For this theory of Parallelism brings man into unison with the universe only in so far as everything specific and distinctive within him is discarded, and only in so far as what constitutes a copy of the external world is alone held as essential. But what

remains on this theory is thus no more than Thought with its forms and concatenations: man consequently and necessarily becomes a mere mechanism of Presentations and Ideas; and so it remains entirely enigmatic how he can cultivate a *unity* or *whole*, and how he can experience his own life as such. If Life, in spite of this, gains a psychic depth and warmth, this is supposed to happen not by means of the further development of ideas but by something in contrast with such ideas—by the addition of mystic speculation and intuition. It is, however, the main feature of the theory of Parallelism that while it is able to present the equilibrium striven after by the two sides by means of general ideas, it is *not* able to carry such ideas into effect. For as soon as the theory of Parallelism presents any of its conclusions we find that either the *external* or the *internal* aspect is uppermost; and the conclusion expresses itself either in Naturalism or in Idealism; mind either becomes a pheno-

menon which merely accompanies us—a mere reflex of Nature—or Nature becomes a mere description and semblance of mental and spiritual life.

The failure of both attempts—of Relation and Parallelism—necessarily leads to a further quest for a solution of the problem. If the two sides do not relate themselves intimately together, and, if separated, they do not again come together there is only one possibility of solution open, viz. the denial of all Existence outside Thought and the laying of all Reality within Thought and its movement. If Thought has to deal with *its own* evidence and not at all with anything alien to itself, if Knowledge becomes a self-comprehension of Thought, then no opposition can prevent the realisation of a complete illumination of the problem—then the work of Thought seems certain of a complete conquest. Thought is certainly here to be raised above the mere individual and established with its own motive power; it must, in

order to fulfil its task, be raised to Absolute Thought. In all this, there is in fact a genuine effort to reach summits and turning-points of life.

This path was not trodden for the first time by modern thought: antiquity and especially Plotinus and the Mystics of the Middle Ages who followed his lead trod the same path. But there lies a considerable disparity between the ancient and the modern modes of conceiving the matter. The old mode of thinking placed Being [the Constant] in the foreground, while the new mode gives most prominence to Becoming. Thus the turn of the old mode towards an Absolute Thought signified the taking up of all the multiplicity into an unchangeable unity, and interpreting the latter by means of the former. As everything draws its life from such a unity, which is its root, everything strives to return, of necessity, to this unity in order to find in it its self-subsistence and eternal rest. It is in this way alone that the Universe gains

an all-pervading unity and a pure inwardness; it is here alone that an *inner world* originates. Here the unity precedes the multiplicity, the inner precedes the outer, and the Constant precedes the mobile. As here the whole of Reality thus flows into the life of Infinity, so all definite and limited conceptions disappear, and are unable to present as their interpretation anything more than a metaphor of the deepest truth. Complete, adequate knowledge, on this view, is given by mystic intuition alone—an intuition which must be clearly distinguished from the æsthetic intuition of classical times; for while mystic intuition extinguishes all particular elements, æsthetic intuition seeks the unity in and along the multiplicity alone. It is especially from this point of view that the thought of an all-present unity and of a self-subsisting eternity (*præsentia stans*) gained such enchanting power over many minds, and gave life its penetrating inwardness as well as the way into the Great and the

Cosmic. But what is here offered as Knowledge is more of a Feeling difficult to grasp—is more of a calm absorption of the soul in Infinity than of an intellectual penetration into Reality. Such an experience certainly discovers original depths, but it does not point out a path to pass back from itself to the work of life. So that it remains true that life as a whole has been furthered more on particular sides by Religion and Art than by Philosophy.

But the modern turn of the main thought we have under consideration penetrates still more deeply into the meaning of Knowledge. It understands Thought not as an intuition by the self of an Eternal Being but as a great Becoming—as a quest for one's own self and as a self-realisation. Thus, according to this view, the cosmic process is nothing other than a self-realisation of Thought. Here emanation gives way to evolution, and intuition to the construction of ideas. Hegel especially brought this leading funda-

mental Thought to a remarkable expression. In Hegel's teaching the process of Thought is driven further and further by means of self-engendered antitheses; through thesis, antithesis, and synthesis the Thought-process evolves an ever richer content; it ascends from general outlines to concrete forms : the Process draws all that lies near to it to itself. Thus the whole of Existence is in flux; still all the multiplicity is brought into mutual relation and interpenetration, and everywhere a content of Thought is discovered as the real kernel and energy of the things of existence. Thought thus steps out of the "realm of shades"; it gains the most definite connection with the historico-social life of mankind, while the historico-social life is itself seen in great connections and is universally illumined. The view presented here by Hegel is not directed backwards towards origins but forward towards the goal of an entire self-realisation; it is the view of a calm philosophical reflection

embracing all movement—embracing all the reciprocal conflict and opposition which were placed by him in his picture of the universe. We are aware how mightily that stream of life which has had its source in this Hegelian movement has affected the minds of men, and how much this stream has affected spiritual work as well as modern civilisation and culture; but we are also aware how soon a reaction took place and how many contradictions raised up their heads.

The conception of an absolute Thought-process contains before all else an inner contradiction. Thought can be no Process, and the Process can be no Thought. Thought is essentially a stepping forth out of Time, and an apprehension of things under the "Form of Eternity." The Process, on the other hand, moves hurriedly forward further and further and knows neither rest nor terminus. Hegel, in his own person and for his own day, understood how to connect

those two different aspects; but a contradiction existed in the facts themselves, and he was obliged to find justification for his theory of Becoming in the special characteristics of great personalities, and thus he had to divide mankind into opposite camps. Where *Thought* stands in the foreground, the Process is overlooked; but this is certainly a mistake unless the Process has reached its final terminus. Thus the Movement falls within the Past alone; the Present appears as ready-made, and the Future will contain nothing to do. Where the *Process* stands in the foreground, it moves further and further into the region of the indefinite and the uncertain; the Ages lose their inner bond of connection, and Philosophy becomes a mere expression of the existing situation—a historico-social view of Reality. Thus all absolute truth must give way to a relativism; we cannot any longer speak of a deliverance from, and a mastery of, the world; in other words, there is no Knowledge possible. The

struggles and doubts which issue from such a view are bound to shake to its very foundation the position of Thought and its claims to rule the world. For though, within the human domain, a web of Thought arises and a circle of existence superior to the remainder of the psychic life develops, still all this remains a *thought of man;* and that even all this is the source of Reality—that all this carries the universe within itself—is extremely difficult to substantiate. Human thought is on this theory raised to Absolute Thought, and its mode of movement is transformed into a cosmic phenomenon in far too rash and direct a manner. For close at hand exists the doubt whether the *Whole* which is thus declared as the kernel of Reality is anything more than an accompanying phenomenon of Reality.

Further, the nature of the world presented in this view also strengthens such doubts. As Thought draws into itself all Reality, it transforms Reality into a domain of relations

and forms—into a world of outlines and shadows—into a gloomy picture. When Hegel presents us with something more than this and when his world of ideas with all its distinctive clearness works upon us, this effect does not arise from his theory but from his *personal* mode of presenting things—a mode which has an open mind for all greatness, and which understands how to view the multiplicity *together* as a richly-coloured picture. Apart from the quickening energy of great personalities, everything in his theory discloses a shadowy character and a distressing emptiness of content. And it is this fact which explains the occurrence of a rash turn towards Empiricism and Positivism and with the obscuring of man and his soul behind the problem of the physical universe, and, finally, with the renunciation of all knowledge regarding the things of the spirit and regarding greatness. Thus the historical consideration of things justified the doubt whether Thought be able

by the mere exercise of its own force to attain to Knowledge; and in this way doubt presents the dilemma that in the recognition of a world *existing externally* Thought is unable to find the path to such a world; and, that Thought, in the attempt to create all Being out of itself, exaggerates itself and loses itself in a world of shadows. Consequently the path of Philosophical Speculation ends in disappointment.

(*a*) The Transition to the Problem of Life

Speculative Philosophy and Science tend to belittle each other. Science looks upon Speculative Philosophy as a fanciful reverie; Speculative Philosophy looks upon the undertaking to interpret the universe by the methods of Science as a presumption and an invasion into a province alien to Science (*μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*). Still in spite of this divergence between the two they are related to each other, and work towards similar

ends. Both summon the intellect to assume regnancy over the whole of life, and to compress all Reality within the bounds of Thought. Thought traces out a place for both—a place into which everything has to fit and to adapt itself; it points out to action its direction, and it understands action as a conclusion—as the application of *general* propositions to *particular* cases. But the modern world has protested more and more emphatically against such a mode of treatment. The incessant expansion of Life towards the inclusion alike of what is great and what is small shows Life as being far too rich and coloured—far too mobile and variable—to be reduced into the forms and formulas of Thought. The stream of Life breaks through the dam which was meant to enclose it, and flows out of its limited enclosure into the open and the boundless. At the same time, there springs up a strong antipathy towards all attempted adjustments of Life to Thought: stronger and

stronger grows the aspiration after more immediacy, more intuition, and more originality. In Thought, we seem to be presented with mere signs and pictures and not with the "things themselves." In all the work of Thought, with its incessant reflection and discussion, Life seems to evaporate and to disappear into the shadowy. The realisation of all this is bound to create a passionate desire after a more complete Reality. Further, the work of Thought has shown so much confusion and has, within its own domain, split up in so many directions—it is so full of inquiries and doubts, of contradictions and negations—that it appears absolutely impossible to construct Life upon so unstable a foundation.

The Life of the Present is therefore powerfully affected by a desire to break the autocratic rule of the intellect, and to cast off the yoke of intellectualism. But what we discover here, as a demand of the Present, casts its light also upon the Past, and enables

us clearly to see that at all times the work of Thought reached its results not in any isolation from, but in a definite connection with, every situation of life and with the problems of the whole of life. In nowise could Greek Philosophy have brought so near together Thought and Being, or could have placed them in so fruitful a relation, had it not been that this Philosophy was encompassed by an æsthetic form of life—a form which united into *one* cosmos the inner and the outer worlds, and which brought forth by means of such a union the most fruitful creativeness. Only in an age when men, tired of mere civilisation and culture, became impressed with the necessity of something beyond mere rest and peace, and only when they felt that their greatest gain consisted in a flight to a supersensuous order of things could such a world of ideas as that of Plotinus originate and gain the influence it actually attained. And, in modern times, it is on account of the desire to free Body and

Mind, Nature and Spirit, from an intolerable entanglement and to differentiate them in a fundamental manner without allowing either to fall outside *one total world*, that the doctrine of Parallelism has reached such a stage of development and has exercised such a power. And are the systems born of keen speculative German Philosophy understandable without the background of a highly-strung cultivated age and of a human capacity directed towards what is highest? Indeed, different as such epochs may be, and far removed from one another as may be their achievements, all their differences recede into the background as soon as we compare the whole of our Western civilisation and culture with the Indian civilisation and culture. For then it becomes apparent that in the Western World a more positive love of life discovers all the more strongly the oppositions of the world and struggles with them, and, on account of this, stands upon solid ideas and a uniform development;

whilst, in the East, a renunciative mode of life paints the impressions of the world in weak colours, and seeks the *whole* in the *particular*, and thus gladly expresses its results and convictions by means of symbols and metaphors. Thus the mode of *Life* radically determines the mode of Thought and Knowledge.

Indeed, with regard to this, History shows that even where Intellectualism reached its highest point—where Thought attempted to carry Life along simply by its own energy —Thought advanced far beyond its merely intellectual achievement, so that it became a movement of the whole of life even to the realisation of a new level—a level of self-activity. When Plato bases all genuine virtue upon an insight of knowledge, because it is such an insight alone that makes virtue one's own act; when Clement and Origen show that Christian truth is brought into the inwardness of the soul by means of knowledge alone; when Leibniz, in a similar manner, considers it necessary that all

genuine love to God should be based upon knowledge; when Spinoza and Hegel are persuaded that a new nature for man springs out of Thought—to them all Thought is incomparably more than a mere mental act; it means in fact to them all an act of the whole nature of man and a turn of the whole life.

If thus a specific Life exists as a directive power behind Thought, the struggle for Thought is in the last resort a struggle for Life. Thinkers are divided from one another not so much because they interpret a *common* fact in merely *different* lights, but because they see things from different standpoints of life—each seeing something different in the things under observation—each fact disclosing something special to each thinker. But though this connection of Thought and Life is now so indisputable, the connection was not thoroughly worked out at an earlier period, and hence the struggle of the spirit of man was not decisively presented. So far from

seizing the key of the situation one did not come out of a situation of skirmishing between advance guards. But when we find to-day an aspiration after, as well as a clearer insight into, the moving energies of life should we not break away decisively from Intellectualism, and base Thought upon Life rather than Life upon Thought? Certainly the problem of Knowledge gains a more advantageous position when the question is directed towards Life and not towards Existence. For Existence stands over against us as something fixed and inscrutable: only in its *effects* does Existence come into contact with us—in *effects* which continue unintelligible however much of their nature they communicate to us. But Thought is quite capable of being translated into Life; and, because it is created out of Life, it can, at the same time, work for the elevation of Life. Thus Knowledge advances not by means of anything alien to itself but by means of *itself;* and it moulds itself into a knowledge of itself

as well as into a knowledge of the self. That Thought be above all else transformed into self-knowledge is an imperative demand. For it is an inner contradiction to will to know what is alien to us—to will to fathom what is alien to ourselves. If we really know only what is *our own*, the power of appropriation must precede all Knowledge or at least must be united with Knowledge. It is only the turn towards Life that offers a pathway in this respect.

Thus various things operate to sustain the desire to base Knowledge upon Life. This desire moves in mighty waves through the efforts of the present day.

CHAPTER IV

The Modern Conceptions of Life

A movement such as this in the direction of Life could hardly have been called with such earnestness into being in our day had there not awakened also a *new* Life—a Life that has branched out in all directions. But it is not said that the Life that has filled and satisfied a particular epoch is the whole, the final, and the deepest possible within the human domain, or that this Life of a particular epoch is able to bring forth Knowledge in the full sense of the term. For, as will be shown later in this volume, Knowledge has permanent conditions. Whether the mode of Life which prevails at the present day, and which might mould Knowledge in a new way, is in reality able to do this

is a question which must first of all be investigated. A demonstration of this is all the more necessary because currents of an epoch tend to become self-satisfying and readily accept the approval of the masses as the actual proof of their worth.

The present-day view of Life, however, is especially under the influence of the turn towards sensuous existence as this existence surrounds us in Nature and in human society; and the empirical mode of thought which issues is held competent to mould Knowledge from these two sources. Whatever in our day proves favourable to such a point of view as this (and we have already noticed that much seems favourable) will enter into the new moulding of Knowledge, and will recommend itself to our age. This method will especially seek to draw into its current the movements against Intellectualism, the desire after immediacy, intuition, and reality. The age will thus find its fulfilment in what appear as the

claims of this point of view. But the empirical current divides into two main tributaries according as to whether human existence or Nature stands in the foreground. Thus there are apparent to-day two new modes of the Theory of Knowledge—a Pragmatic and a Biologic mode. It is necessary to investigate more fully the nature of both conceptions; for it is only the analysis of both of these modern conceptions which can prove the right of our particular undertaking, and which can clearly set forth the characteristics of this right.

(*a*) Pragmatism

Pragmatism has had a continuous history from of old down to the English-speaking world of the present, and has exercised great influence; but the formulation which its fundamental idea has recently received in the United States of America has given it a more precise form as well as a new significance. Its direction upon experience

and the conduct of life has, in America, brought about a specific conception of Truth which has placed the whole work of Knowledge in a new light. To this view, it seems entirely misleading and fatuous to attempt to discover the nature of things through an effort after the nature of Knowledge, or by means of a union with the "things themselves"; and it is also hopeless to attempt to reach a world existing independently of ourselves. For there is no sure path to such a world, and there is no possibility of verifying any of the experiments made in this direction. In fact, through such attempts we lose ourselves in vain reflections, which have not the slightest possible value for our actual needs. The wide divisions and the incessant disputes of the sects also furnish a further corroboration to the uselessness of this kind of effort. What we know and what is of significance for us are *our own life and its needs;* it is only in so far as things

work upon life that we know them and have interest in them; and as these effects of things upon us are either of a helpful or of an obstructive kind a standard and also a conception of Truth are to be found in such effects. What is now *true* is that which works for the elevation of life—that which serves the development and success of life—that which is useful in the widest sense of the term—whilst what is *false* is that which injures and coerces life.

The method which develops out of such a standpoint possesses many advantages. It removes us from inaccessible causes and sets us upon tangible effects; the work of Thought is here brought near to the whole of life as well as to immediate perception and intuition; nowhere then is such work vain but it bears valuable fruit in every situation of life. And, at the same time, there result an intense concentration and condensation of the work of Thought,

whilst all the problems which cannot affect anything in life must be excluded as things irrelevant and insoluble, as, for instance, the ontological questions of the old Metaphysic; whilst, however, all that remains by virtue of its relations to a governing centre—to life—is brought nearer and its elements are woven more closely together. In addition to these advantages, there is also the merit of the *mobility* which the work of Thought thus gains, and which answers in the best possible manner to the modern desire for more freedom of movement. As Life is in incessant movement the useful and the harmful change along with it; therefore Knowledge also must possess a definite relation to the times and must shape ever anew a readjustment of the demands of the times. In all this, Thought seems to operate not on account of its own necessity, but is used as a tool of Life—as a path upon which Life seeks its summit; thus Thought has no autonomous

and absolute character, but only an instrumental one.

How far the work of Thought has been transformed by means of such a conception can be more clearly shown by means of particular examples than by elaborate discussions. Though Materialism and Idealism have in the past struggled against each other, still both have sought to trace back reality to a value contested for by each. In this attempt, therefore, each came to the region of Metaphysics—an unknown land to the mass of mankind. The result of the contentions was an endless debate, not in the least useful, and leading to no conclusive result. The facts become interpreted quite otherwise when it is asked (following here the guidance of the leading spirit of the whole movement—the excellent William James) whether an explanation of the higher phenomena by means of the lower and the reduction of the higher to the lower, or whether an explanation by means of a recognition

of the independence and leading position of the higher phenomena be the more profitable. Thus the question is wholly transferred into the domain of our own history and experience; and here the answer certainly seems to favour Idealism as a doctrine which possesses more rousing energy and presents higher Ends than Materialism. "But spiritualistic [idealistic] faith in all its forms deals with a world of *promise*, while materialism's sun sets in a sea of disappointment" (James's *Pragmatism*, p. 108). The case is similar in connection with the problem of Religion. If the truth of Religion depended upon speculative insight we should need to possess the mental capacity sufficient to penetrate into its deepest "grounds," and consequently a certitude could never be attained; and, besides, if such "grounds" were attainable they would still have too little to reveal to us. But if we test Religion by what it is able to accomplish for human life, when it works upon life, a path seems

to be found which certainly leads to a definite goal and one in which we can all participate. "On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true" (*Pragmatism*, p. 299).

By means of such a turn towards the *effects* of things Pragmatism does no more than take up once again an old mode of experience and raise it to the level of a *Principle:* this is the *Principle* that nothing gives man an easier entrance into general Thought than what is felt as a *personal effect.* For instance, the peace of mind and the fulness of hope which Religion brings to the souls of men have undoubtedly meant far more than all the efforts of theologians and philosophers to found religion upon a scientific basis. Pragmatism further recommends itself to the modern mind on account of the prevalent denial of the validity of Intellectualism and especially of Speculative Metaphysics, and also on account of the

rich fulness of intuitive experience which leads the modern mind to the work of Knowledge. But what contributes most of all to the popularity of Pragmatism is the surpassing position which human society has reached in modern times with regard to its view of *Life*—a fact which means that the welfare of life has become more and more the all-governing aim of effort. As the unity of mankind cannot now, as was the case in former times, create its tasks and its values from an order of existence above and beyond itself, every synthesis which binds men together must therefore all the more concentrate all anxiety, work, and hope upon its own immediate existence. Herewith it appears at first a great gain to throw off the yoke of dependency upon alien powers, to place man simply upon himself, and thus to gain a better soil for fruitful work and creativeness. Thus the definite co-operation of men seems able to place high value on effects which had become sacri-

ficed to Religion and Metaphysics. In fact, the whole mental and moral movement of modern times has taken the path from God to reason and from reason to humanity, and is believed to have reached a final conclusion in a "religion of humanity." Ludwig Feuerbach was only giving an individual expression to a widespread tendency when he said—"God was my first thought, reason my second, and man my third."

Thus were Ideals transformed solely into the meaning of human society: Ethics now discovered its main task in working for the human environment, and it became moulded into Social Ethics; Religion became a worship of humanity ("le grand être," to use Comte's expression); instead of a belief in an invisible Kingdom of God there appeared the belief in the incessant progress of humanity. Does not the work of Thought stand in the closest accord with such notions when its main subject-matter and motive no longer deal

with attempts to fathom the depth of the Godhead, but with illuminating and furthering the situation of man? The human province on this view can no longer receive its light from the universe, but its darkness is now illumined only in so far as it relates itself to the situation of man.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the Pragmatic movement should attract wide circles, especially when we remember that the weight of remarkable personalities lies behind its teaching. But there is no question that over against the strong impression which Pragmatism has made a reaction has again set in—a reaction which raises more and more objections to it. These objections penetrate from particular points to the very heart of the assertions of Pragmatism, and it is precisely in what Pragmatism regards as its own stronghold that its disadvantages and drawbacks become manifest.

In the first place, it is not easy to determine and to assess the *nature of effects*

upon man—it is not easy to state what is useful or what is injurious. Judgments on this question may vary considerably because different sides give attention to different complexes of thought, and the particular standpoints of the observers put emphasis on very different things. The opponent of Religion is far from admitting that Religion furthers human welfare: he will far rather place in the foreground the superstition, the inner disposition of men, the spirit of persecution—it is on these things that the emphasis will be laid by him. He argues as follows: The whole of human existence shows good and evil effects in an entangled confusion, and who is going to decide, without any doubt concerning the matter, whether good or evil has the upper hand? The materialist again will by no means acknowledge that Idealism works advantageously upon the human spirit. He will at once raise the objection that a favourable judgment with

regard to Idealism assumes at the outset the standpoint of Idealism, and that consequently the facts appear quite otherwise than what they really are. Thus the strife concerning the *effects* inevitably leads back to a similar question concerning *principles*—a question which it is sought to avoid.

Further, the mobility of the Pragmatic doctrine is in no manner a pure gain. The advocate of mobility accustoms himself to see in it only freedom, richness, and progress; he overlooks the dispersal, the frittering away, and the disappearance of so many things of value. If human wants and needs are made the measurements of truth, we get truths as numerous as are times, states of morals, and, indeed, individuals. For one thing finds its welfare in *this* and the other in *that*, so that we obtain a situation of sharp contrasts. Thus times of spiritual exhaustion and of timid disposition call for a system of religious ideas quite different from what is desired in times of

joyous creativeness and of victorious energy. In the former the idea of the antitheses, and in the latter the idea of harmony, would predominate; in the former Transcendence and Dualism become just as self-evident as Immanence and Monism in the latter. The contrast between waning antiquity and the beginnings of modern times shows all this quite clearly. And this contrast ramifies further and further into all the multiplicity, until finally every point and every moment come to have each its own particular needs and also to possess each its own specific truth. In such an unfathomable ocean of particular truths is not the conception of Truth itself drowned? This destruction of the conception of Truth would not only mean the destruction of what *objectively* surveys the whole of the movement; it would also mean a perceptible difference in what exists *within*. For no one is so confined to his own particular circle that he can afford to dispense with the observations

and points of view of others, or to abandon the attempt to adjust his own life to what is external. And when one now discovers such points of deviations—deviations not only here and there but everywhere and universally —one is inevitably shaken in one's own convictions. Indeed, the further one sees into this fact and, indeed, the more impartially one can place himself in the position of another, the more inevitably does he arrive at scepticism.

But a deeper note still is sounded in the question whether, in connection with the things of the spirit, the *effects* allow of being considered by *themselves in isolation*, or whether they remain *connected* with their *causes*. The *effects* of things in the *external world* can be measured *by themselves:* the effects of electricity, for instance, do not depend upon the mode in which they are interpreted by us. But what obtains within the *soul*, and is mediated by means of Thought, cannot be removed from its basis,

because it receives its scientific character *from the character of its basis alone.* This basis is not something that is supplemented by Thought, but belongs to the *nature of things.* For this reason Religion so powerfully affects the human soul in that it brings to man a Power superior to himself, in that it promises to unite him from *within* with this Power, and, indeed, to transplant him into the kingdom of this Power. It is because Religion is *no mere theory* of Divine things, but the inauguration of a *new life,* that it cannot possibly doubt the real presence of a Divine Being within the human soul. If nothing beyond a *mere intellectual proof* of the presence and reality of the Divine be present in the soul, Religion becomes no more than a mere phantom and fancy: the claim that Religion works in man and the effects it produces depend upon the experience that *something beyond* him is grasped as a *fact* and is attended to and preserved. Thus in spiritual things the

effects do contain assertions concerning the *cause*. It may be that up to a certain level the mere idea produces the same result as the reality, but it is able to do this only so long as it is held as the entire truth; when any uncertainty arises concerning the completeness of the idea, the *effect* disappears. The illusion of a dream works upon us only so long as we are asleep. The idea of Thought waking out of the slumber of ordinary daily life is as old as Plato.

Behind this reflection of things from the side of their *effects*, there arises a conception of Thought and Knowledge which produces a positive contradiction. This standpoint for viewing things looks upon Life, with its situations and movements, as something close to our hands—ready-made—as something which Thought has only to interpret. But such a relation of Thought to Life holds good only in so far as an *external* world exists by our side; and such a relation

is invalid with regard to the *inner* world. For in the *inner* life Thought co-operates from the very first in the development of life, and blends in the re-moulding of life —it is really an *essential* part of life and not a mere means to it. And when philosophic effort raises Thought in a freer manner from the structure of Life, and seeks to bring it into independent effect, Thought is not by this means entirely severed from the process of Life, but is further developed; and, indeed, in this manner a transformation takes place within Thought itself—a transformation which means that man is freed from his *natural* state and from the particularity of a life moving from point to point, and is transplanted into a life connected with the universe and into a Reality which is more than the individual content of his own life. Man, in all this, labours to shift the centre of gravity of his life from the petty, narrow, and empty self into the creativeness of a

more universal life—from what is merely "given" into self-activity, and from a derivative and dependent life to a life freer and more original. When this happens, new avennes open out, new movements are called forth, and mightily within the human soul arises the hope for freedom, for expansion, and for a life of larger content. This has constituted the aspiration and hope of all the great thinkers: to all of them Knowledge so far from being merely a genial helpmate of Life, was an ascent to a *new kind of life*—a deliverance out of an intolerable narrowness and emptiness. It is true that doubt attaches itself to such an effort, and raises the question whether man does not undertake the impossible in the pursuit; but, in spite of this, doubt does not destroy the *inner elevation* which lies beyond the initial situation —beyond the situation of the "merely human." Though a complete answer to the question may not be reached, still the

question has *altered* the aspect of the facts—a new view has been reached and it cannot possibly again disappear—so that a return to the initial naïve situation or the finding of a satisfaction in it is utterly precluded. Such a satisfaction is herewith finally destroyed; so that, if we are unable to proceed further on the new path, there now opens up before us only a gulf of dark despair in which all striving is abandoned.

On account of such a situation of things, the undertaking of Pragmatism—the undertaking to hold fast to the knowledge concerning human well-being and to return constantly to such a knowledge—cannot but be viewed as a situation which the most important historical movements of the world have left behind. We have outgrown the standard of a welfare merely human, and all the values of such a welfare cannot blind us to their narrowness and emptiness. Nothing is so characteristic of man as that he possesses a nature that must

strive to get beyond itself; such a characteristic and effort may be often ignored, but they can never be entirely suppressed. That Pragmatism, by means of its activity, has made such a deep impression and has won so many excellent personalities is accounted for by the fact that it has, from the very outset, idealised its view of human life, and has included within itself qualities which could not possibly arise within the merely human circle, and which also need for their development the energetic work of Thought. Especially does the modern conception of Society work upon Pragmatism often in a misleading manner, whilst, in its mere extension of the human circle, a refinement and a transformation of the "goods" of Society take place in such a way as to involve the belief that a growth in *quantity* means without further ado an advance in *quality*.

Society certainly issues in a unification of things, but the experience of History

shows clearly enough that such a unification is not confined to what is good, but extends also to what is evil; and the situation as a whole is marked rather by confusion than by orderly arrangement. If the social effort results in something *essentially new and higher*, this can only proceed from the energy of a Spiritual Life: the issues set forth the conditions of Spiritual Life which reveal themselves in them. Then it is not so much the *natural* man—either as a type or as an individual—whom we have to esteem and honour but the *new stage of life* which appears within him and which makes him a "new creature." The glorification of the natural man roots itself in the last resort in that cult of generalities which began in antiquity but which was brought to a full development only at the period of the Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*), and from which most of our great thinkers have been unable to free themselves. If we break with this cult the impossibility

of confining all Knowledge within the bounds of the *ordinary* experience of mankind becomes fully evident.

If, therefore, we are obliged to deny that Knowledge is to be gained on the path of Pragmatism—Knowledge as it not only presents itself to the mind, but as it corresponds to the longings and aspirations of mankind —still we can receive an incentive from Pragmatism and recognise in it something of value. This we are able to do especially in two respects—in the human point of departure of Pragmatism and in its demand for a Knowledge which tells upon life. Little as we may make mankind the goal of our Knowledge, still mankind with its experiences remains the only possible *point of departure* for the work of Knowledge. To have emphasised this truth is a service rendered by Pragmatism. But a twofold negation comes in in connection with this matter. On the one hand, we find the negation of the possibility of starting from

the external world—a world which only means anything to us in its effects upon us, and which can never become our own life; and, on the other hand, a denial of a point of departure from ontological conceptions such as unity and multiplicity, rest and change—conceptions which can never lead to a reality rich in content, and which can never lead beyond themselves to a point of sure decision. Man himself undoubtedly presents us with the deepest meaning of the universe—man not in his individual existence but in his final convictions and in his development of universal experiences. If at all, it is in this way that an inner relation to the universe such as is sought after by Knowledge is attained. But we have to bear in mind that such a Cosmic life is something more than the mere acceptance of what is on the surface or a mere description of things; such a Cosmic life has to raise man and set in motion something that is within him which is superior to his own particularity.

The hope of success in this direction lies in the fact that man can aspire after independence and can construct a Reality rich in content. It is out of such a hope alone that he can make the attempt to discover a light in a universe otherwise dark. Our Yea leads beyond Pragmatism; in the Nay we are at one with it.

Further, we sympathise with its condemnation of a work of Knowledge which severs itself from the *whole* of life, which constructs a special web of its own, which has no progressive results without having serious defects along with them. It is not necessarily meant that he who desires a furtherance of Life by means of Thought has passed over to Utilitarianism. For such an advance of Life by means of Thought is to be understood in two ways. On the one hand, such a furtherance deals with the situation—with the subjective state and the welfare of man and of human relations; and, on the other, the existence and content

of life itself have to be taken into account. In the former, human existence is viewed as a " given " possession—a possession whose petty " dead level " has to be shared in by all that is drawn into its service and that is employed as a means for its success. In the latter, man is considered as a being who has *needs* and is capable of elevation, so that everything that enters into relation with him, in this respect, is drawn into an ascending movement and is further developed by means of itself. In the former, man is a datum; in the latter, he becomes a problem. In the former, he is engaged in the decoration of an *old* world; in the latter, he is struggling for a *new* one.

The view which develops out of the former mode of thought renders clear no more than the relations which objects and processes have to man's given possessions. What these signify beyond their relations and what they are in themselves—all this remains, on the level of relations, in total

darkness as well as in entire indifference. But if the question is turned towards something that is *new* that can happen in man—towards the question whether and how far he is able to experience a further development and transformation within his own life—then there arises the *affirmative fact* of something that exists beyond the customary mode of ideas and the mere inclination of man—of something that comes to the foreground of life, something which gains *an independence of its own* in contrast to the remainder of life, and which extends the circle of man's reality, and, indeed, leads him to a genuine reality. Thus there arise here, out of man's life itself, both a problem of Truth and a movement towards Truth.

Within all the domain of the life of the spirit as Knowledge may apprehend it, such a difference as we have mentioned as well as an advance beyond Utilitarianism become evident. For instance, Religion appears quite different and has quite a different

value for Thought according as to whether it is conceived as a means of furthering the subjective opinions of the individual or of human society and of furthering man in his mere wishes and hopes, *or* according as to whether it develops further the situation of life, awakens new tasks and energies, calls forth new movements, shifts the standpoint of life, culminates by means of them all in a transmutation of the process of life so that all prior aims and standards, and, indeed, all man's prior existence, become insufficient and even intolerable. By means of the first conception referred to, we do not, in an inward manner, reach beyond ourselves; and doubt remains as to whether the whole domain of Religion is anything more than a fabric of human wishes and ideas, and as to whether man constructs within himself anything beyond a mere semblance which has no right to be termed Truth at all. But when Religion calls forth movements which withstand, in a direct manner,

the natural desires of man — movements which engender difficult entanglements, and cast him into a state of grave unrest, but which, in the midst of all agitation and negation, inaugurate new contents of life, new instinctive and intuitive energies, new aims and, indeed, a completion of life— then we are compelled to ask, could all this originate from that "given" existence by which man is primarily conditioned? Is there not rather to be recognised here a further inauguration of Reality, which carries its verification within itself? And are we not able, in so far as such a Reality becomes *our own* life and deed, to penetrate into it and to transform it into Knowledge?

In the antithesis, however, which is thus disclosed in all this, and which extends over the whole extent of life, we observe, on the one side, the cultivation of the merely *natural* life, and, on the other, the *inner elevation* of man above irreconcilable opposition. Thus we observe morality and right,

on the one hand, as mere means for the development of an easy and pleasurable collective life; and, on the other, as the dawning of a new world of freedom and spontaneity. Thus, we find Art on the one side, as a means of gratification—as a pleasant stimulus to the senses; and, on the other side, we are conscious of an inner conquest over the contrasts of our life—of the creation of a more sublime harmony. We find Science on the one hand a means to the mastering of the environment; on the other hand, we experience an elevation of life beyond the embroilment of its daily routine and beyond an effortless renunciation into the mere level of external things. Therefore the Useful and the Good constitute two entirely different *stages*—indeed, two entirely different *worlds*. Little advantage as may accrue to the problem of Knowledge from the promotion of the *first* mode of life, the *second* mode has an advantage all the greater. Knowledge itself verifies its own value and rights;

it not only merely prepares the inner elevation of man but it also remains permanently present within the development of such an elevation; it is not merely a point of departure, but also constitutes an essential part of the new life; it does not stand by the side of, but within, the life. It is therefore able to reveal the work of Thought which operates upon Life. A Reality which has its source within the *process of Life* does not countenance our being shut up within what is alien and unknowable. Therefore points of connection, prospects, and tasks arise as material for Thought to work upon.

We are at one with many of the Pragmatists with regard to the necessity of making the assertion of the *actual elevation of life* the touchstone of Truth, and, indeed, we are at one with the main atmosphere of Pragmatism. But we must bring the accusation against it that it does not sufficiently distinguish between the *natural desires* and the *elevation of life*, between the

decoration of a *given* world and the struggle for a *new* one, between what is *useful* and what is *good*. Where, however, the New does not attain spontaneity it cannot possibly connect itself together; it cannot unfold its own nature, and its motive power cannot develop; it cannot secure a standpoint to view and illumine Reality or possess Knowledge in the sense in which we here employ the term. This being so, we remain immersed in a turbid mixture while our situation is in dire need of clarification and differentiation. The continuance of Pragmatism in such a confused situation is ultimately due to its false idealisation of the merely ordinary level of human life: it concedes to such an ordinary level, especially by means of an ethico-religious conviction, a deeper background and a richer spiritual content than such an ordinary level of life is capable of bringing forth through its own virtue. Man needs and sees *more* than he really possesses; but this More is not, however,

acknowledged in its superiority and independence, but is looked upon and used as if it were entirely the evidence of an existence merely human—as if his merely natural existence had brought forth what in fact has been brought forth by a Spiritual Life operating within man's natural state.

The fact is therefore to be admitted that if human life is to constitute the starting-point of Knowledge, *more* must happen within it than the preservation and desires of man in his *merely natural state.* If there were no more than this present, the aims of life could never lead to an *essential* content of life, but even in every success man would enter into an ever greater inward emptiness. Therefore true Knowledge calls upon man not merely to reorganise what is *given* to him as a natural human inheritance but to transform such an inheritance from its very foundation. The words of Kant are applicable in this respect: "Everything—even the most sublime thing—diminishes

under the hands of man when he turns the *idea* into a *mere utility*."

(*b*) The Biological View

Pragmatism roots itself in the life of the individual and of society as these are interpreted in our own modern times. The Biological view connects itself with Nature, and develops out of Nature a specific theory of Knowledge. As against Pragmatism, with which it has many affinities, the Biological view has the merit of greater expansion—of a wider adaptation of man in his connection with the physical universe. Nature, however, appears to the Biological view as a domain of universal movement and incessant "becoming." What is attempted here, from the very outset, is to interpret Nature in this manner. This point of view constitutes the difference even of the new Physics from the old; indeed, the new Physics founded by Galileo and Descartes maintained that *change* cannot be conceived any

longer as *matter* set going by *spirit*, but that what is termed *spirit* is imbedded in *matter:* it was maintained further that the " ground " of *change* appears as a natural " ground " which requires no other kind of interpretation. Everywhere the idea of *change* has been gradually applied to all natural phenomena, and, indeed, to the whole of Nature itself. This could not come about until the rigidity of the old mechanistic system had been overcome nor before the phenomenon of Life, found in Nature, had acquired greater importance and, indeed, had been brought to the foreground. The modern theory of Evolution has brought this tendency to a culmination. At the present time, the whole of Nature appears as a stream of Becoming, and, indeed, as a Becoming which does not from the outset follow any definite course, but which obtains its present form only through the situations which constitute the actual course of the process and which consequently are discovered by experience.

Change is conceived as entering more deeply into the particular elements than was previously supposed to be the case. Becoming and passing away, youth and old age, are now discovered as exhibited in things which were formerly viewed as static and immutable. Thus the belief in any stability has been surrendered: all things from the greatest to the least are conceived as being in flux.

Corresponding to such a view of Nature as an incessant Change and Becoming is the view of the whole of modern times. Hardly any mode of thought distinguishes so clearly our own day from earlier epochs as the conviction that our circle of life is not something ready-made and enclosed, but that it continually extends and transforms itself. Such a conviction not only sharpened the insight for discovering Change and Becoming everywhere, but became also an incentive for the extrusion of all ideas of Permanence — it became the incentive

for the awakening of all that slumbers within us, and for the taking hold of and extending new possibilities at all times. It became now impossible to retain the old conception of the meaning of Life and the Universe; it became impossible to bring life to a situation of Rest; it became impossible to resolve it into a calm contemplation of itself. But the task became now to strive further towards the endless, to conceive physical things not as something limited but as something capable of indefinite heightening. As early as the fifteenth century we find in Nicolaus Cusanus this sentiment: "To be able to know more and more without end is the image of eternal wisdom. The man who knows may ever know more, and the man who loves may ever love more: the whole world cannot suffice such a man because it cannot satisfy his desire for knowledge." In the progress of such a transformation all aims governing the Change as from the outside disappeared; all now resolves

itself into the heightening of the Change itself —the emphasis is now laid on the ever more complex growth of physical energies towards a self-sufficing aim. All consequences and results had value here only in so far as they led to new tasks beyond themselves.

Biological Science also adjusts Knowledge to this incessant stream of Becoming. Where all is discovered as being in flux and transformation there is no longer possible an immutable truth—a truth which enables man to view things *sub specie æternitatis*, but Knowledge has to follow the course of the stream of Life, and has to present before itself the phases of this stream, and has to apply itself in the best way it can to what is happening at the moment. Hence Knowledge has not so much to *explain* as to *ascertain* and *describe ;* it does not now originate from a *complete idea* but only shows the *connections* of simultaneous and successive events. It cannot now attempt to construct a specific and

independent mode of life and confer upon such a mode a value for itself; for it cannot possibly be more than a *means* for the vindication and heightening of the process of Life. It can, it is true, become useful to man because it points out in each case certain situations, and helps to link such situations to human activities, and is able to work for the acceleration of the process of Life. If, thus, not only all Metaphysics but also all the conclusions of the *world of ideas* are sacrificed, an entire compensation for this loss is supposed to be gained in a fuller openness in connection with particular impressions and stimulations as well as in the realisation of untold plenty of the things which change. It is then assumed that when the work of Thought thus gives up its " imaginary superiority and independence," it will flow all the more intimately with the work of life, and will extend over the whole breadth of life. It requires no exposition on our part

to show how conducive in modern times is this mode of thinking to the breaking up of the traditional systems of Thought and of the familiar boast of intuitive experience : this condition is induced by the fact that ever anew unexpected paths appear, and vistas unseen before are opened to view. The whole result of modern technics, with the triumphal march of its discoveries, points in this direction. How often here does the unexpected lead to important results, and how often is physical reality alone proved simply by its actual occurrence!

Thus we have here under consideration a particular development of Life and Thought whose rights cannot be disputed. The question is whether such rights are all-inclusive and all-controlling, and whether the effort of mankind after Knowledge can be satisfied to end in the solution offered. The answer to this question depends especially upon as to whether the conception of life which Biology offers is able to include within itself

the whole of human life. Should human life overstep the boundary marked by the Biological conceptions, what is offered here as Knowledge cannot possibly satisfy.

Now, Biology creates its conception of Life from the world around us : Life is thus nothing other than a development of energy and the movement of elements united together ; it is the self-maintenance of particular points in the web of relations which, as such, expresses reality. Life constitutes also here, in each particular situation, no more than a succession of particular processes which form a concatenation, but out of which *no inward whole*, which is able to bring about a union and survey of these processes, can be established. Behind these processes there thus remains only an inscrutable life-energy which appears in no manner as having purpose or value, but which works merely as a blind fact. It is thus impossible to give any meaning and aim to the movement of Life. Reality therefore is here reduced

entirely to particular threads, and consequently it is held that only human imagination can combine the mechanism into a *whole* and conceive it as a *whole;* and, further, it is held that when Nature is personified and efforts and effects are ascribed to it, we are dealing with what may be allowable as an artistic view but which is not a philosophical interpretation of things.

Now, it is incontestable that such a Life—with its mysterious impulses, its boundless and incessant mobility, its dissolution of all relations into a succession of elements—reaches far into the domain of *human* nature, indeed, far deeper than the illusive appearance of civilisation and culture is apt to indicate. But such a Life in no manner includes the *whole* domain and capabilities of man—it is not man's inevitable destiny. With regard to man, the facts disclose a *More*—they disclose that it is possible for man to *reflect* upon such a natural process of Life, to compare it with his own mental

conclusions, to examine his relations to it, and to test its value by means of a *Standard* that is within himself. In connection with all this, the experience of universal history testifies with undoubted clearness that such tests are by no means invariably favourable to man; indeed, they show that man's life, with its self-assertion and achievements, brought forth at any price, is insufficient and, indeed, intolerable; and further that the binding of his life to this natural course of things appears as a great degradation and an ignoble shackle from which he should strive with his whole energy to free himself. Closer consideration discloses the fact that a similar opposition appears not only in the individual situations but that it also penetrates the whole of history, and that the mental and spiritual movement cannot attain to an independence and well-marked characteristics without engaging in a *struggle*. It is not only this or that element in civilisation and culture, but the *whole* of

these, that seek an elevation beyond such a natural process of Life—that seek a *new* life over against it all.

Thus the fundamental idea involved in the Indian conception of Spiritual Life is the deliverance of man from the darkness and delirium of desire—an idea which wins man's soul and frees him from "the thirst—the contemptible thirst—which has such power over the world." And Greece, at the summit of its development, blended the pursuit after a merely surface-life with an effort for a life full of content—a life resting in its own activity, a creative life in contrast to a life of a mere contemplation of the Beautiful. And when we come to Christianity, it is evident how it made all things subservient to the anxiety for the redemption of the soul and to the struggle for life eternal. And in regard to the powerful impulse of modern life, life is not, at the point of its highest development, the mere rise of energy but a *personal experience* of this

rise within the *whole* of life; life here means the increasing greatness and strength of the nature and a personal experience of the validity of this in the midst of all its activities. It is this which moves and carries onward and upward the minds and hearts of men.

Again an impartial reflection upon and a critical valuation of the Biological mode of thought which arises from such experiences as we have already noticed cannot evade the fact that the effect upon the minds of its adherents, in so far as it is good at all, depends upon an unstipulated idealisation of the movement of the natural process of Life. It often seems as if Life in general were conceived as in sure progress—as in an unbroken ascent. This admission—of Life's ever further Becoming—may then offer a certain compensation for the seeming failure of other aspects and ends of Life. This admission may inspire man with an intense desire to further the

development of the Universe. But how does it stand in connection with the validity of such a progress? It is true that it holds valid in connection with particular periods, and is able to find a specially favourable soil within certain domains; but it is not on account of this valid for the *whole* of existence. If the world, in the last resort, is nothing more than "mere Nature," every ascent is followed by a descent, every flow by an ebb, every growth by a decay, every life by a death; for this is the iron law of Nature, which governs from the solar system to the minutest elements. Observation of all this may not cause any pain to the mind that clings to the mere moment and exhausts itself in each moment; but to him who, as a *man*, reflects concerning things as a whole there cannot but arise burning questions concerning the results of the whole: the alternate billows and shallows which result in nothing substantial and the transformations of the whole of reality into a blind play of forces

—all this weighs heavily upon the soul, so that man must either deny the possibility of anything higher or take his stand upon a life superior to that of the natural world. Only such as do not think out their thoughts to their ultimate issues are satisfied with a mid-path between these two alternatives.

That this More of Life is, however, no mere fancy is shown in the world's actual development as presented in history. Such a movement would have been impossible if man had been wholly immersed in the blind pleasures of life. In fact, man is driven by such pressure *beyond* that "mere life" which has no concern for the future to a desire for a *personal experience*—to an effort after some kind of content for life, and to some kind of a *new being* by means of the development of an inward energy. In the degree in which this aspiration succeeds in the same degree also arises an effort after an *inner illumination*—after a Knowledge in a higher sense than is verified in a Biological sense.

Such a Biological Knowledge has definite conditions, and sets forth imperative demands, but it does not require much effort to show that such demands can never be fulfilled unless the process of life itself comes half-way to meet them and unless it prepares the way for them.

Knowledge is possible only if a stable fulcrum is able to persist in the midst of the flux of things, and if such a fulcrum is able to furnish durable truths out of the changes and transformations. Biology, however, is bound to come into conflict with such a view on account of the fact that it makes Thought entirely dependent upon the stream of Becoming. Biology has good reasons for seeing Mobility and Change present everywhere in human existence; but whilst seeing this it overlooks another fact—it overlooks the fact that in so far as a life of the mind and spirit of man arises, such a life is something to be contrasted with ordinary Mobility and Change; such a life is something which

initiates and furthers one kind of movement over against another kind. It is this fact which constitutes a *specific history of man* as distinct from his *merely natural* history. Though certainly the life of the spirit of man needs Time for its unfolding, it does not exhaust itself in the passing moment, nor, indeed, in the current of Time itself, but it is able to reach towards something that is independent of all Time and that has permanent validity for all times. The fact that man is able to preserve times and events in his *memory*, and is able to transform these events into a continuous series—the fact that he is able, within his own thought, to reawaken what has passed away in an external sense—is a proof that he is not a slave but a master of Time. Consequently the Past remains for man not merely as a fact of bare reflection but as something connected with his life. This being so, he believes himself to have discovered something in past times—especially on the summits of

such times—which possesses an enduring right and a durable energy—something which ever draws him back to itself, because on such summits of the Past special conditions existed which gave an intense fervour and a fund of energy which are absent in ordinary life, and because with the help drawn from such summits new and specific creativeness is able to kindle itself ever afresh. Thus there can arise something within Time which, by means of its content, separates itself from Time—something which does not lose its youth in the course of the centuries, and of which we may say in the words of Goethe—

Die unbegreiflich hohen Werke
Sind herrlich wie am ersten Tag.

"The Deeds of high and noble nature
Still wear the glory of their birth."

Thus out of the labours of History there arises an *eternal content* which forms an arch above the embroilments and worries of daily life. The aspiration after such an *eternal content* is the strongest motive within the

movements of universal history, for without such a *content* all genuine connection is lost. The discovery of such a *content* offers to the work of Knowledge a great goal which is not wholly unrealisable; but such a goal cannot be possessed by Thought until Thought raises itself above Time and Change, and thinks of all things *sub specie æternitatis*.

Further, the movement of Life passes beyond the standpoint of Biology. As certainly as that all genuine Knowledge is self-knowledge—a rediscovery of the self in things—quite as certainly is it that all genuine Knowledge is a wholeness or totality of Life which embraces and holds together the manifold, and which postulates scope within which it may construct a relation of *whole* to *parts*. Such a scope for Life and such an effort from a whole to a whole are not offered by Biology, for Biology reduces Life into purely isolated factors—factors which may well be united and interwoven with one another, but which do not bind themselves together

into an inner totality or whole. Consequently the level of *mere connection* and *association of ideas* is not passed; and he who frames his Thought upon no higher level imports into the *effects* what he has actually and avowedly discarded in *principle*.

Now, all development—and especially all modern development—has brought forth connections of life which enable us to think from the standpoint of a *unity* or *whole*. For hardly anything is so characteristic of the modern world as the severance of independent complexes of Life and Thought from man and his aims, as well as the development of these complexes in accordance with their own methods, contents, and propelling power. It is thus in connection with Science, the Theory of the State, as well as in other provinces of life. A significant change is taking place with regard to the *Form* of every System, whilst the *Idea* of a System, with its demand for a thorough order, gradation, and organisation,

has gained a power hitherto unknown, and has led the *main thought* deeper than ever into a unity and breadth of the material which is handled. The *new Form*, however, would remain an *external schema* did it not serve for the moulding of the specific characters of the various provinces of life. Such a moulding has in fact resulted : the various provinces of life place their multiplicity under an all-embracing unitary idea; the various provinces stamp themselves more distinctly and produce greater effects upon the whole of life and also upon our view of the universe.

How much such a method is able to develop the significance of its value is clearly evident within the domain of industry. So long as this domain was present to man's conviction only in certain particular aspects of experience industry remained in the service of other provinces of life—especially in the service of ethics and religion—and consequently it failed to come to a develop-

ment of its specific mode and demands. It is only by means of its connection within a unity or whole, as has come to pass in modern times, that such a development has taken place; and, at the present day, we witness what mighty power has originated from such an achievement, so that instead of speaking of certain social questions in general we speak to-day of *the* social question and perceive a common problem in all the multiplicity of events.

This advance in importance of the particular provinces of life and of their emancipation from the immediate ordinary form of life is a striking phenomenon of modern times; and life has become incomparably richer and more mobile because of it. Knowledge however, finds a new task on account of a change of this sort, because it has it in its power by virtue of the energy of Thought to place itself within such a unity or whole and to develop the contents and demands implicit in Thought itself. Hence there arises here

a Thought out of the *facts themselves*—a Thought which gains superiority over all opinions and inclinations merely human and individual. Certainly new entanglements here arise. Indeed, the more clearly and energetically the particular individual provinces develop their characteristics the greater becomes the danger of these provinces getting separated from one another, the more urgently there is required a *unity* of life to work against such a dispersal and to clear the way for a better interpretation of things as well as for a transformation of the results of the particular provinces into what will prove a gain to them all. Such a unity is sought by modern man in the idea of the development of civilisation and culture—in a whole or totality of self-activity and spontaneity. On account of the fact that this effort desires a *precise conception* the task of discovering such a synthesis has become the task of tasks. But however much unrest and

uncertainty arise from the relation of the individual provinces to an embracing and governing unity and totality of life the problem, by means of the relation of one complex of life to another, is laid in a sphere above the natural impulses of life and of the mere increase of physical energy; and, also, what is striven after and achieved in this sphere is beyond the domain of Biology.

Finally, Thought would never have become an explanation of the *Object* and would never have become Knowledge if the movement of life had remained simply on the side of the *Subject* and had been unable to draw the *Object* into itself. Thought could never find a path to the *Object* if Life itself were not able to bridge the cleft between *Subject* and *Object.* But this it is able in fact to do; it accomplishes such a feat by means of the further development of the *external* and its transformation into an *internal.* The natural level of life and also the Biological conceptions are susceptible to the effects of work

done upon the *Object*, but the *Object* still on such levels remains largely *external*, and signifies for us only so much as serves our particular aims, whilst we are *indifferent* to the *specific nature* of the Object. Indeed, the work in connection with the life of man, for the most part, remains on this low level. But it does not remain there entirely. For upon the summit of mental and spiritual development the Object is drawn into the process of Life itself; the Object is included in the process of Life : Life here embraces both the potentiality of consciousness and the Object, and each receives a further development with and through the other. It is through this alone that life to its utmost circumference is set in activity, and that activity is raised into an activity of the *whole nature* of man; the *division* between Consciousness and Object lies *within* a comprehensive area of life, and is thus bridged into a unity without the submergence of the multiplicity. It is thus, for example, in connection with

artistic creativeness : it transplants the Object within the region of the Soul; the Object is here quickened into life and is made a distinctive part of a comprehensive life. It is thus also in the relation of man to man : here the possibility arises, by means of *love*, of binding us together, so that what seemed previously entirely external now becomes an integral portion of our own life. Not less, too, is an inner feeling for the rights of others attained—a feeling which includes both aspects, external and internal, and which constitutes a comprehensive life to which Nature does not offer the least analogy.

Out of all the provinces, by means of these experiences, there arises a superstructure of life—*an inner world*—which signifies incomparably more within the soul than a mere reflection of external events; there culminates here, within the whole of our life, a *new synthesis*, while our work in the world—*i. e.* the circle of life encompassed by definite work—differentiates itself clearly

from all which lies outside and which merely touches us from without. Just as this—our work in the world—invests us with self-reliance and fixity of purpose in contrast to the confusing impulses of the merely ordinary life so also is it able to point out clear paths for our efforts. All our activity, though our own, is still at the same time something *above* us; it possesses aims and energies; by means of its contact with the environment it constructs specific experiences and thus forms *the basis of a spiritual experience*—a spiritual experience which differentiates itself in the clearest possible manner from experiences " merely individual." Anything great that has ever been achieved originated out of the energy and necessity of this inner activity. Without the belief in the power of this energy and activity, and without allowing ourselves to be carried along on its current, activity cannot overcome the indecisiveness of personal, emotional reflection, nor find security and joy.

But when thought yields to the *necessity* of the facts, there results an unmistakable elevation and activity in contrast with the ordinary situation of life. But granting that all this happens, is not man even here on a level which is no more than a subjective one? Is not man here only raised to the level of his own full activity, and does not *genuine life* appear still as a high goal, and in no manner as an inert point of departure merely given and ready-made? Genuine life is no ready-made thing, but a difficult problem—perhaps the most difficult of all problems. What is usually termed Life cannot be considered by the spiritual nature of man as anything other than a *semblance* of life or a play with life.

If so much more than the Biological conception acknowledges is imbedded in Life, the Knowledge which such a conception offers is insufficient; so that it is not difficult to show that, strictly speaking, the matter does not deal with any effort for a Knowledge

which ignores the question concerning the elevation of Life beyond the Biological situation. It is the service rendered by Biology to oppose conceptions which treat the world as a " railed-in " system, to prove the presence of effective movement everywhere, so that the *mobile* character of our world has succeeded in gaining due recognition—so that the world is understood as being plastic and fluid enough for adaptation to the transformations that are taking place, and to allow of further development by means of such transformations. In all this, Life becomes something of importance to Knowledge; so that Life does not run like an impetuous stream tearing everything it touches, but must allow of being directed within its proper banks; it must pass from the common, " dead-level " life into a *personal* life; it must develop a content within itself—it must develop itself right through all the unfolding of its energy into *self-subsistence.* This, too, is a Movement;

but it is a Movement which does not remain by itself, but which turns towards permanent "Ends" beyond all the "Becoming," and holds fast to such "Ends." Indeed, the very thinker who enunciated that "all is in flux" still placed over against the flux a Divine reason—a "revealed secret"; for without an elevation above the flux there is no possibility of Knowledge for us.

CHAPTER V

Retrospect and Prospect

Biology and Pragmatism, in spite of all their differences, are at one in the fact that both alike expect the Life which shall bring forth more immediacy and fulness to Knowledge to come about by means of an absorption in immediate existence, and also in the fact that both repudiate the possibility of an ascent beyond an existence that is nearest to our hands. Both are therefore of an empirical kind. But we have already seen that what is attained in an intellectual sense upon this path does not accomplish and cannot accomplish what we seek for or aspire after in Knowledge.

Indeed, what is to be found, in the form of Knowledge, on the level of immediate

existence, where everything resolves itself into isolated elements of Life, is in contradiction with our main thesis. What operates beyond the empirical level is not the caprice of the metaphysician and his love of conundrums, but is the situation of *experience itself*, which is essentially richer than empiricism presents it. For empiricism takes account of only one side of the facts—only of the *object* which the activity handles and by means of which it creates itself: the *subject*—the vehicle—of life is treated by empiricism as a kind of empty space into which something alien and external enters, and in which various phenomena meet and unite with one another; but the fact is forgotten that experience itself, with its syntheses and classification of phenomena, can never originate unless the vehicle—the subject—exercises *activity*—an activity which constitutes not merely a point of departure but which persists and moulds the subject of treatment into a form very

different from what it was at the start. The problem of the Subject—of "the vehicle"—however, leads immediately into the problem of Life; and, when this happens, it becomes evident that our life is not a mere piece of a "given" existence, and does not exhaust itself in its relation to the environment, but that it is able to pass beyond the concatenation of external existence, to gain an independence of its own, to develop a spontaneity, and to bring into existence a *world of deed.* Such a turn of Life gives an entirely new view of Reality, and places Reality before us as a great quest. The main question now becomes: How external existence relates itself to this *world of deed;* the question is whether external existence corresponds to the demands of the *world of deed* or whether it remains in the rear of such a *world* or, indeed, whether it contradicts such a *world.* It is commonly held in all religions as well as in creative Art and genuine Philosophy that

in connection with such questions as these great difficulties arise. Here the world which arises within the soul and the world which we discover around us and partly within us enter into a sharp conflict with each other. Religion, Art and Philosophy affirm not *given existence* but the "Yea" upon which they all rest; they discover such a "Yea" only in the break with natural existence—only through a convulsion and a negation of the same. This denial becomes to Religion, Art, and Philosophy, in spite of all the distress occasioned by it, an essential factor of Spiritual Life; indeed, it appears as the "salt of life," without which life loses its savour and becomes soulless. It is first of all the negation which leads Life to a right movement, energy, and depth; for he who holds within his soul and turns into a conviction what the world-historical activity of mankind has reached in this direction and what it has experienced in the form of freedom, expansion, and develop-

ment, will view the contraction of life upon "given" existence as an imprisonment in a cage and will repudiate it as a hindrance; he will protest against its being set up as the self-evident and only possible solution of the problem of life.

That the representatives of empiricism do not find such a situation unbearable is possible only because they furtively *supplement* a *higher world;* they reflect upon such a world in their own light, and aim to endow it with "goods" of a lower value. It is thus that the social empiricist explains human society though he discovers a superior life of the spirit present within society; it is thus that he uses such a superior life of the spirit for his own particular ends, and, indeed, that he makes this life serve as a means and instrument for his own development. It is thus that the naturalist ascribes his life and its meaning and significance to the physical energies of Nature. This process of supplementing things in order to view them

in a more complete manner is only too apt to be overlooked, and therefore possibilities and powers are ascribed to environing existence which, in fact, are only achieved through the inner presence of a *quickening deed-world.* As soon as this mistake is perceived only one alternative remains, viz. to acknowledge such a *deed-world* as the very basis, and to accept what is *within it* as the true standpoint of life. When this is done, the result is that we are carried beyond all " mere nature " and all that is " merely human " to an *autonomous inwardness*—to a *spiritual* life. What " given " existence is, and how much there is to be gained from it, can only be made clear and decisive from such a standpoint.

The matter as hitherto considered shows two main attempts to determine the relation of Thought and Life as well as an effort

to bring Knowledge into a safe path. On the one hand, Thought raises its head independently of Life; it turns Life into a mere tool of its own, and seeks (be it in the form of scientific research or of philosophic speculation) to engender Knowledge out of itself. On the other hand, Life appears as something independent of Thought—imposes its own nature on Thought and transforms it into a mere tool. But in neither of these two modes is a happy solution of the problem reached. Great as is the work of research within its own province, and great as its independent value may be within such a province, still such research, as we conceive it in this book, cannot mean anything more than a mere preparatory stage of Knowledge. Whatever directivity or purpose, in the form of intellectual achievement, is ascribed in this manner to the life which lies nearest to our hands, there is not ascribed to it an *inner connection*, so that whatever can in reality be ascribed to it at all far rather confirms man in

his initial narrowness than frees him from it. And, when we turn to the method of philosophic speculation for the solution of the problem of the universe, we have already seen that this method, in its turn, presents no secure relation to the whole of reality, but that, in spite of all its independent procedure, the conclusions it reaches are no more than a web of forms and semblances.

If neither Thought alone nor Life alone leads to the goal aimed at, there necessarily arises the question whether the two can be made to co-operate, and whether the goals presented can be combined in a free and friendly union. In fact, neither Thought without Life nor Life without Thought is complete: the separation makes Thought merely *formal*, and brings Life into danger of diminishing, or even entirely losing its spiritual character. Thus the establishment of an inner union between the two in the interest of each separate side is an urgent necessity for spiritual preservation.

That this is a problem not for the mere philosopher but for the whole of mankind is evidenced by the fact that fundamental *types of life* arise and proceed right through the history of the world. Thus antiquity shows this fact in the distinction of Greek and Roman, and modern times up to the present day presents, for example, German and English types. The German places the work of Thought *first*, and is inclined to understand practical life only as an application of general principles; he will have everything that appears to him valuable proved and mediated, and thus runs the risk of obviating the immediate impressions of things. The advantage of this mode lies in the setting up of *universal ideas* and in the width of its mental horizon. Also, in the setting up of a systematic and methodical procedure of work the German attempts to lift himself above his surroundings and to quicken something universal within his own soul. But the

advantage which such a method possesses in dealing with the problem of the universe and with the mental creativeness which issues out of such a problem can easily become a disadvantage in dealing with the problems of social life. The German is inclined to remain too much in the region of brooding and reflection, and also to exaggerate the value of mere learning within a special province. Thus Knowledge can easily come to mean something apart from action—something hovering over the waters, and unable to find a resting-place for the soles of its feet. And, further, in this kind of intellectualism there lies an exaggerated opinionativeness—an opinionativeness which believes itself to be something special—something which can ignore the common ends of mankind, and which easily leads even to a petty struggle for rights, and to a quest after things of no real moment. All this, it is true, is only the dark shadow in a degenerated form of something that is

of real significance and value, but it is a dark and dangerous shadow.

When we turn to the English type we discover an inverse danger. Here the strength lies in the development of the *practical* life—in the open mind for the impressions of experience, and in the attempt to grasp any situation that presents itself and to value it; and especially in the building up of a social life in which scientific potentialities soon pass into fruitful activity. On such a ground as this, individuals find themselves together in freedom and are able to subordinate individual proclivities. Such a union produces far more effects in the visible world and far more security for governing the world than the German method. But this method, too, has its dangers in the fact that a society formed on these lines is liable to beget a uniformity of development—a uniformity which injures the development of true individuality. Here, too, it is insufficiently recognised

that the problem of the universe lies not in something connected with life in a supplementary manner, but in something which actually belongs to life from the very outset, and which helps to form its mental and spiritual character. The true originality of mental and spiritual life can suffer detriment through absorption in concern for social ills alone, and it comes very near to a relapse into utilitarianism if there is not a strong, and, indeed, a religious conviction within the social order—a conviction which recognises a background of an eternal order of things valuable for its own sake, and which withstands many of the impressions of life and of society. But we have to bear in mind that behind this *practical reason* there ought to arise an ideal of a distinctive character. Thus each of the two types—the German and the English—stands for an extremely valuable type of human life; but it is clear that each has need of being supplemented in an important way; and it is also

clear that humanity as a whole must emerge beyond the opposition of these two types of life.

In so far as we have dealt with the problem of Knowledge, we have sought for an inner elevation of man through the working out of an inner relation to the world; and we now see that neither can mere Thought guarantee such an effect nor can a *new world* arise within the soul by merely occupying ourselves with the external world as it presents itself to us from moment to moment. Thus there seems only one way out of the difficulty: viz. that a *world* should develop within the domain of man—a *world* which signifies a synthesis of life, which is at the same time man's own possession and also something above him—a *world* which allows man to experience in a form of *immediacy* the *essential depth* of things. We cannot renounce such a *world:* an external world is closed to us; for the creation of a *new* one power fails us. Thus if we are

not to surrender all hope, a *world* has to develop in our own sphere and from our own life. A *new life* of a cosmic character has to arise in us; otherwise there is no Knowledge and no inner elevation. But how all this is to be understood and how it can be reached it remains now to be investigated.

II.—EXPLANATORY PART

CHAPTER VI

The Main Thesis

Our critical investigation led us to advance the claim that in the human sphere an *independent complex of life*, yea, even a *world*, arises; such a *world* as only results from the movements of life itself and which remains present to life, is able to become a Standard for one's own thought and a subject-matter for one's own knowledge. A relation so vital will not be attained without an essential conversion of the existing situation, but only in so far as it is *new* does such a relation succeed in becoming an anchorage in the various situations of human life. For so far as human life exceeds "mere Nature" and produces effects of a mental and spiritual

kind, it always involves *the tendency towards an independent Wholeness ;* it strives for the development of a kingdom—indeed, of an *entire world.* It is thus in Science and Art, in Law and Morality—everywhere it is a *wholeness* which includes and governs the manifold; it is the presence of a synthesis which gives meaning and value to the *particular* achievements.

But such a tendency towards a whole or totality is in the first instance a mere regulative idea for the individual man, and as long as he remains on this level he cannot possibly attain autonomy or rid himself of an admixture of intentions and opinions "merely human"; he cannot work out the content of his own nature into clearness and power. A contradiction between the *content* as well as between the *claims* of what he is striving after on the one hand, and the *form of existence* on the other hand—*i. e.* the *mode* in which *existence* becomes operative in us—is not to be mistaken. This

contradiction is overcome—a contradiction whose persistence threatens to bring all mental and spiritual movement to nought—if the life breaks lose from such a binding and particularity, and seeks to connect itself together into *a whole independent and self-subsistent.* But for this task the operation of Thought is indispensable. We recognise the peculiar potency of Thought in the fact that it has the power to separate itself from conditions " merely human " and to further develop itself; so that in opposition to such a condition it can bring about *a real event within the soul;* it is able to bring into a *system* what it thus experiences, and endeavours to transform it into a graduated and articulated *whole.* Thought is thus pre-eminently the world-organ of spiritual life—the power whereby spiritual life ascends to an independent reality. Thus, there is present in human nature something *essential and substantial* which is in process of continual realisation, so that here a significant turn of

life follows over against the *natural* order of things; and it is on this fact that all hope for genuine Knowledge rests.

A specific relation of Thought and Life arises within such a movement. Thought now discovers itself to be within Life and realises that it is encompassed by Life as part and member of it; but, at the same time, Thought is able to separate itself so far as to reveal an independent domain of its own—a domain capable of reacting upon the remaining life in a developing and elevating manner. Life as a whole appears accordingly not as a simple magnitude and as a ready-made datum but as something which has first of all to seek itself; and as something which cannot discover itself without a separation that comes about only through toilsome work—as something which climbs to its own summit only by overcoming the contradictions in which it is entangled on the natural level. An intuitive view is thus gained by means of such a cosmic work

as places the totality of effort in the service of such a task; and thus the absolute right and, indeed, the necessity of life are confirmed.

The first condition of this progressive independence of life is this: that the life of the spirit, be it by the favour of special circumstances, or by means of deep feeling, or by a fervent aspiration, or by self-development or self-preservation, always rises above the usual warfare of elements within itself, and takes a specific orientation; it discovers a common goal, creates an all-pervading atmosphere, so that it finally develops a specific mode of life. There can spring from this an incentive to, and fertilisation of, Thought, so that Thought is driven beyond "mere form"—beyond the mere schemata of reality—to the creation of a reality filled with content; and, at the same time, Thought leads Life to an entire autonomy and to a superiority to all that is "merely human." This is the *inverted order* of existence which obtains

in all spiritual life; such an inverted order becomes a progressive independence and freedom over against "mere man"—an independence and freedom which are witnessed in all branches of spiritual work and which bring these branches to flower and fruit. Such an inverted order will further work, over against the prior condition of man, as a rousing influence strengthening and elevating his nature; but it accomplishes all this only because there stands behind it a *wholeness of life* which seeks its own completion within this inverted order. Thought thereby becomes Knowledge, since a reality which arises out of the activity of Thought cannot isolate itself from the domain of Knowledge but percolates into that domain.

This movement takes place in three main stages—the stages of Criticism, of Creativeness, and of Work. As Thought brings to effect its specific method in the process of life, and especially its claim to originality

and independence of life, so it will feel the *prior* situation as one of narrowness and halfness, and will make it its main task to free man from it. Thus all genuine Philosophy is concerned in showing in an urgent and clear manner the insufficiency of the existing situation, in rousing man out of his easy smugness and idle repose, and in revealing the pettiness, insecurity, and semblance of his supposed possessions; and, further, genuine Philosophy is concerned in pointing out the ways and means which will help to remove the danger in which man is placed. Herein Philosophy aims at even heightening the defects and ills of the special historical situation in order that the situation may become a problem and a task to humanity. Consequently the situation increases in difficulty; through the special need of the times now felt Philosophy sees a task for all times. Thus it cannot expect help from the transient achievements of the times, nor from merely momentary impressions;

but only by means of penetrating and permanent transformations can the redemption and holiness of mankind be realised. Regarded from this standpoint, Philosophy presents itself especially as a power of criticism and doubt and, indeed, of dissolution and destruction; it takes from man the faith which hitherto satisfied him, so that it is no wonder that it often seems as a crushing burden and encounters much resistance, and is often regarded with dislike and rejected.

The collision of Philosophy with the historical situation of mankind is especially severe in regard to the problem of Knowledge itself. It was the uncertainty arising from the *idea* of the existence of a firm basis, along with the difficulty of finding it, which filled the great thinkers with wrath and drove them to sharp oppositions and to the most valiant efforts for a solution of the problem. It was only through the fiery furnace of doubt and negation that a

path to truth was discovered. Thus Plato broke away from all the merely human foundations of things; thus Descartes began his work with the acceptance of radical doubt; and similarly Kant reduced all prior solutions of the problem into an intolerable dogmatism. To all the great thinkers Truth appeared unattainable on the path of the preservation and furtherance of *what had already been attained;* it was only by means of a decisive breach with all this and by gaining an entirely new point of departure that Truth could be attained.

Such an opposition of Philosophy as we have referred to is by no means limited to the *intellectual* province; it passes also into the other provinces of life. How questionable did what men had acclaimed as virtue appear to Plato and Kant; how impure did the motives which are wont to govern human actions appear to them; how energetically Philosophy passed, by means of the Beautiful, beyond a conception which allowed sensuous

pleasures and petty aims to enter into the idea and even to govern it; how low and merely shadowy did that which is customarily striven for as happiness appear, and what low motives were often present in religion itself! Certainly Philosophy includes more than this, but it includes this as well. Yet beyond what is included here there arises an effort to overcome the " dead level " life with all its painful ingredients; and it is the task of Philosophy to extend this effort over the whole of human existence and to lead us to struggle *from a whole to a whole.*

Criticism can lead us further only when it is considered not as a terminus *ad quem* but as a terminus *a quo;* the Nay has to be driven further, and this can be brought about only through the energy of a Yea which, though concealed and unfinished, still stands behind the Nay and works upon it with living force. It is in this manner alone that the vague Nay transforms itself into something

definite—into a *question;* it is thus alone that the *quest* is removed from the region of vacillating feeling and assumes a definite orientation. From the mere reflective criticism of discursive thought much feeling arises, but never is anything great brought to birth in such a manner.

But again, it is necessary for the *nucleus*, which is contained in every genuine criticism, to develop, and this development can take place only by means of a *great turn* —only by means of a transposition into a domain of *creativeness*. A severance of the movement which accomplishes all this from the " merely human " situation towards spirituality has to take place—a severance which means an elevation beyond needs and ends " merely human " as well as a focusing of everything upon an entire *self-subsistence* which can develop its own potencies and follow its own laws. It is in this manner alone that the life of the spirit becomes superior to the " merely human " and brings

man into a new relation with Reality. This new kingdom does not lie close to our hands—it is not something we can enter into without effort; but it has first to be *built* by us, and in order that this may happen our work and sacrifice are needed. In *the great turn* towards this new kingdom and in the *preservation* of what is actually gained here there lies a *personal deed*—a *deed* which not only forms a bridge to the new kingdom but which also *persists*, carries all along, and tells upon all activity. This new kingdom may be designated a *world of deed*. But throughout it is no work of "mere man"—it is not something which he imagines and spins out of himself. What happens here *within* man is at the same time *above* him and raises him through sacrifice *beyond himself*. In fact, what happens is the unfolding of an *independent phenomenon*—it is the revelation of a *new world* whose realisation makes us quite other than we were before, and which forms the centre of gravity

of our inmost nature. Through all this, our entire view of reality is changed; *external existence* and the *world of deed* get differentiated without falling entirely apart. The *world of deed* cannot develop without demanding an *autonomy*, apart from external existence, for its own original and creative life; it will set the world of external existence in its true light; it will seek points of contact with such a world; it will draw together the separate threads of existence and combine them; it will elevate and unify all the relativity of things; it will not only clarify all existence, but will also envisage existence as a whole and grant it a meaning as a whole. Thus, within man's own domain, *two worlds* appear; and, on account of this fact, man gains an incomparable expansion and greatness. For the first time, definite questions originate concerning the real meaning of existence; and again for the first time, an experience not of " mere man " but of *spiritual life* is gained—an experience which affects the

whole of life and existence. Thus a powerful movement into reality originates; and as such a movement presupposes an entire change and a new standard of life there appears a *Metaphysic* within life itself. Such a *Metaphysic of Life* is not exposed to the opposition which is raised against the prevalent view of Metaphysics; because this Metaphysic of Life is not mere Thought, which constructs a merely conceptual view of the universe, but is a *new life*—a great actuality —which arises within our own domain, and which culminates in the removal of man from what he possesses by nature to a life which is original, and from an atmosphere "merely human" to a superhuman world. Thus the Metaphysic of Life is not something that is merely added to a finished and enclosed world—not something that is as useless as it is impossible: but the world nearest to our hands appears from this standpoint of the life of the spirit as throughout insufficient, as wanting in self-subsistence and

also in a genuine life. It is therefore an aspiration after a true and genuine life as well as after a Reality originating out of such a life which renders necessary a transformation and, at the same time, a Metaphysic. Without such a turn, as well as a constantly progressive autonomy of spirituality, all movement towards spirituality is stopped short, and all human effort sinks into incompleteness and insecurity.

The New cannot possibly seek the proof of its truth by means of an agreement with an *existence merely given*, but it becomes necessary to elevate and to set in a new light all that presents itself to us. Every proof here lies in the fact that the New is able, in connection with all that happens within the life of the spirit, to bind together individual factors otherwise isolated, and to free these from all alienation, and, finally, to lead the whole of life to full originality. But certain as it is that the main work is here done from *within*, still the creativeness does not reach

its entire development by means of *mere ideas*, but has to come into contact with the surrounding world; and it is only through this contact as well as through the overcoming of the world that creativeness reaches its summits. Therefore we perceive *work* and *danger* in our task; but it is a task upon whose fulfilment the self-maintenance of man and also the possibility of Knowledge rest.

That we are here concerned with inner necessities and not with subjective constructions is clearly shown by the universal work of Philosophy. Philosophy shows that every great and fruitful achievement includes a severance of the self from its prior situation and the creation of an actual autonomy of creative power. It is presented thus, for example, by Plato. It is true that he was surrounded by artistic features of life, presented by his people and his age, but it was reserved for him to free all such features from the narrowness and confusion of situa-

tions "merely human," and to reach an *independent Kingdom of Forms* and of a *self-subsisting World of Ideas*—both of which became the bearers of an original life. This actual autonomy of the *Form* was a purification—an elimination of all that was vulgar and immoral—through which the nature of man effects a greater working out of its characteristics. This actual autonomy of the *Form* was now able to discover within its own domain a principle for co-ordinating the manifold; and out of division and reunion, out of harmony and gradation, there emerged a plastic work of Art which became a fundamental constituent of Reality. The whole of existence experienced here a thorough winnowing: on the one hand, the World of Forms could once more discover itself in existing things; it could draw to itself all that was related to it until it illumined all to their very foundation; but, on the other hand, there remained a *contradiction* and, indeed, a deep darkness which

resisted all illumination. But in spite of this twofold aspect of things, the original chaos, with its apathetic unconcern, was now dispelled; creativeness and analysis had brought forth a *new* view of man and the universe; out of the *whole* into all the *manifold* there were now projected a task and a quest; and thus everything was brought into movement and was compelled to reveal its own nature. Now it became necessary to prove *each* individual object in accordance with its position and work in the *whole;* grades and successions of things now blended into a great life-tissue.

The turn to religion brought forth another kind of view at the time of waning antiquity. Here, again, ordinary life showed a mixture of *higher* and *lower*. In waning antiquity we find, on the *lower* side, a longing of the "natural man" for freedom from pain and need and for a transportation into greater pleasure and happiness, all of which was expected to be brought about in a super-

natural manner without man's own effort; on the *higher* side, we find an aspiration after an elevation beyond all "merely human" modes—an aspiration after an inner communion, and, indeed, after a union with God and after a new nature by means of such a union. It was only in the hands of Philosophy that Life found a corrective for the extravagances of much that existed in this epoch of waning antiquity. The corrective came through such men as Plotinus, Origen, and Augustine; it was through their work that the *anthropocentric* mode of life gave way to a *theocentric* mode, while, at the same time, its full value was given to the *new life* itself. And at the same time, the problem of Knowledge entered upon a new phase. The union of man's nature with the Divine was now seen to grant power to understand and experience the whole of Reality as proceeding from God and as being the fundamental basis and unity from which all the manifold originated. Looked at and illu-

mined from this standpoint, *external existence* was conceived as the *lower* grade of life; each individual thing was regarded as deriving its value only in its relation to the whole and through what it signifies to the whole; everywhere it became necessary to seek for this *Whole* with its Infinity and to submerge oneself in this; all effort thus presented itself as a desire of the Part for the Whole, of the visible for the invisible, of Time for Eternity. Evil and delusion were conceived as having arisen on account of the *individual being* of things breaking violently away from the *unity* upon which their *being* depended and attempting to signify something apart from their source. Knowledge likewise in its inner nature undergoes a transformation; it leaves behind the artistic synthesis of the manifold and becomes possessed by a quest and an aspiration after Infinity in each of the individual situations in which it finds itself; clear conceptions now give way to an insight toned more by

feeling; until it is now held that all the visible is no more than a metaphor.

The modern world plumes itself on having abolished the cleft between man and the world by means of some form of immanental doctrine. But beyond this the modern world is now breaking away from *immediate existence* and is developing a process of life superior to such external existence. This is illustrated especially in the recognition and development of a *reason* independent of the individual and of his situation in life. This development has not only become the basis of Knowledge but also the Standard of life; not only has there resulted an elevation beyond the standpoint of Psychology with its merely descriptive methods; but also the aspiration after a thorough-going elevation of human existence, as well as after a complete dispersal of all darkness and misery—both of which are to be discovered in modern life—derives its rights and its driving-power simply out of the belief in such a *reason* superior to

man and yet present in man. This belief has proceeded into the world as a power of clarification and orientation as well as of a stimulation and further development; it tolerates nothing which contradicts its claims, but what it conceives as valid it unifies the more closely and renders the more effectual. Knowledge, however, receives here its main task, viz. to develop a connected sphere of Thought and to illumine the whole of existence from such a sphere. The logical structure which thus originates—a domain of general laws and unbroken causal connections—seeks to discover everywhere, in such a turn towards existence, simple fundamental forms of occurrences and solid connections in order not only to illumine existence but also to draw human activity into such a sphere of influence. Here, let it be observed, it is by means of the *Form* of existence [as this is found in consciousness] that Reality reveals itself to man; but the fact that the Form

disclosed is not of an æsthetic but of a logical kind is bound to transform, in a fundamental manner, the whole procedure as well as the whole achievement of man.

Particular thinkers show the characteristic features of their thought in the manner in which they understand and treat this *Reason* superior to man; their point of departure becomes specially manifest in the fact that the activity of *Reason* connects itself together more and more from *individual processes* into a *totality or whole*. Thus Descartes in his propagation of " innate ideas " contends for the fundamental idea of the independence of Reason; and the abandonment of this by Locke was in fact an abandonment of the independence of Thought. Accordingly Kant raised the *theoretical* and the *practical Reason* into a connected whole; and finally Hegel conceived of the whole of Reality as being engendered out of the creative energy of Reason. Thus Reason, in the course of such a development, attains more and more

autonomy and unity, so that its effects upon *existence* as well as its transforming power become ever greater and ever more penetrating.

An inverted order of the original human situation is thus manifested in the teachings of Descartes, Kant, and Hegel : they presented an order other than that of the inability to step beyond Nature or than that of viewing man as a mere piece of Nature or than that of following Knowledge downward to mere association of ideas. For unquestionably the immediate existence of man shows—if only in his ideas and imagination—a parting of man from Nature; and an emancipation from a false view of man is only possible if the external world is clearly contrasted with his own mind and spirit, and if the situations which lie nearest to his hands in the external world—situations full of enigmas and demanding inquiry—are worked out by his own mind and spirit into ever larger connections and totalities. Viewed from the

human standpoint, the whole meaning of Nature is an ideal which it is necessary to realise. Whether such a view of a parting from first impressions and such a movement from a whole to a whole present an entirely different characteristic of life from that presented in the results of Naturalism; or whether, within life itself, form and content contradict each other in a manner which cannot be tolerated—all this is a question by itself. In any case, even Naturalism itself declares that all Knowledge consists in an elevation beyond the situation nearest to our hands, and in the setting of life in a new situation — in an independent sphere.

Thus the origination of an independent individual life, and also of social life within the domain of man, constitutes the decisive step for the possibility of Knowledge; for merely out of the situation nearest to our hands such a step is impossible. This turn alone clears away the confusion which sur-

rounded us from the outset, and in whose thick mist all forms disappeared; it places existence, for the first time, from the totality to its elements, face to face with a problem, and demands an answer to this problem. Separation and creation are consequently (as in the Biblical history of Creation) definitely connected together and dependent upon each other; without separation there is no creation, and without creation no separation. There thus opens out a double mode of existence—an experience out of the development of one's own *world of deed*, and an experience out of our relation with the *world of existence*. According to the different modes in which the *world of deed* shapes itself will different things be sought for and found in the *world of existence;* and, also, the *nature* and the *gains* of experience will subsequently become divided. The problem here is not concerning the accidental things of human opinion and inclination, but concerning the appearance of a new life—

of what casts light upon darkness, and of what gives a definite direction to the investigation. True, such a life needs our *continuous deed*, but its actual content and inner connections as well as the obligation it exercises over us prove clearly enough that it depends in no manner merely upon our subjective choice. Here appears, through and through, the life of the spirit, not as a *new arrangement* of an *old world*, but as the inauguration of an essentially *new* one. Human life does not run merely on a flat surface, but discovers its own nucleus only by means of a transition and transformation.

But certainly as the world of creativeness finds itself at the outset placed in the midst of opposition and bound at the same time to proceed on its own course, then it becomes clear that this *new world*—when it becomes a *whole* and governs all—cannot remain permanently within the realm of such stubborn opposites: it must, with-

out giving up its independence, yet return to the world which it had left behind and must attempt to penetrate into it; it must do this most of all on account of the fact that its own development is at stake, for only by some such understanding with things outside itself—only by means of a struggle with its oppositions—can the life of creativeness in man find its way from the great outlines of its ideal-plan to a full and essential development. Along with this, Philosophy moulds itself in the direction of *activism*—an *activism* which, at the outset, seems to turn only towards the *external*, but which in reality reaches as far as the nucleus of life itself and develops further such a nucleus. This entrance of life into the region of the multiplicity of things carries the work of Thought into ramifications and refinements hitherto unexperienced. And as this multiplicity has to remain within an *embracing whole* there originate the idea and the demand of a

System—of a systematic order of a World of Thought. And further than this, the movement now extends over the whole extent of the multiplicity and gains quite a different relation to it than has hitherto been the case. This *activism*, however, is able to penetrate into and re-mould its material with a living energy only if it possesses such a transforming and pioneering creativeness at its back; for without this the *activism* does not free itself from nor pass beyond the external order of things and a soulless scheme of ideas. Thus there are two types of great thinkers—heroes of mental transformation and of creative renewal, and heroes of energetic work and of strong will. The former type has to precede the latter; for the former prepares the ground on which the latter must work to sow, to weed, and to reap. A Plato is followed by an Aristotle, a Descartes by a Spinoza and a Leibniz, a Kant by a Hegel. The movement of Thought needs both types,

for it is thus alone that the work can fully succeed.

But as the two types are dependent upon each other it cannot but happen that obstacles and misconceptions should prevail in both. *Activism*, for example, suffers injury when it is considered as merely practice and effect, for in fact it has also to carry forward not only the *external* but also the *internal* situation of things. On the other hand, mental creativeness must be looked upon as something more than a mere preparatory stage for *activism*—it has ever to present us with *norms* superior to the transient aspects and impressions of the world and of the moment, and it has to deal with the orientation of our quests. *Activism* does not connect itself with the external world without effort, but does so through our *deed-world* alone. And, further, *activism* reaches its full development within the domain of the inner life of the spirit itself, for it is within such an inner domain alone

that *external* existence is first of all transformed into something *internal*, since we must not forget that *activism* cannot arise from a mere surface-connection of the *world of deed* and the *world of sense*. The fact that a cleft permanently remains between our own inner *deed-world* and the *world of outer existence* has not always been clearly recognised by some of the great heroes of the World of Thought as, for instance, is the case with Aristotle; and consequently such thinkers appeared more empirical than they really were. Also, in the return to *external existence* the contrast persists : the scrutiny and analysis of the things of external existence cannot be understood as a means for realising the entire meaning of the external world.

Thus three different elements are discovered in the work of Knowledge—*Criticism*, *Creativeness*, and *Activism*. Their equable working-out and their fruitful co-operation constitute an ideal that is only partially

realised at the best. Every disturbance of the equilibrium of the three gives rise to misunderstandings and dangers. Creativeness is, as we have already seen, the enlivening soul of the whole. Without a union with Creativeness, Criticism degenerates into fruitless disputes, and Activism into a mere routine. But Creativeness needs, on its side, the help of the other two elements. Without penetrating Criticism, Creativeness fails to stand out in bold relief from the ordinary shallow life, and fails in self-reliance as well. But unless we pass from both into Activism the necessary clarification is lacking, and effects which are possible come to nought. Therefore the different tasks serve *one specific total-task*. The question where such a total-task lies, what it means, and how it may be accomplished, is the question which has separated the great thinkers of the world from one another.

Thus *Thought* appears as an indispensable co-worker in the perfecting of *Life*. But, at the same time, it is evident that Thought not only *gives* but also *receives*—that, by means of its union with Life it is carried far beyond what it could of itself achieve. For, from its own energies, Thought can only weave outlines and forms—in itself it remains as a quest for a *universal* and as a quest for a means of connecting the *manifold*. But all this is more of a setting than of a solving of the task. The demand of the mind for universality [as mental concepts] and for a connected view of the external world is no more than the programme of what has to be achieved. When all this programme is complete, we have still to inquire in what directions universality is to be sought and in what manner concatenations of things are to be set forth. Now all this remains at the outset in entire darkness; and if no direct orientation is given to Thought and no secure fulcrum given

to effort, activism loses itself in worthless abstractions, empty forms, and semblances. Thought, however, obtains such an indispensable and direct orientation by means of the actually autonomous life which is now raised to a specific atmosphere of its own, and which develops throughout by means of its own activity. The general impression of things confirms this fact, while the characteristics of the main epochs of the world show still more clearly that they conferred a specific character upon the work of Thought, be such work artistic as in Antiquity, religious as in the Middle Ages, or scientific as in Modern Times. In all this we are able to see that epochs do not merely distinguish between a *More* and a *Less*, but that they also conceive the common goal quite differently, and proceed upon different paths to reach it. It is not the *answer* but the *question* which sets each epoch upon a path different from the rest. Such differences reach deeply into the work

done in the world and have shaped each piece of such work in a specific manner; each of the main epochs has its own special conception of Idea and Judgment, of Substance and Causality; each develops a different methodology, and has its own way of binding the manifold into a totality. It is only such a thorough development—it is only such a turn towards the *concrete*—that can lead Thought to a definite connection and combination with things, and can enable it to bring its entire nature to expression.

This turn towards the *concrete* does not signify, however, the overcoming of Thought by the special situation or time, for even in such a turn Thought maintains its own independence and seeks in such a turn its own development; the *particular* mode of the operation of Thought appears here as the continuation of a *general* mode—as a fulfilment of the demand which a *general* mode of Thought involves. In order that the *particular* mode may achieve this, the

difference of these two standards of Thought must be present in the mind; and it has to be made clear ever afresh whether the *general* is present in the *special*, in order to protect the *special* from the contingencies to which it is exposed. Thought thus includes a movement from a *universal* to a *specific* mode—from a contriving and regulating activity to a guiding and productive one. But Thought has not its main task in bringing Reality under the mere form of universality—a conception which constitutes the deepest root of intellectualism, and which is liable to paint the world purely grey in grey. In fact, the *form* of the *universality* is only a way and a means for working out the concrete material; but the turn towards this is not discovered by Thought within itself alone: it is discovered only in union with the autonomous and ever progressive life. Thought is also, after the nature of its inmost construction, placed upon an *experience;* and all Philosophy and Theory

of Knowledge, which reject such an experience and place themselves upon their own brooding reflections, invariably fail to pass out of the realm of appearances to that of genuine Reality.

But though such a union leads Thought to its goal and moulds it in a productive manner, still, at the same time, the union threatens Thought with a loss which far outweighs all gains. We have already seen that there has originated not merely one specific mode of Thought and Knowledge but that different periods produced various modes, and that the actions as well as the beliefs of earlier times must give way to those of later times. Does not this fact lead to a destructive relativity? And will not Truth thus become a mere slave of the age, and will not Philosophy become a mere result of the conclusions of history, civilisation, and past culture, and thus suffer destruction from what succeeds these? Such a consequence would be unavoidable if the

particular phases fell entirely outside one another, and if a later phase entirely displaced an earlier, and if the manifold did not somehow bind itself together into a common unity and a common effort so that each achievement obtained may thus have a value. That such an effort arises is shown by the circumstance that each individual phase does not simply appear as a mere expression of its particular period, but is valid for all periods and is permanent; and it is from this conviction that effort obtains courage and energy for creativeness. That such a conviction is not a vain presumption of contending parties but a well-founded one is shown by the actual achievements of the individual mouldings of life, by the rise of a life entirely active and embracing both inward power and outward material, and by the development of a spiritual sphere of life and of a specific reality. As certain as that the whole of such a movement is no mere mechanism, but carries within itself

a creative energy, quite as certain is it also that Philosophy, when it leads to such a movement towards the summits of life, is no mere passing view of things—no mere reflection of the subject. The fact stands before us that certainly, under specially favoured circumstances, an *inversion* of the customary order of life did actually take place—an autonomy of life arose, and out of itself illumined the world. And the movement of life even passed beyond such an autonomy and found itself still in need of more breadth and depth; and here again the entire originality which is demanded of such an autonomy is not yet won, and consequently life is compelled to pass beyond the situation already attained and even to step into fresh troubles and doubts. But though the universal experience of history shows many movements and transformations still there proceeds *one total movement* right through all the different phases. Life seeks itself within such a total movement—it seeks within such

a movement its own *self-subsistence*, and, at the same time, its own entire content and its own entire depth. It is, in the last resort, one and the same inquiry which constitutes the aims sought in different formations of life. It is true that the struggles and transformations of the ages bear witness with great clearness, on the one hand, that the level and the main direction of the movement are not given us from the outset and that there does not lie within our consciousness a ready-made answer to our problems—answers which are only to be brought to the surface; but, the struggle and transformations bear witness, on the other hand, that our efforts do not entirely go to pieces, but that throughout the whole movement—right up from its very source—*the same necessity* works and relates all the efforts to one goal. The soil upon which Truth can grow is not presented to us from the very beginning, but we have first of all to struggle for its possession within the

experiences of History; but we should not seek for it at all had there not been present a strong *necessity* of our own inmost nature —a *necessity* which proceeds right through the ages.

Such a conviction rejects both an unhistorical idealism and the usual form of the doctrine of evolution. For this particular kind of idealism presents the view that either " innate ideas " or a spiritual organism is present in us as a ready-made quality from the very beginning, and that this, by means of the energetic work of Thought, can be immediately set in activity. According to this theory historical work has then no longer any great task or any constraining motive. But such a theory lacks in appreciation and also in introspection if it conceives man as having the value of his life determined by a given fate which compels life to float along its current, or if the individual phases of life and the situations in which man is placed are regarded as mere pieces of

a great mechanism. Whether we take the scientific theory of Darwin or the logical theory of Hegel the main facts we have here under consideration are not at all altered. In both systems Freedom is sacrificed; and our life and actions are driven into rigid grooves if we are not independent co-workers but only mere tools controlled by some external power. The facts stand out quite otherwise in the interpretation which we present here. It is true that in our view of the matter it is recognised that a *self-subsistent life* and a truth superior to Time are somehow imbedded in the nature of man—elements which work within him as driving energies and which become the Standards for all his undertakings. But it is not given him to realise this depth or to transfer it entirely into his own life by means of an immediate effort of will, but only by means of the work of the historical movements of the world with all their experiences and transformations. This movement with

its depth does not flow in one simple direction: it varies its course and meets along its way with sharp oppositions, without, however, being thereby dissipated or lost; it reasserts itself again and again above the disintegration and connects itself into a whole or totality; right through all the individual movements there proceeds one total-movement. Further, in support of our present contention we get the evidence of the spiritual unrest which permeates the centuries—the power of doubt and denial in the movement of the world's history. The fact that man has thus to struggle for the whole of his life and has to win the depth of his own nature only by means of battle gives him more freedom as well as more greatness.

History thus becomes a dialectic not of mere thought but of the whole of life. Points of concentration arise and develop into autonomies; these seek greater originality and aim at governing the whole domain of existence. For a length of time they

succeed in doing much, and consequently man feels himself secure and joyous in the possession of genuine truth. But a still further movement of life destroys such satisfaction and passes beyond the terminus which it had hitherto set for itself. This further movement—venturesome in its nature—meets with stubborn opposition, but so long as this opposition comes from merely without it cannot destroy confidence in the enterprise which is at stake. As soon, however, as flaws appear in the *inward* parts of the movement and its originality seems to become insecure, life, though it has succeeded on its external side, cannot remain satisfied with all this; a weariness follows, and a seeming dissolution seems inevitable—a positive period is thus followed by a critical one. When this happens the particular elements sever themselves from their prior union, and instead of the former tendency to more unity and " togetherness " of things we now obtain a tendency towards variation

and infinite multiplicity—*Expansion* now takes the place of *Concentration*. But if such a critical movement proceeds far and if the connections of things give way, there is danger lest the spiritual character of life fall into an inner decay and into a swift disintegration. When this happens, the aspiration after the preservation of the spiritual self once again asserts itself above the critical situation and connects the movement again into a unity, until at last an inverted order of life is reached and a new autonomy of life is gained. But even such a transformation as this does not bring about a final result —even this will not bind *all* the fulness of life together or bring the movements of life to a final rest. Thus life once again succumbs to the same destiny as before, and proceeds again further and further towards Expansion. All this is inevitable because Life is no enclosed and definitely bounded circle; from every conclusion there arise new problems and new entanglements.

For the movement, in a spiritual sense, is not only a movement *forward* but also a *return* movement; it is, indeed, an effort after a standpoint for viewing Time itself and a quest for a Present superior to Time. As true as that the critical movement displaces the completed elements of life so true is it still that such a completed life remains permanently effective in us, and quite as true is it also that a time must come when the struggle between Old and New is superseded and the effort after a union of both is realised. One may complain and scoff at such an effort when one understands it as no more than a mere juxtaposition of heterogeneous elements or as a weak compromise in an insoluble situation; but the effort is seen as a necessary demand and as what serves Truth when it places Life upon a deeper foundation, when it gains a greater scope for its potencies, and when it is able to mould the different elements which present themselves into members and aspects of a

greater totality. Indeed, the more such an effort permeates the course of history not as a constant change of multi-coloured pictures but as an ever further working out of an eternal content, the more it appears as a progressive self-deepening of life to its entire self-reliance and originality, and as a gaining of life itself by means of its inward potencies. Therefore the movement is not something which presses towards some obscure terminus in the distance : it is something which turns towards life itself. For life has not merely to heighten and adorn a situation merely given to it, but has to overcome an intolerable contradiction within its own being; it will attain a content for itself; it will justify its own volition; and it will succeed in passing from a life of halfness and semblance to one of genuine reality. It thus becomes clear that Life is no datum but a problem, and that by the side of all particular struggles *a struggle from a whole to a whole must originate.*

That times of struggle are ever followed by times of collective effort is shown clearly enough in the experiences of history. Christianity in its beginnings viewed the life of the ancient world in no friendly manner; but the Middle Ages made it one of its chief aims to connect both antiquity and Christianity into one world. The period of Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*) in modern times inclined towards the refusal of all tradition, but this period itself soon became too narrow, and was unavoidably driven back towards antiquity and Christianity in order to incorporate the eternal content of the two into its own life. Man lives in Time, but he need not live in it alone nor remain merely a product of the moment. He is able to raise himself above these and to gain a life superior to them. Thus the individual is able to construct a wholeness or totality of life superior to the succession of particular events and give to such a life a specific character, while the particular events are, at the same time,

permanently preserved and treated as progressive effects. What appears to the individual as a mere possibility has, however, become for mankind a reality; it has constituted a spiritual atmosphere—a domain of life—in which the individual has placed himself and in which he can view his own or any other period, and can also oppose it if necessary. In so far as the life of mankind culminates in a progressive elevation above Time in so far does it always gain greater self-existence and self-subsistence—in so far does it gain greater originality and content of truth. Therefore Knowledge can become an ever greater conjoint experience of reality.

All this can happen of course only under the presupposition that the ever progressive working out of one's own depth and ever greater transformations into self-activity and originality are possible; and that such a change as this signifies not a mere displacement of the things which present themselves from one side to another but a

new inference, an essential conversion, and a genuine content of life. What appeared first of all as a gift of Nature and of destiny has to become more and more our own work and has, at the same time, to develop life further. Such an advance to self-activity takes place not only in the movement of universal history; but also the character of particular epochs is determined through nothing more than through the fact that what appeared previously as self-evident now becomes a problem—a difficult and imperative task. Thus Christianity made it clear that the morality of antiquity even upon its highest levels was afflicted with merely natural motives, and that the capacity of man for the Good was presupposed in a manner which is in no way proved true and which, indeed, has least of all been justified by the experience of life. This message of Christianity was the means of relegating the question of the immanence of the Good supposed to be

present in the nature of man into the background; and the main question now became how to satisfy the need for Divine love and grace. Thus the whole view of Reality was altered. Enormous entanglements arose out of this conception, but, at the same time, there came a powerful deepening of life; dark abysses now appeared within the nature of man, but there were revealed at the same time great spiritual depths. Such a conception of the deepening of life has never disappeared from the history of the Christian world: what before its discovery appeared as something simple and self-evident has ever afterwards appeared as shallow and even frivolous.

The modern world undertook to bring about a transformation in another direction—in the relation of man to the world—in contrast to the view of Antiquity and of the Middle Ages. According to the main conceptions of Antiquity and the Middle Ages, man appeared securely and solidly surrounded

by a great order or system : the macrocosm carried its content to the microcosm in a manner that left no room for doubt. The growing intensity of the life of the soul in Modern Times led to the dissolution of so definite and certain a connection. Man now breaks away from his dependence upon externals and sets his life independently of them; it became necessary now to re-establish the connection, which could not be now considered as a possession close at hand, by means of one's own activity and even by means of mighty struggles and doubts. To deeper minds there could be no question concerning this necessity—they were convinced that man's reunion with the universe could not take place from the outside nor through shrewd acumen, but could only come about by means of the discovery and development of a cosmic life within man himself. Thus a task was now set him, overruling all tasks and governing his whole view of Reality. It was a task

to whose solution the best thinkers devoted their deepest powers. Thus Spinoza found within Thought the presence of a cosmic life : this cosmic life was put in motion by the necessity of Thought itself, and was something different from all emotion " merely human." Thus Kant found the same fact in moral activity : in this activity he discovered the proof of an intelligible universe —a universe of freedom and inwardness. Whether these solutions solve the problem in its entirety and whether there do not appear new questions arising out of the old solutions cannot here be discussed. One thing is certain—such achievements accomplished by these thinkers constitute a part of the great movement which forms the very nerve of history—a movement which has transformed life into ever greater self-activity, which has placed life at a deeper point than the situation of the moment, and which has ever awakened new depths within the soul of man and given him an

ever richer content. But this does not signify that life is completed even by its acceptance of this standpoint or by its initial experience. For the more Life depends upon itself the more must it question, and the more must it demand for itself; the more it discovers opposition the more doubts it will have to overcome—the more work will it have to accomplish. The self-evident certitude in which Life previously felt its security now disappears more and more; more and more do the self-evident data transform themselves into difficult problems —the practical, forward movement of the act forces more and more all the presuppositions into the background. Thus the whole process may appear, especially at the first glance, as something shadowy and unreal; and it is not to be wondered at that such a view, which considered the whole movement only from the external side and as something alien to the soul, should now become afflicted with the denial of the

possibility of all fruition and meaning. But if, in dealing with cardinal questions, we step more and more into the very nucleus of the problems—if the struggle becomes ever harder and the path ever more difficult—still all this constitutes but *one* side of the situation; indeed, it constitutes only the obverse side of the fact that the life of man transforms itself into more and more self-activity and has now for the first time become fully *his own life.* The fact that man is capable of all this—capable of taking the burden of life upon himself and of developing a reality *from within*—is what gives him genuine greatness, and what gives his deeds a heroic character. A *Yea* far overtops the *Nay* as soon as it is recognised that the movement of universal history is not a mere web of human opinions and interpretations, but that real further development of life results by means of it, that new aims and energies appear, and that, indeed, a content of life becomes possible for the first time—a con-

tent which develops the life in a manner essentially different from that of the initial stages. Such a movement is not merely of assistance to man: it makes something *essentially new* out of him; it gives for the first time value to the idea of what human life and personality ought to be. The working out of a *self-existence and self-subsistence for reality* which happens in this manner can happen, as we have already seen, only by means of an *inversion of the initial situation*, and not in any way by means of a uniform and calm progress. The Biblical words concerning the builders with the trowel in one hand and the sword in the other hold good in connection with all the development of the life of the spirit as well as in connection with the progressive freedom which occurs within the soul. The fact that we ever remain in the realm of quest and effort and that, indeed, all our developing conclusions reveal our limitations and even our weakness, destroys in no manner the truth-

character of the whole. Though the new movement of the soul, with its superiority to the individual in his merely natural state, does not contain as yet the full possession of truth, still it instils into the soul elements of truth; so that the smallness of the individual becomes a testimony to the greatness of the whole matter. When, however, a great movement takes place within human life for granting Reality a *self-subsistence,* and when this movement becomes a *personal fact,* there results within the soul a new relation to Reality and to Knowledge. Over against all anxiety and doubt concerning any *particular* truths there is signified here the fact of a movement towards Truth—a movement which is very far removed from all subjective inclinations and human opinions.

CHAPTER VII

The Consequences of the Main Thesis

(*a*) consequences of the main thesis on the situation of philosophy

Our conception of the relation of Knowledge to Life gives Philosophy a specific position in the whole domain of human effort. In this respect Philosophy does not appear as a cool observer that runs a course independently of Life and that is illumined by Life only in a supplementary manner. For Philosophy participates in all the movement towards granting Reality a self-subsistence and towards the attainment of a genuine originality of life. Philosophy also helps to construct and to develop further life itself. But how could Philosophy be qualified to do this if it were not united, in an *inward* manner,

with the whole of life, and if it were not led forward by the whole movement of life itself?

There is thus inherent in the movement of Philosophy a powerful energy of life. Life does not only find something already existing in the work of Thought, but also itself gives Thought more content and freedom; and the achievements of Philosophy concerning the results, the transformations of life, the further developments of life, and the ascents of life were not at the outset anything intuitive. The leading thinkers were such that in all of them a new life broke forth and a new energy came to development; they were pioneers and conquerors in the kingdom of the spirit, and the effects of their work were more penetrating and durable than the effects of the conquerors of the world of sense. If, to these thinkers themselves, their works not seldom appeared as originating and maturing in calm contemplation and cool intuition, it must be remembered that such a calm was captured

from the experiences of a tempestuous world-mechanism, and had continually to assert itself above such a mechanism; and in order to achieve all this it needed perpetually new energy. Thus, what appeared first of all as a mere rest or calm had to be turned into the inwardness of the soul. Do we not recognise, for instance, the presence of such a movement in the philosophic thought of Spinoza—the master of contemplation—and have not permanent dynamic effects proceeded out of such thoughts? The calm or rest of the spirit is fundamentally different from that which results from an effortless life. The fact that the need for concentrating or focusing their work compelled the great thinkers to hold back from the publicity of life should not blind us to the fact of the energy and ardour contained in their work and to the mighty transformations which have issued from such men and their work. We can take as instances Plato, Descartes, and Kant.

Particular thinkers differ fundamentally in the manner in which they relate themselves to life. In Philosophy we endeavour to distinguish between a Science of the Universe and a Science of the Schools. Philosophy is not a Science of the Universe, and does not deal with the problems of the Universe; for when Philosophy attempts to deal with such problems it is only too apt to do so in a highly scholastic, narrow and prejudicial manner. The business of Philosophy is to preserve a connection with the whole of the life of the spirit of man and to further such life by means of its work. The particular point, however, where this happens and the mode in which it happens show most clearly the characteristics as well as the greatness of the thinkers of the world. If Philosophy loses this connection with the life of the spirit and places itself upon mere knowledge, cleverness, and reflection, it may accomplish in certain directions something that is valuable, but it is unfruitful in the sense we

here conceive of the real meaning and value of Knowledge; for by the severance of Thought from Life and by the suppression of its binding energy Philosophy will either fritter away into noisy individual opinions or cling to the traditions of some creative thinker, reading everything that is new into the ideas of such a thinker and extracting the whole meaning of life and existence out of his ideas. This becomes a scholasticism and is a besetment not only of the Middle Ages but of all times.

Our conception also places the relation of Thought to its own time in a specific light, so that the different aspects of the matter in hand may obtain their entire rights. The thinker stands within the movement of humanity; his environment leads him into a specifically spiritual atmosphere and gives an orientation to his efforts. Can we conceive of a Kant in the situation of a Plotinus, or of a Hegel in the situation of a Descartes? But such a connection of the

thinker to his environment does not in any manner make the thinker a mere interpreter of his age; and it is only the intellectual pantheism of Hegel which could interpret Philosophy solely as "the particular age conceived in thought." For the great thinkers did not only bring to self-consciousness the *substantial* that was already in existence, but they also transformed this *substantial* and raised it to a higher level, whilst, by means of their work, the movement which they initiated overcame the narrowness of the "merely human" and the "pseudo-spiritual" which characterise the ordinary civilisation and culture of their day; their work gained an entire self-reliance; by means of their teaching they succeeded in bringing forth something *new* over against what existed in their age, and they embodied this *new* into the content of their own age. The main fact for them was not what the age *already possessed* but what it *needed*. Though Hegel designates the

great thinker as "he who gives expression to what his own age needs and who speaks to it and shows it the meaning of its real life," still there is to be placed over against this truth the fact that any age on the whole needs but little of what is of fundamental significance, but it oscillates insecurely between willing and non-willing, between affirmation and negation until the strong thought and will of a mind creating qualities from an *inner necessity* frees the age from its imperfections. Thus the great thinkers have a twofold relation to their age—that of *relation* and that of *opposition:* they stand *within* their age, and, at the same time *above* it; they lead it further and further and withstand it; they create out of it and struggle against it. Indeed, the more the effects of their works represent and contend for what is not inwardly present within the age the more do they come into contrast with the shallowness of their age. Plato, in the very substance of his ideas,

possessed more of the Greek spirit than Aristotle, and hence he was obliged to come into a sharper opposition to his environment than his great pupil. Voltaire was a truer expression of his age than almost any of his contemporaries, and yet he passed away with his age leaving no deep footprints behind him. Spinoza was in a large measure an alien to his own age, but out of his work permanent results have gone forth.

Another point to be noticed in the relations of the great thinkers to their own age is the fact that they all aimed at giving an individual, specific moulding to what they conceived to be the most important efforts of their age; for without this achievement the thinkers could not possibly attain the thorough essential development which they saw needful for life and effort, and it was just here that their greatness lay. As with all great men, a leading thinker is not a mere representative of some one general principle—is not a mere vehicle of

some "imperative mandate"—but has a unique individuality as well as something incalculable about him. But this individuality is no mere accident: behind it stands something that is *universal*—a *universal* that seeks its incarnation in the *individual*, so that such a *universal* is able to become effective in the whole of life and able to draw at last the whole of mankind after itself. The presuppositions of the Reformation were in all essentials the same; but how differently did Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin create their *intellectual* interpretations from an essentially similar *spiritual universal!* Such a place and significance as we give here to individuality render it impossible to press the universal movements of mankind into any intellectual mould, and such an emancipation from intellectual formulæ does not appear to us to-day as a detriment, but as essentially an advantage.

Our conception of Philosophy explains also the differences of opinion concerning

its proper function and the perpetual strife concerning its value. If, on the one hand, Philosophy is praised as the Queen of the Sciences and, indeed, as the towering height of the whole life, still, on the other hand, Philosophy is represented as something superfluous, injurious, or even impossible. What has particularly brought forth such a conclusion as this is the statement continually made that the work of Philosophy in connection with fundamental questions all along the centuries has not achieved any results absolutely certain and universally valid, and that in the course of history it has not transformed the doubts and struggles which surrounded it into any solid and definite conclusions. Or, as such a statement as we have referred to might present its opposition to Philosophy: Are not the differences in the various modes of thinking—say of the Sophists and of Socrates, of Plato and of Aristotle, of the Stoics and of the Epicureans —absolute contradictions one of the other?

And are not these differences actual problems with us to-day, and do they not give rise to ever fresh strife? But, at the same time, it is clear that periods in which Philosophy is depreciated tend to sink spiritually and to fall into narrowness and stagnation. Men cannot long subsist without Philosophy; so that Philosophy, often rejected, constantly returns.

All this gains a new light when it is recognised that the main task of Philosophy is the transformation of *life*—the elevation of life to *a being and existence of its own* and consequently to a *genuine Reality*. When the matter is so conceived, the differences of estimation, the existence of different starting-points, and the conclusions and results of different orientations can be well understood; but without this understanding, the point of essential significance either becomes obscured or degenerates into a matter of merely subjective taste. The work of Philosophy does not run into nothingness;

and all the differences imbedded in it serve a common end. Granted that the fruits of the labour are no solid results which stand outside the universal movement of life itself, yet the results consist in the heightening of this movement itself—in the increasing transformation of ordinary existence into spiritual freedom and self-reliance; and the gain thus secured far outweighs the lack of concreteness with which Philosophy is charged. This is so because what issues out of *life itself* is in the last resort of infinitely greater value and significance than what is achieved in an *external* sense. The fact, however, that Philosophy has really brought forth, by means of its elevation of life above the narrowness and pettiness of man, the most powerful transformation and that it has worked in a powerful, free, and progressive manner is shown by the whole course of history as well as by each particular epoch. Different epochs have sought different things by means of their Philosophy. It may have

been an effort to place things within an elevated kingdom of durable Being and of pure Beauty, as with Plato; it may have been an effort to bring about the victory of logical power over the ordinary chaotic condition of things, as with Aristotle; or it may have been an effort to raise morality to a sphere of entire self-reliance and of unconditional values, as with the Stoics; or it may have been an effort, by means of Philosophy, to free religious aspirations from the selfishness and egoism of the mere individual and of setting this aspiration in communion with the Alone in order to satisfy the longing soul, as with Plotinus. In all these an elevation of the life of the spirit of man to a level of entire independence was undertaken by Philosophy; it proved itself in all these as an agent of radical transformations and as a motive calling out man's deepest energies.

At the same time, it is clear that what special situations thus brought forth in the

form of tasks and movements did not pass away with the ordinary circumstances of the day or of the age; but nuclei thus formed detached themselves from such ordinary circumstances and became permanent elements of life. The Platonic and the Stoic *Systems* are obsolete for us to-day, but the Platonic and the Stoic *modes of thinking* remain ever fresh and capable of ever new effects—they represent a mode of life expressed in terms of Thought.

Now it is easy to perceive why Life comes to a deadlock and is paralysed when it abandons Philosophy. For Life thus loses the possibility of gaining a self-reliance over against the individual's mere likes and dislikes; it is irretrievably banished into the narrowness of the circle of its own mere individual history and of its accidental interests. Philosophy, despite its emancipating and elevating effects, is rejected only because its elevating effects are not apparent to the senses. These effects cannot be

touched with our hands or seen with our eyes. But when Philosophy is thus slighted and its true meaning and value unrecognised—all this is not the fault of Philosophy. The fault lies in that which has no eye for *inner* movements. Nor is it otherwise in connection with religion, art, and morality : they, too, participate in the danger of being considered superfluous and of being denied. But what is thus considered as a weakness by man in his natural state is in fact something great and lofty; every elevated quality does not force itself upon any man, but still it aspires after a friendly relationship with man's aspirations and seeks an awakening of his inner life.

As herewith the whole of Philosophy receives a positive value, so a friendly relationship to the great thinkers of the world is gained in spite of all the differences of their conceptions and their systems. It is thus possible to disregard the particular formulation or precise wording

of their thoughts and still recognise fully the acknowledgment of an ascent of life as constituting the kernel of their teaching. The learned treatises of Spinoza lead, in some of their main points, to decisive contradictions. This is especially so in regard to the monism so strongly emphasised in his teaching—it is really a monism only in appearance; and Spinoza's system on closer investigation is seen to be a dualism of Naturalism and Mysticism. But in spite of all contradictions the inner freedom and breadth manifest in his works can be held in the highest honour. Thus there arises a twofold mode of viewing and valuing things: one dealing with a learned *formulation* and a precise wording of the teaching; the other dealing with the stimulating *spirit* present in all the teaching. This twofold aspect explains the remarkable fate—especially the change of valuation—by which many Systems of Thought have been overtaken. Wolff, with his systematic and precise work, was during his own lifetime held

in the highest esteem, and was a distinguished member of all the great European Societies. The absence from his teaching of a stimulating spirit and of an elevated conception of life was not observed by the learned members of these Societies; but when these defects in Wolff's teaching were afterwards discovered the judgment of the members of learned Societies bordered almost on injustice to him. But Spinoza, on the other hand, was ignored not only by the orthodox but also by the learned of his day; such an impartial thinker as Bayle termed the Spinozistic Philosophy a lamentable absurdity (*Gallimathias pitoyable*); and yet Spinoza became for some of the greatest German poets and thinkers their fountain of fresh life. Such a welling-up life is often discovered only where it is active from the outset; and judged according to such a criterion alone it fritters away the history of Philosophy to happenings merely on the external side; but what, however, remains

intact in spite of all this has all the more content and stimulating energy. Thus there come to be in our view of things new vistas and new tasks.

(*b*) CONSEQUENCES OF THE MAIN THESIS ON THE WORK OF KNOWLEDGE

In our discussion Knowledge and Life have been shown as shaping themselves in a specific manner. We have already seen that in the process of Knowledge, Thought and Life present mutual effects. On the one hand, Thought develops, out of its own nature, definite demands and places these into all that it comes in contact with. But these demands of Thought do not lead beyond the *outlines* of things : the filling up of these outlines has to take place by means of the characteristic mode of Life that is brought face to face with Thought. This state of things (and, in particular, this dependency of Thought and also of the work of Thought upon Life) is verified by

the whole experience of philosophic work; while, at the same time, Life shows itself dependent in its moulding of its World of Thought upon the particularity of the process of Life which comes to development and seeks its perfection within it. This process of Life considered in regard to its place of origin, its relationship to the environment, and the tasks thus arising, determines for Thought its orientation and the various directions in which it can move. Thus there stand side by side in the conflict of the minds of the great thinkers not only theories but also views of *life:* the ideas and doctrines bring forth only what was actually differentiated within the basis itself. Locke and Leibniz did not come into conflict with each other's theory because each gave the same facts a different interpretation, but because the facts themselves were different from their very basis—the point of departure was different for each of the two. What has made the con-

flicting ideas of philosophers unfruitful is the fact that the problem is taken up on the side of its *effects* instead of going back to the *causes*. The thinkers consequently speak different tongues; and the conflict between them is in fact only a seeming one. Accordingly we ascertain a general fact when we maintain the dependence of Thought upon Life. But this fact that is clearly ascertained and is now in the foreground was at an earlier time overlooked and consequently ignored; and it is this which presents us with the new situation of the problem. For now it is necessary to shift the problem further back and to change the method of proof in an essential manner; now one mode of life must prove its superiority, its independence, and its originality over against another mode. Thus there opens out a vista into a rich movement. We now observe that different kinds of realities conflict with one another; and the question arises, what kinds will make

other kinds subservient to themselves and carry through their own specific character? Every philosophical system at the present time has in the first place to give account of its relation to Life; it has to show and justify the *process of life* in which it is rooted and from which it draws a knowledge of its own directivity. Herewith all that refuses us this demand becomes insufficient for us and becomes the main source of dogmatism and discord—it presupposes a certain mode of life as something self-evident and consequently avoids all discussion on the matter. In particular, all Theories of Knowledge which undertake to discover the pathway to Truth by means of minute reflection become an unfruitful and a hopeless undertaking. It is imperative to develop another mode of treatment over against this mode and also to see the history of Philosophy in another light. It is necessary to go further back and to bring more into movement.

At the same time, the question arises

whether Knowledge after all be possible—whether a Life which furnishes the necessary demands be revealed to us. A fundamental presupposition for answering this question is the conviction that an elevation of the process of life beyond the level of mere individuality has actually taken place—a process of life which, though not near to our hands, still is accessible to us; and it becomes of importance to discover and to grasp within the human domain a life which is original and which constructs Reality; it is now necessary to bring about within ourselves a scale as well as a conversion of life. Such a *new life* cannot originate out of the ordinarily "given" situation: it originates only in opposition to such a situation—only by seizing a new point of departure. When this comes about, there happens at the same time a breaking away from the old and a progressive autonomy of Thought towards the greatest and most urgent *necessities;* there is now fully accomplished

within the soul a *deed*—a *deed* which does not allow of being forced upon man by any one or any thing, but which claims man's own decision. Therefore all the systems of Thought have to eliminate from the domain of Thought what such a decision conceives as superfluous, and at the same time to disallow all attempts to belittle the autonomy attained and to view it as no more than an eccentricity or over-excitement. These systems may achieve results of some value in other directions. They may, for example, do this by means of collecting and classifying facts of value; but they do not grant us a genuine Knowledge nor an inner experience of Reality. Indeed, strictly speaking, the systems do not at all belong to genuine Philosophy.

But if this turn of life towards self-reliance signifies so much, it includes not only the setting of life in a situation other than its prior situation—it is not only a turn from the Object to the Subject—but the *nucleus of life itself* has now to be changed. Freedom is

now understood not as something merely formal and negative. Freedom does not signify merely an independence of alien powers: it signifies that a new mode of life has actually appeared and that a new Reality has made its presence felt within the aspiring spirit. When the consciousness becomes aware of this, the need for the process of elimination just spoken of is seen to originate from such a spiritual base; and the *free deed* already referred to is seen as being possible of realisation from such a source alone. Freedom is the indispensable *condition* as well as the *form* of the *new life*, but it is *not* its *content*. Freedom, despite its tension of energy, would issue in emptiness if there did not exist a depth of Reality and if this Reality could not become man's own life. This signifies also that the new life thus disclosed comes to us as something revealed and experienced; it is not something to be puzzled out by means of speculative ideas, but is discovered only as a *fact*—a fact which certainly does not

lie without but within, and which does not signify a mere succession of particular mental processes, but which gathers together all the multiplicity into a unity or whole. If one were to denominate this turn towards an *original fact* Positivism, such a spiritual Positivism would be fundamentally different from the familiar naturalistic doctrine which is aware of facts only in so far as they are outside the mind that perceives them, which never succeeds in passing from mental processes to a totality or wholeness, which never attains an inner appropriation of Reality, and which can never transform the world from being an alien land to being a home.

What, however, appears as a *real inward fact* is for Thought at the outset a mere conjecture, and has first to prove its own nature in order to be acknowledged. It can do this in no way other than through the production of results which show that this *inward fact* establishes new contents and values which not only bring about

further developments of life in particular directions—not simply fixing certain particular goals and developing certain particular powers—but which, originating from the totality or wholeness of life, accomplishes something quite other than all this—by inaugurating a life essentially *new*, which entirely supersedes the capacity of the individual in his merely natural state and which transforms him into something entirely different from what he formerly was. All this will not take place unless contents and values such as the Good, the True, and the Beautiful—the conceptions of which are usually a mixture of spiritual and merely human qualities—are freed from such a mixture and understood and treated entirely in accordance with their spiritual content as self-developments of the life of the spirit. When this is done, these contents and values will become evidences of the *reality of the turn* which life has taken. For this new grade and new form of life it is essential to

bear in mind that the *Object* does not lie somewhere over against the *activity* of the *Subject*, but that it has now been drawn into this *activity* and is assimilated by it. As this experience now moulds itself into an energy and activity which constitute an encompassing, complete and absolute activity *there originates first and foremost a reality within the soul*; an *actual event*, with its own powers and necessities, now develops, and the emptiness and insecurity of all bare subjectivity is overcome. The present age possesses a strong desire for such an emancipation—a strong desire for a greater content of soul and for the discovery of an *Object* where all this can be found. But mere Thought concentrated upon such an Object will prove fruitless so long as the Object remains *outside* us: we may thus shuffle and waver irresolutely around the Object, but it will remain in its essence for ever alien to us. The Object can be made our own—can become *our own* thoughts—only in so

far as our life is able to develop it out of itself. The matter passes more and more into a state of advance—into a state of progressive breadth and originality—until finally *Life* is seen as being always the *Standard* for the measurement of *Knowledge*.

The essentially new content also requires a *new method:* it is the content that has compelled us to differentiate between a *Noological* and a *Psychological* Method. The latter is by no means to be curtailed of its rights; but these rights must claim for it only a subsidiary place if we are to prevent the worst results from happening. Questions such as the following have to be more sharply distinguished than is usually the case: *What* does the Spiritual Life in man, in the form of a content, develop out of itself? And *how* does that which develops acquire such an experience of Spiritual Life? Untold confusion and error originate on account of the indiscriminate mixing up of these two questions. When

such confusion occurs we obtain disastrous results. On the one hand, the *conditions* of the spiritual stimulation within man are carried into the *content* of Spiritual Life itself; and, on the other, *consequences* which have developed only in such a spiritual content are supposed to have arisen from powers "merely human."

Thus, for instance, Spiritual Life in man stands under the form of Time, and it is only by means of a gradual further movement —indeed, only by means of an opposition and struggle throughout—that Spiritual Life unfolds into flower and fruit. But, in spite of this, Spiritual Life must never be understood as an entire Becoming—as a mere Process—for, if this were the case, Truth would become the mere slave of its age; and such a state of things would mean an inner destruction of Truth. But, on the other hand, man trusts himself too much when, within his own circle, he considers Knowledge as an absolute point of departure

for his life. It is true that there works in the life of the spirit of man something that is absolutely fixed and original; but man is only able to approach this in a slow and gradual manner—only at the cost of work and trouble, of experience and constant disillusionment concerning the things nearest to his hands. The danger arises of bringing the whole movement to a standstill when man, within his own domain, considers any *terminus a quo* or any *terminus ad quem* as something simply evident and complete and upon which everything else depends. Thus what is an *indisputable Fact* concerning the Spiritual Life of man is at the same time a high and distant goal for him. It is true that he participates in this *Fact* in so far as his nature is grounded in Spiritual Life; but this *Fact* becomes his own possession, joy, and strength only through the uprising of his own creativeness. To hold up simultaneously *fact and task*—to be on guard against losing the possession in one's

quest and the quest in the possession—is the main condition of success in the enterprise.

This *noological* treatment has, however, to extend from the whole of Spiritual Life to the particular provinces. These provinces have to corroborate their rights and discover their particular contents; and since they prove their own standpoint and achievements within this totality or wholeness a further development of life takes place. It is this alone which gives the various provinces an absolute conviction and which disengages them from what is contingent in human situations and opinions. If, for example, religion is based upon the need of man as he is in his merely natural state—be the situation that of the individual or of human society—the occasional, accidental situation is taken as the reality. When this happens one will remain, despite the greatest expansion of life on its *external* side, bound *inwardly* to an unstable situation—one will

succumb to the constant changes of human situations and wishes. Would it be surprising if such a religion came to be regarded as a tissue of mere illusions in which man is enclosed? But the case appears quite otherwise if it is affirmed that Spiritual Life is to be preserved within our own domain —if, right through distress and negation, a new depth of life has been disclosed—a depth which goes beyond all general conceptions *about* Spiritual Life—and if a scale of values comes into existence for us. Herewith for the first time an experience valid for all will be gained—an experience superior to the contingency which enmeshes the individual. Coming from such a source, religion cannot any longer appear as a mere product of psychic processes or situations—a conception which not only limits it to one particular sphere of action, but which also lowers it in an inward manner and relegates it almost to the domain of mental Pathology. In every religion there is rooted

a *contrast* between an *old* and a *new* world; for an immanent religion is a contradiction in itself. Religion is not, however, merely a mere expedient for the assistance of natures full of contrast—natures that are tattered and torn in their inward parts and that seek in it a healing balm for their wounds. It is this, but it is something else as well. All honour to the "art of healing" in religion; but to turn it entirely into such an art is to destroy its deepest nature and truth. A torn and tattered condition, on the one hand, and the presence of shadows and gradations within the life of the spirit, on the other, are things fundamentally different. On the one hand, the presence of mere contradictions within the soul would hardly produce a turn towards religion had it not been that a religious atmosphere already surrounded the individual. On the other hand, there can be deeply religious natures in whose lives and work the sharpest contradictions may be fully present but without

passing into a state of rebellion and dismemberment of the soul. And further an inner weakening of the real essence can readily take place if it is assumed that the effects of religion upon man are pre-eminently exhibited in certain sudden and striking psychic acts, instead of issuing from the source of all the work of life and thus penetrating constantly into all work and creativeness. How much injustice has been done to the mystic by failure to realise this truth! Art usually tends to treat things in a different fashion, and as follows: On the one hand, religion is conceived as originating from the confused situations of the soul; but, on the other, religion originates from the harmonious situation of the soul, or, expressed more definitely, from the equilibrium of sensuous and spiritual elements. But we can readily see that all that is expressed in such statements is confined within the soul of the individual: it can never become a spiritual creativeness—

it can never engender a growing reality—which will have value for the whole of mankind, and which will be able to work in an elevating and ennobling manner upon the life of man. And further, unless we conceive of religion as being able to produce such effects, all the intense earnestness, the mighty aspirations, and the deep emotions which appear on the summits of artistic creativeness cannot be accounted for. As the psychological interpretation of religion conceives of it in too pessimistic a manner it tends to look upon the work of Art in too optimistic a manner. Art has its greatness and truth in the fact that it inspires a demand of the life of the spirit, and, at the same time, carries this life further on its way.

Thus there appears a wide interval between the *noological* and the *psychological* methods. The former alone produces an experience valid for all and capable of becoming the possession of all; it thus

reveals a *cosmic movement* within man's own domain, and also raises his World of Thought into what is great as well as into what binds mankind together.

The fact that such a transformation comes to consummation and that a new life breaks forth must consequently alter man's whole view of things. He is now not a mere speck on the face of a boundless expanse, but a co-partner with the universe—a participator in infinity. On account of such a view of man's life and destiny it is impossible for the new life to be adjusted to a state of soul already existing: the wholeness or totality present in the soul must come into activity—it must bring forth an *effort* which does not proceed from the particular to the whole, but from the whole to the particular. Certainly as all Spiritual Life—in the form of a *deed which is entire*—unites the opposites of inward potency and external object, just as certainly spiritual creativeness thrives within us and overcomes the contradictions.

Now, the empirical consciousness stands under these contradictions so long as it feels itself as something over against the things which present themselves to it. The creativeness must therefore rise above such a consciousness. The creativeness with its results appears in such a consciousness, but it does not originate from this source. This is not to be conceived as something subconscious, but far rather as something superconscious to the normal consciousness of man. Man, from this standpoint of creativeness, is not to be interpreted as a mere sequence of psychic activities or as a bundle of so-called "faculties of the soul"; for in that basal unity of his life the particular activities coalesce, mutually permeate each other, and, at the same time, lead to a higher stage. It is through the agency of this living source that percept is raised into concept, and impulse into will. Thus it becomes clear that we are not to seek the nucleus of man's nature in psychic

activities because these are in fact only *appearances* and developments of a basal Spiritual Life. When we view the matter thus we have but little taste for the debate between Intellectualism and Voluntarism, for such a debate places the problem in the region of *phenomenalism*—a problem which is more properly concerned with the *spiritual substance* of life. Still less are such psychic processes of value for a complete view of the universe. As undoubtedly the rising of Spiritual Life within the human domain gives evidence of a *self-subsistence* or *being-for-self* of Reality every idea of such a self-subsisting Reality when presented in the form of human psychic powers is no more than a metaphor. What becomes specific to us and what sets us in an incessant movement is the fact that we are unable to transform into *ideas* that of which we are immediately certain as a whole and as existing in the depth of the soul without, at the same time, drawing it down to a lower

level. Conceptions of the universe which make us look upon the intellect or the will as the vehicle of reality—which seek each other or struggle with each other—are projections of human qualities into the universe: as metaphors they are indispensable, but we dare not make them more than this.

When the *noological* method strives to raise a clear and strong structure of Spiritual Life out of the existing confusion of things—when it shifts Life from effects to causes—an elevation of life will immediately follow; for with such illumination and emancipation of Spiritual Life the method becomes, over against the prior situation, a pattern, a summons, a motive. The "Higher" is not now merely a hope, a wish, an ideal; it is not woven by the mere intellect nor is it added to it, but is the deepest source of our life and a mighty power within us. This *New* way, in relation to the situation nearest to our hands, appears as an imperative—as an Ought—but this Ought is able in this connection

to shake off and overcome all that otherwise would have made it dependent and servile, because here the *Higher* is carried forward and upward by *its own deed* and is present as a living power. We hear much to-day concerning Judgments of Values, but such Judgments possess good rights and a dynamic energy only if they are the expression of a life *effective* within us; and it is only in so far as this *new life* has become *our own real self* that it can work in a rousing and elevating manner: for mere reflections and logical Judgments cannot much elevate and help without this at the back of them.

If the *noological* method thus brings more movement into our life, it drives more genuine content into self-consciousness and also works for a fuller acknowledgment of the spiritual results present in our work; it will not only clarify much in certain directions, but will also perfect our more complete view of Reality into a totality and into an inwardness. If it be a weakness

of the ordinary human mode of conceiving things to resort to ready-made conclusions, such a " dead-level " mode has been accentuated in modern times through its craving for results and its acceleration of the rate of life, so that it is specially inclined to forget practically everything concerning the *what* and the *how* of things; and in its constant attention to the results of its work is only too apt to leave the vehicle of the work entirely out of account. Where, however, as in connection with Knowledge, the whole content has to be valued and appreciated, the *noological* side we have just mentioned must also be valued and appreciated because it determines in an essential manner the character of the whole.

There accordingly arises the task of the criticism of the work of Knowledge—the task of proving whether what is announced as a *result* is in accordance with the *nature* of the work which really led to the *result*. If this harmony be wanting, the whole

cannot maintain itself intact. How far such a whole can break up and how such a breaking up can coercively displace the situation already attained—all this I have attempted to show in my work entitled *Die Einheit des Geisteslebens* (The Unity of the Spiritual Life[1]), especially from the side of modern thought and effort. The modern naturalistic philosopher would, if he could, reduce the whole world into terms of nature, and nature into a mechanism. When he attempts to do this, he dissolves Spiritual Life into a mere epiphenomenon of natural phenomena, and makes the effects of Spiritual Life to be participated by the mechanical order of things. But the *work itself* which leads to such results, shows the matter in a quite different light. This work takes place in the *mind* and shows a picture very different from the

[1] A translation of this important work is in preparation, and will be published by Messrs. Williams and Norgate. [Translator.]

conclusions of naturalism. *This work in the mind* has to be wrought out from a *whole* to a *whole;* it has first of all to prepare the ground for one's own conviction; it has to remould first impressions; it has to exercise perseverance and patience, to plan and to verify its proofs. In all this *the work in the mind* develops a web so subtle that it is only held together by means of a superior Thought; this work presents Thought as so independent in its character that the frame of natural phenomena is entirely broken through. He who treats Nature thus—he who is able to bring his own thought over against it—is *more* than mere Nature. This thinking is also a constituent of reality, and such a mental picture must embrace reality. Consequently, natural science, understood on the side of its mental constructions, most certainly refutes all mere naturalism. The case is similar in connection with the attempt to transform reality into a *process* which, though spiritual, is yet personal. For what leads

the struggle against the narrowness of a life " merely human and personal " is in the last resort *a specific aspiration of life itself*—a quest for a deeper and richer *self-existence* and *self-subsistence*. If the *process* does not find its home in such qualities as these—if it does not hold together a *superior unity* and transform it into a *result*—the whole movement will dissipate itself in the sand. Thus, this view of reality acquires vividness and depth if the emphasis on results does not make us forget the very power through which these results accrue.

All this cannot come to pass if the *world of deed* does not first of all stand out in strong relief from the *world of existence*, and if this *world of deed* is not comprehended purely in its *self-existence* and *self-subsistence*. Without this there is no binding into a *whole* and no distinctive marks of character. But we have already seen that the division between the two worlds is inhibited from being an entire cleavage—that the *deed-world*,

in order to find its own consummation, has to return to the *world of existence*, and has to come to an understanding and arrangement with it. Herewith arises the task of ascertaining and determining in a thoroughly unbiassed way the state and nature of the *world of existence;* and this can only be done if, first of all, the *world of existence* is viewed (by a process of abstraction) as entirely independent of the *world of deed.* In this sense a true empiricism, with its insistence upon simple experience, has its justification as against much of the idealisation and optimistic interpretation of the content of experience now so much in vogue. The strength and hardihood necessary to carry further the spiritual movement fails such optimistic interpretations because they neglect the simple content of experience; whilst a true empiricism calls forth new powers by dint of the oppositions which present themselves, and breaks open new pathways. Not only much confusion of

thought but also much lassitude in action is occasioned by the facile disposition to attribute to experience qualities which can only become its own by means of the spiritual activity it puts forth. It is necessary to work out experience from two sides. There must be, on the one side, a serious wrestling with the *deed-world*, and, on the other, with the *world of existence* if the *spiritual world* of man is to develop and express its full characteristics. But the co-operation of both worlds must not be understood as a kind of combination of two different things —as something to which the *deed-world* gives the *form* and the *world of existence* gives the *material*. Such a combination can never engender a *living whole*—indeed, the two elements can never come together in an *inner* manner. For if the life of the spirit is to progress the conditions and circumstances of the *external world* are rather to be placed upon the ground of the *deed-world*, and are here to be transformed into an

antithesis furnishing motives for the further development of the life of the spirit. The *deed-world* is not a mere side of life but constitutes the whole or totality of life—a whole that can submit to nothing outside itself; but it is a whole or totality that is as yet incomplete, and which can perfect itself only by means of contact and collision with *external existence*. Such an interpretation of this *world of existence* raises important questions concerning its relation with the *world of deed*. The question is, whether and in what manner does the *existing world* take up and carry further a movement different in nature from its own movement, or whether and in what manner does it bring forth strong opposition to such a movement and bring to nought every attempt at illumining the meaning and value of things? This question branches out in all directions—it extends from particular points to the fundamental relationship of the *deed-world* and the *existing-world*.

Does the *existing-world* as a whole enter into the *higher world of deed* either summarily or gradually? Or does it signify, as over against the *deed-world*, an opposition which perhaps in course of time will grow sharper rather than milder? If the former view be held, not only Knowledge but also Life itself will be moulded into what is mental and ideal. If the latter be true, it is simply impossible to overcome an irrationality which seems imbedded in the very nature of things. Which is the true view can never be decided by means of imaginative reflection, but only by ascertaining the real facts. The fact that the life of the spirit is capable of developing only by means of a partial severance from and opposition to the world outside shows that we are placed in a peculiar situation in this world of sense and time—it shows that an opposition has to be overcome and that this can be achieved only in a very gradual manner. But the further question presses itself, whether the

Higher succeeds in obtaining an entire self-reliance or whether, within the human domain, it remains permanently tied to the Lower? Indeed, the question really comes to this: Whether the Higher is not often drawn to the level of the Lower and placed in its service? If this were so, the situation would occasion stagnation and perversion; but this sad experience, in its turn, would call forth a yearning after some counter effect. Thus possibilities upon possibilities arise; and how we are now to conceive of Reality can be decided by means of *experience alone*. We have to guard ourselves here from being drawn to some abstract principle to which some kind of definite solution to the problem is to be credited. But, on the other hand, it often happens in this situation that the easiest and simplest solution which offers itself from the outside is accepted without more ado. But this means nothing less than to make the shallow comfort of man the criterion of reality and to fall under the

imputation of an anthropomorphism which is perhaps even more dangerous than crude. In connection with the Problem of Knowledge we must not for a moment forget, as man possesses a special situation within Reality and finds the life of the spirit within him in a special situation, that the experiences which merely surround him must not be summarily set in the *nature of spirit*, and that even in his relation to his environment his world of thought possesses some characteristics of an *affirmative* kind which point beyond the world of sense.

Such an affirmation appears further in the movements of universal history—movements which, as we have already observed, do not run in a definite direction from the outset, but which have to seek their course and goal through struggles and opposites, through affirmations and negations. In the rise and fall of autonomies within the spirit of man as well as in the efforts to combine the different kinds of products into a totality of life *signifi-*

cant experiences have to be taken into account as an interpretation—experiences which, despite all that is "merely human" about them, are still *self-experiences of the life of the spirit.* The work of Thought has to raise up such experiences and to use them for its own ends—it has to discover beyond the individual *parts* a movement of the *whole;* and from this standpoint Thought will strive for a *present* experience which is superior to Time and which spans the events of Time. It is from this standpoint and not from the sequence of the mere events which pass swiftly over the surface of Time that the task of our own day is apprehended.

All these things together point out the direction in which the work of Thought has to seek its main domain. It does not find it in Nature, nor in the individual psychic life, nor in ontological speculations. It finds it in *the inner world of Spiritual Life*—in its dawning and its experiences, its struggles with oppositions, and its own further development. It is

necessary to discover and appropriate within this domain a rich fulness of Reality. The movement of History indicates the readiest point of attack; but History helps and furthers us only in so far as it is set in an *over-historical* light—only in so far as it is understood as a quest for *life itself*, and as it is led towards the *eternal content* which is imbedded in it. Here lies the greatest depth of Reality which man can plumb; here lies also, in the form of a Yea and a Nay, the source of the final convictions of the meaning of Reality and of the possibility of genuine Knowledge. Great minds and different epochs have been divided on the question as to whether Spiritual Life is a fixed quality which reveals itself in different degrees only on its external side, or whether the movements of Life and of History reach to its inmost being and whether History itself extends into the very nucleus of the course of the cosmos. All this gains in intensity with the tasks of

life; but the work of Knowledge has still further to pass out of the region of the Speculative into that of the Positive. How this can take place can only be made clear by further investigation. So much, however, is certain, viz. that it is this *historical* conception alone which gives Life space for its utmost exercise as well as a dramatic character; while, on the other hand, such a character is bound to be wanting when Life is viewed, as in antiquity, as something stable or, as in modern times, as some kind of physical or logical process. The Christian religion (along with other religions, and even more than other religions) gives a thoroughly historical character to our Reality; but it gives Reality this character in a specifically religious sense which has become too narrow for us to-day. And we may state that here are involved tasks for the future.

So much as this is certain: that a work of Knowledge which forces such problems into the background or which fails, in the main,

to recognise them is doomed to barrenness. In regard to this subject the two following questions are to be considered first *separately* and afterwards *together:* these are the questions concerning the *fundamental content* of Spiritual Life on the one hand, and the *mode of its formation* within the human domain on the other; or, as the question might be otherwise stated—the one concerning the *substance* of the Spiritual Life and the other concerning its *form of existence.* In connection with the former, it is necessary to develop what is imbedded within the fundamental content of the *substance*—what the *substance* reveals to us concerning Reality and what is implicit in it in the form of Ends. In the latter, it has to be shown *how* our *thought* relates itself to the *substance* and also what issues through the contact of the *deed-world* and the *existing world.* In the *substance, fundamental truths* make their appearance, while in the *form of existence facts* of experience are seen. These *funda-*

mental truths—as the most original inclusion of Reality and as superior to human particularity—cannot be encroached upon by the most radical contradictions of our earthly situation with its varied points of view. These are also truths which alone place the *world of existence* and all that it contains in a definite light; they are truths which address precise questions, and which free the *world of existence* from the meaningless appearance which it at first presents. Out of the ordinary experiences which arise within the *world of existence* there never arises real genuine experience. Therefore such ordinary experiences must be placed in the scale in order to be estimated at their proper value. When this is done, such ordinary experiences point *beyond* themselves; they lead to something more inward, and become stimulations and motives for the further development of Spiritual Life.

Such a contact between *fundamental truths* and *factual experiences* gives special signifi-

cance to the particular situation of man. There cannot be a doubt that the Spiritual Life in humanity has to develop in a medium very different from, and conflicting with, itself. It may be that the *world of existence* contains possibilities through which may be supplied help and protection for this spiritual development of life, but it is necessary, first of all, to call these possibilities into actual existence; and in order to do this, hard work and continuous deeds are requisite. It is necessary from the outset to possess the ground of our "building" and to safeguard it ever anew from all assaults. Each stage of life shows the truth of all this. As the life of the individual generally deals with what lies nearest to our hands it flows with the sequence of the momentary processes of consciousness. How then can it be qualified to become the vehicle of Spiritual Life with all its demands concerning Totality, Wholeness, and Infinity? When, however, a spiritual movement arises

from the depth of the soul it forms a deeper layer for constructing the basis or nucleus of life, for bringing up out of unity an effort towards a further totality, for gaining self-subsistence for life over against the merely ordinary consciousness — a self-subsistence which is able to hold the manifold of phenomena present in consciousness. Thus we obtain a new view of the life of the soul, but this is not a view which lies near to our hands : it is a view which is ever stimulated and raised up from the soul itself. There does not exist any ready-made depth in the soul as against the superficiality of the merely drifting consciousness of the ordinary moments. Such a depth has first of all to be *established* in the soul.

The collective life of mankind usually presents itself merely in the form of co-existence and sequence. Such a life, however, cannot possibly develop a Spiritual Life. Therefore it is necessary to place a *unity* over against the *co-existence* and a *duration* over against

the *sequence*. This is done by means of the developments and formations of Society and History in so far as these preserve a specific meaning. But Society and History, as vehicles of Spiritual Life, are in no manner qualities ready to our hands—they are in no manner essential parts of what merely exists in the external world, but something which has to be brought forth continuously from the depth of spiritual activities; for these vehicles of Society and History fall in pieces as soon as such spiritual activities slacken. Thus there is need of constant struggle concerning the meaning and value of Society and History. And further, the Spiritual Life can spread so as to cover the whole meaning of Nature only if it connects itself together into a Reality, and if it develops a distinctive character of its own. Thus Spiritual Life cannot in any manner be severed from Reality, nor can it acquire value if it disperses itself and fritters itself away.

Therefore the Spiritual has everywhere to create its own domain in this world of existence; it does not discover it as something self-evident; it does not develop by attempting to jump out of the existing world. It develops *in* the world and elevates the world to its own high level. If Reality thus depends upon a *creative deed* therefore Knowledge cannot operate in any ready-made manner, but must place itself within the spiritual movement itself; it must accompany this movement, discover new possibilities, see new points of departure and of initiative. While thus it serves the forward march of life it gains at the same time unlimited enrichment for itself. Herewith, this significance and tension give to the movement such a field of activity that the Spiritual Life has now to struggle not only on the external side *against* what is infra-spiritual, but also *for* the moulding of its own nature; so that the struggle of the spirit is at the same time a struggle for the spirit.

To the work of Thought there is given incomparably more freshness, fulness, and mobility, so that it now participates in the great Becoming of Life, and has not merely to imitate a ready-made life or merely bring such to self-consciousness.

The close connection of Knowledge and Life advanced in these pages is able to understand opposites and, at the same time, to overcome them—opposites which have often split up the effort of Thought when working apart from Life. From of old there has been a hard and fierce conflict between a *discursive* and an *intuitive* mode of Thought. The *discursive* order of Thought takes in the whole breadth of science; and its main object is to transform the dispersive manifold into a web of a *System,* and here bind all together in such a way as to form a successive and graduated Series. But as Aristotle demonstrated long ago every logical

linkage or System leads finally to Propositions which are clear by reason of *their own immediacy alone;* so that thus all proofs cannot and need not be carried *ad infinitum.* This conception of *Immediacy* has been wont to be designated by the thinkers of the ages as *Intuition;* which *Intuition* has been at certain times viewed as the conception of a *Unity* revealing itself in an æsthetic form within the multiplicity. At certain other times, it takes a religious form in the conception of unity forming itself over against the multiplicity and permeating it all. Thus the claims of *Immediacy* and *Unity* combine in the conception of *Intuition.* If *discursive* Thought resolves Reality into particular Parts and Series, it becomes the task of Intuition to point to a union of the Parts with the Whole, and from this standpoint of the Whole to impregnate all the multiplicity with a living spirit. It is no wonder that the idea of Intuition has won the minds and hearts of men; nor is it

THE INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES
ST. MICHAEL'S COLLEGE

any wonder that the willing recognition of an indispensable task has treated the question in a manner far more summary than the actual situation warranted. The æsthetic conception doubtless comes into view in the work of Thought; and, regarded from this standpoint, the scientific view of the world has to be carried back and placed upon an æsthetic view. But such a view of the work of Thought had far greater rights in the ancient than in the modern world. For, to the thought of the ancient world, the sensuous and the spiritual appeared far more closely connected than they do to the modern world: inner and outer seemed to depend upon each other in one living cosmos; they sought each other side by side, and in the contemplation on both, each merged into the other. Further, the conviction of the ancient world was that as the process of thinking lay within a consolidated and approachable realm it was bound to furnish a justification for such a conclusion as we

have just referred to. The modern world, too, forbids too sharp a distinction of the spiritual and the sensuous by its constant effort to bring them so closely together; but to the modern world the connection of the two is far less simple than in ancient times. The modern mind has been able to establish a connection only through the help of Logical Thought; and, even further, the modern mind does not any longer believe itself able to grasp in a form of immediacy what is *final and axiomatic*, but pushes such final and axiomatic conclusions ever further into the background, and busies itself most diligently in attempting to transform what previously seemed static into movement. Modern thought further attempts to overcome the antithesis of Subject and Object as well as the function of reflective thought; but it expects to accomplish this feat not by means of any contiguity of Subject and Object, but by spanning the antithesis through the simple force of activity itself

—through an ascent to a creativeness which itself constructs Reality. Thus the main task becomes that of setting the capacities in such a creativeness, and of carrying back this creativeness to an entirely simple original life. What is here in question therefore is not an imaginative view of a ready-made and complete truth actually existent but the *progressive Becoming of Life itself*—a personal experience of Reality from the very basis of life to its highest ideals. What is generally designated as Fancy and Imagination must appear as far too passive for such a spiritual creativeness. For in this way, instead of being presented with an entire illumination of the meaning and significance of life, man gets no more than a mental impression of things: and if nothing beyond this occurs man is rather shut up within his own subjectivity than freed from it and placed at the very centre of a life of creativeness. When dealing with Reality it is necessary to state that the manner of the quest must not be

that of the contemplative artist but that of the general on the field of battle. The artist connects the multiplicity of happenings into one complete picture; but how different is this picture from that of the great general who binds the threads together, and gives them meaning by fitting them into general ideas. It is the latter alone who penetrates into and through all the confusion and conflicting motives by which he is beset—it is he alone who interprets these as a whole or unity from their very origin. What happens in this respect must also be adopted as a method in dealing with the problem of the Universe. In connection with this problem, too, it is necessary to possess a comprehensive and synthetic Thought —a "synoptic" Thought—which contains within itself the power of the synthesis together with the gradations and mutual determinations of the manifold so that a *Complex* of life may develop and may parcel out the life of Reality and bring it to a clear expression—so that all the Parts

may be seen from the standpoint of the Whole and moulded from such a standpoint. It is the consciousness of this kind of task which differentiates the genuine philosopher from the mere scholar who occupies himself with philosophic problems. The two are further distinguished by the fact that the latter reflects upon things on their *external* side and interprets them entirely from such a standpoint, and by the fact that he does not unify in any essential manner the things he brings together. The genuine philosopher, on the other hand, is able to attain to comprehensive and vitalising ideas of things. The power to do this can be extracted by Thought only out of the Life which wells up within it. If Life be unable to connect itself together into a totality or wholeness and to work from such a level, Thought can never take entire possession of what is *within*—it can never hold the manifold together or determine the relative values of its different constituents.

Thinkers like Leibniz and Kant had cer-

tainly a clear and deep view of Reality as a whole; but it was a view in which all the different aspects were closely associated, and from which every aspect received a particular colouring. But did they not owe this power far less to their faculty of perception than to the power of Thought which understood how to mould things from a comprehensive and unifying standpoint, how to weave the web of a System, and how to work from each Whole to a greater Whole? Thus the total-view or synthesis towards which our effort is directed originates inside and not outside of Thought. Such a total-view is not something already existent but something that has to be moulded. Consequently we need not less but more Activism; we require not a cessation of activity but an ascent into a domain in which the activity of the whole of man's nature can operate.

In the reaction of the present day against *Intellectualism* the *logical* element present in the work of Thought may be easily

deprecated. It is true that Logic cannot create—it only proves and adjusts; it has to presuppose something as being present before it is able to work at all. But such a work of Logic is indispensable wherever it is necessary to weave a Manifold into a Whole, wherever it is necessary to drive out contradictions and to link individual elements together. The work of art, practical activity, political and social co-operation require the help of Logic. Every fallacy avenges itself in a frittering away of life. How therefore can Logic play only a subsidiary part in the process of Knowledge? Logic by itself is *formal* and *schematic*, and is unable of itself to shape life in any living way. But whatever limitations Logic may possess in this respect, these limitations ought never to suggest a turn towards something like the Romanticism of modern times—a tendency to revel in the illogical and to be at ease in the midst of contradictions. The limitations of Logic ought rather to

drive us to place logical work in further connections and, out of the whole of life, to guide us to the realisation of quickening and directive capacities. Our effort after a complete illumination of the problems of life and existence is doubtless confronted with insurmountable barriers; but should we on this account think little of our own capacities at the very outset and rashly flee to the irrational? He who places Life ever before his view and believes that an ascent of Life is possible will first and foremost aim at a deepening and energising of Thought; and will not flee from Life because Logic by itself does not unravel the whole of the problem, nor will he recommend to himself or to others what is illogical.

CHAPTER VIII

Transition to the Present

Though the problem of Knowledge is thus connected in the most definite manner with the whole of the life of the spirit of man, such a spiritual life has to discover itself first of all within the movement of universal history and to unfold itself more and more within this movement, so that it becomes indispensable for Thought to grasp and to preserve such a situation. We have to search for such a situation in Philosophy and in the history of mankind. We believe that we can find such a situation in the Philosophy of Kant.

(*a*) analysis of kant's position

He who to-day appraises Kant's teaching as the acme of the philosophical movement

is liable to the danger of pursuing only a single current in the thought of our own time. It will be easy to show that even in connection with the problem of Life such an estimate of Kant has its good rights; but, at the same time, the estimate ought to signify something more than an uncritical opinion for us.

Before all else, it is the well-known transition from Object to Subject—from external things to man himself—it is this Copernican transition which signifies a segment in the history not only of Thought but also of Life. For this transition corresponds to, and serves the need of, the total-movement of mankind. Though man, at the outset, was thought to be no more in this movement than a sensuous existence, with his life depending entirely upon the external world, yet as the result of ages of thinking an *inverted* mode of conceiving him was reached. The *inner* life of man now developed more and more a content of its own and gained

ever greater self-reliance until at last it became the main standpoint of life, and sought to bring, in a practical and intelligent manner, the external world into subjugation to itself.

The modern world has brought this conclusion to clearer self-consciousness on the side of Thought; it suffices us here to bear in mind the dictum of Descartes—"I think, therefore I am." But, at the same time, the question arises whether the Subject be sufficiently strong and comprehensive to develop a *World* out of itself. Evidently the Subject, in order to do this, needs strengthening; and attempts to give it this strengthening have not been wanting prior to Kant. These attempts, however, did not extend to an entire autonomy over against the environing world; but such an autonomy came to its own through the transformation of *the conception of the Subject* set forth by Kant. The Subject, to Kant, did not mean a mere point isolated from its

surrounding objects, but he discovered within it a web of life—a general mental and moral structure. Thus the individual by himself does not constitute the vehicle of life, and neither does the endless sequence of conscious states form such a vehicle. Such a vehicle is formed in consciousness through the presence of a governing and effective Reason. The main problem then for Kant was to work out the implications of this Reason and clearly to perceive, in accordance with its capacity and limitations, Reason's specific achievements. Thus over against the customary every-day mode of reflection there arose a *transcendental* mode. This transcendental mode obtained its fixed orientation and standard in great *collective* achievements, as, for example, in the formation of a scientific experience and in the development of morality. As Reason carried such achievements towards their conditions, their inner connections, and their consequences a surpassing piece of analysis

was executed, and Life was through and through deepened and refined. Thus, there resulted, within the human domain, a scale of values of extreme importance in its future consequences; science now, in the midst of all its necessary and universal propositions and facts, was lifted above mere association of ideas; and even a domain of moral freedom over against the impulses springing from mere individual wants originated. Even this scale or gradation—this holding forth of a wider view—enabled man to recognise clearly the presence of a freedom and of a distinctive life superior to the natural life. The fact that such an all-important inversion of the accepted order took place was bound to alter essentially man's outlook and the task of his life and even his view of the world and his own capacity over against the world.

To such an emancipation of the Spiritual Life and of the situation of man there corresponds a further inner development. It is true that Kant accepted the disputable

doctrine of the "three separate faculties" of the mind; and, indeed, it was through him that this doctrine first became stamped as current coin. But in fact the nucleus of the Spiritual Life, according to his teaching, lies beyond the supposed "faculties" —in his teaching the movement of life was carried far beyond the *intellect* as well as beyond the *feeling;* and also according to his teaching when the *will* moves within a higher domain, careful examination shows that by *will* is meant not any special faculty lying alongside of other faculties, but a setting of the *whole man in action.* In the manner, therefore, in which the Spiritual Life is raised by Kant above the usual division into "faculties," it is able to embrace all the individual provinces of life, and to set all the tasks of life in their right order. Thus the whole range of life even into all its ramifications is accordingly set in a motion of an upward direction. And at the same time, this outstanding fact of the Spiritual

Life of man makes it possible for him to grasp tightly and preserve continually spiritual demands in all their self-reliance and purity, and, as well, to detect, without any bias, all that is insufficient and, indeed, unedifying. This conception does not represent merely the questionable doctrine of the "radical evil" of human nature as presented in some of the details of Kant's teaching, but is one which pervades the whole Kantian Philosophy and gives it the air of distinct veracity and greatness. No other philosopher of modern times has treated the great problems of life in so lofty a manner and with so deep an earnestness. The thinkers who succeeded Kant have, despite their achievements on the *external* side of things, brought the movement into narrower tracks on its *inner* side. They have all dealt far rather with questionable statements of a speculative nature. Thus Kant remains the overtowering summit of a new epoch in connection with the problem of Life.

But there appears here also what is truly the fate of all transformations upon human soil. In the *nucleus* of things there arises something *new* which produces undreamed-of results, but which, in the carrying out of it, remains too much tied to much that is *old* —to much that the *new* had broken away from *inwardly*. Just as much that undoubtedly belonged to the Middle Ages worked in Luther, so worked in Kant much that belonged to the period of the Enlightenment; and as it is in accordance with the deeper spirit present in Luther to differentiate the elements of the Middle Ages from these *deeper* elements, so it is in accordance with the *deeper* spirit of Kant to free the main stuff of his life and activity from the merely explanatory elements of the *Aufklärung* which had twined around it. In what respect this can be made clear to-day can be only briefly indicated.

The fact that Kant interpreted Reality in the form of sharp opposites has had much

to do in giving his work its penetrating clearness and its overwhelming forcibleness; but still his teaching corresponds to the *analytical* mode of interpretation if the opposites we have referred to cannot be overcome. If we believe that the opposites cannot be overcome, Kant's teaching presents not a few dangers in many important respects. His teaching that *a world of appearance* persists over against a *world of things in themselves* threatens to sever spiritual activity from the great Reality and to place it in contrast with such Reality. If this be so, it becomes difficult to distinguish sufficiently between the demands of Spiritual Life and demands "merely human," and difficult not to glide into a Philosophy of subjectivism —a Philosophy of the "As If" (*Als Ob*).[1] One need only consider critically Kant's alleged refutation of the ontological argu-

[1] An important work bearing this title by Professor Vaihinger was published in 1912 and has created a good deal of discussion in Germany. [Translator.]

ment for the existence of God in order to become convinced that grave dangers are imbedded in the argument. Kant, in the ultimate ground of his teaching, is above subjectivism; but in the working out of this ultimate ground he often falls into subjectivism. Not less doubtful is the sharp cleavage made between *theoretical and practical reason*, where each of the provinces receives too narrow an interpretation, and where the unity of the whole is not sufficiently developed. *Theoretical* reason remains with him restricted to Nature and logical proofs, and the inner movements and experiences are placed at too low a valuation. The working out of the *practical* reason is limited too much to the relations of person to person; and the ethical values of mental and æsthetic work, as, for instance, of science and art, are not sufficiently taken into account. Here if anywhere are found two halves which are far from constituting a whole.

Further, as was the case in the period of Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*) Kant also gave an insufficient valuation to History. The *Aufklärung* had good reasons and, indeed, an imperative necessity for recognising a timeless reason beyond the intolerable inconstancy of the historical situation. We, too, hold fast to the conviction that without an experience of a Life *above* Time there is no Truth. But we have to become quite as convinced that such a Life must find its abode as a fact in our deepest nature. That such a Life succeeds only by means of progressive work in being directed towards, and appropriated by, our own activity, and that the fact of the existence of such a Life is also a difficult and continuous task—all this, if not overlooked, was at least insufficiently appreciated by the *Aufklärung*. This Life superior to Time seemed in the teaching of the *Aufklärung* to be present in consciousness in a manner ready at hand, and which could be made entirely clear by means of logical

analysis. Kant himself did not free himself sufficiently from this teaching, and has caused much confusion of thought on this account. Kant's achievements, as a whole, as we have already noticed, present excellences which cannot be over-estimated. But the transcendental treatment in his teaching contains no more than a *possibility* of discovering the Real; it could do no more in the last resort than deepen the content of its own conclusions. But do the achievements, which are by the side of the fundamental truth superior to Time, not contain an element of Time? And have they not first of all to seek for means of their self-evolution? Are they in any manner ready-made? As certain as that we are a thinking nature quite as certain is it that we think according to particular fundamental conceptions—according to categories—and also as certain is it that we bind together all particular propositions in accordance with definite

laws such as, for instance, Causality. But the timelessness of our values in no manner excludes the fact that the further moulding of our nature is brought about by incessant work. In fact, we have a history not merely of the theory of Categories and Causality, but of *categorical and causal Thought itself*. It is of great importance to realise that the *timeless* and the *temporal* are to be held sufficiently apart although they are universally related to each other. This is necessary because it is not only incumbent to obtain a *concrete* conception of the value of the *timeless*, but also to call up our own *activity* to undertake and achieve tasks still greater than any conceptual tasks. It is almost a trait of the Kantian teaching to show that the task of Thought should be viewed especially as self-reflection—should be viewed as evidencing a depth of being found in human life from the outset. The persuasion that we are *more* than we are accustomed to think we are—that we possess greater com-

pleteness and inwardness than we are aware —is certainly a powerful weapon to fight against all that leads to shallowness and the frittering away of life. Such a persuasion constitutes a fixed foundation upon which much is constructed in spite of all assaults; but still it does not sufficiently attest the fact that we have not so much to discover as to *establish* the Spiritual Life. The Kantian proof does not *rouse* us sufficiently —does not offer a path of elevation and further creativeness such as the perplexing situation of the present day demands. The Kantian teaching in this respect is not quite free from the defect that it allows the life of the spirit to fall too readily to a merely intellectual level—a level of much thinking *around* things and *of* things. In this way the level of *life itself* is not sufficiently raised. We find, on this path, much in our possession; but we do not "trade" sufficiently in order to *increase the value* of our possessions.

Finally, it is the Kantian Conception of Reason which retains us too much in the ideas of the period of Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*). This conception of Reason has already raised many scruples: it is looked upon as something between an *empirical* and an *over-empirical* conception of Reality; it passes beyond the flow of momentary experience, but Kant stops short of consolidating this *More* over against ordinary experience. In fact the conception of Reason is here far more unstable and more open to criticism than the conception of the Godhead. But what more than anything else makes Kant's position doubtful is, that he restricts Life and Thought too much to *formal* features, and gives them far too little content and soul. In the closer determination of Reason the *old* and the *new* philosophies proceed on different pathways towards their goals. The ancient world sought its main pathway, on the whole, in general universal conceptions apprehended by Reason. The modern world seeks its

main pathway in the freedom and independence inherent in the nature of man. But neither universal conceptions nor freedom can reach a turning-point unless a *new stage of life* arises within them. They do not engender this *new life* out of themselves: they presuppose it, and constitute only its receptacle and its form of appearing. It is true that the Kantian world of ideas develops a life far fuller of *Content* than these *Forms* are able to engender out of themselves; but this *Content* is not worked out clearly enough nor raised sufficiently above the *Forms*, so that the *Forms* play too great a part in connection with the *Content*, and appear far too much as if they were grounded in themselves.

Thus we find ourselves in essential points beyond the doctrines and formulations of Kant. But we believe we can remain loyal to what distinguishes Kant from the *Aufklärung*, and further believe that by being so we do not fall out of the movement which

his mighty life-work inaugurated. If we understand his teaching in this broad and free sense, we shall be able to liberate the rich development of life which the great systems succeeding Kant brought forth, and appreciate them as a further development of Kant's life and work.

(*b*) THE DEMANDS OF THE PRESENT

When we understand the effort after Knowledge as a counter-effect to the confusions and the acute needs of our own day, it is not to be expected that we shall find much movement towards the necessary renewal immediately apparent. There is manifest, however, in our own time, however indirectly, the evidence for such a movement in the growing desire to discover new modes of approach to ultimate questions. It would also be easy to show that possibilities arise which meet these desires half-way, and which give them enough to do.

Over against the unlimited *Expansion* of

Life there is awakened once again a need of *Concentration*—a need which is beginning to seek suitable means of satisfaction. Men were drawn into the current which made for *Expansion* because the traditional syntheses of life proved themselves able to answer only very partially the new impressions, experiences, and tasks of the last century. If the *old* mode of conceiving things, especially as it is incorporated in the traditional religious system, embraced securely and with certainty all the manifold in a unity, the *new* mode, in its turn, is handling the infinite multiplicity of events apart from their connection in any such unity. According to the *old* mode, all happenings rest upon an eternal order, and all Becoming is viewed as proceeding out of immutable Being; while according to the *new* mode, the Ground of Time is the creative workshop of all development, and it is this Ground which furnishes Becoming with the key for the understanding of Being. In the *old* mode, the life of the

spirit felt itself on a lofty summit, and in possession of absolute superiority to Nature; in the *new* mode, Nature herself succeeds in obtaining an independence of her own, and even ventures to subordinate the life of the spirit to her own conceptions and measurements. In the *old* mode, the Spiritual Life was grasped after the manner of a human, personal life, and approached by means of immediate feeling; in the *new* mode, the nucleus of the Spiritual Life is laid in an impersonal complex of life such as science, the State, industry, etc., and the *personal* life here falls to the level of a mere instrument of what passes within this impersonal complex. In the *old* mode, anxiety for ethical conditions and for the redemption and eternal welfare of the soul became the all-important concern; in the *new* mode, first and foremost, life is placed in the midst of developing powers—powers external to itself and even working in independence of it.

All this testifies to a powerful trans-

formation—a transformation not of mere doctrines but of *life itself*. How much superiority the *new* mode possesses, and how it has carried mankind along with itself—this requires no explanation. But it is evident that we discover more and more limitations within this *new* mode; and the belief in its all-sufficiency is rapidly fading away. The *infinity* presented by it is of a kind which precludes all attempts at a completeness and originality of character. The exclusive conception of a universal flux transforms Life into an irresistible stream and destroys the possibility of any enduring Truth. And we have to bear in mind that Nature cannot be made to mean the whole of Reality without endangering the distinctive spiritual greatness and also the pre-eminence of man. The positing of human life within an impersonal complex has given us concatenation of events, material powers and "goods," but these have enslaved the soul of man, and have actually threatened to transform him

into a mere piece of a soulless mechanism of civilisation and culture. The withdrawal of the *moral* elements into this background may appear at the outset as a dissolution of old obstacles and hindrances; but, with our eyes open once again, we shall see that all the heightening of activity on its external sides and all the betterment of the ways and means of life are a loss rather than a gain if there does not correspond to them an *ethical* disposition—a character and conduct of the whole man; and the experiences of our day teach us clearly enough that painful confusions are to be found in this respect.

Indeed, the more perceptible such losses and dangers become the more strongly are we driven to some counter-effect that imperatively demands our consideration of the problem of a renewed *Concentration* of Life. If the particular movement of life in our day shows that the *old* Concentration was too narrow, and is so to-day because it does not sufficiently distinguish and hold

apart the Spiritual and the "pettily human," and because it depicts the Spiritual too much in a merely anthropomorphic fashion. The direction therefore in which a *new* Concentration is to be found is as follows: It is necessary to lift up the Spiritual Life from its "merely human" level—it is necessary to lay hold of it in *its own existence*, and to understand and acknowledge it as an *independent world.*

Now, the whole of our investigation goes to show that such an emancipation of the Spiritual Life is not only possible but also absolutely necessary for the Spiritual Life itself in order that it may gain a distinctive character of its own, and may work in a stimulating and creative manner. It is only by means of such an autonomy that *spiritual* experience can grow over against an experience "merely human"; it is only thus that *something* can break through the individual situation—*something* that has real value and significance *for all;* it is thus

alone that *something* can appear at a specific point of time which belongs to all times; it is thus that a world of ideas and ideals, common to all and good for all, can appear and construct a deeper layer of life over against situations merely shallow and "pettily human."

Indeed, the more the Spiritual Life lifts itself up from a level "merely human" the more must it seek a foothold and defence *within itself* and the more must it continually develop beyond the customary "dead-level" conception of life. We have already seen how many transformations are necessary in order to accomplish such a turn as this, and how imperfect the ordinary position of man and the reality included within such a position are. But no task which originates from an *inner necessity* should frighten us. And it is this consideration which constitutes a claim upon the men and women of the present to strive for a *new Concentration of life*—for an inner

strengthening and consolidation of the Spiritual Life. It is true that when this takes place much which previously seemed to fall into our lap without any effort now becomes a difficult task, opening out a vista of mighty movement and struggle; but, at the same time, human life becomes incomparably deeper and richer—it comes to be more *our own deed* and, along with this, it becomes for the first time "the life which is life indeed."

Another aspiration of our day is that which looks for an emancipation from life-systems of mere power and material development. This is an aspiration after a *self-subsistent life*. The turn towards these systems had much to justify it in many of the most important situations of history. It was the strong feeling of a new power and courage in mankind, conscious of its own development, which, in the beginning of modern times, succeeded in turning men from the weak and shy inwardness of the religious

life as then conceived to a firmer grasp of Reality; a change which, on its external side, worked for a subjugation of Nature, and, on its inner side, for the clarification and mastery, through enlightened reason, of the various situations of life and of all human relations. How much was accomplished in this respect towards the subjugation of Nature and the development of Reason and how much has been gained—all this is known and enjoyed by us all. But, all this fully in view, we are to-day convinced that all the heightening of material power and the increase of such power over the very soul itself have their limitations, and that in no manner do they give life any genuine content. Notwithstanding expansion and prosperity unheard of before, we discover with pain an inward emptiness. We aspire ever more deeply towards a Goal or End to which all increase of material things shall become subservient—a Goal or End into which material things will be transmuted and thus acquire their proper

valuation. We are convinced that all toil and care which fail to serve such an End will finally prove of no avail. We feel this last more and more acutely. Indeed, the more urgent and expansive modern life becomes the more anxiety it lays upon us and the less fitted it becomes to grant true peace and joy. *Either* there is *something more* imbedded in life *or* life passes quickly away into oblivion.

Thus there awakens an ever greater desire for a *content* of life—for greater *inwardness and self-worth.* If, at the same time, it is indisputable that the *old* mode of inwardness has become too confined and too insipid for us—that it savours too much of the puny independence of man in his natural state—then it is necessary to attain an inwardness both broader and more virile; and in order to accomplish this the *self-subsistence of the Spiritual Life* offers a footbold for us. From the standpoint furnished hy this foothold it behoves us to hold forth

a system of *essential and substantial development* over against a system of material and natural power; it behoves us from such a standpoint to force our way to the conviction that it is not enough for individuals, nations, and mankind itself merely to become aware of this: it is necessary that the awareness should make us *something other* than we now are—that it should lead us to unfold a *distinctive type of life*, and, in the midst of all the wild and chaotic impulses of our day, to consummate the construction of *a Reality existing and subsisting within itself*. What such a Reality further signifies has to be treated in a succeeding volume. But so much at least is already ascertained that only a *self-subsistent Spiritual Life* can engender *true inwardness;* and, further, that in order to satisfy the aspiration already spoken of that aspiration has to come into contact with another pressing demand of our day. We find the present situation of civilisation and culture far too confusing

and artificial, and long for more simplicity, sincerity, and homeliness. A return to Nature—to what is *below* ourselves—can never bring this about; it will come about only by means of an ascent to a *life of the spirit above* us. We are in danger of forfeiting the true promise of life by overweighting it with what pertains merely to its environment and by the dissipation of our energies; we are in danger of becoming *inwardly lonely* notwithstanding the superabundance of external things. What can save us from this peril except a *conversion to great experiences of a spiritual kind*—experiences common to all and which will mould and illumine our individual destiny? What can accomplish this save the essential cultivation of an *inner world* common to all mankind?

Finally, there goes through our times an aspiration for *continuity* and *eternity*. We are tired of the constant changes and transformations: the idea of these incessant

changes in life and in the situations in which we are placed as well as of the incessant shifting with the environment is beginning to lose the spell which it previously exercised over the minds of men; we are really yearning for something that will not get lost in all the movements of the world and of life—something that will persist and which is capable of endless progress. What therefore the individual experiences and feels attains importance through the problems which are raised by the modern historical method. With growing clearness are different periods of time distinguished—more and more does each period reveal some specific characteristic—and ever more strongly is it forbidden for any one particular period to accept and to retain aspects of former periods. All this is a gain in independence; but it is at the same time destructive of all permanent and persistent results. For as earlier times have passed away so shall we and our day pass away. What we are

to-day clinging to with might and main will be dismissed by a later age as something outworn. Must not then observation of the transiency and fleetingness of all human endeavour destroy our happiness in work and our creativeness? And can we undertake any great and difficult task in a spirit of entire self-devotion if all is to pass so quickly away—if all that does not bring with it its entire results and values to us *here* and *now* becomes on that account uncertain and futile? Wherefore there arises a yearning for emancipation from this state of instability—a yearning for the possession of a life superior to Time. We cannot possibly return to the *old* conception of *duration* and *continuity* because, according to the conviction of the present day, such a conception confused the Eternal with the Temporal, and placed *Eternal Truth* under the *form of Time.* It is therefore essential that Eternity be placed outside the " merely human " situation and planted within the *self-existence and self-*

subsistence of the life of the spirit. Only in so far as we participate in such a life as this do we participate in Eternity; but it is an Eternity which originates in the deepest root of our being and is, at the same time, a high End and Ideal. Only incessant work in Time frees us from "mere" Time. Corresponding to this is also the conception of History as a *coming-to-itself of the Spiritual Life.* The task then is, after having obtained our footing and standpoint within the Spiritual Life, to work out from the material and changes of Time an *essential and substantial Reality*—a Reality which forms an arch overspanning the movements of daily life, as in the ancient conception of a fixed heaven above the lower spheres.

Thus, there goes through our "age" a great desire for unity, depth, and eternity. And it is clear that the particular movements of our day are not separate streams but tributaries of one mighty river. The fact that this river does not as yet carry on

its breast the trivial and shallow things of life is no proof whatever of its failure. It is necessary first of all to govern our own soul and to shape its life. This accomplished, *something more* will break forth and carry the whole of life along with itself. These invisible powers are always in the last resort the greatest of all. To refuse their claims is to render sterile all our work. If the Absolute Philosophy of our day will deny these claims—well, then, it will go the way it went in the beginning of modern times when a mighty spiritual revolution developed entirely outside the Universities. If nations that, through their special characteristics and history, were destined to become leaders, will deny these claims—well, then, others will take their place and assert themselves in order to bring pressing matters to fruition. If any age as a whole deny these claims, that age will inevitably suffer spiritual decay, and the work will remain for a coming people. Done the work will

certainly be; for the spiritual powers which are here in question cannot be destroyed by man, though man destroys himself by alienating himself from them.

A time, however, which stands in the midst of so many entanglements and so great tasks needs necessarily a Philosophy; for it is only through Philosophy that the age can raise problems into Totalities and Principles such as the situation demands. But our generation cannot begin its work without reflecting anew upon its own capacities and upon its situation on all the sides of life. This conviction drives us irresistibly to the problem of Knowledge. What we have already set forth in connection with the problem requires the orientation which the quest must take. The further following of the path and the execution of what is here outlined are reserved in a volume soon to appear.

We connect the main results of our investigation into the following theses :—

(1) Only in so far as we participate in a *self-subsistent life* is Knowledge possible for us. There remains much scope for intellectual achievements which do not contain so much as this, but they do not constitute genuine Knowledge.

(2) Such a *self-subsistent life* must become effective in the very basis of our nature, but it becomes our entire possession only with the help of the work of universal history. He who believes it possible to grasp this content merely by means of an analysis of consciousness undervalues the *deed-character* of our life, and inevitably falls into intellectualism, though it may be intellectualism of a fine kind in regard to its own special work.

(3) History furnishes such a *self-subsistence* not in the form of a mere sequence of happenings, but only in so far as a life superior to Time raises itself above the

movement of these sequences. It follows therefore that all Knowledge issues in something *sub specie æternitatis*. He who presents no counter effect to the flux of Time falls inevitably into a destructive relativism.

(4) The movement of History culminates alternately in *Concentration* and *Expansion*—in Positive and Critical Periods. If only one of the two be present in the individual life, the breadth of life disappears, and the life of the whole is obscured.

(5) To-day the predominance of the *Expansion* side has destroyed the equilibrium of life, and this is to be regained by means of a new process of *Concentration*.

(6) Such a *new Concentration* is possible: the experience of History has prepared it in important respects, and the desire for it is a strongly-marked feature of our times.

(7) We shall succeed in gaining such a Concentration only by means of an elevation above the confusing situations of daily life and by means of a Turn to a *new Metaphysic*

of Life. He who fights shy of this Turn renounces at the same time a fundamental renewal of life.

(8) As the present day possesses a specific character of its own and places forth essentially new demands, it is evident that no union with an older System of Thought—not even with that of Kant's—can bring about the necessary progress. We must seek, out of the depth of our own energy, to correspond to the demands of the most important and universal situations, and venture upon our own path. The possibilities of Life and of Knowledge are in no way exhausted; but it is our own courage and deed alone that bring these possibilities into a full activity. Our young people have much to do; and may they rise to the consciousness of their task!

INDEX

Advance of life: its twofold meaning, 121, 122
Ancient World, mode of thinking of, 33, 34, 107, 259
Aristotle, 171, 173, 207, 209, 212, 259
Art, effect of, 48, 121
—— higher and lower conceptions of, 93, 233
Augustine, 161
Autonomies of life, 181 ff., 249

Bayle, 216
Becoming: there is no absolute Becoming, 111, 125
Biological Theory of Knowledge, 97–125

Calvin, 208
Capacity of soul, 235 f.
Christianity, 107, 192, 193, 252
Clement, 59
Comenius, 14
Complexes of life, 115 ff., 143 ff.
Comte, 73
Concentration and Expansion, Periods of, 187, 285 ff., 303
Creation and separation: their connection, 168

Darwin, 184
Denial, necessity of, 129 f.
Descartes, 96, 165, 166, 202, 204, 271
Dogmatism, 220
Doubt: its significance, 185, 186

Empirical Current of Thought, 64, 65
Empiricism, 127, 244
Enlightenment, Period of the, 31, 85, 279 f.
Entire Deed and activity of the whole nature, 120, 226
Epicureans, 209
Essential Development, 295
Eternal Content, the demand for an, 113 f., 298, 299
Evolution, insufficiency of the historical conception of, 183, 184
Expansion and Concentration, Periods of (*cf.* Concentration), 187, 285 ff., 303
Experience: its twofold mode, 168
—— spiritual and "merely human" modes distinguished, 153–158, 291–296, 299, 300

Feuerbach, 73
Forms, distinction of æsthetic and logical, 158, 159; life no mere connection of matter and form, 245; overestimation of mere form, 221 f.

Fundamental Truths and Facts of Experience distinguished, 254 ff.

Galileo, 97
Generalities, over-estimation of, 85
—— as conceived in the ancient world, 283
German and English types compared, 134 ff.
Goethe, 113

Hegel, 49 ff., 53, 60, 166, 184, 204, 205
Heraclitus, 125
History, modern conception of, 18 f.
—— its significance for a theory of the universe, 251 ff.
—— and thought, 185 ff., 279
—— distinction between human history and history of nature, 112
—— human history not ready-made, 257
—— as a dialectic of life, 185

Idea of development in civilisation and culture, 118
Idealisation (false) of society, 84 f.; its place in empiricism, 130
Indian mode of viewing life, 58, 107
Intellectualism and voluntarism, 237
—— present-day tendencies against intellectualism, 55 ff.
Intuition, 260, 262
—— æsthetic and religious modes distinguished, 47
Inversion of life, 147 f.

James, William, 69, 70, 71
Judgments of Value, 239

Kant, 96, 151, 165, 166, 171, 202, 204, 265, 272, 276, 269–285

Leibniz, 32, 59, 171, 218, 265
Locke, 165, 218
Logic: its significance and limits, 266 ff.
Luther, 208

Metaphysic of life: in what sense necessary, 156, 303, 304
Modern times, the spiritual movement within, 72
Morality, different conceptions of, 93; its effects, 177 f.
Movement: its prominence in modern life, 97 ff.

Naturalism, 241
Nicolaus Cusanus, 100
Noological method, 227 ff.

Ontology, 87
Origen, 59, 161

Philosophy: its task, 11, 149, 150, 151; its place in life, 217 ff., 200–217; its relation to our own day, 204, 205; as a theory of the universe and as a science of the Schools, 203; the dispute concerning its value, 204, 205
Plato, 59, 151, 158, 202, 209, 213
Plotinus, 46, 109, 161, 204, 212
Positive and Critical times, 186–189
Positivism, distinction of naturalistic and spiritualistic, 224
Pragmatism, 65–97

Present, the mental and spiritual situation of the, 1 ff.
—— its claims, 285 ff.
Psychological method, 227 ff.

Rationalism : its insufficiency, 203, 204
Reality, the thirst of modern times for, 64
Reason : its significance for modern times, 163; criticism of the conception of reason, 278 f.; old and new conceptions, 283 f.
Religion : its conception in Pragmatism, 70; its effect upon man, 75; different conceptions of religion, 90, 91, 230 ff.
Right, higher and lower conceptions of, 92, 93, 121

Scholasticism a permanent danger, 204
Science : its achievements and its limits, 35 ff.; higher and lower conceptions of, 93
Scientific theory of the universe : its inner contradiction, ch. ii.
Self-evident, the : its collapse through history, 196
Society : its prominence in modern times, 72
—— not anything merely "given," 257
Socrates, 209
Sophists, 209
Speculation : its branches, 17 ff.
Spinoza, 60, 171, 195, 202, 207, 215, 216
Stages of life, 122, 123
Starting-point of knowledge : where to seek it, 96, 230 ff.
Stoics, 209, 213
Synoptic thought, 264
System, meaning of, 115 f., 204–210

Technics : its influence upon Knowledge, 103
Theory of Science is not Philosophy, ch. ii.
Thesis, main, 143 ff.
Thinkers, the two main types of, 171; characteristics of leading thinkers, 201; their individuality, 203–208
Thought : its superior power, 17 ff.; its grades, 177, 178
—— and Existence, the different attempts to unite, 86, 87
—— work of, as Criticism, Creativeness, and Activism, 120, 148 ff., 173
—— discursive and intuitive, 259 ff.
Time, man's relation to, 113, 190, 228
Transcendental Method, 272, 281 ff.

Useful and the Good, the difference between the, 93
Utilitarianism placed on one side, 81–88

Voltaire, 207

Wolff (Ch.), 215 f.
Work and Soul : their conflict, 8 ff., 292, 294
Work, distinction of external and internal, 116 ff., 292
World of Existence and World of Deed compared, 129 ff., 144, 243 ff.
World of Work, 121 f.

Zwingli, 208

RICHARD CLAY & SONS, LIMITED,
BRUNSWICK STREET, STAMFORD STREET, S.E.,
AND BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.

WORKS BY DR. RUDOLF EUCKEN

THE TRUTH OF RELIGION

BY

PROF. RUDOLF EUCKEN

TRANSLATED BY

W. TUDOR JONES, D.PHIL. (Jena)

(Second and Revised Edition based on the latest German Edition)

The first large English edition of "The Truth of Religion" became exhausted in less than twelve months, and advantage was taken of the appearance of the New German Edition (August 1912) to adopt the important changes which the author has made. Nearly a hundred pages of new material appear in the present edition, and the translator has simplified much of the difficult terminology for this new issue. The work is a mine of rich things, and has been hailed in the English-speaking countries of the world as one of the greatest apologetics of Religion and Christianity ever offered. Professor Eucken's whole system of the Philosophy of Religion is found in this unique volume.

"The book holds the reader's attention by the energy that surges through the whole, while he is charmed with the eloquence and wealth of language preserved in Dr. Jones' excellent translation. . . . There can be little doubt that this is one of the greatest apologies for religion ever written."—*The Christian Commonwealth.*

Demy 8vo. Cloth. **12s. 6d.** *net; postage inland, 6d. extra.*

WILLIAMS & NORGATE: 14 Henrietta St., Covent Garden, London, W.C

WORKS BY DR. RUDOLF EUCKEN

(*continued*)

PRESENT-DAY ETHICS

BEING THE DEEM LECTURES DELIVERED AT NEW YORK UNIVERSITY IN 1913

BY

PROF. RUDOLF EUCKEN

TRANSLATED BY

MARGARET VON LEGDEWITZ

Dr. Rudolf Eucken, whose spiritual insight and constructive ethics have placed him among the thinkers to whom the world looks for guidance, has prepared for book publication the series of addresses which he recently delivered before an absorbed audience at New York University.

In his new volume the author answers the doubts that arise in the mind, as it surveys history and observes the apparent contradictions of its environment, regarding the place of ethics among the constructive world-forces. The principle of ethics which takes shape in his pages is one which is not confined to the merely prohibitive and negative aspects of goodness, but offers opportunity for spiritual development, for intensity. The author's analysis of the tendencies of present-day life is penetrating, and the emphasis he lays on the relationship which ethics bears to these tendencies, or should bear, is a valuable reminder of the direction in which a permanent, harmonious, and spiritually enriching progress may be looked for.

Crown 8vo. Cloth. **3s.** *net; postage 4d. extra.*

WILLIAMS & NORGATE: 14 Henrietta St., Covent Garden, London, W.C.

WORKS BY DR. RUDOLF EUCKEN

(continued)

THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT

AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY

BY

PROF. RUDOLF EUCKEN

TRANSLATED BY

F. L. POGSON, M.A.

Fourth Impression.

In the present volume philosophy is not regarded as a known quantity, and no attempt is made to impart it to the individual by a comparative survey of its different departments; but it is treated as a problem—the problem it in reality continually becomes in the course of the centuries. The book represents a particular view of the nature of philosophy, and undertakes to show that it must be conceived in this way if it is to be equal to the demands which are made upon it by the life of mankind, and particularly by the present situation.—*From the Preface by the Author.*

"Professor Eucken is the champion of religion, but not of ecclesiasticism or of dogma. He appeals to a growing experience."—*The Guardian.*

"For the instructed reader it is full of helpful suggestions. It offers us no conclusions, but it sets us on the road towards them, and fills us with hopeful stimulus for the march."—*Christian World.*

Crown 8vo. Cloth. **4s. 6d.** *net; postage inland, 4d. extra.*

WILLIAMS & NORGATE: 14 Henrietta St., Covent Garden, London, W.C.

DR. RUDOLF EUCKEN'S PHILOSOPHY

AN INTERPRETATION OF RUDOLF EUCKEN'S PHILOSOPHY

BY

REV. W. TUDOR JONES, D.Phil. (Jena)

This book deals with Prof. Eucken's Philosophy in a far more exhaustive manner than has hitherto been attempted in England. The Author has the great advantage of Prof. Eucken's assistance and unpublished material of his great work on the Theory of Knowledge, now in course of publication, which will be dealt with. The main aim of the volume is to present the essentials of Eucken's teaching, to show its genesis and growth, its connection with Science, Philosophy, Sociology, History, and Religion. Eucken's main concept concerning the Spiritual Life forms the core of the volume. The whole volume is an attempt to present the essential nucleus of Eucken's teaching, and to show its fundamental importance in the individual life, the society, and the religion of the future.

"An admirable introduction to the works of the greatest religious philosopher of the day. English readers will find this volume extremely helpful. It brings out with great lucidity the main points in Eucken's teaching."—*The Guardian.*

"He writes with lucidity, sympathy, and enthusiasm. Eucken's thinking has entered into the mind of our author, and what he has himself assimilated he can convey in clear and forcible exposition. No other introduction to Eucken's thought is written so explicitly from the religious standpoint or is so greatly elucidative of Eucken's central concept of the spiritual life."—*The Christian World.*

In Crown 8vo. Cloth. **5s.** *net; postage inland,* 4*d. extra.*

WILLIAMS & NORGATE: 14 Henrietta St., Covent Garden, London, W.C.

FOR STUDENTS OF BERGSON

A NEW PHILOSOPHY:
HENRI BERGSON
By EDOUARD LE ROY

Translated by VINCENT BENSON, M.A.

In this volume the author presents a lucid study in brief of the Bergsonian philosophy, and his interpretation carries the *imprimatur* of Henri Bergson himself, who writes: "Your study could not be more conscientious or true to the original . . . it has required deep sympathy of thought."

Crown 8vo. Cloth. **5s.** *net; postage inland, 4d. extra.*

AN EXAMINATION OF PROFESSOR BERGSON'S PHILOSOPHY
By DAVID BALSILLIE, M.A.

"Without endorsing everything that is said, one must admit that Mr. Balsillie has written a book which will be found very helpful by students of Bergson."—*The Morning Post.*

"Mr. Balsillie keeps always thoroughly wideawake, and gives us an excellent account as well as a valuable criticism of the great French philosopher."—*The Yorkshire Post.*

Crown 8vo. Cloth. **5s.** *net; postage inland, 4d. extra.*

EDUCATION AND ETHICS
By EMILE BOUTROUX
OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY

Authorised Translation by FRED ROTHWELL

"This is a sane and well-balanced review of a great subject."—*Sheffield Daily Telegraph.*

"A treasury of noble ideals and of practical suggestions. M. Boutroux has one of the finest minds in France, and he has treated this supreme question in a way worthy of himself."—*The Christian World.*

Crown 8vo. Cloth. **5s.** *net; postage inland, 4d. extra.*

WILLIAMS & NORGATE: 14 Henrietta St., Covent Garden, London, W.C.

WORKS BY DR. ADOLF HARNACK

MONASTICISM: ITS IDEALS AND HISTORY

AND THE

CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE

By ADOLF HARNACK, D.D.

RECTOR OF, AND PROFESSOR OF CHURCH HISTORY IN, THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN

This writer has established his fame as one of the foremost leaders of contemporary thought. His minor works display, on a smaller scale, the same historic sense, the same wide and profound learning, and the same sympathy with varying points of view, which characterise his more ambitious productions.

The translation has been made by Messrs. E. E. Kellett, M.A., and F. H. Marseille, Ph.D., M.A.

New Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth. **4s. 6d.** *net; postage inland, 4d. extra.*

NEW TESTAMENT STUDIES

Crown 8vo. Cloth. **5s.** *net per volume.*

VOL. I. LUKE THE PHYSICIAN.

VOL. II. THE SAYINGS OF JESUS.

VOL. III. THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES.

VOL. IV. THE DATE OF THE ACTS AND OF THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS.

VOL. V. BIBLE READING IN THE EARLY CHURCH.

WHAT IS CHRISTIANITY? 8vo, Cloth. 4*s.* 6*d.* net.

THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW OF THE CHURCH IN THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES. Cloth. 5*s.* net.

ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL GOSPEL. By Dr. HARNACK and Dr. HERRMANN. Crown 8vo, Cloth. 4*s.* net.

THE MISSION AND EXPANSION OF THE CHURCH IN THE FIRST THREE CENTURIES. Second Revised and Enlarged Edition. Two Vols. 25*s.* net.

THE HISTORY OF DOGMA. Translated from the third German Edition. Edited by Rev. Prof. A. B. BRUCE, D.D. In Seven Vols. Demy 8vo, Cloth. 10*s.* 6*d.* each.

WILLIAMS & NORGATE: 14 Henrietta St., Covent Garden, London, W.C.

PROBLEMS OF MODERN SOCIALISM

MARXISM *V.* SOCIALISM

BY

VLADIMIR J. SIMKHOVITCH, PH.D.

PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

This volume is the result of many years of study, and furnishes a thorough and intimate knowledge of all the intricate theories, problems, and difficulties of modern Socialism. The author shows us that the economic tendencies of to-day are quite different from what Marx expected them to be, and that Socialism from the standpoint of Marx's theory is quite impossible.

Small Demy 8vo. **6s.** *net; postage inland, 5d. extra.*

SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE

BY

S. P. ORTH, PH.D.

This volume traces briefly the spread of the Socialist movement in England, France, Belgium, and Germany. It attempts to determine the relation of economic and political Socialism to Democracy. The author has made extended visits to the countries studied. He has tried to catch the spirit of the movement by personal contact with the Socialist leaders and their antagonists, and by many interviews with the Labour men themselves, so as to fully grasp the feeling of the rank and file. It is a condensed study of the history of Socialism and the present status of the movement in the countries where it has made the most progress.

Small Demy 8vo. Cloth. **6s.** *net; postage inland, 5d. extra.*

WILLIAMS & NORGATE: 14 Henrietta St., Covent Garden, London, W.C.

WORKS ON RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

"A MOST REMARKABLE HUMAN DOCUMENT."

WITHIN: THOUGHTS DURING CONVALESCENCE. By Sir Francis E. Younghusband, K.C.I.E., LL.D., D.Sc., etc. In small demy 8vo. Second Impression. Cloth. **3s. 6d.** net; postage inland 4*d.*

FROM REVIEWS

"A book of great beauty and the revelation of a mind tender, strong, and spiritual—the man of action as a teacher of men."—*Public Opinion.*

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE OF ST. PAUL. By Prof. Percy Gardner, D.Litt., author of "Modernity and the Churches." Forming Vol. XXXIV. in the Crown Theological Library. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth. **5s.** net; postage inland 4*d.*

"Professor Gardner's is a reverent and serious attempt to interpret the inward experiences of a man who has been one of the greatest spiritual forces of the world; and whether or not the interpretation commands our complete assent, it must receive a cordial welcome, as coming from one so well qualified for the task by his earnestness, his scholarship, and his freedom from the bias of a professional theologian."—Dr. Drummond in the *Hibbert Journal.*

THE FOUNDATIONS OF DUTY: OR MAN'S DUTY TO GOD, HIS FELLOW-MEN, AND HIMSELF. By the Right Rev. J. W. Diggle, D.D., Bishop of Carlisle. Crown 8vo. Cloth. **3s. 6d.** net; postage inland 4*d.* extra.

"It is marked by the deep thinking, lucidity, and spiritual emphasis which characterises the Bishop of Carlisle's writings. To the reader with an eye for spiritual things it will be pure gold."—*Church Family Newspaper.*

WILLIAMS & NORGATE: 14 Henrietta St., Covent Garden, London, W.C.

A CATALOGUE OF
WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S
PUBLICATIONS

ADDIS (W. E., M.A.). Hebrew Religion to the Establishment of Judaism under Ezra. Crown 8vo, cloth. 4s. 6d. net. *See* Crown Theological Library, p. 34.

AINSWORTH DAVIS (J. R.) and H. J. FLEURE, B.Sc. Patella (the Common Limpet). With 4 Plates. 2s. 6d. net. *See* Liverpool Marine Biology Committee Memoirs, p. 39.

ALLIN (Rev. THOS.). Universalism asserted as the Hope of the Gospel on the Authority of Reason, the Fathers, and Holy Scripture. With a Preface by Edna Lyall, and a Letter from Canon Wilberforce. Crown 8vo, cloth. 2s. 6d. net.

ALVIELLA (Count GOBLET D'). Lectures on the Origin and the Growth of the Conception of God, as Illustrated by Anthropology and History. Translated by the Rev. P. H. Wicksteed. Hibbert Lectures 1891. Cloth, Library Ed., 10s. 6d. Popular Ed., 3s. 6d.

ANDREWS (CHARLES M'LEAN, Ph.D., L.H.D.). **The** Colonial Period. F'cap. 8vo, cloth. 2s. 6d. net.

ANGLICAN LIBERALISM. By Twelve Churchmen. Rev. Hubert Handley, Prof. F. C. Burkitt, M.A., D.D., Rev. J. R. Wilkinson, M.A., Rev. C. R. Shaw Stewart, M.A., Rev. Hastings Rashdall, D.Litt., D.C.L., Prof. Percy Gardner, D.Litt., LL.D., Sir C. T. Dyke Acland, Rev. A. J. Carlyle, M.A., Rev. H. G. Woods, D.D., Rev. A. A. Caldcott, D.Litt., D.D., Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D., Rev. A. L. Lilley, M.A. Crown 8vo, cloth. 4s. 6d. net.

ASHWORTH (J. H., D.Sc.). Arenicola (the Lug-Worm). With 8 Plates. 4s. 6d. net. *See* Liverpool Marine Biology Committee Memoirs, p. 39.

AVEBURY (Lord, D.C.L., F.R.S.). **Prehistoric Times, as** Illustrated by Ancient Remains and the Manners and Customs of Modern Savages. 6th Edition, revised, with 239 Illustrations, a large number of which are specially prepared for this Edition. Demy 8vo, cloth, gilt tops. Cheap Popular Edition, 7s. 6d. net.

AVESTI, PAHLAVI, and ANCIENT PERSIAN STUDIES in Honour of the late Shams-ul-Ulama Dastur Peshotanji Behramji Sanjana, M.A., Ph.D. Paper cover, 12s. 6d. net; cloth, 13s. 6d. net.

BACON (Professor B. W., LL.D., D.D.). The Making of the New Testament. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 56 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

BACON (ROGER), the "Opus Majus" of. Edited, with Introduction and Analytical Table, by John Henry Bridges, Fellow of Royal College of Physicians, sometime Fellow of Oriel College. Complete in 3 vols., 31s. 6d. ; Vol. III. sold separately, 7s. 6d.

BAILEY (JOHN, M.A.). Dr Johnson and his Circle. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net ; leather, 2s. 6d. Forming Vol. 64 in Home University Library ; for list, see p. 38.

BALSILLIE (DAVID, M.A.). An Examination of Professor Bergson's Philosophy. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s. net.

BARRETT (Sir W. F., F.R.S.). Psychical Research. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net ; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 28 in the Home University Library ; for list, *see* p. 37.

BARRY (WILLIAM, D.D.). The Papacy and Modern Times (1303–1870). F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net ; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 14 in the Home University Library ; for list, *see* p. 37.

BAUR (F. C.). Church History of the First Three Centuries. Translated from the Third German Edition. Edited by Rev. Allan Menzies. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 12s.

—— **Paul, the Apostle of Jesus Christ, his Life and Work, his** Epistles and Doctrine. A Contribution to a Critical History of Primitive Christianity. Edited by Rev. Allan Menzies. 2nd Edition. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 12s.

BAYLEY (HAROLD). The Lost Language of Symbolism. With above 1400 symbols. 2 vols. Medium 8vo, cloth. 25s. net.

BEARD (Rev. Dr C.). Lectures on the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century in its Relation to Modern Thought and Knowledge. Hibbert Lectures, 1883. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3rd Edition, 3s. 6d.

—— **The Universal Christ, and other Sermons.** Crown 8vo, cloth. 7s. 6d.

BEGBIE (HAROLD). *See* "Character and Life," p. 4.

BELLOC (HILAIRE, M.A.). The French Revolution. (With Maps.) F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net ; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 3 in the Home University Library ; for list, *see* p. 37.

—— **Warfare in England.** (With Maps.) F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net ; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Vol. 51 in the Home University Library ; for list, *see* p. 38.

BENEDICT (F. E., Ph.D.). Elementary Organic Analysis. Small 8vo. Pages vi+82. 15 Illustrations. 4s. 6d. net.

BERGEY (D. G.). Handbook of Practical Hygiene. Small 8vo. Pages v+164. 6s. 6d. net.

BEVAN (Rev. J. O., M.A., F.G.S.). The Genesis and Evolution of the Individual Soul scientifically Treated. Including also Problems relating to Science and Immortality. Crown 8vo, cloth. 2s. 6d. net.

BIBLE. Translated by Samuel Sharpe, being a Revision of the Authorised English Version. 6th Edition of the Old, 10th Edition of the New Testament. 8vo, roan. 5s.

BILTZ (HENRY). The Practical Methods of determining Molecular Weights. Translated by Jones. Small 8vo. Pages viii + 245. 44 Illustrations. 8s. 6d. net.

BLACKBURN (HELEN). Women's Suffrage. A Record of the Women's Suffrage Movement in the British Isles, with a Biographical Sketch of Miss Becker. With portraits. Crown 8vo, cloth. 6s.

BOÏELLE (JAS.). French Composition through Lord Macaulay's English. Edited, with Notes, Hints, and Introduction, by the late James Boïelle, B.A. (Univ. Gall.), Officier d'Académie, Senior French Master, Dulwich College, etc., etc. Crown 8vo, cloth. Vol. I. Frederick the Great. 3s. Vol. II. Warren Hastings. 3s. Vol. III. Lord Clive. 3s.

—— *See* Victor Hugo, "Les Misérables" and "Notre Dame."

BOLTON. History of the Thermometer. 12mo. 96 pages. 6 Illustrations. 4s. 6d. net.

BOUSSET (Prof. WILHELM). Jesus. Trans. by Janet Penrose Trevelyan, and ed. by Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D. Cr. 8vo. 3s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 14 in the Cr. Theological Library; *see* p. 34.

BOUTROUX (EMILE). Education and Ethics. Authorised Translation by Fred. Rothwell. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s. net.

BRADLEY (A. G.). Canada. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 34 in the Home University Library; *see* list, p. 37.

BRAUNS (Dr REINHARD). The Mineral Kingdom. The author is the well-known Professor of Mineralogy in the University of Bonn. Translated with additions by L. J. Spencer, M.A., F.G.S., Assistant in the Mineral Department of the British Museum. In demy 4to, comprising 91 full-page plates beautifully executed in colours, 73 of which are chromo-lithographs, 18 photographic reproductions, and 275 figures in the text. Bound in half-morocco. £2, 16s. net.

BREMOND (HENRI). The Mystery of Newman. With Introduction by the late Rev. George Tyrrell, M.A. Medium 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. net.

BREWSTER (H. B.). The Theories of Anarchy and of Law. A Midnight Debate. Crown 8vo, parchment. 5s.

—— **The Prison.** A Dialogue. Crown 8vo, parchment. 5s.

—— **The Statuette and the Background.** Crown 8vo, parchment. 4s.

BREWSTER (Prof. W. T.), Editor of The Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

—— **The Writing of English.** F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 73 in Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 39.

BRUCE (ALEX., M.A., M.D., F.R.C.P.E.). A Topographical Atlas of the Spinal Cord. F'cap. folio, half-leather. £2, 2s. net.

BRUCE (Dr W. S., F.R.S.E.). Polar Exploration. (With Maps.) F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 8 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

BURKITT (Prof. F. C.). Euphemia and the Goth. With the Acts of Martyrdom of the Confessors of Edessa. 21s. net. *See* Text and Translation Society, p. 40.

BURY (Prof. J. B., Litt.D.). A History of Freedom of Thought. F'cap. 8vo, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 74 in Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 39.

CAMPBELL (Rev. COLIN, D.D.). The First Three Gospels in Greek. Arranged in parallel columns. 2nd Edition, Revised. Crown 8vo, cloth. 3s. 6d. net.

CARPENTER (Rt. Rev. W. BOYD). Some Pages of My Life. By the present Canon of Westminster and late Bishop of Ripon. With portrait of the author as frontispiece, and other interesting portraits. Medium 8vo, cloth, gilt top. 15s. net.

CARPENTER (Prof. J. E., LL.D.). Comparative Religion. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 68 in Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

CARTWRIGHT (Captain) and His Labrador Journal. Edited by Charles Wendell Townsend, M.D. With an Introduction by Dr Wilfred T. Grenfell. With Illustrations from old engravings. photographs and a map. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s. net.

CECIL (Lord HUGH, M.A., M.P.). Conservatism. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 11 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

CHADWICK (HERBERT CLIFTON). Antedon. With 7 Plates. 2s. 6d. net *See* Liverpool Marine Biology Memoirs, p. 39.

—— **Echinus.** With 5 Plates. Price 2s. net. *See* Liverpool Marine Biology Memoirs, p. 39.

CHANNING'S COMPLETE WORKS. Including "The Perfect Life," with a Memoir. Centennial Edition. 4to Ed. Cloth. 7s. 6d.

CHAPMAN (Prof. S. J., M.A.). Elements of Political Economy. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 59 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

CHARACTER AND LIFE: A Symposium. By Dr Alfred Russel Wallace, John A. Hobson, Harold Begbie, Walter Crane, and the late Dr Emil Reich. Arranged by Percy L. Parker, Editor of "Public Opinion." Crown 8vo, cloth. 3s. 6d. net.

CHESTERTON (G. K.). The Victorian Age in Literature. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 70 in Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

CHEYNE (Rev. T. K., D.Litt., D.D.). Biblé Problems and the New Material for their Solution. A Plea for Thoroughness of Investigation, addressed to Churchmen and Scholars. Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d. net. *See* Crown Theological Library, p. 34.

CHILD AND RELIGION, THE. Essays. By Prof. Henry Jones, M.A., LL.D., University of Glasgow; C. F. G. Masterman, M.A.; Prof. George T. Ladd, D.D., LL.D.; Rev. F. R. Tennant, M.A., B.Sc.; Rev. J. Cynddylan Jones, D.D.; Rev. Canon Hensley Henson, M.A.; Rev. Robert F. Horton, M.A., D.D.; Rev. G. Hill, M.A., D.D.; Rev. J. J. Thornton; Rev. Rabbi A. A. Green; Prof. Joseph Agar Beet, D.D. Edited by Thomas Stephens, B.A. Crown 8vo. 5s. net. *See* Crown Theological Library, p. 34.

COIT (STANTON, Ph.D.). National Idealism and a State Church. Demy 8vo, cloth. 7s. 6d. net.

—— **National Idealism and the Book of Common Prayer.** An Essay in Re-Interpretation and Revision. Demy 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. net.

COLBY (ALBERT LADD). Reinforced Concrete in Europe. Demy 8vo, cloth. 14s. 6d. net.

COLE (FRANK J.), and JAMES JOHNSTONE. Pleuronectes. With 11 Plates. 7s. net. *See* Liverpool Marine Biology Memoirs, p. 39.

COLLINS (F. H.). An Epitome of Synthetic Philosophy. With a Preface by Herbert Spencer. 5th Edition. The Synthetic Philosophy Completed. 8vo, cloth. Reduced to 5s. net.

CONYBEARE (F. C., M.A.). The Ring of Pope Xystus: a collection of Aphorisms and Short Sayings in use among Christian Communities in the Second Century. Beautifully printed on hand-made paper. 4s. 6d. net.

CORNILL (Prof. CARL). The Introduction to the Canonical Books of the Old Testament. Demy 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. net. *See* Theological Translation Library, p. 41.

CRANE (WALTER), contributor to "Character and Life," *see* p. 4.

CREIGHTON (Mrs). Missions: their Rise and Development. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Volume 60 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

CREIGHTON (CHAS., M.D.). Cancer and other Tumours of the Breast. Researches showing their true seat and cause. The Author was sometime Demonstrator of Anatomy, Cambridge Medical School, and is the author of "Bovine Tuberculosis in Man," etc. With 24 Lithographic Plates containing 138 figures from the Author's drawings. Royal 8vo, cloth. 12s. 6d. net.

—— **Contributions to the Physiological Theory of Tuberculosis.** Royal 8vo, cloth. 12s. 6d. net.

CUSSANS (MARGARET, B.Sc.). Gammarus. With 4 Plates. 2s. net. *See* Liverpool Marine Biology Memoirs, p. 39.

DAKIN (W. J., M.Sc.). Pecton. With 9 Plates. 4s. 6d. net. *See* Liverpool Marine Biology Memoirs, p. 39.

DARBISHIRE (OTTO V.). Chondrus. With 7 Plates. 2s. 6d. net. *See* Liverpool Marine Biology Memoirs, p. 39.

DAUDET (A.). Contes Militaires. 2s. 6d. *See* Army Series, p. 33.

DAVENPORT (CHARLES BENEDICT). Heredity in relation to Eugenics. The Author is Director, Department of Experimental Evolution, Cold Spring Harbour, Long Island, N.Y.; Secretary of the Eugenics Section American Breeders' Association. With Diagrams and Coloured Plate. Demy 8vo, cloth. 8s. 6d. net.

DAVIDS (Mrs RHYS, M.A.). Buddhism. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 47 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

DAVIDS (T. W. RHYS). Lectures on Some Points in the History of Indian Buddhism. The Hibbert Lectures, 1881. 2nd Edition. Demy 8vo, cloth. Library Edition, 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

DAVIS (H. W. C., M.A.). Mediæval Europe. (With Maps.) F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 13 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

DELBOS (L.). Nautical Terms in English and French and French and English. With Notes and Tables. For the use of Naval Officers and Naval Cadets. By Leon Delbos, M.A., of H.M.S. *Britannia*, Dartmouth. 4th Edition, thoroughly revised and considerably enlarged, with additional Plates. Crown 8vo, cloth. 7s. 6d. net.

—— **The Student's Graduated French Reader.** Remodelled and rewritten. Edited, with Notes and a Complete Vocabulary. First Year—Part I. Anecdotes, Tales, and Exercises. Part II. Tales, Historical Pieces, and Exercises. 1s. 6d. each. Second Year—Parts I. and II. in the Press.

DELITZSCH (Dr FRIEDRICH). Babel and Bible. Authorised Translation. Edited, with an Introduction, by Rev. C. H. W. Johns. Crown 8vo, with 77 illustrations, cloth. 4s. 6d. net. *See* Crown Theological Library, p. 34.

DEWALL (JOHANNES V.). Auf Verlornem Posten and Nazzarena Danti. 3s. *See* Army Series, p. 33.

DIBBLEE (G. BINNEY). The Newspaper. F'cap. 8vo, cloth 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 69 in Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

DICKSON (H. N., D.Sc.). Climate and Weather. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 36 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

DILLMANN (A.). Ethiopic Grammar. Translated from C. Bezold's Second German Edition. By Rev. J. A. Crichton, D.D. With Index of Passages, Philological Tables, etc. 1 vol., royal 8vo. 25s. net.

DÎPAVAMSA (THE): A Buddhist Historical Record in the Pali Language. Edited, with an English Translation, by Dr H. Oldenberg. 8vo, cloth. 21s.

DOBSCHÜTZ (ERNST VON, D.D.). Christian Life in the Primitive Church. The Author is Professor of New Testament Theology in the University of Strassburg. Translated by Rev. G. Bremner, and edited by the Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D. Demy 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. *See* Theological Translation Library, New Series, p. 41.

DOLE (CHARLES F.). The Ethics of Progress, or the Theory and the Practice by which Civilisation proceeds. Small demy 8vo, cloth. 6s. net.

DRUMMOND (Dr JAMES, LL.D.). Philo Judæus; or, The Jewish Alexandrian Philosophy in its Development and Completion. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 21s.

—— **Via, Veritas, Vita.** Lectures on Christianity in its most Simple and Intelligible Form. Hibbert Lectures, 1894. Demy 8vo. Library Edition, 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

DUNCAN (DAVID, LL.D.). The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer. With 17 Illustrations. Cheap Reissue. 6s. net.

EMERY (F. B., M.A.). Elementary Chemistry. With numerous Illustrations. 8s. 6d. net.

ENGELHARDT (V.). The Electrolysis of Water. 8vo. Pages x + 140. 90 Illustrations. 5s. net.

ENGLAND AND GERMANY. By Leaders of Public Opinion in both Empires, among whom may be mentioned:—Rt. Hon. Arthur J. Balfour, Viscount Haldane of Cloan, Rt. Hon. A. Bonar Law, Baron Alfred von Rothschild, Rt. Hon. Herbert Samuel, Sir Rufus Isaacs, Norman Angell, J. Ramsay MacDonald, M.P., J. A. Spender, Excell. Karl Galster, Ernst Basserman, Professor Dr Riesser, Baron Wilhelm von Pechmann, Professor Wilhelm Wundt, Dr Walther Rathenau, August Thyssen, sen., His Excellency Dr Adolf Wermuth, Excell. von Holleben, etc. With Portraits. Stiff wrapper. 1s. net.

ERMAN'S EGYPTIAN GRAMMAR. Translated, under Professor Erman's supervision, by J. H. Breasted, Professor of Egyptology in the University of Chicago. Crown 8vo, cloth. 18s.

ERSKINE (Prof. J.) and Prof. W. P. TRENT. Great Writers of America. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 52 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

EUCKEN (Dr RUDOLF, Jena). The Life of the Spirit. An Introduction to Philosophy. Second Edition. Third Impression. 8vo, cloth. 4s. 6d. net. *See* Crown Theological Library, p. 35.

—— **The Truth of Religion.** Translated from the latest revised German edition by Rev. W. Tudor Jones, Ph.D., with a special preface by the Author. Demy 8vo, cloth. 12s. 6d. net. *See* Theological Translation Library, New Series, p. 41.

EUGÈNE-FASNACHT (G.). Eugène's Student's Comparative Grammar of the French Language, with an Historical Sketch of the Formation of French. The Author was for many years French Master, Westminster School. For the use of Public Schools. With Exercises. 23rd Edition, thoroughly revised. Square crown 8vo, cloth, 5s.; or separately, Grammar, 3s.; Exercises, 2s. 6d.

—— **French Method.** Elementary French Lessons preparatory to the same Author's Grammar. 18th Edition. Cloth. 1s. 6d.

EVANS (GEORGE). An Essay on Assyriology. With 4to Tables of Assyrian Inscriptions. 8vo, cloth. 5s.

EWALD'S (Dr H.) Commentary on the Prophets of the Old Testament. Translated by the Rev. J. F. Smith. [Vol. I. General Introduction, Yoel, Amos, Hosea, and Zakharya 9–11. Vol. II. Yesaya, Obadya, and Mikah. Vol. III. Nahûm, Ssephanya, Habaqqûq, Zakhârya, Yéremya. Vol. IV. Hezekiel, Yesaya xl.–lxvi. Vol. V. Haggai, Zakharya, Malaki, Jona, Baruc, Daniel, Appendix and Index.] 5 vols. 8vo, cloth. 30s. *See* Theological Translation Library, Old Series, p. 42.

—— **Commentary on the Psalms.** Translated by the Rev. E. Johnson, M.A. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 12s.

—— **Commentary on the Book of Job,** with Translation. Translated from the German by the Rev. J. Frederick Smith. 8vo, cloth. 6s.

FAGUET (Prof. EMILE, of the French Academy). **Initiation** into Philosophy. Translated by Sir Home Gordon, Bart. Crown 8vo, cloth. 2s. 6d. net.

FARMER (Prof. J. B.). Plant Life. (Illustrated.) F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 72 in Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 39.

FARNELL (L. R., D.Litt.). The Evolution of Religion: an Anthropological Study. Crown 8vo, cloth. 4s. 6d. net. *See* Crown Theological Library, p. 34.

—— **The Higher Aspects of Greek Religion.** Lectures delivered in Oxford and London. Being Vol. 1 of New Series of Hibbert Lectures. Demy 8vo, cloth. 6s. net. *See* Hibbert Lectures, p. 36.

FARQUHARSON (Rt. Hon. ROBERT, LL.D.) The House of Commons from Within, and other Reminiscences. Med. 8vo. With portrait by J. S. Sargent, R.A., never before published. 7s. 6d. net.

—— **In and Out of Parliament.** With a number of portraits and caricatures. Medium 8vo, cloth. 12s. 6d. net.

FARRIE (HUGH). Highways and Byways in Literature. A volume of original Studies. Demy 8vo, cloth. 5s. net.

FINDLAY (Prof. J. J., M.A., Ph.D.). The School. An Introduction to the Study of Education. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 38 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

FISCHER (Prof. EMIL, of Berlin University). **Introduction to** the Preparation of Organic Compounds. Translated with the Author's sanction from the new German edition by R. V. Stanford, B.Sc., Ph.D. With figures in the text. Crown 8vo, cloth. 4s. net.

FISHER (HERBERT, M.A., F.B.A., LL.D.), Editor, Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

—— **Napoleon.** (With Maps.) F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 61 in Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

FOUR GOSPELS (THE) AS HISTORICAL RECORDS. 8vo, cloth. 15s.

FOWLER (W. WARDE, M.A.). **Rome.** F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 42 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

FOX (FRANK), Author of "Ramparts of Empire," etc. **Problems** of the Pacific. Demy 8vo, cloth. With Map. 7s. 6d. net.

FRY (The Rt. Hon. Sir EDWARD, G.C.B., etc.). **Some** Intimations of Immortality. From the Physical and Psychical Nature of Man. Royal 8vo, sewed. 1s. net.

GAMBLE (Prof. F. W., D.Sc., F.R.S.). **The Animal World.** With Introduction by Sir Oliver Lodge. Many Illustrations. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 19 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

GARDNER (Prof. PERCY, D.Litt., F.B.A., Oxford). **Modernity** and the Churches. 4s. 6d. net. *See* Crown Theological Library, p. 35.

—— **The Religious Experience of St Paul.** Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s. net. *See* Crown Theological Library, p. 35.

GELDART (W. M., M.A., B.C.L.). **Elements of English Law.** F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 30 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

GIBBS (PHILIP). The Eighth Year. The Dangerous Year of Marriage. Crown 8vo, cloth. 2s. net.

GIBSON (R. J. H.) and **HELEN P. AULD,** B.Sc. **Codium.** With 3 Plates. Price 1s. 6d. net. *See* Liverpool Marine Biology Memoirs, p. 39.

GILES (H. A., LL.D.). **The Civilisation of China.** By the well-known Professor of Chinese in the University of Cambridge. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 25 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

GILL (CHARLES). The Book of Enoch the Prophet. Translated from an Ethiopic MS. in the Bodleian Library, by the late Richard Laurence, LL.D., Archbishop of Cashel. The Text corrected from his latest Notes by Charles Gill. Re-issue, 8vo, cloth. 5s.

GIVEN (JOHN L.). Making a Newspaper. Cloth, above 300 pages. 6s. net.

GOLDAMMER (H.). The Kindergarten. A Guide to Fröbel's Method of Education. 2 vols. in 1. 120 pp. of Illustrations. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d.

GOOCH (G. P., M.A.). **The History of our Time, 1885–1911.** F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 23 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

GOULD (F. J.). Noble Pages from German History. Crown 8vo, cloth. Illustrated. 1s. 6d. net.

GRAVELY (F. H., M.Sc.). Polychaet Larvae. With 4 plates. 2s. 6d. net. *See* Liverpool Marine Biology Committee Memoirs, p. 39.

GRAY (Rev. H. B., D.D.). The Public Schools and the Empire. A plea for higher education in citizenship. Cloth. 6s. net.

GREEN (Rt. Rev. A. V., D.D., Bishop of Ballarat). The Ephesian Canonical Writings: Being the Moorhouse Lectures for 1910. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s. net.

GREEN (Mrs J. R.). Irish Nationality. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 6 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

GREGORY (Prof. J. W., F.R.S.). The Making of the Earth. (With 38 Maps and Figures.) F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 53 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

GRIEBEN'S ENGLISH GUIDES. Practical and handy; size, suitable for the pocket, $6\frac{1}{4}+4\frac{1}{4}$, and bound in cloth.

Switzerland. A practical guide with seven Maps. Cloth. 3s. net.

Norway and Copenhagen. With six Maps. Cloth. 3s. net.

Ostend and other Belgium Watering Places. With two Maps. Cloth. 1s. 6d. net.

Lakes of Northern Italy. With Maps. Cloth. 3s. net.

The Rhine. With Maps. Cloth. 3s. net.

North Sea Watering Places. Cloth. 3s. net.

Belgium. With Maps. Cloth. 3s. net.

Brussels and Antwerp. With Maps. Cloth. 1s. 6d. net.

Holland. With Maps. Cloth. 3s. net.

The Riviera. With Maps. Cloth. 3s. net.

Winter Sports in Switzerland. A practical guide for those visiting Switzerland in the winter. With Map. Cloth. 3s. net.

Dresden and Environs. With Maps. Cloth. 1s. 6d. net.

Munich and Environs. With Maps. Cloth. 1s. 6d. net.

Nuremburg and Rothenburg on the Tauber. With 2 Maps. 1s. 6d. net.

The Dolomites. With 3 Maps. 3s. net.

Naples and Capri. With seven Maps and three Ground Plans. 1s. 6d. net.

GUPPY (H. B., M.B., F.R.S.E.). Studies in Seeds and Fruits. An Investigation with the Balance. Demy 8vo, cloth, nearly 600 pp. 15s. net.

HAERING (Prof. THEODOR). Ethics of the Christian Life. Translated by Rev. J. S. Hill, B.D., and edited by Rev. W. D. Morrison. Demy 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. net. *See* Theological Translation Library, New Series, p. 41.

HALLIGAN (JAMES EDWARD), Chemist in charge Louisiana State Experiment Station. Soil Fertility and Fertilisers. With Illustrations and Tables. Demy 8vo, cloth. 14s. 6d. net.

HANNAY (DAVID). The Navy and Sea Power. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 66 in Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

HANTZSCH (A.). Elements of Stereochemistry. Translated by Wolf. 12mo. Pages viii + 206. 26 Figures. 6s. 6d. net.

HARDY. Elements of Analytical Geometry. 8vo. Pages iv + 365. 163 Figures. 8s. 6d. net.

—— **Infinitesimals and Limits.** Sm. 12mo, paper. 22 pp. 6 Figures. 1s. net.

HARNACK (ADOLF, D.D.). The Acts of the Apostles. Being Vol. III. of Dr Harnack's New Testament Studies. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s. net. Vol. 26 in the Crown Theological Library; for list, *see* p. 35.

—— **Bible Reading in the Early Church.** Forming Vol. V. of New Testament Studies. 5s. net. *See* Crown Theological Library, p. 35.

—— **The Constitution and Law of the Church in the First Two** Centuries. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s. net. Vol. 31 in the Crown Theological Library, p. 35.

—— **The Date of the Acts and of the Synoptic Gospels.** Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s. net. Forming Vol. IV. in Dr Harnack's New Testament Studies, and Vol. 33 in the Crown Theological Library, p. 35.

—— **History of Dogma.** Translated from the Third German Edition. Edited by the late Rev. Prof. A. B. Bruce, D.D. 7 vols. 8vo, cloth, each 10s. 6d.; half-leather, suitable for presentation, 12s. 6d. *See* Theological Translation Library, New Series, p. 40.

—— **Letter to the "Preussische Jahrbücher" on the German** Emperor's Criticism of Prof. Delitzsch's Lectures on "Babel and Bible." Translated into English by Thomas Bailey Saunders. 6d. net.

—— **Luke, the Physician.** Translated by the Rev. J. R. Wilkinson, M.A. Being Vol. I. of Dr Harnack's New Testament Studies. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s. net. *See* Crown Theological Library, p. 34.

—— **The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First** Three Centuries. Second, revised and much enlarged Edition. 25s. net. Forming Vols. 19 and 20 in Theological Translation Library, New Series; *see* p. 41.

—— **Monasticism: Its Ideals and History; and The Confessions** of St Augustine. Two Lectures. Translated into English by E. E. Kellet, M.A., and F. H. Marseille, Ph.D. Crown 8vo, cloth. 3s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 28 in the Crown Theological Library, p. 35.

—— **The Sayings of Jesus.** Being Vol. II. of Dr Harnack's New Testament Studies. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s. net. Forming Vol. 23 in the Crown Theological Library, p. 35.

—— **What is Christianity?** Translated by Thomas Bailey Saunders. Third and Revised Edition. Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 5 in the Crown Theological Library, p. 34.

—— and **Prof. W. HERRMANN,** of Marburg. **Essays on the** Social Gospel. Crown 8vo, cloth. 4s. net. Forming Vol. 18 in the Crown Theological Library, p. 34.

HARNACK (AXEL). Introduction to the Elements of the Differential and Integral Calculus. From the German. Royal 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d.

HARRISON (JANE, LL.D., D.Litt.). Ancient Art and Ritual. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 75 in Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 39.

HART (EDWARD, Ph.D.). Chemistry for Beginners. Sm. 12mo.
Vol. I. Inorganic. Pages viii + 188. 55 Illustrations and 2 Plates. 4th Edition. 4s. 6d. net.
Vol. II. Organic. Pages iv + 98. 11 Illustrations. 2s. net.
Vol. III. Experiments. Separately. 60 pages. 1s. net.

—— **Second Year Chemistry.** Small 12mo. 165 pages. 31 Illustrations. 5s. net.

HATCH (Rev. Dr). Lectures on the Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church. Edited by Dr Fairbairn. Hibbert Lectures, 1888. 3rd Edition. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

HAUSRATH (Prof. A.). History of the New Testament Times. The Time of the Apostles. Translated by Leonard Huxley. With a Preface by Mrs Humphry Ward. 4 vols. 8vo, cloth. 42s. (Uniform with the Theological Translation Library, Old Series.)

—— **History of the New Testament Times.** The Time of Jesus. Trans. by the Revs. C. T. Poynting and P. Quenzer. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 12s. *See* Theological Translation Library, Old Series, p. 42.

HAWORTH (PAUL LELAND). Reconstruction and Union, 1865–1912. F'cap. 8vo, cloth. 2s. 6d. net.

HEATH (FRANCIS GEORGE). Nervation of Plants. By the well-known Author of "Our Woodland Trees," "The Fern World," etc. Well Illustrated. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. net.

HEBREW TEXTS, in large type for Classes:
Genesis. 2nd Edition. 16mo, cloth. 1s. 6d. Psalms. 16mo, cloth. 1s. **Isaiah.** 16mo, cloth. 1s. **Job.** 16mo, cloth. 1s.

HENSLOW (Rev. G.). The Vulgate; The Source of False Doctrine. Crown 8vo, cloth. 2s. 6d. net.

HERDMAN (W. A.). Ascidia. With 5 Plates. 2s. net. *See* Liverpool Marine Biology Committee Memoirs, p. 39.

HERFORD (Rev. R. TRAVERS). Christianity in Talmud and Midrash. Demy 8vo, cloth. 18s. net.

—— **Pharisaism: Its Aims and its Methods:** Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s. net. Forming Vol. 35 in the Crown Theological Library, p. 35.

HERRMANN (Prof. WILHELM). The Communion of the Christian with God. Translated from the new German Edition by Rev. J. S. Stanyon, M.A., and Rev. R. W. Stewart, B.D., B.Sc. Crown 8vo, cloth. 4s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 15 in the Crown Theological Library, p. 34.

—— **Faith and Morals.** New Edition. Crown 8vo, cloth. 4s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 6 in the Crown Theological Library, p. 34.

HEWITT (C. GORDON, B.Sc.). Ligia. With 4 Plates. 2s. net. *See* Liverpool Marine Biology Memoirs, p. 39.

HIBBERT JOURNAL: A Quarterly Review of Religion, Theology, and Philosophy. Edited by L. P. Jacks and G. Dawes Hicks. In quarterly issues, 2s. 6d. net; or yearly volumes bound in cloth. 12s. 6d. net. Annual Subscription, 10s. post free.

HIBBERT JOURNAL SUPPLEMENT, 1909, entitled JESUS OR CHRIST? Containing 18 Essays by leading Theologians and Thinkers. Super royal 8vo, cloth. 5s. net.

HICKSON (SYDNEY J., D.Sc., F.R.S.). Alcyonium. With 3 Plates. Price 1s. 6d. net. *See* Liverpool Marine Biology Committee Memoirs, p. 39.

HINKS (A. R., M.A.). Astronomy. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 31 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

HIRST (F. W., M.A.). The Stock Exchange. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 5 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* page 37.

HOBHOUSE (Prof. L. T., M.A.). Liberalism. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 21 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

HOBSON (J. A., M.A.). The Science of Wealth. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 16 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

—— **Character and Life.** *See* p. 4.

HÖFER (E.). Erzählungen. 3s. *See* Army Series of French and German Novels, p. 33.

HOFF (J. H. VAN'T). Studies in Chemical Dynamics. Revised and enlarged by Dr Ernst Cohen, Assistant in the Chemical Laboratory of the University of Amsterdam. Translated by Thomas Ewan, M.Sc., Ph.D., Demonstrator of Chemistry in the Yorkshire College, Leeds. Royal 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d.

HOLDERNESS (Sir T. W., K.C.S.I.). Peoples and Problems of India. The Author is Secretary of the Revenue, Statistics, and Commerce Department of the India Office. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 37 in the Home University Library; *see* p. 38.

HOLLINS (DOROTHEA). The Quest. A Romance of Deliverance. Demy 8vo, cloth. 4s. 6d. net.

HOME UNIVERSITY LIBRARY OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE. Every volume is specially written for this Library by a recognised authority of high standing. Each volume is complete and independent, but the series has been planned as a whole to form a comprehensive library of modern knowledge. The Library is published under the direction of Professor Gilbert Murray and Mr Herbert Fisher of Oxford, Professor J. Arthur Thomson of Aberdeen, and Professor William T. Brewster of New York. Each volume consists of 256 pages and is issued bound in cloth at 1s. net, or in leather, 2s. 6d. net. For list of volumes, *see* p. 37.

HORNELL (JAMES, F.L.S.). Report to the Government of Baroda on the Marine Zoology of Okhamandal in Kattiawar. With Supplementary Reports on Special Groups by other Zoologists. Demy 4to, cloth, with full-page Plates. Part I. 15s. net.

HOWE (J. L., Washington and Lee University). Inorganic Chemistry for Schools and Colleges. Being a Second Edition of "Inorganic Chemistry according to the Periodic Law." By F. P. Venable and J. L. Howe. Demy 8vo, cloth. 12s. 6d. net.

HUGO (VICTOR). Les Misérables: Les Principaux Episodes. Edited, with Life and Notes, by the late J. Boïelle. 2 vols. 6th Edition. Crown 8vo, cloth. Each 3s.

—— **Notre Dame de Paris.** Adapted for the use of Schools and Colleges. By the late J. Boïelle. 2 vols. 2nd Edition. Crown 8vo, cloth. Each 3s.

HUNTER (Rev. J., D.D.). De Profundis Clamavi, and Other Sermons. Large crown 8vo, cloth. 5s. net.

—— **God and Life.** A Series of Discourses. Uniform with "De Profundis Clamavi." Cloth. 5s. net.

—— **The Coming Church.** A Plea for a Church simply Christian. Cloth. 1s. 6d. net.

ILBERT (Sir C. P., K.C.B.). Parliament. Its History, Constitution, and Practice. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 1 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

IMMS (A. D., B.Sc. (Lond.). Anurida. With 7 Plates. 4s. net. *See* Liverpool Marine Biology Memoirs, p. 39.

ISGROVE (ANNIE, M.Sc.). Eledone. With 10 Plates. 4s. 6d. net. *See* Liverpool Marine Biology Memoirs, p. 39.

JACKS (L. P.), Editor of the Hibbert Journal. Mad Shepherds, and Other Human Studies. With a frontispiece drawing by Leslie Brooke. Crown 8vo, cloth. 4s. 6d. net.

—— **Among the Idolmakers.** Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s. net.

—— **The Alchemy of Thought and Other Essays.** Demy 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. net.

JEREMIAS (Prof. ALFRED). The Old Testament in the Light of the Ancient East. The translation is edited by Professor C. H. W. Johns of Cambridge. With a large number of Illustrations. In two volumes, demy 8vo, at 25s. net. *See* Theological Translation Library, New Series, p. 41.

JOHNSTON (Sir H. H., K.C.B., D.Sc.). The Opening-up of Africa. (With Maps.) F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 12 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

—— Views and Reviews. Essays on Racial, Political, and Colonial Questions. Crown 8vo, cloth. 3s. 6d. net.

JOHNSTONE (J.). British Fisheries: Their Administration and their Problems. A short account of the Origin and Growth of British Sea Fishery Authorities and Regulations. 10s. 6d. net.

JOHNSTONE (J.). Cardium. With 7 Plates. Price 2s. 6d. net. *See* Liverpool Marine Biology Memoirs, p. 38.

JONES. The Freezing Point, Boiling Point, and Conductivity Methods. 12mo. Pages vii + 64. 14 Illustrations. 3s. net.

JONES (J. T. SHARE-). Surgical Anatomy of the Horse. To be completed in 4 Parts. With above 100 Illustrations, a number being in colour. Part I. Head and Neck. Part II. Fore Limb. Part III. Hind Limb. Price per part, 15s. net, sewed; cloth, 16s. 6d. net.

—— **Life-Size Models, Illustrating the Superficial Anatomy of the** Limbs of the Horse. Price per set of four models, £21; or separately—Fore Limb, Inner and Outer Aspects, £6, 16s. 6d. each; Hind Limb, Inner and Outer Aspects, £6, 6s. each.

JONES (Rev. R. CROMPTON). Hymns of Duty and Faith. Selected and Arranged. 247 pp. F'cap. 8vo, cloth. 2nd Edition. 3s. 6d.

—— **Chants, Psalms, and Canticles.** Selected and Pointed for Chanting. 18mo, cloth. 1s. 6d.

—— **Anthems.** With Indexes and References to the Music. 18mo, cloth. 1s. 3d.

—— **The Chants and Anthems.** Together in 1 vol. Cloth. 2s.

—— **A Book of Prayer.** In Thirty Orders of Worship, with Additional Prayers and Thanksgivings. 18mo, cloth. 2s. 6d. With Chants, in 1 vol. 18mo, cloth. 3s.

JONES (Rev. W. TUDOR, Ph.D.). An Interpretation of Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy. Crown 8vo. 5s. net.

JORDAN (HUMFREY, R.), B.A. Blaise Pascal. A Study in Religious Psychology. Crown 8vo, cloth. 4s. 6d. net.

JOURNAL OF THE LINNEAN SOCIETY. Botany. At various prices. Index to Journal (Botany), 20s. Zoology. At various prices. General Index to the first 20 vols. of the Journal (Zoology) and the Zoological portion of the Proceedings, 20s.

JOURNAL OF THE QUEKETT MICROSCOPICAL CLUB. Nos. 1–26, 1s. net; Nos. 27–31, 2s. 6d. net. 1893, No. 32, and following Nos., half-yearly 3s. 6d. net.

JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL MICROSCOPICAL SOCIETY, containing its Transactions and Proceedings, with other Microscopical Information. Bi-monthly. Previous to 1893 at various prices; after that date bi-monthly, each 6s. net.

KAPP (GISBERT, D.Eng., M.I.E.E., M.I.C.E.). Electricity. The Author is Professor of Electrical Engineering in the University of Birmingham. (Illustrated.) F'cap. 8vo, cloth. 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 58 in the Home University Library; *see* p. 38.

KAUFFMAN (RUTH and R. W.). The Latter Day Saints: A Study of the Mormons in the Light of Economic Conditions. Medium 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. net.

KAUTZSCH (E., Professor at Halle). An Outline of the History of the Literature of the Old Testament. With Chronological Tables for the History of the Israelites, and other Aids to the Explanation of the Old Testament. Reprinted from the "Supplement to the Translation of the Old Testament." Edited by the Author. Translated by John Taylor, D. Litt., M.A., etc. Demy 8vo, cloth. 6s. 6d.

KEIM'S History of Jesus of Nazara: Considered in its connection with the National Life of Israel, and related in detail. Translated from the German by Arthur Ransom and the Rev. E. M. Geldart. In 6 vols. Demy 8vo, cloth. 6s. each. *See* Theological Translation Fund Library, p. 42.

KEITH (A., M.D., LL.D.). The Human Body. The Author is Conservator of Museum and Hunterian Professor, Royal College of Surgeons. (Illustrated.) F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 57, Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

KENNEDY (Rev. JAS.). Introduction to Biblical Hebrew, presenting Graduated Instruction in the Language of the Old Testament. 8vo, cloth. 12s.

—— **Studies in Hebrew Synonyms.** Demy 8vo, cloth. 5s.

KER (Prof. W. P., M.A.). English Literature: Mediæval. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 43 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

KIEPERT'S Wall Maps of the Ancient World—

Wall-Map of Ancient Italy. Italia antiqua. For the study of Livy, Sallust, Cicero, Dionysius, etc. Scale 1 : 800,000. Mounted on rollers, varnished. 20s.

General Wall-Map of the Old World. Tabula orbis terrarum antiqui ad illustrandum potissimum antiquissimi ævi usque ad Alexandrum M. historiam. For the study of ancient history, especially the history of the Oriental peoples: the Indians, Medes, Persians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Egyptians, Phœnicians, etc. Scale 1 : 5,400,000. Mounted on rollers, varnished. 20s.

General Wall-Map of the Roman Empire. Imperii Romani tabula geographica. For the study of the development of the Roman Empire. Scale 1 : 300,000. Mounted on rollers, varnished. 24s.

Wall-Map of Ancient Latium. Latii Veteris et finitimarum regionum tabula. For the study of Livy, Dionysius, etc. Scale 1 : 125,000. With supplement: Environs of Rome. Scale 1 : 25,000. Mounted on rollers, varnished. 18s.

Wall-Map of Ancient Greece. Græciæ Antiquæ tabula. For the study of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Strabo, Cornelius Nepos, etc. Scale 1 : 500,000. Mounted on rollers, varnished. 24s.

Wall-Map of the Empires of the Persians and of Alexander the Great. Imperia Persarum et Macedonum. For the study of Herodotus, Xenophon, Justinian, Arian, Curtius. Scale 1 : 300,000. Mounted on rollers and varnished. 20s.

KIEPERT'S Wall-Maps of the Ancient World —*continued.*

Wall-Map of Gaul, with Portions of Ancient Britain and Ancient Germany. Galliæ Cisalpinæ et Transalpinæ cum partibus Britanniæ et Germaniæ tabula. For the study of Cæsar, Justinian, Livy, Tacitus, etc. Scale 1 : 1,000,000. Mounted on rollers and varnished 24s.

Wall-Map of Ancient Asia Minor. Asiæ Minoris Antiquæ tabula. For the study of Herodotus, Xenophon, Justinian, Arian, Curtius, etc. Scale 1 : 800,000. Mounted on rollers and varnished. 20s.

—— **New Atlas Antiquus.** Twelve Maps of the Ancient World, for Schools and Colleges. Third hundred thousand. 12th Edition, with a complete Geographical Index. Folio, boards. 6s. Strongly bound in cloth. 7s. 6d.

KING, THE, TO HIS PEOPLE. Being the Speeches and Messages of His Majesty George V. as Prince and Sovereign. Published by permission. Square 8vo, art canvas. 5s. net.

KITTEL (Dr RUDOLF, of Breslau). A History of the Hebrews. In 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. Each volume, 10s. 6d. Forming Vols. 3 and 6 of the Theological Translation Library, New Series; for list, *see* p. 41.

—— **The Scientific Study of the Old Testament:** Its Principal Results, and their Bearing upon Religious Instruction. Illustrated. 5s. net. Forming Vol. 32 in the Crown Theological Library; for list, *see* p. 35.

KUENEN (Dr A., of Leiden). The Religion of Israel to the Fall of the Jewish State. Translated from the Dutch by A. H. May. 3 vols. 8vo, cloth. 18s. *See* Theological Translation Fund Library, p. 35.

KYRIAKIDES (A.). Modern Greek-English Dictionary. With a Cypriote Vocabulary. 2nd Edition, revised throughout. Medium 8vo. 920 pages. Cloth. 15s. net.

—— **A Modern Greek-English and English-Modern Greek Pocket** Dictionary. In 2 vols., about 650 pages each. 7s. net each volume.

LAKE (KIRSOPP). The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. The Author is Professor of New Testament Exegesis in the University of Leiden, Holland. Crown 8vo, cloth. 4s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 21 in the Crown Theological Library; *see* p. 34.

LANDOLT (Dr HANS). The Optical Rotating Power of Organic Substances and its Practical Applications. 8vo. Pages xxi+751. 83 Illustrations. 31s. 6d. net.

LAURIE (Prof. SIMON). Ethica: or, the Ethics of Reason. By Scotus Novanticus. 2nd Edition. 8vo, cloth. 6s.

—— **Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta: A Return to Dualism.** 2nd Edition. Crown 8vo, cloth. 6s.

LEA (HENRY CHARLES, LL.D.). History of Sacerdotal Celibacy in the Christian Church. 3rd Edition. Thoroughly Revised and Reset. 2 vols. Medium 8vo, cloth. 21s. net.

LEAVENWORTH (Prof. W. S., M.Sc.). **Inorganic Qualitative** Chemical Analysis for Advanced Schools and Colleges. 8vo. Pages vi + 154. 6s. 6d. net.

LEBLANC (Dr MAX). **The Production of Chromium and its** Compounds by the Aid of the Electric Current. Demy 8vo, cloth. 5s. net.

LEIPOLDT (C. LOUIS, F.R.C.S. Eng.). **Common-sense Dietetics.** Strongly bound in cloth. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. net.

LE ROY (Edouard). **A New Philosophy: Henri Bergson.** Translated by Vincent Benson, M.A. Crown 8vo, cloth, 5s. net.

LETHABY (Prof. W. R.). **Architecture.** Over 40 Illustrations. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 39 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* page 38.

LEWIS (AGNES SMITH), Edited by. **Old Syriac Gospels, or** Evangelion Da-Mepharreshe. This is the Text of the Sinai Palimpsest, including the latest additions and emendations, with the variants of the Curetonian Text, corroborations from many other MSS., and a list of quotations from ancient authors. With 4 facsimiles. Quarto, bound half-leather. 25s. net.

LLURIA (Dr ENRIQUE). **Super-Organic Evolution.** Nature and the Social Problem. With a Preface by Dr D. Santiago Ramon y Cajal. Large Crown 8vo. Illustrated. 7s. 6d. net.

LOBSTEIN (PAUL). **The Virgin Birth of Christ:** An Historical and Critical Essay. The Author is Professor of Dogmatics in the University of Strassburg. Translated by Victor Leuliette, A.K.C., B.-ès-L., Paris. Edited, with an Introduction, by Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 2 in the Crown Theological Library; for list, *see* p. 34.

LODGE (Sir O.). **Life and Matter:** An Exposition of Part of the Philosophy of Science, with Special References to the Influence of Professor Haeckel. Second Edition, with an Appendix of Definitions and Explanations. Crown 8vo, cloth. 2s. 6d. net. Popular Edition. Paper Cover. 6d. net.

—— **School Teaching and School Reform.** A Course of Four Lectures on School Curricula and Methods, delivered to Secondary Teachers and Teachers in Training at Birmingham. 3s.

LONDON LIBRARY (St James's Square), **Catalogue of.** xiv + 1626 pages. 4to, bound in buckram. 42s. net. Supplements I.–VIII., bound in buckram, 5s. each.

—— **Subject Index.** 4to, bound in buckram. xxxviii + 1256 pages. 31s. 6d. net.

LONG (J. H.). **A Text-book of Urine Analysis.** Small 8vo. Pages v + 249. 31 Illustrations. 6s. 6d. net.

LORIA (ACHILLE). **Les Bases Economiques de la Justice** Internationale. 4to, 3s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 2 of Publications de l'Institut Nobel Norvégien.

LYALL (Sir C. J., M.A., K.C.I.E.). Ancient Arabian Poetry, chiefly Præ-Islamic. Translations, with an Introduction and Notes. F'cap. 4to, cloth. 10s. 6d.

MACAN (R. W.). The Resurrection of Jesus Christ. An Essay in Three Chapters. 8vo, cloth. 5s.

MACAULAY (THOMAS BABINGTON). The Lays of Ancient Rome. With 8 Illustrations faithfully reproduced in colours, and a number in black-and-white, from original drawings by Norman Ault. Small 4to, cloth. 6s. net.

MACCOLL (HUGH). Man's Origin, Destiny, and Duty. Crown 8vo, cloth. 4s. 6d. net.

MACDONALD (J. RAMSAY, M.P.). The Socialist Move-ment. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Vol. 10 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

McDOUGALL (Prof. W., F.R.S., M.B.). Psychology: the Study of Behaviour. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Vol. 49 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

MACFIE (RONALD C., M.A., M.B.). Science, Matter, and Immortality. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s. net.

MACGREGOR (Prof. D. H., M.A.). The Evolution of Industry. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Vol. 24 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

McKENDRICK (Prof. J. G., M.D.). The Principles of Physiology. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Vol. 44 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

MACKENZIE (W. LESLIE, M.D.). Health and Disease. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 17 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

MAIR (G. H., M.A.). English Literature: Modern. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 27 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

MARETT (R. R., M.A., of Oxford). Anthropology. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 41 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

MARGOLIOUTH (Prof. D. S., M.A., D.Litt.). Mohammedanism. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 15 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

MARKHAM (Sir CLEMENTS, K.C.B.). Vocabularies of the General Language of the Incas of Peru. Crown 8vo, cloth. 7s. 6d. net.

MARRINER (GEORGE R., F.R.M.S.). The Kea: A New Zealand Problem. With Illustrations. Demy 8vo, cloth. 7s. 6d. net.

MARTI (KARL, Professor of Old Testament Exegesis, Bern). The Religion of the Old Testament: Its Place among the Religions of the Nearer East. Crown 8vo, cloth, 4s. net. Forming Vol. 19 in the Crown Theological Library; for list, *see* p. 34.

MARTINEAU (Mrs ALICE). The Herbaceous Garden. Gives full particulars how to make and arrange hardy borders, and containing an alphabetical index of the most suitable plants. With a large number of illustrations and a frontispiece in colour. Demy 8vo, cloth. 7s. 6d. net.

MARTINEAU (Rev. Dr JAMES). The Relation between Ethics and Religion. An Address. 8vo, sewed. 1s.

—— **Modern Materialism: Its Attitude towards Theology.** A Critique and Defence. 8vo, sewed. 2s. 6d.

MASEFIELD (JOHN). Shakespeare. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 2 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

MASON (W. P.). Notes on Qualitative Analysis. Sm. 12mo. 56 pp. 3s. 6d. net.

MEADE (RICHARD K., B.Sc.). Chemist's Pocket Manual. 16mo. Leather. Pocket Edition. Second Edition. 12s. 6d. net.

—— **Portland Cement: Its Composition, Raw Materials, Manufacture, Testing, and Analysis.** Second Edition. With 170 Illustrations. 20s. net.

MELDOLA (Prof. RAPHAEL, D.Sc., LL.D.). Chemistry. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. Forming Vol. 67 in Home University Library; for list, see p. 38.

MELVILLE (HELEN and LEWIS). The Seasons. An Anthology in Prose and Verse. Forming an attractive volume, bound in art linen. 3s. 6d. net.

MERCER (Rt. Rev. J. EDWARD, D.D.). The Soul of Progress. Being the Moorhouse Lectures for 1907. Cr. 8vo, cloth. 6s.

MERCIER (Dr C. A., F.R.C.P.). Crime and Insanity. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 22 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

MEREDITH (LEWIS B.). Rock Gardens. How to Make and Maintain them. With an Introduction by F. W. Moore, A.L.S., and an Alphabetical List of Plants suitable for the Rock Garden, with Notes on the aspect and soil they require. Demy 8vo, with Plates. 7s. 6d. net.

MERIMÉE (PROSPER). Le Coup de Pistolet, etc. 2s. 6d. *See* Army Series of French and German Novels, p. 33.

MILINDAPAÑHO, THE. Being Dialogues between King Milinda and the Buddhist Sage Nāgasena. The Pali Text, edited by V. Trenckner. Crown 8vo, sewed. 21s.

MITCHELL (Rev. A. F.). How to Teach the Bible. 2nd Edition, thoroughly revised and reset. Cr. 8vo, cloth. 2s. 6d. net.

MITCHELL (Rev. C. W.). The Refutation of Mani, Marcion, and Bardaisan of St. Ephraim. 21s. net. *See* Text and Translation Society, p. 40.

MOISSON (HENRI). The Electric Furnace. 8vo. Pages x + 305. 41 Illustrations. 10s. 6d. net.

MONTEFIORE (C. G.). **Origin and Growth of Religion as** Illustrated by the Religion of the Ancient Hebrews. The Hibbert Lectures, 1892. 2nd Edition. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

MOORE (Prof. BENJAMIN). **The Origin and Nature of Life.** F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 62 in Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

MOORE (G. E., M.A.). **Ethics.** The Author is Lecturer in Moral Science in Cambridge University. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 54 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

MÜNSTERBERG (Prof. HUGO, of Harvard). **The Americans.** Translated by Edwin B. Holt, Ph.D., Instructor at Harvard University. Royal 8vo, cloth. 12s. 6d. net.

MURRAY (Prof. GILBERT, D.Litt., LL.D., F.B.A.)., Editor of the Home University Library. For list, *see* p. 37.

MYRES (J. L., M.A., F.S.A.). **The Dawn of History.** The Author is Wykeham Professor of Ancient History, Oxford. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 29 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

NAVILLE (EDOUARD, Ph.D., Litt.D.). **The Old Egyptian** Faith. Translated by Colin Campbell, M.A., D.D. Illustrated. 4s. 6d. net. Vol. 30 in Crown Theological Library; for list, *see* p. 35.

NESTLE (Prof. EBERHARD, of Maulbronn). **An Introduction** to the Textual Criticism of the Greek New Testament. Translated from the Second Edition, with Corrections and Additions by the Author, by William Edie, B.D., and edited, with a Preface, by Allan Menzies, D.D., Professor of Divinity and Biblical Criticism in the University of St Andrews. With eleven reproductions of Texts. Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d.; half-leather, 12s. 6d. Forming Vol. 13 in the Theological Translation Library, New Series, p. 41.

NEWBIGIN (Dr MARION). **Modern Geography.** Illustrated. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net.; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 7 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

NEW HEBREW SCHOOL OF POETS OF THE SPANISH-ARABIAN EPOCH. Selected Texts with Introduction, Notes, and Dictionary. Edited by H. Brodey, Ph.D., Rabbi in Lachod (Bohemia), and K. Albrecht, Ph.D., Professor in Oldenburg (Grand Duchy). English Translation of the Introduction, etc., by Mrs Karl Albrecht. Cloth. 7s. 6d. net.

NIBELUNGENLIED. **"The Fall of the Nibelungens,"** otherwise "The Book of Kriemhild." An English Translation by W. N. Lettsom. 5th Edition. 8vo, cloth. 5s.

NIKAIDO (Y., B.Sc., M.A.). **Beet-Sugar Making and its** Chemical Control. With a number of valuable Tables and Illustrations. Demy 8vo, cloth. 12s. 6d. net.

NISSENSON. The Arrangements of Electrolytic Laboratories. Demy 8vo. 52 Illustrations. 5s. net.

NOLDEKE (Prof. THEODOR). Compendious Syriac Grammar. With a Table of Characters by Julius Euting. Translated (with the sanction of the Author) from the Second and Improved German Edition by Rev. James A. Crichton, D.D. Royal 8vo. 18s. net.

—— Delectus Veterum Carminum Arabicorum Glossarium Confecit A. Muller. Crown 8vo, cloth. 7s. 6d.

NOYES (ARTHUR A., Ph.D.). Organic Chemistry for the Laboratory. Small 12mo. Pp. xii+257. 22 Illus. 6s. 6d. net.

—— and SAMUEL P. MULLIKEN, Ph.D. Laboratory Experiments on Class Reactions and Identification of Organic Substances. 8vo. 81 pp. 2s. net.

O'GRADY (STANDISH H.). Silva Gadelica (I.–XXXI.). A Collection of Tales in Irish, with Extracts illustrating Persons and Places. Edited from MSS. and translated. 2 vols. royal 8vo, cloth. 42s. Or separately, Vol. 1, Irish Text; and Vol. 2, Translation and Notes. Each Vol. 21s.

OORDT (J. F. VAN, B.A.). Cape Dutch. Phrases and Dialogues, with Translations, preceded by short Grammatical Notes. Crown 8vo, cloth. 2s. 6d. net.

ORTH (SAMUEL P., Ph.D.). Socialism and Democracy in Europe. Demy 8vo. 360 pages. Cloth. 6s. net.

OSTWALD (WILHELM). Natural Philosophy. Translated by Thomas Seltzer. Crown 8vo, cloth. 4s. net.

OTTO (Prof. RUDOLF). Naturalism and Religion. Translated by J. Arthur Thomson, Professor of Natural History in the University of Aberdeen, and Margaret R. Thomson. Edited with an Introduction by Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D. Crown 8vo. 5s. net. Forming Vol. 17 in the Crown Theological Library; *see* p. 34.

PARKER (PERCY L.), Editor of "Public Opinion." Character and Life. A Symposium. Containing contributions by Dr Alfred Russel Wallace, John A. Hobson, Walter Crane, Harold Begbie, and the late Dr Emil Reich. Crown 8vo, cloth. 3s. 6d. net.

PAXSON (Prof. F. L.). The American Civil War. With Maps. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 48 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

PEARSON (JOSEPH, M.Sc.). Cancer. With 13 Plates. 6s. 6d. net. *See* Liverpool Marine Biology Memoirs, p. 39.

PEDDIE (R. A.). Printing at Brescia in the Fifteenth Century. A List of the Issues. 5s. net.

PERCIVAL (G. H.). The Incarnate Purpose. Essays on the Spiritual Unity of Life. Crown 8vo, cloth. 2s. 6d. net.

PEROWNE (J. T. W., M.A.), Editor of the Army Series of French and German Novels For list, *see* p. 33.

PERRIS (G. H.). A Short History of War and Peace. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 4 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

PETERS (JOHN P., D.D.). Early Hebrew Story. A Study of the Origin, the Value, and the Historical Background of the Legends of Israel. Crown 8vo, cloth. 4s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 7 in the Crown Theological Library; for list, *see* p. 34.

PETIT (ROBERT). How to Build an Aeroplane. Translated from the French, with some additional matter, by Messrs T. O'B. Hubbard and J. H. Ledeboer. With nearly 100 Illustrations. Demy 8vo, cloth. 2s. 6d. net.

PFANHAUSER (Dr W.). Production of Metallic Objects Electrolytically. 5s. net.

PFLEIDERER (Dr O.). Lectures on the Influence of the Apostle Paul on the Development of Christianity. Translated by Rev. J. Frederick Smith. Being the Hibbert Lectures for 1885. Library Edition. Demy 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, cloth. 3s. 6d. *See* The Hibbert Lectures, p. 36.

—— **Paulinism: A Contribution to the History of Primitive** Christianity. 2 vols. Demy 8vo, cloth. 12s. *See* Theological Translation Library, Old Series, p. 42.

—— **Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of its History.** In 4 vols. Demy 8vo, cloth. 24s. *See* Theological Translation Library, Old Series, p. 42. [Vol. 2 quite out of print.]

—— **Primitive Christianity: Its Writings and Teachings in their** Historical Connections. 4 vols. 10s. 6d. net each. *See* Theological Translation Library, New Series, p. 41.

—— **The Early Christian Conception of Christ: Its Significance** and Value in the History of Religion. 3s. net. *See* Crown Theological Library, p. 34.

PHILLIPPS (V., B.A.). A Short Sketch of German Literature, for Schools. 2nd Edition, revised. Pott 8vo, cloth. 1s.

PHILLIPS (FRANCIS C.). Methods for the Analysis of Ores, Pig Iron, and Steel. 2nd Edition. 8vo. Pages viii + 170. 3 Illustrations. 4s. 6d. net.

PICTON (J. ALLANSON, M.A. Lond.). Man and the Bible. A Review of the Place of the Bible in Human History. Demy 8vo, cloth. 6s. net.

PIDDINGTON (HENRY). The Sailors' Horn-Book for the Law of Storms. Being a Practical Exposition ot the Theory of the Law of Storms, and its uses to Mariners of all Classes in all Parts of the World. Shown by transparent Storm Cards and useful Lessons. 7th Edition. Demy 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d.

PLATTS (J. T.), Hon. M.A. (Oxon.)). A Grammar of the Persian Language. Part I. Accidence. Broad crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.

POLLARD (Prof. A. F., M.A.). The History of England: A Study in Political Evolution. With a Chronological Table. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 33 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

PRAY (Dr). Astigmatic Letters. Printed on Millboard, size 22 by 14 inches. 1s.

PROCEEDINGS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE under the Auspices of the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, held at Washington, Dec. 1910. In 1 vol., sewed. 4s. net.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. Old Series—Odd Numbers at various prices. New Series (yearly volumes bound in buckram)—Vols. I.–XI. ready, 10s. 6d. each net.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE OPTICAL CONVENTION, No. 1, 1905. Crown 4to, cloth. 10s. net.

PROCEEDINGS AND PAPERS OF THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF FREE CHRISTIANITY. Held at Berlin, 1910. Edited by C. W. Wendte, D.D., and V. D. Davis, B.A. Medium 8vo, cloth. 9s. 6d. net. Sewed, 8s. 6d. net.

PUNNETT (R. C., B.A.). Lineus. With 4 Plates. 2s. net. *See* Liverpool Marine Biology Memoirs, p. 39.

RÆDER (A.). L'Arbitrage International chez les Hellènes. 4to, sewed. 10s. net. Being Vol. I. of Publications de l'Institut Nobel Norvégien.

RAY (Prof. P. C.). A History of Hindu Chemistry from the Earliest Times to the Middle of the Sixteenth Century A.D. With Sanskrit Texts, Variants, Translation, and Illustrations. Vol. I. 2nd Edition. Revised and Enlarged. Crown 8vo, 10s. 6d. net. Vol. II. Cloth. 10s. 6d. net.

REICH (Dr EMIL), Contributor to "Character and Life." *See* p. 4.

RENAN (E.). On the Influence of the Institutions, Thought, and Culture of Rome on Christianity and the Development of the Catholic Church. Translated by the Rev. Charles Beard. Being the Hibbert Lectures, 1880. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition (3rd Edition), 3s. 6d.

RENOUF (P. LE PAGE). On the Religion of Ancient Egypt. Hibbert Lectures, 1879. 3rd Edition. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

RÉVILLE (Dr A.). On the Native Religions of Mexico and Peru. Translated by the Rev. P. H. Wicksteed. Hibbert Lectures, 1884. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

—— **Prolegomena of the History of Religions.** With an Introduction by Prof. F. Max Müller. 8vo, cloth. 6s. See Theological Translation Library, Old Series, p. 42.

RÉVILLE (Prof. JEAN). Liberal Christianity: Its Origin, Nature, and Mission. Translated and edited by Victor Leuliette, A.K.C., B.-ès-L. Crown 8vo, cloth. 3s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 4 in the Crown Theological Library; for list, *see* p. 34.

RHYS (Prof. J.). On the Origin and Growth of Religion as Illustrated by Celtic Heathendom. Hibbert Lectures, 1886. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

RIEDEL (Prof. W.) and W. E. CRUM. The Canons of Athanasius of Alexandria, in Arabic, Ethiopic, and Coptic. 21s. net. *See* Text and Translation Society, p. 40.

RIX (HERBERT). Tent and Testament. A Camping Tour in Palestine, with some Notes on Scripture Sites. With 61 Illustrations, Frontispiece, and Maps. Demy 8vo, cloth. 8s. 6d. net.

ROBERTSON (Prof. J. G., M.A.). The Literature of Germany. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 65 in Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

ROGET (F. F.). An Introduction to Old French. History, Grammar, Chrestomathy, and Glossary. 2nd Edition. Crown 8vo, cloth. 6s.

—— **First Steps in French History, Literature, and Philology.** For Candidates for the Scotch Leaving Certificate Examinations, the various Universities Local Examinations, and the Army Examinations. 4th Edition. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s.

RUFFINI (FRANCESCO). Religious Liberty. The Author is Ordinary Professor at the Royal University of Turin. With an Introduction by Prof. J. B. Bury of Cambridge. Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 32 in the Theological Translation Library; *see* p. 41.

RUSSELL (Hon. BERTRAND, F.R.S.). The Problems of Philosophy. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 40 in Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

SABATIER (Late AUGUSTE). The Doctrine of the Atonement and its Historical Evolution; and Religion and Modern Culture. Translated by Victor Leuliette, A.K.C., B.-ès-L. Crown 8vo. 4s. net. Forming Vol. 9 in the Crown Theological Library; *see* p. 34.

—— **The Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit.** New impression. Demy 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. *See* Theological Translation Library, New Series, p. 41.

SADI. The Gulistan (Rose Garden) of Shaik Sadi of Shiraz. A new Edition of the Persian Text, with a Vocabulary, by F. Johnson. Square royal 8vo, cloth. 15s.

SADLER (Rev. Dr). Prayers for Christian Worship. Crown 8vo, cloth. 3s. 6d.

—— **Closet Prayers, Original and Compiled.** 18mo, cloth. 1s. 6d.

SADLER (GILBERT, M.A., LL.B.). A Short Introduction to the Bible. Crown 8vo, cloth. 2s. 6d. net.

SAGAS OF OLAF TRYGGVASON AND OF HAROLD THE TYRANT. A new translation, well illustrated with drawings by Erik Werenskiold, Christian Krogh, and others of the best Norwegian artists. In small 4to, printed on specially mould-made paper, comprising above 200 pages, bound with linen back and paper sides, done up in box. 12s. 6d. net.

SALEEBY (C. W., M.D., F.R.S.). Individualism and Collectivism. Crown 8vo, cloth. 2s.

SAUNDERS (T. BAILEY). Professor Harnack and his Oxford Critics. Crown 8vo, cloth. 1s. 6d. net.

SAYCE (Prof. A. H.). On the Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by the Religion of the Ancient Babylonians. 5th Edition. Hibbert Lectures, 1887. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

SCHLOSS (DAVID F.). Methods of Industrial Remuneration. 3rd Edition, revised and enlarged. Crown 8vo, cloth. 7s. 6d. Popular Edition. 3s. 6d.

SCHRADER (Prof. E.). The Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament. Translated from the Second Enlarged Edition, with Additions by the Author, and an Introduction by the Rev. Owen C. Whitehouse, M.A. 2 vols. With a Map. 8vo, cloth. 12s. *See* Theological Translation Library, Old Series, p. 42.

SCHREBER (D. G. M.). Medical Indoor Gymnastics, or a System of Hygienic Exercises for Home Use, to be practised anywhere, without apparatus or assistance, by young and old of either sex, for the preservation of health and general activity. Revised and Supplemented by Rudolf Graefe, M.D. With a large plate and 45 illustrations in the text. Royal 8vo, cloth. 2s. 6d. net.

SCHROEN (L.). Seven-Figure Logarithms of Numbers from 1 to 108,000, and of Sines, Cosines, Tangents, Cotangents to every 10 Seconds of the Quadrant. With a Table of Proportional Parts. By Dr Ludwig Schroen, Director of the Observatory of Jena, etc., etc. 5th Edition, corrected and stereotyped. With a description of the Tables by A. De Morgan, Professor of Mathematics in University College, London. Imp. 8vo, cloth, printed on light green paper. 9s.

SCHUBERT (HANS VON). History of the Church. Translated from the Second German Edition. By arrangement with the Author, an Additional Chapter has been added on "Religious Movements in England in the Nineteenth Century," by Miss Alice Gardner, Lecturer and Associate of Newnham College, Cambridge. Demy 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. *See* Theological Translation Library, New Series, p. 41.

SCHURMAN (J. GOULD). Kantian Ethics and the Ethics of Evolution. 8vo, cloth. 5s.

—— **The Ethical Import of Darwinism.** Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s.

SCHUSTER (ERNEST J.). The Wife in Ancient and Modern Times. Crown 8vo, cloth. 4s. 6d. net.

SCOTT (ANDREW). Lepeophtheirus and Lernea. With 5 Plates. 2s. net. *See* Liverpool Marine Biology Committee Memoirs on Typical British Marine Plants and Animals, p. 39.

SCOTT (Dr D. H., M.A., F.R.S.). The Evolution of Plants. Fully illustrated. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 9 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

SCOTT (E. F., M.A.). **The Apologetic of the New Testament.** Cr. 8vo, cloth. 4s. 6d. net. *See* Crown Theological Library, p. 35.

SEEBERG (Prof. R., of Berlin). **The Fundamental Truths of** the Christian Religion. Sixteen Lectures delivered before the Students of all Faculties in the University of Berlin. Crown 8vo. 350 pp. 4s. 6d. net. *See* Crown Theological Library, p. 35.

SEGER (HERMAN AUGUST), **Collected Writings of.** Papers on Manufacture of Pottery. 2 vols. Large 8vo. £3, 3s. net per set.

SELBIE (Principal W. B., M.A.). **Nonconformity: Its Origin** and Progress. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 50 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

SEVERUS (Patriarch of Antioch). **The Sixth Book of the** Select Letters of Severus, Patriarch of Antioch, in the Syriac Version of Athanasius of Nisibis. Edited and Translated by E. W. Brooks. Vol. I. (Text), Part 1, and Vol. II. (Translation), Part 1. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 42s. net. Vol. I. (Text), Part 2, and Vol. II. (Translation), Part 2. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 42s. net. *See* Text and Translation Society, p. 40.

SHARPE (HENRY). **Britain B.C.: As Described in Classical** Writings. With an Inquiry into the positions of the Cassiterides and Thule, and an attempt to ascertain the ancient coast-line of Kent and East Sussex. With Maps. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s. net.

SHEARMAN (A. T., M.A.). **The Development of Symbolic** Logic. A Critical Historical Study of the Logical Calculus. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s. net.

SMITH (The Rt. Hon. F.E., K.C., M.P.). **Unionist Policy** and other Essays. Large 8vo, cloth. 5s. net.

SMITH (L. PEARSALL, M.A.). **The English Language.** F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 45 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

SNELLEN'S OPHTHALMIC TEST TYPES. Best Types. for the Determination of the Acuteness of Vision. 14th Edition, considerably augmented and improved. 8vo, sewed. 4s. Single Sheets: E T B, M O V, B D E, Ш Ш Ш, and Large Clock Sheet. 8d. each. Small Clock Sheet and R T V Z. 4d. each.

SNYDER (HARRY, B.Sc.). **Soils and Fertilisers.** 2nd Edition. 8vo. Pages x + 294. 1 Plate, 40 Illustrations. 6s. 6d. net.

SODDY (F., M.A., F.R.S.). **Matter and Energy.** F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 46 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

SODEN (Prof. H. VON, D.D.). **The Books of the New Testa-** ment. Translated by the Rev. J. R. Wilkinson, and edited by Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D. Crown 8vo, cloth. 4s. 6d. net. *See* Crown Theological Library, p. 34.

SOLILOQUIES OF ST AUGUSTINE, THE. Translated into English by Rose Elizabeth Cleveland. With Notes and Introduction by the Translator. Small demy 8vo, cloth. 6s. net.

SOMERVILLE (Prof. W., D.Sc.). Agriculture. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 26 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

SONNTAG (C. O.) A Pocket Flora of Edinburgh and the Surrounding District. A Collection and full Description of all Phanerogamic and the principal Cryptogamic Plants, classified after the Natural System, with an artificial Key and a Glossary of Botanical Terms. By the late C. O. Sonntag. F'cap. 8vo, limp cloth. 3s. 6d. net.

SORENSEN (S., Ph.D.), Compiled by. An Index to the Names in the Mahabharata. With short explanations. Royal 4to, in twelve parts, which are not sold separately, at 7s. 6d. per part net. Parts I. to VI. now ready.

SPEARS (J. R.). Master Mariners. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 55 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

SPENCER (HERBERT). A System of Synthetic Philosophy—

Vol. I. **First Principles.** With an Appendix and a Portrait. Finally revised. New Edition, large crown 8vo, cloth. 7s. 6d. Specially printed cheap edition, bound in cloth. 2 vols. of 240 pages each. 1s. net per volume. Complete in one volume. 2s. net.

Vols. II. and III. **The Principles of Biology.** 6th Thousand 8vo, cloth. Revised and greatly enlarged. 2 vols. 18s. each.

Vols. IV. and V. **The Principles of Psychology.** 5th Thousand. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 36s.

Vol. VI. **The Principles of Sociology.** Vol. I. Part 1, The Data of Sociology; Part 2, The Inductions of Sociology; Part 3, Domestic Institutions. 4th Thousand, revised and enlarged. 8vo, cloth. 21s.

Vol. VII. **The Principles of Sociology.** Vol. II. Part 4, Ceremonial Institutions; Part 5, Political Institutions. 3rd Thousand. 8vo, cloth. 18s.

Vol. VIII. **The Principles of Sociology.** Vol. III. Part 6, Ecclesiastical Institutions; Part 7, Professional Institutions; Part 8, Industrial Institutions. 2nd Thousand. 8vo, cloth. 16s.

Vol. IX. **The Principles of Ethics.** Vol. I. Part 1, The Data of Ethics; Part 2, The Inductions of Ethics; Part 3, The Ethics of Individual Life. 8vo, cloth. 15s.

Vol. X. **The Principles of Ethics.** Vol. II. Part 4, Justice; Part 5, Negative Beneficence; Part 6, Positive Beneficence; Appendices. Demy 8vo. cloth. 12s. 6d.

—— **A Rejoinder to Professor Weismann.** Sewed. 6d.

—— **Data of Ethics.** Reset uniform with popular edition of "First Principles." Sewed, 2s. 6d. net; cloth, 3s. net.

SPENCER (HERBERT). Descriptive Sociology; or, Groups of Sociological Facts. Compiled and abstracted by Professor D. Duncan of Madras, Dr Richard Scheppig, and James Collier. Folio, boards.

No. 1. **English.** 18s.
No. 2. **Ancient American Races.** 16s.
No. 3. **Lowest Races, Negritto Races, Polynesians.** 18s.
No. 4. **African Races.** 16s.
No. 5. **Asiatic Races.** 18s.
No. 6. **American Races.** 18s.
No. 7. **Hebrews and Phœnicians.** 21s.
No. 8. **The French Civilisation.** 30s.
No. 9. **Chinese.** Compiled and abstracted by E. T. C. Werner, H.M.'s Consular Service, China. 63s.
No. 10. **Greeks: Hellenic Era.** By Rev. Dr J. P. Mahaffy, and Professor W. A. Goligher, Trinity College, Dublin. 21s.

—— **Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical.** Popular Edition. Entirely reset. Crown 8vo, cloth. 2s. 6d. Cheap Edition, cloth, 1s. net.

—— **Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative.** A new Edition, rearranged, with additional Essays. 3 vols. 8vo, cloth. (Each 10s.) 30s.

—— **Facts and Comments.** Demy 8vo, cloth. 6s.

—— **Justice.** Being Part 4 of the Principles of Ethics. 2nd Thousand. 8vo, cloth. 6s.

—— **Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte.** Sewed. 6d.

—— **Social Statics.** Abridged and revised, together with "The Man *v.* The State." 8vo, cloth. 10s.

—— **The Man *versus* The State.** 14th Thousand. Sewed. 1s.

—— **The Study of Sociology.** Library Edition (21st Thousand), with a Postscript. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d.

—— **Various Fragments.** Uniform in Library binding. Demy 8vo, cloth. Enlarged Edition. 6s.

STATUTES, THE, OF THE APOSTLES. The hitherto unedited Ethiopic and Arabic Texts, with Translations of Ethiopic, Arabic, and Coptic Texts, by G. Horner, M.A.

STEPHEN (Rev. Canon REGINALD, M.A.). Democracy and Character. Being the Moorhouse Lectures for 1908. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s.

STERNE (LAURENCE). A Sentimental Journey through France and Italy. With 12 Illustrations faithfully reproduced from water-colour drawings by Everard Hopkins. Ordinary Edition in crown 4to, 10s. 6d. net. Edition de Luxe, limited to 500 copies, in demy 4to, 21s. net.

STILLMAN (THOS. B., M.Sc., Ph.D.). Engineering Chemistry. 4th Edition. The 4th edition has been mostly rewritten and altered to incorporate the latest approved methods of chemical testing. Medium 8vo. With 147 Figures in the text. 21s. net.

STOCKER (R. DIMSDALE). Social Idealism. Crown 8vo, cloth. 3s. net.

STRACHEY (G. L.). Landmarks in French Literature. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 35 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

TAYLOR (A. CAMERON). General Sir Alexander Taylor. A Memoir by his Daughter. 2 vols. Demy 8vo, cloth.

TAYLOR (Rev. Dr J.). The Massoretic Text and the Ancient Versions of the Book of Micah. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s.

TEN SERVICES OF PUBLIC PRAYER, with Special Collects. 8vo, cloth, 3s.; or 32mo, cloth, 1s. 6d.

—— **PSALMS AND CANTICLES.** 8vo, cloth. 1s. 6d.

—— **PSALMS AND CANTICLES, with Anthems.** 8vo, cloth. 2s.

—— **SERVICES OF PUBLIC PRAYER, taken in Substance** from the Common Prayer for Christian Worship, with a few additional Prayers for particular Days. 8vo, cloth, 2s. 6d.; or 32mo, cloth, 1s.

TENNYSON (ALFRED, LORD). The Princess: A Medley. With Six Illustrations beautifully reproduced in colours, and a number in black-and-white, from Original Drawings by Everard Hopkins. Small 4to. 7s. 6d. net.

THOMAS (Rev. J. M. LLOYD). A Free Catholic Church. Crown 8vo, cloth. 1s. 6d. net.

THOMSON (J. ARTHUR, M.A., LL.D.). Introduction to Science. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 32 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

—— and **Prof. PATRICK GEDDES. Evolution.** F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 20 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

—— Editor of the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

THURSTON (E. TEMPLE). The "Flower of Gloster." By the well-known Author of "City of Beautiful Nonsense," "Sally Bishop," etc. With six Illustrations faithfully reproduced in colours, and other Illustrations in black-and-white, from drawings by W. R. Dakin. Small 4to, cloth. 7s. 6d. net.

TISCHENDORF (C.). The New Testament. Novum Testamentum Græce. 3 vols. 8vo. 70s. net.

TOWER (CHARLES). Germany of To-day. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 71 in Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 39.

TOWER (O. F., Ph.D.). The Conductivity of Liquids. 8vo. Pages iv + 190. 20 Illustrations. 6s. 6d. net.

TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL DUBLIN SOCIETY. Issued in parts at various prices.

TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL IRISH ACADEMY, DUBLIN. Vols. I.–XX. 4to. £22, 5s. 6d. Vols. XXI.–XXXI. Various prices.

TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF EDINBURGH. Issued in parts at various prices. General Index to First Thirty-four Volumes (1783–1888), with History of the Institution. 4to, cloth. 21s.

TRENCKNER (V.). Pali Miscellany. Part I. The Introductory Part of the Milanda Panho, with an English Translation and Notes. 8vo, sewed. 4s.

TRENT (Prof. W. P.) and ERSKINE (Prof. J.). Great Writers of America. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 52, Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

TROELTSCH (Prof. ERNEST, of Jena). Protestantism and Progress: The Significance of Protestantism in the Rise of the Modern World. Translated into English by Rev. W. Montgomery, B.D. *See* Crown Theological Library, p. 35.

UPTON (Rev. C. B.). On the Bases of Religious Belief. Hibbert Lectures, 1893. Demy 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

VEGA. Logarithmic Tables of Numbers and Trigonometrical Functions. Translated from the 40th, or Dr Bremiker's Edition, thoroughly revised and enlarged, by W. L. Fischer, M.A., F.R.S., Fellow of Clare College, Cambridge; Professor of Natural Philosophy in the University of St Andrews. 75th Stereotyped Edition. Royal 8vo, cloth. 7s.

VEILED FIGURE, THE, and other Poems. Large post 8vo, buckram, gilt, cover designed by Mr T. Blake Wirgman. 2s. 6d.

VELASQUEZ. Large Spanish Dictionary. Composed from the Dictionaries of the Spanish Academy, Terreros and Salva. Spanish-English and English-Spanish. 1279 pp., triple columns. 2 vols. in 1. Imp. 8vo, cloth. 24s.

VENABLE (T. C., Ph.D.). The Development of the Periodic Law. Small 12mo. Pages viii + 321. Illustrated. 10s. 6d. net.

—— **The Study of the Atom.** 12mo. Pages vi + 290. 8s. 6d. net.

—— and **HOWE. Inorganic Chemistry according to the Periodic** Law. 2nd Edition. *See under* Howe, p. 14.

VINCENT (JACQUES). Vaillante. 2s. 6d. *See* Army Series of French and German Novels, p. 33.

WALFORD (Mrs L. B.). Recollections of a Scottish Novelist. With Portraits and other Illustrations. Demy 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. net.

WALLACE (Dr ALFRED RUSSEL). *See* Character and Life, p. 4.

WEDMORE (Sir FREDERICK). Painters and Painting. Illustrated. F'cap 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 63 in Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 38.

WEINEL (Prof. H., of the University of Jena). St Paul: The Man and his Work. Translated by Rev. G. A. Bienemann, M.A. Edited by Rev. W. D. Morrison, M.A., LL.D. Demy 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. *See* Theological Translation Library, New Series, p. 41.

WEIR (T. H., B.D.). A Short History of the Hebrew Text of the Old Testament. By Thomas H. Weir, Assistant to the Professor of Oriental Languages in the University of Glasgow. 2nd Edition, with Additions. Crown 8vo, cloth. 6s.

WEISSE (T. H.). A Short Guide to German Idioms: being a Collection of the Idioms most in use. With Examination Papers. 3rd Edition. Cloth. 2s.

—— **Elements of German.** With a Course of Exercises instructing in Simpler Composition. Crown 8vo, cloth. 3s.

WEIZSÄCKER (Prof. CARL VON). The Apostolic Age. Trans. by James Millar, B.D. Demy 8vo, 2 vols., cloth. Each 10s. 6d. *See* Theological Translation Library, New Series, p. 40.

WELD (A. G.). Glimpses of Tennyson and of Some of his Friends. With an Appendix by the late Bertram Tennyson. Illustrated with Portraits in photogravure and colour, and with a facsimile of a MS. poem. F'cap 8vo, art linen. 4s. 6d. net.

WERNER (A.) and G. HUNT. Elementary Lessons in Cape Dutch (Afrikander Taal). 16mo, cloth. 1s. 6d.

WERNLE (PAUL). The Beginnings of Christianity. The Author is Professor Extraordinary of Modern Church History at the University of Basel. Revised by the Author, and translated by the Rev. G. A. Bienemann, M.A., and edited, with an Introduction, by the Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d. per volume. *See* Theological Translation Library, New Series, p. 41.

WHITEHEAD (A. N., Sc.D., F.R.S.). Introduction to Mathematics. With Diagrams. F'cap. 8vo, cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Forming Vol. 18 in the Home University Library; for list, *see* p. 37.

WILEY (HARVEY W., A.M., Ph.D.). Principles and Practice of Agricultural Chemical Analysis. 3 vols. 8vo. New Edition in preparation. Vol. I. Soils. Ready. 18s. net. Vol. II. Fertilisers. 20s. net. Vol. III. in active preparation.

WILLIAMS (The Right Rev. W. L., D.C.L.). A Dictionary of the New Zealand Language. 4th Edition. Edited by the Right Rev. Bishop W. L. Williams, with numerous additions and corrections. Demy 8vo, cloth. 12s. 6d.

—— **Lessons in Maori.** 3rd Edition. F'cap. 8vo, cloth. 3s.

WIMMER (R., Pastor of Weisweil-am-Rhein in Baden). My Struggle for Light: Confessions of a Preacher. Crown 8vo, cloth. 3s. net. *See* Crown Theological Library, p. 34.

WINSTEDT (E. O.), Edited by. Coptic Texts on St Theodore the General, St Theodore the Eastern, Chamoul and Justus. 21s. net. *See* Text and Translation Society, p. 37.

WOODS (C. E.). **The Gospel of Rightness.** A Study in Pauline Philosophy. 300 pages, cloth. 5s. net.

WRIGHT (Rev. C. H. H.). **Light from Egyptian Papyri on** Jewish History before Christ. Crown 8vo, cloth. 3s. net.

WRIGHT (G. H. BATESON, D.D.). **The Book of Job.** A new critically revised Translation, with Essays on Scansion, Date, etc. 8vo, cloth. 6s.

—— **Was Israel ever in Egypt? or, A Lost Tradition.** 8vo, art linen. 7s. 6d.

WRIGHT (W. ALDIS, LL.D.), Edited by. **A Rabbinic** Commentary on the Book of Job, contained in a unique MS. at Cambridge. With Translation and Commentary. 21s. net. *See* Text and Translation Society, p. 40.

WUNDT (WILHELM). **Outlines of Psychology.** Translated, with the co-operation of the Author, by Charles Hubbard Judd, Ph.D., Instructor in the Wesleyan University. 3rd Enlarged Edition. Demy 8vo, cloth. 8s. net.

WYSOR (HENRY, B.S., Assistant Professor of Analytical Chemistry, Lafayette College). Metallurgy. A Condensed Treatise. Demy 8vo, cloth. 12s. 6d. net.

YOUNGHUSBAND (Col. Sir FRANCIS E.), K.C.I.E. Within: Thoughts during Convalescence. 3s. 6d. net.

COMPLETE LIST OF LIBRARIES & SERIES ARRANGED IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER.

ARMY SERIES OF FRENCH AND GERMAN NOVELS.

Edited, with short Notes, by J. T. W. Perowne, M.A.

This series is equally well adapted for general reading, and for those preparing for the Army, Oxford and Cambridge Certificates, and other Examinations—in fact, for all who wish to keep up or improve their French and German. The notes are as concise as possible, with an occasional etymology or illustration to assist the memory. The books selected being by recent or living authors, are adapted for the study of most modern French and German.

Le Coup de Pistolet, etc. Prosper Merimée. 2s. 6d.

Vaillante. Jacques Vincent. 2s. 6d.

Auf Verlornem Posten and Nazzarena Danti. Johannes v. Dewall. 3s.

Contes Militaires. A. Daudet. 2s. 6d.

Erzählungen. E. Höfer. 3s.

CROWN THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY.

The only undertaking of its kind in the English language; each writer is at liberty to express his deepest convictions with absolute freedom—a freedom which is the only ultimate security of truth.

Vol. I.—**Babel and Bible.** By Dr Friedrich Delitzsch. 4s. 6d. net.

Vol. II.—**The Virgin Birth of Christ.** An Historical and Critical Essay. By Paul Lobstein. 2s. 6d. net.

Vol. III.—**My Struggle for Light.** Confessions of a Preacher. By R. Wimmer. 3s. net.

Vol. IV.—**Liberal Christianity.** Its Origin, Nature, and Mission. By Jean Réville. 3s. 6d. net.

Vol. V.—**What is Christianity?** By Adolf Harnack. 4s. 6d. net.

Vol. VI.—**Faith and Morals.** By W. Herrmann. 4s. 6d. net.

Vol. VII.—**Early Hebrew Story.** A Study of the Origin, the Value, and the Historical Background of the Legends of Israel. By John P. Peters, D.D. 4s. 6d. net.

Vol. VIII.—**Bible Problems and the New Material for their Solution.** By Prof. T. K. Cheyne, D.Litt., D.D. 4s. 6d. net.

Vol. IX.—**The Doctrine of the Atonement and its Historical Evolution,** and **Religion and Modern Culture.** By the late Auguste Sabatier. 4s. net.

Vol. X.—**The Early Christian Conception of Christ.** Its Significance and Value in the History of Religion. By Otto Pfleiderer. 3s. net.

Vol. XI.—**The Child and Religion.** Eleven Essays by Various Writers. 5s. net.

Vol. XII.—**The Evolution of Religion.** An Anthropological Study. By L. R. Farnell, M.A., D.Litt. 4s. 6d. net.

Vol. XIII.—**The Books of the New Testament.** By Baron Hermann von Soden, D.D. 4s. 6d. net.

Vol. XIV.—**Jesus.** By W. Bousset. 3s. 6d. net.

Vol. XV.—**The Communion of the Christian with God.** By W. Herrmann. Revised and much enlarged edition. 4s. 6d. net.

Vol. XVI.—**Hebrew Religion.** To the Establishment of Judaism under Ezra. By W. E. Addis, M.A. 4s. 6d. net.

Vol. XVII.—**Naturalism and Religion.** By Rudolf Otto. 5s. net.

Vol. XVIII.—**Essays on the Social Gospel.** By Dr Adolf Harnack and Dr Herrmann. 4s. net.

Vol. XIX.—**The Religion of the Old Testament.** By Karl Marti. 4s. net.

Vol. XX.—**Luke the Physician.** Being Volume One of Dr Adolf Harnack's New Testament Studies. 5s. net.

Vol. XXI.—**The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ.** By Prof. Kirsopp Lake. 4s. 6d. net.

Crown Theological Library—*continued.*

Vol. XXII.—**The Apologetic of the New Testament.** By E. F. Scott. 4s. 6d. net.

Vol. XXIII.—**The Sayings of Jesus.** Being Volume Two of Dr Adolf Harnack's New Testament Studies. 5s. net.

Vol. XXIV.—**Anglican Liberalism.** By Twelve Churchmen. 4s. 6d. net.

Vol. XXV.—**The Fundamental Truths of the Christian Religion.** By Dr R. Seeberg. 4s. 6d. net.

Vol. XXVI.—**The Life of the Spirit.** An Introduction to Philosophy. By Dr Rudolf Eucken. 4s. 6d. net.

Vol. XXVII.—**The Acts of the Apostles.** Being Volume Three of Dr Adolf Harnack's New Testament Studies. 5s. net.

Vol. XXVIII.—**Monasticism and the Confessions of St Augustine.** By Dr Adolf Harnack. 3s. 6d. net.

Vol. XXIX.—**Modernity and the Churches.** By Prof. Percy Gardner. 4s. 6d. net.

Vol. XXX.—**The Old Egyptian Faith.** By Prof. Edouard Naville. Illustrated. 4s. 6d. net.

Vol. XXXI.—**The Constitution and Law of the Church in the First Two Centuries.** By Dr Adolf Harnack. 5s. net.

Vol. XXXII.—**The Scientific Study of the Old Testament.** Illustrated. By Dr Rudolf Kittel. 5s. net.

Vol. XXXIII.—**The Date of the Acts and of the Synoptic Gospels.** Being Volume Four of Dr Adolf Harnack's New Testament Studies. Cloth. 5s. net.

Vol. XXXIV.—**The Religious Experience of St Paul.** By Prof. Percy Gardner. 5s. net.

Vol. XXXV.—**Pharisaism: Its Aims and its Methods.** By R. Travers Herford, B.A. Cloth. 5s. net.

Vol. XXXVI.—**Bible Reading in the Early Church.** Being Volume Five of Dr Adolf Harnack's New Testament Studies. Cloth. 5s. net.

Vol. XXXVII.—**Protestantism and Progress.** By Prof. Ernest Troeltsch of Jena. Cloth. 3s. 6d. net.

Descriptive Prospectus on Application.

THE HIBBERT LECTURES.

Library Edition, demy 8vo. 10s. 6d. per volume.
Cheap Popular Edition, 3s. 6d. per volume.

Alviella (Count Goblet D'). **Lectures on the Origin and the Growth of the Conception of God, as illustrated by Anthropology and History.** Translated by the Rev. P. H. Wicksteed. (Hibbert Lectures, 1891.) Cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

Beard (Rev. Dr C.). **Lectures on the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century in its Relation to Modern Thought and Knowledge.** (Hibbert Lectures, 1883.) 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

The Hibbert Lectures—*continued.*

Davids (T. W. Rhys). Lectures on Some Points in the History of Indian Buddhism. (Hibbert Lectures, 1881.) 2nd Edition. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

Drummond (Dr). Via, Veritas, Vita. Lectures on Christianity in its most Simple and Intelligible Form. (The Hibbert Lectures, 1894.) 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

Hatch (Rev. Dr). Lectures on the Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church. Ed. by Dr Fairbairn. (Hibbert Lectures, 1888.) 3rd Ed. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

Kuenen (Dr A.). Lectures on National Religions and Universal Religion. (The Hibbert Lectures, 1882.) 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

Montefiore (C. G.). Origin and Growth of Religion as Illustrated by the Religion of the Ancient Hebrews. (The Hibbert Lectures, 1892.) 2nd Edition. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

Pfleiderer (Dr O.). Lectures on the Influence of the Apostle Paul on the Development of Christianity. Translated by the Rev. J. Frederick Smith. (Hibbert Lectures, 1885.) 2nd Edition. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

Renan (E.). On the Influence of the Institutions, Thoughts and Culture of Rome on Christianity, and the Development of the Catholic Church. Translated by the Rev. Charles Beard. (Hibbert Lectures, 1880.) 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3rd Edition, 3s. 6d.

Renouf (P. Le Page). On the Religion of Ancient Egypt. (Hibbert Lectures, 1879.) 3rd Edition. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

Rhys (Prof. J.). On the Origin and Growth of Religion as Illustrated by Celtic Heathendom. (Hibbert Lectures, 1886.) 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

Réville (Dr A.). On the Native Religions of Mexico and Peru. Translated by the Rev. P. H. Wicksteed. (Hibbert Lectures, 1884.) 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

Sayce (Prof. A. H.). On the Religion of Ancient Assyria and Babylonia. 4th Edition. (Hibbert Lectures, 1887.) 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

Upton (Rev. C. B.). On the Bases of Religious Belief. (Hibbert Lectures, 1893.) Demy 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d.

Second Series.

Farnell (L. R., D.Litt., Wilde Lecturer in the University of Oxford). The Higher Aspects of Greek Religion. Lectures delivered in Oxford and London in 1911. Demy 8vo, cloth. 6s. net.

HOME UNIVERSITY LIBRARY OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE.

Editors: Prof. Gilbert Murray, D.Litt., LL.D., F.B.A., Herbert Fisher, M.A., F.B.A., LL.D., Professor J. Arthur Thomson, LL.D., and Professor Wm. T. Brewster. Each volume is written by an expert of the very first rank, and consists of 256 pages. Issued bound in cloth at 1s. net, or beautifully bound in leather, levant morocco grain, 2s. 6d. net.

Sixty Volumes Now Ready.

1. **Parliament.** Sir C. P. Ilbert, K.C.B.
2. **Shakespeare.** John Masefield.
3. **French Revolution.** (With Maps.) Hilaire Belloc, M.A.
4. **History of War and Peace.** G. H. Perris.
5. **Stock Exchange.** F. W. Hirst, M.A.
6. **Irish Nationality.** Mrs J. R. Green.
7. **Modern Geography.** (Illustrated.) Dr M. Newbigin.
8. **Polar Exploration.** (With Maps.) Dr W. S. Bruce.
9. **Evolution of Plants.** (Fully Illustrated.) Dr D. H. Scott, F.R.S.
10. **Socialist Movement.** J. Ramsay MacDonald, M.P.
11. **Conservatism.** Lord Hugh Cecil, M.A., M.P.
12. **Opening Up of Africa.** (With Maps.) Sir H. H. Johnston, G.C.M.G.
13. **Mediæval Europe.** (With Maps.) H. W. C. Davis, M.A.
14. **The Papacy and Modern Times.** Rev. Dr W. Barry.
15. **Mohammedanism.** Prof. D. S. Margoliouth.
16. **The Science of Wealth.** J. A. Hobson, M.A.
17. **Health and Disease.** Dr W. L. Mackenzie.
18. **Introduction to Mathematics.** (With Diagrams.) A. N. Whitehead, Sc.D., F.R.S. [F. W. Gamble.
19. **The Animal World.** (With many Illustrations.) Prof.
20. **Evolution.** Prof. J. A. Thomson and Prof. P. Geddes.
21. **Liberalism.** Prof. L. T. Hobhouse.
22. **Crime and Insanity.** Dr C. A. Mercier.
23. **History of our Time, 1885-1911.** G. P. Gooch, M.A.
24. **The Evolution of Industry.** Prof. D. H. MacGregor.
25. **The Civilisation of China.** Prof. H. A. Giles, LL.D.
26. **Agriculture.** Prof. W. Somerville, D.Sc.
27. **English Literature: Modern.** George Mair, M.A.
28. **Psychical Research.** Sir W. F. Barrett, F.R.S.
29. **The Dawn of History.** Prof. J. L. Myres.
30. **Elements of English Law.** Prof. W. M. Geldart, B.C.L.
31. **Astronomy.** A. R. Hinks, M.A. [M.A.
32. **The Introduction to Science.** Prof. J. Arthur Thomson,
33. **The History of England:** A Study in Political Evolution. Prof. A. F. Pollard.
34. **Canada.** A. G. Bradley.
35. **Landmarks in French Literature.** G. L. Strachey.
36. **Climate and Weather.** (With Diagrams.) Prof. H. N. Dickson, D.Sc.

Home University Library of Modern Knowledge—*continued.*

37. **Peoples and Problems of India.** Sir T. W. Holderness, K.C.S.I. [Prof. J. J. Findlay.
38. **The School.** An Introduction to the Study of Education.
39. **Architecture.** (Over 40 Illustrations.) Prof. W. R. Lethaby.
40. **Problems of Philosophy.** The Hon. Bertrand Russell
41. **Anthropology.** R. R. Marett, M.A. [F.R.S.
42. **Rome.** W. Warde-Fowler, M.A.
43. **English Literature: Mediæval.** Prof. W. P. Ker.
44. **Principles of Physiology.** Prof. J. G. M'Kendrick.
45. **The English Language.** J. Pearsall Smith, M.A.
46. **Matter and Energy.** F. Soddy, F.R.S.
47. **Buddhism.** Mrs Rhys Davids.
48. **The American Civil War.** (Maps.) Prof. F. L. Paxson.
49. **Psychology.** The Study of Behaviour. Prof. W. McDougall. [W. B. Selbie.
50. **Nonconformity,** Its Origin and Progress. Principal
51. **Warfare in England.** (With Maps.) Hilaire Belloc, M.A.
52. **Great Writers of America.** Profs. W. P. Trent and J. Erskine. [Prof. J. W. Gregory, F.R.S.
53. **The Making of the Earth.** (With 38 Maps and Figures.)
54. **Ethics.** G. E. Moore, M.A.
55. **Master Mariners.** J. R. Spears. [LL.D., D.D.
56. **Making of the New Testament.** Prof. B. W. Bacon,
57. **The Human Body** (Illustrated). Prof. Arthur Keith, M.D., F.R.C.S. [M.I.E.E.
58. **Electricity** (Illustrated). Dr Gisbert Kapp, D.Eng.,
59. **Political Economy.** Prof. S. J. Chapman, M.A.
60. **Missions:** Their Rise and Development Mrs Creighton.
61. **Napoleon.** (Maps.) Herbert Fisher, M.A., F.B.A.
62. **The Origin and Nature of Life.** Prof. Benjamin Moore.
63. **Painters and Painting.** (Illustrated.) Sir Frederick Wedmore.
64. **Dr Johnson and his Circle.** John Bailey, M.A.
65. **The Literature of Germany.** Prof. J. G. Robertson, M.A., Ph.D.
66. **The Navy and Sea Power.** David Hannay.
67. **Chemistry.** Prof. Raphael Meldola, D.Sc., LL.D.
68. **Comparative Religion.** Prof. J. Estlin Carpenter, LL.D.
69. **The Newspaper.** (Illustrated.) G. Binney Dibblee.
70. **The Victorian Age in Literature.** G. K. Chesterton.
71. **Germany of To-day.** By Charles Tower.
72. **Plant Life** (Illustrated). By Prof. J. B. Farmer, F.R.S.
73. **The Writing of English.** By Prof. W. T. Brewster.
74. **A History of Freedom of Thought.** By Prof. J. B. Bury, Litt.D.
75. **Ancient Art and Ritual.** By Jane Harrison, LL.D., D.Litt.

A Detailed List, containing Particulars of more than One Hundred Volumes, to be had upon application.

LIVERPOOL MARINE BIOLOGY COMMITTEE. MEMOIRS ON TYPICAL BRITISH MARINE PLANTS AND ANIMALS. Edited by W. A. Herdman, D.Sc., F.R.S. All demy 8vo, stiff boards.

1. **Ascidia.** By W. A. Herdman. With 5 Plates. 2s. net.
2. **Cardium.** By J. Johnstone, Fisheries Assistant, University College, Liverpool. With 7 Plates. 2s. 6d. net.
3. **Echinus.** By Herbert Clifton Chadwick, Curator of the Port Erin Biological Station. With 5 Plates. 2s. net.
4. **Codium.** By R. J. Harvey Gibson, M.A., F.L.S., Professor of Botany in University College, Liverpool, and Helen P. Auld, B.Sc. With 3 Plates. 1s. 6d. net.
5. **Alcyonium.** By Sydney J. Hickson, M.A., D.Sc., F.R.S., Beyer Professor of Zoology in Owens College, Manchester. With 3 Plates. 1s. 6d. net.
6. **Lepeophtheirus and Lernea.** By Andrew Scott, Resident Fisheries Assistant at the Peel Hatchery. With 5 Plates. 2s. net.
7. **Lineus.** By R. C. Punnett, B.A. With 4 Plates. 2s. net.
8. **Pleuronectes.** By Frank J. Cole, Jesus College, Oxford Lecturer in the Victoria University, Demonstrator of Zoology, University, Liverpool, and James Johnstone, B.Sc. Lond., Fisheries Assistant, University, Liverpool. With 11 Plates. 7s. net.
9. **Chondrus.** By Otto V. Darbishire, Owens College, Manchester. With 7 Plates. 2s. 6d. net.
10. **Patella (the Common Limpet).** By J. R. Ainsworth Davis, M.A., Professor of Zoology in the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, and H. J. Fleure, B.Sc., Fellow of the University of Wales. With 4 Plates. 2s 6d. net.
11. **Arenicola (the Lug-Worm).** By J. H. Ashworth, D.Sc., Lecturer in Invertebrate Zoology in the University of Edinburgh. With 8 Plates. 4s. 6d. net.
12. **Gammarus.** By Margaret Cussans, B.Sc., Zoological Department, University of Liverpool. With 4 Plates. 2s. net.
13. **Anurida.** By A. D. Imms, B.Sc.(Lond.). With 7 Plates. 4s. net.
14. **Ligia.** By C. Gordon Hewitt, B.Sc., Demonstrator in Zoology, University of Manchester. With 4 Plates. 2s. net.
15. **Antedon.** By Herbert Clifton Chadwick. With 7 Plates. 2s. 6d. net.
16. **Cancer.** By Joseph Pearson, M.Sc., Demonstrator in Zoology, University of Liverpool. With 13 Plates. 6s. 6d. net.
17. **Pecton.** By W. J. Dakin, M.Sc. With 9 Plates. 4s. 6d. net.
18. **Eledone.** By Annie Isgrove, M.Sc. With 10 Plates. 4s. 6d. net.
19. **Polychaet Larvae.** By F. H. Gravely, M.Sc. With 4 Plates. 2s. 6d. net.

TEXT AND TRANSLATION SOCIETY. Established for the purpose of editing and translating Oriental Texts chiefly preserved in the British Museum.

The Sixth Book of the Select Letters of Severus, Patriarch of Antioch, in the Syriac Version of Athanasius of Nisibis. Edited and translated by E. W. Brooks, M.A. Vol. I. Text, Parts I. and II. Vol. II. Translation, Parts I. and II. 84s. net.

The Canons of Athanasius of Alexandria, in Arabic, Ethiopic, and Coptic. Edited and translated by Prof. W. Riedel (Griefswald) and W. E. Crum. 21s. net.

A Rabbinic Commentary on the Book of Job, contained in a unique MS. at Cambridge. Edited, with Translation and Commentary, by W. Aldis Wright, LL.D. 21s. net.

An Ancient Armenian Version of the Apocalypse of St John; also **The Armenian Texts of Cyril of Alexandria, Scholia de Incarnatione** and **Epistle to Theodosius upon Easter,** the former incompletely preserved in Greek, the latter unknown in Greek or Latin. All edited, with English versions, etc., by F. C. Conybeare, formerly Fellow of University College, Oxford.

Remnants of the Later Syriac Versions of the Bible. Part I. (Sixth Century). The Four Minor Catholic Epistles. Reconstructed Text, with Apparatus Criticus. Part II. (Seventh Century). Extracts, hitherto unedited, from the Syro-Hexaplar Text of Chronicles, Nehemiah, etc. All edited, with Greek versions, etc., by John Gwynn, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity, Dublin. 21s. net.

Coptic Texts on St Theodore the General, St Theodore the Eastern, Chamoul and Justus. Edited and Translated by E. O. Winstedt, late Senior Demy of Magdalen College, Oxford. 21s. net.

The Refutation of Mani, Marcion, and Bardaisan of St Ephraim. Edited by the Rev. C. W. Mitchell. 21s. net.

Euphemia and the Goth. With the Acts of Martyrdom of the Confessors of Edessa. Edited and examined by Prof. F. C. Burkitt. 21s. net.

THEOLOGICAL TRANSLATION LIBRARY.

New Series. A Series of Translations by which the best results of recent Theological Investigations on the Continent, conducted without reference to doctrinal considerations, and with the sole purpose of arriving at the truth, are placed within reach of English readers.

Vols. I. and V.—**The Apostolic Age.** By Prof. Carl von Weizsäcker. Translated by James Millar, B.D. 2 vols. 10s. 6d. each.

Vols. II., VII., VIII., IX., X., XI., XII.—**A History of Dogma.** By Adolf Harnack, Berlin. Translated from the Third German Edition. Edited by the late Rev. Prof. A. B. Bruce, D.D. 7 vols. 10s. 6d. each.

Theological Translation Library—*continued.*

Vols. III. and VI.—**A History of the Hebrews.** By R. Kittel, Ordinary Professor of Theology in the University of Breslau. 10s. 6d. per volume.

Vol. IV.—**The Communion of the Christian with God:** A Discussion in Agreement with the View of Luther. By W. Herrmann, Dr Theol., Professor of Dogmatic Theology in the University of Marburg. 10s. 6d. net.

Vol. XIII.—**An Introduction to the Textual Criticism of the Greek New Testament.** By Prof. Eberhard Nestle, of Maulbronn. Cloth, 10s. 6d.; half-leather, 12s. 6d.

Vols. XV. and XVII.—**The Beginnings of Christianity.** By Paul Wernle, Professor Extraordinary of Modern Church History at the University of Basel. Vol. I. The Rise of the Religion. Vol. II. The Development of the Church. 10s. 6d. per volume.

Vol. XVI.—**The Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit.** By the late Auguste Sabatier. 10s. 6d.

Vol. XVIII.—**Christian Life in the Primitive Church.** By Ernst von Dobschütz, D.D., Professor of New Testament Theology in the University of Strassburg. 10s. 6d.

Vols. XIX. and XX.—**The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries.** By Adolf Harnack, Berlin. Second, revised and much enlarged edition, 25s. net. Vols. not sold separately.

Vol. XXI.—**St Paul:** The Man and his Work. By Prof. H. Weinel, of the University of Jena. 10s. 6d.

Vols. XXII., XXVI., XXVII., and XXXI.—**Primitive Christianity:** Its Writings and Teachings in their Historical Connections. By Otto Pfleiderer, Professor of Practical Theology in the University of Berlin. 4 vols. 10s. 6d. each net.

Vol. XXIII.—**The Introduction to the Canonical Books of the Old Testament.** By Carl Cornill, Professor of Old Testament Theology at the University of Breslau. 10s. 6d. net.

Vol. XXIV.—**History of the Church.** By Hans von Schubert, Professor of Church History at Kiel. 10s. 6d. net.

Vol. XXV.—**Ethics of the Christian Life.** By Theodor von Haering, Professor of New Testament Dogmatics and Ethics at Tübingen. 10s. 6d. net.

Vols. XXVIII. and XXIX.—**The Old Testament in the Light of the Ancient East.** By Alfred Jeremias, Pastor of the Lutherkirche, and Lecturer at the University of Leipzig. With numerous illustrations and maps, 25s. net. Vols. not sold separately.

Vol. XXX.—**The Truth of Religion.** By Dr Rudolf Eucken, Senior Professor of Philosophy in the University of Jena. 12s. 6d. net.

Vol. XXXII.—**Religious Liberty.** By Prof. Francesco Ruffini. With a Preface to the English Edition by Prof. J. B. Bury of Cambridge. Demy 8vo, cloth. 12s. 6d. net.

THEOLOGICAL TRANSLATION FUND LIBRARY.

Old Series. Uniform Price per Volume, 6s.

Baur (F. C.). Church History of the First Three Centuries. Translated from the Third German Edition. Edited by Rev. Allan Menzies. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 12s.

—— **Paul, the Apostle of Jesus Christ, His Life and Work,** His Epistles and Doctrine. A Contribution to a Critical History of Primitive Christianity. Edited by Rev. Allan Menzies. 2nd Edition. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 12s.

Ewald's (Dr H.) Commentary on the Prophets of the Old Testament. Translated by the Rev. J. F. Smith. 5 vols. 8vo, cloth. 30s.

—— **Commentary on the Psalms.** Translated by the Rev. E. Johnson, M.A. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 12s.

—— **Commentary on the Book of Job,** with Translation. Translated from the German by the Rev. J. Frederick Smith. 8vo, cloth. 6s.

Hausrath (Prof. A.). History of the New Testament Times. The Time of Jesus. Translated by the Revs. C. T. Poynting and P. Quenzer. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 12s.

Keim's History of Jesus of Nazara: Considered in its connection with the National Life of Israel, and related in detail. Translated from the German by Arthur Ransom and the Rev. E. M. Geldart. Complete in 6 vols. 8vo. 36s. (Vol. I. only to be had when a complete set of the work is ordered.)

Kuenen (Dr A.). The Religion of Israel to the Fall of the Jewish State. Translated from the Dutch by A. H. May. 3 vols. 8vo, cloth. 18s.

Pfleiderer (O.). Paulinism: A Contribution to the History of Primitive Christian Theology. Translated by E. Peters. 2nd Edition. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 12s.

—— **Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of its History.** Translated by Prof. Allan Menzies and the Rev. Alex. Stewart. 4 vols. 8vo, cloth. 24s. (Vol. I. out of print).

Réville (Dr A.). Prolegomena of the History of Religions. With an Introduction by Prof. F. Max Müller. 8vo, cloth. 6s.

Schrader (Prof. E.). The Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament. Translated from the Second Enlarged Edition, with Additions by the Author, and an Introduction by the Rev. Owen C. Whitehouse, M.A. 2 vols. With a Map. 8vo, cloth. 12s.

LIST OF PERIODICALS, REVIEWS, AND TRANSACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS OF LEARNED SOCIETIES published by Williams & Norgate.

The British Review. With which is incorporated the Oxford and Cambridge Review. Monthly, 1s. net. Postage inland, 3d.; abroad, 4d.

The Hibbert Journal: A Quarterly Review of Religion, Theology, and Philosophy. Single numbers, 2s. 6d. net. Subscription, 10s. per annum, post free.

List of Periodicals, Reviews, etc.—*continued.*

Journal of the Federated Malay States Museums. Issued quarterly. Single numbers, 1s. 6d. net. Subscription, 5s. per annum.

Journal of the Royal Microscopical Society, containing its Transactions and Proceedings, with other Microscopical Information. Bi-monthly. 6s. net. Yearly subscriptions, 37s. 6d., post free.

Journal of the Quekett Microscopical Club. Issued half-yearly, April and November. Price 3s. 6d. net. 7s. 6d. per annum, post free.

Linnean Society of London. Journal of Botany and Journal of Zoology. Published irregularly at various prices. Also Transactions, published irregularly.

Royal Society of Edinburgh. Transactions. Issued irregularly at various prices.

Liverpool Marine Biology Committee. Memoirs. I.–XIX. already published at various prices. Fauna of Liverpool Bay. Fifth Report, written by Members of the Committee and other Naturalists. Cloth. 8s. 6d. net. *See* p. 39.

Publications de l'Institut Nobel Norvégien. Vol. I. L'Arbitrage International chez les Hellènes. Par A. Raedar. 4to. 10s. net. Vol. II. Les Bases Economiques de la Justice Internationale. By Achille Loria. 3s. 6d. net.

Royal Irish Academy. Transactions and Proceedings issued irregularly; prices vary. Cunningham Memoirs. Vols. I.–XI. already issued at various prices. *See* p. 31.

Royal Dublin Society. Transactions and Proceedings. Issued irregularly at various prices.

INDEX OF TITLES.

Acts of the Apostles. Adolf Harnack, 11.
Acts, The Date of the. Adolf Harnack, 11.
Aeroplane, How to Build. Robert Petit, 23.
Africa, The Opening Up of. Sir H. H. Johnston, 14.
Agricultural Chemical Analysis. Wiley, 32.
Agriculture. Prof. W. Somerville, 28.
Alchemy of Thought, and other Essays. Prof. L. P. Jacks., 14.
Alcyonium. *Vide* L.M.B.C. Memoirs, 39.
America, Great Writers of. Trent and Erskine, 7, 31.
American Civil War, The. Prof. F. L. Paxson, 20.
Americans, The. Hugo Münsterberg, 21.
Among the Idolmakers. Prof. L. P. Jacks, 13.
Analysis of Ores. F. C. Phillips, 21.
Analysis, Organic. F. E. Benedict, 2.
Analytical Geometry, Elements of. — Hardy 11.
Anarchy and Law, Theories of. H. B. Brewster, 3.
Ancient Art and Ritual. Harrison, 12.
Ancient Asia Minor, Wall Map of, 16.
Ancient Assyria, Religion of. Prof. A. H. Sayce, 26.
Ancient Greece, Wall Map of, 16.
Ancient Italy, Wall Map of, 16.
Ancient Latium, Wall Map of, 16.
Ancient World, Wall Maps of the, 15.
Anglican Liberalism, 1.
Animal World, The. Prof. F. W. Gamble, 9.
Antedon. *Vide* L.M.B.C. Memoirs, 39.
Anthems. Rev. R. Crompton Jones, 14.
Anthropology. R. R. Marett, 19.
Antwerp and Brussels, Guide to, 10.
Anurida. *Vide* L.M.B.C. Memoirs, 39.
Apocalypse of St. John, 40.
Apologetic of the New Test. E. F. Scott, 27.
Apostle Paul, the, Lectures on. Otto Pfleiderer, 23.
Apostolic Age, The. Carl von Weizsäcker, 32.
Arabian Poetry, Ancient. Sir C. J. Lyall, 19.
Architecture. Prof. W. R. Lethaby, 18.
Arenicola. *Vide* L.M.B.C. Memoirs, 39.
Aristotelian Society, Proceedings of, 22.
Army Series of French and German Novels, 33.
Ascidia. Johnston, L.M.B.C. Memoirs, 39.
Assyriology, Essay on. George Evans, 8.
Astigmatic Letters. Dr Pray, 24.
Astronomy. A. R. Hinks, 13.
Athanasius of Alexandria, Canons of, 37.
Atlas Antiquus, Kiepert's, 17.
Atlas, Topographical, of the Spinal Cord. Alex. Bruce, 4.
Atonement, Doctrine of the. Auguste Sabatier, 25.
Auf Verlornem Posten. Dewall, 33.
Avesti, Pahlavi. Persian Studies, 1.

Babel and Bible. Friedrich Delitzsch, 6.
Bacon, Roger. "Opus Majus" of, 2.
Basis of Religious Belief. C. B. Upton, 31.
Beet-Sugar Making. Nikaido, 21.
Beginnings of Christianity. Paul Wernle, 32.
Belgium, Practical Guide to, 10.
Belgium Watering Places, Guide to, 10.
Bergson's Philosophy. Balsillie, 2; Le Roy, 18.
Bible. Translated by Samuel Sharpe, 3.
Bible, a Short Introduction to, Sadler, 23; Bible Problems, Prof. T. K. Cheyne, 5; How to teach the, Rev. A. F. Mitchell, 20; Remnants of Later Syriac Versions of, 37.
Bible Reading in the Early Church. Adolf Harnack, 11.
Biblical Hebrew, Introduction to. Rev. Jas. Kennedy, 16.
Biology, Principles of. Herbert Spencer, 28.
Blaise Pascal. Humfrey R. Jordan, 15.
Book of Prayer. Crompton Jones, 15.
Books of the New Testament. Von Soden, 27.
Britain, B.C. Henry Sharpe, 27.
British Fisheries. J. Johnstone, 14.
Brussels and Antwerp, Guide to, 10.
Buddhism. Mrs Rhys Davids, 6.

Calculus, Differential and Integral. Axel Harnack, 12.

Canada. A. G. Bradley, 3.
Cancer. *Vide* L.M.B.C. Memoirs, 37.
Cancer and other Tumours. Chas. Creighton, 5.
Canonical Books of the Old Testament. Cornill, 5.
Cape Dutch. J. F. Van Oordt, 22.
Cape Dutch, Werner's Elementary Lessons in, 32.
Capri and Naples, Guide to, 10.
Captain Cartwright and his Labrador Journal, 4.
Cardium. *Vide* L.M.B.C. Memoirs, 39.
Catalogue of the London Library, 17.
Celtic Heathendom. Prof. J. Rhys, 25.
Channing's Complete Works, 4.
Chants and Anthems, 15; Chants, Psalms, and Canticles. Crompton Jones, 15.
Character and Life, 4.
Chemical Dynamics, Studies in. J. H. Van't Hoff, 13.
Chemistry. Prof. Meldola, 20.
Chemistry, Elementary. Emery, 7.
Chemistry for Beginners. Edward Hart, 11.
Chemist's Pocket Manual, 20.
Child and Religion, The, 5.
China, The Civilisation of. Prof. H. A. Giles, 9.
Chinese. Descriptive Sociology. Werner, 27.
Chondrus. *Vide* L.M.B.C. Memoirs, 39.
Christian Life, Ethics of the. Chas. F. Dole, 10.
Christian Life in the Primitive Church. Dobschütz, 7.
Christian Religion, Fundamental Truths of the. R. Seeberg, 25.
Christianity, Beginnings of. Paul Wernle, 32.
Christianity in Talmud and Midrash. R. Travers Herford, 12.
Christianity? What is. Adolf Harnack, 11.
Chromium, Production of. Max Leblanc, 18.
Church History. Baur, 2; Schubert, 24.
Civilisation of China. H. A. Giles, 9.
Climate and Weather. H. N. Dickson, 6.
Closet Prayers. Dr. Sadler, 23.
Codium. *Vide* L.M.B.C. Memoirs, 39.
Collected Writings of Seger, 27.
Colonial Period, The. C. M. Andrews, 1.
Coming Church. Dr John Hunter, 14.
Commentary on the Book of Job, Ewald, 7; Wright and Hirsch, 30; Commentary on the Old Testament. Ewald, 7; Commentary on the Psalms. Ewald, 7.
Common-Sense Dietetics. C. Louis Leipoldt, 18.
Communion with God. Wilhelm Herrmann, 12.
Comparative Religion. Princ. J. E. Carpenter, 4.
Conception of God. Alviella, 1.
Concrete, Reinforced. Colby, 5.
Conductivity of Liquids. Tower, 30.
Confessions of St Augustine. Adolf Harnack, 11.
Conservatism. Lord Hugh Cecil, 4.
Constitution and Law of the Church, Adolf Harnack, 11.
Contes Militaires. A. Daudet, 33.
Copenhagen and Norway, Guide to, 10.
Coptic Texts on St. Theodore. E. O. Winstedt, 32.
Crime and Insanity. Dr. C. A. Mercier, 20.
Crown Theological Library, 34.
Cuneiform Inscriptions, The. Prof. E. Schrader, 26.

Date, The, of the Acts and of the Synoptic Gospels. Harnack, 11.
Dawn of History, The. Prof. J. L. Myres, 21.
Delectus Veterum. Theodor Nöldeke, 20.
Democracy and Character. Canon Stephen, 29.
Democracy, Socialism and, in Europe. Samuel P. Orth, 22.
De Profundis Clamavi. Dr John Hunter, 14.
Descriptive Sociology. Herbert Spencer, 26.
Development of the Periodic Law. Venable, 31.
Differential and Integral Calculus, The. Axel Harnack, 11.
Dipavamsa, The. Edited by Oldenberg, 6.
Doctrine of the Atonement. A. Sabatier, 25.
Dogma, History of. Adolf Harnack, 11.
Dolomites, The, Practical Guide to, 10.
Dresden and Environs, Guide to, 10.

Early Hebrew Story. John P. Peters, 23.
Early Christian Conception. Otto Pfleiderer, 23.
Echinus. *Vide* L.M.B.C. Memoirs, 36.
Education. Herbert Spencer, 28.
Education and Ethics. Emile Boutroux, 3.
Egyptian Faith, The Old. Edouard Naville, 21.
Egyptian Grammar, Erman's, 7.
Eighth Year, The. Philip Gibbs, 9.
Electric Furnace. H. Moisson, 20.
Electricity. Prof. Gisbert Kapp, 15.
Electrolysis of Water. V. Engelhardt, 7.
Electrolytic Laboratories. Nissenson, 22.
Eledone. *Vide* L.M B.C. Memoirs, 39.
Elementary Chemistry. Emery, 6.

Elementary Organic Analysis. F. E. Benedict, 2.
Elements of English Law. W. M. Geldart, 9.
Engineering Chemistry. T. B. Stillman, 30.
England and Germany, 6.
English Language. L. P. Smith, 27.
English Literature, Mediæval. W. P. Ker, 16.
English Literature, Modern. G. H. Mair, 19.
Enoch, Book of, C. Gill, 9.
Ephesian Canonical Writings. Rt. Rev. A. V. Green, 9.
Epitome of Synthetic Philosophy. F. H. Collins, 4.
Erzählungen. Höfer, 33.
Essays on the Social Gospel. Harnack and Herrmann, 11.
Essays. Herbert Spencer, 29.
Ethica. Prof. Simon Laurie, 17.
Ethics, Data of. Herbert Spencer, 28.
Ethics, Education and. Emile Boutroux, 3.
Ethics. G. E. Moore, 21.
Ethics, Principles of. Herbert Spencer, 28.
Ethics of the Christian Life. Prof. T. Haering, 10.
Ethics of Progress, The. Chas. F. Dole, 6.
Ethiopic Grammar. A. Dillmann, 6.
Eucken's Philosophy, An Interpretation of. W. Tudor Jones, 15.
Euphemia and the Goth. Prof. F. C. Burkitt, 4, 40.
Europe, Mediæval. H. W. C. Davis, 6.
Evolution. Thomson and Geddes, 30.
Evolution of Industry. Prof. D. H. Macgregor, 19.
Evolution of Plants. Dr. D. H. Scott, 26.
Evolution of Religion, The. L. R. Farnell, 7.
Exploration, Polar. Dr W. S. Bruce, 4.

Facts and Comments. Herbert Spencer, 29.
Faith and Morals. W. Herrmann, 11.
Fertilisers. Soil Fertility and. Halligan, 10.
First Principles. Herbert Spencer, 28.
First Three Gospels in Greek. Rev. Canon Colin Campbell, 3.
Flower of Gloster, The. E. Temple Thurston, 30.
Four Gospels as Historical Records, 9.
Free Catholic Church. Rev. J. M. Thomas, 30.
Freedom of Thought. Bury, 4.
Freezing Point, The. Jones, 13.
French Composition. Jas. Boïelle, 3.
French History, First Steps in. F. F. Roget, 23.
French Language, Grammar of. Eugène, 7.
French Literature, Landmarks in. G. L. Strachey, 30.
French Reader. Leon Delbos, 6.
French Revolution, The. Hilaire Belloc, 2.
Fundamental Truths of the Christian Religion. R. Seeberg, 27.

Gammarus. *Vide* L.M.B.C. Memoirs, 37.
Gaul, Wall Map of, 16.
General Language of the Incas of Peru. Sir Clements Markham, 19.
Genesis, Book of, in Hebrew Text. Rev. C. H. H. Wright, 28.
Genesis and Evolution of the Soul. J. O. Bevan, 2.
Genesis, Hebrew Text, 11.
Geography, Modern. Dr M. Newbigin, 21.
Geometry, Analytical, Elements of. Hardy, 11.
German History, Noble Pages from. F. J. Gould, 10.
German Idioms, Short Guide to. T. H. Weisse, 30.
German Literature, A Short Sketch of. V. Phillipps, B.A., 23.
Germany, England and, 6.
Germany of To-day. Tower, 30.
Germany, The Literature of. Prof. J. G. Robertson, 25.
Glimpses of Tennyson. A. G. Weld, 32.
God and Life. Dr John Hunter, 14.
Gospel of Rightness. C. E. Woods, 33.
Gospels in Greek, First Three. Rev. Colin Campbell, 4.
Grammar, Egyptian. Erman, 7.
Grammar, Ethiopic. A. Dillman, 6.
Greek-English Dictionary, Modern, 17.
Greek Ideas, Lectures on. Rev. Dr. Hatch, 11.
Greek, New Testament. Prof. Edouard Nestle, 19.
Greek Religion, Higher Aspects of. L. R. Farnell, 8.
Greeks: Hellenic Era, 27.
Grieben's English Guides, 9.
Gulistan, The (Rose Garden), of Shaik Sadi of Shiraz, 23.
Gymnastics, Medical Indoor. Dr Schreber. 24.

Harnack and his Oxford Critics. T. B. Saunders, 26.
Health and Disease. Dr W. L. Mackenzie, 19.
Hebrew, New School of Poets, 20.
Hebrew Religion. W. E. Addis, 1.
Hebrew Story. John P. Peters, 23.
Hebrew Synonyms, Studies in. Rev. J. Kennedy, 16.
Hebrew Texts, 12.
Hellenistic Greeks. Mahaffy and Goligher, 27.
Herbaceous Garden, The. Mrs A. Martineau, 20.
Heredity in Relation to Eugenics. C. B. Davenport, 6.
Hibbert Journal Supplement for 1909, entitled: Jesus or Christ? 13.
Hibbert Journal, The, 13.
Hibbert Lectures, 35.
Highways and Byways in Literature. H. Farrie, 8.
Hindu Chemistry. Prof. P. C. Ray, 24.
Historical Evidence for the Resurrection. Kirsopp Lake, 17.
History of Dogma. Adolf Harnack, 11.
History of England. A. F. Pollard, 23.
History of Jesus of Nazara. Keim, 14.
History of Our Time. G. P. Gooch, 9.
History of Sacerdotal Celibacy. H. C. Lea, 17.
History of War and Peace. Perris, 22.
History of the Church. Hans von Schubert, 26.
History of the Hebrews. R. Kittel, 17.
History of the Literature of the O.T. E. Kautzsch, 16.
History of the New Testament Times. A. Hausrath, 11.
Holland, Practical Guide to, 10.
Home University Library of Modern Knowledge, 37.
Horse, Life-Size Models of. J. T. Share-Jones, 13; the, Surgical Anatomy of, 13.
House of Commons, The, from Within. Rt. Hon. R. Farquharson, 8.
How to Teach the Bible. Rev. A. F. Mitchell, 20.
Human Body, The. Prof. Arthur Keith, 16.
Hygiene, Handbook of. D. G. Bergey, 2.
Hymns of Duty and Faith. R. Crompton Jones, 15.
Idolmakers, Among the. Prof. L. P. Jacks, 14.
Immortality, Some Intimations of. Rt. Hon. Sir E. Fry, 9.
Incarnate Purpose, The. G. H. Percival, 21.
India, Peoples and Problems of. Sir T. W. Holderness, 13.
Indian Buddhism. Rhys Davids, 6.
Individual Soul, Genesis and Evolution of. J. O. Bevan, 2.
Individualism and Collectivism. Dr C. W. Saleeby, 26.
Indoor Gymnastics, Medical. Dr Schreber, 26.
Industrial Remuneration, Methods of. David F. Schloss, 26.
Infinitesimals and Limits. Hardy, 11.
Influence of Greek Ideas upon the Christian Church. Rev. Dr Hatch, 12.
Influence of Rome on Christianity. E. Renan, 24.
Initiation into Philosophy. Emile Faguet, 6.
Inorganic Chemistry. J. L. Howe, 14.
Inorganic Qualitative Chemical Analysis. Leavenworth, 18.
Interpretation of Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy. W. Tudor Jones, 15.
Introduction to Biblical Hebrew. Rev. J. Kennedy, 16.
Introduction to the Greek New Test. Prof. E. Nestle, 21.
Introduction to the Old Test. Prof. Carl Cornill, 5, 39.
Introduction to the Preparation of Organic Compounds. Emil Fischer, 8.
Introduction to Science. Prof. J. A. Thomson, 30.
Irish Nationality. Mrs J. R. Green, 10.
Isaiah, Hebrew Text, 11.

Jesus. Wilhelm Bousset, 3.
Jesus of Nazara. Keim, 16.
Jesus or Christ? The Hibbert Journal Supplement for 1909, 11.
Jesus, Sayings of. Adolf Harnack, 11.
Job. Hebrew Text, 11.
Job, Book of. G. H. Bateson Wright, 30.
Job, Book of. Rabbinic Commentary on, 30.
Johnson, Dr, and His Circle. John Bailey, 13.
Journal of the Federated Malay States, 40.

Journal of the Linnean Society. Botany and Zoology, 15.
Journal of the Quekett Microscopical Club, 15.
Journal of the Royal Microscopical Society, 15.
Justice. Herbert Spencer, 29.

Kantian Ethics. J. G. Schurman, 26.
Kea, The. George R. Marriner, 19.
Kiepert's New Atlas Antiquus, 15.
Kiepert's Wall-Maps of the Ancient World, 15.
Kindergarten, The. H. Goldammer, 9.
King, The, to His People, 17.
Kingdom, The Mineral. Dr Reinhard Brauns, 3.

Laboratory Experiments. Noyes and Mulliken, 20.
Lakes of Northern Italy, Guide to, 10.
Landmarks in French Literature. G. L. Strachey, 30.
Latter Day Saints, The. Ruth and R. W. Kauffman, 15.
Law, English, Elements of. W. M. Geldart, 9.
Lays of Ancient Rome. Macaulay, 19.
Leabhar Na H-Uidhri, 41.
Le Coup de Pistolet. Merimée, 33.
Lepeophtheirus and Lernea. *Vide* L.M.B.C. Memoirs, 39.
Letter to the "Preussiche Jahrbucher." Adolf Harnack, 11.
Les Misérables. Victor Hugo, 14.
Liberal Christianity. Jean Réville, 24.
Liberalism. Prof. L. T. Hobhouse, 13.
Life and Matter. Sir O. Lodge, 18.
Life of the Spirit, The. Rudolf Eucken, 7.
Ligia. *Vide* L.M.B.C. Memoirs, 39.
Lineus. *Vide* L.M.B.C. Memoirs, 39.
Linnean Society of London, Journals of, 15.
Literature, English Mediæval. Prof. W. P. Ker, 16.
Literature, Highways and Byways in. Hugh Farrie, 8.
Literature of Germany. Prof. J. G. Robertson, 25.
Literature of the Old Testament. Kautzsch, 16.
Literature, The Victorian Age in. G. K. Chesterton, 4.
Liverpool Marine Biology Committee Memoirs, 39.
Liverpool Marine Biology Committee Memoirs, I.—XVII., 36, 37.
Logarithmic Tables. Schroen, 26.
London Library, Catalogue of, 18.
London Library Subject Index, 18.
Luke the Physician. Adolf Harnack, 11.

Mad Shepherds, and other Studies. Prof. L. P. Jacks, 14.
Mahabharata, Index to. S. Sorensen, 28.
Making a Newspaper. John L. Given, 9.
Making of the Earth. Prof. J. W. Gregory, 10.
Making of the New Testament. Prof. B. W. Bacon, 1.
Man and the Bible. J. A. Picton, 23.
Man *versus* the State. Herbert Spencer, 29.
Man's Origin, Destiny, and Duty. Hugh M'Coll, 19.
Maori, Lessons in. Right Rev. W. L. Williams, 30.
Maori, New and Complete Manual of. Williams, 30.
Marine Zoology of Okhamandal. Hornell, 14.
Massoretic Text. Rev. Dr J. Taylor, 30.
Master Mariners. J. R. Spears, 28.
Mathematics, Introduction to. A. N. Whitehead, 32.
Matter and Energy. F. Soddy, 27.
Mediæval Europe. H. W. C. Davis, 6.
Metallic Objects, Production of. Dr. W. Pfanhauser, 23.
Metallurgy. Wysor, 31.
Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta. Prof. Simon Laurie, 17.
Midrash, Christianity in. Travers Herford, 12.
Milando Panho, The. Edited by V. Trenckner, 20.
Mineral Kingdom, The. Dr R. Brauns, 3.
Mission and Expansion of Christianity. Adolf Harnack, 11.
Missions. Mrs Creighton, 5.
Modern Greek-English Dictionary. A. Kyriakides, 16.
Modern Materialism. Rev. Dr James Martineau, 18.
Modernity and the Churches. Percy Gardner, 9.
Mohammedanism. Prof. D. S. Margoliouth, 19.
Molecular Weights. Methods of Determining. Henry Biltz, 3.
Monasticism. Adolf Harnack, 11.
Moorhouse Lectures. *Vide* Mercer's Soul of Progress, 18; Stephen, Democracy and Character, 27.

Mormons, The. R. W. and Ruth Kauffman, 15.
Munich and Environs, Guide to, 10.
My Life, Some Pages of. Bishop Boyd Carpenter, 4.
My Struggle for Light. R. Wimmer, 32.
Mystery of Newman. Henri Bremond, 3.

Naples and Capri, Guide to, 10.
Napoleon. H. A. L. Fisher, 9.
National Idealism and State Church, 5; and the Book of Common Prayer, 5. Dr Stanton Coit.
National Religions and Universal Religion. Dr A. Kuenen, 33.
Native Religions of Mexico and Peru. Dr A. Réville, 24.
Naturalism and Religion. Dr Rudolf Otto, 22.
Nautical Terms. L. Delbos, 6.
Navy, The, and Sea Power. David Hannay, 11.
Nervation of Plants. Francis Heath, 12.
New Hebrew School of Poets. Edited by H. Brody and K. Albrecht, 20.
New Testament, Making of. Prof. B. W. Bacon, 1.
New Zealand Language, Dictionary of. Rt. Rev. W. L. Williams, 32.
Newman, Mystery of. Henry Bremond, 3.
Newspaper, Making a. John L. Given, 9.
Newspaper, The. G. Binney Dibblee, 6.
Nibelungenlied. Trans. W. L. Lettsom, 20.
Noble Pages from German History. F. J. Gould, 9.
Nonconformity. Its Origin, etc. Principal W. B. Selbie, 27.
North Sea Watering-Places, Guide to, 10.
Norway and Copenhagen, Practical Guide to, 10.
Norwegian Sagas translated into English, 23.
Notre Dame de Paris. Victor Hugo, 14.
Nuremberg and Rothenburg, Guide to, 10.

Old French, Introduction to. F. F. Roget, 23.
Ostend, Guide to, 10.
Old Syriac Gospels. Mrs A. Smith Lewis, 18.
Old Testament in the Light of the East. Jeremias, 14.
Old Testament, Canonical Books of. Cornill, 5.
Old Testament, Prophets of. Ewald, 8.
Old World, The, Wall Map of, 16.
Ophthalmic Test Types. Snellen's, 25.
Optical Rotating Power. Hans Landolt, 17.
"Opus Majus" of Roger Bacon, 2.
Organic Analysis. Benedict, 2.
Organic Chemistry. A. A. Noyes, 20.
Organic Compounds. Emil Fischer, 8.
Origin and Growth of Religion. C. G. Montefiore, 21.
Origin and Nature of Life. Prof. Benjamin Moore, 21.
Outlines of Church History. Von Schubert, 24.
Outlines of Psychology. Wilhelm Wundt, 31.

Pages of my Life, Some. Bishop Boyd Carpenter, 4.
Pacific, The, Problems of. Frank Fox, 9.
Painters and Painting. Sir Fredk. Wedmore, 31.
Pali, Handbook of. Dr O. Frankfürter, 35.
Pali Miscellany. V. Trenckner, 31.
Papacy and Modern Times. Rev. Dr Wm. Barry, 2.
Parliament, In and Out of. Rt. Hon. R. Farquharson, 8.
Parliament, Its History, Constitution, and Practice. Ilbert, 4.
Pascal, Blaise. H. R. Jordan, 14.
Patella. *Vide* L.M.B.C. Memoirs, 1, 39.
Paul. Baur, 2; Weinel, 32.
Paulinism. Otto Pfleiderer, 23.
Pecton. *Vide* L.M.B.C. Memoirs, 37.
Persian Empire, Wall Map of, 16.
Persian Language, A Grammar of. J. T. Platts, 23.
Personal and Family Prayers, 23.
Pharisaism. R. Travers Herford, 12.
Philo Judæus. Dr Drummond, 7.
Philosophy, a New. Edouard Le Roy, 18.
Philosophy, Initiation into. Emile Faguet, 6.
Philosophy and Experience. Hodgson, 29.
Philosophy of Religion. Otto Pfleiderer, 23.
Plant Life. Farmer, 8.
Plants, Nervation of. Francis Heath, 12.
Pleuronectes. *Vide* L.M.B.C. Memoirs, 39.
Pocket Flora of Edinburgh. C. O. Sonntag, 28.
Polar Exploration. Dr W. S. Bruce, 4.
Political Economy, Elements of. Prof. S. J. Chapman, 4.
Polychaet Larvae. *Vide* L.M.B.C. Memoirs, 39.

Portland Cement. Richard K. Meade, 20.
Prayers for Christian Worship. Sadler, 25.
Prehistoric Times. Lord Avebury, 1.
Primitive Christianity. Otto Pfleiderer, 23.
Princess, The. Alfred, Lord Tennyson, 30.
Principles of Physiology. Prof. J. G. MacKendrick, 19.
Printing at Brescia. R. A. Peddie, 22.
Prison, The. H. B. Brewster, 3.
Problems of Philosophy. Hon. Bertrand Russell, 25.
Problems of the Pacific. Frank Fox, 9.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 24.
Proceedings of the Optical Convention, 24.
Prolegomena. Dr A. Réville, 24.
Protestant Commentary on the New Testament, 8, 23.
Protestantism and Progress. Ernst Troeltsch, 31.
Psalms, Commentary on. Ewald, 8.
Psalms, Hebrew Text, 12.
Psychical Research. Sir W. F. Barrett, 2.
Psychology. Prof. W. MacDougall, 19.
Psychology, Principles of, Spencer, 28; Outlines of, Wundt, 33.
Public Schools and the Empire. Rev. Dr H. B. Gray, 10.

Qualitative Analysis, Notes on. Prof. W. P. Mason, 20.
Quest, The. Dorothea Hollins, 13.

Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte. Herbert Spencer, 29.
Recollections of a Scottish Novelist. Mrs L. B. Walford, 31.
Reconstruction and Union. Paul Leland Haworth, 12.
Reformation of the Sixteenth Century. Rev. Dr C. Beard, 2.
Refutations of Mani, Marcion, and Bardaisan. Rev. C. W. Mitchell, 20, 40.
Reinforced Concrete in Europe. Colby, 5.
Rejoinder to Prof. Weismann, 28.
Relation between Ethics and Religion. Rev. Dr James Martineau, 20.
Religion and Modern Culture. Auguste Sabatier, 25.
Religion, Comparative. Principal J. E. Carpenter, 4.
Religion, Evolution of. L. R. Farnell, 8.
Religion, Truth of. Rudolf Eucken, 7.
Religion of Ancient Egypt. Renouf, 24.
Religion of the Ancient Hebrews. C. G. Montefiore, 21.
Religion of Israel. Kuenen, 17.
Religion of the Old Testament. Marti, 19.
Religions of Ancient Babylonia and Assyria. Prof. A. H. Sayce, 26.
Religions of Authority and the Spirit. Auguste Sabatier, 25.
Religious Experience of St. Paul. Prof. P. Gardner, 9.
Religious Liberty. Professor Ruffini, 25.
Resurrection of Jesus Christ. Lake, 17; R. W. Macan, 19.
Revolution, The French. Hilaire Belloc, 2.
Rhine, The, Guide to, 10.
Ring of Pope Xystus, 5.
Riviera, The, Practical Guide to, 10.
Rock Gardens. L. B. Meredith, 20.
Roman Empire, Wall Map of, 16.
Rome. W. Warde Fowler, 9.
Rothenberg and Nuremberg, Guide to, 10.
Royal Dublin Society. Transactions and Proceedings, 30, 43.
Royal Irish Academy. Transactions and Proceeding, 31, 43.
Royal Society of Edinburgh. Transactions of, 31, 43.

Sacerdotal Celibacy. Henry Chas. Lea, 17.
Sadi. The Gulistan (Rose Garden) of Shaik Sadi of Shiraz, 25.
Sagas of Olaf Tryggvason and Harold the Tyrant, 25.
Sailors' Horn Book. H. Piddington, 23.
Sayings of Jesus, The. Adolf Harnack, 11.
School Teaching and School Reform. Sir O. Lodge, 18.
School, The. Prof. J. J. Findlay, 8.
Shakespeare. John Masefield, 20.
Science of Wealth. J. A. Hobson, 13.
Science, Matter, and Immortality. R. C. Macfie, 19.
Scientific Study of the Old Testament. R. Kittel, 17.
Seasons, The: An Anthology. H. and L. Melville, 20.
Second Year Chemistry. Edward Hart, 12.

Seeds and Fruits, Studies in. H. B. Guppy, 10.
Seger. Collected Writings, 27.
Sentimental Journey. Laurence Sterne, 29.
Seven-Figure Logarithms. L. Schroen, 26.
Severus, Patriarch of Antioch, Letters of, 27.
Short History of the Hebrew Text. T. H. Weir, 32.
Silva Gadelica. Standish H. O'Grady, 22.
Social Gospel, Essays on the, 11.
Social Idealism. R. Dimsdale Stocker, 30.
Social Statics. Herbert Spencer, 29.
Socialism and Democracy in Europe. Samuel P. Orth, 22.
Socialist Movement, The. J. R. MacDonald, 19.
Sociology, Descriptive. Herbert Spencer, 29.
Sociology, Principles of. Herbert Spencer, 28.
Sociology, Study of. Herbert Spencer, 29.
Soil, Fertility, and Fertilisers. Halligan, 10.
Soils. *Vide* Wiley's Agricultural Analysis, 32.
Soils and Fertilisers. Snyder, 27.
Soliloquies of St Augustine. Cleveland, 27.
Soul of Progress. Bishop Mercer, 20.
Spencer, Herbert, Life and Letters of. D. Duncan, 7.
Spinal Cord, Topographical Atlas of. Alex. Bruce, M.A., etc., 4.
Spirit, The Life of. Rudolf Eucken, 7.
St. Paul, The Religious Experience of. Prof. P. Gardner, 9.
Statuette, The, and the Background. H. B. Brewster, 3.
Statutes, The, of the Apostles. G. Horner, 29.
Stereochemistry, Elements of. Hantzsch, 11.
Stock Exchange, The. F. W. Hirst, 13.
Storms. H. Piddington, 23.
Studies from the Yale Psychological Laboratory. Edward W. Scripture, Ph.D., 31.
Studies in Seeds and Fruits. H. B. Guppy, 10.
Studies on Northern Mythology. Geo. Stephens, 56.
Study of the Atom. Venable, 31.
Study of the Saviour. Alex. Robinson, 24.
Subject-Index to London Library Catalogue, 54.
Super-Organic Evolution. Dr Enrique Lluria, 18.
Surgical Anatomy of the Horse. J. T. Share Jones, 46.
Switzerland, Practical Guide to, 10; Winter Sports in, 10.
Symbolic Logic. A. T. Shearman, 27.
Symbolism, Lost Language of. Harold Bayley, 2.
Synoptic Gospels, The Date of the. Adolf Harnack, 11.
Synthetic Philosophy, Epitome of. F. H. Collins, 5.
Syriac Grammar. Theodor Nöldeke, 22.
System of Synthetic Philosophy. Herbert Spencer, 31.

Talmud and Midrash, Christianity in. R. Travers Herford, 12.
Taylor, General Sir Alexander. A Memoir by his Daughter, 30.
Ten Services and Psalms and Canticles, 27.
Ten Services of Public Prayer, 27.
Tent and Testament. Herbert Rix, 25.
Testament, Old. Canonical Books of, 5; Religions of, 19; Cuneiform Inscriptions, 26; Hebrew Text, Weir, 32; Literature, 16.
Testament, The New, Critical Notes on. C. Tischendorf, 30.
Testament Times, New, 12; Acts of the Apostles, 11; Apologetic of, 26; Books of the, 27; Commentary, Protestant, 8; Luke the Physician, 11; Textual Criticism, 21.
Test Types. Pray, 24; Snellen, 27.
Text and Translation Society, Works by, 40.
Theological Translation Library, 40.
Theories of Anarchy and of Law. H. B. Brewster, 3.
Thermometer, History of the. Bolton, 3.
Tourist Guides. Grieben's, 10.
Transactions of the Royal Dublin Society, 30.
Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy 31.
Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, 31.
Truth, The, of Religion. Eucken, 7.

Unionist Policy, Rt. Hon. F. E. Smith, 27.
Universal Christ. Rev. Dr. C. Beard, 2.
Universalism Asserted. Rev. Thos. Allin, 1.
Urine Analysis, A Text-Book of. Long, 18.

Vaillante, Vincent, 33.
Various Fragments. Herbert Spencer, 29.
Veiled Figure, The, 31.
Via, Veritas, Vita. Dr. Drummond, 7.

Victorian Age in Literature. G. K. Chesterton, 11.
Virgin Birth of Christ. Paul Lobstein, 18.
Vocabularies of the General Language of the Incas of Peru. Sir Clements Markham, 19.
Vulgate, The. Rev. G. Henslow, 12.
Wall Maps of the Ancient World. Kiepert, 16.
Warfare in England. Hilaire Belloc, 2.
Was Israel ever in Egypt? G. H. B. Wright, 33.
Water, Electrolysis of. Engelhardt, 7.
Weather, Climate and. Prof. H. N. Dickson, 6.
What is Christianity? Adolf Harnack, 11.
Winter Sports in Switzerland, Guide to, 10.
Wife, The, in Ancient and Modern Times. Schuster, 26.
Within, Thoughts during Convalescence. Sir Francis Younghusband, 33.
Women's Suffrage. Helen Blackburn, 3.
World, The Old. Wall Map of, 16.
Writers, Great, of America. Profs. Trent and Erskine, 7, 31.
Writing of English. Brewster, 3.

PRINTED BY NEILL AND CO., LTD., EDINBURGH.



10196

THE INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES
59 QUEEN'S PARK CRESCENT
TORONTO — 5, CANADA

10196

SOCIALISM
AN ANALYSIS

80180 J


SIGILLVM · VNIVERSITATIS · CALIFORNIENSIS
FIAT
LVX
MDCCCLXVIII
EX LIBRIS

183
1

SOCIALISM :
AN ANALYSIS

RUDOLF EUCKEN
HIS LIFE, WORK AND TRAVELS
By Himself. Translated by JOSEPH McCABE
10/6 net.
T. FISHER UNWIN LTD, LONDON

SOCIALISM: AN ANALYSIS · *By*

RUDOLF EUCKEN

Translated by JOSEPH McCABE

UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD
LONDON: ADELPHI TERRACE

HX 276
E8

First published in English . 1921

(All rights reserved)

PREFACE

SOCIALISM comprises an ideal of life as well as an economic statement. This ideal the politician may relegate to a secondary place and rarely notice, but for the philosopher it is the chief matter to be considered. Beyond both politician and philosopher, moreover, is the plain man, in whose mind the various movements of our time meet and must be adjusted to each other.

The economic question is a child of our own time and is directly related to the present condition of the world, but philosophy is based upon the tranquil work of thousands of years. Yet even philosophy seems to have reached a critical stage where radical alterations of all human things are demanded. We see everything about us in a state of suspense, and in the strain which ensues we may hope to obtain some general improvement by combining the two points of view. It is a strange situation to see ancient wisdom join hands with the advancing present: to find permanent hopes of human nature shooting through the stormy agitation of the day.

476013

As a thinking being man does not exhaust his powers in the situation of the moment, the passing hour. To give point to his efforts he needs to direct his gaze to a higher order of life and a larger happiness. It is hope that gilds for him the dreariness of life, and lends it some joy and splendour. That is true, in the first place, of the individual, but it holds also for the race; for the race itself cannot prosper unless it seeks its task in life as a whole, is conscious of possibilities that are full of promise, and tries its strength upon obstacles. The higher the wave of life rises in this sense, the more zealously will new paths be sought, and the more passionately shall we try to determine which resource is the best for attaining the desired end. The question may rend humanity into hostile camps and give rise to grave doubts about the meaning of the whole scheme of things, but the doubts themselves will invest it with an incomparable greatness. The race now receives its fate from no alien power, but earns it by its own resolution and will.

This conflict over the ideal of life is shared by Socialism. But the struggle has only in the course of time passed from being a secondary current into the great stream of life, and concentrated all attention upon itself. We shall see how many causes have contributed to this, but we know from the

start how it has become a burning question, not only for the German people, but for the whole race. We cannot, however, sufficiently appreciate the situation to-day without recalling first, in general outline, the story of how the present strain developed.

CONTENTS

		PAGE
PREFACE		5
CHAPTER I.	THE HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM	13
II.	THE AFFIRMATION OF THE SOCIALIST IDEAL	31
	§ 1. The Foundation	34
	§ 2. Effective Movements	48
	§ 3. A Common Structure	66
III.	A VIEW OF LIFE AS A WHOLE	83
IV.	EXAMINATION OF THE SOCIALIST IDEAL	101
	§ 1. The Unity and Harmony of Life	101
	§ 2. The Socialist Idealism	108
	§ 3. The Socialist Conception of History	119
	§ 4. The Limits of Socialist Equality	133
	§ 5. The Problem of Socialisation	150
	§ 6. A Criticism of Economism	167
V.	CONCLUSION	181

THE HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM

Univ. of California

CHAPTER I

THE HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM

Our starting point is the problem of the physical maintenance of man in face of an indifferent or hostile nature: the problem of the hard struggle for life. The first improvement that individuals obtained in this regard was when they came together in social groups. They now had some protection against both the terrors of nature and the menace of their enemies. It was religions which first inspired them with a sense of task and duty; and gradually religion and morality, especially morality in its social aspect, entered into close combination and completed each other.

Of the religions with which we are familiar it is chiefly Judaism that has been of service in this respect in the course of its history. Concern for the good of one's neighbour was the chief point of its creed. Christianity in turn joined to the love of God an ardent love of men. It devoted itself to the poor, the suffering, and the

oppressed; and it inspired many humane institutions and enkindled a willingness for self-sacrifice. All this sentiment and activity, however, failed to create an order of life in the sense of the Socialist ideal. It did not subject the conduct of the individual to a powerful common will, and it created no firm organisation. On the one hand, it attached more value to the voluntary action of charity, and on the other hand it considered that anything that tended to mitigate the undeniable economic distress was quite secondary to the confident expectation and joyous hope of a higher world, in comparison with which all the happiness and sorrow of this world fade into insignificance. The man who thus believes that we have no lasting city on the earth, but must ever look to a home beyond the grave, feels no impulse to seek a radical transformation of our economic life. He does not develop Socialistic ideas.

But the period which we call modern times brought a great change. The religious epoch was succeeded by one in which thought of this world predominated, and which was occupied more and more with the visible things of sense. These were considered not merely the very type of reality, but the essential aims and values of life. There now appeared a stronger vital impulse and a direct affirmation of life. The very soul of the

new tendency was to secure a full development of one's strength and raise it to the highest possible pitch: an ardent determination to reduce this world to subjection and do great things in it; to overcome all obstacles and create more greatness and more joy. This impulse to the exercise of strength raises the value of material things and of the whole of our economic life. They become, not simply indispensable means, but independent parts of life. New technical paths are opened for the economy of life. It is, as a whole, made more continuous and more progressive. It experiences the most radical transformations as time goes on. The old direct connection of producer and consumer disappears, no less than the direct connection of personality and work. The traditional fixed order of things yields more and more to a condition of general movement.

To this corresponds a new state of the soul. Man reflects more clearly and deliberately upon his position and conduct. He thinks out new theories, and expects from them a larger and more tangible happiness. Economic novels appear in conformity with the new ideas. It was in the atmosphere of the Renaissance that Thomas More created his famous Utopia—in 1516, contemporaneously with the appearance of Luther—directing an acute criticism upon the existing

economic condition, and sketching a new ideal of life that has survived four centuries.

Yet, while these changes do indicate a fresher feeling of life and a freer attitude toward reality, there was no radical alteration until the eighteenth century sharply broke with the old traditions. Even modern Socialism is connected by many threads with that movement. The eighteenth century clearly grasped the fact that man does not belong to a settled and self-contained world, but that he himself is called upon to improve and transform his existence. With confidence he takes control of his own fate and prepares the conditions of his own life. In this work the chief share is taken by thought. Henceforward it has not merely to mirror an existing world, or pour it into the moulds of conceptions. It is not, to use an expression of Hegel's, the owl of Minerva, which takes to flight only after the first onset of dusk. It is the dawn of a new age, spreading its rays over the world. And to this power of remoulding and uplifting the mind unites a power of discrimination and insight which submits everything to the proof, and accepts only what passes the test.

This vitalising and transforming activity implies also a confident belief in the power of reason in human nature, which is to make all reality reasonable and bring all that is reasonable into reality.

Religious belief gives place to a belief in reason; though in the eighteenth century this itself contained an element of religion, since reason was regarded not as a mere property of a man, but as an indication of a superhuman intelligence. It is only this appeal to a divine, world-ordering reason that justifies us in making reason superior to all human authority and tradition. This enthroned reason inspired the social body with the belief that one and the same power of thought dominates and links together all men; and it is in this connection that we first encounter the idea of perfect human equality. Mere manhood, even independently of God, becomes more and more a supreme value in itself. "Man," says Herder, "has no nobler word to apply to himself than what he himself is." It was in this sense that France took the lead. The more intolerable the course of the eighteenth century made the existing state of things, the more confidently and triumphantly rose this belief in the greatness and dignity of human nature. Men felt that they stood on the threshold of a better and happier age. The sparkling freshness and liveliness of the French literature of that period did not a little to open new paths for these ideas, and bring on the epoch of the Revolution, in which we still live.

All this, however, only slowly and hesitatingly

overtook the economic movement. The leading thinkers of the eighteenth century were chiefly concerned with the universe, and were more dedevoted to philosophical truth than to the condition of men, while the century was dominated by the grim tasks and complications of the social situation which gave the tendency its main character. At first, moreover, it was the political rather than the economic conditions that demanded attention; it was a question of political freedom, not of equality. Economic systems and ideas of progress were not wanting, it is true; but the Mercantilists, whose work filled the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth, treated the economic world merely as a means to increase the power of the State, and the Physiocrats, in spite of the value of their effort to base economic life upon nature, had not in their minds any clearly outlined economic scheme, such as Adam Smith (in his famous *Wealth of Nations*, 1776) created.

This work embodied the main idea of the eighteenth century in its economic application. It attempted to make the intricate economic framework perfectly intelligible, and it threw the whole stress upon the forces, impulses, and aims of individuals, with which it built up a comprehensive picture of the economic life. The picture was thoroughly optimistic. In the unrestricted

competition of individuals and nations Smith saw an immeasurable gain in freedom and power. The interests of all seemed to him to unite in a complete harmony, and to guarantee a steady progress of the whole. He thought of the whole as well as the individuals, but the entire collective condition seemed to him to be best promoted when it was left to the activities of individuals. Here also we have for the first time a general picture of the economic life in all its ramifications, an ideal and a prescription of life. While earlier ages had talked of a religious, scientific, or artistic type of life, we now have, added to these, if not placed higher than they, an economic type.

The influence of Smith's work extended, in varying degree, to every nation in Europe. The movement was hailed as a liberation from oppressive restrictions and an unchecked outpouring of strength. But people did not see the historical conditions of its appearance, or the immense complications which the further course of economic life would involve. These complications, however, soon arrived. The very period which adopted the economic theory of the eighteenth century experienced a complete transformation. The entire character of work was changed by the invention of machinery and the growth of factories, and other problems supervened. In spite of all

their achievements men were troubled in soul, and were soon sharply divided. The heart of the new problem was the radical alteration of economic life.

From this point onward there has been a steadily increasing restlessness. The work of the intelligence found more and more to do; the movement spread continually beyond the frontiers of any special province, and man and his condition became the great problem. French thinkers were the first to give close attention to these problems. The French Socialists poured upon them a penetrating criticism, sketched the various economic possibilities, and greatly enriched our ideas and broadened our horizon. But they were not connected closely enough with the economic life itself and its conditions, and hence, in spite of all their freshness and imagination, they had no lasting influence. England, apart from the appearance of a few striking personalities like Robert Owen, followed its own way at first, and had little influence upon civilisation in general.

Germany was at that time very backward both in economic life and in theory. We must, of course, not forget that in that country philosophy did a great deal in the way of stimulating intellectual life, and considerably deepened the ideas of men. In particular its starting from the whole instead of the individual, and its idea of a

movement advancing in virtue of its own forces, had a great influence on every section of social life. But there was no close connection between philosophical production and the economic problem, and on this account the general social movement was directed by Lassalle, and still more by Marx, into far too narrow a path, and the Socialist ideal was conceived in too partisan a sense. Lassalle, it is true, was the first to enkindle the attention of large numbers of Germans with his fiery appeals, and he poured his own warmth into their souls. Marx, on the other hand, worked with untiring intellectual labour to construct a thoroughly considered system, and he thus came to have an immense influence on civilisation. He gave the Socialistic sentiment a definite aim and a means of procedure. The chief aim was to bring about a collective ownership of the means of production and "socialise" all property, and to recognise in the class-war a lever for the overthrow of the existing political conditions. It was thus that the Socialist movement captured the thoughts and sentiments of great masses of people. We must, however, bear in mind that the main idea of Socialism goes far beyond the conception of Marx; that it may be realised in many different ways, and that under one common head it embraces all sorts of opposite opinions and divergences. We are concerned with this

general idea, not with particular theories. Its starting point is the unqualified submission of individuals to the social collectivity and the treatment of the economic task as the chief business of life. Round this nucleus there gathered a large ideal of life which aims at completely transforming the human condition.

In the first place it can appeal to the convergence of various pre-existing tendencies. One of these is the extraordinary increase of economic duties and complications. We have only to think of the revolution of work through the technical application of the forces of nature, the detachment of the work from the personality of the man, the emergence of gigantic industrial complexes, the sharp antithesis of capital and labour, the concentration of the masses in large towns with its inevitable strengthening of their self-consciousness, the enormous increase of the population in a way that had never been known before on the earth—in most European countries the population increased threefold in the course of the nineteenth century—and, finally, the continuous and unprecedented progress of invention. All this was bound to turn thoughts and feelings more strongly than ever to economic questions and materially alter the conditions of life.

To this we must add the development of demo-

cratic ideas and institutions in modern times. The sentiment has gone far beyond the political world and has deeply influenced the fundamental ideas of men. There is now a question of distributing life and effort as far as possible into elementary forces, to raise these to a state of complete independence, and to make them the basis of every construction. Naturally, as the power of the individual grows, he asserts a stronger claim to vital activity and happiness. All the injustices and distresses of the traditional state of things are now directly felt, and all its antagonisms seem sharper than ever. The subject rises above the object and reduces it to obedience.

Finally there was, apart from economic matters, a zealous effort, which we may call Politism, to enlarge the power and the province of States as far as possible. There have been great changes in this respect in the course of centuries. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially in England, were disposed to cast the burden of political and economic life as much as possible upon individuals, to trust to the free association of particular forces, and to restrict the interference of the State. In the course of the nineteenth century the power of the State and the community has notably increased in many ways. In this we see the influence of the increasing settlement and differentiation of the various nations, of the

historical attitude with its tendency to link all fortunes and achievements in a continuous chain of ages, of the progressive organisation of economic life, and of the demand for some authority that should be superior to the economic antagonisms. Even speculative German philosophy, with its idea of a collective life that embraces all individuals, had a powerful influence on the development. The ideas of Hegel, in particular, provided the philosophical framework of Marxism. All these things together engendered a firm belief, almost a superstitious belief, in the State and its power to solve all the problems of life.

But into every new branch of the social life there poured an even deeper movement: a diversion of attention from the universe to human interests. The older order, as it was conceived in the Middle Ages, bound man closely with the whole by means of religion. The collective order had an undisputed superiority, and gave meaning and purpose to human life. In the course of modern times the stress has passed more and more to the side of the individual. Metaphysics was succeeded by psychology: religion by social life. The inner connection of man and the world was more and more relaxed, until at last it broke down altogether in a large number of cases. The development went through various stages. Religion seemed at first to modern men to be a friendly

and valuable companion, then it sank into a subordinate position, and finally it came to be thought of no consequence whatever, if not injurious.

The denial also had its various stages. Positivism was one of the mildest types, with its tendency merely to put the cosmic problem aside. More drastic was the radical German philosophy, particularly Neo-Hegelianism. The leader was Ludwig Feuerbach, who won large numbers of adherents by the definiteness of his statements and the glow of his eloquence. Religion, like everything supersensual, seemed to him "outworn." Engels, who was an ardent follower of Feuerbach, said: "We have done with God." Religion seemed to Feuerbach an illegitimate extension to the whole scheme of things of man's ideas and aspirations: a mischievous illusion which weakened the power of men and distracted them from their proper aims. His ideas are easily gathered from these words of his: "God was my first, reason my second, man my third and final thought." It is true that Socialism has room for great differences of opinion in regard to religion, but as a whole religion plays no part of any importance in it, and the Erfurt Program, in declaring that religion is a private affair of the individual, deprived it of the position of centre of gravity for man's thoughts and actions. The man who regards religion as a private matter

cannot think much of it. He has plainly broken with traditional ideas.

The result of all this is that Socialism has framed its own ideal, and it seeks to win the whole of human nature. The strength of this ideal is that it meets an actual movement in modern life which, by human force and resolution, is raised to the position of a principle and a whole, and is therefore the work of the whole man and the whole of humanity. The reciprocal support of facts and ideas lends a very considerable power to the whole. We have an experiment on the grandest possible lines in humanity and conducted by it. It puts a decisive question, and it demands either Yes or No. It is only the experience of the collective life that can show whether the answer which Socialism gives meets the whole reality of human nature; for here it is not simply a question of mere theories and types of life, however well they may be constructed, but of actual vital developments. There is question, in a word, of the possibility of a new life which promises man an ampler truth and a larger happiness, and may absorb his whole soul. The new conceptions of life involve such radical alterations of values as humanity never saw before.

But the man who propounds this question must not analyse the movement from without, as if it were a soulless object, and content himself

with a cold description. He must get into the heart of the work of it, examine its impulses, and share the life to some extent and make it his own. Any person who sees only its detached parts will naturally lose the general picture; he will find it easy to criticise and condemn, but he will not do justice to his subject, and his criticism will not affect it. The further course of this essay will show that a sympathetic study does not imply assent, but we must insist that to condemn a thing without understanding it is useless. We will therefore first try to follow the Socialistic ideal in its own life as impartially as we can.

THE AFFIRMATION OF THE SOCIALIST IDEAL

CHAPTER II

THE AFFIRMATION OF THE SOCIALIST IDEAL

LIFE, as we are concerned with it, is no mere accumulation of separate efforts and achievements. It must have certain firm general lines about which all its diverse contents are arranged, and which give an internal continuity to the whole. Now the Socialistic life which at present pervades the race has two chief features, and these mingle Yes and No inseparably with each other.

1. It takes its stand exclusively on the ground of experience, on our direct perception of action and reaction, and it condemns every effort which looks beyond these limits as erroneous and fruitless.

2. It conceives reality as a combination of particular elements which are mutually related to each other and are in a state of constant reciprocity. The new thing it promises is to bring these elements more closely together and relate them more profitably to each other. It draws the circle round them more stringently, discovers

and develops a number of hitherto dormant resources, brings the scattered elements into firmer connection, and by this vitalising of the whole secures a fuller and richer content of the human kingdom. In this work it makes a confident affirmation of life, and promises it an ever increasing happiness. It comes into an already existing world, but by its influence it can convert what merely happens into an act of its own. Since it aims at inaugurating a new state of things, it has the character of an idealism, but an idealism that rejects all imaginary greatnesses and values, and conceives its task entirely within the limits of reality. This conception of life has drastically to deny and reject all that is alien and inimical, and therefore it shows a very definite limitation and resistance; but this limitation and rejection are in the interest of a predominant affirmation, which discovers and appreciates greatness in what is simple and lies immediately round us.

This general conception may be divided into various parts. It implies:

1. A firm foundation,
2. Effective movements, and
3. A common structure.

In regard to the first, it demands:

(*a*) More unity and continuity than there are in the existing state of things, and

(*b*) A closer connection with man and better concentration of his powers.

As regards the second, it demands :

(*a*) The exclusive basing of life and all its arrangements upon the present (sincerity), and

(*b*) The equal vitalisation of all elements (equality and justice).

In regard to the third, it demands :

(*a*) Co-operation in a common will and conduct (socialisation), and

(*b*) A closer association of the material and the ideal factors of life (economism).

The general feature that arises from all this is the firmer concentration and fuller vitalisation of human life in every respect, an all-round increase of life. Now let us briefly and clearly consider each of these characteristic movements.

§ 1

THE FOUNDATION

(*a*) *The Demand for Greater Unity.*

THE Socialist life is vigorously opposed to the confusion and the antagonisms which oppress modern life. There was much confusion in earlier ages of history, but it never reached such a pitch as now, and never before was the intolerable mischief of such a condition felt so keenly as now. Our age is a medley of old and new, of higher and lower, jostling and interfering with each other. We moderns borrow an important part of our culture from antiquity, with its instinct for form and limit, yet we have all round us the immense abundance of strength and the unceasing exaltation of life of our later age. We cannot do without the higher world opened to us by Christianity, without its deep inwardness and its moral earnestness; but at the same time we eagerly embrace the visible world and its wealth. The currents of modern life diverge even more than this. We rejoice in

the sparkling fulness of life of the Renaissance, but we find indispensable also the clear intellectual life and purposive illumination that followed it. We enjoy gratefully the splendid treasures of our classical days, yet we adopt also a strict realism with all its emphasis on the world of sense. Is it any wonder that individuals differ so much from each other in their acts and deeds and feelings? Is it surprising that our life is so much occupied with indecisive reflections and varying moods, and that there is no indisputable goal to combine our forces and put a check upon the wilfulness of individuals? Is it strange that we have no great men, no men of high creative power, no men whose souls pour fire upon the world?

For several decades this lack of inner unity and of a dominant centre has been painfully felt and deplored. I myself wrote a work in 1888, in which I described the actual spiritual confusion and did my best to find a remedy. Since then the inner collapse has grown worse than ever, and it now darkens our days.

The Socialist ideal takes up a firm attitude in face of this confusion, and promises us a radical cure of it. Where else, it asks, can a man find unity and continuity except in himself, in concentration upon the centre of his own life, in his self-preservation and his welfare? Here alone can the various movements meet, and strengthen and

supplement each other. Here everything that is subordinate or superfluous must be discarded, all antagonisms be reconciled or disappear, and the spiritual and the material form an indissoluble unity. To this general condition of man everything must contribute, and by it as a standard everything must be judged. All experience must be associated with the simplest and most fundamental sensations. The past must be converted into a living present. From this standpoint we attain that comprehensive philosophy of life which our age so sorely needs. Life and work enter into an intimate harmony.

The strength of this conception of life lies not merely in the fact that it treats a whole nation as an economic unity—in this respect Rodbertus with his finely graduated system might challenge comparison with it—but still more in its construction of a common measure of life and thought for the whole man, its creation of a spiritual atmosphere that embraces and adjusts all duties and all accomplishments. A common atmosphere of this kind is now found, apart from Socialism, only in Catholicism, but we know how wide a chasm there is between this creed and modern man; besides that its reconciliation of contradictions cannot be regarded by our critical culture as a real inner unity. Catholicism speaks to us in the language of the Middle Ages. Socialism

lives in the very heart of the present, and shares its struggles and anxieties.

(*b*) *The Demand for a New Texture of Reality.*

Socialism takes up its position clearly and deliberately upon a man's experience, but it cannot do this without coming to terms with a deep-rooted error and materially altering the traditional idea. The question is : What is the position of man in regard to the world ? Clearly the great whole embraces him and prepares life for him ; but has he the right to regard himself as its centre, seeing that he is entirely subject to the immutable laws of the universe and is, measured by the infinity of time and space, so negligible and diminutive a creature ? Through countless ages he has committed the error of putting himself, in his own opinion, in the place of the world. He has unthinkingly imported human magnitudes and values into it, and imagined it subordinated to his own designs. He deals with an image he has himself created as if it were genuine reality, and he ascribes to it his own chief wishes and hopes.

This humanisation of the world gave rise to a whole world of illusions, and made man a stranger to himself. More than two thousand years ago Xenophanes said that men take their images of

the gods from themselves. Modern thought has, in the whole course of its development, recognised the deceptiveness and error of this, and has striven constantly to banish the supersensuous and metaphysical as an illusion from the human mind. Positivism made headway with its claim that we ought to restrict our ideas and our life rigorously to the province of direct perception and experience. Not without risk of grave and dangerous error could we pass that province, it said; and still less should we trouble about our relations to unknown powers, or place any reliance on them. In this way all religion and all metaphysics was declared to be a delusion. By the side of this sober conception of the Positivists there then appeared Ludwig Feuerbach's more highly coloured picture, and all theology and metaphysics was reduced to anthropology. Socialism shares these ideas, but its own special contribution is that it took what had hitherto been regarded by small groups as a scientific theory and made it a power, an inspiration, for great masses of men.

In this, as in so many other things, Socialism availed itself vigorously of an existing movement of the time, and followed it boldly to its logical consequences. It detached the problem of life entirely from the cosmic problem, and cast man entirely upon his own resources. The limitation and impoverishment which this involves do not

trouble it. What do those inaccessible depths matter to us? Our sorrows and sufferings do not seem to touch them. Those dark powers neither hurt nor help us. The great world follows only its own iron laws, and they know no exception and admit no accommodation in the interest of man.

Moreover, this very limitation means a strengthening of our life, and this far outweighs all that is sacrificed. We shall work all the more energetically to improve our real possessions when we cease to think about imaginary ones. Whatever else be doubtful, we have man—man in the totality of his life, man above and beyond all separate parts. That solid fact becomes a great task for us when we take over the whole of human nature. History shows that man is not something perfectly obvious to himself. He has first to discover himself; he has to tear away all false accretions, all parasitic growths, all that is imposed from without, all artificial and untrue ideas of life.

Humanity has repeatedly found refuge in itself, in its own unadulterated nature. It has time after time been seized with an ardent desire to work out its own being, to make its way unhindered to purer and stronger vital sources. It did so in the later period of the ancient world, and again in the course of the eighteenth century. Rousseau,

particularly, pointed out a way in which life might be delivered from the ruins of the past and the evils of the present. Do we not suffer from similar evils to-day? Do we not often lose sight of man as a whole in considering the parts, in dealing with the narrow mind which takes its little corner for the whole world? Do not even scholars and artists strangely forget the whole man at times in the contemplation of themselves?

We have to decide which is the best way to choose in order to put man into full possession of his powers. The Socialist ideal would give a simple and plain answer to this. It is "society": it is human co-operation that develops the proper characteristics of man, that strengthens by association what has become weak and uncertain and irresolute through dissociation. Society alone can develop the real human qualities of a man; it is only amongst men that one becomes a man. The old truth, that man is a social animal (ζῶον πολιτικον, *animal sociale*), is now for the first time fully appreciated. All the prerogatives of man depend upon his not remaining an isolated point but being in constant association and reciprocal activity with his fellows. As a definite proof of this Aristotle has pointed to the formation of rational speech as opposed to the mere sounds by which animals express their sensations, and

has related the whole advance of reason to this. But, under the influence of the old ideas, he regarded reason, the intellectual faculty, as the chief thing, and he deduced the human form of society as a simple consequence of this. The modern way of thinking, which starts from experience, has taken up the contrary position. It considers society to be the root of all spiritual power, of everything that lifts man above nature.

The thorough elaboration of this idea gives a new view of human existence. All conceptions of greatness and value diverge greatly from the traditional standard; all the separation into different provinces is seized upon by the new thought and adapted to it. What we had been accustomed to call "reason" is now a standard of human greatness, and, whereas we had formerly distinguished between a secular or cosmic and a social life, the social life is now our exclusive concern. Society now engenders all spirituality and embraces the whole of life, and its welfare has become the highest of aims. This aim has now two meanings, the old and the new. "Good" is now merely something that promotes the good of society; it coincides with "useful" in the social sense. "True" is what has results in the social order and ensures its assent. There is no longer any room for the old conceptions of things that are good and true in themselves; there is no such

thing as good and true in that sense. In this way man becomes, in the words of Protagoras, the measure of all things; with the difference, however, that we do not mean the individual man, but collective humanity.

This development has made life and conduct more fluid and elastic. It gets rid of all the rigidity of absolute and self-sufficing truth. It brings the standard of greatness nearer to man's condition and efforts. Like the eighteenth century, the movement has directed a penetrating criticism upon, and greatly altered, the traditional standards of life, but it differs from the earlier phase in the fact that Socialism does this from the point of view of society, not of the individual. This makes it less abstract, and connects it more closely with our actual circumstances and duties. Thought and action can unite more intimately. The one can pass without difficulty into the other.

But, while Socialism is more concerned about the social condition than thought was generally in the eighteenth century, which was mainly concerned with the individual, the aim is substantially the same. It is a question of bringing the whole of existence under man's control. For this purpose we need above all things clearness and strength, and the combination of the two promises us a new world. We have to develop reason to a pitch of complete self-consciousness, to root out all

unreason, to shape everything in view of a definite purpose.

The chief means of attaining this desired clearness and strength is education. It is especially by education that a man is raised from the state of nature to civilisation and develops his entire humanity. It has to brace all his powers and make them of value for vital purposes. It can raise them indefinitely; and on it is chiefly based the confident expectation of an unfaltering mental and moral progress of the race. That is the spirit of the saying of Helvetius: "L'éducation peut tout." In this ancient and modern thought differ materially from each other. Ancient thought regarded a man's endowment as a fixed and limited quantity which could only be developed to the extent of its inherent capacity. Modern thought sees in man a germ of indefinite life which can develop all kinds of fresh powers. Hence our concern about education has become the main business of life, and all the resources of society must be enlisted in it. For this it is necessary to bring the whole material and spiritual possessions of the race to each individual and thus thoroughly permeate him. This effort on the part of Socialism is in harmony with an historical movement which has greatly increased in strength in recent centuries. We find ourselves confronting colossal tasks. Has not culture been far too little a matter of the whole

man and of each individual man? Has it not entered far too little into the individual life? Great teachers of the race, such as Comenius, Pestalozzi and Froebel, have deeply deplored this alienation of our culture. Is there not much here for Socialism to do? Up to the present there has been a deep cleft between the higher and lower strata of the social order. Must we not do all we can to bridge this gulf?

Modern education is in harmony with modern humanitarianism. It corresponds with the earnest endeavour of Socialism to bring more comfort and joy into the life of each individual, to free it as far as possible from restrictions, to substitute mildness and kindliness for hardness and rigorism, to infuse this spirit even into legislation and government. There is question here not only of the content, but also the form, of life, which is often wrongly underestimated. It is a particular weakness of German life to treat the subjective condition, the feelings of individuals, as secondary and unimportant. We were content with the soundness of our measure, and forgot to make it attractive to men. Aristotle shrewdly observed that food must be prepared so as to satisfy the guests as well as the cook. He was thinking of political matters, and his words contain a lesson for Germany. The acknowledged excellence of our officials has not prevented them from being very much dis-

liked at times. The harsh and masterly tone they often adopt, as if they were schoolmasters, has done a great deal to make many a German feel as if he lives in a foreign land in his own country. This evil of the mutual estrangement of citizens and officials goes back even to the time of Luther, who says: "Doctor Martinus is not only a theologian and a defender of the faith, but also a champion of the rights of poor folk who come from every part to ask his help and intercession with the authorities in such numbers that he would have quite enough to do without taking any other work on his shoulders." Do not these words show much between the lines?

There was also the evil, right down to our own time, that the State demanded many sacrifices of its subjects without taking any trouble to secure their own assent and consent. Such a thing was possible in earlier ages, when life was more oppressive, but it is impossible now that the minds of men are awake.

Dislike of us abroad corresponded to this dislike of officials in Germany itself. We had no skill in getting foreign peoples to recognise our real qualities. The French were, in this respect, far more skilful. The unhappy issue of the war is partly due to the fact that the nation which regarded itself as a nation of poets and thinkers had not the gift of presentation, the eloquence,

the fire, to compete with the superior propaganda of other peoples. We—that is to say, mainly the Government of the time—were clumsy in the psychic mobilisation of our forces, in organising them and concentrating them upon the great struggle. We do not sufficiently apply our strength at decisive points. The German needs to take to heart the words of the wise Philo, that man does not live in a desert; he must not underestimate others, and must remember that he has not only the reality, but also the appearance, to consider. We regarded it as a great thing to treat the effect on other nations as a matter of no consequence.

It was even more mischievous than our statecraft was unable to understand the spiritual currents of the time and direct them in the proper way. We thought, for instance, that we could neglect with impunity the great democratic wave that has surged through the civilised world for the last few centuries. We lost sight of the profound difference between the thinker and the statesman. The thinker can, and must, pursue his work on a permanent level, undisturbed by the views of men; but the statesman has to reckon with the currents of the hour as so many forces or he will come to grief.

Here, as in so many other questions, small things and great are often mingled together, but the Socialist is determined that both shall serve his

main design of making man and his welfare the central consideration. It is not a question of particular achievements or demands, but of changing man as a whole, of delivering him from deep-rooted errors and putting him in the full enjoyment of his powers. It is a question of a radical alteration of values in human life, of making a new man. And the first condition of doing this is a solid foundation, which Socialism promises.

§ 2

EFFECTIVE MOVEMENTS

We must now consider the various transfers and increases of strength which the Socialist life demands and effects. In this respect it seems to be the fulfilment and completion of certain movements which pervade the whole of modern life. It draws these movements to itself and increases their intensity. For its main purpose, however, it requires a transfer and an intensification at two chief points: it demands that we turn from the past to the present, and it demands a redistribution of forces in the direction of equality. On the one side the Socialist life conducts a stern struggle against insincerity, and on the other side against the injustice and inequality of the traditional order. This union of sincerity and justice of life promises to give the whole a greater vitality and an ethical character that is far superior to the ordinary moral teaching. We will first consider this new life in its relation to the times.

(c) *The Struggle Against Insincerity of Life.*

Socialism finds that the traditional mode of life is unsound in that it does not trust to its own powers, but binds us to past ages, and sustains externally what is internally dead. It thus prevents us from giving vitality and full value to the resources of our own time, and places restrictions on our activity. Certainly we have here a serious problem. It is one of the main distinctions between the natural and the spiritual world that in the former everything remains in its state of rest or movement until it experiences some change from without; whereas in the realm of spirit each action requires a continuous vitalisation if it is not to sink rapidly or wholly disappear. A sustained strain is necessary to keep up to the height that has been reached. In most cases this is not done. In the average man the law of inertia holds good; it turns action into a mechanical habit, and the real present becomes merely an accumulation of past elements. Once more, therefore, a fact becomes a problem for us: the past ever threatens to spread over the present.

The complications that arise from this fact have greatly exercised modern times and especially our own time. Our civilisation has sprung from historical ground—we need only think of Christianity and of the ancient world—yet modern

times have produced a culture of their own. Old and new now mingle in great confusion. We live between two worlds, and the modern world tends to fall into a grave insincerity. The struggle against this was energetically taken up in the seventeenth century, but all sorts of obstacles were put in its way. Socialism had the distinct merit of coming nearest to living history and taking up its stand mainly on the present. By this radical displacement it has very greatly quickened the pulse of life. Many institutions were fitted for particular ages, but they have far outlived the need for them. What was once good has been turned by the course of history into an evil. Is it not useful, indeed necessary, to make an end of these things? Step by step we have to advance from a half-awakened and narrowly restricted world to one that is wide awake and consciously active. The idea of progress has a very powerful influence in this. It is, at the bottom, the desire of modern man for indefinite life. From the heights of philosophic speculation it has spread over the whole of life. And, as it spread, it inspired a vigorous determination to get rid entirely of all that was outworn and separate it from what was advancing.

Think of religion! How many contradictions there are in it to-day, and how earnestly do we long for complete sincerity! We quietly accept

the old ecclesiastical picture of the world with its sense-appealing miracles, and at the same time we admit the teaching of modern science with its vigorous ideas of causality. We base our religious beliefs on facts of an historical character, and at the same time our historical culture and criticism make them uncertain, if not incredible. We form our conception of the world independently of all human standards, and at the same time our religious and personal ideas imply standards which to the modern scientific mind are purely mythological. The contradiction goes far beyond mere ideas; it rends the fundamental impulse of life. From our religious point of view we regard man as a feeble being, entirely dependent on supernatural assistance; in our culture we describe him as a being relying upon his own powers and summoned to awaken all his forces.

The deepest reason for the confusion is that Christianity brought about a specific historical situation, and this was permanently established, though it fell out of accord with the progress of the ages. At the time when Christianity arose Mediterranean civilization was much enfeebled, and it needed a fresh vital impulse; and at the same time there appeared new peoples to whom the old civilisation was to be communicated. This conjunction of circumstances led to a work of synthesis which gave a support and a destiny

to the new peoples. Meantime, however, great changes occurred in life itself. Are we now to seek light for our seething and tumultuous present, with its great problems, from the past, and measure it by the ancient standards? Is a dead age to dominate our own time? Deeper still is the contradiction that Positivism found in our condition, and Socialism has willingly taken over from it: the whole of religion is, it says, merely an historical category, an anthropomorphic setting of reality, due entirely to special conditions that exist no longer. To see this anthropomorphism clearly is to destroy it. Are we to blame Socialism for drawing the logical conclusion from that principle?

In the political and social world also we are threatened with insincerity on account of the encroachment of the past upon the present. It is clear, in the first place, that there are around us to-day large numbers of laws, institutions, and ideas which have no root in our own time, yet they are maintained as our own, and they do a great deal of harm. Collectively they threaten to drag life down to a condition of semi-animation and half-hearted conviction. The consequences of this are particularly grave because the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have, as a fact, brought about great changes in social and political matters. Such is the confusion that the past often

hides the present from us. We see things in the light of another age, and our own life is thus enfeebled. I do not speak merely of earlier years, but of our own time, for we Germans show ourselves in many ways incompetent to bring out the full force of life and meet the demands of our own time. We live at far too slow a pace, and we let valuable opportunities slip by. We have only to recall the long refusal of the Prussian Government to grant a just suffrage! Did we not see the great political and economic changes that were taking place all round us? Did we not see the injustice and the danger of the existing order? We did, and we did not. We were too sluggish to overcome the difficulties and grant the present its rights. We looked upon Austria, also, and treated it in the light of the past, in the glory of its earlier ages. We did not observe the mighty changes that the rise and division of nationalities had involved. Every journey that we made to Prague, Cracow, and Pesth brought them before us, but the mental eyes of our statesmen were closed against them. So we failed to see how frail was the structure on which we laid the weight of our foreign policy and our fate. Socialism is on its guard against this mental blindness. It will change the entire current of the movement and keep life entirely to the present.

We have, moreover, been far too much disposed

to let the state of civilisation pass over us like some uncontrollable fate. Our intellectual life is made up of a number of different elements: Greek, Roman, Teutonic, Christian, medieval and modern are all blended in it. We live on the past. But we do not sufficiently attempt to make out of it all a superior and comprehensive present, and to give this its proper place in history. Hence our culture has been far too much a mere matter of learning, instead of being a practical idealism of man and the spirit. We take a momentary situation as definitive and mould our conduct by it. We often mistake the conditions under which the spiritual movement was required. It was, for instance, a particular situation that gave rise to the classical life of Germany. An important element in it was the close association of German and Greek life. In Greek life men then saw a clarified picture of their own aims. The Greeks seemed to them to be the finest representatives of real humanity and pure beauty. But ought we to forget the animating bond that made the union of the two cultures so fruitful? Ought we to entrust for ever the control of our universities to those gifted humanists of long ago, and continue to draw up our educational schemes on their ideas?

The hindrances to the freshness and originality of our life from such a state of things are visible

everywhere. We take a particular pride in German thoroughness, but this may easily become a weakness by causing us to be slow and meticulous. We like to load our ship with a good deal of ballast, and in this way we cut down the speed. How much, for instance, could a genius like Leibnitz not have done for the race and his people if he had not obscured the chief points of his system with so many additions? We are eager to put our life upon a broad and solid foundation of historical culture, but we often devote ourselves to a mere historical erudition which confuses life and knowledge, and makes one's own view merely an appendage to other people's opinions. There is still truth in the saying of Mme. de Staël, that the German is at home everywhere except in his own house; that he is acquainted with all periods except the present. In the eighteenth century men's minds were narrower, but their thoughts were clearer and stronger. They thought in sharp antitheses, whereas the German is too apt to be content with an easy-going "this as well as that."

In view of all this it is significant that Socialism entirely discards the burden of history and entrusts life to the immediate present. It says, with Paracelsus, the founder of modern medicine: "Of what use is the rain that fell a thousand years ago? Only that which falls now is of any service

to us. What good was the sunshine of a thousand years ago to this year?" He accordingly demands a thorough revision of our whole culture, a resolute and uncalculating preference of all that the present affords and requires, so that the world may be our own possession, and not belong to others.

Since Socialism aims at this vitalisation and rejuvenescence, it naturally turns in the first place to the rising generation and seeks to win its allegiance. The old may have the qualities of wisdom, experience, and prudence, but Socialism turns rather to the young, who are nearer to the sources of life, and seem to have more powerful and more original ideas. Hence it seems so important to have their support and co-operation. The age-limit is brought forward as much as possible, and the young are brought into their counsels. In all this there is a firm belief in an unceasing progress of the human race. All the glories of the past pale beside the ideals and hopes of the future. The great problem is the rejuvenation of the race and the expulsion of all insincerity from the minds of men and from the institutions of our collective life. We shall have to consider these matters later, but there is an undeniable truth in the saying: whoever has the young has the future.

(*d*) *The Struggle Against Inequality.*

In the problem of equality we have, simultaneously with the struggle between past and present, a struggle between the demands of reason and the actual human condition. Here again there is question, not of a few particular defects and shortcomings, but of a radical change in the process of life. In this respect Socialism owes its power to the fact that it is the final term of a struggle that has lasted a thousand years, and it raises this struggle to the rank of a paramount and general issue. The claim of equality, or of the equal treatment of all who contribute to life, is based upon the conviction that inequality means injustice, and that this injustice is intolerable to any fully awakened intelligence. Here more than anywhere else the Socialist system assumes the character of an ethical idealism, since it pursues a demand of reason to its ultimate consequences, affirms these against the most obstinate resistance of experience, and makes everything subordinate to it. And this claim of equality and justice does not apply merely to all individuals, but to every aspect of life; they are all to be regulated in the sense of complete equality.

Here it is impossible not to recognise a serious strain. Existence presents the spectacle of men who are extremely unequal. Nature makes us

unequal both in bodily and mental endowment, and civilisation only adds to the inequalities with its increasing discrimination. What can we say in opposition to this mass of facts? We have nothing to oppose except our power of thought. Everything depends on this single point: on this power which seems so evanescent externally, yet is so mighty internally. Upon it depends the advance of an historical movement that has already had an immense influence, and continues to exercise it. The problem has had a most interesting development, especially when we recall that there are so many kinds of equality: religious, rational, political, socialistic, and Communist. The movement has passed more and more from a non-sensuous to a material form, and has at length deduced social demands from processes of thought.

In the course of history it was at first religion that assailed inequality. From the common relation of all men to God, the fount of all life, it concluded that all men were equal. We need quote only the pregnant words of Luther: "Though we are never equal before the world, yet are we all equal before God, children of Adam, creatures of God; and every man is of the same value as any other." The idea of a common priesthood of the faithful is based upon the same principle. But as the traditional religion drew a sharp distinction between this world and the next, its idea of equality had

no deep influence in secular matters. It did, indeed, bring about a certain alleviation—it created a place in which antagonisms disappeared—but it saw no injustice in inequality. In this it was moved by its confident expectation of happiness in the next world, in which there would be no distinctions; in fact, the poor and oppressed seemed to be entitled to the highest places. Modern Socialism, however, finds no consolation in that doctrine. It is not satisfied with an equality in hope and expectation.

The lead of the historical movement passed from religion to intellectual life; personal standards were replaced by impersonal. In the later ages of the ancient world this had occurred before, but it reached its height at the beginning of the seventeenth century. It based its idea of equality, not on a relation to God, but on the reason which is inherent in all men. Even Descartes appealed to the equality of reason in all men (*rationem quod attinet, quia per illam solam homines sumus, aequalem in omnibus esse facile credo*), and Fichte's idea of the equality of all that has human features was only a development of this.

From the philosophic world the idea of equality now gradually passed into the souls of men, and it began to have practical influence in the world. The movements which preceded the French Revolution at first bore the ensign of political liberty,

not of economic equality, but the idea of equality steadily gained ground and led to intense agitations. It was now conceived in two different senses, a negative and a positive. The negative as well as the positive declared that all men were equal, but it made equality consist essentially in awarding the same formal rights to every individual, including the right to develop by his own powers; the actual inequality of individuals was not disputed. But the idea in its positive form demanded the complete and unreserved equality of all individuals. All inequality it regarded as unjust, as a mere consequence of external circumstances, especially property and education. It was to be abolished by every possible means, and an absolute equality was to be established. During the French Revolution the Gironde held the negative, the Mountain the positive, conception of equality. The final issue of the movement was pure Communism (Babeuf). It was soon forcibly suppressed, but, as is well known, its influence is not at an end.

The idea of equality captured, not merely the individual, but his whole frame of mind and his work, and sank deeper and deeper into his spirit. We need only point to a few instances. The doctrine of equality places the idea of humanity above all distinctions, and uses it as the standard for judging everything. The higher degree of univer-

sality decides upon the value of individual institutions. The whole of the race is preferred to any particular nation, and the whole of a nation to any of its particular elements. As a man derives his importance from the fact that he belongs to humanity, all division into classes must cease. The ideal is a class-less social order.

This leads to a determination to lessen the differences between men as much as possible, if not to obliterate them altogether. This is done in the life of the State, in education, and in the suffrage. The idea of equality becomes a superior standard of value. It compels us to avoid everything that places one man above another, and so lowers a man, not only in the sight of others, but in his own estimation. Great and small are thus knit closely together. The Germans, for instance, have a tendency to create artificial distinctions and divide men into various classes. This is bound to weaken the consciousness of the community, and lessen the interest of some in the whole. Often in our distinction between the schools of the people and the schools of the middle class we forgot the work of building up a common humanity; and in our gradation of lower, middle, and higher officials we lost sight of the general duties of officials. The distinction was carried into the most trivial details. Certain military circles regarded themselves as "superior." Even our universities

were not ashamed to encourage the enormity of a man calling himself a Doctor of such and such a place, in order to make it clear that the older universities regarded themselves as superior. Such facts must be borne in mind by any man who wants to appreciate properly the tremendous power of the movement toward unity. A distinction of that kind is rather political than pædagogical.

There have been great changes in the position of the various classes. Time itself has gone far beyond Socialism; but the Socialists may boast that they first raised the matter to the rank of a principle and developed all its consequences.

This way of thinking not only opposed sharp distinctions between different kinds of human activity, but it could not tolerate the ordinary way of estimating work. For thousands of years intellectual work and manual labour have been regarded as different in value. It seemed to be a proof of idealistic sentiment to put spiritual, especially intellectual, work far above physical and manual. Meantime, however, there has been a considerable change. Even Aristotle, representing the Greek spirit, spoke of the hand as the greatest of implements; and Pestalozzi taught us the importance of the hand in education. In our own time it is at last fully recognised how the two worlds overlap; how all manual labour is permeated with intellectual life. There is far

more use of the mind and technical skill in the ordinary workshop, and the earlier distinction between higher and lower is fast disappearing. Differences of quality have been turned more and more into mere differences of quantity, and the sharp distinction that once existed gives place to a continuous line.

This development involves a material change in the whole social order. For thousands of years it had been customary to divide humanity, under various forms, into a smaller and a far larger half, the distinction being based at one time on race, at another time on personal freedom, at another on property or education, and so on. In Germany not more than five per cent. of our youths obtained full university education. This five per cent. seemed to constitute the main part of our civilisation, and they set the standard for the education of the whole of the people. Much was done to improve this, it is true, and there was a good deal more co-operation of the various classes; but the fact remained that the great majority were only imperfectly developed, often scandalously neglected. There was still a distinction of intellectual classes: a distinction between the educated and the uneducated.

The more earnestly we reflect on this division of humanity, the more urgently we feel compelled to ask whether it is necessary, and whether human

ingenuity and goodwill cannot make an end of it. This question, however, raises the further question of the predominance of the economic factor and its chances of abolishing inequality. The more the effort to secure equality pervades our life, the more painful and intolerable is the stark contradiction between a purely theoretical equality and the actual state of things. It is all very well for individual citizens to get equal rights and to be free to aspire after all sorts of material and intellectual pleasures, but they must have a certain amount of property before they can profit by the right. The man who has no property can do nothing; these good things are to him mere possibilities. The task of maintaining himself is full of care and danger, and these things are bound to embitter the souls of men in proportion as the modern economic development causes sharper contrasts than ever. New York is the city of millionaires, and their number increases steadily; but it has also been established on medical authority in New York that in the year 1914 five per cent. of the children examined were underfed, and that by the year 1919 the proportion had risen to nineteen per cent. Surely such figures give ground for reflection! And the feeling against earlier ages on account of this state of things has grown stronger. What seemed at one time an inevitable fate is now regarded as the culpable work of human

institutions. Class-differences have drifted into class-conflicts.

It is particularly difficult to see how these people without property can rise in the mental scale. A few members of the working class may climb to a higher level, but this is generally due to some fortunate chance or to friendly assistance. This state of things seems not only unjust to the sufferers, but an injury to the race, which ought to entrust the control of its affairs to the best in every class of the population. Much has been done in this direction, but it was left to Socialism to devote its whole strength to the problem and to replace philanthropy by civic and national institutions. Socialism need not overlook the difficulty of these and similar problems. It can freely recognise the limits of economic possibilities. But it makes a considerable difference if we remain far short of those limits, or if we make a serious attempt to push them back and so free a man from his guilt as far as possible.

In this sense the idea of equality is an urgent demand of justice, a triumph of reason over the unreason of human affairs, a victory of the whole race over the interests of particular classes or individuals.

§ 3

A COMMON STRUCTURE

THE claim that we shall base our life entirely upon the present and the demand that we shall develop all forces equally and unite them in an undifferentiated whole constitute a special type of reality, and this needs only a firm structure to triumph over all obstacles. This structure is in Socialism provided by a combination of socialisation and economism. By this means, as in the earlier proposals, life is drawn together more actively and based directly upon human interests, and thus it gains in strength, self-consciousness, and happiness. Let us first consider socialisation, which is the very heart of the Socialist ideal.

(*e*) *The Demand for Socialisation.*

Socialisation alone will give the Socialistic life a definite embodiment. It confidently enters upon a struggle against the distraction and the egoism of individuals. It brings the communal idea out

of the realm of wishes and dreams, realises it, and enables it to dominate the whole life of the race. This strongly organised society will be the standard of all values. Ethical ideas, in particular, will be materially changed when socialisation assigns them a fixed aim and a firm support.

This socialisation promises considerable gains in many ways. In the first place the clearer consciousness of purpose and the linking of individual forces which it brings about through the collective will must make the work of the individual more fruitful and rid it of all restrictions and friction. The whole system will run more smoothly, superfluous things will drop out, and individual faculties will supplement each other and increase each other's productivity.

Yet however valuable this gain may be, it is not the chief thing. This is rather of an ethical character. It is a question of devising a new relation of man both to his fellows and to the object of his labour, and linking him more closely with them. The traditional idea of work makes a man think mainly of his own profit. It impels him to think first of all of himself. There was a cogent reason for this as long as the various spheres of life were divided; as long as every man had his own field or practised his own craft, and enjoyed the fruits of his own labour. This state of things, however, became intolerable when

modern labour developed its divisions. The work was now more and more detached from the workers, and went its own way. Under the lead of technical science it brought the forces of nature to an indefinite extent into the service of man. It made the individual worker defenceless, as its vast industrial aggregations robbed him of his independence, while capital obtained an appalling power and forced him to serve the designs of others. He became simply a piece of merchandise, the value of which was settled by the market. Thus the race drifted into a sharp antithesis of "labour and capital," and the two soon proved irreconcilable enemies.

In face of this there arose amongst the workers the stern struggle for emancipation which is one of the leading features of our time. The workers took their fate into their own hands, and in doing so they attained an inner greatness, an increasing power, and a complete independence. But as long as this split lasted, the worker could take no interest in his work. However he applied his energies, the work was alien to him, in fact hated by him. How this situation led to a great historical movement has been clearly and acutely shown by Marx with the aid of the Hegelian dialectic. According to him the "capitalistic phase" means the first negation of private property based upon one's own work. The course of the

movement has now to negate this negation and to bring on a higher stage by the adjustment of the conflicting elements.

A good deal of this is certainly too dogmatic and summary, but it remains an historical fact that a great part of the race became merely objects and means of labour, not independent subjects; in order to become personalities the whole existing state of things had to be changed. Socialisation is the way to do this. By this means the worker becomes the master, instead of the servant, of his work, and the work can, through the community, attract the interest of the worker. Beyond what is actually achieved, there is a closer union of sentiment, a solidarity of all the comrades. The work loses the impersonal character which they so bitterly resented, or it is at least greatly modified, when a man devotes his whole personality, his whole soul, to the common good, and expresses his own character in his success. We have a confident expectation of a life that will be richer in love and comfort. It is true that religion formerly aimed at this state of things, but its teaching is now disputable and its effort, even where it succeeds, touches the emotions rather than affects the substance of life.

The situation thus brought about by socialisation is in harmony with the whole trend of civilisation. For life everywhere now assumes a super-

individual and super-national character. A world-economy is developing which binds the various nations closer and closer together economically. Our science spreads over the whole world, and even our religions mitigate, if they do not abolish, their old antagonisms. The race seeks salvation more and more in communal life, and arranges its work more connectedly. Now is the time to strive earnestly to bring about the league of nations projected two hundred years ago by that noble philanthropist, the Abbé de Saint Pierre (1713–1717), to make an end of war and its horrible injuries to the common weal, to establish an alliance of mutual profit and friendship between all peoples. Thus the humanitarian sentiments inspired by socialisation give us both a firm and a tangible ground of hope. Working on these ideas, man can advance along purely human lines and find his greatest height in himself.

(*f*) *The Demand for an Economism.*

Thus socialisation opens out a great prospect. But have we the means to realise so vast a plan? Will not the idealism which we have described be wrecked on the stubbornness of the material conditions which dominate our lives and work? Will not the spiritual fall before the power of the material? Such a fate is inevitable unless material

and spiritual are more intimately combined, and reason takes the lead. This is to be secured by economisation, as Socialism understands it, which is closely connected with socialisation. In this there is to be a full recognition of the overwhelming importance of the economic task, but at the same time the meaning of it is to be altered and ennobled. Let us see what the historic movement has to do in this respect, and what changes the lapse of time has brought about.

At first man was dominated entirely by the need of physical self-preservation. He had to wrest his sustenance from a nature that was sometimes friendly and sometimes hostile, but was at all events indifferent to him. It was only later that other tasks became attractive to him, and acquired an independent value. The first thing was, in the words of Aristotle, to live (ζῆν); then one might think of living well (εὖ ζῆν). For this it is necessary for a civilised people to follow a definite line. As is well known, Greek culture has in this respect had a profound influence on us; Aristotle especially has clearly formulated the ideal that has dominated the last two thousand years. He distinguished plainly between the useful, which is concerned only with self-preservation, and the beautiful, which gives life value and joy. The main thing here seemed to be to make the whole range of life active, yet not to leave particular

achievements side by side, but to unite them all in a collective work which should have for its aim the complete satisfaction, the happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*), of all.

This ideal comprises two elements: the substantial content and the conditions of life. The former consists in the inner excellence, whilst the external advantages are, not ends in themselves, but conditions, which take their value from the life-content. At the same time it assigns them a strict limit, and this limit a rational life which is to afford genuine happiness must not transgress. This clear distinction between end and means applied also to the ideal society which Aristotle, in conformity with Greek ideas, conceives as a narrowly limited City-State or communal State. As this State depends on the individuals, the aims of the State are in complete harmony with those of the individuals. Neither individual nor community must make concern about material things its chief business. The indefinite craving of the individual is a lower impulse that must be checked in every way, and all hunting after money for its own sake must be branded a dangerous aberration. And as this ideal regards economic activity merely as a means to higher ends, it does not bring the two together in one whole and cannot recognise any particular economic legislation.

This distinction passed on to the Christian

world. Religion brought about a good deal of improvement and mitigation of the old conditions, but the teaching of Aristotle remained the chief guide, and his attack upon usury was transplanted into Christian soil by Lactantius. The chief concern now, however, was the soul; material possessions were deemed to be of much inferior value. There was much in this that restricted and caused a decay of economic life. It was divided into particular transactions which had no common aim. Labour was confined within narrow channels, and had very limited aims, so that production on a large scale ceased, and great wealth became impossible. The individual was weak, and needed an economic organisation to protect him, as the Guilds did. The mainspring of trade was individual covetousness, and this was enough of itself to restrict the full recognition of economic activity. Thus medieval life had narrow limits. Even in this respect its world was supposed to be settled once for all. There was no impulse to bring about large changes or to set life flowing in a continuous stream.

It is well known that the close of the Middle Ages witnessed a great change. We are, in fact, still in the midst of the movement that was then initiated. There was, in the first place, a new impulse given to life and a technical improvement of the economic life. The fact that life won a

larger control of and action upon the world was bound to modify the estimate of the value of material possessions. From this point onward they ceased to be regarded as mere means and incidental things, and they became integral parts of life. The distinction between means and end is found to be unsatisfactory and not in accord with the realities of life. The inner and outer must rather be in a condition of reciprocity. And as the belief in the possibility of an indefinite enrichment of life makes greater headway against the traditional unprogressive idea, it is felt that material possessions must not merely give occupation to our existing powers; they must help to make life larger, stronger, and happier. They become so many levers for lifting a dull existence out of its rut and setting it in motion. This leads to a change in fundamental ideas. Hitherto the beautiful had been considered far superior to the useful, but the useful is now cleansed of the stain that it was supposed to have; it is ennobled and becomes a spur to action. Life as a fixed thing gives place to an idea of indefinite increase of strength; its increasing rise becomes a further incentive to effort. Men now propose to exploit all resources, open out every possibility, transform life more and more from a small enclosed province into a ceaselessly advancing evolution.

But the complexion of this vital order of power

and progress has materially changed in the course of modern times. It has passed more and more from the immaterial, the ideal, to the material and tangible. The intellectual and speculative activity which opened the modern phase becomes to an increasing extent a mere means of compelling the material world to serve man's designs. The spiritual was at first an independent value, but it is drawn into closer relation to life. The traditional idealism gives place to a resolute realism. This is, doubtless, accompanied, even pervaded, by standards of value, but its chief concern is the visible world.

This state of things gives economic life a preponderance in man's aims and conduct. A man will concern himself only about what can claim full reality; all enterprise must confine itself to this. The older mode of life had greatly depreciated economic life; the new made it the very heart of things. Individual thinkers put it differently, and adopted different lines, but behind them all was the leading characteristic of the time, and it gave an immense productive power to thought. Adam Smith very clearly showed that economic aims, with their concentration upon self-maintenance, entirely dominated the individual, and gave a peculiar complexion even to his work in the spiritual provinces of life—religion, education, etc.—but Socialism carried this beyond the in-

dividual and extended it to the general movement of the world. In this way it founded a special philosophy of history (Engels) which might very well be called economic or materialistic. It purports to have discovered that economic interests are the mainsprings of the historical movement and of all progress; that it is not ideas, as independent forces, but the interests of life, which control the whole. This not only gave us a new picture of history, and opened out a good deal of surprising insight into the relations between its various processes. It also materially improved conduct, because it plainly indicated and strengthened the chief roots of conduct. Here, quite clearly, appearance yields to reality: imagination is replaced by the force of real powers.

Socialism wholeheartedly adopts this historical movement. Its life has a realistic and empirical character. It confines itself to the world that is directly accessible to us. But it changes the situation considerably because, while it fully recognises the preponderance of the economic element, it transfers it from the individuals and makes it the business of the whole race. In this way the material is ennobled and moralised; the immaterial is strengthened. The material may be the starting point, even the centre, but it is capable of further development. The two elements combine, as soul and body do, to form a single

and complete reality which promises to meet the wishes of all. The merciless struggle of individuals can thus be transformed by socialisation into a lofty concern for the common weal: indisputable aims can be disentangled from the chaos of conflicting individual designs. In this light material things are seen to be two-edged weapons; they may serve a good or a bad purpose according to the use made of them. They are not used for good by the individual with a subjective intention, however high-minded he may be, but must be employed collectively on Socialist lines. This is the way to settle the old conflict and to make a harmonious whole of life.

Socialism feels that in these ideals it is far superior to the traditional systems. The older order wished to render collective service, but it could not win the co-operation of individuals, and there was therefore a painful clash between the collective aims and the designs of individuals. There was no inner truth in the body as a whole, and it fell into a psychic dualism. This antagonism was abolished by the modern system by making life fluid once more and presenting illimitable possibilities to it, but the forces which had been unchained enter into a new antagonism in the course of time, and we get the antithesis of work and soul which at present rends our life. Socialism promises to end the confusion by completely

reconciling the aim of the whole with the instincts of individuals, by teaching each to regard the whole as his business and his work; and at the same time it blends the sensuous and the spiritual into a common life under the lead of economic interests. The material is no longer to be regarded in our philosophy of life as something inferior and contemptible. Man ennobles it, and raises the value of reality, by associating it inseparably with the common good. By the co-operation of the two aspects he brings about a Monism of life which is superior to the antithesis of end and means, and he transforms the whole of reality into a progressive evolution. Thus all movements are made to converge to one dominating central point.

Looking back on all that we have so far seen, we realise that Socialism means a turning point such as the world never saw before. It is not that particular things are changed, but the entire process of life has departed from the traditional model. A new epoch has been opened in history. The ideal has even changed our conceptions, and involved very material transvaluations of values. This has, of course, not been done suddenly. Socialism derived its strength largely from the fact that modern times as a whole had experienced great changes; and these changes were gradual, and often associated with reactions. The specific

work of Socialism was that it raised these partial changes to the position of a whole and a matter of principle, and it boldly deduced the logical conclusions. It takes us back to the simple, elementary, and immediate, yet transforms the whole, and gives life a predominant character of truth and reality, and a reality that can be fully developed only on its own lines.

In the first place this ideal of life demands a concentration of effort under the guidance of a common goal; it will have no breaking up into fragments. It strives to attain this goal in spite of all obstacles, and this of itself furnishes a common standard of value. A further development is yielded by the idea of humanity in its social form. The relation to the universe is set aside, and man is thrown upon his own resources. This leads to a new type of life in every branch, involving ever new demands, and all taken together make up a new sort of reality. This in turn leads to a new frame of mind and new standards of value. The centre of gravity is placed in the present time, and the past is as far as possible converted into the present. The pulse of life beats faster. All separation of classes must be abandoned as far as possible, and all men be treated on a basis of equality. Here again we have to bring reality as near as we can to man and his sentiments. We have, in fine, just seen

how the structure of the whole is completed by a combination of socialisation and economism.

It is characteristic of this system that it appeals to the world of facts, yet has inspired a great movement. That could not be done without rejecting a good many outworn and effete things that had sheltered under the protection of the past. Naturally, this negative feature was at first very much in the foreground, but a close examination of the matter will show that the negation is in the interest of an affirmation. There is much drowsiness to be shaken, much improvement to be made, much misery to be relieved. There is still full truth in the words of Goethe:

> "The load of misery and pain yet wrings
> The hearts of men in many a quiet home.
> Outcast they seem—fortune hath cast them out."

But a new stream of life is flowing. It means a vigorous concentration, a greater animation, of the whole human condition. It combines a firm belief in the power of man, a confident hope of a better future for the race, an untiring zeal for society, a self-sacrificing love of one's fellows. Can we wonder that this ideal spurns the thought of resignation, or that it stirs the souls of men, especially the men who suffer oppression and want?

A VIEW
OF LIFE
AS A WHOLE

CHAPTER III

A VIEW OF LIFE AS A WHOLE

So far we have allowed the Socialist ideal to speak for itself and to instruct us as to its aims. That is the only way to understand properly both its affirmation and its negation. We have now to form our own opinion on it, and to take up a clear position in regard to what we have seen. For this purpose we require a firm standard of judgment, as otherwise the whole matter is left to parties and individuals with their differences and antagonisms; and we have experience enough to-day of the helpless and intolerable position in which that puts us. But where shall we find this standard if not in man himself? Only human nature in the entirety of its development can rescue us from the chances and changes of opinion and enable us to form an independent judgment upon what is occurring in and around us. But the very thing which promises to help us is at once seen to be itself a problem that

urgently requires examination. We can easily see that the life of man does not run on a single plane. It has various strata and different aims. To understand these strata satisfactorily and plainly distinguish between them is an essential condition of clearing up our own ideas and forming an opinion upon the ideal of life. And when we consider this series of strata, we see that it is only in their graduation that we have a firm standard for judging human life and its conditions. There are three such stages: the fundamental stratum, the condition of human life, and the historical movement.

(*a*) *The Fundamental Stratum.*

We start from the fundamental idea of life as it is common to man and all other living creatures. Life is a great fact, and at the same time a great riddle that defies every attempt to solve it. The chief point that we have to consider here is the appearance of various stages in it. There is such a thing as a life bound up with nature and a life of spontaneous activity. The former is part of the chain of causation which is reproduced in our experience; the latter is revealed in man alone, having an activity of its own and opening out new relations to man. The one we call nature, the other spirit or

the spiritual world: the one means for us mere existence, the other a world of action. The spiritual world clearly presupposes existence as its foundation, and rises above it as a higher stage.

These two categories have very different features. Existence consists of separate elements which are merely connected externally with each other. The world of action, on the contrary, produces inner connections. Its elements are members of a whole which confers on them a characteristic life. Thus the standards of value of the two stages are quite different. In the one case the elements merely attract and repel each other, and their work is confined to a reciprocal exchange of energy. In the other life is an independent province; it can create a content and engender a self-sufficiency.

This self-sufficiency and creation of a content involve certain demands. They require in the self-sufficiency a certain discrimination, a distinction between object and state. There thus arises an antithesis which is both to be controlled and to be retained, and it will then communicate an inward movement to life. It is only by overcoming this cleavage that life can be complete in itself, be orientated toward itself, engage its own attention, and take itself for its task and work. That this movement is effected

by a cleavage and the maintenance thereof is seen, not only by a thorough examination of the whole situation, but from the fact that it constitutes the two forces, truth and freedom, the great agencies of our effort and makes them inseparable companions. From this arises a characteristic feature of life with which no enterprise can dispense without losing its spiritual character.

(*b*) *The Vital Condition of Mankind.*

But beyond this fundamental character and its maintenance human life exhibits a special state. It contains acute contradictions which must not be treated as final, but which press us on urgently to further work; though in this they merely evince the incompleteness of the whole situation.

The distinction between nature and spirit, existence and a world of action, is of the essential structure of life; but beyond this distinction there appears a contradiction between the power and the validity of the two. The spiritual purports to be the higher, not merely in the thoughts and hearts of men, but in its creation of special standards and values, even of an independent reality. In our world, however, it is inseparably bound up with nature, and shares its fortunes. The order of nature treats the conduct of the

spiritual being as a matter of complete indifference, and the various phases of life are measured entirely according to the demands of nature. Man may strive to give a certain power to the spiritual in his own province, but, however eager the will, there are limits fixed. What purports to be higher is permanently subject to the power of nature. Great changes in the material world seem to put an end to the spiritual, and seem to make of it merely a concomitant phenomenon. Nevertheless it is impossible for the human effort to sacrifice the independence and intrinsic value of the spiritual life without destroying it at its roots. How shall we escape this contradiction which distracts our lives ?

To this contradiction between nature and spirit we must add an even greater within the psychic life itself. The psychic life exhibits many movements and tendencies, and these tendencies are frequently divergent from and contradictory to each other. The vital instinct may be opposed to the higher aim. Frightful perversions, not merely in individuals, but in the whole race, are not only possible, but actual facts. We thus get the problem of evil. On the one hand it may be held to prove an independence of life, but on the other hand it means a lamentable obstruction and confusion. Human life seems,

not merely in the theories of thinkers, but in its own development to drift into a fierce struggle against itself. How shall we extricate ourselves from this contradiction?

This profound confusion shows that our human manner of life is not the whole of reality, but a special category of it in a special condition. It must be related to something larger, and only in virtue of this can it possess any meaning and derive the necessary power. Religion adopts this way. It leads beyond a special province to a new stage of life; a stage that transcends these contradictions and opens out new contents and new forces. Hence the whole of reality which is accessible to men falls into three stages: a fundamental stage, a stage of conflict, and a stage of victorious spirituality. The first is the pre-requisite and foundation of all spirituality; the second is the chief theatre of man's activity; the third completes the scheme and promises the power to overcome. It is this last which alone furnishes human life with its indispensable support and an indisputable goal. But this leads to a considerable strain, as the victorious spirituality seeks complete independence and intrinsic value, whilst the province of work shows us spirituality only in a bound condition. This prompts the question which of them it is that mainly decides the character of our world. Will there be an

independent stage of spirituality superior to the world, or will man never pass beyond the condition of severe and unceasing conflict?

Our human realm exhibits this independent spirituality, this complete self-sufficiency of life, only in certain features, but it sufficiently shows that this stage is active in us, and that it is wholly necessary for the spiritual self-preservation of humanity. This is done in two ways: by the construction of a personality superior to and embracing the world and by the opening of a kingdom of God which essentially transcends the entire political and social order. But however unmistakable may be the action of this independent spirituality, its actual shape is determined by the forms and limits of the world of work. Hence a man has to be content with figures of speech and suggestions, and the heart needs a heroism that confidently sustains its affirmation in spite of all contradiction. All these things exhibit the human condition in great achievements, but under very severe restrictions. There is clearly a pervasive movement of the whole, but the condition of the world does not entirely pass into this movement. There is an unquestionable irrationality in reality. Every theory of life must take that into account.

A further stage of the spiritual life arises with the appearance of history, which again is peculiar

to man. We may distinguish between passive and active history: the passive history which merely records what happens to man, the active history which has to do with what he, as a member of a world of action, makes of things and of himself. The combination of the two constitutes human history proper, in which actions and events, deliberate doings and mere happenings, are closely interwoven; but the driving force is in the deliberate actions. They have a special character. They may do nothing for the whole if they are mere individual achievements; or they may not be able to pass beyond certain narrow limits without disclosing at once greater and firmer connections and creating independent provinces and realities of life. These vital connections again have a special history. They not only develop an enduring character, but they have to struggle vigorously against resistance, and they can only become full realities after further development and self-experience. In the human field, moreover, they are apt to rise and decay, and they relate a man in various ways to his proper task. At first conduct is greatly influenced by a higher range of facts and connections, such as environment, tradition, and the conditions of life. It is only in the course of time that individuals make themselves completely independent of these, and life as a whole reaches

its highest point. Later, individuals obtain complete control, and they, in the main, fashion the province of life according to their own ideas and aims. Thus in spiritual productiveness we may distinguish an objectivist and a subjectivist stage, or a pre-conscious and a post-conscious stage. But beyond this antithesis and at the decisive point there is a fully conscious height of productiveness, upon which all vital movements converge. Here alone is there an insight into an independent and self-contained reality, a sustained effort, a direct contact with the creative depths of life; here alone can life transcend its temporary limitations and assume a timeless character. These classical heights seem externally to last only a short time. They may be regarded as rare festivals of humanity. But they really have a permanent influence, and thousands of years afterwards they live on their accumulated treasures.

The history of civilisation shows us three great vital contacts of this kind: the ancient world with its emphasis on colour and form, the Christian-religious world with its deepening of souls, and the modern world with its exploitation and intensification of force. In other words, form, character, and force are the chief vehicles of the movement. Each of them attains its peculiar and self-sufficient reality; each of them has its

characteristic procedure, its own experience, and its special aims. They are higher currents of life with which all fruitful productiveness has to come to terms. It is only by contact with these currents of life that one can pass beyond a state of indecisive activity and attain a deep-rooted progressiveness and genuine truth. The movement and conflict of these currents form the theatre of the history of the spirit.

But, whatever these movements may accomplish beyond history, on the historical level the forces wear themselves out. We have to recognise a self-destruction as well as a rise of civilisations. It would mean the tragic end of all human enterprise if the life of the spirit were wholly embodied in the movement of a civilisation; if there were not a victorious independent spirituality, raised high above, to convert the succession of civilisations into a real co-operation. The work of man has, however, to deal directly with the separate realities of life, and the actual condition of any age is mainly determined by the attitude of the race toward these realities.

(*c*) *The Present Situation.*

In relation to these movements the life and effort of the present occupy a very characteristic position. At the moment several different

worlds meet each other in us: conflicting currents struggle with each other around us. The spiritual power that possesses the average man in our day is the spirit of the eighteenth century, with its high appreciation of reason and its special attention to the purposeful and useful. Deriving its chief features from the seventeenth century, it was fully developed, and secured spiritual dominion, in the eighteenth. There was then a furious resistance to it, but in the course of its development it effected most important, in fact decisive, achievements (the *Sturm und Drang* movement, classicism, and Romanticism) the spiritual content of which far transcends the movement itself. While, however, these things have captured the higher intellectual world, they have no influence on the mass of people of our time. It is true that the chief feature of our time is still that of the eighteenth century, though it has in the meantime been very much modified; but there is an undeniable gulf between what appeals to the majority and what is appreciated in higher circles. Even in these higher circles, moreover, there is a lack of unity and continuity, so that it is not strange that in the conflict the masses prevail over the few. The actual condition of life binds us to a good deal to which we feel ourselves superior, yet which we dare not abandon.

Upon this feeble and distracted age there now comes the mighty agitation caused by the stubborn persistence of the social problem and the rise of Socialism to power. This event not only divides the race into opposite camps; it may revolutionise the whole condition of life. Socialism derives great strength from the fact that it wrests the problem of life from the movements, experiences, and wishes of the immediate present, and purports to illumine and refashion everything from a single point of view. All that has gone before is, in its esteem, only a preparation for the present. It confines itself strictly to life as we know it in experience. Man is the centre of the whole: man without any addition or artificial fringes. But he receives his special character and life from his surroundings, his social environment; and his chief task is to bring about a new social order which promises to revolutionise, ennoble, and uplift all the conditions of life. The whole movement of the race tends toward this ideal as to a peak that closes its horizon.

When we turn to a critical appreciation of this movement as a whole, we must first distinguish between the larger idea of the Socialist movement, which is found in all existing nations, and the detailed form which it assumes in any particular nation, especially the German; and

at the same time we must notice the threads which connect the two. We must not lose sight of the peculiar position of the Socialist movement in Germany. Precisely as a result of its victorious progress it has developed many complications in its own body. In the early days the Socialist movement met with stern resistance and a good deal of misunderstanding. It was not without its martyrs. It is not therefore surprising that hopes and wishes went far beyond the possibilities, and that a glorious light poured over everything, that a golden heaven seemed to be opening.

Then experience made itself clearly felt with its difficulties. Once again it was realised that ideas can easily live together in the mind, but things not so easily in space. The happy honeymoon was soon over for Socialism; the limitations of hard facts, and still more of men's minds, became acutely perceptible. It is precisely this fact which makes it necessary, nay imperative, to study the problem of life thoroughly and see how far Socialism is able to meet the spiritual condition of humanity. For in the long run it is human nature as a whole that passes judgment on every attempt to improve it.

This question cannot be solved unless we bear clearly in mind the chief stages which we found in man's condition. It is absolutely necessary

to compare these stages and their achievements and requirements with the ideal that is put before us. This ideal must meet the demands which life as a whole, with the three chief elements of its graduation, makes on man. We have therefore to inquire (1) whether the deeper layer of human life is seen with sufficient clearness in the chaos of the immediate impression, and whether it provides definite guiding lines for thought and conduct: (2) whether the particular experiences of human nature with all their complexities and contradictions can be adequately recognised, and whether the problems thus raised are capable of a satisfactory solution: (3) how far the ideal offered to us is adapted to the spiritual movement of humanity, and assimilates this into its own work and efforts. It is far beyond my present purpose to answer these questions systematically and deductively, yet we must face them seriously. They must be the main position to which we shall return at every stage, and from the point of view of which we must pass judgment. The chief question is how far the reality presented to us meets the requirements of the case, at what points and in what directions it goes beyond them, and what methods must be pursued in regard to it. It is therefore a question of comparing the necessities which are inherent in our life with the solution offered to

us, and of establishing their rights and wrongs. We will therefore now take in detail the various parts of the Socialist ideal, and enter the very heart of the mighty struggle that is going on around us.

EXAMINATION
OF THE
SOCIALIST IDEAL

UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA

CHAPTER IV

EXAMINATION OF THE SOCIALIST IDEAL

§ 1

THE QUESTION OF THE UNITY AND HARMONY OF LIFE

THERE is not the slightest doubt that humanity to-day urgently needs an inner harmony and a settled goal. Socialism derives considerable strength from the fact that it fully recognises this situation. But the situation is one thing; the remedy of it is another. The Socialist remedy is to make the economic well-being of society our chief aim. To this purpose it subordinates all others; from this point of view it hopes to cover every province of life. In its support it can quote a formidable array of facts. In the first place physical and economic well-being is a necessary condition of human prosperity. Grave evil is done by neglecting it. Further, it

is not a mere question of conditions, but of constant contacts and relations of this side of life to its entire development. The older idealism treated the material, including the economic, as a subordinate requirement, but experience has shown that the material intervenes in the vital development of the spiritual, and that it is far more than a mere means to an end. To this extent it is unquestionable that the different aspects of life must be taken together.

But it is a question whether these things are all on the same plane; whether we have not to distinguish between leading and following groups, and whether our life is not very definitely graduated in stages. Even the economic view of life cannot escape the fact that our life shows a broad division: a life bound up with the senses and a life that is independently active, a merely existing world and a world of action. The one has its roots in sensation, the other in thought.

This leads to different points of view and tendencies. In the one case life is in a world of sense that embraces it; in the other case it may take up an attitude of opposition to the world of sense and follow lines of its own. As a result of this we get radically different standards of value without any common measure. On the one side are instincts, ideas, conditions that do not materially go beyond those of the animals

which are nearest to us: a sheer, blind actuality of events, an unending stream of action and reaction, a casual juxtaposition of elements, a restriction to particular impressions and impulses. On the other side is an effort to attain a connected system of ideas, a power of associating and dissociating, judging and selecting, the emergence of contents which refer life to itself and bind together particular actions by means of common aims. On the one side a predominance of the world of sense with all its fortuitousness and transitoriness and slavery to the impression of the moment; on the other the capacity to construct one's own plans and carry them through in spite of all obstacles, to control one's impulses from a higher point of view and bring them into subjection to standards of conduct. It is only action of this kind that can oppose the ideals of civilisation to the world of sense, bring it under the dominion of man, convert the mere contiguity of individuals into a firm social order, and link the succession of moments in an enduring history.

It is therefore beyond question that there are different stages in the life of man. These must be brought into relation to each other, but this relation must not be one of direct confluence. There must be a division, so that each type shall develop its peculiar qualities and give effect to them. Merely bringing the two together does

not provide a connection between them or give us a dominant unity. But the connection suggested by Socialism confuses the two stages, and yields no superior and comprehensive unity. All its fundamental ideas are on this account obscured, if not ambiguous.

This is particularly clear in the case of its conception of the collective life, which transcends everything else. This collective life differs entirely according as spirit or nature provides the standard for it and controls its main features. There is a wide difference between a mere society and a community with some internal connectedness; life is forced to take very different paths in the two cases. If the collectivitism of men is merely a matter of living side by side, the various elements may indeed be in contact with each other, but they cannot help each other; whereas if there is an inner communism, we get the action of a higher whole. If there is mere contiguity, we may have an occasional concentration, but it cannot effect any material changes and improvements. And since these are absolutely required, there must be a force at work in man that is something more than mere existence, a force that engenders a world of activity. Socialism has no means of recognising such a world of action.

The more closely we consider this, the more clearly we discover a flagrant contradiction in the

fundamental elements of its ideal. It wants to create a structure which is superior to the individuals, and all its wishes and hopes are centred in this, but what it constructs can never be more than a bringing together of separate elements without any inner connection. It thus comes to be divided in its own body. Its ideal of the whole demands a world of action, and puts in on the lines of self-direction and spirit; but in its actual development it imitates the mere contiguity of the material world and is bound up with it. The consequence is that it contains several different ideals of life which are not reconciled with each other. Even the happiness it offers is marred by this division. The whole body is to be as happy as possible; but what is the nature of the happiness if in the end it means merely the welfare of individuals, if it does not evolve a realm of goodness and truth out of the turmoil of interests and enable human nature to participate in it? Quantity, it seems, is to replace quality; but is that done so easily? Do we not find ourselves in entirely different worlds? Socialism wants a community, but can only attain a comradeship.

Thus the situation is extremely unsatisfactory as far as unity and connection are concerned. In spite of all concentration the individuals are inwardly separated from each other. If the economic task is held to be a supreme aim uniting

the various provinces of life, this means that their qualities will be restricted and stunted. A certain relation—in fact a union—is proved on one particular level of life, but this level is not the whole of life; it is not even the main level, the level which determines its meaning and value. We have already seen that there are far greater and more difficult duties. We certainly cannot regard the actual situation, with all its contradictions, as final, but we can only escape from it by means of progressive productiveness, an uplifting revolution, a comprehensive remoulding of reality.

The Socialist ideal will not solve this problem. It can find stones for the building and stimulate people to work; but it cannot either design or create the entire structure. Indeed, as regards the problem of the unification of life the Socialist ideal achieves precisely the opposite of what it intended. It wishes to bind men together more closely and make an end of all gulfs between them, but as it builds only from without, not from within, and has no higher life to offer, the individuals will inevitably diverge more and more from each other. Any one of them may impose his conception of life upon the others. There will be an increasing dispersion until in the end some force brings the situation to a close. You get at last the demand for a dictation of

the proletariat; but what is the use of a dictatorship when there is no supreme dictator? This Socialist effort to secure unity is only another illustration of the old truth that you get a particularly large amount of conflict out of an inadequate attempt to bring about unity. Socialism therefore does not go deep enough into the roots of life. It overlooks the immense complications, and also the immense possibilities, that human life bears within itself. Instead of the whole of life it takes up only a certain section; a section that may in special circumstances passionately agitate the race, but can never permanently satisfy it. Real unity can never be attained by bringing individuals together externally. It can only be secured by a high and comprehensive world of action. This only will enable us to rise above our actual situation.

§ 2

EXAMINATION OF THE SOCIALIST IDEALISM

Socialism hopes to bring about more unity in life by directing efforts immediately to man and his welfare, making him the measure of all things, and removing from him all restrictions and interferences. This concentration upon man is in harmony with one of the chief features of modern life in the sense that the elevation of man to the position of central point of the spiritual movement distinguishes our age clearly from earlier ages. Formerly man was regarded as a member or a part of a comprehensive whole, whether this was held to be the universe (cosmos) or a kingdom of God. In either case the whole seemed to give life its substance and its value. Our age, on the contrary, starts from man, and seeks to understand the world through him and distribute life according to its own powers. This modern tendency, however, passes through various stages and has had very varied results. The chief aim of it was to bridge the gulf which had been caused by the division

into a simple and a spiritually active stage between man and the world. This was first attempted intellectually in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They thought that they were strong enough to bind the two closely and conduct their vitality to man.

Kant's critical system, with its disintegration of the idea of reality, altered all this. It placed the centre of gravity of life in moral conduct, which thus rose to the rank of an independent world and ascribed to human nature and its freedom an infinite value, though it did not include the whole substance of life. The separation that was thus effected led in a remarkable way to a speculative attempt to derive the whole of reality from man's productive powers. As time went on it was found that this was an excessive strain of man's faculties, and thus man and the world fell apart, and the problem of their relation arose once more.

In the meantime a situation had developed which tended to confine man more and more to his own circle. In the eighteenth century itself the world at large came to be considered more and more merely the environment of the human province. Then Positivism gave a scientific form to the feeling, cut the inner connection of man with the world, and restricted interest entirely to the human sphere. Socialism follows the

same tendency, but it completes it by a stronger emphasis on man's own achievements, as we see them in the subjection of nature by scientific and technical work and in the construction of a new social order. Thus armed, man seems to be in a position to rely entirely upon himself and secure truth and happiness for his life.

But this is not done quite so easily and smoothly as it would appear. Such a solution has profound consequences both for man's inward condition and his activity. It imposes upon him certain limits which cannot be satisfactory to any thoughtful person. When a man is thrown entirely upon himself, the only goal he can set up is his own comfort and welfare, the happiness of his subjective experience. But this goal is quite inadequate for any thoughtful man whose mind is fully developed. According to Socialist ideas it often looks as if a life not overburdened with work, free from care, and attended by intellectual enjoyment would meet all one's requirements. It may seem so to men who are overburdened with work and have to struggle hard for their maintenance, but this can be regarded as a final state only by the man who treats his spiritual nature as a thing of no consequence and spiritual activity merely as a luxury and distraction, not as an inward necessity, a compelling impulse to self-maintenance. The spiritual

activity loses its power to uplift when it is regarded as simply an appendage to a life that is of a fundamentally different character. Even the finer type of comfort and enjoyment will, in a detached subject, turn into an inward emptiness, which in the long run will prove less tolerable than care and want, struggle and pain. Ancient Epicureanism showed this two thousand years ago, and Socialistic Epicureanism will show the same thing.

To meet this intolerable emptiness men turned to work, in order to derive from it a worthy aim for their lives. The nineteenth century in particular produced a fine and very successful idealism of work in this sense. With a feverish exaltation of all its forces and a concentration of all its interests it brought the whole of life into subjection to work, but its very success made its defects clear to everybody, and awakened fresh concern about the soul. That put wind into the sails of Socialism, but, as it recognised no soul beyond one's subjective experience, it could give man as a whole no purpose and no substance. The average man therefore remained in a state of restless and helpless vacillation between the two movements. Such distraction and emptiness could not possibly produce great personalities or excite original productiveness.

The problem is now clear to all. Above and

beyond all particular questions and tasks is the problem of man as a whole. It can only be approached with any prospect of success if we take it in its historical connection and bring about a real revolution. We need new possibilities: a new attitude of man toward reality. The men of earlier times started from the world as a whole, and life was thus deprived of its full freedom and originality; we of modern times started from freedom and originality, and our life had no firm substance or settled truth. It threatened continually to fall into the merely subjective and personal. We have now to bring freedom and truth closer together. That can only be done by radically altering our conception of man and bridging over the gulf between him and the world, by recognising in man himself a cosmic life and raising him from the depths of his being to a creative height. This gives us a new idea of man as a whole. It includes the two stages, nature and spirit; but it is characteristic of the spiritual stage that it brings together the individual element and the collective life, and in combination they form an independent vital concentration, a spiritual energy, which is essentially different from that of the elements in nature owing to its being based upon collective life..

The fact that there is in man an individual element as well as a cosmic life, and that some

relation between the two is possible, gives us a distinctive life-process which must control the shaping of our ideals. It is only when productiveness is not opposed to the world, but kept within it, that the conception of the content of life has any clear meaning; only then can there be a construction of reality; only then can the wild desire of life be tamed and, amidst the strain of action, a self-containedness of life, an inner unity, a calm outlook, an independent productivity become possible. The chief provinces and tendencies of life—science and art, religion and law—do then not mean the work of detached points, but they are witnesses to a higher collective force. It is true that such an advance as this can, in view of the limitations of human nature, only proceed gradually, but the main fact remains, that there is in man a movement toward these goals, and that it reveals to us a new relation of reality to the whole.

There may even be collective experiences which are at the same time direct experiences of man as a spiritual being. The antithesis of truth and freedom may no longer trouble us with its discord, because man, as the agent of a productive life, may directly share in both. In such a situation his life acquires an indubitable meaning and a high value. There are other consequences, of various kinds. In such a situation as this a

spiritual culture may succeed in overcoming the antagonism of work and concern for one's welfare. From this point of view also we can successfully meet the intellectualism which has done so much harm in modern times. Intellectual activity may still remain one of the chief parts of the spiritual life, but it is within, not opposed to, a higher productivity. Man and the world no longer diverge from each other; they are bound together by an inner movement. Mankind is no longer lonely, abandoned in a dark and inaccessible world; this movement may bring light and make the connection closer. This gives us a new idea of life and civilisation, based upon a new idea of the world and strengthening this by its power.

All these problems find the Socialistic ideal without a solution. When it tries to solve them it falls into serious errors. The last term of these errors is the humanitarian idealism which pervades the whole ideal. It treats man as a superior value, and it wants to direct every effort toward him; but it can find no basis for this value. It falls into the contradiction of treating man as a mere piece of reality and transferring to this piece of the world that appreciation which belongs only to a standard of value.

This procedure is always dangerous, as it attributes the claims of the ideal man to the empirical man. This is bound to lower considerably every standard

of life and inspire a superficial optimism. It also causes a disposition to shelve all problems that are very difficult, and to cast as far as possible upon the external circumstances of life the complications which it cannot ignore. In this way friend and foe are apt to be judged by different standards. It seems sometimes as if misunderstanding were confined to opponents, and the members of the party were considered blameless and faultless. Let us rather have a firm faith in the spiritual and divine in human nature, and not this blind belief in man's ordinary self.

Socialistic idealism is eager to ensure the progress as far as possible of individuals, but it injures the race by lowering the standard, and, when that is done, individuals also must suffer. We have painful evidence of the result daily. In fact, this confusion of human nature with man's actual condition makes the life of the whole community vapid and one-sided. The Socialist ideal has certainly the great merit of bringing men into closer association and making them stronger and more active in this way. There is still much to be done in this important direction. But the work ought to be preceded by the generation of spiritual standards and forces. It must not be the first task, though it has an indisputable right to the second place. We must not measure spiritual standards by ordinary human nature, but the

reverse. We cannot make man the standard without regarding his welfare as the supreme goal, without making everything relative and subjective, without treating the inward state of life as a secondary matter, without appreciating all that is done only in so far as it contributes to the comfort of the individual.

While, therefore, the Socialist ideal will remove many evils and effect many improvements, promote education, and mitigate the crudities and injustices of the existing order, it remains true that its tendency to treat the spiritual substance of life merely as a means to advance the welfare of men is very injurious. Spirit or man, uplift of human nature or the welfare of individuals—that is a question that will not be evaded. Socialism decides for man. But all spiritual activity that is not regarded as an independent value is lost; as a mere means this kind of life cannot attain the inward compulsion, the inner joy and uplift, the power of self-preservation, so that the soul be moved to grasp it, and turn it into original and constructive activity. Such a life is condemned to spiritual sterility. It does not sufficiently rouse man from his lethargy and stagnation. It places before the soul no inexorable "Either—Or." It may be fully occupied with political and social questions and devote a passionate zeal to them, but it brings down every question to the level

of the politics of the day, of economic interests, of parties; it does not consult the inner man, the entirety of human nature. But what will become of man when material things are all to him? When he loses himself by always looking outwards?

All this has led to a great deal of confusion in the appreciation of man. Different ages had different conceptions. It was quite natural that in certain special circumstances man turned to himself and tried to strengthen himself in his own nature. So it was in the last phase of the ancient world, when the idea of humanity gave great strength; so in modern times, when it helped to increase the feeling of life. We can quite understand that in the grave inner and outer struggles of modern times many seem to find in the idea of humanity a more joyous outlook and a much-needed consolation. But how frail and tottering our support has now become! In the later phase of ancient times and in the eighteenth century the idea of humanity was firmly based upon a theory of a higher cosmic reason. It seemed to speak to souls as a strengthening and directive force. But for most of us this theory is now an empty phrase, and we see no substitute for the power it exerted.

There is, in fact, to-day over wide areas of life a positive dislike of man, a *taedium generis humani*,

as it was called in the last days of the ancient world. We have at one and the same time the evil of overpopulation, the concentration of men in cities, the economic struggle, and so on. We have not space enough. One man is the enemy of another. Above all our particular questions we feel the power over men of the trivial, the common, the evil. The idea of a superman occurred to some; but can thought alone get over realities and their power? So the human problem finds us involved in a terrible complication, and the Socialist ideal cannot extricate us. The situation would be hopeless if there were not higher forces working in man, making more of him, unsealing old and new springs of life to him. At present, however, we are merely searching.

§ 3

EXAMINATION OF THE SOCIALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY

One of the chief sources of the strength of Socialism was that it turned life entirely into an affair of the present. It proposes to test thoroughly all that has been handed down to us, to reject everything that is antiquated, to have nothing but truth in our ideas and institutions. As true it regarded only what immediately affects and moves man. This was to give freshness and power to life. There is no question but that in our life, where the past so often hampers the present, we have a great deal to do in this respect, and it was quite right to appeal decisively to the present. But we shall now see, as we have seen in so many connections, that Socialism conceives the problem in a short-sighted and partial way, and that all the stimulation that it can afford does not outweigh the harm it does to the substance of life.

We must first recognise that all great revolts against the traditional are particularly apt to

show us its seamy side, and this was bound to be especially true of an attitude which based life, as the eighteenth century did, upon independent reason. We must also remember that the masses, who are the strength of Socialism, know very little about history, and live almost entirely in the present. But we must now see that this unhistorical attitude gives us a false idea of reality and leads to narrow-mindedness.

Socialism proposes to make life entirely a matter of the present. What does it mean by the present? What are we to understand by it? Does it mean merely the actual moment? Is this enough for us? In that case there would be no firm structure in our life. Our work and institutions would merely reflect our casual and individual moods and opinions. Our conduct would change from time to time just as each season has its new fashions. No one would admit this in so crude a form; but can we escape the consequences of the attitude? If life has no permanent support, and is surrendered entirely to the stream of development, it breaks up into particular impressions; and in that case there is, strictly speaking, no present. For a thoughtful person there can be no present without continuity. It must have some sort of substance and must impart this to man's conduct. Such a person cannot receive a present from without; it must be his own work—his merit or his fault.

We have therefore to distinguish between the momentary present and a genuine present. And a genuine present needs a history. It is unintelligible unless it has an element of history in it. It is not a dead past, a mere memory that occupies our minds at times; it is not a mere matter of learning. It belongs directly to the present and is inseparable from it.

Take a fully civilised nation. Its collective life requires permanent institutions and aims. It needs permanent connections, common experiences of joy and sorrow. These connections were generally formed gradually, and often with much trouble. They are valuable because they weld the individuals together and keep common aims before them, in fact infuse into them a common spirit.

Such a collective creation is, for instance, a national army; the outcome of a long series of generations through several centuries. Such also, is a national administration. Continuities of this kind often have their sharp corners and angularities. They may be very trying, and there are distinct weaknesses in their strength. But they give a firm direction to the lives of large bodies of men. They embody definite aims, and they strengthen the collective labours. They are not vague ideas, accidents, but distinctive modes of thought and developments. They engender special forces and

feelings, such as honour, bravery, devotion, and incorruptibility. They put a check on lower impulses, and free a man from the control of fleeting moments and varying moods. They are real life-forces. It is only a superficial optimism that can treat them as of no importance. These life-forces are difficult to build up and easy to destroy. The loyalty and steadiness they embody are things of value, the destruction or enfeeblement of which may leave great gaps in our life, as we have recently experienced.

A nation without tradition is not a complete entity. It has no shadow of its own. The quality of its education, the force of its legislation, depend in great part upon its tradition. As Sir J. G. Frazer says: "Only a legislation which is in harmony with a nation's past has the power to build up a nation's future. . . . There must be in every law, as in every plant, an element of the past." Living history and dead past are two totally different things. A nation that disowns its history must disown its own nature, deny itself. It is, in a word, a miserable nation.

How does the Socialist ideal stand in this respect? It does not sufficiently discriminate in dealing with history. It does not distinguish between a passive history, which merely stores actual events in the memory and does nothing further with them, and an active history, which

is concerned with man's work and aspirations. Active history belongs to the world of deeds, not to mere existence. It is this alone that can bring out the full value of living history. But Socialism, with its dependence on passive history, cannot pass an impartial judgment. It is apt to use a double standard in judging the old and the new. It sees only the good in the new and only the bad in the old, and it at times becomes a mere caricature. In human affairs everything has its seamy side, and it is very easy to give prominence to this and make it the basis of a verdict. It is, to say the least, bad taste when even well educated men speak of the traditional and deep-rooted order of things as a mere "authoritative State." In Prussia, certainly, the idea of authority was often overstrained; but is that all that we can say even of Prussia, with its stern insistence on duty, its subordination of individuals to collective purposes, its unflinching industry, its conscientiousness and attention to detail and incorruptibility? It seems sometimes as if most Germans had lived without any liberty until the recent revolution had brought it to them. The liberty which the old order gave, far beyond the party-programs, is entirely forgotten. And it is equally forgotten that each great civilisation has its own idea of liberty. Our Radicals are too apt to confine themselves to the French

idea of liberty and take pride in imitating it as far as possible. They have no conception of the deep meaning of the German idea of freedom.

This ignoring of what is great in our character and our achievements is found in every department of life. It often looks as if our educational system, to which whole centuries have contributed zealously, were in such a condition that it needs a revolutionary reform. In other respects also we have forgotten that Germany was the first of all nations in social legislation for the workers, and that this implied great sacrifices. It seems to some people a mark of intellectual superiority to decry our institutions.

One of the chief reasons for this error in underestimating real achievements is that in our daily life we treat many things as self-evident which are by no means self-evident, but which have cost a good deal of trouble and labour and even self-sacrifice. People would not speak so lightly of Christianity if they did not forget what a task it is to hold men together inwardly and control the lower impulses which drive us. There is the same carping disposition in regard to the State. What Hegel said is true of both State and religion: "Education begins always with censure, but, when it is complete, it sees the positive in everything." That is particularly true in periods of great change, such as ours. The course of the

movement shows clearly enough that a good deal that we are accustomed to treat as self-evident is not self-evident, but "custom makes the very basis of our existence invisible" (as Hegel says). Nothing betrays more clearly the deterioration of the whole condition of life when what was formerly regarded as self-evident becomes a great task. How does our own time stand in this respect?

Inequality in the treatment of various periods is accompanied by a similar treatment of ages. Youth is extolled as much as possible: age is depreciated as much as possible. The young seem to be more alert, less prejudiced, keener on freedom, more productive. They are the sole hope of the future and must take precedence. The larger experience and riper judgment of the old count for nothing in comparison. In this Socialism is very one-sided and short-sighted. There can be no doubt that life as a whole requires a certain equilibrium, a remedying of the faults of each age by the other. Who does not share Luther's wish, that the young might be wise and the old strong? Each age has its advantages and its weaknesses, and it is wrong to see only the advantages of the one and only the weaknesses of the other.

There is also the confusion of the physical and the psychic, which pervades all Socialist thought.

In this respect different ages have different qualities. A physical youth may be spiritually feeble and dull, while years alone give no advantage. Times that are full of strength and endowments can inspire even what is physically old with youthful courage. As in all other respects, it depends entirely upon what spiritual force makes of a man. The number of years is nothing in itself. This is not a matter in which you can measure by the yard.

The same attitude which leads to an exaggerated estimate of the spiritual present is also apt to make the pulse of social life as slow as possible. Here again we have a difficult and important problem. Just as the bodily processes depend upon an equilibrium between acceleration and retardation, so even the psychic life needs both, and it is one of the chief merits of statesmanship to steer the ship of State prudently between Scylla and Charybdis, and to find the right point for action. In Germany the chief danger in the political world is undoubtedly to delay too long in realising proposals: to consider matters very thoroughly—too thoroughly—and then suddenly break out in momentous actions, as the hasty beginning of the late war showed.

The fault of Socialist ideas is not of this kind. It wants to renovate the world at once, and does not sufficiently consider whether the change

is really an improvement. It also forgets too easily the conditions of success, since it relies entirely upon the intellect and entrusts the decision to it. Important decisions such as the promulgation of a new code of laws or a new system of education ought to be preceded by a conscientious and thorough consideration of the question whether our age is sufficiently firmly rooted in its convictions and clear as to its objects to find the necessary force and confidence for such an enterprise. Otherwise a mere wind will blow away the traces of our work. The popular parliamentary form of government is little fitted to determine the proper rate of action. Unimportant questions are often drawn out according to the favour or mood of parties, while important questions are hastily decided. New measures about telephones are of deep interest to our overburdened middle class, yet a small majority in a thin House passes such measures and others of great importance.

All these things bring us back to the great problem of the relation between thought and experience, the present and history. Modern times here confront a formidable problem without being able to solve it or to disentangle itself from sharp antagonisms. We want to settle everything by our own ideas and actions, to enter upon every enterprise in a spirit of independence. This

unintelligible wish was, however, checked at the beginning, because mere thinking, the form of life, was chiefly entrusted with the execution. In earlier ages it was based, not upon man's mere intellect, but upon absolute thought. It had firm foundations such as "innate ideas." The mind rested upon, and was supported by, the truth of God.

English thinkers of the seventeenth century, especially Locke, brought about a great change. Innate ideas were discarded as an error. The connection with absolute reason was lost. Reason sank from a spiritual to a human level, and thought lost all its independence. It had to draw upon experience for its entire contents; it could offer no resistance from its own powers to the stream of impressions and impulses; it acted like soft wax under all influences. When this empirical theory was fully developed, and followed to its logical consequences, independent science became impossible. Its claim to general validity and necessity was unsound. All thought became mere presentation, either on the part of individuals or of the masses which they made up. The mental compromise of modern times shrinks from this logical conclusion and its denials, and relies upon a blend of thought and experience; but the mixture is useless. Socialism shares this vacillation between empty thought and concrete impressions, and it

can therefore take up no definite position in regard to the contents of history. It rejects history when it is not in harmony with Socialist ideas, but adopts it willingly when it promises to be of any use. This means that the Socialist judgment is based upon, not realities and their requirements, but immediate impressions and party-interests.

Take, for instance, the German universities. They belong in origin to the Middle Ages and do not fit in the scheme of the modern State. It is not difficult to find in them much that is antiquated. But with these antiquated features is intimately connected that which gave their life an independence and their work an originality, and won the esteem of the whole civilised world. Ought we not to seek the reasons for their good work and improve it as far as possible rather than make a parade of their defects? We may draw a distinction between the irrational and the unreasonable. Much that seems to be irrational may, when it is closely considered, serve a deeper reason. Historical life, with its combinations and institutions, is full of an irrational element. The whole of reality known to us is pervaded by a stern struggle of the rational and irrational, and the rational must in the end be based upon a life of activity, a creative will, and derive its substance therefrom. But in all these things Socialism follows the line

of the eighteenth century, not of the twentieth. It cannot therefore come into close touch with history; its standards are too small for the fulness of reality.

The limits of the Socialist ideal must be clear to any man who does not merely float helplessly with the current of historical events, but takes up a point of view of his own and surveys the whole from that. It is an indubitable fact that man does not live entirely within the limits of time. By means of his thought and his spiritual life he can transcend time and grasp something eternal, progressive, present, in the things of time. Consider an historical phenomenon such as Christianity. It was an issue of special conditions, of a very troubled and distracted age; but is it on that account merely a product of that troubled age, which we ought to get rid of? Has it not produced permanent experiences, achievements, and objects, with which even we cannot dispense? Is not the moral antithesis under which it presents the life of man not a permanent thing? Can we sacrifice the great earnestness, the impelling and rousing force, the revelation of higher powers and original sources of life, which it gave to the world?

We cannot do this without depriving man of something great, of an indispensable spiritual help. It is the same with classic Greece. Its time was

limited, the period of its bloom short; but this brief period produced eternal values without which modern civilisation would be greatly impoverished. How far different ages and individuals will assimilate these vital contents is another question. They are certainly not dead things, but living possibilities, permanent requirements, facts which, once brought into the human sphere, can never disappear from it. Any man who looks beyond these questions to a timeless world will remember Goethe's words:

> "The man who from three thousand years
> No lesson for his life can wrest
> Lies in the dark, in inexperience,
> Trudging his way from day to day."

Something beyond the historical breaks upon a man in history. In the human chronicle we detect a chronicle of the spirit, which puts us in a new order, in a life with eternal relations (*sub specie aeternitatis*). Whilst wave follows wave in human history, without any connection between them by higher aims, the history of the spirit undertakes to give life substance and value and independence, to find it support as well as continuity. It is only from this point of view that something like an organisation of history can be obtained, and that primitive revelations of life may be distinguished from each other and combined in the whole. From this point of view

there must be a complete return of life from the immediate things of sense to the immediate things of the spirit. It is only a confirmed change of this kind that can prevent our whole human effort from drifting into the current of mere evolution and sinking, after a brief spell of brightness, into the abyss of nothing; and that is true both of the individual and the race.

But these problems, which are essential to the spiritual life, do not exist for Socialism. It is concerned entirely with the historical movement which is due to mere existence. Its work has no spiritual background. Everything it does affects only the limited surface of life. The "materialistic" philosophy of history of Marx and Engels does not go beyond this. Yet all this must not prevent us from recognising that Socialism has done much valuable work in the province of empirical history by means of its criticisms, its liberation from restrictions, and its rejection of superfluous ballast; though even in this province it applies standards that are too narrow, and it lacks that sense of justice which is above all party strife.

§ 4

THE LIMITS OF SOCIALIST EQUALITY

THE idea of equality is one of the chief elements of the Socialist ideal, and it has had a great influence upon both thought and conduct. Its principal aim is to attack all artificial distinctions, to get rid of all imaginary and unjustified privileges, to meet all obstacles and disturbances with the idea of our common human nature as a settled basis. When this is not done, the forces of progress are dammed, the consciousness of interconnection is lowered, and a man's joy in his work is destroyed. It is a question, not merely of individual actions, but of fundamental convictions and whole systems of thought. We shall see, however, that here again Socialism conceives the matter superficially, and that it encounters many obstacles; and that sometimes it attains a result the opposite of what it had intended. There are, in particular, the following points that require explanation.

1. At the very basis of this idea of equality

there is a contradiction which is dangerous to the whole structure. What is the root, the moral title, of the idea of equality? Is it in a higher spiritual order or in the province of experience? The older idea of equality chose the former alternative. It was rooted in God as the source of all life or in reason as a cosmic force; but Socialism has nothing to do with these things. God it regards as a mythological idea: in reason it sees a product of human presentation which cannot transcend its own sphere. There remains experience alone to justify the claim of equality.

But experience shows us men unequal everywhere; nature and civilisation are at one in making life more and more unequal. Now experience is for Socialism the source and justification of all ideas, and this puts it in the following dilemma: If it recognises any sort of equality of all human beings, it must appeal to some kind of spiritual force and run counter to experience, whereas if it adheres to experience, it must follow it and shape its conduct and claims by it. This contradiction is inevitable unless experience can bring about, empirically, a complete equality of all men and conditions. This would be, if logically carried out, thorough Communism as proposed by Babeuf, and indeed Communism is the most logical form of Socialism. But how mankind and civilisation would fare under such a system we need hardly

inquire. It follows that there is no possibility of reconciling reason and experience in the problem of equality. Nietzsche saw more clearly than most of his contemporaries when he said that the disappearance of the idea of God deprives the idea of equality of all justification.

2. The decisive question is whether the collective life is in one or two stages: that is to say, whether differences all lie on one plane, or whether it is possible and desirable to have a gradation of such a kind that some higher unity stimulates the individual elements to action and influences them by its own powers. A one-stage structure will refer all life and conduct directly to the individuals and forbid any differentiation of society. Communism is, on that ideal, the simplest and most direct way. On the other hand, in a two-stage structure it is possible to have adjustment and combination. A higher whole is active, but the individual may regard this whole as his own affair, and may feel that, however subordinate he may be, he is a member of the whole. It is, in fact, only on such a basis that we can have the ideas of right and duty. The one-stage theory puts the right of the individual before duty, and it is plain that in such a case the idea of right itself has no rights; that the decision rests with might, not right. It is only a two-stage order that can guarantee independence both to the whole and

to the individual elements. The individual will, of course, have a secondary position in it, but as a member of the whole he will be more than a mere point, and he will feel that he is co-operating with the whole. Look at the structure of the Catholic Church. Each individual priest may, in virtue of his ordination, regard himself as a co-operating element of the whole and therefore ascribe the highest value to his action, but this does not in the least prevent him from occupying a very modest place in the structure.

The Socialist ideal vacillates between a one-stage and a two-stage structure, because it clings to the idea of a whole, but regards it merely as a collection of individuals, and can therefore give it no independent content. It falls inevitably under the power of the individual elements, the mere aggregation of which it cannot overcome. The prosperity of the whole must be measured by the interests of the individuals, and this is in flagrant contradiction to the main idea. This identification of an aggregation of individuals with an independent whole is bound to lead to contradictions and confusion at every step.

Let us take the suffrage, for instance. The State as a whole is bound to seek such an arrangement as will best serve its purposes and its interests. The individuals as so many rational beings endowed with independence must not, it is true, be for-

gotten in this arrangement, but the decision rests mainly with the whole. It was a sign of the incipient dissolution of the traditional order when a Prussian minister described adult suffrage as a fundamental right of all. In the prevailing confusion of ideas he himself scarcely noticed that he was rejecting the basic principle of the Prussian State —the subordination of the individual to the whole. This question, whether the individual is to get everything directly and in virtue of his association in the whole, has very serious consequences for the complexion of the collective life. The educational system will have different features according as a collective state, superior to the individuals, sets up a sphere of common instruction or the curriculum is to be as far as possible equally applied to individuals. A good deal cannot be given equally to all, but it is not the less important to the whole on that account. Higher mathematics cannot possibly be communicated to all; not merely from lack of time, but from lack of ability for it. Are we to think less on that account of the value of higher mathematics? Civilisation would be incalculably impoverished if we were to judge things by that standard. In this as in other respects we see that it is to the interest of the whole to divide the collective life into a higher and a lower stage.

Such a division is objectionable only when it

is made in the interest of certain classes, not of the whole. It is based upon the need of entrusting the care of the spiritual self-preservation of mankind to a limited group of individuals. This class cannot exist and do its work properly unless it is in vital relation with the other classes, unless it has a tradition, and unless it is freed from the cares of material life. It needs also very thorough methods of thought, not merely a number of individual achievements. And are we to abandon all this for the sake of the illusion of a classless society which would soon prove to be without culture and spirituality? Even the individual elements fare better when there is a gradation. It is only an extraordinary sort of optimism that can look for the salvation of humanity by any other method. Aristotle, in his clear and penetrating way, pointed out long ago the logical fallacy of Communism. It is in the ambiguity of the word "all." It suggests not only all taken together, but each taken by himself (*πάντες ὡς ἕκαστος*); and this gives the idea of a common possession two different meanings. In few cases has passion been so stirred by a fallacy as in this case. Socialism, with its talk about the whole while it puts the sum of individuals instead of the whole, finds itself in an untenable middle position.

3. This recognition of an essential difference between society as a whole and the sum of its

elements enables us to appreciate fully the diversity of the conditions of life, as experience presents them to us. Socialism regards this diversity as a matter of no consequence. It gives us an inaccurate version of it, and ignores the significance of the various starting points and lines which it affects to conduct. It was the special strength of ancient thought that it clearly described these vital conditions in their entirety. This was in harmony with its tendency to regard reality as realm of self-contained forms and to demand perfectly sharp frontiers. In this, it is true, it often conceived the distinctions too rigidly; it overlooked connecting shades between definite types, and did not sufficiently recognise the changes and developments of phenomena in all their fluidity. In particular, it did not do full justice to the infinity of the individual.

Yet the fact remains that experience shows us a great diversity of movements and tendencies. This diversity may serve us as a means to make life fluid and tractable, and at the same time to give us more nearly correct views of it. Obliterating these differences and antitheses easily leads to a dreary monotony. The thinkers of antiquity agreed in distinguishing between a nobler and an ordinary frame of mind: one directed to the beautiful, and one to the useful. In the one case conduct found satisfaction in itself: in the other it looked

to external objects. From the soul of this older culture came the words of Aristotle: "It is the part of a free and high-minded man to seek, not the useful, but the beautiful." This acute student of men has ably described the chief types of human conduct, and has distinguished five principal shades of thought and character: great, good, those who love honour and power, those who are intent on gain and enjoyment, and, finally, criminal natures. The truth of this division is supported by the fact that it has been substantially preserved in the tradition of the Catholic Church. In all this there is a good deal of knowledge and experience of life that we do not find in people who talk about equality.

Reference to this diversity brings us to the problem of greatness, which was much discussed in ancient times, and has been much discussed in our own day. The older thinkers meant by it especially a superiority to fate and the accidents of life: modern thinkers lay more stress on the power of original production.

They agree, however, in recognising that greatness is rare and exceptional, and that it differs in quality, not merely quantitatively, from the common type; and this gives us a characteristic view of the process of life. Genuine creativeness is not a precipitate of the average mass. It derives its power from its own soul and from the spiritual

contacts of life. It has to fight unceasingly against the stupid and inert, often jealous and hostile, mass; and the struggle is full of grave tragedies. It was not individuals, but the masses, who condemned Socrates and Jesus.

Great men are, from an external point of view, rare exceptions. To others they seem merely unintelligible fanatics. In reality they are the normal: the first condition of the ascent of life to a higher stage. They alone protect the interests of the spiritual, open out new prospects and possibilities, and enkindle original life from their fiery souls.

It is owing to these higher souls who rise above the mist of the average that there is a general feeling of dissatisfaction, and that this puts some movement into ordinary life. It is an entire mistake to think that the normal and the average are the same thing. The average is content with what Goethe calls "that mediocrity which is hateful to God and men." Against it Nietzsche flung out the words: "Life will build itself up into the heights with columns and stages. It would look into the far beyond, to the blessed beauties, so it must rise. And because it must rise, it needs stages, it needs men to rise. Rise it will and, in rising, overcome itself."

To this gradation of aims there corresponds a gradation of moods. Here again there may be a whole world between different individuals:

vast distances, heights, and depths may separate them. There runs through the whole of life the antithesis of dependent and independent spirituality: the antithesis of an effort to share the infinity of life and get into touch with the whole, and an effort to reach a comfortable state of equilibrium as quickly as possible. To the one work is a painful necessity with a view to material and social life: to the other it is the very soul and joy of life. Justified as Socialism was in refusing to strain the distance between physical and intellectual work, it does, in point of fact, make a great difference whether we trust merely to material possessions to help men or look to a development of the spiritual life. Step by step we must fight a tendency that "seems to be in favour of an equalising justice, but in reality may easily become an injustice to higher things." Let us not forget that jealousy and envy are ever at work in the average levels of life and that, in the words of Goethe: "The most envious person in the world is the man who thinks everybody his equal." Aristotle also rightly warned us not to treat equals unequally nor to treat unequals equally.

Socialism seeks as near an equality as possible, and it very rightly wishes for this purpose to raise the general level and lift as many as possible to the heights of life and culture, without lowering

these heights. But the nature of things is stronger than the wishes of men. Unwittingly the condition of those who receive becomes the standard of the process, and the state of the whole inevitably sinks. It is impossible to make this effort chiefly in the form of influencing others without suffering some loss oneself. Work that is mainly taken up with instructing and propagating unavoidably loses in quality. Deep original conviction and the instruction of others must be strictly proportioned to each other, and the leading place must be assigned to conviction.

4. In fine, we must not forget to notice a certain contradiction which follows from the innermost feelings connected with the idea of equality. People always speak about equality, but in reality no one means mere equality. He wants *more*, especially more power. The demand of equality is generally inspired by the wish to rise from a lower to a higher level. Those who have something to gain by it are the most zealous for it. When they reach the desired stage, however, they wish to push further. The workers at first set up as their goal the attainment of an equality with the other citizens of the State. This no longer contents them; they want to rule the middle class, and even think it unreasonable that anybody should demur to this. In the end we get the dictatorship of the proletariat—a dictatorship with-

out a dictator. What has now become of the ideal of equality which was the starting point? It is a mere equality in slavery.

5. The real and right meaning of this aiming at equality can only be learned from history. As we have repeatedly seen, it is not the first time that there has been an idea of improving and sustaining life by an appeal to the reason which is immanent in men. There is, clearly, a very broad analogy between the later period of the ancient world and the modern spirit. At that time there were grave struggles, and man turned upon himself and found support in a strong self-consciousness. Ancient and modern thought do not, of course, coincide. The one was the evening of a rich civilisation which had substantially run its course, but our modern culture feels that it is rather the dawn of an age that comes on with all the strength of youth. Ancient thought had not the problem of breaking with a traditional culture; it had only to make things clearer, to collate things, to make them the property of the race and of each individual. The modern mind, on the contrary, found itself confronting a vast mass of facts which were out of harmony with its needs and demands, and it had inevitably to break with these. In the confusion that ensued the humanitarian idea seemed to be the only hope of salvation. This, however, brought on the idea

of equality, and it obtained an immense influence over the souls of men. It was hailed as a great emancipation. It has, in point of fact, done a vast amount in the way of improvement and in suppressing unreason and superstition.

Any man who would fully appreciate the influence of the dream of equality must examine it from this point of view. It was a frame of mind that could hail Rousseau as, in the words of Schiller, "the man who made men out of Christians." Even the literature of our classical period was at first touched by this influence of the movement. Then, however, came the opposite tendency toward the historical, the positive, the individual. People were tired of the intellectualism of the eighteenth century, and they wanted a more satisfying, a more highly coloured, a more original life. They enriched their minds from their own history, and thus they brought about the nationalist movement and all that it achieved, as well as its dangers.

The nationalist idea was at first of a predominantly spiritual character. For some time the question of power, of economic development, etc., was in the background. Even Fichte wanted to restrict Germans as much as possible to their own sphere. World-commerce seemed to him to be dangerous, and he regarded the absence of colonies as an advantage. That could not last

long. The development of life necessitated closer contact with material things. This drove the movement along the lines of realism, and consequently along the line of interests and conflicts. The old idealism disappeared. The idea of power and greatness urged on the nations with demonic energy. Peaceful co-operation gave place to a stern world-rivalry: in the end the terrible world-war from which we have just emerged. By a reaction upon this the humanitarian and equalitarian idea has gained fresh strength; it is supported by the economic struggle of the advancing workers. The idea of human brotherhood came into vogue once more.

But all this has resulted in a state of chaos from which nothing but a superior spiritual force can extricate us. On the one hand we have the spirit of the eighteenth century come to life again, though its fine intellectuality and utilitarianism will never satisfy us in spite of all the improvements and the enrichment of our idea of reality. On the other hand, we find ourselves bound up with the positive, the individual, the actual, which yields us no guiding aims. Socialism coincides with the eighteenth century in its intellectualism and ideal of equality. It is right in so far as it holds up an ideal of co-operation against the prevailing hostility of nations; it is wrong in so far as it

would subject all individuality and historical achievement to these general ideas, and can give no assured substance to its humanitarianism. Hence it is that we are torn to-day between an intellectualism without roots and a naturalist Positivism. The only thing that can remedy this paralysing cleavage is an idealistic Positivism, which promises a more vital substance and a comprehensive goal to the humanitarian idea.

The Socialist ideal is not capable of solving this problem, if it be only because it recognises no independent spiritual world, and is therefore restricted entirely to material things. Hence the ideal is, for all its claim of equality, a much too abstract and superficial scheme of life. This is particularly true of its conception of man himself. Our conception of man must assume an individual character on the basis of a world of action. The fact that on this particular planet there are innumerable beings who have certain special features of their own as distinguished from the animals most nearly related to them is not enough to exact respect and reverence for the idea. It must above all be recognised that by a revolutionary advance of life in this field there has appeared a world of action, promising an even greater development. We have, moreover, to appreciate the special nature and experiences of this province of life. We have to see that there are here two stages

of life, and that the conjunction of them gives rise to difficult problems, but also affords an insight into further depths. Upon those foundations, under those standards, we have to range whatever experience we have had of historical development. Abstract humanitarianism is wrecked upon those problems. When it emptily discusses them, Socialism is out of accord both with the richness of reality and with the historical situation of humanity.

It is just the same in regard to the relation between man and the world. A nation is not a mere aggregation or collection of different men who are enclosed within a common frontier. It needs an inner continuity, a common life of the whole. Unless it has this, the richest resources are undeveloped. Remember the words of Schleiermacher: "It is only the man who knows the mind of his own nation that can find a true joy in the affairs of the race. . . . A nation is a permanent growth in the garden of God. It outlives many a dreary winter which robs it of its green garment, and often of its flowers and fruit." Certainly we want international ideals, but not the kind of internationalism which surrenders all the characteristic features of nations and seeks greatness precisely in this thin-blooded life.

This abstract thought, with its dream of equality, enters into every branch and section of the com-

munity. It has no idea of forming independent groups. It will tolerate no strong middle class, but sees in it only a collection of so many individuals who have no special history and no special tasks. It enables quantity to triumph over quality. It is indifferent to all that is individual, direct, original. Thus we come back always to the conviction that a real equality can be derived only from spiritual contacts, and that the idea of a naturalist equality is self-contradictory.

§ 5

THE PROBLEM OF SOCIALISATION

THE Socialist ideal reaches its highest point in socialisation. In this it combines the technical power of the economic world and the fundamental qualities of conviction. The modern tendency toward the sovereignty of the individual has experienced a severe check. The tendency now is to give authority and influence to a higher whole. This affects even the mood of the individual: man feels himself helpless and abandoned in face of appalling evils. The economic world is, on account of its sharp antagonisms, especially affected, and it is therefore no wonder that the idea of a stronger concentration of the scattered and often conflicting elements has a considerable and increasing influence. The working class, moreover, has become independent, and this has urged life on to new lines and promises to uplift the entire race. There is unmistakably a great movement in this direction.

But it would be remarkable if a situation which so strongly agitates the minds of men could be easily reconciled with other requirements. There is danger of a narrowing of life. It threatens to bring great and necessary things under the control of a party and thus endanger their rational elements. We will consider these dangers in succession.

1. In the first place there is a serious contradiction in the fundamental idea. The movement for socialisation is supposed to proceed from the whole to the individual, as it is from the whole alone that decisive help can come. But we have already seen that on this point the Socialist ideal falls to pieces. Such a combination as socialisation aims at cannot come from the elements and the connection of these, but only from an independent whole. If there is no such whole, the movement has no solid foundation, and the structure will not stand. But the Socialist ideal has no room for a life from within and from the whole, and therefore the concentration which is intended has no soul, the enterprise has no background. All action is confined to the surface. There are no uplifting spiritual forces to overcome the friction of the elements. This would be fatal to the whole scheme. It might give a semblance of combination, but it cannot give the full reality. At

this point, therefore, the philosophy and the social aim part company.

2. The Socialist philosophy is apt to regard the action of the individual as of no consequence and as the outcome of mere selfishness. In point of fact, not only is the capability of the individual necessary for the physical maintenance and the stimulation of forces in the struggle for life, but it is indispensable, for the full development of souls, to form an independent province of the individual's capacity. That is the only way to make him a living member of reality. A spiritual individuality ought to be regarded as an original source of unlimited vitality. It has a direct value in itself. Aristotle rightly said that nothing so stimulates a man to action as his own property and the object of his affection. Adam Smith's attempt to trace all action to the aims of individuals certainly failed, but his power of awakening and stimulating forces is a fact. To ennoble the rivalry and make it a great help, not only for utilitarian purposes but in the service of beauty, was one of the chief aims of the ancient world; and our own system of education might well copy it. Can Socialism do this? Will it not lessen the effectiveness? Will it not restrict the free movement of individuals and reduce their joy in their work?

3. Socialisation relies upon the power and justice

of the economic order which it would set up. It expects this order to attract to itself everything that can promote the continuity of work and the spirit of the workers. It is quite right in discarding the older type of idealism, which relied exclusively on the good feeling of individuals. In view of the grave dangers and misunderstandings of our time this would certainly not be enough; we need a vigorous extension of the sphere of collective life. Yet written laws and material institutions will not succeed in touching the deeper part of a man, in winning the soul for the highest purposes. We must bring into action continuous spiritual forces: we have to raise the whole man, the inner man, to a higher level. Thoughts and sentiments must work together to bring about an inner revolution, and to oppose the greater self of the spirit to the lesser self of nature.

In connection with these problems we are again painfully conscious of the shortcomings of Socialism in confusing higher and lower things, spirit and nature. In its practical application the higher features are not kept together, and do not work by the force of a common world. As an illustration we may take the distinction between a lower and a higher type in sympathy and love. Sympathy as a natural sentiment has no uplifting moral value. Kant and other

thinkers have justly pointed out that the common type of sympathy is casual and incidental, whereas the kind of sympathy urged in the religions of India is quite a different thing; it is based upon a special relation to universal life and derives great power from the development of this relation. It is the same with Christianity. What is usually called "love" is, as a rule, closely connected with a lower natural impulse, and does little for life as a whole. But what is called, in a special sense, Christian charity is rooted in the power of a creative world-will, which brings individuals together with an uplifting action and intimately connects them. When men's aims and conduct have not some such connecting and uplifting bond, all our laws and institutions may have only a superficial and external effect. However valuable and indispensable the affairs of the material world may be, they cannot properly attain their end except in connection with an invisible world.

Socialism, with its rejection of religion, or its declaration that religion is a private concern, is particularly unfitted to derive advantage from the stimulation it affords, and to build up an independent inner life. Hence, while its scheme of socialisation may hold men together externally, it cannot fill them with the spirit of love and thus bind them intimately to each other.

4. Moreover, Socialism takes too narrow a view of the complex web of human life. It ignores the many differences and antitheses which are found throughout life, and on the reciprocal action of which the full success of life depends. Let us consider the chief points in this connection.

(*a*) Life does not treat man as a particular piece in a continuous mass, but it requires for his development some sort of separateness, a certain distance from others. He must have a sphere of his own: he must not only be associated, but dissociated. Goethe was right when he said: "Every living thing makes its own atmosphere about it" and "Distinctiveness evokes distinctiveness." This combination of attraction and repulsion gives us a special type of quality; it has nothing whatever to do with professional class-consciousness, but is essentially required for the full characterisation of life. It is a lower type of character that tries to blend the various streams of life. All great thinkers from the earliest times have been opposed to this. Aristotle considered dependence upon other men mere imitation of others, a sign of an inferior character. German humanism at its height was strongly opposed to it, and created, with great energy, independent spheres of life. "Be everything to thyself, or thou art nothing," said Fichte. This separateness and individuality of life may be

exaggerated, as it was amongst the Romanticists, but it is absolutely necessary if we are to have independent creative work. The socialisation plan has no room for it.

(*b*) The course of our inquiry has led us to the relation of the individual to his social environment, and has thus raised the problem of the psychology of the crowd. This problem has been discussed so much for thousands of years that we need not go deeply into it here. We will deal only with a few points in regard to which Socialism is in conflict with the demands of philosophy. It appeals confidently to collective reason and the importance of "public opinion," but it ignores the fact that it is not a belief in the reason of a mass of men, but a belief in a spirituality that is active in the human realm, which justifies this appeal. It is only contact with some spiritual requirement of the historical situation that gives weight to public opinion and makes it superior to the varying moods of individuals. Of itself it has not the slightest guarantee of truth.

The mere summing up of opinions does not make reason. That able student of human nature, Tocqueville, rightly said that passions usually increase with the number of the individuals which share them, and that a majority is in a condition of progressive self-deification. It is a re-

markable thing that in spite of thousands of years of experience the question seems to be still open. Every utterance of public opinion is hailed as an indisputable truth. It is especially prone to treat as permanent requirements of human nature certain ideas which are in harmony with particular tendencies. That, for instance, democracy meets only special sections and duties of political life was pointed out long ago, with convincing clearness, by Plato; yet innumerable people still regard it as the last word of political wisdom and would subject the whole of life to it.

Hegel was certainly right when he said that the only thing we can learn from history is that neither rulers nor peoples have ever learned anything from it.

The relation of the social average to the great personalities of historic life has already been considered. They are by no means mere megaphones for their fellows. They are not mere summaries of contemporary life. They bring about a radical uplift and advance, a return from unstable wavering between alternatives to a solid and clearly conceived reality. Hegel was wrong when he said: "He who utters the wishes of his age, tells them to it and realises them, is the great man of his time." The work of the great man is not confined to teaching people the content of life, as intellectuals say, for in that case

there would be no answer to the question in what the will of an age consists, or whether an age as a whole can have any will. Is it not usually driven by dark and confused impulses until some outstanding personality sets a limit to its vagaries and gives definite aims to his fellows?

(*c*) In fine, the individual has not only to act within society: he may be in opposition to it and have to wage a stern struggle against it. This happens particularly when the general human condition no longer satisfies the life that appears on special heights and streams from them; when some inner uplift, even a revolution, is necessary. It is due to a conviction that there is an independent spirituality at work in men, but that in the ordinary course of things it is entangled in various relations to nature and society, and it is only on the highest level that it succeeds in attaining an entirely independent and victorious spirituality, and can thus give life a firm support and an indisputable value. From this comes the loftiness of the spiritual creative power, of the inner revelations, which we have in the great founders of religions and in great artists and thinkers of the type of Plato. Their task is not merely to do something great amongst men, but to make something great out of men. That was the work of personalities who were

firm and secure in their spiritual contacts. They were appointed to reach the heights of their own nature in detachment from society and thus to give complete independence to their creative work. Only in their case could there be a union of profound isolation with an intimate connection with the whole: a struggle against ordinary human nature which was victorious even when to the outward eye they seemed to fail. They lifted life above the utilitarian level and turned the useful into a blessing. As Kant said: "Everything, even the highest, becomes small in the hands of men when they apply the idea of it to their own use." That Socialism, with its utilitarian tendency, knows nothing of these problems, though they are indispensable to humanity as a whole, is only another proof of its limitations.

5. Socialism has every right to press the idea of the whole and deny that it splits the community into atoms, but it narrows the idea of the whole in a lamentable fashion and thus divides humanity itself. It would represent the whole race, and it certainly often does so very sincerely. But its identification of one particular party with the whole community is bound to lead to serious misunderstandings; and that is what happens in Socialist circles. The party considers itself humanity; it usurps the position that belongs to the whole. In this way the race is divided

and rent in a way to which we find a parallel only in the ecclesiastical fanaticism which divides men into believers and unbelievers, and takes no account of anything else. Belief becomes party-belief, a mere confession of faith in the program of the party. In its narrower circles the movement recognises no right, freedom, truth, or goodwill outside of itself; the others, the "reactionaries," have only the opposite. Everything is staked upon a sheer alternative: all compromise and adjustment is rejected; the whole race is divided into friend and foe, worker and drone, proletariat and capitalists. The individual is from early years impregnated with very narrow views, and is taught to regard every problem as solved.

For the race as a whole this division into separate and irreconcilable worlds is very injurious. Germany has already had painful experience of the harm that is done by this sectarian treatment, this substitution of members of the party for citizens of the State. It means that every institution and measure has to be adapted to the interests of the manual workers. Freedom gives way to might. For true freedom it is essential that a man can put himself into the frame of mind of others and converse quite impartially with them, instead of confining himself to his own circle. The chief root of this defect is the

lack of a broad and uplifting conception of the life of man as a whole: the inability to rise above controversy to genuine truth and serve it in preference to the interests of ordinary human nature. When this power is lacking, there is an unavoidable division into parties, and no amount of zeal for socialisation can prevent men from drifting apart.

6. Finally, there is a good deal of contradiction in the details of the ideal offered to us. There is, in the first place, a contradiction in the fundamental idea of Social Democracy, which tries to combine two diametrically opposite tendencies. Democracy and Socialism lie too far apart to be combined: the one must precede the other. Modern thought had for its leading idea to develop life from individual centres and base all institutions upon their will and work. In its clearest form it brought about the eighteenth-century ideal of a State with freedom and law, restricting the interference of the community as much as possible and looking to the free activity of individuals for salvation. This gave the lead to the democratic movement, and it did many valuable things.

Socialism, on the contrary, takes its stand decisively on the idea of the whole. Its main concern is not the freedom of individuals, but the collective welfare. The individual has to submit himself and his personal aims to this common

welfare; he has to look to it for both the standard and the guide of his efforts. It is absolutely necessary to reconcile these tendencies. The freedom of individuals and the unity of the whole are both indispensable for the spiritual good of the race. But they cannot be directly reconciled on the surface of life. They can be combined only by a considerable uplifting and unification of the race. Social Democracy as a party has no chance of doing this. Its two tendencies cannot develop without encroaching upon each other and restricting each other, so that there cannot logically be a harmonious social structure. The logical consequence, both for life and the State, is merely a series of sharp antagonisms.

How deeply this affects the fabric of life may be shown by considering the question of strikes. From the democratic point of view the strike is an unlimited right on the part of citizens. Whether the use of the weapon on any particular occasion profits the strikers, or how far a strike injures the entire economic life of the community, is, from the democratic point of view, a matter for the judgment and good feeling of individuals. They alone are responsible. But the man who is chiefly concerned about the good of the whole and a possible injury to it cannot grant this unqualified liberty and right to the individual. He seeks some legal means of meeting the danger;

he prefers the Socialist idea to the democratic. There is thus a contradictory state of things. If the democratic tendency wins, Socialism has to be content with a subordinate position; if the Socialist tendency prevails, the democratic movement has to come to terms with it.

The Social Democracy of our days tries to occupy an untenable middle position. It is on a very steep slope. There must be either a liberty which dissolves the common life into a number of atoms and destroys the structure of the State, or a collective control which logically leads to complete Communism and destroys all liberty. A contradictory situation of this sort may be helped for a time by a compromise, but this cannot inspire a common will or bring about a firm structure of the whole. In reality there is no room for an idea of the whole or of freedom in an order of things which restricts itself to mere existence and experience. Reality requires greater breadth and originality than is possible in such an order. That is the only way to adjust the difficulty.

In Germany the confusion is especially bad on account of the occurrence of three great political tendencies, which are only held together by the parliamentary system. We cannot here enter into a detailed criticism of this system. There is no doubt that in England it had special

conditions, and was able to do much good, but to make it the normal type of constitutional life has done a great deal of harm. In Germany we have political Catholicism, in the Centre Party, added to the distinction between Social Democracy and democracy. The vast distance between the ideals of the three is clear to everybody; their practical, and not merely their speculative, views are diametrically opposed to each other. This is very clearly seen in connection with religion. Social Democracy is indifferent, if not hostile, to religion. The only reality it concerns itself about is of this world. The most it can do for religion is to tolerate it; it cannot recognise its independent value. Democracy may easily develop a spiritual world in the individual as a being endowed with freedom, but it throws this being upon its own resources and rejects the idea of subjection. Catholicism places the visible world under the power of an invisible world and binds the individual firmly to a visible order like the Church.

Thus the three political orders meet and clash with each other. There is no possibility of adjustment unless each of them is willing to withhold its fundamental convictions in the field of politics, and, like Social Democracy, declare religion to be a man's "private business." For the Catholic, however, it is a first principle that

religion is anything but a private matter. How can there possibly be any reconcilation of these fundamental contradictions? Must it not end in a collection of regulations which have no inner connection with each other? Can there be any collective will in such a situation? And will not the State itself in such a case fall under the power of parties and their temporary tendencies? The more the consequences of the situation disclose themselves the lower the State is bound to sink, the looser its inner structure will become, and the less moral power will be derived from it.

It is clear, then, that the idea of socialisation is full of difficulties, and that it sinks deeper into them the farther it proceeds in the reconstruction of life. We have before us a great, an indispensable, idea, but Socialism cannot carry it out. Its standard is too narrow. By restricting itself to the visible world it falls under the power of parties and forgets man as a whole. Experience clearly shows us that Socialism only leads to trouble in its own camp when it tries to work out its scheme in detail. New parties arise constantly out of the old. The mere reason of man cannot lay the spectres which it has raised. Each particular plan of the whole regards itself as superior as long as it is in opposition, but the moment it attempts constructive thinking, it finds itself confronted by a new opposition. We are

threatened with a terrible chaos, and in the end the force of some strong personality may have to be brought in to put an end to it. What becomes then of the inner unity of the race and of the realm of peace and love? Socialisation certainly presents problems enough. What it lacks is the power to solve them.

§ 6

A CRITICISM OF ECONOMISM

In the case of economism there is question of the value of the economic life for the race. It is inevitable that there should be great changes of the old order. This order, which was mainly fixed by the teaching of Aristotle, was closely connected with a structure of society that we have passed beyond in the course of our evolution. The appreciation of spiritual things which inspired the old order was determined by the existence of slavery. It was only because the greater part of the race was in a state of servitude that concern about material things could be regarded as secondary. The matter appears in a very different light when the slaves become free and independent workers; when the movement is rather from below to above than the contrary, and thus entirely new claims make their appearance. The rise of this question gives great prominence to the economic factor, and is bound to shift the centre of gravity of the collec-

tive life. It is no longer a sign of an idealist disposition to make light of the economic question.

Moreover, the old order was too rigid, too inaccessible to large changes. The new order wants to bring men and things into a state of suspense, and to oppose to every limitation the idea of indefinite progress. That stiffened man's self-consciousness, and gave more confidence to his conduct. New resources were discovered. Theory took the lead. New forces were disclosed.

In fine, the technical and industrial development has entirely changed the character of economic work. It produced appalling problems which it left to our age and the future to solve. Whatever we decide in this field seems to settle the fate of the race. The situation is, therefore, one of great strain, and we quite understand that every available force is summoned in the attempt to find a remedy. But the Socialist ideal tried to put the spiritual and material, the things of sense and the things above sense, on a common footing of appreciation. It hoped to give life more power and more continuity in this way.

We have to question this idea of the relation of the material and spiritual. Socialism is quite right when it refuses to treat economic things as mere means to an end, and assigns them a value of their own. They influence the whole process of life. They provide new powers, new stimula-

tions, new objects. But to recognise this is not at all the same thing as to put the material and the spiritual on a common level. Throughout our whole life and conduct we feel the antithesis of mere existence and a world of action, of dependent and independent spirituality. There can be no question of making them equal: one must lead, the other follow. It is one of the limitations of Socialism that in its economism it knows no such thing as independent spirituality, or treats it merely as an appendage of the material. Hence even in the best cases Socialists must put material prosperity in the first place. This means a lowering of the standard of things which require an independent spirituality, and an absence of independent contacts.

Here we have the fundamental error of this naturalistic Monism. It regards the psychic life as merely a process in individual minds, and recognises no connection through a common life. When it thus confines its attention to individuals, it can justly claim that the individual life is closely associated with others, and that even the frontiers between animal and human life are not rigid. But it fails to appreciate the profound fact that in the case of man the psychic life does not consist of separate points; it runs together into a common life. This common life has an extraordinarily rich content, and it has

quite different features from those of nature. It is this connectedness that makes history and society in the strict human sense possible; it alone gives rise to conceptual language and culture, and facilitates the branching of culture into the independent provinces of law, morals, art, and science. It is, in fact, only in this soil that an independent economic life is possible; for there is a vital difference between the mere natural impulse to assert oneself in the struggle for life and the effort to bring about a common economic order. The main idea of the latter presupposes a spiritual and independent activity. The mere clash of natural impulses could never lead to the construction of an economic life.

Naturalistic economism shares with materialistic naturalism the defect of treating natural existence as the chief world, and then applying to its intellectual adaptation powers of thought which are unintelligible within the bounds of nature. This contradiction in theory leads to contradiction in action. Concern about the material world cannot be regarded by a spiritual being as the main object of life. His efforts must be directed to an autonomous purpose and value somewhere; they must be self-contained. The acquiring of an unlimited amount of material things cannot in the end satisfy a man. Hence even the economic life has to be included in a

larger life if it is to bring a man happiness and not unhappiness. Outwardly the desire may have no limits whatever, but there is a subjective limit. Concern about the means of life cannot be the substance of life.

The cares and complications which come of the wild struggle for life can only be endured when a man is full of spiritual interests and has in his mind no grave moral difficulties. This was the idea of the eighteenth century. It made life dependent above all on the general intelligence, and from its insight and benevolence it expected everything. As regards insight, we have already said enough about the unsatisfactory condition of the average man. But there is no doubt that he is equally unsatisfactory morally. Every profound thinker has taken these moral complications very seriously. Even those thinkers who in their philosophy zealously contended for the supremacy of reason, such as Aristotle and Leibnitz, could not refrain from sharp censures when they contemplated the condition of men. Different ages have expressed these censures differently, but there is a general agreement.

The thinkers of the ancient world demanded a firm standard of judgment and a harmonious development of all a man's powers, a tranquillity even in the midst of active work. They found the great mass of men full of insatiable greed

and constantly changing. Christianity declared that charity is the controlling power of human life, but all its leaders bitterly deplored the lack of charity, the great indifference of men to each other, the destructive power of selfishness. Modern times had the ambition to develop every power and enable all men to share in the advance of life; but the admission had to be made that the average man inertly opposed every attempt to stimulate him and could only be moved by artificial means. It can be shown to demonstration that the more any thinker reflected on the moral task, the more painfully he felt the distance of the average man from the ideal. That was the case of Kant, for instance, with his insistence on truthfulness and integrity.

Now what has economism, with its emphasis on material conditions, to say on this question? On Socialist principles it casts the whole blame for our moral condition on the perverse and corrupt social conditions. But how did it come about that a nature endowed with insight and benevolence created such conditions? If the conditions are so bad, their author cannot have been very good. And if men are of their own nature defective and contradictory, a change in their conditions will not help them much. Man is always human; no new constitution will deliver him from the faults of his own nature. The character of the

constitution matters, of course. It makes a good deal of difference whether a man lives in a healthy or an unhealthy social atmosphere. But the internal and external must work together. It is by no means the atmosphere alone that determines the spiritual condition. Christianity arose in unfortunate conditions, but it did not give in to its surroundings: partly at least, it overcame them.

Every civilisation has had its special difficulties. A certain self-destruction is seen unmistakably in the course of history. Great waves break upon men and races, but man is not merely passive under them. In virtue of the originality of the spiritual life, in which each individual may share, and in virtue of the influence of an independent and triumphant spirituality, he can begin again and find in the depths of his own soul something superior to all environment and tradition. Our condition is not so simple or so restricted as this Socialist economism supposes. Even the life of the community is more varied and more alive than Socialism represents it to be. It contains many levels and currents, and these may provide new impulses and stimulations, and thus affect individuals.

Let us not forget, in fine, that the predominance of the economic may assume different forms. There is capitalism, with its terrible power and

its insatiable cupidity. There is on the opposite side a constant condition of dissatisfaction, envy, and jealousy, which hampers, and may entirely prevent, the inward advance of life. The main thing is always the moral problem, the state of men's souls. Whatever we may say about the historical position of Christianity, we must never forget that it grasped very zealously the problem of the moral renovation of the race and sought to give a firm support and an inner harmony to a distracted age. Socialist economism is apt to underrate this. It is so disposed because it regards as a matter of course the constructive influence which came to men from Christianity. But we have just now a painful consciousness that it is not a matter of course; that it requires powerful forces and earnest effort.

Not only is economism apt to underrate the inner tasks and perplexities of men, as we have seen, but its ideal of happiness is too superficial. Its main object is subjective comfort, pleasure. This need not be directly sensuous; it may assume spiritual forms. But unless pleasure depends upon some real content, it soon becomes sensuous and vague. Even when it is attained, it leads in the end to a feeling of emptiness and tedium. It makes upon life a great claim that must be satisfied, a driving impulse that goes beyond the

mere individual and shows that man is a cosmic being, a sharer in infinite life.

That should be our attitude in regard to the main feature of human activity. It is work. The word, however, has many meanings, and the use of it has led to a good deal of confusion. We have only to think of work which is imposed upon us by the pressure of the needs of physical or economic subsistence, and then of our inner relation to an object, of a complete psychic disposition for it, an adoption of it into one's own province of life. We must clearly distinguish between the work imposed upon us and this self-chosen work: work directed to without and work directed to within. In the first case we are indifferent to the object; perhaps we hate it. In the other case it grows with our inner life. In the one case one strives to avoid the work as much as possible; in the other it is welcomed, and becomes a thing of joy, clearly distinguished from any other pleasure by the relation to the object. It is only free work that makes an appeal to a man and relieves him from the feeling of compulsion. It alone can permeate a man's whole life.

Within the psychic life itself we have two stages. All genuine work embraces the object, and binds the psychic power to it, but it makes a difference whether the object has merely certain attractions for us or can be adopted fully into

one's own life. It is only in the latter case that work becomes creative, and produces new reality: here alone can life find rest in itself and at the same time attain to something higher. Working and creating do not mean any sort of selection from a confused and vague collection of things; they are independent members of a comprehensive whole. This enables man, when he chooses his task, to conceive the whole as his own concern and share the uplift of life that proceeds from it. Happiness is not a matter of individual elements, but a vast source of life upon which every man may draw, and which he may regard as his own possession. It is one of the chief defects of modern times that we have far too much compulsory, and far too little free, work. Hence we find no true happiness, no inner contact with reality as a whole.

We have seen enough about the mighty problems which confront our age. Work, which had a more personal character in earlier times, has lost this more and more owing to the intellectual and technical enslavement of the forces of nature and the development of the factory system. It has created gigantic industrial complexes which bring man more and more within their power. This leads to immense achievements and to an increasingly complex division of labour, but the soul remains empty, and its thirst for happiness

is unsatisfied. It was the great aim and the chief duty of Socialism to satisfy this desire and to strengthen the souls of men. But here again it transpires that it is much easier to formulate problems than to solve them. The antithesis of the ideal of work and the ideal of happiness remains. Socialism means by soul merely a man's powers. We saw that this is not enough, and only lands us in fresh complications. On the other hand work presses its claims upon us. It seems to us a demoniac force that we would shake off, but we cannot do this without gravely injuring, if not destroying, civilisation.

It must therefore be a matter of deep concern to all earnest and thoughtful people to devise every possible means of ending this conflict which distracts the race. For this we need social institutions and regulations. Here more than anywhere else we need wise statesmanship: a mind that can see deep into the nature of things and does not shrink from the most drastic means of bridging the gulf between the soul and work. On the other hand, however, human nature itself must be deepened. Superhuman forces must be brought to life, and on the strength of these we must bring about a spiritual—not merely a religious —reformation. This alone can provide an adequate counterpoise to the weight of material interests.

It is at all events clear that modern life has two poles and turns upon these: a spiritual culture, which has the power of overcoming the antagonism of work and welfare, and an economic culture, which can meet the demands of nature and the social collectivity. The great problem of our day is to bring these two poles into harmonious relation to each other and reconcile the conflicting points of view. In this spiritual force must take the lead, and link up our aims with the whole.

In fine, it is not a question merely of economic prosperity, but of the good of man as a whole. The chief concern is not personal happiness, but an inner uplift and transformation. As individuals and even as social units we generally seek our own happiness, but when we reflect we see that this desire of happiness is only a means to lift us to the heights of our nature and make more of us inwardly. What often happens in the individual probably holds good also for the whole: a man often attains, not what he sought, but something greater. He sought happiness, and found a new life and being. As Goethe said: "Saul, son of Kis, went forth to seek his father's asses, and he found a kingdom."

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

ALL the various points that we have hitherto considered may be summed up in one question: Can Socialism as an ideal embrace the whole life of man, supply it with the necessary objects and powers, fully develop man's capabilities, and satisfy the desire of happiness?

It believed and hoped that it would do this by setting a man free from all non-human entanglements and putting him on the ground of experience. It was convinced that the problem can be fully solved by the combination of individual forces, by society, especially by an economic collectivity. All other questions merged in this. All other matters were coloured by this. A realm was established which promised to meet all man's legitimate aspirations.

To these questions we have to give a clear and unambiguous answer. We reply in the negative. Our point of view is not that of the politician or the political economist, but the philosopher. The

philosopher alone can tell what will happen to man as a whole, and inwardly, if the Socialist ideal is fully realised.

We put our opinions under six main headings. In each case we found that Socialism raises formidable problems and provides valuable stimulation, but that it cannot solve the problem of life. Its treatment is far too narrow, too summary, too partisan. It overlooks the depths and complexities of human nature, and its action could affect only part of the surface of life. Let us again glance at these points.

1. Socialism would embrace the whole movement of life and give more unity to our efforts. The problem is inevitable; but the solution offered to us does not go beyond a limited surface and a particular level. It ignores the deeper movements and the antagonisms which confront us.

2. Socialism makes man the centre of all effort, but its conception of human nature is too external. It separates man from reality as a whole, and, on account of this separation, it is unable to give his life a meaning and value. It is only a connection of life with the life of the whole that can give it substance.

3. Socialism would make life entirely a thing of the present. But it does not attain to a living present. It falls under the power of the passing moment. It has no genuine history.

4. Socialism would bring about complete equality. But it cannot do this without destroying the whole structure of society, and, if it is thoroughly consistent, sinking into a condition without spirituality or culture. The equality it aims at is very apt to become injustice.

5. Socialism would bind men more closely together by socialisation, and enable them to do higher things. But as it has no inner power to communicate, the whole must fall apart and end in a struggle of each against all.

6. Socialism treats the economic task as the greatest of all. It cannot do this without gravely injuring and stunting man's nature as a whole, and particularly his inner life. The external would dominate the internal.

In sum, there is here no right content of life and no real happiness. The whole thing is, in spite of all that has been done, confined to the surface. The only guide of conduct is utility. A combination of superior intelligence and sense-impulse is to constitute a complete man. Intellectualism and sensualism together are to control life and rob it of its soul. This theory suffers from a great exaggeration of the importance of the economic means which are provided by nature and our condition, and of the moral faculty. Man is thought to be naturally good and noble. It is evil conditions that are responsible for the un-

101
107
(133)

happy state of the race. That was the idea of Rousseau and the French Revolution, and it is also the idea of Socialism. The coincidence was bound to give rise to powerful movements and fiery passions, but it leads to an inner degeneration. What is the use of it all, if there is no inward life, if we are concerned only about material existence?

With all these objections and censures we must not fail to appreciate what Socialism has done. It has, in the first place, directed upon our conditions a vigorous and largely justified criticism. It has, in particular, made the economic problem an important part of life and shown how significant its consequences are. It has recognised the independence of the workers as an essential element of humanity, and this is bound to have a powerful influence upon the whole of life. Beyond all these services, there are very many Socialists who wish to see a new life inspired: more love, more unity, more happiness. The strength of this aspiration must be considered by any man who would understand Socialism rightly. Yet this aspiration cannot be fulfilled unless it is based upon larger contacts than those which Socialism affords. If its ideal is to sacrifice all that could be gained from further contacts, a spiritual impoverishment is inevitable. In point of fact, our whole spiritual atmosphere is steeped in historic work, though it is not yet recognised.

That Socialism—taking the word in its broadest sense—is now a world-power is experienced daily and hourly by every nation, at least indirectly. There were two chief reasons why it attained this power, and the coincidence of these has a great effect upon the actual crisis. Civilisation has not at present any comprehensive and uplifting aim. In earlier times religion gave it such an aim; then it received one from intellectual and artistic culture. Realism then came to power, and under its influence life divided into particular currents, many of which may be effective in detail, but the general effect is to divide, not to unite.

Upon this restless age fell the great economic development: the radical transformation of work and the appearance of the economic problem with all its antagonisms. This problem now dominates the situation. It has dragged the whole race out of its orbit. It has tried to put life on a new foundation. It has raised its objects to the rank of objects of man as a whole. This aim mixes right and wrong things inseparably together. Up to a point it is right, but it becomes wrong when it thrusts aside the question of man as a whole, and substitutes for him man as a worker, especially a manual worker.

That makes the standard of life much too narrow. To save the breadth and freedom of humanity we have to fight vigorously against this threat of

narrowness. The race must make a great struggle for self-preservation. We have to decide whether man as a whole is to be the ideal or whether he is to be sacrificed: whether he can assimilate the present situation, or whether it will destroy him. The danger is not so much in the spiritual content of Socialism, which is, nevertheless, undoubtedly limited and one-sided, as in the absence of a positive aim of life, a comprehensive and uplifting ideal. We have none at present. The future must have one, and it must at the same time properly adjust the relations of economic and spiritual activity; it must put the man above the worker. We shall not succeed without a thorough strengthening and deepening of life, a spiritual reformation. Personal enthusiasm cannot help us. We must be acted upon by higher spiritual forces before there will be any great change in us. Perhaps we are entering upon a new religious epoch that will give us inner support and substance. At all events, the main thing is our spiritual self-preservation, accompanied by happiness. Man will find that by his spiritual maintenance he is superior to all political and social problems. Once awakened to spirituality, he will never part with it. His spiritually free nature cannot tolerate the compulsion of Socialism. While, however, we hope for the ultimate triumph of man as a whole, there may be mighty struggles and revolutions before

it is attained. The immediate outlook has little hope in it. We have reached a fateful turn, and we need all our resources to decide.

There have been large transfers of power and of value. A powerful movement has arisen, and the feelings of whole nations as well as individuals are deeply stirred. But we have no containing and uplifting forces to provide a counterpoise. There is no substance in our life to direct our energies. Serious changes threaten man as a whole. The thousand-year-old content of society is in ruins, and elementary forces are let loose. The movement which formerly proceeded from above to below now runs in the opposite direction. That has caused immense changes. Man's position in regard to the totality of things is altered. He is uncertain about himself and his fundamental relation to reality. The bearers of moral as well as religious life are tottering.

In this respect our age is a tragic spectacle. Modern man would free himself from all entanglements and rely upon his own powers. He thought that he could do everything by closer combination and a full development of his faculties on the level of ordinary existence. With feverish energy he sought to build up a tower as high as the heavens. Already the various nations are in confusion. With all their talk of unity and equality, men fall wider apart than ever. We see clearly the

limitations of our race. Enthusiasm for humanity is dying down. It must soon be decided whether our social order and civilisation are, or are not, strong enough to bring about an inward unity, to engender the needful spiritual forces, to find a remedy for the psychic isolation of the race as well as of individuals. If not, they must perish, and they deserve to perish. The spiritual world itself is safe enough, and stands above all changes and human feverishness, as the stars shine high above the earth. It is not impossible that the race must actually learn by a crass denial of the existence of independent spirituality and the destruction of all invisible contacts how vitally it needs them. Meantime, let each faithfully do his duty and keep the totality of things firmly in view.

Printed in Great Britain by
UNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED, THE GRESHAM PRESS, WOKING AND LONDON

RUDOLF EUCKEN:

HIS LIFE, WORK, AND TRAVELS By HIMSELF. Translated by JOSEPH McCABE. Demy 8vo, cloth. 10/6 net.

Eucken commences his Biography by giving a brief description of the province of Friesland, its early history, etc., and its principal town, Aurisk, in which Eucken was born on the 5th January, 1846. He then describes his parents, his childhood, the family relatives, and the provincial family life of his day. In the second part of his work Eucken continues the story of his life, how he was called to Stockholm and awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1908. In dealing with the war, Eucken attributes the blame firstly to the clumsy methods of German diplomacy and to the policy of the late King Edward, which resulted in alliances against Germany, but he entirely acquits the German people of any desire for war. This is one of the most fascinating and important autobiographies of recent years.

VENIZELOS

By HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS Illustrated. Demy 8vo, cloth. 14/- net.

Mr. Gibbons, whose books upon European affairs have given him a leading position among American writers on European diplomacy, was in Paris throughout the war. During the Peace Conference, he was in very close touch with M. Venizelos, and writes from the fullest possible knowledge. His book is a notable contribution to international biography, and is as readable as it is important.

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD, 1 Adelphi Terrace, London

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE

By Professor SIGMUND FREUD, LL.D. Authorised English Edition, with an Introduction by A. A. BRILL, Ph.D., M.D. Cloth. 12/6 net. [*Seventh Impression.*

"The book is extraordinarily interesting and full of hints for the study of human nature."—*Nature.*

THE FREUDIAN WISH & ITS PLACE IN ETHICS

By EDWIN B. HOLT. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5/6 net.

Professor Holt here reviews Freud's work in its ethical aspect. He shows what support his psychological theories afford to the ancient identification of virtue and knowledge, and while giving due consideration to the well-known theory of dreams, he allots it a subordinate place in the whole of Freudian theory. This is a contribution of permanent and enormous value to psychology, both pure and applied."—*New Statesman.*

THE WORLD IN REVOLT

A Psychological Study of Modern Times. By GUSTAVE LE BON. Translated by BERNARD MIALL. Demy 8vo, cloth. 12/6 net.

M. Gustave Le Bon, the celebrated author of "The Crowd : A Study of the Popular Mind," and many other well-known works, here presents a study of the conditions of a world largely in revolt against the old order of things. He deals first with the moral and intellectual perturbations caused by the war, how new opinions and ideas originate, with the present political disorganisation, with the new popular aspirations, with some illusions of the proletariat, with communism, with the principle of nationalities, with the psychological mistakes in the Peace Treaty, with the problems facing the League of Nations, with present international stable elements, and many other questions of world importance. M. Le Bon writes with his usual lucidity and charm, and has here produced a book of high significance.

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD, 1 Adelphi Terrace, London

PHILOSOPHY:
A Popular Introduction

By Dr. WILHELM WINDELBAND
Translated by JOSEPH McCABE
Demy 8vo, cloth. 21/- net

In his Preface the Author points out that most works on Philosophy have the defect of being expressed in such technical language that the author and his meaning become inaccessible to the reader who is not versed in the terminology of the philosopher. The Author has, therefore, made it his aim to express himself in words and language that is intelligible to a non-philosophical reader, and consequently to meet the desire of those who wish to understand the main lines of philosophy. The book is not devoted solely to Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and the few other famous philosophers, but surveys the whole field of philosophical thought as it is understood to-day. The problems which the mind of man has at all times been trying to solve—i.e., time, space, matter, eternity, immortality, and other abstract subjects—are dealt with. The hypotheses on which man's conception of these questions is based are then explained. The Author shows how such hypotheses have arisen, their authors, their origin, and how they can be traced back to their source, whether in Greek or other ancient philosophy.

INSTINCTS OF THE HERD IN PEACE AND WAR

By W. TROTTER. Revised and Enlarged.
Cloth. 8/6 net. **[*Sixth Impression***

"An exceedingly original essay on individual and social psychology."—*New Statesman.*

"It is a balanced and inspiring study of one of the prime factors of human advance."—*Times.*

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD, 1 Adelphi Terrace, London

THE LAW OF BIRTHS AND DEATHS: Being a Study of the Variation in the Degree of Animal Fertility under the Influence of the Environment. By CHARLES EDWARD PELL.

Demy 8vo, cloth. 12/6 net.

The Author argues that the decline of the birth-rate is not to be explained as the result of deliberate birth-control, but that it can be explained as the result of a natural law, the function of which is to adjust the degree of fertility to suit approximately the needs of the species. He holds that decisive proof can be provided of a decline in natural fertility sufficient to account for the whole decline in the birth-rate, and in support of this contention, he adduces a number of striking test cases. On the other hand, he shows that the existence of a law which adjusts the degree of fertility to suit the death-rate is a necessary deduction from the theory of organic evolution—that evolution would have been impossible without the existence of such a law. The effects of all the environmental factors, such as climate, food, and intellectual activity, upon birth-rate, stature, and physical development generally are collated and analysed. It is shown that we are on the eve of a wave of depopulation, which may ruin our modern civilisation as similar waves ruined the civilisations of the ancients, unless we awake in time to the real character of the menace and take effective steps to combat it. It is evident that the book grapples with the most vital problem which confronts modern civilisation.

THE EUGENIC PROSPECT

National and Racial. By C. W. SALEEBY, M.D., F.R.S.E., F.Z.S. Demy 8vo, cloth. 12/6 net.

In this volume the Author, who abandoned medical practice in 1904 to follow Francis Galton, the founder of modern eugenics, continues his studies of personal, national, and racial health. Our scientific knowledge, especially of food and drink, has greatly advanced since Dr. Saleeby published his previous volume shortly after the Armistice; vital statistics, and especially the quality of the birth-rate, have shown grave tendencies; and the Author, during visits to Canada and the United States in 1919 and 1920, as delegate to certain international congresses concerned with public health, took the opportunity to make wide observations in sixteen States, notably in relation to the value of light in cities, the results of which are given a prominent place in the present work, in view of their importance for the proper building of the new houses now needed in this country.

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD, 1 Adelphi Terrace, London

UNWIN'S "CHATS" SERIES

PRACTICAL HANDBOOKS FOR COLLECTORS

Most people nowadays are collectors in a small way of Autographs, China, Furniture, Prints, Miniatures, or Silver, and would take up these fascinating hobbies more extensively, and collect with profit, if they had a knowledge of the subject.

It is to the beginner and would-be collector that Unwin's "Chats" Series of practical handbooks especially appeal. They are the recognized standard guides to collecting, each volume being the work of an expert on the subject dealt with.

Each volume is profusely illustrated with carefully-chosen specimens of the various styles and periods.

Full Indices, Bibliographies, and Lists of Sale Prices at Public Auctions are included in the volumes.

"As this is the age of collectors, so it is the age of books for their guidance. Mr. Unwin's series of books for collectors now includes twenty-one volumes, and if bargains are missed it is certainly not the fault of the various writers." *The Nation.*

HOW TO COLLECT WITH PROFIT is the keynote of the series. The phenomenal prices realized at auction sales are obtained by those who have collected wisely. Prices are still rising, and those who have the knowledge are buying for future rises. Ask always for and see that you get UNWIN'S "Chats" Series—the standard popular handbooks on collecting.

THE "CHATS" SERIES IS ON SALE AT ALL BOOKSELLERS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AND IS PUBLISHED BY T. FISHER UNWIN LTD., 1 ADELPHI TERRACE, LONDON, W.C.2

UNWIN'S "CHATS" SERIES

LIST OF VOLUMES

Chats on English China. By ARTHUR HAYDEN. Illustrated with reproductions of 156 marks and 89 specimens of china. Cloth, 15s. net. Fourth Edition.

This is the standard work on the subject. The volume will enable the possessors of old china to determine the factories at which their ware was produced.

"It gives in a few chapters just what the beginner wants to know about the principal varieties of English ware. We can warmly commend the book to the china collector." *Pall Mall Gazette.*

"So simply yet so thoroughly written, that it is a sage guide to the veriest tyro in china collecting." *Bookman.*

Chats on Old Furniture. By ARTHUR HAYDEN. With a coloured frontispiece and 104 other Illustrations. Cloth, 12s. 6d. net. Fourth Edition. Eleventh Impression.

"The hints to collectors are the best and clearest we have seen; so that altogether this is a model book of its kind." *Athenæum.*

"A fully illustrated practical guide for collectors." *The Times.*

"Mr. Hayden has worked at his subject on systematic lines, and has made his book what it purports to be—a practical guide for the collector." *The Saturday Review.*

Chats on Old Prints. How to Collect and Identify. By ARTHUR HAYDEN. With a coloured frontispiece and 72 full-page plates. Cloth, 15s. net. Sixth Impression.

Every branch of the subject is carefully and explicitly handled in this book, and valuable information as to technical processes and identification of prints is given.

"If there is a better book of its kind on print collecting we have not yet come across it." *Daily Graphic.*

"A very useful handbook for beginners, intended to help any reader of artistic tastes, but very moderate means, to collect to good purpose." *The Times.*

Chats on Costume. By G. WOOLLISCROFT RHEAD, R.E. With a coloured frontispiece and 117 other Illustrations. Cloth, 10s. 6d. net. Second Impression.

A practical guide to historic dress. "Clothes" is a subject that has been neglected by collectors, and this book will be a useful guide to those who desire to repair that neglect by forming a collection.

"A book that is at once the work of an authority on the subject of costumes, and one that helps to enlarge our range of selection." *Pall Mall Gazette.*

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD., 1 ADELPHI TERRACE, LONDON, W.C.2

UNWIN'S "CHATS" SERIES

Chats on Old Miniatures. By J. J. FOSTER, F.S.A. With a coloured frontispiece and 116 other Illustrations. Cloth, 6s. net.

This book presents in a concise and popular form a variety of valuable information on the collection and preservation of miniatures, on the leading English and French artists, and on the specimens exhibited in public galleries.

"Mr. Foster is truly a guide, philosopher and friend. He tells us not only how to judge and how to buy miniatures, but how to take proper care of them. . . . The splendid photographs by which the book is enriched adds in a great measure to its attractiveness and utility." *Aberdeen Free Press.*

Chats on Old Lace and Needlework. By MRS. LOWES. With a frontispiece and 74 other Illustrations. Cloth, 10s. 6d. net. Third Impression.

Written by an expert and enthusiast in these most interesting branches of art. The low price at which the work is issued is exceptional in dealing with these subjects, and it is remarkable in view of the technical knowledge displayed and the many photographic illustrations which practically interleave the book.

"In commendable, clear and concise style Mrs. Lowes explains the technical features distinguishing each example, making the book the utmost value in identifying samples of old lace."—*Weldon's Ladies' Jour.*

Chats on Oriental China. By J. F. BLACKER. With a coloured frontispiece and 70 other Illustrations. Cloth, 10s. 6d. net. Fourth Impression.

Will be of the utmost service to collectors and to all who may have old Chinese and Japanese porcelain in their possession. It deals with oriental china from the various standpoints of history, technique, age, marks and values, and is richly illustrated with admirable reproductions.

"A treatise that is so informing and comprehensive that it commands the prompt recognisation of all who value the choice productions of the oriental artists. . . . The illustrations are numerous and invaluable to the attainment of expert knowledge, and the result is a handbook that is as indispensable as it is unique." *Pall Mall Gazette.*

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD., 1 ADELPHI TERRACE, LONDON, W.C.2

UNWIN'S "CHATS" SERIES

Chats on English Earthenware. A companion volume to "Chats on English China." By ARTHUR HAYDEN. With a coloured frontispiece, 150 Illustrations and tables of over 200 illustrated marks. Cloth, 10s. 6d. net. Third Impression.

"To the ever-increasing number of collectors who are taking an interest in old English pottery . . . will be found one of the most delightful, as it is a practical work on a fascinating subject." *Hearth and Home.*

"Here we have a handbook, written by a well-known authority, which gives in the concisest possible form all the information that the beginner in earthenware collecting is likely to need. Moreover, it contains one or two features that are not usually found in the multifarious 'guides' that are produced to-day." *Nation.*

Chats on Autographs. By A. M. BROADLEY. With 130 Illustrations. Cloth, 6s. net.

"Being an expert collector, Mr. Broadley not only discourses on the kinds of autograph he owns, but gives some excellent cautionary advice and a valuable 'caveat emptor' chapter for the benefit of other collectors." *Westminster Gazette.*

"It is assuredly the best work of the kind yet given to the public; and supplies the intending collector with the various sources of information necessary to his equipment." *Manchester Guardian.*

Chats on Old Pewter. By H. J. L. J. MASSÉ, M.A. With 52 half-tone and numerous other Illustrations. Cloth, 10s. 6d. net. Second Impression.

"It is a remarkably thorough and well-arranged guide to the subject, supplied with useful illustrations and with lists of pewterers and of their marks so complete as to make it a very complete and satisfactory book of reference." *Manchester Guardian.*

"Before setting out to collect old pewter it would be as well to read Mr. Massé's book, which is exhaustive in its information and its lists of pewterers, analytical index, and historical and technical chapters." *Spectator.*

Chats on Postage Stamps. By FRED J. MELVILLE. With 57 half-tone and 17 line Illustrations. Cloth, 10s. 6d. net. Second Impression.

"The whole book, with its numerous illustrations of excellent quality, is a *vade mecum* for stamp collectors, even though their efforts may be but modest; we congratulate Mr. Melville on a remarkably good guide, which makes fascinating reading." *Academy.*

"There is no doubt that Mr. Melville's book fills a void. There is nothing exactly like it. Agreeably written in a popular style and adequately illustrated, it is certainly one of the best guides to philatelic knowledge that have yet been published." *World.*

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD., 1 ADELPHI TERRACE, LONDON, W.C.2

UNWIN'S "CHATS" SERIES

Chats on Old Jewellery and Trinkets. By MACIVER PERCIVAL. With nearly 300 Illustrations. Cloth, 6s. net.

"The book is very thorough, dealing as it does with classic, antique and modern ornaments; with gold, silver, steel and pinchbeck; with the precious stones, the commoner stones and imitation."—*Outlook.*

"'Chats on Old Jewellery and Trinkets' is a book which will enable every woman to turn over her jewel-case with a fresh interest and a new intelligence; a practical guide for the humble but anxious collector. . . . A good glossary of technicalities and many excellent illustrations complete a valuable contribution to collector's lore." *Illustrated London News.*

Chats on Cottage and Farmhouse Furniture. A companion volume to "Chats on Old Furniture." By ARTHUR HAYDEN. With a coloured frontispiece and 75 other Illustrations. Cloth, 15s. net. Third Impression.

"One gets very much for one's money in this book. Seventy-three full-page illustrations in half-tone embellish a letterpress which is replete with wise description and valuable hints." *Vanity Fair.*

"Mr. Hayden's book is a guide to all sorts of desirable and simple furniture, from Stuart to Georgian, and it is a delight to read as well as a sure help to selection." *Pall Mall Gazette.*

"Mr. Hayden writes lucidly and is careful and accurate in his statements; while the advice he gives to collectors is both sound and reasonable." *Westminster Gazette.*

Chats on Old Coins. By FRED W. BURGESS. With a coloured frontispiece and 258 other Illustrations. Cloth, 10s. 6d. net. Second Impression.

"A most useful and instructive book . . . will prove a boon to the intending collector of old coins and tokens, and full of interest to every collector. As was to be expected of any volume of this series, the illustrations are numerous and good, and greatly assist the reader to grasp the essentials of the author's descriptions." *Outlook.*

"The author has not only produced 'a practical guide for the collector' but a handy book of reference for all. The volume is wonderfully cheap." *Notes and Queries.*

Chats on Old Copper and Brass. By FRED W. BURGESS. With a coloured frontispiece and 86 other Illustrations. Cloth, 6s. net.

"Mr. F. W. Burgess is an expert on old copper and bronze, and in his book there is little information lacking which the most ardent collector might want." *The Observer.*

"Italian bronzes, African charms, Chinese and Japanese enamels, bells, mortars, Indian idols, dials, candlesticks, and snuff boxes, all come in for their share of attention, and the reader who has mastered Mr. Burgess's pages can face his rival in the auction-room or the dealer in his shop with little fear of suffering by the transaction." *The Nation.*

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD., 1 ADELPHI TERRACE, LONDON, W.C.2

UNWIN'S "CHATS" SERIES

Chats on Household Curios. By FRED W. BURGESS. With 94 Illustrations. Cloth, 6s. net.

"Mr. Burgess gives much information about such attractive antiques as old glass and enamels, old leather work, old clocks and watches, old pipes, old seals, musical instruments, and even old samplers and children's toys. The book is, in short, an excellent and comprehensive guide for what one may call the general collector, that is, the collector who does not confine himself to one class of antique, but buys whatever he comes across in the curio line, provided that it is interesting and at moderate price." *Aberdeen Free Press.*

Chats on Japanese Prints. By ARTHUR DAVISON FICKE. With a coloured frontispiece and 56 Illustrations. Cloth, 6s. net. Third Impression.

"Mr. Ficke writes with the knowledge of the expert, and his history of Japanese printing from very early times and his criticism of the artists' work are wonderfully interesting." *Tatler.*

"This is one of the most delightful and notable members of an attractive series. . . . A beginner who shall have mastered and made thoroughly his own the beauty of line and the various subtlety and boldness of linear composition displayed in these sixty and odd photographs will have no mean foundation for further study."—*Notes and Queries.*

Chats on Old Clocks. By ARTHUR HAYDEN. With a frontispiece and 80 Illustrations. 2nd Ed. Cloth, 10s. 6d. net.

"A practical handbook dealing with the examples of old clocks likely to come under the observation of the collector. Charmingly written and illustrated." *Outlook.*

"One specially useful feature of the work is the prominence Mr. Hayden has given to the makers of clocks, dealing not only with those of London, but also those of the leading provincial towns. The lists he gives of the latter are highly valuable, as they are not to be found in any similar book. The volume is, as usual with this series, profusely illustrated, and may be recommended as a highly interesting and useful general guide to collectors of clocks." *The Connoisseur.*

Chats on Old Silver. By ARTHUR HAYDEN. With a frontispiece, 99 full-page Illustrations, and illustrated table of marks. Cloth, 10s. 6d. net. Third Impression.

"Mr. Hayden's 'Chats on Old Silver' deals very thoroughly with a popular branch of collecting. There are a hundred full-page illustrations together with illustrated tables and charts, and the student of this book can wander round the old curiosity shops of these islands with a valuable equipment of knowledge. . . . Altogether we have here a well-written summary of everything that one could wish to know about this branch of collecting." *The Sphere.*

"The information it gives will be of exceptional value at this time, when so many families will be forced to part with their treasures—and old silver is among the most precious possessions of the present day." *Morning Post.*

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD., 1 ADELPHI TERRACE, LONDON, W.C.2

UNWIN'S "CHATS" SERIES

Chats on Military Curios. By STANLEY C. JOHNSON, M.A., D.Sc. With a coloured frontispiece and 79 other Illustrations. Cloth, 6s. net.

"Mr. Johnson in this book describes many of the articles a collector should be on the look out for, giving short but informative notes on medals, helmet and cap badges, tunic buttons, armour, weapons of all kinds, medallions, autographs, original documents relating to Army work, military pictures and prints, newspaper cuttings, obsolete uniforms, crests, stamps, postmarks, memorial brasses, money and curios made by prisoners of war, while there is also an excellent biography on the subject. The author has, indeed, presented the reader with a capital working handbook, which should prove a friendly and reliable guide when he goes collecting." *Field.*

Chats on Royal Copenhagen Porcelain. By ARTHUR HAYDEN. With a frontispiece, 56 full-page Illustrations and illustrated tables of marks. Cloth, 10s. 6d. net.

"This very beautiful and very valuable book will be eagerly welcomed by lovers of porcelain. . . . Mr. Hayden describes with great skill and preciseness all the quality and beauty of technique in which this porcelain excels; he loves it and understands it, and the examples he has chosen as illustrations are a valuable supplement to his descriptions." *Bookman.*

Chats on Old Sheffield Plate. By ARTHUR HAYDEN. With frontispiece and 58 full-page Illustrations, together with makers' marks. Cloth, 21s. net.

Old plated ware has, by reason of its artistic excellence and its technique, deservedly won favour with collectors. The art of making plated ware, which originated at Sheffield (hence the name "Sheffield plate"), was continued at Birmingham and London, where a considerable amount of "old Sheffield plate" was made, in the manner of its first inventors, by welding sheets of silver upon copper. The manufacture lasted roughly a hundred years. Its best period was from 1776 (American Declaration of Independence) to 1830 (Accession of William IV). The author shows reasons why this old Sheffield plate should be collected, and the volume is illustrated with many examples giving various styles and the development of the art, together with makers' marks. Candlesticks and

candelabra, tea-caddies, sugar-baskets, salt-cellars, tea-pots, coffee-pots, salvers, spoons, and many other articles shown and described in the volume indicate the exquisite craftsmanship of the best period. The work stands as a companion volume to the author's "Chats on Old Silver," the standard practical guide to old English silver collecting.

Bye Paths in Curio Collecting. By ARTHUR HAYDEN, Author of "Chats on Old Silver," etc. With a frontispiece and 72 full-page Illustrations. Cloth, 21s. net. Second Impression.

"Every collector knows the name of Mr. Arthur Hayden, and knows him for a wise counsellor. Upon old furniture, old china, old pottery, and old prints there is no more knowing judge in the country; and in his latest volume he supplies a notable need, in the shape of a vade-mecum exploring some of the nondescript and little traversed bye-paths of the collector. There was never a time when the amateur of the antique stood more in need of a competent guide. . . . The man who wishes to avoid the pitfalls of the fraudulent will find much salutary advice in Mr. Hayden's gossipy pages. There are chests, for example, a fruitful field for reproduction. Mr. Hayden gives photographs of many exquisite examples. There is a marriage coffer of the sixteenth century, decorated with carved figures of Cupid and Hymen, a fine Gothic chest of the fifteenth century, with rich foliated decorations; and a superb livery cupboard from Haddon Hall. From Flanders come steel coffers, with a lock of four bolts, the heavy sides strongly braized together. Then there are snuffers, with and without trays, tinder-boxes, snuff graters, and metal tobacco stoppers. The most fascinating designs are shown, with squirrels, dogs, and quaint human figures at the summit. Fans and playing-cards provide another attractive section.

Chicken-skin, delicate, white,
Painted by Carlo van Loo.

The fan has always been an object of the collector's passion, because of the grace of the article and its beauty as a display. Mr. Hayden shows a particularly beautiful one, with designs after Fragonard, the sticks of ivory with jewelled studs. Then there are watch-stands, a little baroque in design, and table-bells, some of them shaped as female figures with spreading skirts, old toys and picture-books, and, of course, cradles, of which every English farm-house once boasted its local variety. Altogether the book abounds in inviting pictures and curious information, and is certain of a large, appreciative public." *Daily Telegraph.*

The Fan Book: Including Special Chapters on European Fans of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. By MACIVER PERCIVAL, author of "Chats on Old Jewellery and Trinkets." Fully Illustrated. Demy 8vo, cloth, 21s. net.

POETRY THAT THRILLS

A COLLECTION OF SONGS FROM OVERSEAS THAT THRILL WITH VIVID DESCRIPTIONS OF THE ADVENTUROUS LIFE IN THE FROZEN NORTH, IN THE OUTPOSTS OF CIVILIZATION AND OF THE HEROISM OF SOLDIERS IN BATTLE

SONGS OF A SOURDOUGH. By ROBERT W. SERVICE.
Crown 8vo. Cloth, 4/6 net. Fortieth Impression.
Also a Pocket edition. Fcap. 8vo, cloth, 4/6 net.

"Of the Canadian disciples of Kipling, by far the best is R. W. Service. His 'Songs of a Sourdough' have run through many editions. Much of his verse has a touch of real originality, conveying as it does a just impression of the something evil and askew in the strange, uncouth wilderness of the High North." *The Times.*

"Mr. Service has got nearer to the heart of the old-time place miner than any other verse-maker in all the length and height of the Dominion. . . . He certainly sees the Northern Wilderness through the eyes of the man into whose soul it is entered." *Morning Post.*

RHYMES OF A RED-CROSS MAN. By ROBERT W. SERVICE. Crown 8vo. Cloth, 4/6 net. Sixth Impression.
Also a Pocket edition. Fcap. 8vo, cloth, 4/6 net.

"It is the great merit of Mr. Service's verses that they are literally alive with the stress and joy and agony and hardship that make up life out in the battle zone. He has never written better than in this book, and that is saying a great deal." *Bookman.*

"Mr. Service has painted for us the unutterable tragedy of the war, the horror, the waste, and the suffering, but side by side with that he has set the heroism, the endurance, the unfailing cheerfulness and the unquenchable laughter." *Scots Pictorial.*

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD., 1 Adelphi Terrace, London, W.C.2

BALLADS OF A CHEECHAKO. By ROBERT W. SERVICE. Crown 8vo. Cloth, 4/6 net. Fourteenth Impression. Also a Pocket edition. Fcap. 8vo, Cloth, 4/6 net.

"It is to men like Mr. Service that we must look for really original verse nowadays; to the men on the frontiers of the world. 'Ballads of a Cheechako' is magnificent." *Oxford Magazine.*

"All are interesting, arresting, and worth reading in their own setting for their own sakes. They are full of life and fire and muscularity, like the strenuous and devil-may-care fight of a life they describe." *Standard.*

RHYMES OF A ROLLING STONE. By ROBERT W. SERVICE. Crown 8vo. Cloth, 4/6 net. Fifteenth Impression. Also a Pocket edition. Fcap. 8vo, Cloth, 4/6 net.

"There is real rollicking fun in some of the rhymed stories, and some sound philosophy in the shorter serious poems which shows that Mr. Service is as many steps above the ordinary lesser poets in his thought as he is in his accomplishments." *Academy.*

"Mr. Robert Service is, we suppose, one of the most popular verse-writers in the world. His swinging measures, his robust ballads of the outposts, his joy of living have fairly caught the ear of his countrymen." *Spectator*

THE SPELL OF THE TROPICS. By RANDOLPH H. ATKIN. Cloth, 4/6 net. Second Impression.

The poems are striking pen-pictures of life as it is lived by those men of the English-speaking races whose lot is cast in the sun-bathed countries of Latin-America. Mr. Atkin's verses will reach the hearts of all who feel the call of the wanderlust, and, having shared their pleasures and hardships, his poems will vividly recall to "old-timers" bygone memories of days spent in the Land of the Coconut Tree.

THE SONG OF TIADATHA. By OWEN RUTTER. Cloth, 4/6 net. Third Impression.

Composed on the familiar metre of "Hiawatha," "The Song of Tiadatha" (Tired Arthur), an extravaganza written in the highest spirits, nevertheless is an epic of the war. It typifies what innumerable soldiers have seen and done and the manner in which they took it.

"This song of Tiadatha is nothing less than a little English epic of the war." *The Morning Post.*

"Every Army officer and ex-officer will hail Tiadatha as a brother. 'The Song of Tiadatha' is one of the happiest skits born of the war." *Evening Standard.*

SONGS OUT OF EXILE: Being Verses of African Sunshine and Shadow and Black Man's Twilight. By CULLEN GOULDSBURY. Cloth, 4/6 net. Fourth Impression.

"The 'Rhodesian Rhymes' won for their author the journalistic title of 'The Kipling of South Africa,' and indeed his work is full of crisp vigour, fire and colour. It is brutal in parts; but its brutality is strong and realistic. Mr Gouldsbury has spent many years in Rhodesia, and its life, black and white, is thoroughly familiar to him. . . . Mr. Gouldsbury is undoubtedly a writer to be reckoned with. His verse is informed by knowledge of wild life in open places and a measure of genuine feeling which make it real poetry."—*Standard.*

FROM THE OUTPOSTS. By CULLEN GOULDSBURY. Cloth, 4/6 net. Third Impression.

"Mr. Cullen Gouldsbury's collections of his verses are always welcome, and the last, 'From the Outposts,' is as good as its predecessor. No one has quite Mr. Gouldsbury's experience and gift." *Spectator.*

"It has been well said that Mr. Gouldsbury has done for the white man in Africa what Adam Lindsay Gordon in a measure accomplished for the Commonwealth and Kipling triumphantly for the British race, and he certainly is good to read." *Field.*

THE HELL-GATE OF SOISSONS and other Poems. ("THE SONG OF THE GUNS.") By HERBERT KAUFMAN. Cloth, 4/6 net. Fifth Impression.

"A singular gift for expressing in verse the facts, the heroism, even the humours of war; and in some cases voices its ideals with real eloquence." *The Times.*

"Mr. Kaufman has undoubtedly given us a book worthy of the great hour that has brought it forth. He is a poet with a martial spirit and a deep, manly voice." *Daily Mail.*

LYRA NIGERIA. By ADAMU. (E. C. ADAMS). Cloth, 4/6 net. Second Impression.

"Mr. E. C. Adams (Adamu) is a singer of Nigeria, and it can safely be said he has few, if any, rivals. There is something in these illustrations of Nigerian life akin to the style of Kipling and Service. The heart of the wanderer and adventurer is revealed, and in particular that spirit of longing which comes to all . . . who have gone out to the far-lands of the world." *Dundee Advertiser.*

SUNNY SONGS. Poems. By EDGAR A. GUEST. Cloth, 4/6 net.

In America Mr. Guest is an extraordinarily popular writer of verses, though this is his first introduction in book form to the British public. He brims over with sound sense and tonic cheeriness. He is keenly sensible of the humour of domestic life, but is deeply sympathetic with the associations which combine in the word "Home." Hence he is read by women with amusement and pleasure. During the war his poem, "Said the Workman to the Soldier," circulated by the hundred thousand. Like Béranger and all successful poets, he is essentially lyrical; that is to say, there is tune and swing in all his verses.

RICHARD MIDDLETON'S WORKS

POEMS AND SONGS (*First Series*). By RICHARD MIDDLETON. Cloth, 5/- net.

"We have no hesitation in placing the name of Richard Middleton beside the names of all that galaxy of poets that made the later Victorian era the most brilliant in poetry that England had known since the Elizabethan." *Westminster Review.*

POEMS AND SONGS (*Second Series*). By RICHARD MIDDLETON. Cloth, 5/- net.

"Their beauty is undeniable and often of extraordinary delicacy' for Middleton had a mastery of craftmanship such as is usually given to men of a far wider imaginative experience." *Poetry Review.*

"Among the 'Poems and Songs' of Richard Middleton are to be found some of the finest of contemporary lyrics." *Country Life.*

OTHER WORKS BY RICHARD MIDDLETON

THE GHOST SHIP AND OTHER STORIES.

MONOLOGUES.

THE DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY.

THE WAITING WOMAN and other Poems. By HERBERT KAUFMAN. Cloth, 4/6 net.

"Mr. Kaufman's work possesses in a high degree the qualities of sincerity and truth, and it therefore never fails to move the reader. . . . This volume, in short, is the work of a genuine poet and artist." *Aberdeen Free Press.*

"A versifier of great virility and power." *Review of Reviews.*

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD., 1 Adelphi Terrace, London, W.C.2

BY W. B. YEATS AND OTHERS

POEMS. By W. B. YEATS. Second edition. Large Crown 8vo, Cloth, 10/6 net. Ninth Impression.

"Love songs, faery themes, moods of meditation, scenes of legendary wonder . . . is it possible that they should become so infinitely thrilling, touching, haunting in their fresh treatment, as though they had never been, or poets had never turned to them? In this poet's hands they do so become. Mr. Yeats has given us a new thrill of delight, a new experience of beauty." *Daily Chronicle.*

OTHER POEMS BY W. B. YEATS

COUNTESS CATHLEEN. A Dramatic Poem. Paper cover, 2/- net.

THE LAND OF HEART'S DESIRE. Paper cover, 1/6 net.

WHY DON'T THEY CHEER? By R. J. C. STEAD. Cloth, 4/6 net.

"Before the war Mr. Stead was known to Canadians as 'The Poet of the Prairies.' He must now be ranked as a 'Poet of the Empire.' . . . There is a strength, a beauty, a restrained passion in his war verses which prove his ability to penetrate into the heart of things such as very few of our war poets have exhibited."—*Daily Express.*

SWORDS AND FLUTES. By WILLIAM KEAN SEYMOUR. Cloth, 4/- net.

"Among the younger poets Mr. Seymour is distinguished by his delicacy of technique. 'Swords and Flutes' is a book of grave and tender beauty expressed in lucent thought and jewelled words. 'The Ambush' is a lyric of mastery and fascination, alike in conception and rhythm, which should be included in any representative anthology of Georgian poetry." *Daily Express.*

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD., 1 Adelphi Terrace, London, W.C.2

THE MERMAID SERIES

THE BEST PLAYS OF THE OLD DRAMATISTS

Literal Reproductions of the Old Text. With Photogravure Frontispieces. Thin Paper edition. School Edition, Boards, 3/- net; Cloth, 5/- net; Leather, 7/6 net each volume.

Marlowe. THE BEST PLAYS OF CHRISTOPHER MARLOWE. Edited, with Critical Memoir and Notes, by Havelock Ellis; and containing a General Introduction to the Series by John Addington Symonds.

Otway. THE BEST PLAYS OF THOMAS OTWAY. Introduction and Notes by the Hon. Roden Noel.

Ford. THE BEST PLAYS OF JOHN FORD. Edited by Havelock Ellis.

Massinger. THE BEST PLAYS OF PHILLIP MASSINGER. With Critical and Biographical Essay and Notes by Arthur Symons.

Heywood (T.). THE BEST PLAYS OF THOMAS HEYWOOD. Edited by A. W. Verity. With Introduction by J. A. Symonds.

Wycherley. THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF WILLIAM WYCHERLEY. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by W. C. Ward.

NERO AND OTHER PLAYS. Edited by H. P. Horne, Arthur Symons, A. W. Verity and H. Ellis.

Beaumont. THE BEST PLAYS OF BEAUMONT AND FLETCHER. Introduction and Notes by J. St. Loe Strachey. 2 vols.

Congreve. THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF WILLIAM CONGREVE. Edited by Alex. C. Ewald.

Symonds (J. A.). THE BEST PLAYS OF WEBSTER AND TOURNEUR. With an Introduction and Notes by John Addington Symonds

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD., 1 Adelphi Terrace, London, W.C.2

THE MERMAID SERIES—*contd.*

Middleton (T.). THE BEST PLAYS OF THOMAS MIDDLETON. With an Introduction by Algernon Charles Swinburne. 2 vols.

Shirley. THE BEST PLAYS OF JAMES SHIRLEY. With Introduction by Edmund Gosse.

Dekker. THE BEST PLAYS OF THOMAS DEKKER. Notes by Ernest Rhys.

Steele (R.). THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF RICHARD STEELE. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by G. A. Aitken.

Jonson. THE BEST PLAYS OF BEN JONSON. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by Brinsley Nicholson and C. H. Herford. 2 vols.

Chapman. THE BEST PLAYS OF GEORGE CHAPMAN. Edited by William Lyon Phelps.

Vanbrugh. THE SELECT PLAYS OF SIR JOHN VANBRUGH. Edited, with an Introduction and Notes, by A. E. H. Swain.

Shadwell. THE BEST PLAYS OF THOMAS SHADWELL. Edited by George Saintsbury.

Dryden. THE BEST PLAYS OF JOHN DRYDEN. Edited by George Saintsbury. 2 vols.

Farquhar. THE BEST PLAYS OF GEORGE FARQUHAR. Edited, and with an Introduction, by William Archer.

Greene. THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF ROBERT GREENE. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by Thomas H. Dickinson.

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD., 1 Adelphi Terrace, London, W.C. 2

THE ADVANCE OF SOUTH AMERICA

A FEW NOTES ON SOME INTERESTING BOOKS DEALING WITH THE PAST HISTORY, PRESENT AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES OF THE GREAT CONTINENT

When in 1906 Mr. Fisher Unwin commissioned the late Major Martin Hume to prepare a series of volumes by experts on the South American Republics, but little interest had been taken in the country as a possible field for commercial development. The chief reasons for this were ignorance as to the trade conditions and the varied resources of the country, and the general unrest and instability of most of the governments. With the coming of the South American Series of handbooks the financial world began to realize the importance of the country, and, with more settled conditions, began in earnest to develop the remarkable natural resources which awaited outside enterprise. Undoubtedly the most informative books on the various Republics are those included in THE SOUTH AMERICAN SERIES, each of which is the work of a recognized authority on his subject.

"The output of books upon Latin America has in recent years been very large, a proof doubtless of the increasing interest that is felt in the subject. Of these the 'South American Series' is the most noteworthy." *The Times.*

"When the 'South American Series' is completed, those who take interest in Latin-American affairs will have an invaluable encyclopædia at their disposal." *Westminster Gazette.*

"Mr. Unwin's 'South American Series' of books are of special interest and value to the capitalist and trader."—*Chamber of Commerce Journal.*

Full particulars of the volumes in the "South American Series," also of other interesting books on South America, will be found in the pages following.

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD., 1 ADELPHI TERRACE, LONDON, W.C.2

THE SOUTH AMERICAN SERIES

1 **Chile.** By G. F. Scott Elliott, M.A., F.R.G.S. With an Introduction by Martin Hume, a Map and 39 Illustrations. Cloth, 21/- net. Sixth Impression.

"An exhaustive, interesting account, not only of the turbulent history of this country, but of the present conditions and seeming prospects." *Westminster Gazette.*

2 **Peru.** By C. Reginald Enock, F.R.G.S. With an Introduction by Martin Hume, a Map and 64 Illustrations. Cloth, 18/- net. Fifth Impression.

"An important work. . . . The writer possesses a quick eye and a keen intelligence; is many-sided in his interests, and on certain subjects speaks as an expert. The volume deals fully with the development of the country." *The Times.*

3 **Mexico.** By C. Reginald Enock, F.R.G.S. With an Introduction by Martin Hume, a Map and 64 Illustrations. Cloth, 15/- net. Fifth Impression.

"The book is most comprehensive; the history, politics, topography, industries, resources and possibilities being most ably discussed." *The Financial News.*

4 **Argentina.** By W. A. Hirst. With an Introduction by Martin Hume, a Map and 64 Illustrations. Cloth, 15/- net. Fifth Impression.

"The best and most comprehensive of recent works on the greatest and most progressive of the Republics of South America." *Manchester Guardian.*

5 **Brazil.** By Pierre Denis. Translated, and with an Historical Chapter by Bernard Miall. With a Supplementary Chapter by Dawson A. Vindin, a Map and 36 Illustrations. Cloth, 15/- net. Fourth Impression.

"Altogether the book is full of information, which shows the author to have made a most careful study of the country."—*Westminster Gazette.*

T FISHER UNWIN LTD., 1 ADELPHI TERRACE, LONDON, W.C.2

THE SOUTH AMERICAN SERIES

6 **Uruguay.** By W. H. KOEBEL. With a Map and 55 Illustrations. Cloth, 15/- net. Third Impression.

"Mr. Koebel has given us an expert's diagnosis of the present condition of Uruguay. Glossing over nothing, exaggerating nothing, he has prepared a document of the deepest interest."—*Evening Standard.*

7 **Guiana.** British, French and Dutch. By JAMES RODWAY. With a Map and 32 Illustrations. Cloth, 15/- net. Second Impression.

"Mr. Rodway's work is a storehouse of information, historical, economical and sociological." *The Times.*

8 **Venezuela.** By LEONARD V. DALTON, F.G.S., F.R.G.S. With a Map and 45 Illustrations. Cloth, 15/- net. Third Impression.

"An exhaustive and valuable survey of its geography, geology, history, botany, zoology and anthropology, and of its commercial possibilities in the near future." *Manchester Guardian.*

9 **Latin America:** Its Rise and Progress. By F. GARCIA-CALDERON. With a Preface by RAYMOND POINCARÉ, President of the French Republic. With a Map and 34 Illustrations. Cloth, 15/- net. Sixth Impression.

President Poincaré, in a striking preface to this book, says: "Here is a book that should be read and digested by every one interested in the future of the Latin genius."

10 **Colombia.** By PHANOR JAMES EDER, A.B., LL.B. With 2 Maps and 40 Illustrations. Cloth, 15/- net. Fifth Impression.

"Mr. Eder's valuable work should do much to encourage investment, travel and trade in one of the least-known and most promising of the countries of the New World." *Manchester Guardian.*

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD., 1 ADELPHI TERRACE, LONDON, W.C.2

THE SOUTH AMERICAN SERIES

11 **Ecuador.** By C. Reginald Enock, F.R.G.S. With 2 Maps and 37 Illustrations. Cloth, 15/- net. Second Impression.

"Mr. Enock's very thorough and exhaustive volume should help British investors to take their part in promoting its development. He has studied and described the country in all its aspects." *Manchester Guardian.*

12 **Bolivia.** By Paul Walle. With 4 Maps and 59 Illustrations. Cloth, 18/- net. Second Impression.

Bolivia is a veritable El Dorado, requiring only capital and enterprise to become one of the wealthiest States of America. This volume is the result of a careful investigation made on behalf of the French Ministry of Commerce.

13 **Paraguay.** By W. H. Koebel. With a Map and 32 Illustrations. Cloth, 15/- net. Second Impression.

"Gives a great deal of serious and useful information about the possibilities of the country for the emigrant, the investor and the tourist, concurrently with a vivid and literary account of its history." *Economist.*

14 **Central America:** Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama and Salvador. By W. H. Koebel. With a Map and 25 Illustrations. Cloth, 15/- net. Second Impression.

"We strongly recommend this volume, not only to merchants looking ahead for new openings for trade, but also to all who wish for an accurate and interesting account of an almost unknown world." *Saturday Review.*

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD., 1 ADELPHI TERRACE, LONDON, W.C.2

BOOKS ON SOUTH AMERICA

OTHER BOOKS ON SOUTH AMERICA

Spanish America: Its Romance, Reality and Future. By C. R. Enock, Author of "The Andes and the Amazon," "Peru," "Mexico," "Ecuador." Illustrated and with a Map. 2 vols. Cloth, 30/- net the set.

Starting with the various States of Central America, Mr. Enock then describes ancient and modern Mexico, then takes the reader successively along the Pacific Coast, the Cordillera of the Andes, enters the land of the Spanish Main, conducts the reader along the Amazon Valley, gives a special chapter to Brazil and another to the River Plate and Pampas. Thus all the States of Central and South America are covered. The work is topographical, descriptive and historical; it describes the people and the cities, the flora and fauna, the varied resources of South America, its trade, railways, its characteristics generally.

South America: An Industrial and Commercial Field. By W. H. Koebel. Illustrated. Cloth, 18/- net. Second Impression.

"The book considers such questions as South American commerce, British interests in the various Republics, international relations and trade, communications, the tendency of enterprise, industries, etc. Two chapters devoted to the needs of the continent will be of especial interest to manufacturers and merchants, giving as they do valuable hints as to the various goods required, while the chapter on merchandise and commercial travellers affords some sound and practical advice." *Chamber of Commerce Journal.*

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD., 1 ADELPHI TERRACE, LONDON, W.C. 2

BOOKS ON SOUTH AMERICA

Vagabonding down the Andes. By HARRY A. FRANCK, author of "A Vagabond Journey Round the World," etc. With a Map and 176 Illustrations. Cloth, 25/- net. Second Impression.

"The book is a brilliant record of adventurous travel among strange scenes and with even more strange companions, and vividly illustrates, by its graphic text and its admirable photographs, the real conditions of life in the backwood regions of South America." *Manchester Guardian.*

"Mr. Franck is to be congratulated on having produced a readable and even fascinating book. His journey lay over countries in which an increasing interest is being felt. Practically speaking, he may be said to have started from Panama, wandered through Colombia, spending some time at Bogota, and then going on to Ecuador, of which Quito is the centre. Next he traversed the fascinating country of the Incas, from the borders of which he entered Bolivia, going right across that country till he approached Brazil. He passed through Paraguay, cut through a corner of the Argentine to Uruguay, and so to the River Plata and the now well-known town of Buenos Ayres." *Country Life.*

In the Wilds of South America: Six Years of Exploration in Colombia, Venezuela, British Guiana, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil. By LEO E. MILLER, of the American Museum of Natural History. With 48 Full-page Illustrations and with Maps. Cloth, 21/- net.

This volume represents a series of almost continuous explorations hardly ever paralleled in the huge areas traversed. The author is a distinguished field naturalist —one of those who accompanied Colonel Roosevelt on his famous South American expedition—and his first object in his wanderings over 150,000 miles of territory was the observation of wild life; but hardly second was that of exploration. The result is a wonderfully informative, impressive and often thrilling narrative in which savage peoples and all but unknown animals largely figure, which forms an infinitely readable book and one of rare value for geographers, naturalists and other scientific men.

BOOKS ON SOUTH AMERICA

The Putumayo: The Devil's Paradise. Travels in the Peruvian Amazon Region and an Account of the Atrocities committed upon the Indians therein. By E. W. HARDENBURG, C.E. Edited and with an Introduction by C. REGINALD ENOCK, F.R.G.S. With a Map and 16 Illustrations. Demy 8vo, Cloth, 10/6 net. Second Impression.

"The author gives us one of the most terrible pages in the history of trade." *Daily Chronicle.*

Tramping through Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras. By HARRY A. FRANCK. With a Map and 88 Illustrations. Cloth, 7/6 net.

"Mr. Harry Franck is a renowned vagabond with a gift for vivid description. . . . His record is well illustrated and he tells his story in an attractive manner, his descriptions of scenery being so well done that one feels almost inclined to risk one's life in a wild race dwelling in a land of lurid beauty." *Liverpool Mercury.*

"Mr. Franck has combined with an enthralling and amusing personal narrative a very vivid and searching picture, topographical and social, of a region of much political and economic interest." *Glasgow Herald.*

Mexico (STORY OF THE NATIONS). By SUSAN HALE. With Maps and 47 Illus. Cloth, 7/6 net. Third Impression.

"This is an attractive book. There is a fascination about Mexico which is all but irresistible. . . . The authoress writes with considerable descriptive power, and all through the stirring narrative never permits us to lose sight of natural surroundings." *Dublin Review.*

Things as they are in Panama. By HARRY A. FRANCK. With 50 Illustrations. Cloth, 7/6 net.

"Mr. Franck writes from personal knowledge, fortified by the aptitude of a practical and shrewd observer with a sense of humour, and the result is a word-picture of unusual vividness."—*Standard.*

"A sparkling narrative which leaves one wondering again why the general reader favours modern fiction so much when it is possible to get such vivacious yarns as this about strange men and their ways in a romantic corner of the tropics." *Daily Mail.*

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD., 1 ADELPHI TERRACE, LONDON, W.C.2

BOOKS ON SOUTH AMERICA

The Spell of the Tropics. POEMS. By RANDOLPH H. ATKIN. Cloth, 4/6 net. Second Impression.

The author has travelled extensively in Central and South America, and has strongly felt the spell of those tropic lands, with all their splendour and romance, and yet about which so little is known. The poems are striking pen-pictures of life as it is lived by those men of the English-speaking races whose lot is cast in the sun-bathed countries of Latin-America. Mr. Atkin's verses will reach the hearts of all who feel the call of the wanderlust, and, having shared their pleasures and hardships, his poems will vividly recall to "old-timers" bygone memories of days spent in the land of the Coconut Tree.

Baedeker Guide to the United States. With Excursions to Mexico, Cuba, Porto Rico and Alaska. With 33 Maps and 48 Plans. Fourth Edition, 1909. Cloth, 20/- net.

IMPORTANT. Travellers to the Republics of South America will find WESSELY'S ENGLISH-SPANISH and SPANISH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY and WESSELY'S LATIN-ENGLISH and ENGLISH-LATIN DICTIONARY invaluable books. Bound in cloth, pocket size. Price 4/- net each. Ask for Wessely's Edition, published by Mr. T. Fisher Unwin.

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD., 1 ADELPHI TERRACE, LONDON, W.C.2

THE STORY OF THE NATIONS

THE GREATEST HISTORICAL LIBRARY IN THE WORLD :: :: 67 VOLUMES

Each volume of "The Story of the Nations" Series is the work of a recognized scholar, chosen for his knowledge of the subject and ability to present history in an attractive form, for the student and the general reader. The Illustrations and Maps are an attractive feature of the volume, which are strongly bound for constant use.

67 Volumes. *Cloth, 7s. 6d. net each.*

"It is many years since Messrs. T. Fisher Unwin commenced the publication of a series of volumes now entitled 'The Story of the Nations.' Each volume is written by an acknowledged authority on the country with which it deals. The series has enjoyed great popularity, and not an uncommon experience being the necessity for a second, third, and even fourth impression of particular volumes." *Scotsman.*

"Probably no publisher has issued a more informative and valuable series of works than those included in 'The Story of the Nations.'" *To-Day*

"The series is likely to be found indispensable in every school library." *Pall Mall Gazette.*

"An admirable series." *Spectator.*

"Such a universal history as the series will present us with in its completion will be a possession such as no country but our own can boast of. Its success on the whole has been very remarkable." *Daily Chronicle.*

"There is perhaps no surer sign of the increased interest that is now being taken in historical matters than the favourable reception which we believe both here and in America is being accorded to the various volumes of 'The Story of the Nations' as they issue in quick succession from the press. More than one volume has reached its third edition in England alone. . . . Each volume is written by one of the foremost English authorities on the subject with which it deals. . . . It is almost impossible to over-estimate the value of the series of carefully prepared volumes, such as are the majority of those comprising this library. . . . The illustrations make one of the most attractive features of the series."—*Guardian.*

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD., 1 Adelphi Terrace, London, W.C. 2

A NEW VOLUME IN "THE STORY OF THE NATIONS"

NOW READY

BELGIUM

FROM THE ROMAN INVASION TO THE PRESENT DAY

By EMILE CAMMAERTS. With Maps and Illustrations. Large Crown 8vo. Cloth, 12/6 net.

A complete history of the Belgian nation from its origins to its present situation has not yet been published in this country. Up till now Belgian history has only been treated as a side issue in works concerned with the Belgian art, Belgian literature or social conditions. Besides, there has been some doubt with regard to the date at which such a history ought to begin, and a good many writers have limited themselves to the modern history of Belgium because they did not see in olden times sufficient evidence of Belgian unity. According to the modern school of Belgian historians, however, this unity, founded on common traditions and common interests, has asserted itself again and again through the various periods of history in spite of invasion, foreign domination and the various trials experienced by the country. The history of the Belgian nation appears to the modern mind as a slow development of one nationality constituted by two races speaking two different languages but bound together by geographical, economic and cultural conditions. In view of the recent proof Belgium has given of her patriotism during the world-war, this impartial enquiry into her origins may prove interesting to British readers. Every opportunity has been taken to insist on the frequent relationships between the Belgian provinces and Great Britain from the early middle ages to the present time, and to show the way in which both countries were affected by them. Written by one of the most distinguished Belgian writers, who has made a specialty of his subject, this work will be one of the most brilliant and informing contributions in "The Story of the Nations."

A COMPLETE LIST OF THE VOLUMES IN "THE STORY OF THE NATIONS" SERIES. THE FIRST AND MOST COMPLETE LIBRARY OF THE WORLD'S HISTORY PRESENTED IN A POPULAR FORM

1 **Rome:** From the Earliest Times to the End of the Republic. By ARTHUR GILMAN, M.A. Third Edition. With 43 Illustrations and Maps.

2 **The Jews:** In Ancient, Mediæval and Modern Times. By Professor JAMES K. HOSMER. Eighth Impression. With 37 Illustrations and Maps.

3 **Germany.** By S. BARING-GOULD, M.A. Seventh Impression. With 108 Illustrations and Maps.

4 **Carthage: or the Empire of Africa.** By Professor ALFRED J. CHURCH, M.A. With the Collaboration of Arthur Gilman, M.A. Ninth Impression. With 43 Illustrations and Maps.

5 **Alexander's Empire.** By JOHN PENTLAND MAHAFFY, D.D. With the Collaboration of Arthur Gilman, M.A. Eighth Impression. With 43 Illustrations and Maps.

6 **The Moors in Spain.** By STANLEY LANE-POOLE. With the Collaboration of Arthur Gilman, M.A. Eighth Edition. With 29 Illustrations and Maps.

7 **Ancient Egypt.** By Professor GEORGE RAWLINSON, M.A. Tenth Edition. Eleventh Impression. With 50 Illustrations and Maps.

8 **Hungary.** In Ancient, Mediæval and Modern Times. By Professor ARMINIUS VAMBÉRY. With Collaboration of Louis Heilpin. Seventh Edition. With 47 Illustrations and Maps.

9 **The Saracens:** From the Earliest Times to the Fall of Bagdad. By ARTHUR GILMAN, M.A. Fourth Edition. With 57 Illustrations and Maps.

THE STORY OF THE NATIONS—*continued*

10 **Ireland.** By the Hon. EMILY LAWLESS. Revised and brought up to date by J. O'Toole. With some additions by Mrs. Arthur Bronson. Eighth Impression. With 58 Illustrations and Maps.

11 **Chaldea:** From the Earliest Times to the Rise of Assyria. By ZÉNAÏDE A. RAGOZIN. Seventh Impression. With 80 Illustrations and Maps.

12 **The Goths:** From the Earliest Times to the End of the Gothic Dominion in Spain. By HENRY BRADLEY. Fifth Edition. With 35 Illustrations and Maps.

13 **Assyria:** From the Rise of the Empire to the Fall of Nineveh. (Continued from "Chaldea.") By ZÉNAÏDE A. RAGOZIN. Seventh Impression. With 81 Illustrations and Maps.

14 **Turkey.** By STANLEY LANE-POOLE, assisted by C. J. W. Gibb and Arthur Gilman. New Edition. With a new Chapter on recent events (1908). With 43 Illustrations and Maps.

15 **Holland.** By Professor J. E. THOROLD ROGERS. Fifth Edition. With 57 Illustrations and Maps.

16 **Mediæval France:** From the Reign of Huguar Capet to the beginning of the 16th Century. By GUSTAVE MASSON, B.A. Sixth Edition. With 48 Illustrations and Maps.

17 **Persia.** By S. G. W. BENJAMIN. Fourth Edition. With 56 Illustrations and Maps.

18 **Phœnicia.** By Professor GEORGE RAWLINSON, M.A. Third Edition. With 47 Illustrations and Maps.

19 **Media, Babylon, and Persia:** From the Fall of Nineveh to the Persian War. By ZÉNAÏDE A. RAGOZIN. Fourth Edition. With 17 Illustrations and Maps.

20 **The Hansa Towns.** By HELEN ZIMMERN. Third Edition. With 51 Illustrations and Maps.

21 **Early Britain.** By Professor ALFRED J. CHURCH, M.A. Sixth Impression. With 57 Illustrations and Maps.

THE STORY OF THE NATIONS—*continued*

22 **The Barbary Corsairs.** By STANLEY LANE-POOLE. With additions by J. D. KELLY. Fourth Edition. With 39 Illustrations and Maps.

23 **Russia.** By W. R. MORFILL, M.A. Fourth Edition. With 60 Illustrations and Maps.

24 **The Jews under Roman Rule.** By W. D. MORRISON. Second Impression. With 61 Illustrations and Maps.

25 **Scotland:** From the Earliest Times to the Present Day. By JOHN MACKINTOSH, LL.D. Fifth Impression. With 60 Illustrations and Maps.

26 **Switzerland.** By LINA HUG and R. STEAD. Third Impression. With over 54 Illustrations, Maps, etc.

27 **Mexico.** By SUSAN HALE. Third Impression. With 47 Illustrations and Maps.

28 **Portugal.** By H. MORSE STEPHENS, M.A. New Edition. With a new Chapter by Major M. HUME and 5 new Illustrations. Third Impression. With 44 Illustrations and Maps.

29 **The Normans.** Told chiefly in Relation to their Conquest of England. By SARAH ORNE JEWETT. Third Impression. With 35 Illustrations and Maps.

30 **The Byzantine Empire.** By C. W. C. OMAN, M.A. Third Edition. With 44 Illustrations and Maps.

31 **Sicily:** Phœnician, Greek, and Roman. By Professor E. A. FREEMAN. Third Edition. With 45 Illustrations.

32 **The Tuscan Republics** (Florence, Siena, Pisa, Lucca) **with Genoa.** By BELLA DUFFY. With 40 Illustrations and Maps.

33 **Poland.** By W. R. MORFILL. Third Impression. With 50 Illustrations and Maps.

34 **Parthia.** By Professor GEORGE RAWLINSON. Third Impression. With 48 Illustrations and Maps.

THE STORY OF THE NATIONS—*continued*

35 **The Australian Commonwealth.** (New South Wales, Tasmania, Western Australia, South Australia, Victoria, Queensland, New Zealand.) By GREVILLE TREGARTHEN. Fifth Impression. With 36 Illustrations and Maps.

36 **Spain.** Being a Summary of Spanish History from the Moorish Conquest to the Fall of Granada (A.D. 711–1492). By HENRY EDWARD WATTS. Third Edition. With 36 Illustrations and Maps.

37 **Japan.** By DAVID MURRAY, Ph.D., LL.D. With a new Chapter by JOSEPH W. LONGFORD. 35 Illustrations and Maps.

38 **South Africa.** (The Cape Colony, Natal, Orange Free State, South African Republic, Rhodesia, and all other Territories south of the Zambesi.) By Dr. GEORGE MCCALL THEAL, D.Litt., LL.D. Revised and brought up to date. Eleventh Impression. With 39 Illustrations and Maps.

39 **Venice.** By ALETHEA WIEL. Fifth Impression. With 61 Illustrations and a Map.

40 **The Crusades:** The Story of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. By T. A. ARCHER and C. L. KINGSFORD. Third Impression. With 58 Illustrations and 3 Maps.

41 **Vedic India:** As embodied principally in the Rig-Veda. By ZÉNAÏDE A. RAGOZIN. Third Edition. With 36 Illustrations and Maps.

42 **The West Indies and the Spanish Main.** By JAMES RODWAY, F.L.S. Third Impression. With 48 Illustrations and Maps.

43 **Bohemia:** From the Earliest Times to the Fall of National Independence in 1620; with a Short Summary of later Events. By C. EDMUND MAURICE. Second Impression. With 41 Illustrations and Maps.

44 **The Balkans** (Rumania, Bulgaria, Servia and Montenegro). By W. MILLER, M.A. New Edition. With a new Chapter containing their History from 1296 to 1908. With 39 Illustrations and Maps.

THE STORY OF THE NATIONS—*continued*

45 **Canada.** By Sir JOHN BOURINOT, C.M.G. With 63 Illustrations and Maps. Second Edition. With a new Map and revisions, and a supplementary Chapter by EDWARD PORRITT. Third Impression.

46 **British India.** By R. W. FRAZER, LL.D. Eighth Impression. With 30 Illustrations and Maps.

47 **Modern France, 1789-1895.** By ANDRÉ LEBON. With 26 Illustrations and a Chronological Chart of the Literary, Artistic, and Scientific Movement in Contemporary France. Fourth Impression.

48 **The Franks.** From their Origin as a Confederacy to the Establishment of the Kingdom of France and the German Empire. By LEWIS SERGEANT. Second Edition. With 40 Illustrations and Maps.

49 **Austria.** By SIDNEY WHITMAN. With the Collaboration of J. R. MCILRAITH. Third Edition. With 35 Illustrations and a Map.

50 **Modern England before the Reform Bill.** By JUSTIN MCCARTHY. With 31 Illustrations.

51 **China.** By Professor R. K. DOUGLAS. Fourth Edition. With a new Preface. 51 Illustrations and a Map. Revised and brought up to date by IAN C. HANNAH.

52 **Modern England under Queen Victoria:** From the Reform Bill to the Present Time. By JUSTIN MCCARTHY. Second Edition. With 46 Illustrations.

53 **Modern Spain, 1878-1898.** By MARTIN A. S. HUME. Second Impression. With 37 Illustrations and a Map.

54 **Modern Italy, 1748-1898.** By Professor PIETRO ORSI. With over 40 Illustrations and Maps.

55 **Norway:** From the Earliest Times. By Professor HJALMAR H. BOYESEN. With a Chapter by C. F. KEARY. With 77 Illustrations and Maps.

56 **Wales.** By OWEN EDWARDS. With 47 Illustrations and 7 Maps. Fifth Impression.

THE STORY OF THE NATIONS—*continued*

57 **Mediæval Rome:** From Hildebrand to Clement VIII, 1073–1535. By WILLIAM MILLER. With 35 Illustrations.

58 **The Papal Monarchy:** From Gregory the Great to Boniface VIII. By WILLIAM BARRY, D.D. Second Impression. With 61 Illustrations and Maps.

59 **Mediæval India under Mohammedan Rule.** By STANLEY LANE-POOLE. With 59 Illustrations. Twelfth Impression.

60 **Parliamentary England:** The Evolution of the Cabinet System, 1660–1832. By EDWARD JENKS. With 47 Illustrations.

61 **Buddhist India.** By T. W. RHYS DAVIDS. Fourth Impression. With 57 Illustrations and Maps.

62 **Mediæval England, 1066–1350.** By MARY BATESON. With 93 Illustrations.

63 **The Coming of Parliament.** (England, 1350–1660.) By L. CECIL JANE. With 51 Illustrations and a Map.

64 **The Story of Greece:** From the Earliest Times to A.D. 14. By E. S. SHUCKBURGH. With 2 Maps and about 70 Illustrations.

65 **The Story of the Roman Empire.** (29 B.C. to A.D. 476.) By H. STUART JONES. Third Impression. With a Map and 52 Illustrations.

66 **Sweden and Denmark.** With Chapters on Finland and Iceland. By JON STEFANSSON. With Maps and 40 Illustrations.

67 **Belgium.** By EMILE CAMMAERTS. 12s. 6d.

IMPORTANT.—ASK YOUR BOOKSELLER TO LET YOU EXAMINE A SPECIMEN VOLUME OF "THE STORY OF THE NATIONS" SERIES

T. FISHER UNWIN Ltd., 1 Adelphi Terrace, London, W.C.2
And of all Booksellers throughout the World

'E ON 7

14 DAY USE
RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED

LOAN DEPT.

This book is due on the last date stamped below, or on the date to which renewed.
Renewed books are subject to immediate recall.

21 May'60 CF

REC'D LD

JUN 7 1960

REC'D LD

DEC 6 1961

LD 21A–50m-4,'60
(A9562s10)476B

General Library
University of California
Berkeley

YC 08508


476013

HX276
E8

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY